Seediscussions,stats,andauthorprofilesforthispublicationat:https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232576554

Towardgenerativetheory

ArticleinJournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology·November1978

DOI:10.1037/0022-3514.36.11.1344

CITATIONS

137

READS

74

1author:

Someoftheauthorsofthispublicationarealsoworkingontheserelated

projects:

RelationalEvaluation:BeyondtheTyrannyofTestingViewproject

KennethJ.Gergen

SwarthmoreCollege

310PUBLICATIONS11,577CITATIONS

SEEPROFILE

AllcontentfollowingthispagewasuploadedbyKennethJ.Gergenon05April2016.

Theuserhasrequestedenhancementofthedownloadedfile.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology1978, Vol. 36, No. 11, 1344-1360

Toward Generative Theory

Kenneth J. GergenSwarthmore College

Much contemporary theory appears to lack generative potency, that is, thecapacity to challenge prevailing assumptions regarding the nature of social lifeand to offer fresh alternatives to contemporary patterns of conduct. This deficitmay be traced primarily to the commitment of the field to traditional positivistassumptions that (a) give preeminent weight to "the fact," (b) demand verifica-tion of theoretical ideas, (c) encourage disregard for the temporal dependencyof social pattern, and (d) recommend dispassionate comportment in scientificaffairs. Shortcomings are demonstrated in each of these cases, and the ground-work is laid for developing generative theory, liberated both from the press ofimmediate fact and the necessity for verification. Such theory may properlyfunction to sustain value commitments and to restructure the character of sociallife.

When inquiry is made into the function ofsocial theory, the typical response points toits essential contribution to "understanding,prediction, and control." If one were to inquirefurther into what is meant by "understanding"in this case, the answer might well be framedin terms of the scientist's role in "apprehend-ing clearly the character, nature or subtleties"of social life (Urdang, 1968). From this stand-point, social conduct is granted a preeminentontological status: It furnishes the essentialmysteries for the scientist to unlock. Yet, thereis a contrasting sense in which one may under-stand, a sense that does not take nature forgranted. Understanding may also entail "as-signing a meaning" to something, thus creat-ing its status through the employment of con-cepts. Whereas the former sense of meaningfinds its roots in empiricist philosophy, thelatter may be traced primarily to the ration-alist writings of Kant & Hegel. The rationalistorientation, while long entrenched in European

I am indebted to Peter Dachler, Mary Gergen,Carol Gould, Diana Kaplin, Ann Kimura, JacobMeskin, Ralph Rosnow, Barry Schwartz, and Wolf-gang Stroebe for critical appraisal of this work in itsearlier stages.

Reprint requests should be addressed to KennethJ. Gergen, Department of Psychology, SwarthmoreCollege, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania 19081.

intellectual life, has gradually given way in thesocial sciences to the positivist-empiricist ap-proach so central to present-day activities.

This distinction in orientations furnishesimportant insight into the ironic discrepancybetween the seminal theoretical contributionsemerging within the recent European, as op-posed to the contempory American, context.In spite of the relatively vast professionalranks and supporting resources within thelatter context, theoretical contributions havegenerally been far less provocative in theireffects. Few American contemporaries havebeen able to match the intellectual fermentfurnished by such figures as Freud, Durk-heim, Marx, Mannheim, Piaget, Levi-Strauss,Weber, Kohler, Veblen, and Keynes, amongothers. American social psychology appears tosuffer the same malady. Most general treat-ments of theory in the field typically devoteprimary attention to Freud and Lewin; formany, Fritz Heider's richly suggestive workis deserving of equal status. Role theory hasplayed a historically important part in the de-velopment of American social psychology, yetits roots may propertly be traced to the earlycontributions of Durkheim. Similarly, thesymbolic interactionist perspective may betraced to the early European training of itsinitial spokesmen (Jones & Day, 1977). In

Copyright 1978 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0022-3514/78/3611-1344$00.75

1344

TOWARD GENERATIVE THEORY 1345

terms of general perspectives, only learningtheory may be indigenous to American scien-tific soil. In effect, the strength of contem-porary social psychology does not seem to liein its capacity for engendering theory of majorscope and challenge. More generally, it wouldappear that correspondent with the hegemonyof the positivist-empiricist orientation hasbeen a diminution in catalytic theorizing.

This is hardly to say that social psychologyhas been devoid of significant theoreticalwork. Although occasionally conjoined, twomajor forms of endeavor may be distin-guished: (a) the construction oj minimalmodels and (b) the isolation oj significanttheoretical variables. In the former case, theo-rists have attempted to account for a delimitedrange of phenomena with a minimal set oftheoretical assumptions.1 Festinger's (1957)theory of cognitive dissonance may be para-digmatic in this respect; its simple set ofpivotal assumptions has engendered well overa thousand empirical inquiries during the past20 years. Similar with respect to their par-simonious construction and limited explana-tory ends are Brehm's (1966) theory of psy-chological reactance; Schachter's (1964)two-factor theory of emotion; Osgood and Tan-nenbaum's (1955) congruity model; Kelley's(1972) three-factor theory of causal attribu-tion; Jones and Davis's (1965) theory ofcorrespondent inference; Walster, Walster,and Berscheid's (1978) equity formulation;Byrne's (1971) similarity-attraction hypoth-esis; Anderson's (1974) integration model;Duval and Wicklund's (1972) self-awarenesstheory; and Ajzen and Fishbein's (1972) at-titude-behavior theory, to name but a few.The second major theoretical endeavor hasbeen that of isolating variables thought to bevital in their effects on a circumscribed rangeof social activity.2 Paradigmatic in this caseis perhaps the work of the Hovland school ofattitude change, in which investigators differ-entiated among source, message, medium, andrecipient factors believed to influence attitudechange (cf. McGuire's 1969 review). Schach-ter's (1959) attempt to isolate key processesresponsible for affiliative activity furnishesa second classic example. More recently, vari-ables such as physical attractiveness (Ber-

scheid & Walster, 1974); actor versus observerdifferences in causal attribution (Jones &Nisbett, 1971); internal versus external con-trol (Phares, 1976); and "mere exposure"(Zajonc, 1968) have all received similar atten-tion.

Yet, there is one vital difference separatingsuch theoretical endeavors from those of "pre-scientific" European origin. Whereas the cen-tral thrust of American social psychologytheory has been that of stimulating researchwithin an elite, professional circle, the theoriesof Freud, Marx, Durkheim, and others oftenchallenged the assumptive bases of social life,with profound catalytic effects both within theprofession and without. The primary debatesemerging from contemporary social psycho-logical theory are generally limited to ques-tions of alternative explanation (cf. Bern,1972; Cartwright, 1971).3 In contrast, theearlier offerings have often fostered colloquyamong scientists of diverse origin along withphilosophers, historians, theologians, politi-cians, and so on. As Asch wrote in 1952,

It has to be admitted that social psychology livestoday in the shadow of great doctrines of man thatwere formulated long before it appeared, that it hasborrowed its leading ideas from neighboring regionsof scientific thought and from the social philosophiesof the modern period. It is paradoxical but true thatsocial psychology . . . has as yet not significantlyaffected the conceptions it has borrowed, (p. viii)

And, as Tajfel (1972) has more recently com-mented, "Social psychology has certaintly notsucceeded in creating an intellectual revolutionin the sense of deeply affecting our views ofhuman nature" (p. 106). One may wish to de-fend contemporary theory by pointing to itssuperior testability and its related capacity to

1 Such models correspond to Hendrick's (1977)"miniature theories."

- This form of endeavor corresponds with Mosco-vici's (1972) concept of "taxonomic" theorizing.

3 As Silverman (1977) has commented, "Apparentlywe have nothing to offer in terms of general theoret-ical or empirical evolutions or revolutions; nothingto discuss that would represent the basic issues orquestions of our field and the paths taken towardtheir resolution" (p. 3S4). In effect, substantive de-bate appears largely eclipsed by methodological quar-reling.

