TICOM Vol. 8 - Miscellaneous

8/4/2019 TICOM Vol. 8 - Miscellaneous

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l=:UROPEiuv AXI.S SI.GNAL D'ITELL::GENCE :Ill WORLD WAR II ). ' , AS REVEALED BY "TIOOM", IrNESTIGATIONS ..AND BY OTHER PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATIONSAND C A P T U ~ D MATERIAL, PRINCIPALLY GERMAN


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-VOLUME 8Miscellaneous .,,"

Chapter, I . , .Italia.n Signal I n t e l 1 1 g ~ n c e O r g a n i z a . t i o n ~ .HWlgarian Cryptologic Activi t i e s . "

Ch.apter lI1 "Finnish Signa), Intel l igence o ; t " g a ~ i z a . t l o n . ,Cha.pter' IV.' 'Bulga,fia.n Signal Intel l igence.Cha.pter V. I Austrian Cipher Bureau'.

'.Chap te r VI , Army .Ordnance, Development and T e s t 1 ~ Group,Slgnal, Branch.,

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T h ~ R a d i o D e r e n ~ e C o r p s or the 'Armed Forces.,Chapter VIII. Laporator,lum Feuerstein.'Chapter IX. ' C r y p t ~ Q g i c Act iv i t ies of the German Meteoro-log ica l Service , :, C

, , 'phapter X. ' O r l g 1 11 and O p ~ r a t l o n s of .TICOM.


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VOLUME 8

Chapter I I t a 1 1 a ~ Signal In te l l igence Organizations

ParagpaphItal ian Cryptology vas cen te red in the Army and NavyIntelligence Services. 1. Army In.telligenceService had e ight sec tions. I . . 2

. .. . . 56Cryptologic activit ies did not t e r m i n 8 : ~ e 'With the .:'Armistice. 7

Cryptanalytic Bection totaled approximately f i f ty persons 3Ital ian Army Field' Signal I n t e l l l g e n c ~ '! . ! ' : " ~ ' , i . r . II combinedCryptanalysis and Interception .'. 4'Ital ian Naval Intelligence vas streamlined.Italian-German l ia ison was marked by mutual distrust .

TICON ] ~ recovered Ital ian translations of decrypted1!raf'f1c . . . . . . . . 0 0 0. !' ~ 8I ta l ian Cryptanalytic results . . 9'


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b. Navy Intel l lgenceService (ServizloInformazioniSpeciali , abbreviated S I S . ) ,Each of th e above had 8 2cryptograPhic section, and eachhad a cryptanalyt ic section. ' 'There were also nine small signal intelligence field unitsattac:hed to Ital ian Armies.'" ., Two m1nlstrieshad minor cryptologlc bureaus. TheM1nlntry of Foreign Affairs Cryptographic Office (Ufflcio'Crlttogratlco) prepared Ital ian diplomatic codes and ciphers.The Ministry of Interior Inspector General of the' Poli t icalP o l l ( ~ e (Publica Slcurezza) scrutinized "communist 'I and "foreignagent II codes and ciphers.4 ' '., The Air Force Intell igence Service (Servicio Intorm&zionlAeronautica, abbreviated 81 A) had no cryptanalyt ic section .I t l sno t , known whether i t had 'any cryptographic section.. 2. Army Intelligence Service llad eight ,sections. A1!myIntell igence was under the i ta l Ian General Starr, and was, commanded at one time by a Brigadier GeneralAme. I t had eightmain se ctio ns , o f which three were directly concerned withcryptology, and only two were concerned with gathering-militaryintelligence in the usual sense . The o ther th re e vere evaluation,administration, and secretariat . On paper, therefore l crypt-:analysis and cryptography were major functions of Army Inte111genc:e;> The eight ,main branches and their f'unctions vere as 'to l lows: .a. The Secretariat Sectlonoperated the message center:I t "ras f i r s t c o m m a n d ~ d by a Col. Nasta, who. was l a te r ,replacedby Col. Aldo Canale. ' .


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DOCID: 3560798Espionage Sub-section mainta.ined f1eld offices in occupied andn e u t r ~ L l countries. Of particula.r interest 1s exi st ence of anArgentine office whose activit ies were espionage against theUnited States. .!['he Army Intelligence Sub-section (also known as th e ISub-sc:3ction) handled operational intelligence and i t s sectionswere .'9,t tached to each Corps and Dlvisional Command. I t wasc o ~ a d e d successively by a Col . Pasquale and a Col. Gastaldi. 7c. The Evaluat ion Section collected and.analyzed in -formation gathered by the o ther sec ti ons and military attaches Jand issued such information in the form of daily bUlletins,weekly and monthly r ep or ts . D is trib utio n was to the Ministeror Fo,reign Affa1rs, the Minister of the Armed Forces and hisChief's of Staff, and to the commanders of "ma1n army units. IfThe E:valuatlon Section also lssuedpredictions on thepoli t ica .gconduct of th e war. The command officer was a Col.Pacinott i .d. The Monograph Section produced t reatises relatingto foreign nations and th e genera l conduct of thewa.r .Thepersonnel consisted of young college professors Who9had an. accurate historical knowledge o f f ore ign countries.

e. The Cryptography Section compiled and allocatedciphers to a l l army u n 1 t ~ . I t also supervised printing ofthe liIlOSt secret, documents, of the A:rmy Intelligence Service,and provided l inguists for a l l commands and u nits th at re- ,quired i n t e r ~ r e t e r s . This Branch was commanded by a Col.Piccinocchi. 0 , .f . The Intercept Section wa.s responsible for the intercept1oJ;l of' a.ll commercial" military, and diploma1:'ic traff ' lc., I t n ~ 1 n t a 1 n e d i t s principal station at Forte Brasch1" near


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eh The Cryptanalyt ic Sect ion attempted to break AlliedDiplomatic, Army, and Commercial codes a n d c i p h e r s . ~ ~ .3. CryPtanalytic 8ect iontotaled approximatell f i f typersons. At the base only 25cryptanalysts and 25 l inguIsts. and c l e r ~ n made up the Army Intelligence Service Cryptanalyt icSectio.n.. .General Vittorio Gamba was in command from World War I tothe Armistice.. He experienced difficulty in procuring crypt

analysts af ter World War l1 5 and the handica.p was never .overco,me .16The Sect ion' s o ther difficult ies included a lack ot tundsand a lack of IBM equipment. At f i r s t IBM machines were usedonly e ~ theotf ice of t h e W ~ t a o n Corporation (I talian IBM) inRome. Another complication wa.s the poor l ia ison with the Inter- 17capt Branch. All negotiat ions had to go through 8IM headquarters.~ r h e Section never had Ch:l.nese and Japanese translators J andi t always experienced dlrrlcuJ.ty in obtaining Russian Turkishpand A J ~ a b i c l inguis ts .18 All ;personnel, inclUding the guards Jwore civilian clothea. .Generally, th e Sec tion read only those diplomatic systemswhich had been in use ror a long time. All sta t is t ical operationswere ,accomplished by hand; i t "Tas not unti l the las t stage ofth e war that IBM maohines were used regularly. At the time orthe Al'Iilistice:J no general S U C C f ~ S S had been achieved- in breakingAmerican and British diplomatic and ml1;tary systems. ~ x c e p t i o n sto this were: American milits;ry attache systems involving t raff icf rom Ca1ro, Basra. , and Teheran in 1942; Berne, Madrid, an


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DOCID: 3560798The Cryptanalyt ic Sect ion had three Sub-sections:Diplomatic, Military and ResearchJ/ and Commercial. Thea llo tmen t o f personnel among the sections varied with th ework load and current pr ior i t ies ; translators and typists 'were pooled 0 21 ' ' _ ', 'I'he Dip:lomatic Sub-section wa.s subdivided into nine groups.Great B r l t a i n ~ Dominions, America, and Sweden vere the respona ib l11ty of only one group, consi st ing o r tva cryptanalysts. 22The Military and Research Sub-section, consisting of five

cryptanalysts, was divided into Military and Research units., The Military unit forwarded i t s resul ts (via unknown channels)to the field cryptanalytic units and to those in I talian posses-'sions. The Research unit vas non-operational and was assignedthe m.1ssion ot making the initia.l break into' systems. When thework reached an operational. stage,ll the system was transferredto the Military unit. There was excellent l iaison between them. 2}The Research unit was handicapped by i t s late adoption ofIBM methods. I t did not have possession ot any mach1nes unt i llate in th e war. Until that time, such york as was done wasprocessed a t the offices of the Watson Corporation by employeesot Watson who worked under the orders of SIM.With the acqu124i t ion of IBM mach1.Des, more ambitious projects vere tackled., The Commercial unit, conSisting of one cryptanalyst, vasconcerned with I talian commercial codes and ciphers. I tsfunction'was to censor I talian commercial t raffic and to Q e t e c ~d e v 1 ~ l t t o n s from o r d ~ r y commercial code_I2rocedures I t was notconcl3rned with foreign commercial codes. G The Cryptanalytic Section received i t s t raffic from theInte:rcept Section t s four sta.:tiona.ry in te r cep t s ta tions in I taly,


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;" The f inal evalua.tion of th e Cryptanalyt ic Section mightbe m a d ~ in"'Jthe words of Genera+ Gamba,!; the ~ Q m m a n d 1 n g off icer .I t wan said to be of a. "di let tante nature. n 0(.. . "iJL I ta l ian ArInl Field Signal Intell igence "Groups"combllued cryptanalysis and intercept ion. ' EVidently thereexisted in the I ta l ian Army before June 1942' separate crypt

~ l y t i c f 1 e l d units and separate intercept uni ts . assigned toth e various I ta l ian armies by the Army Intell igence Service.(8IM). The organization and missions of these early' uni ts.1s not known. However l in June 1942 a t Stal1no Russia theI ta l ian Eighth Army combined i t s cryptanalytic uni t of tenofficers and six non-commissioned officers with i t s in tercept compEmy, which had a strength of three hundred officers andmen. Intercept functions were 'p laced under the,control of thecryptanalytic unit ; heretofore, each group had been separatelyresponsible to Eighth Army headquarters.. This so-called "Cryptanalytic Group" of the Eighth Armywas direct ly responsible to the Eighth Army, and had no directconnection With the A:rmy Intell igence Senice (SIM) in Rome.The O \ i ; ;placed under the i r authority.28 . .The intercept unit of the Group maintained twenty-fourre.ce1vers of which nine were f i t ted into mobile vans. TwomobIle vans ,contained German direct ion finding se ts . Dift i -cult.ywas experienced in the operation of these units', dueto poor instruction by the Germans.The main cont ribut ion of the Cryptanalytic Group vas' intelligence derived from t raff ic analysis. Cryptanalysis


