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TICOMandtheIntelligenceCorps

DRAMATISPERSONAE

TICOMTEAM1PERSONNEL

*Oeser,O.WingCommanderRAFVR.(ChiefTRO)ACambridgepsychologistand friendofWinterbotham,hehad joinedHut3 in thesummerof1940.In1941hewasHut3Dep.AirAdvisor.ByJune1942wasHeadofHut 3(Air) and by late 1942 hewas head of the newly formedHut 3(L)where hemadeEnigmaandFishprioritydecisions.HebecameprofessorofpsychologyattheUniversityofMelbourne.Bytheageof27hehadgraduatedfromfouruniversitiesinthreecountriesandhadgaineddoctoratesintwodisciplines.

*Campaigne,H.LieutenantCommanderUSNR(DeputyChief)AsayoungmanwithaPhDinmathematicshehadsentthenavyahomemadedesignforanencryptiondevicewhichwasrejected.HegainedhiscommissioninDecember1941.HewaseventuallytobecomeNSAresearchchiefasheadofREMP(Research,Engineering,Math&Physics).

Barringer,H.CaptAUS.(USArmy).Carter,T.CaptainIC(IntelligenceCorps)

ALieutenantthoughtherewasaCaptainTMCarteratthetimeintheCorpsworkingin‘Specialemployment’whichusuallyreferredtoservinginMI5,MI6,MI8;thereisnorecordofhisworkingatB.P..Cockerell,H.LieutenantRNVRHeservedintheNavalSectionofB.P.wherehewasdepartmentheadofN.S.111JAdministrationandManning.AfterTICOM,heandPickeringstayedoninGermanyinsearchofvariouswantedpersons

Coolidge,J.Lieutenant(J.G)USNRCrowe,R.MajorAUS.Donahue,O.MajorAUS

FromYale,SenttoB.P..togetherwithGwynneEvansfromHarvardandHowardPorterfromColumbiaheworkedinHut3

Eldridge,J.MajorAUSTogetherwithFormantak(below)heaccompaniedMajorTestertoPfunds40milesSWTesterhadsingle-mindedlybeentryingtotrackdowntheactualequipmentafterallhiseffortstobreakitblind.

Formantak,C.Capt.AUSLawrance,I.CaptainIC.

Again,aLieutenantalthoughtherewasaCaptainLWLawranceatthetimeintheCorpsworkingin‘specialemployment’thereisnorecordofhisservingatB.P..HeisnotlistedinSpecialDuties&theIntelligenceCorps

Levensen,A.1stLieutenant.AUS.ANewYorkerandmathematicianhehadspenttimeoncodeproblemsbeforetransferringtotheUKandBletchleyParkAsacryptographer,HewasinBlockD(6)andBlockF,&Hut6intheresearchsub-section.LaterhewasinboththeTesteryandNewmanry.TogetherwithWhitaker,NorlandandsevenothercryptologicofficershehadcometotheUKinJuly1943on

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theAquitania,thefirstUScodebreakerstobeassignedtoB.P.whereheworkedfromJuly1943toJan1946.HewassecretaryoftheB.P..chessclub.B.P..’schessandbridgeclubsmusthavebeenawesome,includingasitdid,atonetime,theentireBritishbridgeteamandtheleadingchessplayer.

Lively,J.FirstLieutenantAUS.Maxwell,I.PilotOfficer.RAFVR.

PilotOfficerMaxwellworkedinHut6atB.P.*McIntosh,A.MajorIC

OriginallycomingtoB.P.fromtheTankCorps,alinguisticsexpertwhosespecialitywasMiddleEnglish,hehelddegreesfrombothOxfordandHarvard.HeworkedatB.P..intheNewmanry&Testery1941–1945wherehewasinvolvedinthedesignoftheDragonmachinefortestingcribsagainstencipheredmessages.HewaslatertohaveadistinguishedacademiccareerinEnglishlanguageandlinguistics.

*Norland,S.1stLieutenantAUS.HewasoneoftheearliestUSrecruitstoB.P.BeforeenteringtheArmyin1942hetaughthistoryandGermaninalocalhighschool.HeworkedinHut3withWhitakerasatranslator

Pickering;F.LieutenantColonelIC.ThereisnoLieutenantColonelPickeringshownasworkingatB.P.norintheArmyListofthattimeintheIntelligenceCorps.Itis100%certainthatitwasDrFrederickPickeringwhowasatB.P..1941–46.HeworkedinHut3,BlockD(3)andspecialisedintheanalysisoftheGermanSignalIntelligenceorganisation.

