Land Tenure & Resource ManagementLand Tenure & Resource Management

TO WHAT EXTENT DO FOREST MANAGEMENT REGIMES AFFECT HOUSEHOLD TENURE SECURITY AND

LIVELIHOODS? A MULTI-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF BASELINE DATA FROM A

REDD+ IMPACT EVALUATION IN EASTERN ZAMBIA

M. Mercedes Stickler; Silvia Petrova; Ioana Bouvier—USAID*

Heather Huntington, Ph.D.; Aleta Haflett—The Cloudburst Group

*The views and opinions expressed in this presentation are those of the authors and not necessarily the views and opinions of the United States Agency for International Development.

OUTLINE

• Introduction• Motivation • Context• Study Area• Methodology • Findings• Summary and Implications• Next Steps

INTRODUCTION

LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE RESEARCH AT USAID

• USAID’s draft research agenda includes hypotheses related to• Dependence of adaptation/mitigation programs on secure land and resource tenure• Impact of adaptation/mitigation programs on land and resource governance

• USAID supporting 7 impact evaluations of land/forest tenure programs in Africa• USAID is committed to producing evidence that is

• Gender-sensitive • Addresses potential “unintended consequences,” including for non-beneficiaries

• USAID geospatial team specializes in land and natural resource-related analysis

MOTIVATION

ASSOCIATION BETWEEN FOREST GOVERNANCE AND DEFORESTATION

• Stronger local forest tenure* has been associated with better forest condition• E.g. Nepstad et al. 2006; Robinson et al. 2014

• Stronger forest governance has also been associated with better forest condition• Rules governing forest resource use and monitoring (Gibson et al. 2005; Chhatre & Agrawal

2008)• Participation in local forest governance (Hayes 2006; Chhatre & Agrawal 2009; Van Laerhoven

2010)

• However, recent meta-analysis of deforestation drivers found mixed tenure impacts

• Busch and Ferretti-Gallon 2014

NEED STRONGER EVIDENCE LINKING FOREST TENURE AND CONDITION

• More precise definition of forest tenure forms is needed (Robinson et al. 2014)• Greater attention to perceived (de facto) tenure as driver of land use (Broegaard

2005)• Need to disaggregate impacts of different rights in the bundle and analyze

interactions between customary and statutory rights, institutions, and rules (Seymour et al. 2014)

• Need to expand evidence from African cases outside East Africa (Seymour et al. 2014)

• Greater attention to gendered nature of forest governance (Seymour et al. 2014)

QUESTIONS ARE PARTICULARLY URGENT IN THE CONTEXT OF REDD+

“Good and efficient governance of forest resources and the distribution of benefits will be central to the success of REDD+ policies and measures.”

(UN-REDD Programme)

• REDD+ projects that do not address complex land tenure systems may have an adverse effect on the rights and livelihoods of certain individuals or groups (Larson et al. 2013)

• Processes through which REDD+ projects may effectively clarify and strengthen forest tenure and safeguard local communities’ de facto rights and livelihoods remain unclear (Naughton-Treves & Wendland 2014; Sommerville 2015)

CONTEXT

Photo credit: H. Huntington

FOREST TENURE AND DEFORESTATION IN ZAMBIA

• All land vested in the President and government legally owns all trees (and wildlife)• Dual customary-state land tenure system

• Customary lands represent up to 94% of the country’s land area (no accurate records)• Customary lands administered by chiefs and their representatives on behalf of President

• Among top 10 GHG emitting countries globally, esp. due to deforestation/degradation• 4th highest forest cover in Africa; deforestation rate = top 5 globally (UN-REDD 2015)• Main drivers of deforestation include (GRZ & UN-REDD 2010)

• Zambia is at risk of depleting its forest resources in next 15 yrs (USAID/Zambia 2013)

• Charcoal and wood fuel production• Logging for timber

• Expansion of small scale agriculture • Unsustainable agricultural practices

REDD+ IN ZAMBIA

• UN and USG are supporting the development of a national REDD+ strategy Multiple REDD+ projects are being planned/in development in Eastern Zambia

• USAID: Community-based Forest management Program (CFP) (700,000 hectares)• BioCarbon Fund: Zambia Integrated Forest Landscape Program (6 million hectares)

• To achieve emissions reductions without negative impacts, need to clarify• Who holds property rights to forest resources (access, use, withdrawal, transfer)• Respective roles and responsibilities of various customary and formal government

institutions

USAID COMMUNITY-BASED FOREST MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (CFP)

CFP, designed to reduce deforestation on customary and reserved lands, aims to establish the largest REDD+ program in Zambia.