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The success of the Eighth Army Group led to the formationof si:milar units. In June 1943, Lt. Col. Guido Emer, officeX' in. charge of the Eighth Army Cryptanalytic Group,was ordered bythe Army. Intelligence Service (81M) to organize a similar Groupfor each field army. The Groups were to be patterned at terBrit ish and American. units with special re:ference to theexperience gained by the E1ghth Army. Eight new Groups in a l lwere set up for the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6 t h ~ 3 0 t h , lOth and 11thArmies, and for the I ta l ians in Rhodes. The cryptanalyticelement of a Group,"nucle", contained from one to fifteencrypt,analytic off icers assisted by non-commissioned off icerswho acted as translators and typists . The intercept unit varied'in strength from a section to a company and a half . The resultingGroups never measured- up to expectat ions, however, the 6thArmy's Group was able to predict th e landing in Sicily andthere must have been minor successes.3 l. 5. I talian Navs.l In t e l l imce Was streamlined. Ital ianNaval Intelligence, (Servlzio ~ o r . m a z I o n I SpecIali della RoyalMarina, abbreviated SIS) was located in Rome and was directlyresponsible to the General Staff. I t was organized ~ t fourbranches, a l l of which had the common'mission of discoveringth e enemy's power, organization, location, act ivi t ies , and futureplans. The four branches vere set up on the basis of functionand "ere as follows: .a. Intelligence Based on Radio Intercept - Branch Bbo Evaluation of Intelligence - Branch Cc. Intelligence Based on E S P i o n a g e 3 ~ Branch Dd. CoUnter-Intelligence - Branch ,E 2


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a.gains1i British Naval and Air operational codes. Navaltactical codes and Air code enciphering tables were cons id ered to be simple problems, despite the daily change inth e cal,e of . the lat ter.3 4 The Sub-section was also successfu l w i 1 ~ h a four-figure Br1t ish Naval Code in 1941 and 1942.This system was not read at ter the l a n d ~ s in North Africa.A four,figure"Anglo-Amerlcan Naval Code" was also read. '5~ ~ e I n t e r c e p t and Direction Finding Sub-section maintained seven principal in te rcept s tat ions in I taly and i tspossessions. Six ot these were l inked toge ther by teletypeto facil i tate operations part!cularly with r e s p e c ~ t o .directionf inding. The maintenance ot one hundred and, :f1.fty watchesdailY3 along with the t raffic received trom German intercept. stations located outside of the Mediterranean, produced adaily average ot three thousand messages.3b This Sub-sectionalso controlled intercept groups which were located on theflagship s o f all ' commands. These groups were under thecommand of a Navy Intelligence Service (SIS) officer whowas supplied w1thmaterialfor th e immediate decoding andi n t e r ~ p r e t a t l o n ot enemy t raff lc . 37

. ~ h Security Sub-section had as i ts mission th e cryptanalysI1s of I talian Naval Codes" Ciphers" and cal l signs. Tomaintain the,1nqulry on a purely c rypt analytic leve l" the Subsect1cln was kept in complete ignorance of I talian naval act i vity. If 1t was suspected that a system could be read, information was forwarded to th e Communicat1onsDepartment or'theGeneral Staft . This informa1on orten containedsuggestlonsfor eJL1m1nating the danger." .r.rhe Clandestine Radio Intercept Sub-section organized and ---- -_._------------


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DOCID: 3560798BrEmch C evaluated a l l the intelligence produced byBranches B and D,exoept t h o ~ e o ~ an ~ e d i a t e operationalnature. I t was organized on the basis of oount ri es or groupsof c o u n 1 ~ r i e 8 . I t circulated translations among higher authorit ies ~ served as an information section to r the other Bran-ches. 0 . _Branch D produced intelligence based on espionage. In -i t lal ly. . Branch D depended on ship capta ins and informers for1nf'ormation that was of doubtful value. Gradually i t buil t up

i t s own espionage centers in Europe, North Africa, and Asia Minorwhich were highly effective. Attempts a t espionage i n enemycountries failed. The main mission of these centers'. was. tocollect information of a naval nature. The secondary mis,sionwas to collect information of a polit1cal nature. Reportswere relayed back to the Branch by means o t , c l a n d e s t ~ e statIonsset up lby the Clandestine Radio Intercept Sub-section of BranchB. Aircraft fl ights were reported by fishing boats In the.Mediter,ranean and Atlantic. Toward . t h end of the war, theBranch vas given the task of sabotage. 1Branch E was responsible for c o u n t e r ~ e s p l o n a g e . Branch Ewas originally divided into two sections; one dealt with m.1lI-,tary police r ttnc tions; the other with counter-espionage. Theseactivities were la ter combined in the form of centers. Elevencenters were set up in Italy. Five centers welle maintained inoccupied areas and North Africa. Branch E coordinated a l lactivities relative to naval espionage and sabotage. I t Vasreporte4 that t h e ~ e was no successful act of sabotage againstthe Ita,llan Navy. 2. "The I talian Air Force Intelligence Service (Servicio


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6. Italian-German l iaison was marked by mutual distrust.Major De Witt" an: I talian crwtanalyst ,was of the opinionthat poor l iaison with the German ~ Signal IntelligenceAgency (OKH/GdNA and predecessors) was based on the Germand o c t r ~ l e ot ' taking a lo t and giving nothing. This is a mootpoint when one considers what the Ital ians had to offer. Inactual i ty, neither side ever expressed a Willingness forcomplete cooperation.Liaison on military t raf f ic began in 1939 with an emphasison FreJtlch t raf f ic . Major De Witt reported that the Ital iansana G e ; ~ s were supposed to collaborate on the recovery of anenciphered cooe system which had a for ty day period. There wasgreat :rivalry and no interchange of information was p ~ r m 1 t t e dby ei ther s1deunt i l the recovery had been completed.44 ' .Ln 1942, the Ital ians learned from the Germans that certainI ta l ian cipher systems (not named) were insecure. The Germansrecomm,ended the adoption of a Playfa1r cipher using te n ta ble s .The It,alian Army a.dopted the German suggestion for a short timeand then dropped i t . The Ital ian Cryptanalytic Sect ion statedthat i t had found the recommended system to be insecure andexpressed the fear that th e Germans favored the system becausethey could read i t .45 .In January 1942, Capt. Augusto Bigi, a c r y p ~ a n a . l y s t , wassent to Berlin to investigate German cryptanalytic procedures,with special emphasis on IBM techniques. As a result of th emission's report to Army Intelligence Service (8IM), it wasdecided to under take smal l scale experiments with IBM machines.With a view toward expansion of the use of IBM equipment) shouldthe experiments prove successfUl, Capt. Big1 was again sent to


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The documents of the Cryptanalyt ic Branch of' the ArmyIntell1gence Service (SIM) were in part des troyed , but a greatmany ' W e l ' l ~ tu rned over to the Germans or taken into hidingagainst the day when the organizat ion might be recreated.Capt. = ~ i . g 1 , a cryptanalyst, stated that he des troyed onlyold and obsolete documents.51 ,, The successor to the Mili tary Inte l ligence Service was th eDefense Intelligence Service (Serviz10 Informaz10ni Difesa, "abbreviated SID). I t was under thed1rect1on of a Dr. Fosch1n10Organized in October 1943, i t was successively located in Rome,Volta Mantovano, and Castiglioni del le S t1v ie rl . I ts organization paralleled that ot the old A ~ Y ' I . n t e l l i g e n c e Service, and1 t was, in tact , a continuation of the previous organizatlon.52I t had available only twelve c ~ t a n a l y s t s to r th e task whichhad beeIl too great to r double that number. ,A further diff i -culty WELS i ts lack of int er cept faci l i t ies . The Germans d1s-'couraged the development of intercept 'and-are r e p o ~ t e d to haveplaced 'Dr. Foschini in a concentration c ~ because ot hisefforts to obtain intercept equipment. The only systems thatwere generally worked on were some of those that had preViouslybeen rel3.0 by the Army Intelligence Service (5IM); namely, , ,Turkish, Spanish, and Rumanian d i p l o m a ~ l c codes and c1phers.5}Occasionally a new system was b r o k e n . 5 ~ ,Thte crn>tanalytlc and intercept functions of the DefenseIntelligence Service (SID) were reorganized 1p June ~ 9 4 4 . Allcryptana.lytic and intercept activities vere" combined into' theIntercept Section (Intercettazlone sezlone) which w.as., known a.s "IN . The- IN was subdiVided into three "bureaus .. "55 ...".'; ,', " ,a . The Firs,t Bureau consisted of naval personnel "wnose


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whiohL terminated with the incorporation ot i t s personnel intothe Second Bureau in November 1944.56b. The Second Bureau worked on diplomatic and militaryattache codes and ciphers. The work was lim ited to s ~ s t e m salready broken.c. The Third Bureau confined i t s activities to themonitoring of press reports, particularly Reuters.578. TICOM has recovered I talian translations of decrypted

traff:1c. TICOM has obtained the ItalIan translations of t raff icd e c r ~ p t e d by the Ital ian Defense Intelligence Service (SID) fromlate 1943 to early 1945. Notations indicated that the Republican Fasoist Government had a particular interest j in tel l i -g e n c ~ relating to conditions in liberated Italy; secondaryimportance was attached to messages dealing with condi tionsin 1t l ! Olin terri tory. The decrypted traff ic also revealed thatmessages of general intelligence value were read. Below. aresummaries o t a few of th e representative messages:

. . \forksheet l l l l-Vat1can to Lisbon 30 Dec. 1944-597 groupsl'ortuguese message number 1.Liberated I taly is economically devastated, expeoiallylirith regard to raW' materials. I t is a the mercy of thejn i t ia t ive of th e l iberators. Ital ians believe that theBritish a re s in ce re in the ir desire actively to aid reconsturction. The public debt is 676 bil110n 11ra s, th re etimes national income, but the government 1s optimistic.Worksheet 2925-Moscov to Paris 20 Feb. 1945-88 groups


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evaouate Tokio, but i t 1s unable to provide transport, and lodging. The milita:ry fear the loss of Formosa and. an invasion of Kyushu A Germa.n defeat is believed in -eVitable, but i t 1s hoped that the Germans will delay toth e point of extermination. The press 1s very hostile toRussia, but th e official attitude is very correot.Worksheet.3330-Pa:ris to Rio de Janel:ro 1 Ma:roh 1945-71groups French message number 26. . .