PorterHoward.HecamefromColumbiaUniversity.Anotablelinguisticsscholar,heworkedinHut3.HereturnedtobecomeprofessoroflinguisticsintheDepartmentofGreek&LatinatColumbiaUniversity

Rood,l.LieutenantColonelAUS.HewaswiththeSLU*atthefirstTacticalAirforceandwascriticalofB.P.strategypost-D-Dayin‘PiercingtheFogIntelligenceandArmyAirForceOperationsinWWIIwhichheco-authored.Hewasverycriticalof*Winterbotham’s‘SpecialLiaisonUnits’

*Rushworth,E.MajorIC.MajorEdward(Rush)RushwortworkedinHut3andHut6FusionRoom&SIXTAonthelong-termanalysesofenemyorderofbattleandoperations

*Sayres,G.FlightLieutenantRAFVR.ItispossiblebutunlikelythatthisisPilotOfficerP.N.SayerswhoworkedinHut3secondedfromAirSection.ThereisnooneofthenameSayresrecordedasbeingatB.P.

*Stone,l.CaptAUSCapt(Lou)StonerepresentedtheUSSpecialBranch.Bythistime,USMilitaryIntelligencewaspresentingafarmoreunifiedpicturethanpreviouslywithG-2havingwonthefighttotakeovertheSignalSecurityAgencyfromtheSignalCorps

*Tester,R.MajorIC.MajorRalphTesterworkedinHut5andthenthe‘Testery’andwasoneoftheveryfewheadsofdepartmentstohaveitnamedafterhim(theotherwasNewmanandtheNewmanry)HehadjoinedtheMilitaryResearchteamin1940,becomingheadofTestery,breakingFishcodesbyhandmethods,theonlymethodavailableuntilthearrivalofHeathRobinsonandColossus

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*Whitaker,P.1stLieutenantAUS.FortwoyearshehadbeenassignedtoHut3.Beforejoiningthearmyin1942hehadstudiedandtaughtGermanintheUSA,GermanyandAustria.At38hewasconsiderablyolderthanhisfellowjuniorofficers.ItisthankstohisdiariesandphotographsthatweknowsomuchdetailaboutTICOMteamsotherthanfromtheNSAreport.

*OriginalTeam1personnel,theotherswereattachedforvaryingperiods.

TICOMTeam2personnel:MajorCharlesJ.Donahue,AUS(chiefTRO)

SeeaboveTeam1CaptThomasM.Carter,IC(deputychief)

HeworkedatB.P.intheMilitarySectionandthenSIXTA.LieutenantHughA.L.Cockerell,RNVR

ThisispresumablythesamepersonasservedinTeam1CaptLeslieW.Lawrence,IC

CaptL.W.LawrenceisnotrecordedashavingbeenemployedatB.P.butheservedinSpecialEmployment.SeeaboveTeam1

CaptHenryC.Barringer,AUSDrBarringerwentontoservewiththeUSForeignServiceinBurundi,Colombia,Congo,Denmark,GermanyandGreece.In1970hefoundedtheUSNationalPeaceAcademyandwastheco-creatoroftheCenterforConflictResolution

CaptainJamesK.Lively,AUSFirstLieutenantArthurJ.Levenson,AUS

SeeaboveTeam1PilotOfficerIanC.M.Maxwell,RAFVR

HeworkedinHut6CorporalJ.W.Biggin,w/toperatorLanceCorporall.Tyler,w/toperatorCorporalRalphH.Brazel,driverT/5FredrickMuzer,driverTICOMTeam3personnel:LieutenantColonelPaulE.Neff

MajorPaulENeffhadworkedatB.P.1943-44intheMilitarySectionspecialisinginItaliantraffic

LieutenantColonelGeoffreyH.EvansAlmostcertainlythiswasMajorG.H.EvansoftheIntelligenceCorpswhoworkedinMilitarySectionB.P..from1940.HewasheadofNo4IntelligenceSchoolandthensub-sectionB.InFeb1945hewasheadoftheGermanpolicesub-section.Post-warhewentontowritethe‘HistoryofInterception’.