Four primary objectives: 1. Empower and equip communities to lessen the drivers of deforestation;2. Establish and improve forest and natural resource management plans;3. Promote alternative livelihoods to unsustainable charcoal and timber

production; and4. Implement pay-for-performance and/or revenue-sharing programs for forest

conservation and carbon sequestration.

CFP IMPACT EVALUATION PURPOSE AND KEY QUESTIONS

USAID’s primary learning objectives for the CFP IE are:1. To understand how REDD+ programs impact land tenure and property rights (LTPR)

and related livelihoods, either positively or negatively. 2. To learn about what aspects of REDD+ programming are most effective in

incentivizing long-term carbon sequestration and reduced GHG emissions from forests and landscapes.

Key evaluation questions for this research are:1. How do REDD+ programs affect land tenure and property rights in forested areas? 2. How do any changes in tenure as a result of the REDD+ program affect livelihood

outcomes within communities and within households?

INITIAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Primary• How are perceived forest tenure* and forest condition related (if at all) in the study

area?• What characteristics (socio-economic, demographic, governance, livelihoods, market

pressure, etc.) are associated with stronger forest tenure in the study area?

Secondary• How are livelihood outcomes and forest condition related (if at all) in the study area?• Does gender play a role in perceived forest tenure* and/or forest condition?

*We build on Ostrom’s (1990) seminal work on rights relevant to common pool resources but focus our analysis here on rights of exclusion, following the work of Sunderlin et al. (2013) on tenure in the context of REDD+.

STUDY AREA

LOCATION OF PROGRAM DISTRICTS

VILLAGE LOCATION, FORESTS, AND TREE COVER LOSS (2000-2014) IN STUDY AREA

METHODOLOGY

RESEARCH DESIGN

• Multi-level modeling (random intercept models)• 2-levels of clustered data: households within villages + villages within chiefdoms• Spatial proximity of villages required adding 3rd level (village groups) for forest condition analysis

• Baseline survey data from prospective quasi-experimental impact evaluation of CFP• Household survey (n≈3,000)• Village leader (headperson) survey (n≈250)

• Spatially derived variables based on secondary biophysical and demographic data• Deforestation rate 2000-2014 (Hansen et al.

2013)• Mean elevation, slope (SRTM)• Mean population density (Landscan 2013)

• Distance to main road, road tracks, waterways (USAID)

• Estimated annual rainfall in mm (WorldClim)

PRIMARY DEPENDENT VARIABLES

I. Association between perceived forest tenure and forest conditiona. Forest condition perception index derived from household survey questions b. Deforestation 2000-2014 within village cluster buffers (e.g., DeFreese et al. 2005, 2010)

II. Drivers of perceived forest tenurea. HH forest governance perception index based on 4 encroachment-related questionsb. Headperson forest governance perception index based on same 4 questions at village level

Note: A higher score on the tenure security scale indicates higher perceived risk of encroachment = lower security.

PRIMARY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES USED IN THE ANALYSES

I. Association between perceived forest tenure and forest conditiona. Biophysical and market pressure (e.g. elevation, slope, distance to roads, markets, waterways) b. Demographic (e.g. gender of HH head, highest level of education achieved by HH, wealth)c. Socio-economic and livelihoods (e.g. livelihood strategies, dependence on forests, etc.)d. Tenure, management, governance (e.g. institutions, rules, monitoring, enforcement, participation)

II. Drivers of perceived forest tenurea. Biophysical (distance to nearest forest, urban market area) b. Demographic (e.g. HH head gender, highest level of education w/in HH, relation to chief, wealth)c. Socio-economic and livelihoods (e.g. livelihood strategies, dependence on forests, etc.)d. Forest governance (e.g., decision makers, rules, enforcement, conflicts, outside interest in

forests)

KEY INITIAL FINDINGS

ASSOCIATION BETWEEN FOREST TENURE AND FOREST CONDITION

VARIABLES

Model A -Two level Model B -Three level

Forest condition Forest condition

Forest dependence 0.0876*** (0.0281) 0.0876*** (0.0247)