1346 KENNETH J. GERGEN

yield reliable bodies of social knowledge. Yet,it is difficult to fault the earlier theories for thelack of research that they have generated (cf.Blum's 1964 summary of empirical researchon psychoanalytic theory), nor can one distillfrom the immense contemporary effort athypothesis testing a body of highly reliablepropositions (cf. Cartwright, 1971; Gergen,in press-a; Greenwald, 1975). In effect, thecontemporary alternatives are not demonstra-bly superior in other respects.

It may be useful, then, to consider compet-ing theoretical accounts in terms of their gen-erative capacity, that is, the capacity to chal-lenge the guiding assumptions of the culture,to raise fundamental questions regarding con-temporary social life, to foster reconsiderationof that which is "taken for granted," andthereby to furnish new alternatives for socialaction.4 It is the generative theory that canprovoke debate, transform social reality, andultimately serve to reorder social conduct. Itis the contention of the present article that thegenerative weaknesses of contemporary socialpsychological theory may be traced primarilyto the discipline's steadfast commitment to thetraditional positivist-empiricist paradigm.5 Al-though the paradigm has furnished a guidingrationale for many decades, it is essential tomonitor continuously the paths along whichit has led, as well as those which have beenforeclosed. Four fundamental deterrents in-herent in the positivist paradigm will be sin-gled out for attention, and in each case seriousweaknesses will be elucidated. Further, thecritical rationale will be employed in each in-stance to lay the groundwork for generativetheoretical pursuits.

The Preeminence of Objective Fact

From the traditional positivist standpoint,it is the scientist's initial task to observe thestate of nature and to document with accuracythe systematic relationship among observables.On the basis of such preliminary observation,it is said, the scientist may build inductivelytoward general theoretical statements describ-ing and explaining the phenomena in question.Progress from the level of particulars to thatof theoretical generalization is to be made byemploying canons of inductive logic, such as

those proposed by John Stuart Mill in 1846.Classical astronomy is often considered ex-emplary in this respect. The science com-menced, it is said, when serious individualsbegan to record systematically the movementsof the heavenly bodies. On the basis of suchrecords, theoretical descriptions and explana-tions could be formulated and subsequentlytested against continuing observation. In ef-fect, observable fact is of preeminent concern.

The general acceptance of the traditionalposition within contemporary social psychol-ogy seems widely evident. As Shaw andCostanzo (1970) state the case,

Modern social psychology has largely been empiricalin nature, basing its propositions and conclusionsupon observations in controlled situations. . . . As aresult of the empirical approach, a considerableamount of data about social behavior has accu-mulated. To be useful, such data must be organized ina systematic way so that the meaning and implica-tions of these data can be understood. Such system-atic organization is the function of theory, (p. 3)

In keeping with this orientation, graduatetraining is commonly centered on the processof systematic observation. Extensive knowl-edge of methodology and statistics is normallyrequired, and the thesis typically insures thatthe candidate has mastered the skills of soundobservation. Training in the process of theoryconstruction is a rarity. The primary journalsof the field are also devoted almost exclu-sively to the establishment of fact. Freedman's(Note 1) recent comment on the state of theart appears to capture the modal thinking ofthe discipline,

4 The generative criterion may be contrasted withthe traditional concept of "heuristic." The lattertypically refers to the capacity of a theory to generateresearch or solutions to practical problems. In thesesenses, generative theory may or may not be heuris-tically valuable, and vice versa. Whether generativetheory need be contrary to common assumptions mayalso be questioned. However, it would appear thatthe formulation of new alternatives is inevitablycounterposed to some set of existing agreements.Creativity and conflict may be inseparable.

5 Clearly, not all social psychologists wholly ascribeto all four of the assumptions here set forth. Yet, afamily of congenial assumptions can be discerned inthe public documents of the field, and it is to this"metatheoretical representation" that the presentarguments are directed.

TOWARD GENERATIVE THEORY 1347

Since research [on crowding] has only been goingon for a few years, and since the findings are ratherinconsistent and confused, it seems that people shouldbe doing research rather than worrying about theories.The idea that there would already be a review of thetheories in the field is certainly depressing. It is per-fectly all right for people to offer hunches or tentativeexplanation or what might be called mini-theories ofany area of social psychology, but to start presentingtheories when we don't even know what the factsare is an exercise in futility.

Yet, the common belief that social theoryshould ideally be premised on sound factseems to have continued undaunted by sig-nificant misgivings within the philosophicrealm. It has first become apparent that thescientist cannot approach nature as an un-sophisticated or unbiased observer of the facts.Rather, he or she must already harbor con-ceptions of "what there is to be studied" inorder to carry out the task of systematic ob-servation. From this perspective, scientificastronomy did not begin with the process ofdocumenting existing fact. Required were pre-liminary conceptual distinctions between theearth and the heavens and among entitiesexisting within the heavens. In effect, scien-tists must share certain theoretical assump-tions in order to carry out meaningful investi-gation. Or, to put it more formally, "It is thetheory that determines what is to count as afact and how facts are to be distinguishedfrom one another" (Unger, 1975, p. 32) .

It has further been recognized that canonsof inductive logic are inadequate to describethe process by which the scientist typicallymoves from the concrete to the conceptuallevel. The most careful observation and cat-aloguing of all the stone formations on earth,combined with the most assiduous employ-ment of inductive logic, would not yield con-temporary geological theory (cf. Medawar,1969). Neither the facts nor the logic canfurnish the questions to be asked of the dataor a metaphor for conceptual organization.Concepts such as "the ice age" or "geosyn-clinal stage" appear to require some form ofcreative or intuitive act that is as yet poorlyunderstood. Again, it appears that a premiumis to be placed on theoretical imagination andthat a preeminent commitment to establishing"the facts" is inimical to such investments.

The case is particularly potent with respectto generative theory. If "commonsense as-sumptions" concerning, for example, the unitsof behavior, their labels, or their relationshipsare allowed unconsciously to guide one's ob-servations and hypotheses, then the resultingtheoretical models are very likely to reflectthose assumptions. Resulting theory will ap-proximate "commonsense," a problem withwhich social psychologists have been strug-gling for several decades. When one "beginswith the facts" one has already incorporatedan implicit theory, and the potential for a gen-erative outcome may thereby be reduced. Or,as Moscovici (1972) has more forcefully con-cluded, "social psychologists have done nomore than to operationalize questions andanswers which were imagined elsewhere. Andthus the work in which they are engaged—inwhich we are all engaged—is not the work ofscientific analysis but that of engineering"(p. 32) .

Psychological Theory and the Shapingoj Social Phenomena

Although early astronomical investigationwas surely guided by preformal theoreticalconceptions, it is difficult to argue that suchpreconceptions have operated at an obviousdisadvantage in this domain. If such is thecase, one may well ask why social investigationcannot proceed along similar lines; what prob-lems are incurred by allowing "normative pre-conceptions" to channel social psychologicalinvestigations? The answer to this query liesin the far greater potential for such precon-ceptions to shape the phenomena for studyin the social, as opposed to the natural,sciences. That is, the social scientist appearsto be in a far more precarious position withrespect to generating theory that serves tofulfill itself. There are two important respectsin which social theory actively creates thephenomena to be investigated, neither ofwhich appears as germane to most investiga-tion in the natural sciences.

In the initial case, social theory may deter-mine the investigatory scanning process, thusfocusing attention on particular patterns whileobscuring others. In determining the investi-gator's focus of attention, the theory estab-

1348 KENNETH J. GERGEN

lishes in advance the form of observation. Toappreciate this point we must return to theearlier argument, that in order to recognize"the facts" one must already possess someform of conceptual knowledge. Such prelim-inary knowledge is required in order for a dis-crimination to be made between "facts" and"nonfacts" or events and their surroundingcontext. Yet, it may be further asked, what isthe basis of the preliminary conceptual orien-tation? While the possibility for a priori con-ceptual structure awaits thorough study, itdoes appear that sensory inputs must fre-quently play some part in shaping these pre-liminary conceptual schemata. At the sametime, the extent of their impact may dependon the character of these inputs as related tothe physiology of the organism. At one ex-treme we may consider experiential inputswhich readily lend themselves to "natural cat-egorization" (Rosch, 1977). In particular,stimulation that significantly disturbs thenervous system may frequently give rise toconceptual distinctions. For example, the dif-ference between the size and luminosity of thestar against the background of the night sky,the sound of thunder versus the precedingquiet, the shape of fish as opposed to fowl mayprompt the development of conceptual distinc-tions in virtually all cultures. These categoriesmight later come to fix the range of preconcep-tions operating within the relevant branchesof the natural sciences.