MajorWilliamP.Bundy

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HetrainedasalawyeratHarvardbutlefttojointheArmySignalCorps,workingatB.P..Duringthe50’sheworkedasananalystfortheCIAandwaschiefofstaffattheOfficeofNationalEstimates.

CaptainR.W.Adams CaptainD.M.MacIntyre

AUSArmyofficer.HeworkedatB.P.intheMilitarySectionandSIXTASergeantI.LoramSergeantF.A.MarxCorporalSchnabelTICOMTeam4personnel:LieutenantCommanderHowardCampaigne,USNR.LieutenantEvelynTalbot-Ponsonby,RNVR

ServedatB.P.1940-45inHut4andBlockB.InNavalSectionIV(GO),BlockB,Room7andHut4(NavalSection(historical)

LieutenantChristopherHuntington,USNRHeworkedinB.P.NavalSection

CorporalA.G.Abel.RoyalSignals,SCU.8.SCUunitswereMI6’smainradioconduits

CaptainM.A.G.Wingate,oftheIntelligenceCorps,laterjoinedthem.HeworkedinHut6,BlockD(6)SIXTAandtheMilitarySectionwhilstatB.P.until

1945TICOMTeam6personnel:CommanderA.M.S.Mackenzie,RNVR,C.O.

LieutenantCommanderservedatB.P.fromJune1940to194646,HeworkedinHut4&BlockBNavalSectionNSVIII,RecordsandNSIVsubmarinesandhydrography.

LieutenantJohnNuelsen,USNR,X.O.HeworkedatB.P.inthenavalsection.

LieutenantCommanderLeonardA.GriffithsLieutenantCommanderRNVRjoinedB.P.inthespring1941to1946andworkedinHut4andBlockA.Inlate1943hewasHeadofNSVII(surfacevessels&GeneralIntelligence),bymid-1944wasHeadofNavalSectionResearch.Post-warhejoinedtheForeignOfficeandcontinuedtoworkatGCHQ

LieutenantHowardJ.HortonAnHHortonisshownasworkingatBletchley.HeisnotrecordedasbeingamemberoftheCorpsnorwithanymilitaryrank.Almostcertainlynaval

SubLieutenantE.MorganHeworkedatB.P.inNavalSection

USNavyLieutenant.(j.g.)M.Gaschk,USNEnsignP.Phillips,USNUSArmyMajorWilliamF.Edgerton,LieutenantOliverR.KirbyLieutenantLouisLaptookBritishArmy

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LieutenantGeoffreyH.EvansICThoughtheArmyListshowshimasbeingalieutenant,B.P.recordslisthimasMajor.HehadjoinedB.P..MilitarySectionbackin1940andwasatonetimeHeadof4I.S.(IntelligenceSchool).ByFeb.1945hewasheadoftheGermanPoliceSub-sectionandwentontowritetheHistoryofInterceptionforB.P..

MajorEricK.MorrisonICMajorEricKeirMorrisonwasatB.P.from1941to1945.HeworkedinHut6,BlockD(6),BlockG,SpecialLiaisonParty,latertobecomeSIXTA.HespecialisedintrafficanalysisandthedevelopmentofdiagramstoidentifyGermanMorsenetworks.