Slope -0.0408* (0.0233) -0.0408* (0.0248)

Type of forest 0.06 (0.0685) 0.0600 (0.0808)

Tenure Security 0.0817*** (0.0200) 0.0817*** (0.0268)

Headperson - socio econ 0.170** (0.0853) 0.170** (0.0783)

Distance to tarmac road 0.00188 (0.00132) 0.00188 (0.00130)

Travel time to market -0.0455** (0.0184) -0.0455*** (0.0143)

Village wealth 0.755*** (0.265) 0.755*** (0.272)

Rules 0.0719*** (0.0265) 0.0719*** (0.0258)

Forest management institution -0.0754 (0.104) -0.0754 (0.0787)

Distance to forest 0.00140 (0.000897) 0.00140 (0.000964)

Product permit -0.198** (0.0998) -0.198* (0.120)

Rule enforcement 0.0871* (0.0449) 0.0871** (0.0420)

Luembe -0.684*** (0.206) -0.684*** (0.177)

Nyalungwe -0.122 (0.273) -0.122 (0.334)

Mwanya -0.542*** (0.206) -0.542*** (0.172)

Msoro 0.0497 (0.174) 0.0497 (0.142)

Malama -0.576*** (0.212) -0.576*** (0.200)

Observations 2,898 2,898

Number of groups 240 39Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VARIABLES MEASURING FOREST CONDITION

CHARACTERISTICS SIGNIFICANTLY* ASSOCIATED WITH FOREST CONDITION

Chiefdom • Households in Luembe, Malama, & Mvwanya note better forest conditions*** (good REDD+

targets)Perceived tenure security

• Higher perceived tenure security associated with better perceived forest condition (0.08***)Village wealth

• Villages where HH (0.75***) or headperson (0.17**) are wealthier report worse forest condition

Forest governance• Greater number of rules associated with worse forest condition (0.07***)• Requiring a permit for forest product collection is associated with better forest condition (-

0.20*)

*Results are significant at 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***)

CHARACTERISTICS SIGNIFICANTLY* ASSOCIATED WITH FOREST CONDITION

Slope • Higher slope associated with better forest condition (-0.04*)

Forest dependence• Higher dependence on forest products associated with worse perceived

forest condition (0.09***)

Proximity to markets• Villages closer to large towns report worse forest condition (-0.45***)

*Results are significant at 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***)

CHARACTERISTICS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY ASSOCIATED WITH DEFORESTATION

• Forest type• Distance to tarmac road• Distance to edge of forest• Village institutional capacity

KEY INITIAL FINDINGS

DRIVERS OF PERCEIVED FOREST TENURE

VARIABLESModel A -Two level Model B -Three level

Tenure Security Tenure SecurityForest valuation 0.254***(0.0894) 0.254**(0.107)Forest based livelihoods 0.108*** (0.0368) 0.108** (0.0531)Headman (decision-making power) -0.0881*** (0.0190) -0.0881*** (0.0237)Chief (decision-making power) 0.0836*** (0.0168) 0.0836*** (0.0165)Forest type -0.0991 (0.0680) -0.0991 (0.0862)Travel time to market 0.0288 (0.0354) 0.0288 (0.0383)Relation to chief -0.199* (0.104) -0.199 (0.145)Cleared forest land -0.360*** (0.0733) -0.360*** (0.0640)Conflict 0.119* (0.0671) 0.119* (0.0688)Governance index 0.0879* (0.0469) 0.0879* (0.0470)Rules 0.0438* (0.0266) 0.0438 (0.0284)HH socio econ 0.113 (0.0691) 0.113 (0.0727)Female headed households -0.0635 (0.0840) -0.0635 (0.0927)Education 0.0432 (0.0317) 0.0432 (0.0373)Institution -0.0628 (0.126) -0.0628 (0.103)Luembe 0.435 (0.274) 0.435 (0.299)Nyalugwe 0.536*** (0.183) 0.536*** (0.170)Malama 0.146 (0.333) 0.146 (0.219)Mwanya 0.221 (0.202) 0.221 (0.216)Msoro 0.412** (0.198) 0.412** (0.181)Rules 0.0438* (0.0266) 0.0438 (0.0284)HH socio econ 0.113 (0.0691) 0.113 (0.0727)Msoro 0.412** (0.198) 0.412** (0.181)Observations 2,898 2,898Number of groups 240 39Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VARIABLES MEASURING FOREST TENURE SECURITY