In contrast, we may consider a range ofexperiences dominated by continuous move-ment and ambiguous repetition. In observingthe ocean waves, for example, it is exceedinglydifficult to discriminate one wave from anotheror to form more than the roughest of categoryschemata (e.g., "wave height"). In this case,natural categories may not be readily forth-coming, and "what sorts of waves" one seesmay largely be determined by one's visualfocus. Such focus could be directed toward thewave slope, the amount of emerald green, theamount of foam, and so on. With each newfocus, one's experience of pattern may bealtered. The "pattern of study" thus dependsvery importantly on the cognitive set of theobserver (cf. Neisser, 1976; Posner & Snyder,197S; Shiffrin & Schnieder, 1977). In this

case, the category system serves to direct at-tention and, in doing so, "creates" the phe-nomenon for observation. It may further beargued that the great abundance of humansocial activity is of this second order.6 Thatis, such activity appears in a state of nearcontinuous motion, its forms are infinitelyvariable, and fresh patterns may emerge atany point. Under such conditions, the con-ceptual standpoint of the observer may be-come an extremely powerful determinant ofwhat is perceived. Preliminary understandingsof "what there is" may well prove self-sup-portive. It is in just such conditions thatcompeting conceptual perspectives are mostrequired. Each perspective may operate as alens through which experience is served up indiffering form. With each new lens one in-creases sensitivity to the whole.

In addition to determining the scanningprocess through which social experience isfashioned, the social theorist may create his orher subject matter by actively changing itscomposition. Such alterations may be effectedin a variety of ways, one of which may besingled out for its special importance. Itwould appear that people do not generally re-spond to social stimuli on a purely sensorybasis. Intervening between the impingingstimulus and subsequent action is a concep-tual or symbolic reconstruction of the stimu-lus, and it is to this "world as symbolicallytranslated" that one's actions most typicallycorrespond. Thus, unlike structurally undif-ferentiated organisms such as protozoa,echinoderms, and flatworms, the human beingis not "stimulus bound." Little in the way ofresponse reliability can be anticipated. Thesame proximal stimulus may engender a vir-tual infinity of reactions depending on its

6 It would be cavalier to assert that what the nat-ural scientist senses is not frequently influenced bypreliminary conceptions. One must learn "what tosee," for example, through the aperture of a micro-scope, and this learning is typically conceptual incharacter. The present argument must thus be con-sidered one of degree. It is also possible that as a nat-ural science exhausts the gains to be made on thebasis of "natural categories," it becomes increasinglydependent on social agreement within the field forspecifying "what there is to be studied."

TOWARD GENERATIVE THEORY 1349

"meaning" for the recipient. This line of rea-soning is, of course, consistent with majorassumptions underlying much contemporaryresearch in social psychology. However, vir-tually unexamined by the field is the po-tential of the science to shape the meaningsystems of the society and thus the commonactivities of the culture. Following the tradi-tional positivist model, the social psychologisthas remained primarily concerned with thetasks of reliable description and explanation.However, unlike the natural scientist, the so-cial psychologist uses descriptive and explana-tory terms that have the capacity to shape thecharacter of social activities about which ac-counts are fashioned.

In the case of Freudian theory, such shap-ing effects already seem broadly apparent.In previous times, aberrant, exotic, or deviantactivity was frequently viewed as an expres-sion of "witchcraft," "inferior character," or"lack of willpower." Resulting reaction pat-terns were often punitive. With the advent ofpsychoanalytic theory, the same activitiescame to be seen as products of personalitydynamics over which the individual had lit-tle control. From this perspective, the actor isdeserving of "treatment" or "cure." In effect,the development and dissemination of psy-choanalytic theory succeeded in altering wide-spread patterns of social activity (Moscovici,1961). Similar effects may be traced to socialpsychologists' attempts to explain such phe-nomena as prejudice, obedience, social pro-test, and ghetto revolution. To elaborate, itappears from the broad literature on causalattribution that the culture frequently dis-tinguishes between behavior that is under theindividual's control ("internally caused") andbehavior that is under environmental control("externally caused"). Further, the literaturemakes it clear that patterns of blame andpraise are often related to the locus of causalattribution (cf. Kelman & Lawrence, 1972;Newtson, 1974). In particular, for de-valued behavior (e.g., murder) we may assignincreasing amounts of blame or punishment tothe extent that action seems internally, as op-posed to externally, caused. Similarly, forvalued acts (e.g., heroism in battle) wetypically assign lesser amounts of praise or

reward to the extent that the act seems ex-ternally, as opposed to internally, caused.Thus, as the common explanation for a givenaction shifts from one causal locus to another,behavioral reactions may shift as well.

In this light, we seee that the social psy-chologist's choice of explanation for a givenaction may either sustain or alter the com-mon attribution patterns of the culture andthus the common patterns of blame andpraise. For example, when prejudice is ex-plained in terms of authoritarian personalitydynamics (Adorno et al., 19SO), the preju-diced person is treated as the causal source ofhis or her own actions. Person blame is en-hanced through such explanation, and onemay feel justified antipathy toward the prej-udiced person. A similar argument may bemade in the case of obedient behavior, asdescribed by Milgram (1974). When such be-havior is traced, as it is, to the subject's di-vesting him- or herself of responsibility, toprimitive thought patterns, to narrowing ofmoral concerns, and to lack of inner re-sources, then public scoyi for the obedient in-dividual can be justified. On the other sideof the ledger, social protest is generallyviewed in a positive light by the liberal wingof the profession. When such behavior is ex-plained in terms of the individual's con-science, personal values, or intelligence (cf.Flacks, 1969; Keniston, 1968), it gains in-creasing value. In the case of ghetto riots, sci-entific explanation has frequently centered onsociety's oppression of the ghetto black. Suchexplanation functionally shifts blame from therioter to the society. In all such instances so-cial psychological theory has operated muchlike instructions in a reattribution experiment(cf. Dienstbier, 1972; Storms & Nisbett,1970). They shift the attributed locus ofcausality for a given range of activity and,in doing so, alter common reations to suchactivity.

From the positivist perspective, one mightview such shaping effects with dismay. Theyconstitute inappropriate violations of the tra-ditional roles assigned to the scientist, namelythose of observation, description, and explana-tion. Yet, from the present standpoint wefind that in the process of description and

1350 KENNETH J. GERGEN

explanation, the scientist is inevitably engagedin the creation of social phenomena, both inthe fashioning of the theoretical lenses throughwhich social action is observed and in the re-constitution of the culture's systems of mean-ing. Theoretical terms, the range of activitiesto which they are applied, and the form ofexplanation may all enter the common sys-tems of constructed reality and, in doing so,may determine "what there is" and the ap-propriate manner of responses. Yet, ratherthan viewing such effects as nettlesome "in-cidents de parcours," we may appropriatelyconsider them among the foremost of our as-sets. The capacity of the discipline to effectsocial change need not depend on quixotic al-liances with the public official or professionalchange agent. Rather, the theorist may di-rectly alter patterns of social action as his orher mode of conceptualization is incorporatedinto the common understandings of the cul-ture. This possibility stands as a major chal-lenge to generative theorizing. Not only is thetheorist urged to free him- or herself fromthe shackles of prevailing conceptual agree-ments, but is asked to consider alternative so-cial forms that may be created through theory.