I t is reported from MQntevldeo that the Argentineis Uncertain about ente:ring the var. ' The Dl1litar1stsoppose this move and the United states hasatnd1cated thata mere declaration would be insufficient.Worksheets 3333 and 3334-washington to Paris 1 March1945-74 and 57 groups French message numbers 94 and 191.Argentina is suspeoted of being sympathetio not onlyto the German Government, but also to the Nazi ideology.Nazi technicians have been infi l t rat ing into Argentinaand now occupy prominent positions in the &I'my and in -dustry. I t appears that the American Government. backedby the major ity of publio opinion, will not change i t s .attitude toward Argentina unless the Argentine radicallymodifies l t s approving attitude toward Naziism.Worksheet 2g46-Paris to Rio de Janeiro 21 Feb. 1945-107groups French message number 279. oircu1ar 22 .I t i s reported from Berne that Germany is, sufteringtrom a transportation cr is is . The Relohsbahnen are no


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Wo:rksheet 453S-Stockholm to Paris 28' March 1945-61 groupsFrrench messa.ge number 149In Switzerland i t is estimated that Germany wi l l f s l l

in two weeks. The Nazi Government vi l l not give up, butth.e armies wj..ll surrender. .. Worksheet 3 1 9 2 - S t o c k h ~ l m to Paris 27 Feb. 1945-72 groupsFl"ench message n u m b e ~ 71 .Swedish correspondents in Ber lin repor t a. fata.l isticat.titude on the part ot th e populace. The people no longer.mention Hitler. The executions of party officials, whodeserted their posts, have been greeted with public sat is -

! ' ! ~ c t 1 6 n . The press has taken clever advantage of th e .mlstakes in Allied propaganda. There 1s l i t t le 'probabil i tyof a popular revolt. I t is believed that a revolution, .i f any" will have to come from the army.'Worksheet 9'3-Borovecto Zagreb 23 Aug.1944-276 groupsJllgoslavlan ( C r o a t i ~ ) message number 1 .The Bulgarian foreign minister has stated thatBulgaria joined the Axis to keep 'peace in the Balkans.Thrace and Macedonia were occupied because they were. essentially Bulgarian areas and because foreigners' would~ a v e occupied 1f Bulgaria hadn,t t . Bulgaria claims t h a ~she never made active war against the Allies" and that shewishes to keep good relatIons With Russia and the Balkans.

~ I the case of Russia, th e burden is on th e Soviet toremain friendly with Bulgaria.


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Worksheet 8l6-Vatiean to Madrid lS June 1944-179 groups.:Portuguese Message number .. I t i s expected that Kesselring w l l l ~ g i v e up soon.'rGerma.n col lapse 1s attributable to des truc tion of communications and transportation. The zones of occupatlonof theAllies are predict ed to be: 1) Great Britian-France,.BelgiUm. Holland, Norway and Rhineland. 2) RussiaGermany, bounded by the Bal t ic , the Danube and Balkanareas. ')SUnlted States- Central Germany, (Bavaria andAustria).5. "90 Ital ian cryptanalytic l'esu1ts . Brigadier General Vit t ....

01'10 Gamba, the Director of 8IM Cryptoiraphic Section, had a verylov opinion of Ital ian signal intelligence a ~ t i v l t i e s . Gamba\ attr:1.butes the Italians t poor showing to @.9lack of capablepersonnel and a lack of sufficient t u n d s . ~ Gamba sums up succease,s against the USA and Britain as folloW's, lilt is a tact thata t t t time of the Armistice no results had been attained inbrea.king the cypher systems of m 1 1 i t ~ o Y and diplomatic traff icfrom England and th e United States." . Gamba d o ~ s c 6 ~ i m thatphotc)stats of the US State DepartmentVs "Brown" Gode -:".:,We1'6ava il ab le to theItalians and that/8IM. succeeded in solVinga British diplomatic five figure code and an unenclphered .t w o ~ ) a r t four-lettercode. o2 More detailed information r e g a r d ~1ng Ital ian cryptanalytic successes may be found in Chart 1 ... 2 0


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VOLUME 8CHAPTER II

Hungarian Cryptologic Activities,

H ~ a r y t s C r y . p t a n a l y t l c Bureau was organizedfor l arge sca le efforts . . G e r m a n l ~ considered the Hungarian interceptorganization inferior

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Paragraph 10

11Hungar:lan-German liaison began in the 1920' s. 12

1. Hunsary' s cryptanalytic bureau was organized for1arse lacale efforts. The HungarIan cryptanalytic bureau (exact nmne not available from TICOM sources although i t iscalled Abteilung Xin I 193) was directly under th e command ofthe Ch:let of the Hungarian General Sta1'f. Until Russian advances in 1944 endangered the group; i t v e located in th eHonved (Ministry of Defense) in Budapest.OO Under the directionof General von p e t r i k o v i c s ~ 6 9 the cryptana ly tic bureau was organized into ten s e c t i o n s ~ w i t h a total of about f if ty personnel:a. Turkish Section .b. English and American Section (England, North and South

A m e : ~ i c a ~ and E g ~ t ) . .c. French Section (France and C o l o n i e s ~ S W i t z e r l a n d ~


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e"The cryptanalytic bureau averaged or 5 persons toeach section.71 The key section vas the Turkish section, in ',whic}l Lt. Titus Vass, ca.l1ed "the ace Hungarian c!7Ptanalyst .. "worked. Emphasis was placed on Turkish t ra f f ic because ofthe, j ~ t e l 1 i g e n c e der1ved concerning Allied naffai rs . 72 . TheRussj'.e.n and French sections were considered the next most

v a l u ~ ~ b l e , and it is reported that the main Russian diplomaticsystElm vas also read unt i l it changed near the end of the war.7'Another r eport i nd icat es th at' th e emphasis was on I ta l ian ,R u m a r . ~ a n , and Polish ~ y s t e m s . 7 ~ .From 40 to 100 messages were decoded each day. Theywere sent to a representative of Ottice Six of Reich MainSecuI'ity Office (RBBA VI), to Regent Horthy I to the Chief ofthe Gfenera1 ~ t e . r f ' , the Foreign Minister, and to t he "Min is te rPres1.dent. "75 .. . . .Contlicting e s t ~ t e s of the success of Hungarian c ~ t - .anal"sis are reported in TIQOM sources. I t 1s stated that theHunga,riang. depended on the Gemans to r the solu t1.on of manysystems.f However, the Reich Main Security Otfice's (RBHA)l iaison off1cer in Hungary s ta tes that the most important cryptanaly'tic int,l11gence aVailable to his group came f r o ~ theHungarians:r I t has also been s ta ted th at the Germans re-ceived a great volume o f r esu'l ts from the Hungarians .. and this1sa t t r ibu tea to the influence of Range who had been intel l i-gence chief of the Austro-Hungar1an.Emplre.78 A to tal ot approximately 90 code books belonging to the H u n g a ~ 1 a n cryptanalyticbureau have been captured. . indicating that they successfullybroke codes of the folloving twelve countries: , Belgium,Bulga,ria, Den,mS.rk" France, Greece, I ta ly , Netherlands, Portu-


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JlllDong the documented failures of tl;1e 'HungarIans are th eSecret and Confidential codes of American Military Attaches.AlthotLgh these codes vere compromised 100% by the Hungariansthey vere t urned over to th e I talian Army Intelligence Service(S1M) because the enclpherment could not be broken by th e8H u n g a J ~ i a n s The I talianswere successful in breaking 1 t . 0A German otficer ot SectionE 1 of the' Signal IntelligenceAgency.of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force ( C h i - S t e l l e ~. Db d J : " ~ Section E) was assigned on the request of the Hungarians tC) break a Rumanian Air Force cipher. Just a.s this otficera n n o w ~ c e d that he was on the threshold of solution, he vasr e t u ~ ~ e d ,to his German unit because ot poli t ical reasons, andthe Hungarians were forced to buy this system from parties Dotstate,d, in stead of solVing I t .Bl

2. Germans considered the Hungarian intercept organization 1nf'erlor. Personnel ,of the SIgnal Intelligence Agenc,of th.e Commander in Chief of the Air Foree (Chi-Stelle Ob 'd L), which mainta.ined intercept s ta t ions in Hungary, reportedthat the H u n g ~ r i a n intercept service was worthless and that,the E[ungarian t raffic analysis reports were u 8 ~ l e s s . Theyalso s ta ted that th e H'1Dgarians we:l'e "cagey." . '30 HiIfarian-German lia1son began in th e 1920'8. In the1920's, l1ason on cryptanalytIc matters began between the

H u n g ~ L r i a n s and the predecessors of the S ignal I n t e l 1 1 g ~ c eAgency of the Supreme c ~ ~ a n d , Armed Forces (OKW'/Chi). Thiee a r l ~ r liaison was close and th e Germans worked on aystems


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requested by the Hungarians.85 There was. never an actualexchange of liaison officers by the German agency and theHungarians. This vas true even during the war. Communi-. cations were through th e H ~ a r l a n E m b a s s y and throughoccasional soclal v i s i t s ~ 8 0.Liaison with other German agencies began at the s tar t ofthe war When the Re1ch Main Secur1ty Off1ce (RSHA) and theSignal Intelligence Agency of the Commander in Chief of t h Air Force (Chi Stelle, Ob d L) set up off1ces in B U d a p e s t . ~ 7The German Air Force s.et up a socalled "Weather' Station ll .( c o v e ~ name) in Budapest in 19}8. This station intercepted andcryptanalyzed Rumanian and Jugoslav t raf f ic . I ni ti al ly " 1 tspersonnel were in civilian clothes. S8 ~ a 1 s o n with the Hungarian intercept service vas alweys poor and the Hungar1answere always considered inferlor. ti9Lia1sonwlththe Reich Main Secur ity Ott ice (RSHA)90 wasmarked by great respect to r Hungarian cryptanalytic abil i ty.The Hungarians passed all . decodes on to this group" and themore urgent messages were radioed back to Berlin by th e ReichMain Security Ottice (RBHA). When the H ~ a r 1 a n intelligenceunits retreated to Eastern Bavaria in 1944 with the approachof the Russians" t he ir r et re a t was aided by the l ia ison off ice rsof the Reich Main SeQur1ty Office (RSBA). I t is believed thatthe Hungarian records were hidden in Eastern Bavaria.9l I t is~ ~ : s ~ ~ : : ; ~ : r ; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e n t s ,recovered by TICOM at Eggente1d are851-21, P 2.