CHARACTERISTICS SIGNIFICANTLY* ASSOCIATED WITH TENURE (IN)SECURITY

Chiefdom • Households in Nyalungwe (0.41**) and Msoro (0.54***) feel greater encroachment pressure

Forest clearance in the past 3 years• Households that have recently cleared land perceive greater tenure security (-0.36***)

Relationship to chief• Households with a direct kinship connection to the chief perceive higher tenure security (-

0.20*)

Primary decision maker for forest use and management• Headperson as primary decision maker associated with higher tenure security (-0.09***)• But chief as primary decision maker associated with lower tenure security (0.08***)

*Results are significant at 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***)

CHARACTERISTICS SIGNIFICANTLY* ASSOCIATED WITH TENURE (IN)SECURITY

Forest based livelihoods• HHs that rank forest resources important for community development feel less

secure (0.25***)• HHs that derive more benefits from forests also feel slightly less secure (0.11***)

Forest governance• Households who reported forest-related conflict in past year felt less secure (0.12*)• Households more satisfied with local forest governance also reported higher

security (0.09*)• More forest related rules weakly associated with less security (0.04*)

*Results are significant at 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***)

CHARACTERISTICS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY ASSOCIATED WITH TENURE (IN)SECURITY

• Proximity to markets• Forest type• HH wealth• Gender of HH head• Education level of HH head• Village institutional capacity

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

ASSOCIATION BETWEEN FOREST TENURE AND FOREST CONDITION

• Several results are in line with what we would expect• More secure tenure and use of permits associated with better forest condition• Higher slope, greater distance from markets associated with better forest condition• Greater wealth, dependence on forest products associated with worse forest

condition

• But some require further examination• Greater number of forest rules associated with worse forest condition

• Potentially a proxy for forest access rather than governance?• Don’t see significance of local forest governance institutions or road proximity as we

would expect

CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH SECURE FOREST TENURE

• Several results are in line with what we would expect• Forest clearing associated with higher tenure security (potential endogeneity issues)• Incidence of conflict associated with lower tenure security• Better overall forest governance associated with higher tenure security• Decentralized forest governance (village level) associated with stronger security• Elites perceive higher tenure security

• But some require further examination• Higher dependence on forests appears to be associated with less tenure security

• HHs most dependent on forests may be most sensitive to potential changes in their access?• Greater number of forest rules associated with less tenure security

• Potentially a proxy for forest access rather than governance?

POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS

Equity• Data suggest that elites may have more secure tenure and access to new farmland

• In line with HH survey across Zambia showing increasing farmland concentration (Jayne et al. 2015)

• Also, while HH survey suggests tenure among HHs who access forest is perceived as tenure, qualitative findings (not reported) highlight weak exclusion rights and multiple instances of lost forest access and local user rights, potentially reinforcing equity concerns

Governance and accountability• Findings highlight the need for CFP to address accountability and inequality in

existing power structures, particularly the power of the chief, when designing benefit sharing mechanisms

NEXT STEPS

NEXT STEPS FOR THE RESEARCH

• Interact potentially related variables• Is forest clearance related to overall dependence on forest-based income?• Is forest-based income related to elite connections?

• Construct new variables• Disaggregate forest-based livelihoods that require forest clearance from those that do not

• Add more precise spatially-derived independent variables• Examine deforestation hotspot in Msoro chiefdom and explore relationship to tenure• Disseminate results

• Reports, presentations in country and globally (e.g., World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty)• Make data available for use by other researchers at usaidlandtenure.net/data

THANK YOU

usaidlandtenure.net

RETAINER

HOUSEHOLDS PER CHIEFDOM

LOCATION OF SURVEYED HOUSEHOLDS AND FORESTS IN THE STUDY AREA

Note: Chiefdom boundaries as depicted in a 1958 map are included here for illustrative purposes only.

VILLAGE LOCATION, TREE COVER (2014), AND MANAGED FORESTS IN STUDY AREA

CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PROTECTING FORESTS

• Climate change is a significant obstacle to ending extreme poverty as it threatens to profoundly impact the livelihoods of millions of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable.

• Deforestation and forest degradation are long recognized as significant sources of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission, account for an estimated 10-25% of anthropogenic GHG (http://ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/).