The Demand for Theoretical Verification

From the traditional scientific perspective, aclose relationship should ideally be maintainedbetween theory and data. Not only should the-ories emerge from initial observation, butonce developed, they should be subjected tothorough and systematic empirical test.Through empirical assessment, theories ofhigh predictive validity may be sustained andthose which fail to correspond with fact ex-cluded from the corpus of "acceptable knowl-edge." This general line of argument formsthe basis of the traditional hypothetico-deduc-tive system for advancing scientific under-standing (cf. Koch, 1959) and serves as theunderlying rationale for the major line ofscholarly work in the discipline, namely, hy-pothesis testing. The demand for verificationhas not remained unchallenged over the years.For example, Popper (1959) has argued thatthere is little to be gained from increasing theamount of empirical support for a given the-

ory. It is primarily failures of verification thatpush understanding forward in significant de-gree. Popper's protege, Thomas Kuhn (1962)has further argued that shifts in theoreticalparadigm do not generally depend on theempirical status of the relevant conceptualsystems. Yet, Kuhn's thesis is not generallyviewed as prescriptive in implication. Thereare more damaging arguments at stake, and itis to these we must now attend. There are atleast three major reasons for believing thatthe goal of verification in social science islargely a chimerical one.

The Negotiated Character of Social Fact

Social actions appear to carry little in theway of intrinsic meaning; the conceptual cate-gories or meaning systems into which theyare placed appear primarily to be products ofsocial negotiation. The fact that a given stim-ulus pattern falls into the category of "hu-mor," "aggression," "dominance," or "ma-nipulativeness," for example, depends not onthe intrinsic properties of the relevant patternbut on the development of a community ofagreement. As a result, the labeling of anygiven action is forever open to negotiationamong interested parties, and the legitimacyof any observation statement is continuouslyopen to challenge. "What is the case" in sociallife may thus be viewed largely as a matter ofsocial influence.

In the natural sciences, this potential forchallenging the existing meaning systems doesnot appear to pose serious threat. Two im-portant reasons for this relatively sanguinestate will concern us here. First, the majorproportion of the theoretical terms in thenatural sciences are tied rather closely tospecific empirical operations or measurements.Such terms as temperature, weight, velocity,and electical energy may often be defined interms of empirical operations about whichbroad agreement can easily be reached. Sec-ond, the theoretical terms employed in thenatural sciences are developed within a rela-tively closed social system, the constituents ofwhich are typically confronted by similarfunctional problems. Conflict of interest is notthe general rule.

TOWARD GENERATIVE THEORY 1351

In contrast to this relatively optimistic stateof affairs, theoretical terms in the social sci-ences are only loosely connected to specificoperations. As Katz and Stotland (1959)put it,

In phyics the concept of atmospheric pressure isfairly close to its operational measure. In physiologi-cal psychology many concepts are similarly tied totheir operational measurement. In personality the-ory and social psychology, however, concepts like egostrength, defense mechanisms, role systems and roleconflict are so remote from their measurement thatwe have no single, clearly required set of operationalmeasures, (p. 471)

Although it might appear that this problemis only symptomatic of the youthfulness of thefield, closer examination suggests that it maybe intrinsic to the language of social interac-tion. Any given behavior or concrete actionmay be denned in numerous ways, dependingon its function within a given social context.Thus, there is no one transcontextual opera-tion to which the investigator can afford totie a given theoretical term. The pointing ofa finger, for example, may signify aggressionin certain contexts, but in others may be usedto indicate an altruistic giving of information,a positive or negative attitude, egocentrism,or high achievement motivation. In short, anybehavior might, on a given occasion, serve asthe operational definition for virtually anygeneral term. On no occasion can one becertain what theoretical categories are rele-vant (cf. Wilson, 1970). Second, for the socialscientist, the mode of theoretical descriptionand explanation is intimately related to thecommon meaning systems within the culture.For the scientist to "make sense" about hu-man behavior, he or she must do so in waysthat are ultimately intelligible to members ofthe culture (or a subculture). Thus, a con-tinuous, dialectical interplay may take placebetween the meaning of specific theoreticalterms within the sciences and the culture moregenerally, such that the meaning of specifictheoretical terms may evolve over time (e.g.,the scientist may borrow a term such as ag-gression from the vernacular, alter its mean-ing through theoretical and empirical analy-sis, and in turn, alter the resulting meaningsystem of the culture). As a result, the rangeof particulars to which any theoretical term

applies may be in a state of continuousemergence.7 What "counts" as aggression, forexample, may vary from one individual toanother and for the same individual overtime.

Because of the ambiguous and continuouslynegotiated meaning of social actions, an im-mense impediment is placed in the way oftheoretical verification. If all stimulus con-ditions and all subject actions are open tomultiple interpretation, then a given hypoth-esis may be sustained only so long as otherinvestigators refrain from challenging themeaning of the data base. For example, muchempirical support has been generated for thesimple proposition that people are attractedto those whose opinions are similar to theirown (cf. Byrne, 1971). Yet, in any given ex-perimental situation, what the investigatortakes to be a "similar" opinion may be viewedby a subject or another investigator as a "cor-rect opinion," "brave opinion," "judiciousopinion," "helpful opinion," "moral opinion,""appropriate opinion," and so on. The hy-pothesis thus retains a patina of verificationbecause the discipline has generally allowedthe independent variable to be negotiated as amanipulation of similarity. At any time onewishes to renegotiate such meaning, the sup-port drops into obscurity.

It is also for this reason that attempts tosolve debates among competing theories in so-cial psychology so often end in an impasse.Freudian theory, for example, has been ableto maintain a brisk following in spite of thelegions of studies that have attempted to dis-credit it. It may continue to do so as long asthere are intelligent defenders who can dem-onstrate the "misleading" character of themany operations used to its detriment. Simi-larly, the hundreds of careful experimentalstudies that have attempted to solve the rid-dle of the risky shift (cf. Cartwright, 1971)or that have pitted dissonance theory againsta phalanx of challengers (cf. Elms, 1969)

7 Relevant here is Quine's (1969) surmise that mostattributive terms of daily discourse belong to a "dimdomain" of meaning, not worthy of science. Onemight hope for a social science terminology free ofperson language (Ossorio & Davis, 1968), but it isdifficult to envision such an accomplishment.

1352 KENNETH J. GERGEN

have left us with no abiding answers. Nor,from the present standpoint, would an in-definite continuation of such efforts. Multiplealternatives in interpretation may be locatedfor virtually any set of empirical findings, asno observation can be unambiguously linkedto a general conceptual term.

The Self-Fulfilling Character ofHypothesis Testing

A second major impediment to theoreticalverification is closely related to the first. Tothe extent that the relationship between the-oretical terms and empirical operations is anambiguous one, the investigator's latitude ofchoice for testing any given hypothesis is in-creased. Given a broad latitude of choice inselecting how a given hypothesis is to betested, the investigator seeking to sustain agiven hypothesis can scarcely select a set ofempirical operations in a way that is notlikely to render support for the hypothesis.For example, much common thinking relatesstress with a variety of negative consequences(cf. Glass & Singer, 1972; McGrath, 1970).At the same time, given the intrinsic am-biguity of a term such as stress, the numberof operational possibilities is virtually infinite.The investigator attempting to demonstratea negative reaction to stress may thus chooseto induce stress by exposing subjects to athreat to their physical well-being, as op-posed to a challenging sports event or thepresence of a superior. The choice is basedneither on theoretical considerations nor onguile, but on the fact that the investigator isaware, by virtue of his or her immersion inthe culture, that threat to physical well-beingoften produces a negative reaction. The al-ternative means of inducing stress may beavoided because the common experience sug-gests that many people respond positively insuch situations. From this standpoint, secur-ing anticipated results speaks far less to theempirical status of the hypothesis than itdoes to the investigator's familiarity with theshared meanings and mores of the subjectsunder test. With sufficient cultural knowledgeit should be possible to generate support forany reasonable hypothesis, along with itsantithesis.