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:lJ1a1son w1th the I tal1ans ' on cryptanalyt1c mattersappea:r-s to have been very good. The Hungarians maintained

l ia i son off icers in Rome and made the results o f the1 r workava1lable to the Ital1ans.93


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VOLUME 8CHAPTER III

Finnish Signal Intelligence O F g ~ z a t i o nParagraphFinnish "Radio Intelligence Companyll cI'yptanalyzedmil:Lta17Jl naval" and diplomatic t raffic 0 13

"

Finnish Cryptanalysts wera successful within the narrowqet1nition of their mission 0 0 0 14Finnish intercept was well done" bu t the ev alu ation unitwas not very competent. 0 .' 0 0 15F1nnls11-German Liaison was well organized and e f f e c t i ~ e o 16Friendly F1nnish-German relat ions did not preclude German

c r ~ p t a n a 1 y s l s of Finnish systems. . . 0 1713. Finn ish "Radio In te l l igence Company" crn>tanalyzed mil i -ta.ry, ltlaval and d1?lomatic t raff ic . Finnish signal intellisenceactivit ies vere aunct10n of a. Radio Intelligence Company (calledRadio. ITe1egraph Kompanie, abbreviated /lRTK" II by the Germans;Finnish namendt given by TICOM sources) which was subordinateto the Finnish Geural Staff 's military intelligence organization(name :not k n o w n ) . ~ This Radio Intelligence Company apparently


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cryptanalysts .101 A Col. He-llama has been reported as head ofthe iti'1nnish cipher section. 102 . _. Germans, interrogated by TICOM on 'the ~ u b j e c t of Finnishcrypt,analysis "l unanimously agreed that the Finnish cryptanalystswere of the highest calibre and considered them an even matchfor 'their own analysts .103 . .14. Finnish cryptana1lsts were successful within the narrowdefinit ion ot theIr mission. The emphasIs of FinnIsh cryptanalysiswas placed on Russian t raffic" particularly of a military and

naval nature; tJecondary c o n s i d e 1 8 ~ l o n was given to Polish" SweclishJlR u m ~ ~ i a n , and American t raff ic . ,The Finns succeeded in reconstructing the Russian five-figurecode used during the f i rs t Russo-Finnish War! This book was givento the Germans by the Finnish Genera.l Staff. 05 The Russianswere aware o f t h ~ Finnish abi l i ty and issued instructions to. their cipher officers which attributed Finnish successes toviolations ot security. I t is interesting to note that the .Russians did not adm.1t the possibility of cryptanalysis ot theirsystems, but they d idemphas lz e the traffic analysis and monitoring .aspects.106 other achievements against the Russians were the1dent i ficat ion of the addit lvefor a four-figure naval Byatem107and'the so lu tio n o f afive f lgure "double s u b s t i t u t i o n l 1 1 0 ~ andthe solution of three-figure and four-figure codes" especiallyRussian Secre t Pol ice Codes.lOg1011_31, l-106 p 3, I-116.


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o t t ~ r 1nstancesof F1nnish successes were: Read1ng ofth e A m e ~ i c a n strip system, which the Germans called AM 10,and the reading or a Swedish diplomatic system which disclosedthe fac1i that .the M-94 vas readable .110 .15. Finnish intercept wasvel l done, but the evaluationunit wa.n not vel' co etent. The intercept unIt of.the RadioIntelligence Company RTK consisted of a fixed station a t .company headquarters approximately 200 men), four other fixeds t a . t l o n : ~ 1 and one motorlzedcompany .111 Despite the age and

var1ety of Finnish intercept a n direction finding equipment, .the'Germans considered the' Finnish intercept work to be of goodquality and depended on the Finns tor interception in theBaltic area and tor ' long range direction finding. l l2 The .Russian security instructions,-discussed in Paragraph 2 above,emphasized the abil i ty of t he F inni sh intercept unit . 11}. The Germans considered th e F inni sh evaluation unit to bedisol'ga:nized and attributed i t s incompetence to th e e m p ~ a s i splaced o ~ 1 ~ r y p t a n a 1 y s i s . This unit consisted or about 20.. persons.16. Finnish-German liaison was well organized and effect ive. Finnish-German liaison existed prior to 1939 and contliiUed unti l Finland's f inal capitulation to Russia. Thefollowing German Slgna1Itrtelllgence organizations mainta1nedlia is on. w ith the Finns:. Signal In te ll igence Bat ta l ion 11 '16'(NAA 11),115 Control Station for Signal Intelligence ( L N A ) ~ l

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Signal Intelligence Agency of Army High Command (oRRI G d NA),117Signal Intelligence Agency of Navy High Command (OKM! 4 SKL/ '111),118 S i ~ a l Intelligence Agency of Supreme Command ArmedForces (OKW/Chi),l19 and the Reich Main Security Orfice (RSHA).120- / Not only was there direct and la rg e sc ale interchange ofwork on Russian systems,12l but there was also interohange onsuch matters as the American strip'system AM 10,122 generalintercept and,direct ion t inding p r o ~ l e m s 3 1 2 3 and there is aninstance where Finland tu rned over a translation of a Swedishmessage l which stated that the M 94 was readable. l24LIaison consisted o f oou rie r service, regular meetings125and interchanges arranged by the Finnish General s ta t t . 126 Forsuch purposes, Germany maintained headquarters (not named) a tTa1lin il,. Eathonia; and there wert2,lso Germans in Pinland a tKirkenEls, Mikleeli, and Sortavala. "fAti the conclus ion of the Finnish-Russian War, the SignalIntel1lgence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) invited the Finns to join i t . No'W'ord was heard trom theFinns H.tter they crossed the F1nnish-Swedishborder.128 -

e 117I_2:L, 1-111.1181 _1;2.119 .1-1:2, 1-31.121_193.1211_12, 1-31, 1 -16, 1-106.

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L1.aisonbetween Finland and Hunga.ry i s reported to havebeen close., The Germaris assumed that the Hunga.rians who cameto Berlin were on thei r way t o F in la nd .129l ' : ~ Friendly Finnish-German relat ions did not precludeGerman cryptanalysIs of FinnIsh systems. Although SenIorSpecial ist Dr. Erich Huettenhain, Of the Signal Intell igenceAgency of the S ~ p r e m e Command Armed Forces (OKW/Ch1) statedthat nc) Finnish systems vere zaead,130 Abteilungen 9 and 6 orHauptabteilung IV (Entzitferung) worked on Finnish t raff ic 131

and Abteilung 6 zaead a t least one F1nnish Hagelin message thatwas 40'()O le t ters 10ng.132 I t i s also 1ndicated that Goering'sR e s e a r ( ~ h Bureau (FA) broke into "F1.rinish or 5 I ~ d 1 S h l l Hagelini i 1 e s s a g E ~ s ,several times on the basis ot cr ibs. :)-, .

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VOLUME 8

CHAPTER IVBulgarian Signal Intelligence

Bulga,rian Cryptanalytic Ability is anunknown quantity . . . . '. . .Parasraph 18Bulga.rlan-German l iaison hardly exlated. 19

18 Bulgarian cryptanalytic abi l i ty 1s' an unknown ~ u a n t l ty .TICOM souroes provide only as1ngle refcpence to the au gariancryptjanalytic agency. In 1944, Group IV or th e S ignal Intel l i -gencEl Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OXW/Chl). trained B u l g a r l ~ s in a special course in cryptanalysis. Lt. Col.Mettig of that agency stated that General.Statt Major 'Gentscheft,head ot t h e ~ a u l g a r i ~ cryptanalytic agency" was not enthusiasticabout this c o u r s e . l 3 ~ .19 . Bulgarian-German l iaison hardly existed. In or about1940;, the SIgnal IntellIgence Agency ot the SupreIJ1e Command .Armed Forces (OKW/Ohl) projected plans for the setting up ofinter cep t s ta tions in BUlgaria. Only one such station wascompleted. I t is not mown whether Bulgaria knew ot thisstat:Lon. This stat ion, which was located a t Varna" vas forthe (Jerman Air Force. .Under the cover name of ItKommando

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" ~ u l i t r ~ ~ , ' 9 ; ~ ~ ~ r " a u waa in "loaelia"son, , 'W i th , ( J : ~ r m . a u y ~ . '. 0 '0 ' . ' ' ~ - '., ' . ' ~ ~ ' '. , . . . . . ~ ' oj, ~ ' . 2 1. , ',' . :! ~ ' : - : ' : : ~ , \; .' . . . oj',- ~ i ' ~ . \.: . '. ,' . ,, ' .".'"."\,,, ,', ",,'" " , ,,' , ' ' ':, "', , , ,', " " "\ ' : ' l e l " , , ' A U e " " t ~ : l a n , : . : t i b ~ r : d U r e 4 U , , ' \ l a S " : S X D $ . ; L l b u t ~ c t ~ v e ' > :'l'he ",',';Aula t'l'!UJ:t: 'C1ph,r:,)3l.,lreaq.? " 4 w a ~ ' , Under, t1ie altte,c tlon o f 'Dr.

: q ' : t : t o ' ~ l o b - : u r i ~ 1 . 1 0 ~ t o ' b e ~ ) 1935, when ':he''':vaS: ' ~ u < : c e ~ d e d ; b y Dt'.' ,,: , 5 i i ~ ~ ; : ~ ~ i s ~ : ; t ~ ~ : ~ ~ i ~ ; S ~ i ~ ; s ~ t ; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ 5 t ~ ~ ; ' ~ t ; ~ ; r ~ , ~ r : ...... : : } . ; ~ t i i ' e & u '. ' ~ ~ P P ~ 8 . i . ' ~ 9 : .t 'o '-surterfrom a .shortage. o t I > e r ~ - o n n ~ l ; . and,', : . : r ~ o ~ t h t ~ m a . n : r , : v & c a t l o n s p r o v i d e d by:'AustzolaIi-.C1v11.; ' S e 1 W i C ~ ; .';': .,' !t.fi1u.st h a v e ' ",peensme.,ll p b e c a u ~ e . a , : 1 t c a ~ a s trophlc.persOn,pel: ' ~ ~ ~ 1 " t : ~ ( ~ . I , was '. averted.when: t ~ r ~ ~ 6 n e v ' menibersj o 1 n e ~ , : t h ' .' o ~ g & n , 1 z , i a . : t 1 o n .. 1n'1fovember 1 9 ' 5 . : t . ~ k .. '.... '" ,.' , '. '. '. .'" ", .." . ~ ' ~ t , i ' h I ! ' 4 u a t ~ " a n 0 1 p h ~ r :Bureau .actively, ' c r y p ' t ~ l ~ e d ~ : ; f o ~ : . , "

l . n j t . ~ J r . ~ e J [ ) t e d t h e dlplbma.tic t:raff1c, or, the tollo\"i,pg. e o u n t r i ~ ~ : '. ' J ? e 1 8 j ; ; ~ , J l . J 3 ~ 1 g a I ' 1 a : ~ C z e c h o s l o v s . k l s . J l F r a . n c e Jl' ' G r e 4 : ) 9 ~ J 1 : ' ~ ~ g a : e Y ' J 1 ' ; ,. I ~ ~ 1 ~ ; : ; ~ ~ ~ 9 ~ . l a v i a . J l ' P O l ~ d J l Rumania, R u s s l a : ~ , 8 e ~ b 1 a 4 Cf;llcJlI: '.'