Preserving forest cover is an important aspect of any development program designed to improve livelihoods, reduce emissions, and mitigate climate change.

CFP INTERVENTIONS

Six main project components:1. Stakeholder Consultation 2. Livelihood Improvement3. Forest Management4. Forest Carbon Science 5. Carbon Market Creation6. Policy and Engagement with the Government of Zambia

BACKGROUND: LTPR

• LTPR: The rights, rules, and institutions that define individual or community access to land and related natural resources, including in forested areas.

• Critical rights: Rights of access; Rights of withdrawal of resources; Rights of management; Rights of exclusion; Rights of alienation (to sell property); Authority to sanction (Ostrom and Schlager 1996, USAID 2011).

• In many developing countries, forest property rights tend to be contested, overlapping, and insecure (Sunderlin et al. 2013).

Lack of secure LTPR for local populations is recognized as a principal driver of deforestation in many developing countries (Angelsen 2008).

LTPR IN ZAMBIA

• The Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) recognizes private property rights in two tenure categories: statutory (leasehold) and customary.

• Statutory lands, cover as little as 6% of all land in the country,

• Customary land covers the remainder of land and is governed by customary chiefs and their representatives, such as village headman, through largely informal systems.

• GRZ retains rights to all trees (and wildlife) in Zambia, even those located on customarily administered lands (GRZ 2015a, b).

OVERVIEW: ACCESS TO FORESTS AND FOREST RESOURCES

• Most households (HHs) in the study sample (76%, 3305) have access to only one forest; • 17% (762) of the HHs report not having access to any forest. • Among those with forest access, the majority has access to communal land that is either located

on their village’s land (69%, 2732) or on communal land in another village (17%, 663).• Majority of forests (62%, 2482) are reported to be in ‘good’ or ‘very good’ condition (62%, 2482).

KEY FINDING: DECREASED ACCESS TO FOREST LAND AND FOREST RESOURCES

Baseline findings suggest that access to forest land and forest resources in the study area is decreasing.

Reasons for lost access:1. Forest degradation and deteriorating forest conditions2. Restrictions on access to forests and resources 3. Outsider use of forest land and resources

REASON 1: FOREST DEGRADATION AND DETERIORATING FOREST CONDITIONS

• Overall condition of forests: Condition of most forests (42%, 1688) was noted to have worsened in the past 3 years; 33% (1305) were reported to have remained the same and 12% (482) have improved.

• Changes in area and thickness of forest cover: Most forests are perceived to have stayed the same in area (45%, 1788), 35% (1405) are reported to have decreased slightly in area. This trend is also evident in questions about changes in the thickness of the forest where 35% (1404) are reported to have remained the same, 38% (1540) reported as slightly thinning.

REASON 1: FOREST DEGRADATION AND DETERIORATING FOREST CONDITIONS

• Changes in availability of forest resources: Availability of wood and non-wood forest products in forests was reported as either ‘A little less’ or ‘Much less available’ than it was 3 years ago by 44% (1599) of HHs. 37% (1342) of HHs reported the availability had remained the same, and 18% (650) noted an increase in availability.

• On forest resources: “ Trees are few in the areas which are closer to our homes because we use them for a lot of activities, but there a lot of trees in the wooded areas which are far from the villages.”

REASON 2: RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO FORESTS AND RESOURCES

• 16% (590) of HHs with access to forests reported new restrictions within the past year that had effected their ability/ease of accessing or collecting resources from forests. 84% (2994) noted no new restrictions.

• 88% (3138) of HHs with access to forests said they did not need a permit to collect forest products, 11% (410) reported a permit as necessary.

• On restrictions to forest resources:“Accessibility of the forest has reduced because the other side is ran by the forest department and you cannot collect even firewood, no cutting trees, no hunting from there. We wanted to kill rats from there…but accessibility has reduced, it has reduced because we are not allowed to go in and cut trees.”

REASON 2: RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO FORESTS AND RESOURCES

• FGDs reveal widespread and increased presence of Zambian Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) in forests.

• Fear and perceptions of violence of ZAWA has had negative impacts on access to forest resources

• On fear and violence of ZAWA: “(R): Men can get up to say, oh let me go and look for rattan from the forest. When he is found he is apprehended to say he is a poacher hunting for animals, yes. They are arrested sometimes… if they are not lucky when they go there they are killed right there in the forest…even when that person did not go there to kill for animals, he just went there to look for rattan or to collect bamboos. So even going there, they do not have full rights, they go with fear.”

