Philosophical Review

Timeless TruthAuthor(s): Charles EvansSource: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Apr., 1962), pp. 241-242Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2182990 .

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TIMELESS TRUTH

JN "Endorsing Predictions" Mr. Richard M. Gale makes rather interesting claims concerning two sorts of statements about future

events.' He states that (i) "a prediction becomes true when the predicted event occurs or takes place" and (2) statements which refer to alternatives of choice are neither true nor false prior to choice. I find the grounds for these claims wanting.

(i) Gale writes of two senses in which a statement can "become true." (a) "When 'become true' is used in a first-order metalinguistic endorsing statement it means that, whereas before now the utterance of the sentence used in the statement being endorsed would not have made a true statement, its utterance now will make a true statement." (b) "When in a second-order metalinguistic statement it is said that a statement (be it tensed or tenseless) becomes true, we mean that whereas before now it was inappropriate, owing to an insufficiency of evidence, to endorse it, it is now appropriate to do so."

There are many fulfilled predictions which have not "become true" in either sense (a) or (b). Suppose that on July 3, I 96 I, I predict that my home will burn down on July 4, i96i. When this prediction has been fulfilled, the reiteration of the sentence "My home will burn down on July 4, i96i," yields neither a true nor a false statement. It would merely sound odd to use this future tensed sentence. My prediction did not "become true" in sense (a).

On July 3, i96i, I predict that my home will burn on July 4, i96i. Suppose that no one can confirm this belief before July 6, i96i. My prediction was fulfilled on July 4, but in accordance with sense (b) of "become true" this prediction does not become true until July 6. It is in fact odd to identify "X has become true" with "There is sufficient evidence to endorse X," since we sometimes have sufficient evidence to endorse false statements.

(2) When Gale says that a description of an alternative of choice is "Cnot now" (at a time prior to choice) either true or false, he means that such descriptions have not "become true" in sense (b). He says, "If I genuinely believe that I can choose r as well as X, I will not find

1 Philosophical Review, LXX ( I96 I), 376-385.

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CHARLES EVANS

any amount of evidence concerning the causal antecedents deter- mining my choice to be sufficient to justify endorsing a prediction about how I shall choose." Here we encounter the folly of identifying "X is true," with "There is sufficient evidence to endorse X." A person confronted with choice would neither endorse as true nor endorse as false a description of any of his alternatives, but he could admit that each such description is either true or false. In like fashion I can say that the statement "There are living creatures on Mars" is either true or false though I do not endorse either of these alternatives.

(3) It is odd to speak of statements "becoming true" or "being now true" or "having been true." Those who speak this way are probably mislead by a confusion of "sentence" and "statement." A sentence can become the constituent of a true statement, but a statement cannot become true.

Since future events do not yet exist, we are tempted to say that descriptions of such events are not yet true. This is a temptation to avoid. Past events no longer exist, but it is not the case that statements in the past tense are no longer true. Truth is in some sense a timeless property.

CHARLES EVANS

Brooklyn, New rork

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