~ p a . 1 i l " 1 J ? 1 1 ~ ~ ~ Y J , U n 1 ~ e K l . , l 1 8 d o ~ J l and'qnj,.ted Statee .. 1.... r:, There;: ', !$:n.gevldenqeot , Qryptanaly,s1s in ,'naval or m 1 1 1 t a ~ . 't:raff1c ,

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basis of having read German messages enciphered by th e Enigma.148The En:lgma involved vas probably the commercial type (withoutplugboard) as the incident occurred prior t o 1 9 3 8 ~ ~ 4 921. Austrian Cipher Bureau was in close liaison withG e ~ ( . The closest possible liaison existed between tne

A u s t r i ~ m Cipher Bureau and th e S 1 ~ 1 Intelligence Agency ofthe Supreme Command, Armed Foroes (OKW/Ch1) and i ts predeoesSOl ' , the Cipher Bureau of the German War M1nistry.150 Thisrelat1c)Dsh1p vas a secret held by only the highest officials .There 'i&S & constant interchange of t raff ic and results ofcryptanalysis. The interchange was through the German Embassyin Vielma and a cipher system was used for s ~ c r e t messages be-.tween th e two agencies. 'Social re la tionships were maintained.5 e c r ~ t assistance was given by the Germans to the AustriahCipher Bureau in collecting evidence for treason t r ials .All of this took place at a time(1935, 1936,and 1937)whentheworld l>elteved antagonism w a s l ~ p a r e n t in the official relation-ships o f Gel'Ill8.nY aJ;I.d Austria. " .When Anschluts was effected in 1938, four of th e o u t s t a n d ~.crypta:llalysts of th e Austrian01pher Bureau" including 1ts head"Dr. Selfert , became members of the German Slsnal IntelligenceAgency of the Supreme Oommand, Armed Forces {OKW/Chi).152Austrian liaison was not confined to the Germans . There issome e'lfidenceof liaison with the Dutch153 and w1th th e Hungar1ansregard:Lng Serb1an t raffic .154 . .1 4 8 I _ I J ~ 2 , P 4.

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VOLUME 8CHAPTER VI

Army Ordnance, Development ana Testing Group, ,Signal Branch" Faragraph.Ord118Jl0e group developed German Army signal equipment. 22

Signal Branch was active in the engineering developmentof manual cipher machines . '. 2}SignaJ. Branch,engineered telepr inter cipher devices.,' ,

Signal Branch was, active in the development of clphony 25)S1gnal. Branch tested N o n ~ M o r s e intercept equipment 26

22. Ordnance sroup developed German A r m ~ Signal equiRment.German, Army signal equipment was developed an tested by th eArmy Ordnance, Development and Testing Group, Signal Branch(Chef del' Heeresruestung und Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres-, ,Amtsgruppe tuel' Entvicklung und pruefung des Heereswaft"enamts,.Waffenpruetung, ~ ~ b t e l 1 u n g 7, abbreviated We. Pruet' 7) 0 This wasone of twelve such branches for ,ordnance testing and development. I t was i t se l f broken down into seven groups, a s fo ll ows:. G:roup I (we. Pruel 7/1) procured raw materials and smalleq,uipment .

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:23. 51 1 Branch wa.s ac t1 e ement'ofmanua cipher mac es. e Deve opmen an ssGroup I SIgnal Branch (Wa Pruet 7) was entrusted with the eng:1.neer1ng and development ,o t many ot the improvements on the An11YEnigma. One of these ,was the variable notchro..tor(Lueckenfue11erwalze) which was suggested by the 81gnalIntel l1RenceAgency ot the Supreme Oommand l Armed Forces (OKW/Chi).161 Toaccommodate th e new rotor$ the S ig nal Branch, (We P ~ e t 7)suggested that sevel'al positions of th e "on-ott tl switch be, 162omitted and that the keying pressure be chB.nged to 1000 g%Dams.Signal Branch also developed printing attachments tor both theArmy and :Navy En1gmas.163 " , 'The proposed new Enigma, 8G 39" which 'Was to combine motionfeatures of the Hagelin machine w l t h t h ~ Enigma. cipher maze, ~ T a Salso engineered by the Signal Branoh.164Another of the Signal Branch's engineering and development'problems was theSG 41, a keyboard Hagel1n ~ 1 t h interlockingmotion. This device was suggested by Senior Inspector Menzerof t h 8ignal Intelligence AgencYJ Supreme Oommand Armed FOrces(OKW/Ch1). The machine had two foms: the standard keyboard'and t,he ten value keyboard for enciphering weather ' synoptics.165Signal Branch (Wa Pruef7) engineered other ldeas or 8 e ~ o rInspector Menzer. . A m O ~ these were: production ot ,an a l u m 1 n ~ , :cipher gri l le (IIRastel'";.,lOt> which wa.s aba.ndoned in thatiform' .befo%le being placed into use; the engineering and development'of' the "cipher box" CSchlueaselkasten)p and the II c1pher diSC"(SchJ.uesselsche1be) .107 These l as t two items 'Were developed160Cj.pher and c1phony devices described in 1ihis and follOWing

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" s1multaneouslytor t h ~ 6 H ~ 1 ~ h Main Security-OffIce (RSHA) 'aswell a,s to r the Army. 1 ' . . '., .. .'. .'rlhere 1 no statement in the TIeON 1 n t e r ~ o g a t l o n s that the. Signal Branoh (WaPxtuef 1) had exolusive engineering oontrolo over the above developments, bt i t indIcat10ns are that it was. .;per,hajls the co-o,r


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Done - . o t ' t 1 i ~ : e x p e ' l ' ~ ~ n t s 'rached ' t h ~ : stagewnere complete.' ,securl,tywa,S ::t>611ev.fjd .to', h ~ v e b e e n ' a c h 1 : e v e 4 . . Typesw6rkeq', .on'llicluded., f;requeiicy'1nV$l'slon whIch ,was abandoned :1I11942 ,.~ ' I r n e - : ~ . 1 ~ y ' : (n T _ ~ g ~ r ~ t e d t 'I); ' the ,ft ~ : t ~ P P i : f i g ' stories fl ,(Bausteine ) p,which, l iers frequency scramblers; 7J and noise superimposl t ion. ' devices., For n01se 8uper1uI.P.9s,ltlon tes ts , a cl;phony link v ~ se t up,by ~ 1 ~ e c t 1 p n p r , t h e . S 1 g n a l - B r a n c h , b e t ' W ~ e n A t h e n 8 i ' C r e t e ,. e.nd Derna .: r "This.. l ink .failed to produce 'sa,t1stactory 1'e:- .."sulta.175 ,... . ' , , . ' . ' .. ,. - _.. , '.' . - '., "., " , . , . . . -: 26. ".SisU!l' Branch tested Non-Morse intercePt'equipment ... ~ t e r l c e p t equipment' for, Russian three-and n 1 n e ; " c h a D n e I t : r ~ ~ ~, m l s 8 . , ~ . o n s w a . ~ ' d ~ ' s 1 g n e d .. .L79 .Success was achieved. in:,1htercepting: th'e"BaudOtl,1nk 'between,Parls, and Mosco'W 177 "EqUipment , ' W a . ~'8.:18:0.' d ' ~ s 1 g . n ~ d tor, the' ,tntel!cept 9 ~ A m e r 1 c a n aal1dot '. t r ~ s , : . ,, m 1 s s j . o n : ~ ~ ' ~ 7 ~ : , Stu4yof,captut'edF,reneh" t h r e . e ~ c h a . m i e l equlp

' m e ' n t w a . s c ~ r ~ e . d o n a t Ge:rman:'statl:ons a t 'Berlin and Bordeaux"" ' 'With'an' attempt to improve, the eQ.uipment by the introductionof frequency m o d u X ~ t i o n ; but thedes.1gn pl 'ovedto'be faulty.Sonie of the French equipment"vas l a te r ,found s ~ ~ : r . ~ d br theSignnl Branch a t th e Feuerstein Laboratory.179 , , ,

~ 7 3 1 ' ~ 5 7 1-96

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J

:eVOLUME 8 ,.

CHAPTER VIIThe .Rad10Defense Corps ot the Armed Forces.

.Paragraph.Radio Defense C.orps attempted to locate. Allied Agents' Radio Tre.n:smit tttrs . 27

i,',.

Radio DefenseCor,ps easily located A m e ~ i c a nAgents' Transmitters at the beg1.nn1ng of the val' ' 28Radio Defense Corps ~ a not alone in i t s f ield . 29

27. Radio Defense C O ~ $ attempted to locate Al11edagents ' radio transmitters. The Radio Defense Corps.of the'Armed Forces (Obex-kommando cier Wehrmacht" W e ~ c h t rlachrichtenverb1ndungJl' F'unkueberwachung., abbrevia.ted OKW/W.JV/Fu) had'., as i ts , mission the following tasks: .". .. 'a . To loca.te, primari ly by d' ireotion finding, a l l .. high .frequency and'very h1ghfrequency t ~ a n s m d t t e r s of' 1l l i c i tt raft1e within AXis Europe.b. To evaluate i l l i c i t transmissions in regard t o the1 rnat1onality# the i r reiat lon to net or control stations, theirscheC/ules, their probable miiSsions and their potent ial value a.s a source of intelligence or coUnter-intelligence., c . To1ntercept i l l i c i t t ra f f ic where valuable to

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b. I t located and oaptU1'ed a.large Russian spy net whichwas kno,m as the "Schulze-Boysen" net . .c. I t located,' intel'cepted, and fu1'Il1shed informat1onfor the capture of a net carrying i l l i o i t Caechoslovakian,traffic" ".'. I t located.ll intercepted, atld occasionally broke uptraff ic nets ot Marshal Tito 's agents. '. , ' , 'e.It located an I ta l ian test t ransmi tt er said by, the"I ta l ians to be proof agatnst direct ion finding.. , ' t I t provided men. equipment, and :lntormation to LUft-,watfe night fighters torlocat1ng and destroyiDgAllied airborneagent control stat1ons. , , " ,' g . I t set up an IBM sect10n for recording and t rat t l0analysis of unknown t raff io . ' , 'The Radio Defense C o ~ s failed as follows:a . " I t could not maintain etfect!ve control'oveX' 1111c1tt raff ic orig1nat1ng in . France. " ,. "b. I t could not control the M1ha11ov1tch-Ca1ro t raff ic .c. ' I t could not control i l l i c i t transmissions in . Ws.r&a,w"d. I t d:1d not maintain effeotive liaison with the ReichMain Secur1ty Off1ce (HSliA). ",' ,

e. I t had almo'st no liaison with the Ital ians.Th.e Rad10 Defense Corps was ot the opiniQnthat 1 t oouldhave performed more effectively i t the Supreme Command hadallocated more personnel to i t .'2 8 . Radio Defenser :Es eas1l1 lq,cated A m e x ' 1 c a . n ' ~ e n t 8 etransm1.tters a t the beg ~ O the 'WaIt" The RadlobeensaCorps held the folloWing op ons of the abil1ty of All ied ,

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, '...'