The A Priori Truth of Sensible Theory

To the extent that people's behavior doesconform to their common conceptions of theworld, then theories that are intelligible withinthe framework of such conceptual systemsmay be endowed with truth value withoutregard to empirical test. If people generallymaintain themselves within normally acceptedlimits of sensibility and avoid acting nonsensi-cally, then any theory that reflects commonconceptions of what is sensible may be sup-ported by at least a portion of the populationat some time. To draw from Ossorio andDavis (1968), setting out to test the bal-ance theory hypothesis that people will beattracted to those who express liking towardthem is equivalent to testing the hypothesisthat twice two is four. In the same way thatpeople generally accept this particular con-ception of numbers and their relations ascorrect, they also believe that liking is an ap-propriate reaction to another's regard. Ofcourse, one need not employ this particulararithmetic system, and there are numerous in-stances in which people do not. Similarly, oneneed not conform to the particular balanceconception of relations, and on any occasionmay select other intelligible ways of respond-ing to positive regard. The major point is thatso long as one's theory "makes sense" withinthe culture, it may be assumed without testthat its conceptual basis will, on occasion,be put to use in everyday life.

Given the substantial if not insuperableproblems underlying the traditional demandfor theoretical verification, the chief efforts ofthe discipline, namely those of testing hypoth-eses, are thrown into severe question.8 Theimmense resources presently directed towardtesting formal hypotheses may be rechanneled.The responsible scholar need not hesitate todevelop and disseminate his or her ideas forlack of empirical test; the massive hours ab-sorbed in the process of executing such tests

8 This is not in the least to argue that empiricalresearch has no place in the science. As argued else-where (Gergen, in press-a) such work may play anumber of vital roles (e.g., social prediction, catalyticillustration, evaluation) other than the traditionalone of verification.

TOWARD GENERATIVE THEORY 1353

may be reinvested in significant intellectualwork. The discipline may thereby more fullyrealize its potential contribution to the his-tory of thought.

The Assumption of Temporal Irrelevance

From the traditional positivist standpoint,the scientist's task is one of developing theoryof transhistoric validity. Thus, in developinglimited theoretical models and isolating majorvariables, social psychologists normally as-sume the transtemporal applicability of theirformulations. Dissonance theory, balancetheory, integration theory, the two-factortheory of emotional experience, attributiontheory, and so on are not generally viewed asmere reflections of contemporary life styles.As many have argued (cf. Manis, 1976;Schlenker, 1974; Triandis, 1978), such formu-lations should be valid across time. From thisperspective, one need not be concerned withthe transient peculiarities of contemporarylife; all may ultimately be subsumed by morebasic theoretical principles.

As argued elsewhere (Gergen, 1976), thecase for cross-time applicability of socialtheory is largely limited to matters of post hocinterpretation. Given the complexity of mostsocial activity, a theorist may typically lookback and discern some manner in which hisor her theory may apply. General theoreticalformulations can almost never be threatenedby past history. However, when one turns tothe problem of prediction, the case for cross-time applicability of social theory seems farless convincing. Either by choice or good for-tune, the natural sciences have largely con-cerned themselves with a subject matter that isrelatively stable or replicable (cf. Scriven,1956). Astronomical theory continues to pro-vide reasonably accurate predictions over timebecause the movements of the specified entitiesare relatively reliable. In contrast, the socialscientist is confronted with an organism that isboth sensitive to wide-ranging influences andcapable of immense variations in behavior.Further, because of the individual's symboliccapacities, the range and type of inputs towhich he or she may be responsive, alongwith the resulting forms of conduct, may all

be rapidly altered over time. In effect, patternsof human activity may be in a continuousstate of emergence, aleatoric in the sense thatthey may largely reflect contemporary con-tingencies (Gergen, 1977). Such capacitiesplace severe restrictions over the social scien-tist's efforts at predicting ongoing interaction.

In part, this line of argument suggests thattraditional social psychology has suffered froma historical myopia. This possibility is welldramatized by recent investigation into life-span development. Developmentalists have be-come increasingly aware that patterns of child-hood development may vary from one his-torical period to another. For example, as vanden Berg (1961) has demonstrated, from the15th to the 17th century, the child was viewedas an adult in miniature, fully developed interms of mental capacities and lacking only inexperience. Thus, a child in the wealthy classesmight be expected to master four separatelanguages, to translate Plato from the original,and to hold serious discussions on death, sex,and ethics before the 7th year. More recently,however, research employing cohort methodol-ogy (cf. Buss, 1974) has greatly strengthenedthe case. Such techniques have enabled inves-tigators to trace developmental trajectories inintelligence, mental and physical skills, per-sonality traits, and other variables within con-trasting historical periods (Baltes & Nessel-roade, 1973; Baltes & Reinert, 1969; Schaie& Strother, 1968; Woodruff & Birren, 1972).As these analyses typically demonstrate, de-velopmental trajectories appear highly de-pendent on historical circumstance; any givenpattern of development may be limited to aparticular period. As Looft (1972) has con-cluded from such work, "no longer should de-velopmental psychologists focus so exclusivelyon ontogenetic age functions; each new gen-eration will manifest age trends that are dif-ferent from those that preceded it" (p. 51).'J

0 Such work does not suggest that there are notranshistorically reliable patterns of development. Thegenetically programmed pattern of physiologicalmaturation, for example, should insure a limited de-gree of reliable change. Parallels to the argumentsmade within the life-span arena may also be found inthe fields of cognition (Jenkins, 1974) and personalitytheory (Sarbin, 1976).

1354 KENNETH J. GERGEN

This line of argument harbors two impor-tant implications for the development of gen-erative theory. First, we find that the theoristmay be liberated from the press of contem-porary events. If the theorist considers currentsocial pattern as fragile, temporary, and capa-ble of alteration, theoretical analysis need notbe circumscribed by a consideration of "whatnow exists." Rather, the theorist may be freedto consider alternatives, the advantages anddisadvantages of relationships as yet unseen.To illustrate, traditional theory of aggressionhas confined itself largely to making sense ofexisting patterns of aggression. The effects ofsuch factors as frustration, modeling, gen-eralized arousal, the presence of models, thepresence of weapons, and so on have all beenexplored (cf. Bandura's 1973 review). Yet, ifwe view all such accounts as relevant primarilyto contemporary sociohistorical circumstancesand take seriously the individual's capacityfor wide-ranging change, then we may beginto consider alternative patterns and to eval-uate their comparative assets. It seems clearthat many reactions other than aggression maybe adopted in frustrating circumstances or inresponse to aggressive models or weapons. Onemay choose to relax oneself, to divert one'sattention, to behave altruistically, and so on,and each such reaction may have certain spec-ifiable advantages and shortcomings. In ex-ploring such alternatives, the theorist operatesgeneratively to undermine common assump-tions about social life. The theorist thusbreaks the stranglehold of what people acceptas "human nature" and paves the way to alter-native social arrangements.

In addition to liberating the theorist fromthe press of contemporary pattern, the presentthesis buttresses the initial line of argumentregarding the shaping of social phenomenathrough theory. To the extent that observedpatterns of behavior are historically limited,the invitation for generative theorizing is in-tensified. The theorist may view him- or her-self as a potential contributor to the historicalsituation and thus as capable of altering it insuch a way as to engender change. If thetheorist is faced with virtually infinite pos-sibilities for human change, then he or shemay challenge the desirability of contem-

porary patterns as against envisioned alter-natives and consider theoretical vehicles forreaching desired ends.

The Dispassionate Bystander Versus theParticipant Theorist

In confronting the potential for transform-ing society through generative theory, thequestion of functional endpoint rapidly comesto the fore. What forms of action are to beshaped or supported through theory? Who isto make such decisions? From the traditionalperspective, this issue is all but obscured fromattention: The scientist's task is chiefly thatof description, while matters of prescriptionare not within the purview of the scientist quascientist. As commonly claimed, the scientistis concerned with what is, and there is no wayof deriving "ought propositions" from the re-sults of such activities. Further, when thescientist harbors vested interests in the end-point of his or her investigation, one cannottrust the results. Passionate involvement maybias the ultimate product. Theorists in socialpsychology have thus tended to remain remoteand aloof from what may be seen as the"squalid bickering over matters of the good."