CaptainM.J.M.HorsfieldICCaptainHorsfieldworkedinBlockF(Mil.E)andHut10

RoyalSignalsCorporalRobertsCorporalTansleyDriverFisherDriverHewetson.TICOMTeam5HadnoBritishpersonnelconsisting,asitdid,ofmainlydiversfortheonespecificOperation.As is so often the case, the part that members of the Corps played in one of the mostimportantSigintoperationsofWWIIand theColdWarhasneverbeenpublicised, indeedtheoperation knownas TICOM itself, is unknown to the general public, and someof thedetailsnearlyseventyyears laterarestillnotofficiallyreleasedbyGCHQandNSA. It isanextraordinarystorythatdeservestobetoldasfaraspossible,particularlyinthecontextofmembersoftheCorpswhoplayedasignificantrole.Just five days after Hitler's suicide, GeneralWilliam O. Donovan, Chief of the Office ofStrategicServices,deliveredasecretreporttoPresidentHarryTrumanoutliningthedangersof a potential conflict with the USSR. With the successful conclusion of World War II,Donovanwarned, ‘theUnited Stateswill be confrontedwith a situation potentiallymoredangerousthananyprecedingone’.‘Russia,’hecautioned,‘wouldbecomeamenacemoreformidable to the United States than any yet known’. Serious consideration had alreadybeengiventocontinuingtheAlliedadvanceintoGermanyandattackingtheRussians.Manysenior US Generals were very much in favour. For many Germans this was seen as thelogical conclusion and their one remaining hope for escaping from inevitable defeat andunconditional surrender. The Germans had been sending out unofficial feelers for sometimehopingtobringthisabout.Byearly1945HimmlerhadlostfaithinaGermanvictory,likelydue,inpart,tohisdiscussions(extraordinarythoughitmaysound)withhismasseurFelix Kersten who had a great deaal of influence over him and with WaLieutenanterSchellenbergwho, following the abolition of the Abwehr,was the S.S. Brigadeführer andHeadofForeignIntelligence.He,Himmler,hadcometorealisethat,iftheNaziregimeweretosurviveinanyform,itneededtoseekapeacewithBritainandtheUSHestillnurtureddreamsofbeingHitler’ssuccessor

Fornearlyayear,bothWashingtonandLondonhadbeen secretlyplanning for the firstbattleof thenewColdWar.This so-calledwar– itnever featureddirectmilitaryaction–unlikeinthepast,wouldbefoughtintheshadowsandmanyofitsactionswouldbedenied.

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Theinitialgoalwouldbethecaptureofsignalsmaterialinallitsformsratherthancitiesandbeingabletounderstandandinterpretit,extractingalltheavailableintelligence.Thiswouldeventually escalate into a war involving both sides being dependent on the yet to beinventedcomputersandthecreationofcomplexmathematicalalgorithmsandthey,ratherthan men, brawn, machines and munitions, would eventually determine the winner – iftherewastobeone.Themainbattlefieldonwhichthewarwouldbe foughtwasalreadyknownas signals intelligence, Sigint, to the initiated -- apolite term for reading someoneelse'smail. It had been fought over since virtually the beginning of the century and thediscovery of wireless. In particular, Ultra, mainly the reading of Enigma traffic, as it wasknown,hadsince1940,playedavitalroleintheapproachingdefeatofNaziGermanyandseveraltensofthousandshadbeenemployedbyallsidesinthisongoingbattle.

As the European war drew to a climax in the summer of 1944, the technologicaladvantagesthattheGermanshaddemonstrated intanks, jetaircraft, rocketsandmissileshadbecomeall too apparent, causing great concern amongAlliedplanners.Anumberofintelligenceoperations,plannedtobecomeoperationalassoonaspracticableintheeventof aGerman collapse,weredesigned to seize asmuchof the intellectual propertyof theThirdReichaspossible.Looselyco-ordinatedbytheCombinedIntelligenceObjectivesSub-committee,anumberoftheseoperationswereplanned,suchasALSOS,whichwouldsearchfornuclear informationandresearch,OVERCAST,dedicatedtothecaptureofrockets,andSURGEON,thesearchforavionicsandjettechnology.