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'. ' ; , , A ( ~ c ~ r d : f . . r i g : .t '()". t ' ~ e : R ~ c i 1 ( ) J ~ : ~ t ~ i u i e , Corps" n i e a ~ u l ' e s ' that ' couldh f : L v e , b ~ e n ' t ~ k e ~ : bf agent,s : t o . ~ e t A e . l o c a . t i o n , and recognition" ',= ,"' of thei r transmitters most diff icu l t were:, ., ~ ..Tlle ' c . ~ o ~ t : L a . g e ofa .gen t t r a f f l cas .6ut.ho1'ized t raff ic. of, the country i n which the agent was opera.ting. .

,b .The "camouflageot ~ 1 J . ~ agent' control stat ion traf 'flcas r e ~ , : L a . r t I . ' a f ~ l c norma,l:Ly1Sf;\v.iIlg'from t 'he,countrY.,of or1gin.. , , c . . Tlle . ~ r " e q u e n t c l l a . n , g e o . f f , r e q u e I l c y and ,time or t rans- '~ s ' s l q i l ' , . ." . ._, ' .... . . ' ': '" ', . . . . '. ,.'',. P . . T h ~ f . r ~ q u e n ~ g h ~ ~ o f ' . the position or the transmitter.,Measures tha1;i c:o:t1J..d, ~ a Y ~ ; ~ < l e l o c a t U 1 g of very h igh f:re

, q u e n c ~ " transinitters, d i f f i cu l t and ineffectual include:.' . __ " a . : ' 1 ' h e o p e r 8 . t l , 6 n o r ' : t ; r . @ ~ J D . 1 t : t e r s o n 6 : to 12 meters"Only at locat'1ons c10'se to ,the:f'ront -. ; b : T h ~ ' u ~ ~ ' i n ~ ~ c J : i ~ e . or.: t w o ~ separate .frequencies by.'. c6ntrctl s t a , . ~ ; o ~ : . 8 . n d t ~ e i 1 g ~ ~ t . ~ . , . , , ' , '. " .

( ~ ' . The elimina.tion of'transmiss1ons in clearo.- ," '. . 'cl.' The use of very low power outputs. ,c., .The instruct ion ()t:agent;.!f.in th e p rope r use o.f'equipinent iJo: tha t m e s ' f r a ; g e ~ J " w ( ) u ~ g ' b ~ c ' ( ) p j , ~ q . ~ o i n P l ~ t e l i ' 'on >the : f i rsttransmission. .:29 . Radio nerenseCo swa sno t alone1n;1ti:l 1 e l d ~ . Therewere' 'IJthezt organiZe.t ions w h o f 3 ~ wor pa.ra le ed or ,- - er ooked'with t h e R a d 1 0 ~ r . ~ ~ s . e . G ( ) r p ~ ; ..... : .,.. . .. " :. a . The' ~ 1 ta.r,y .In te111gence Rapio Superv1sing. otr ica

( A b ' W e : h ~ j . Abte1lung ;[11 F u n k u e b ~ r w a c r , n . m g 3 ) did, direct ion :f"inc;31ng.... for "military .;intelligence purposef3.;. . . . . ' . ' , "'. '. " " b .The 3rdBattal.ionAi:r Signals Regiment 352 { ~ R e g t

_ . _ .. - ' - ; r , - -

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"

. ; : ,. ,- .. ' ,. ' .", :. .. '; " . ~ , .:. VOi.,uME' 'S"" '. " .CHAPTER VIII'" ' ~ . - : _. , . . .

Laboratorium F e u e ~ s t e 1 n," . t.. ' '.. . . .. . . '..... . .. ' , ' , . . ParagraphHlstclry of Feuerste1.ll Labpratory. '0;. '.. 30

: : s p e ~ l ~ i ~ I ~ o ~ . ~ n g ~ ~ e ~ ~ g t e a m ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e d ' , , . . . . ' . >.signal projects . . f . . . . . . . . . . . . 3J...... '" _ . . . . :, . .' '.O t h e r F e u e r $ t e 1 n ~ p r o j e ' c t s ' w e r ~ : : l \ i a r l e d .. ' ' . " .,: '-

: ::; ~ ~ : ; n a t u ~ e . . . ' ~ .... ' ~ ; < . > . ; " ~ ~ . : " ~ ... ~ ~ : ~ : ' : ~ : : : ' ~ . , ' ! : " ~ . ' . ~ ~ _ . ' ~ . ' . . . ' . ' ~ " : 3 2: : . , ' . 3 o ) ~ ' H - i ' ~ t o ' r y , ' 6 r ' ~ e u e ~ ~ , t ~ f h . r . e . b c i ~ a t o I T ' - ~ ' O n e o : t h e , n i G ~ ~ ,fully,explc)1ted T I O O M ~ t a r g e t s ' vas . the Ui:b.oratoryFeuerstelnwhlch ,waslocated on a small' ~ o ~ t a t i i ;nee:r; E ' \ : ) e i ' n i a n n , s ~ a d t . in .UpperFran,;'~ o n 1 8 . s o m e :15 , l i 1 1 . 1 ~ s . :f.rom: ~ a m b e r g a n ~ . WEtS: ow,nedand.. operated ' by 'j)r. 'Oskar Vierling." S 1 n o ~ 'the ' lab'oratory and ntany o.f,1ts',pro:jec.ts. have. been described in'considerable det l i l in speo1al;reports ( In pSl't lcular': ' ., 1'-4}; ' E-7 to E - 1 9 } ~ B ~ and sinoe: eva};b:-atiol1.and,eicploltatiQn of thEf t e c h n i c a 1 . d ~ t a in.these.report 'B ~ ' . ' ,is. 'a , matter for electronic . e n g 1 I i e e r s ~ . the p;roesent chapter' attempts,/ ;0~ ~ . r e l y . a -resume,: or : the:' hlstb'rY 6 f . ~ h e . 1abc>r",tory'and a brlef ' '~ c e o u n t . o r p t " o j e ' c t s ~ d e i ' t a . k e n . , '. :.: Essent la l to 'an 'u:g.derstandirig ot thevho1e .1s the 'persona.11ty , ' o f . t h ~ owner';'dlrec tor , Dr . V 1 e r l ~ . .He . w a .born in ' 1904

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". ~ .

..joining the Siemens s t a f t bu t Was advised to s tar t a p r 1 v a ~ el a b o J C l ~ t o r y instead. This he dldr..nd Siemens paid a monthlyr et a: l. ne rt ee o f 2000 marks to r an option on all inventions.When this laboratory was .bombed out; the sl te near Ebermannstadt, was purchased, and Laboratorlum Feuerstein (named to rthe mountain on which it sat ) oonstructed . As D r Vierl1ng's ,funds were inadequate he BOUght a loan from th e German Arm:ybut since the terms vould have deprived of real c o n t r o l ~he s o u g h t a n d 8 e c u r ~ d a bank loan 'Which enabied him to completa the work: Astnall group r e m a i n ! ~ o 1 n th e vicini ty ofHannover in charge ot Dr . Sennhelserpan' associate who . .had purcha$ed apa r t in teres t in that laboratory.. From the time1 t opened 1n1942 to the end of the var .. thanew labora to ry a tFeuerstein was subject to the usual "party" supervision.' .. .. .For reasons of' exj;>ediency.o Dr. Vlerling'jo1ned the "party"but seems to have been conspicuous by his fai lure to attend ,' ..meetings and take, any active part in party aot ivi t ies . 191 . .Close l iaison vas maintained with large manufacturing. conce,nswhich yere to t a k ~ ' o v e r p r o j e ~ t s as soon as t h e r e a c h e d p ~ o - ,duct-ion stage. Dr . V1er11ngclaimed that his 'success inkeeping' his laboratory open was chiefly due to the tac t thatthe larger conee rn sd1d not c ar e to s p ~ n ~ their t1me doingr e s e ~ a r c h on problems of a military natu re v itA no peace-timeapplications. By standing well with th e armed forces, Dr... VleI'1,.ing seems to have been a.ble to get high prior1t ies despitehis poor stand!r ig in the Party and even to have succeeded indo1l1g a l1 t t le 'Work on the""slde on pet longrange proJects,notassocia.ted :with the var. 19c . ' .. ,. . .Shortly before the. German collapse,. Dr. Vierling was

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," .

. . . . . . . '.',.. '." ' ; ; ..- , ' : ' :'"

.. ,.... , . - '. '. ' ~ .. " .'.'. .!

: o P P Q r t l l n i ~ y : to - r 1 q . l i f u s ~ i ~ ' , Q t ' h 1 ~ ' a r t i e n t : N a Z 1 " ~ , U s l l i g ihe 'goo'd; . e x < : l . 1 s e . t h ~ t t ; h ~ y ( w o : U l ( 2 ( b e : t l t e . most rel iable persons to accompany t . h ~ equip,:ment.s'.c:ro;th. ',. :lIel1t3.c,t a.lsobeen 'ordered, t:o destroyS t l ' ~ o t h e ~ p;rojects lUlgeq1,l1pment, :but ..onoe. the Nazisl1e.regoneh ~ o r i c e a J . e d much 9f. h1sbe,s:t equ1pmentlIl.the bombpr()of' -va.ult,. , s c : t a ~ : e I l 1 , h g ; l ~ t r o : m ' ~ n ~ p ~ c t o r s .QY.putting up a. .false va'ill, andJ : l ~ } ~ X i { l , n u m . p ~ l ' O ' , p a r t s ~ t v a . ~ i o \ l s p l a c e s -1b. the vlc1Ii.ity e, ' .T-hiaq o n ~ , rille await,eo developments ." ' : . _ . ,._ " "" , ..-': , . } i t l ~ n the ' l ~ b o r ~ i o r y , ,was .f:oun4,by TICOM ' T ~ a n r , # 4 i ,,1 twas.', ':be1ngUlSed as - I J . - _ ~ ~ .mil! tary ~ h o s p l t a l . . :W,hen: D r ~ , ,V1erl1,ngs.nd$Onle.ot'. h j , ~ :o91:taborat.or,s _w:ere:found,.:they. proyed'quite '.';'Will.41g 'tQ. 'te,lJ.; . ~ b o u . . ' t ;the,l%": :worl.c,$nd t o "cooperate' in ::res.toring. ; t : t i ~ , ; l . a ) t : ~ o ~ a , t o : c y t o : w o ; r , k 1 n g ' . e o n C l l t . , i o n . \ ' a n ( r in. r.easse-tnbl1ngdis. m A A t J . e d p ~ o : j e C : t B 4 Under -the direction o f theTICOM invest1sa t o r s ; t h , ? : ~ v . ~ l J , a ; p l ~ f o . ~ c e : o f . s ~ r n ! 9 , '0 .person's. , r u ~ h ~ d . w o r k o n ; .. : s e l ~ o t e d l J : r o j ~ c t : s . 1 3 J 1 4 ' m , a ( 1 e , n ~ ' W ' . d r a . w l n g s ;to. rep.la.cathose,des.- '. .t,r,Qyed .. .Dr. V : l e . ~ 1 : i , n g h o p . ~ ~ _ t 1 l 1 ~ :m1gnthe.lp him keep his Organ!: z tion,go.1D.g du;r1ngtne ,t;raa.t'lSit10n ;period, . tee l ing ~ u r e _ t h ~ t h e