The extent to which value investmentsshape scientific knowledge has long been thesubject of debate (cf. Nagel, 1961; Rudner,1953; Weber, 1949; Lacey, Note 2). Whilethe range of implications remains unclear,such debate does indicate that the scientist'svalues are almost inevitably linked to thephenomena selected for study, the labels at-tached to those phenomena, the manner ofinterpreting new findings, the amount of con-firming evidence required for a conclusion, andthe manner of applying social theory. Forpresent purposes, the most significant implica-tion of such debate is that all such valuationalinfluences serve as "ought expressions" for therecipient oj knowledge. As such, they have thepotential to shape the society; they may favorcertain forms of social conduct at the expenseof potential alternatives. As its implicationsand applications are borne out, every theorybecomes an ethical or ideological advocate.

Perhaps the first social scientists to takeseriously such valuational shaping effects were

TOWARD GENERATIVE THEORY 1355

those forming the Frankfurt School (cf. Jay,1973). In the 1930s, Max Horkheimer beganhis attack on the negative social effects of themore general positivist paradigm (see Hork-heimer, 1972). On the one hand, he argued,the scientific paradigm treats the individualsolely as an object to be acted upon, thusdenying him his subjecthood or status as afree agent. Further, general scientific descrip-tion of society is one that justifies by implicitassumption the hierarchical organization of so-ciety ; such theory thus supports the continuedoppression of certain classes by others. It wasthis latter line of argument that JurgenHabermas (1971) elaborated with specialforce. As Habermas argued, in their under-lying epistemology, positivist formulationsobliterate the critical issues of social ethics;such formulations appear to be nonevaluativeand, as such, resist questioning on ethical orideological grounds. Thus, with fundamentalquestions of value obscured, the critical prob-lem of ends is replaced with the relativelysuperficial concern with means; society is leftprimarily with problems of technical applica-tion. For reasons of social utility, both thescientist and the technician also tend to beabsorbed by the decision-making institutionsof the state. Thus, the scientific institution asa whole contributes to the maintenance of theexisting power structure. The power structure,in turn, operates to the disadvantage of manypeople, primarily those occupying the lowerclasses. In short, positivist social science con-tributes to the continued oppression of the"have-nots." Such concerns have been echoedmore recently in American sociology by AlvinGouldner (1970). As Gouldner has demon-strated, even such seemingly dispassionateanalyses as Parsonian functionalism providea rationale for maintaining the status quo and,in doing so, serve the advantaged strata in so-ciety.

Within social psychology, concern with thevaluational implications of normative theoryhas been relatively late in developing. Perhapsthe earliest cries of alarm were European inorigin. As Moscovici, Israel, and otherspointed out (cf. Israel & Tajfel, 1972), by onemeans or another, American social psycholog-ical theory renders implicit support to ideolog-

ical commitments of an indigenous character.This theme is reflected again in Apfelbaumand Lubek's (1977) attack on normativetheories of conflict; as they contend, suchtheories do not take sufficient account of con-flict from the standpoint of the "have-nots"in society and, in failing to incorporate theirconcerns into mainstream theory, render suchgroups "invisible." Sampson's (1977) recentanalysis of social psychological theory repre-sents perhaps the boldest statement to emergewithin the American context. As he argued,much contemporary theory places strong im-plicit value on "self-contained individualism"and thus stands opposed to a collectivist orinterdependent mode of orientation. As hepoints out,

Psychology plays an important role, even more so asit has become the new popular ideology, religion, andjustifier for a variety of social programs. That rolecan continue to serve an isolating, atomizing, indi-vidualizing, and alienating function, or it can helprefocus us on the fundamental interdependencies thatneed nurturance as well. (p. 779)

For present purposes it is largely irrelevantwhether one agrees with the thrust of thesevarious critiques; it is sufficient that ethical orideological objection is publicly expressed overtheory ostensibly lacking in valuational invest-ment. It is also unimportant whether themajority of those exposed to such theories findtheir values either supported or questioned;precisely how many people are influenced atany given time is largely of historical concernand may reflect such practical exigencies aspackaging and dissemination. The importantpoint is that regardless of the traditional at-tempt to remain ethically neutral, the socialtheorist is inevitably favoring certain forms ofsocial activity over others, certain strata ofsociety as opposed to others, and certainvalues over their antitheses.

The answer to our initial query concerningthe functional endpoint of generative theory isnow apparent. Heretofore, the social psychol-ogist has largely avoided questions of valueby hiding behind the mask of "dispassionateobserver." Yet, in spite of such attempts, wefind that the fruits of neutrality are passionatein their consequences. This fact stands as anactive challenge for the scientist to throw off

1356 KENNETH J. GERGEN

the mask of neutrality and to confront moredirectly and honestly the valuational implica-tions of his or her work. It would appear farmore desirable for the theorist to give self-conscious consideration to matters of value inthe development of theory than to stumbleupon them some time after dissemination. Thetheorist need not fear the expression of valuesin a given formulation; they are inevitable.The major problem is to avoid expressions ofvalue that, upon reflection, are disagreeable tothe theorist. In effect, personal values orideology may properly serve as a major moti-vational source for generative theorizing. Inthis way, the theorist becomes a full partic-ipant in the culture, fundamentally engagedin the struggle of competing values so centralto the human venture.10

Continuing Controversy

To recapitulate the central thesis, it appearsthat in the commitment to traditional positiv-ist assumptions, social psychology has sub-stantially curtailed its capacity for generativetheorizing. The attempt to build theory induc-tively from "what is known," the demand forverification of theoretical ideas, the disregardfor the temporally situated character of socialevents, and the avoidance of valuational en-tanglements all prove detrimental to the kindof catalytic theorizing that throws into ques-tion the commonly shared assumptions of theculture and points to fresh alternatives foraction. Further analysis reveals significantweaknesses in each of the traditional assump-tions, thus paving the way for a liberalizationof future theory. Yet, this analysis raises avariety of additional questions concerning theaims and potential for generative theorizing.Two of these deserve continuing attention.

The Desirability of Generative Theory

One major assumption underlying the pres-ent analysis is that undermining confidence incommonly shared assumptions represents apositive goal for scientific theory. In its de-parture from traditional aims, this goal issurely moot. Other than for reasons of intel-lectual zest, why should the scientist strive tocreate altered forms of social reality? In some

measure the present argument rests on theconstricting character of the traditional scien-tific perspective. As we have seen, the tradi-tional role of the scientist as an accurate re-flector of social events is gravely misleading;scientific reflection inevitably lends support tocertain assumptions about social life whiledenigrating others. As assumptions are sus-tained or rejected, social life may be alteredin ways that may be judged "good" or "bad"from some standpoint. Given the choice ofwhether one's theoretical work will supportthe common assumptions of the society or not,there are important reasons for building to-ward contranormative theory.

On the most pragmatic level, it is not clearthat the field may sustain itself if its majortheoretical outcomes primarily perpetuate thecommonsense understandings of the culture.Neither will the intellectual issues be suf-ficiently engaging to capture the interests ofintelligent professionals, nor will the researchfruits appear of sufficient importance to meritpublic funding. The field may wither out ofennui, and its efforts may be curtailed becauseit offers few new insights. Such problems arehardly new ones in social psychology. Thelament that the field too often duplicates com-mon sense has long been echoed, and from thepresent standpoint, it may continue, so longas the traditional mold for "doing science"prevails.11 With the loosening of such stric-tures and the development of generativetheory, the long-standing lament may recede.

There are additional reasons for favoringgenerative theory that are based on the po-tential of the discipline for broad social bene-

10 Many may question the "right" of the psychol-ogist to speak to matters of moral good. As we seefrom the present arguments, the scientist does sowhether he or she wishes it or not. Further, asBrewster Smith (Note 3) has pointed out, the psy-chologist possesses a "privileged window on humanexperience," which may enable him or her to make adistinct contribution to such controversies.