TheALSOSMissionwaspartoftheManhattanProject,theAlliedefforttobuildanatomicbomb. The Manhattan Project was also charged with co-ordinating foreign intelligencerelatedtoenemynuclearactivity,andtheALSOSMissionwascreatedfollowingtheAlliedinvasion of Italy in September 1943, to investigateGermany’s nuclear progress. ALSOSMission personnel followed close behind the front lines, and occasionally behind enemylines,first inItaly,andlaterinFranceandGermany.Theysearchedforpersonnel,records,material, and sites to evaluate the German nuclear project, hoping to further Americanresearch, and prevent their capture by the Soviet Union. Itwas not restricted to nuclearweapons,butalso investigatedchemicalandbiologicalweaponsandthemeanstodeliverthem.ALSOSpersonnelmanagedtofindand‘remove’manyoftheGermanresearcheffort'spersonnel,alongwithasubstantialportionofthesurvivingrecordsandequipment,takingmostoftheseniorGermanresearchpersonnelintocustody.OperationPaperclipwasasecretprojectoftheOfficeofStrategicServices(OSS).Muchofitsworkstillremainsclassified.ItwasexecutedbytheJointIntelligenceObjectivesAgency(JIOA)(similartotoday’sJointChiefsofStaff).ItspurposewastorecruitNaziGermany’stopscientistsforemploymentintheUS.Ofparticularinterestwereaerodynamicsandrocketryscientistsandexperts in chemicalweaponry, chemical reaction technology,andmedicine.ThereasoningbehindOperationPaperclipwastwofold: firstly, totakeadvantageof thesebrilliantmindsforUSbenefitandinthedevelopingColdWar,todenythemtoSovietRussia.Fromtheverybeginning,technologyhadplayedavitalroleinWWIIbutoneinnovationinparticular was causing concern to the Allies. The Germans had finally developed the V-2rocket,thefirstlong-rangeballisticmissile,whichhadbeenusedtodisastrouseffectinthebombing of London from a distance and with an accuracy previously believed to beimpossible. It was based on technology far ahead of that of the USA and would be theforerunnerofallmodernrocketsintoday’sspaceprogrammes.Whenitseffectivenessasaweaponwas seen on London, the V-2 and other impressive technologies such as the jet

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fighterMe262beingmanufacturedanddevelopedbyNaziGermanybecametheenvyandthe target of the Allied forces, both to destroy them as weapons and to obtain itstechnologyandtodenyittotheSoviets.Initialimmediatetargetswerethosetechnologiesthat could be used against the Japanese, but Ultra research and further technologicalbreakthroughs was also a priority since one fear was that the German scientists wouldemigratetocountries thatstill remainedsympathetic toNaziGermanyandcontinuetheirresearch there. Another fearwas that these scientistswould join the Communist regimeleadingtoadangeroustiltingofthescalesoftheColdWarinfavouroftheUSSR.Bythen,GermanywasinnopositiontodefenditselffromtheadvancingRedArmy.Theironlyhope lay indevelopingnewtechnologiesthatmightsavetheminthesamewayas ithadsecuredthemsuccessintheearlydaysofthewar.Germanyhadfinallyrealisedthatinorder tosupport thewareffort itneeded to re-employ thescientists that theypreviouslydismissedwiththestrictimplementationofNaziideologyandsotheybeganidentifyingandlocating them, going on to test their allegiance to the Nazi State.Werner Osenberg thescientist heading theWehrforschunggemeinshaft (Military ResearchAssociation) recordedthe names of thosewhowere deemed to be loyal Nazis onwhat became known as theOsenberg list.There isaunconfirmedstory thatclaimsthataPolish laboratory technicianworking at Bonn University found pieces of this list stuffed into a toilet and from there,usingtheresistancemovement,itendedupinthehandsofMI6whotranslateditand,afterstudying it,passed itontoUS Intelligencewhothenused it tohelpcompile listsof thosewhocouldtakepartinwhatwouldbecomeknownasOperationPaperclip.

In the context of the burgeoning ColdWar, one purpose ofOperation Paperclipwas todeny German scientific knowledge and expertise to the USSR and, surprisingly, to theirclosestallyGreatBritainandunsurprisingly,(divided)Germanyitself.OriginallytheplanwastojustinterrogatethesescientistsbutwhenitwasdiscoveredthatmanyofthoseonthelisthadhelpeddeveloptheV2rocket-4,000ofthemhadbeenallowedbytheNazistoreturntoworkatPeenemünde-theywereroundedupincampsforfurtherinterrogationwiththeintention of sending many of them to work in the USA. One of these camps was CampOvercast, later becoming known as part of Operation Paperclip when the camp and itspurposefirstbecameknowntothepublic.PresidentHarryTrumandidnotformallyordertheexecutionofOperationPaperclipuntilAugust1945bywhichtimeitwaswellunderway.Truman'sorderexpresslyexcludedanyonefound‘tohavebeenamemberoftheNaziParty,and more than a nominal participant in its activities, or an active supporter of Nazimilitarism’.However,thoserestrictionswouldhaverenderedineligiblemostoftheleadingscientiststheJIOAhadidentifiedforrecruitment,amongthemrocketscientistsWernervonBraunandArthurRudolphandthephysicistHubertusStrughold,1eachofwhomhadearlierbeenclassifiedasa‘menacetothesecurityoftheAlliedForces’but,nevertheless,weretopoftheAmericanshoppinglist.