' ~ o 1 1 1 d ; ~ a t ~ r ' be S i b l ~ to ' $mp-loyh!s'.pe.ople. on. n o n ; , . m 1 U : . t a r y r e ~::se.ar;ch:t:n.$OOllsttcS..... .. . . . , . .. . - . . . . '.. : . '.. . .... .' ... ,t.eltlela;boratQry.ll cons1at ingof a ma,1nbul1ding, two sD1a,11 .. s p e c l ~ : L . 1 Q , ~ Q r a ~ o : r l ! 9 s , D r . V1e;rliIigf s ' house.,:andsome :storage ...fac:i11'tles,\l ; h ~ s . b e ~ n d e s c r l b ~ d : . :W'. d.eta.11 and p h o t o g r . a p h e d . , ~ 9 4.ItJ.,ssfi,1Q ~ o h,a v . ,'Qeen we-II ' b ~ 1 J . t and .. $idttlirably e


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reached with many workers either over age or Just out ofschool. Rules governing employment are interesting.197 Wagesseem tlO have been ',those usual to r comparable' york elsewhere inGermany while v o r k i n ~ condit ions vere s u p e r i o ~ . The s ta f f seemstoha.v,e worked in tolerable harmony.l9 ts A l i s t of per sonnel 1saval1a'ble in one of the TICOM publications. 99;, ' > - .\:. . . .3l .SpecialTICOM engineering team studied Signal projects .When, the, hosp1tal had, been e v a c u a t e d ~ and a." spec1alTICOM engin..eering team had assembled at ,Feuerstein la te .1n'July, t h ep re - .

l1m1na,ry l i s t s ' of projeots wer.e discussed; I;fond certain groups ofr e la t ed proj ec ts were selected to r intensive stUdy. " D r . V i e ~ -, . l ing; who was quite v i ll ing to>coopera te" started to clear outdebris" ' recall key men, and ' reassemble equipment. ' ',The selectedprojec.ts were set up" missing'diagrams redrawn, and descriptionswritte!n. A qecision by hlghCJrauthority resulted on 16 "Augustin , the, ar res t ot Dr. Vierl1ng g the d1spersalof ' his s ta f t I andthe d:l.sma.ntling or the laboratory I but in th e time avai lable,much lras accomplished. In the tollow;tng paragraphs the .major,p r o j e c ~ t s st l idiedare enumerated wlthouttechn1cal de ta i ls '.a . Fi l t e r D e S i ~ . Inasmuch as much of the 'Work a t .Feuerfltein, depende.a ~ success upon ,accurate f i l t e rs ; 'and,'since Dr. Glubrecht, the expert, in this f ie ld , seemed to have'a knackwlthsuch designs, he was asked to des1gnfl1ters tomeet dif f icul t" though not iIrJ,possible specifications, and to 'expla:tn both his computations and his reasons for the se1eo-," . t ions he made. In th is w a ~ , the ,TICOM engineering team' hopedtc f arJt'ive a t a reasonable estimate of the efficiency of hismethods .200 Standard typetorold col1s .and,comrnercla1 c()n- .

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an automatic high speed signal generator,a l ight weight transmitter,a carrier regenerator on the receiver, anda single side band demodulator.mhen the dial of th e signal generator vas turned to anygiven le t ter a signal was generated and recoI'ded on a steelwire or tape. This vire was run a t h1gh speed through the,head of the transmitter (Taube) to make interception d1r'i-cult,p i f not impossible. The carr1er regenerator (Spitz)was originally designed to resliore the suppressed carrier,whill3 th e single sideband demodulator (Kaethe) receivea thei n t e : ~ e d i a t e frequency signal from an ordinary receiver(two instruments) could be connected to demodulate two sidebands independently). An interesting departure trom Americanand lBriti.sh practice .was that a l l fi l tering o tcar r ie r andside bands was a t about 15 kc rather than at 100 kc.Aside from the high speed, this equipment was intendedto r,educe tuning to a miniIntlm, so that short messages mightbe sent V i t h 2 ~ i t t l e r isk of d e t e c t l o n ~ I t was'saidto berather good. .c. Speech Scramblers and associated equipment. Themajor speech scrambling project s t i l l under development a tthe end of the war was treated under three heads:

( ~ A converter of' th e "DUdley!! type consi st ing of ananalyser and a synthesizer. . The former measured cer tain fea- 'tures of speech and r epor ted these measurements in the form ofa small number of smoothly varying voltages which togetherconstituted a running description of what was spoken into themicrophone. The synthesizer used such aset of signal voltages

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Particular features proved of interest" but doubt \Tase x p r E ~ s s e d by American engineers as to the practicabil i ty ofthe ILpparatus as a whole .202 rd. Crystal controlled synchronization of cipher tele-p r 1 n 1 ~ e r s (GleichlaU). -.Next to th e speech scrambling devices, this seems tohave attracted most attention. A quartz crystal 'mechanical'r r e ~ l e n c y generator 203 represented the f i rs t stage in thisdevelopment. The &ynchronizating or-two stations would becut ' 1 ~ 0 a minimum since, once synchronized .. both would 1"Wlsynchronously for 24 hours without resetting and send outenciphered space signals when no message was being transmitted.Such continuous transmission with adequate length of key wouldrender i t almost impossible for intercepters to determine wherea mel!Sage began or ended. The controlled synchronization wouldalso overcome diff iculties from interference and fading of8 i g r i ~ ~ l s and minimize the need for repetit ion of long parts of am e s s l ~ g e .Intended for use wlthte lepr inter cipher attachments ofth e :sz 42 type, the Gleichls.ur project included, not merelydevelopment of the synchronizer, but also improvement in th ecIpher device i t se l f , so that considerable information wasobtained a t Feuerstein respecting proposed changes i n theLorenz 5Z m a c h 1 n e s . 2 0 ~ Moreover, as above suggested, Dr.Vierling had visions of incorpora ting this principle in hisspeech scrambler. Rather ful l details were obtained.205e. Teleprinter cipher attachments. In connection withthe Uleichlaur problem several Lorenz cipher machines (SZ 38and SZ 42) were turned over t o Feuerst ein for study!, Vierling

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3 ? .. other Feuerstein projects ,Tere va.ried in natu:x-e ..F e u e r s ~ e 1 n Lahor,atory projects of secondary importance to the

TICOM engineer,ing team were: , 'a. Acoustic torpedo: Feuerstein eng inee rs (ve re used to)d a s l g n e ~ d acoustic and f i l t e r comp'onents, AEG manufactured thetorpadcl 207 'b. Schornste1nfeger, an anti-radar cqat1ng for submarinesl: d e p ~ n d e d on quarte%' ( la ter eighth) wave lengthabsorpt ion .. 20t;S, . 'c., Nachtfee", a night t ighter control system: based onphase Dl0dulation.':::Og ' . ' .d.. Block ci rcui t (wave trap) for intercept pUl'poses.About 1ihe size of a matchbox, cheap and very efficleJ:).t ..Eliminated powerfUl, fixed stat ions thus permitting receptionof veale s ignals . Bone found a.l though produced in some number .. 210e . Multiple frequency generation from one crystal :specially designed multi-vibrator circui ts gave tu l ly stabletrequ;'.;lc.1as which were not harmonics ot th e basic crys ta l1'requeltlcy. The model covered 80 spot frequencies with outputof SOIWe 80 watts. Important to the Germans whose supply otcrystals was l imited.f.. Commercial radio receiver. High se lec t ivi ty and .'sensit1vi toy, used untuned IF and RF c1rucits and replaced ".tuned circui ts by f 1 l t e r s ~ Sole tuning control vas a tunedosci l la tor ci rcui t . Essentially an. ef f ic ient elec t r ica l bandspread .eliminating dif f icul ty of HF tuning.go Voice frequency spectrograpn. . Tvo constructed for thelabora,tory with accuracy ot 10-7.

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jL. H i output c ~ n t 1 m e t r , 1 c t ransmit ter . Work was donea t H ~ U 1 o v e r on a high output Magnetron transmitter and acont1Jluous output of 2 lew had been. at ta ined. Vierling toldof wO:Jrk a t E r l ~ n g e n . on a Klystron transmitter giving a muchhighe:t' output.j . Electronic calculator . Would so lve equa tions up toand 1;ucluding N6; resolveequat.1ons l to sine and cosine functionswhere NO i s represented by a fundamental frequency whose ampli-tude 1s proportionate t o thecoe f r i c i en t and the s econd andthird harmonics, etc . The resul t vas to be obtained instantane-ous ly both as an Elysian r1gure ~ as a spot on a cathode raytUbe. 2l2

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VOLUME 8

_ 34- -

Chapter IXCryptolog1c Activ1ties of the German Meteorolog1cal Service

p a r a ~ r a ; P hG e ~ n Meteorological Service was l ocated nea r Berlin - - 3Cryptographic Machines, of the German MeteorologicalService were those used by .the German Army - _ _ -German Meteorological Service successfully cryptanalyzedRussian Wea.ther Systems _ 0 35

'e33 . German Meteorolo 1cal Service was

~ h German Meteoro og cal Service Relc Weloca.ted near Berlin.at Glindow, Potsdam.2l7 .The Berlin headquarters, known as the Central Weather Service Group (Zentralw e t t l ~ r d 1 e n s t g r u p p e ) , expanded during the war to include a.secondary headquarters in A t h e n s ~ 2 1 B Lit t le is reportedTICOM sources concerning the formal prganization and size ofthe Service . I t is reported that a cryptanalyt ic section washeadedby a Senior I n ~ ~ ~ c t o r Naumann who directed 10 special is ts ,and 20 to }o helpers_ The intercept and other fUnctions otthe Service were carried out by the Meteorological InterceptControl (Wetternachrictenueberwachung, abbreviated Wenueb)