11 It has been argued elsewhere (Gergen, in press-b) that positivist metatheory dictates in large measurethe components of substantive theory in social psy-chology. In adopting the metatheory, one simulta-neously accepts a particular image of human func-tioning. Thus, a full liberation of theoretical optionswill depend on the search for alternative metatheory.

TOWARD GENERATIVE THEORY 1357

fit. In the act of theorizing, one translatesexperience into symbol, and the conceptualreplica is inevitably a distortion of such ex-perience. By nature a concept treats separateentities as equivalent, entities that may varyin numerous ways unrecognized by the con-cepts in question; any conceptual system isby nature incomplete. In addition, conceptsare ill fitted to continuous motion or to stim-uli of extreme complexity. Concepts do notadequately account for the complicated andcontinuous movements of a ballet dancer or atumbler in action. Because of such inherentshortcomings, one may justifiably remain sus-picious of any conceptual system. All theoriesremain partial, distorted, and biased. Thus aspecial premium is to be placed on generativetheories, that is, theories that have the ca-pacity to unseat the comfortable truths ofwide acceptance. Such theories may generatecontroversy and doubt and, in doing so, re-duce the strangling biases imbedded in anyparticular conceptual system. In effect, gen-erative theory engenders a flexibility that mayenhance the adaptive capacity of the society.

Such concerns have been linked to ideolog-ical ends by members of the Frankfurt School.The concept of "critical theory" was elab-orated by Horkheimer, Adorno, Habermas,and others as a form of undermining the con-ceptual basis for the contemporary socialorder, an order that they viewed as inimicalto the interests of the laboring classes. Thecritical orientation would isolate inconsis-tencies in the prevailing system of beliefs(scientific and otherwise), problems withinthe social structure, as well as discrepanciesbetween prevailing beliefs and relevant fact.In this way, critical theory was to serve eman-cipatory interests (Rommetveit, 1977). Al-though such critiques of knowledge may seemuncongenial to those committed to the tradi-tional maxim "no criticism without alterna-tives," critical theorists maintained thatthrough criticism, choice was restored.Through critical appraisal, a given course ofaction (or manner of doing science) was nolonger taken for granted, adopted withoutreflection. Rather, the critical awareness gaveone the choice of doing other than treadingtime-worn paths. Although the ultimate aims

of the critical school were to see the capitaliststructure of the society give way to a Marxistform, it becomes apparent that the centralthrust of their argument is relevant to anyoneconcerned with changing any aspect of theprevailing order.

The Quicksand of Committed Theorizing

Serious pragmatic questions may also beraised with the present arguments for valua-tional advocacy in theorizing. It may well bemaintained that such activity equates thescientist with the political ideologue or re-ligious proselytizer and will eventually createwidespread public suspicion. If theories be-come conscious expressions of value, thenwhatever trust has accrued to the field by vir-tue of its attempts at objectivity may be lost.These are grave issues indeed and should besubject to continued study. However, it isimportant in this case to distinguish betweenproblems of prediction versus explanation, onthe one hand, and the principles versus thepractices of valuational expression, on theother. In the case of scientific explanation, itseems clear that scientific theory may well loseits status as an essentially objective enterprise.However, as we see, this status was ill acquiredat the outset, and it is far preferable that thediscipline revitalize its aims on an indigenousbasis than remain vulnerable to attack overits duplicity or self-deception. At the sametime, important distinctions must be madebetween the task of theorizing and that of pre-dicting (Toulmin, 1961). Prescriptive invest-ments at the theoretical level do not preventthe science from offering useful predictiveservices. The objectivity of predictive for-mulae need be no less suspect than those ofthe insurance actuarial. A similar case may bemade for contemporary economic theory. Al-though macroeconomic theory is inevitablyvalue based and prescriptive in implication,the economic forecaster may offer reasonablyreliable predictions of certain economic activ-ities.

Turning to the problem of principle versuspractice, we find that the present argumentsdo suggest that social psychological theory isinevitably biased on ideological grounds, even

1358 KENNETH J. GERGEN

in its most ardent attempts at "realistic de-scription." However, this fact need not haveadverse practical consequences. The impact ofMarxist theory has been diminished in no ob-vious way by virtue of its ideological commit-ments; one might even argue the contrary. Itis simply not clear that the society searchesfor dispassionate theoretical accounts, espe-cially when such accounts appear to have per-sonally beneficial consequences. The questionis deserving of continued exploration.

Other issues remain. For example, certainforms of theoretical work in contemporary so-cial psychology may have generative potentialas yet unexplored. Consistency theories con-tain strong valuational implications that re-main to be fully elaborated; the two-factortheory of emotion contains the seeds for amajor challenge to the liberal political tradi-tion (Unger, 197S); should attribution theorybe extended, it could unseat the epistemolog-ical basis for contemporary social science. Ineffect, we have too frequently stopped shortof realizing the generative potential of presentpursuits. At the same time, we have little en-couraged creative theorizing and have scarcelybegun to take advantage of theory as a meansto social reconstruction.

Reference Notes

1. Freedman, J. Social psychology. Presentation tothe 1975-76 meetings of the Psychology Section,New York Academy of Sciences, New York.

2. Lacey, H. Fact and value. Unpublished manuscript,Swarthmore College, 1977.

3. Smith, M. B. Psychology and values. Gordon All-port memorial lecture, Harvard University, 1978.

References

Adorno, T., Frenkel-Brunswick, E., Levinson, D., &Sanford, N. The authoritarian personality. NewYork: Harper, 1950.

Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. Attitudes and normativebeliefs as factors influencing behavioral intentions.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1972,21, 1-9.

Anderson, N. H. Cognitive algebra: Integration theoryapplied to social attribution. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.),Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol.7). New York: Academic Press, 1974.

Apfelbaum, E., & Lubek, I. Resolution versus revolu-tion? The theory of conflicts in question. InL. Strickland, F. Aboud, & K. Gergen (Eds.), So-

cial psychology in transition. New York: PlenumPress, 1976.

Asch, S. Social psychology. New York: Prentice-Hall,1952.

Baltes, P. B., & Nesselroade, J. R. The developmentalanalysis of individual differences on multiple mea-sures. In G. R. Nesselroade & H. W. Reese (Eds.),Life-span developmental psychology: Methodolog-ical issues. New York: Academic Press, 1973.

Baltes, P. B., & Reinert, G. Cohort effects in cogni-tive development of children as revealed by cross-sectional sequences. Developmental Psychology,1969,1, 169-177.

Bandura, A. Aggression: A social learning analysis.Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973.

Bern, D. J. Self-perception theory. In L. Berkowitz(Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology(Vol. 6). New York: Academic Press, 1972.

Berscheid, E., & Walster, E. Physical attractiveness.In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimentalsocial psychology (Vol. 7). New York: AcademicPress, 1974.

Blum, G. S. Psychoanalytic theories of personality.New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964.

Brehm, J. W. A theory of psychological reactance.New York: Academic Press, 1966.

Buss, A. R. Generational analysis: Description, ex-planation and theory. Journal of Social Issues,1974, 30, 55-71.

Byrne, D. The attraction paradigm. New York:Academic Press, 1971.

Cartwright, D. Risk taking by individuals andgroups: An assessment of research employing choicedilemmas. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-chology, 1971, 20, 361-378.

Dienstbier, R. A. The role of anxiety and arousalattribution in cheating. Journal of ExperimentalSocial Psychology, 1972, 8, 168-179.

Duval, S., & Wicklund, R. A. A theory of objectiveself-awareness. New York: Academic Press, 1972.

Elms, A. C. Role-playing, reward and attitude change.New York: Van Nostrand, 1969.

Festinger, L. A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evans-ton, 111.: Row, Peterson, 1957.

Flacks, R. The liberated generation: An explorationof the roots of student protest. Journal of SocialIssues, 1969, 23, 52-75.

Gergen, K. J. Social psychology, science and history.Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1976,2, 373-383.

Gergen, K. J. Stability, change and chance in under-standing human development. In N. Datan &H. Reese (Eds.), Life-span developmental psychol-ogy: Dialectical perspectives on experimental re-search. New York: Academic Press, 1977.