REASON 3: OUTSIDER USE OF FOREST LAND AND RESOURCES

• 11% (196) of forests reported to have decreased in forest area were noted as having decreased due to large-scale projects (plantations, new settlements, mining, etc.). 36% (642) noted as having decreased due to ongoing or increased charcoal production.

• 13% (211) of forests reported to have decreased in forest thickness were noted as decreased due to large-scale projects. 30% (499) noted as decreased due to ongoing or increased charcoal production.

REASON 3: OUTSIDER USE OF FOREST LAND AND RESOURCES

• Qualitative findings suggest the reallocation of forest land to lodge owners as common reason for lost access.

• On access to forests: “It has reduced, because part of the forest had been sold to some investors to develop the area. We don’t move anyhow to get what you need. An investor has built a lodge in the same area and we don’t trespass. Once found you will be charged.…Access to the forest has reduced, because of a lodge you may need some medicine from the forest but you could find that the tree that contain the value of medicine is between the boundaries of that area which was sold, and it’s difficult to pass through and get the medicine.”

BASELINE FINDINGS:

PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNANCE

KEY FINDINGS : PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNANCE

• Among HHs that access a forest, satisfaction with how village leaders manage the forest is high. 87% (3882) noted they were satisfied with how village leaders manage the forest.

• Approximately the same number of HHs (87%, 3800) reported that village leaders in charge of forest management are trusted and honest.

• Trend continued when HH were asked if land related decision making by village leaders is open and transparent (86%, 3773).

KEY FINDINGS: PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNANCE

HH survey and FGD suggest limited local participation in forest management and decision-making: • An overwhelming 81% (2916) of HHs said that no meetings on forest issues have been held in

their village in the past 12 months. • One group noted: “Perhaps we don’t understand what is implied by decision making the decisions

we can make are in cases where the headman brings us a report from the chief telling us what the chief has said and asking us to collectively act on that that is how it is done there is no other way we can make decisions

KEY FINDINGS: PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNANCE

• Ladder of Power: Chief overwhelmingly noted by 79% of all HHs (3454) as the most powerful person in the village in terms of making decisions about forest use and management.

• Qualitative findings further reveal a perceived lack of ability/capacity to hold the chief and government accountable.

• FGD participants often expressed feelings of powerlessness and fear to go against decisions from the chief and/or the government that they were not happy with.

KEY FINDINGS: PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNANCE

• On lack of power to go against the decisions of the chief: “…chiefs are corrupt, they love money and so he can be bribed by those people...This matter will depend on the owner of this community. There is nothing the village members will do about it. The chief is the one that will decide. We do not have any rights, whatever will be decided by the chief is what will be respected.”

• On lack of power to go against the decisions of the government: “The problem is that these rules come from the government. People in the government have money and whatever they say they want it to be obeyed, us here we don’t have any powers to control them or to start claiming our benefits… nothing can happen.”

KEY FINDINGS: PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNANCE

• 26% (1091) of HHs surveyed noted it was either ‘Likely’ or ‘Highly Likely’ that the chief would sell or give away the customary forestland used by their village for investment purposes without authorization from the village in the next 3 years.

• A similar amount (25%, 1065) noted it was either ‘Likely’ or ‘Highly Likely’ that the government would sell or give away the customary forestland used by their village for investment purposes without authorization from the village in the next 3 years.

SUMMARY:

• The UN-REDD Programme: “If the allocation of forest or carbon rights is opaque and uncertain, if the distribution of benefits is unpredictable, untimely or captured by a few, if lack of enforcement allows free riders to exploit the system, or if corruption is perceived as high, stakeholders will not take the risk of forgoing the income they derive from their current uses of forest resources.”

• FGD, Men in Mwambe: “(I): Are there charcoal burners nearby? (R:) Yes they are there, those from the mountains. (I): But for you there are no charcoal burners? (R:) No, no one (M:) Oh, but these are your mountains? (R:) Yes (M:) But other people come to get? (R:) They burn charcoal, destroying our trees. (I): But it is your land? (R:) It is our land but then it was sold (I): But can’t you protect it? (R:) How can we protect it when it the chief who has sold?”