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Ge:rma.n Air Force.' L iaison extended down to the indlvidualLuftflot t e ~ 2 ~ d t o the various 5 i g n ~ l Units of th e Ge,rmanAir Force. All German Air Force Signal Intelligence Unitshad s tanding orders to pass a l l weather information to theneat'est weathel" station. This 1nrormatlon was derived prlmarlly from enemy planes in the area.223 Aweather evaluatorwas placed in Section B of th e Chi/Stelle to expedite the handl ing of a ll weather data and messages and to see that theG e r D ~ Meteorological Service received a ll captured materialr e l ~ ~ t 1 n g to weather.224 Cooperation with the German Air ForceWas hampered by poor communications during the e ~ l y phases orthe German campaigns in the Balkans and Russia.Communications Within the German Meteorological ServicewerE' normally by teleprinter networks in clear. This applied.to ( ~ o m m u n i c a t l o n s within the occupied area in Russia. How-eve]:, J vi thin German-allied areas such as Rumania, teleprintertratf lc was enciphered. 225I t may be inferred that weather r epor ting with in theGerman framework was generally carried on in the u sua l manner.An example of the occasional unusual method is the droppingof parachutists behind the Russian lines for the purpose oflending back weather r ~ p o r t s . 2 2 6. ~ 4 cRtOgraPhiC Machines of th e German MeteorologicalS81"111ce veranose used by the German ArmY. For transmissiono r ; ~ y n o p t i c s the German Meteorological Service originally usedthe internat ional f ive-figure code with encipherment by meansof laubstitutlon tab les fo r th e in i t ia l digraph and the f ~ trlgraph of each group. The period for each table vas three

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th is Iliesulted in security, violations 0 To circumvent thif 'diff icul ty" the five-figure gttoup vas r ep re sent ed a s a s lxfigure, group. The f1n&l digi t of the til 's t trigr&ph andthe in i t ia l . digi t of' the sec'ond trigraph represented thethird digi t of the original five-figure group. The 'sixflgure:s vere 0 then enc1phered in the form of' tvo tr igraphsand t ransmi tt ed as a six-figure group.o ~ I h e subst itu tion tab les to r the six-figure t ra f f ic wereknown &s Siegfried tables . Fz-om 1943 on" Rtunim1a" Hungary, ,and BUlgaria used the German six-figure system with a special 'se t ot subst itu tion tables. Previous to this" an addit ive was'used to r the reports 0 Stations located a t operational headquartEtI'S a t the front used the sU-f igure system with a spec1alse t of' tables 0 Ear l ier these f ro nt s ta ti on s had used A "handkey" to obviate the need f o r d is tr ibu ti on of tables. 22'(Event\.\ally JI on t he Eas te rn front the plugboard Enigma was usedto enc:ipher weather reports and ~ i p h e r instructions of' theGerman Meteorological S e r v i c e . 2 2 ~

J 1943 and 1944 when the Germans became very active inH u n g a 3 ~ Y J l the reports lstatements of' general weather conditions"e . g. JI Fair and Warmer) were enciphered by use of a rectanglecontajlnjllg a l1m1ted vocabulary and three sets of sl iding s t r ips .The s t; rlps vere used to r a :; or 4 month period. Regular syn-~ ~ ; ~ : ~ : : : e a ! ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ : ~ e f n ~ 9 : ~ e b ~ 1 ~ ~ l i r : 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e r ~ : ~ : ~ 2 9One ot the most commoJlweather reporting systems was theZenit C o ~ e . The Zen1t Code was used o r i ~ a l l y i t s form,but lli-ter i t s l e t t e r groups, and s t i l l la ter i t s figure groups,were enciphered. The Zendt Code was used by reconnaissance

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. (

Two other common systems for th e enc1pherment of meteol'ologica.l data were the Barbara Key J which was known to th e A 1 1 ~ e s ' ,from 1.939 on, but was not replaced unti l 1945.. and th e Ras te r,which was introduced in 1944. The B&l"bara Key is supposed toh a ~ e / b e e n replaced by a nev, and undescribed system preparedby Ref'erat I I B 01' Signal Intelligence Agency or the SupremeCOmmaIld 01' the Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) .231, ~ ~ h e other machine beside' the Enigma which has been men-tionecl tor ' weather use was the Cipher Machine 41 a , Hagelinwith interlocking motlon$ which was to have been ,used ei therwIth the standard keyboard or as a special model with 10 keys.2,2This lmay be the machine referred to-as the replacement tor theEnigmn. in J8J?uary 1945 which gave the plain and cipher texton printed tapes. 233For telephonic communication of seoret weather reports,clphe:!" elements were 11mited to , the cover name "FASAB eI .. wh1chindicated that the reports were weather; and th e Group 'WIDDER ..which preceded two 5 element groups which d e 8 ~ g n a t e d the stationsource. Enc1.pherment or such ~ ~ o r t 8 took place only it the . ,.reports la ter went on the a11"0 ,./ .. ',In regard to the German a t t1 tude toward th e security ot ' ~ , , ; . ~ . , .their QWIl systems" the fol lowing sta tement of Dr. Walter Regulais of .part1cular interest . "Russ1an. military o p e r a t ~ o n s verefaul t lessly based on many years exper1ence ot climatic andweather condit1ons (1t '1s thOUght) so that they d1.d not needthe c:U1'rent synopt1cs. "235 This statement was made relat iveto t t question 01' whether the Russians worked on Germanweather systems.

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This prompted similar actiOn by the R u ~ s l 8 J l s . However, theRussians exchanged information concerning European Russia withGermany unt i l the Germans discontinued because of the discoverythat t h gU5sia.ns were g iv in g th e German information to the .Allies. 3 Ea.rly Russian encipherment was by means of th e \II Copenhagen Cipher" wIth the 1&tel' addi t lon of add!tlve tables 0 237In 1944 this system was 'Worked on by the German MeteorologicalServioe and by Regiment 353 using meteorological personnel. 238Russian enciphering tables were captured early in the war andpresented l i t t l e diff1culty.239 Prior to the oapture the JGerman,s read only 2 or 3 days ot each 3-week period 0 240 Therecons:tructed and captured tables were used to read messagea inBer l1l1, and thenthemesaages were reenclphered and sent toa l l l l l ~ t e r e s t e d par t ies bI radio. This sometimes resul ted in aconsiderable time lag. 24 I t soon became noticeable that thequal1t.y and quantity of Russian reports deteriorated. Thisgave I.!se to the bel ie t that the Russians knew of the comprom!se. t;! 2 The q,uality improved when the Russian f ront reachedHungal'y, but the cipher ~ ~ so simple tha t t ron t l ine unitsread the reports easi ly .

~ ~ h e other major missions of the German MeteorologicalService vere concerned with B r i t i s ~ 4 ~ e a t h e r reports and re-ports from the M e d i t e r r a n e ~ area. Although it has beenstated that the Brit ish wea ther could be read once in a While,236I _:L94, p 8.2371_120

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'.the Slgnal Intelligence Agency of th e Supreme Command of theArmed Forces (OKW/Ch1) as a consultant vas not able to breakthe BJC'it1sh system introduced early in the war and the German.Meteorological Service had no greater ~ u c c e s s . 2 ~ 5'fhe fact that Canada" the United Sta.tes, and AsiaticRussll3. did not enc ipher weather a t tlJe beginning of the warwas of inest imable aid to Germany. 249 The Athens group 'Wasaided considerably by the f ~ c t that reports f rom Egypt andSudan vere not e n c l p h e r e d . 2 ~ 7 Further, the fact that reportsfrom th e Azores continued to be unenciphered for many monthsaf ter th e Allied occupation was of g rea t assi st ance. 248 ,I t would appear that there was l i t t le interest in theUnited States reports. Little , i! '" a n y ~ work was done onAmerican systems, and most 'of the necessary information W f J , ~obtained from the reports in clear sent by th e Air F o r c e . 2 ~ 9. In 1941 and 1942" th e Turkish weather systems were easilybroken, but la ter changes made solution ~ p o s s i b l e . 2 5 0 I thas 'been categorically stated that no attempts was made toread Japanese systems. 25lThe German Meteorological Service's success may be ~ e a s u r e din p l : : ~ r t by th e fact that in winter of 1942-1943 i t had availablealmoflt a ll of the European and many non-European secret weather. r e p o ] ~ t s and synoptics in greater volume than a l l the data norm a 1 1 ~ r available in peacetime. 252 The intercept faci l i t ies ofthe (Jerman Meteorological Service were o added value i n thatthey were able to predict th e Allie d a i r attacks from S o u t h e ~Italy on Rumania and Hungary by evaluating the turning t raff icover the various,a1rf1elds. 253 .

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and personnel of the principal German cryptanalytic organiz a t i c ~ s . All available sources were used, including Ultra.Init.1.al consideration wa.s given ~ 8 0 S i X targets , a l l of themthen located in th e Berlin area.. Priori ty I 'Was g1ven toth e S igna l Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of theArmed Forcee (oKW/ch1), thought to be' the principal diplomaticcryptanalrtic agency. Priori ty II was a s s i ~ e d to three agencies:: (1 ) Army Inspectora.te :flYI (OIrn/ln 7{'JI), tentativelylocated-in the Jueterbog area.; (2) The Si&nal IntelligenceAgency of the Air Force High Command (OKL/LN ABT/350), pin-,point,ed a t Potsdam-Wildpark and' (3 ) The Signal IntelligenceAgency of the Navy High Command (OKM/4 SKL1III), then locateda t Eberswalde. Priori ty II I was assigned to two other tar-gets: (1 ) The Army High Command Signal Intelligence Control'stat:ton (OKH/Chef HNW/LNA) I located a t Zossenj and(2) the 'Germa:n Admiralty Headquarters (11Koralle 'l ) located in the Lankearea. I t is notable that Goer1ng's "Research Bureau!: (FA)and the Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Sec tion (Pers Z SJ wereeither not known or not l isted a t the time. Neither were th echanges in 'German army signal intelligence organization afterOctober,.1944, properly outl ined and evaluated., All .of.the six priori ty organizations l isted above yeredes ignated as Class B t a r g e t s ~ that i s , la rg e S ig in t insta l lation,s to be exploited by TICOMapecialists. The smaller s i g i n torganizations which had operated with ta.ctical commarids (Class ATargets)' were to be explolted in the same manner as other captured personnel and instal lat ions, with TICOM special is ts ,ava1.1able i t requested. '

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The \ult1mate action which TIOOM took in regard to exploltat l o ~ vas based largely upon expediency. The, exploitation plan,as revised in March, 1945, provided fo r six U. S.-Bri t ishtar'get exploitation teams. In the actual expl'oltatlon, team,asEllgnments were largelyd:l ,sregarded. Administrative quest ionsand ava1labil i ty ot per sonne l ver e the pr inc1palcr i t e r l a usedf o ] ~ assignments.' 1J.1eams vere dispatched to ta rg ets as they wereo V E ~ r r u n , notice being channeled b ~ c k through the Brit ish Intel l i gence 21 Army 'Group, through Signal Intelligence Division (SID),ETOU5A, or thrOUgh, General Stat t - Intel l igence (G5I(s ,SIDW;F. All ,six . : t e a m s w e l ' ~ eventually, dispatched to targeta.

vnlytwo -OlajOl' German sigint., centers vere found reasonably,intact. and control l ing the majorit;}' 01' the i r assigned personnel .T e ~ ~

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TICOM Vol. 8 - Miscellaneous