Gergen, K. J. Experimentation in social psychology:A reappraisal. European Journal of Social Psychol-ogy, in press, (a)

Gergen, K. J. The positivist image in social psycho-logical theory. In A. R. Buss (Ed.), The social con-text of psychological theory. New York: Irvington,in press, (b)

TOWARD GENERATIVE THEORY 1359

Glass, D. C., & Singer, J. E. Urban stress. New York:Academic Press, 1972.

Gouldner, A. W. The coming crisis in western so-ciology. New York: Basic Books, 1970.

Greenwald, A. G. Consequences of prejudice againstthe null hypothesis. Psychological Bulletin, 1975,82, 1-20.

Habermas, Jiirgen. Knowledge and human interest.Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.

Hendrick, C. Social psychology as an experimentalscience. In C. Hendrick (Ed.), Perspectives on so-cial psychology. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1977.

Horkheimer, M. Critical theory: Selected essays.(Translated by M. J. O'Connell and others.) NewYork: Seabury Press, 1972.

Israel, J., & Tajfel, H. (Eds.). The context of socialpsychology: A critical assessment. New York:Academic Press, 1972.

Jay, M. The dialectical imagination. London: Heine-mann, 1973.

Jenkins, J. Remember that old theory of memory?Well, forget it. American Psychologist, 1974, 29,785-794.

Jones, E. E., & Davis, K. E. From acts to disposi-tions: The attribution process in person perception.In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimentalsocial psychology (Vol. 2). New York: AcademicPress, 1965.

Jones, E. E., & Nisbett, R. The actor and the ob-server: Divergent perceptions of the causes of be-havior. Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press,1971.

Jones, R. A., & Day, R. A. Social psychology as sym-bolic interaction. In C. Hendricks (Ed.), Perspec-tives on social psychology. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum,1977.

Katz, D., & Stotland, E. A preliminary statement toa theory of attitude structure and change. InS. Koch (Ed.), Psychology: A Study of a science.New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959.

Kelley, H. H. Causal schemata and the attributionprocess. Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press,1972.

Kelman, H. C., & Lawrence, L. H. Assignment ofresponsibility in the case of Lt. Galley: Prelim-inary report on a national survey. Journal of So-cial Issues, 1972, 28, 177-212.

Keniston, K. Young radicals: Notes on committedyouth. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968.

Koch, S. Epilogue. In S. Koch (Ed.), Psychology:A study of a Science (Vol. 3). New York: Mc-Graw-Hill, 1959.

Kuhn, T. S. The structure of scientific revolution.Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.

Looft, W. R. Egocentrism and social interactionacross the life span. Psychological Bulletin, 1972, 78,73-92.

Manis, M. Is social psychology really different? Per-sonality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1976, 2,427-436.

McGrath, J. E. (Ed.). Social and psychological fac-tors in stress. New York: Holt, 1970.

McGuire, W. J. Personality and susceptibility to so-

cial influence. In E. F. Borgatta & W. W. Lambert(Eds.). Handbook of personality theory and re-search. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969.

Medawar, P. B. Induction and intuition in scientificthought. London: Methuen, 1969.

Milgram, S. Obedience to authority. New York:Harper & Row, 1974.

Mill, J. S. A system of logic: Ratiocinative and in-ductive. New York: Harper, 1846.

Moscovici, S. La Psychanalyse, son image et son pub-lic. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961.

Moscovici, S. Society and theory in social psychology.In J. Israel & H. Tajfel (Eds.), The context of so-cial psychology: A critical assessment. New York:Academic Press, 1972.

Nagel, E. The structure of science. New York: Har-court, Brace & World, 1961.

Neisser, U. Cognition and reality. San Francisco:Freeman, 1976.

Newtson, D. Dispositional inference from effects ofactions: Effects chosen and effects forgone. Journalof Experimental Social Psychology, 1974, 10, 489-496.

Osgood, C. E., & Tannenbaum, P. H. The principleof congruity in the prediction of attitude change.Psychological Review, 1955, 62, 42-55.

Ossorio, P. G., & Davis, K. E. The self, intentionality,and reactions to evaluations of the self. In C.Gordon & K. Gergen (Eds.), The self in social in-teraction. New York: Wiley, 1968.

Phares, E. J. Locus of control in personality. Morris-town, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1976.

Popper, K. R. The logic of scientific discovery. Lon-don: Hutchinson, 1959.

Posner, M. L, & Snyder, C. R. R. Facilitation andinhibition in the processing of signals. In P. M. A.Rabbitt & S. Domic (Eds.), Attention and per-formance V. New York: Academic Press, 1975.

Quine, W. V. Ontological relativity and other Essays.New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1969.

Rommetveit, R. On "emancipatory" social psychology.In L. Strickland, F. Aboud, & K. Gergen (Eds.),Social psychology in transition. New York: Plenum,1976.

Rosch, E. Human categorization. In N. Warren (Ed.),Studies in cross-cultural psychology (Vol. 1). Lon-don: Academic Press, 1977.

Rudner, R. No science can be value-free. Philosophyof Science, 1953, 20, 1-6.

Sampson, E. E. Psychology and the American ideal.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1977,35, 767-782.

Sarbin, T. Contextualism: A world view for psychol-ogy: In Alvin Landfield (Ed.), Nebraska Sym-posium on Motivation (Vol. 24). Lincoln: Uni-versity of Nebraska Press, 1976.

Schachter, S. The psychology of affiliation. Stanford,Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959.

Schachter, S. The interaction of cognitive and physio-logical determinants of emotional states. In L.Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental SocialPsychology (Vol. 1). New York: Academic Press,1964.

1360 KENNETH J. GERGEN

Schaie, K. W., & Strother, C. R. The effects of timeand cohort differences on the interpretation of agechanges in cognitive behavior. Multivariate Be-havioral Research, 1968, 3, 259-294.

Schlenker, B. R. Social psychology and science. Jour-nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1974, 29,1-15.

Scriven, M. A possible distinction between traditionalscientific disciplines and the study of human be-havior. In H. Feigl & M. Scriven (Eds.), Minne-sota studies in the philosophy of science: Vol. 1.The foundations of science and the concepts ofpsychology and psychoanalysis. Minneapolis: Uni-versity of Minnesota Press, 1956.

Shaw, M. E., & Costanzo, P. R. Theories of socialpsychology. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970.

Shiffrin, R. M., & Schnieder, W. Toward a unitarymodel for selective attention, memory scanning andvisual search. In S. Domic (Ed.), Attention andperformance VI. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence ErlbaumAssoc., 1977.

Silverman, I. Why social psychology fails. CanadianPsychological Review, 1977, 18, 353-358.

Storms, M. D., & Nisbett, R. E. Insomnia and theattribution process. Journal of Personality and So-cial Psychology, 1970, 16, 319-328.

Tajfel, H. Experiments in a vacuum. In J. Israel andH. Tajfel (Eds.), The context of social psychology.New York: Academic Press, 1972.

Toulmin, S. Foresight and understanding. London:Hutchinson, 1961.

Triandis, H. Some universals of social behavior. Per-sonality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1978, 4,1-16.

van den Berg, J. H. The changing nature of man.New York: Norton, 1961.

Unger, R. M. Knowledge and politics. New York:Free Press, 1975.

Urdang, L. (Ed.). Random House dictionary of theEnglish language. New York: Random House, 1968.

Walster, E., Walster, G. W., & Berscheid, E. Equity,theory and research. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1978.

Weber, M. The methodology of the social sciences.Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1949.

Wilson, T. P. Normative and interpretive paradigmsin sociology. In J. D. Douglas (Ed.), Understandingeveryday life. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,1970.

Woodruff, D., & Birren, J. E. Age changes and cohortdifferences in personality. Developmental Psychol-ogy, 1972, 6, 252-259.

Zajonc, R. B. Attitudinal effects of mere exposure.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Mon-ograph, 1968, 0(2, Pt. 2).

Received March 3, 1978 •

View publication statsView publication stats