To circumvent President Truman's anti-Nazi order and the Allies’ Potsdam and Yaltaagreements, the JIOA worked independently to create false employment and politicalbiographiesforthescientists.TheJIOAalsoexpungedfromthepublicrecordthescientists'

1 Brought to the USA in 1947, he became known as the Father of Space Medicine. Following his death, his activities under the Nazis came under greater scrutiny and allegations surrounding his involvement in wartime experimentation conducted on the inmates of Dachau concentration camp greatly diminished his reputation.

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Nazi Partymemberships and régime affiliations. Once ;bleached; of their Nazism, the USgovernmentgrantedthescientistssecurityclearancetoworkintheUnitedStates.

Operation Surgeon was a British post-WWII programme to exploit German aeronauticsanddenyGermantechnicalskillstotheSovietUnion.Alistof1,500Germanscientistsandtechnicianswasdrawnup.Thepolicywasto forciblyremovethescientists fromGermanywhether they liked it or not to lessen the risk of them falling into enemy hands. It wasfeared that if they were allowed to remain in Germany and be captured they might,amongst other things, enable the Soviet Union to ‘achieve a long-range bomber forcesuperiortoanyotherintheworld’.Oftheremovedscientistsintheyears1946–1947,100chosetoworkfortheUK.ManyofthelistedscientistshadalreadyofferedtheirservicestoBritish Commonweath countries, Sweden, Switzerland, Brazil and South America at theinception of the operation and regarded working for the Soviet Union as a last resort ifstoppedfromworkinginGermanyandunabletofindemploymentelsewhereinthewest.These operations have beenwell documented in both popular and academic literaturesince thewar.However,a lesser-knownoperation,TICOM,which targeted theCaptureofGerman signals intelligenceorganisations remained top secret formany years and to thisday some of the detail still remains shrouded in mystery and its release is still notsanctioned.TheacronymTICOMservedasa covername foraTopSecret specialproject,TheTarget IntelligenceCommittee.Accordingtoonesource2 itwasoriginallyconceivedbyColonel George A. Bicher, the Director of the Signal Intelligence Division of ETOUSA,(EuropeanTheaterofOperationsUnitedStatesArmy)inthesummerof1944andwasaimedat the ‘investigation and the possible exploitation of German cryptologic organisations,operations,installationsandpersonnel’.Hisviewthenwasthatthisshouldbedoneassoonas possible bearing in mind the impending collapse of the German armed forces.Interestingly, Parrish3 an important member of the project and who was in as good aposition as anyone to know, gave the credit for the creation of the initial plan to GCHQrather than Bicher, claiming that when Gen Marshall got to hear of it he immediatelydemandedthattheAmericansbeincludedonanequalbasis.4Thisispossible,however,theofficialsynopsisoftheTICOMreportmakesitclearthatthecredithastogotoBicher.Wehavetobearinmind,though,thatthiswaswrittenbyUSofficials.Theorganisationwassosecretthateventoday(atthetimeofwriting),morethanhalfacenturylater,somedetailsconcerningitsoperationsandactivitiesremainclassifiedhigherthantopsecretbyboththeAmericanandBritishgovernments.Until1938BritainhadgiventopprioritytoRussiansignalstrafficinthe‘battle’againsttheComintern,butfollowingtheriseoftheNazisandtheoutbreakofwar,ithadbeengivenaverylowpriorityforsomeyears.TheUSAhadgivenitevenless–virtuallyignoringit.Nowwithluck,however,somewhereintheruinsthatwereGermanytheAlliesmightfindakeythatwouldunlockanumberofcomplexSovietcodes,whichwouldthenmakeup for thislost time,savingyearsof frustratingwork.Knowing theGermanpenchant fororderliness,some storerooms, somewhere, might even contain many thousands of intercepted andpossiblydecodedRussiansignalmessages,offeringinsightsintoSovietmilitaryandpoliticalintentions after thewar. An added bonus could be that, at the same time, interrogation

2 James Bamford, Body of Secrets, Doubleday, 2001, p. 8. 3 Thomas Parrish, The American Codebreakers, Stein & Day, 1986. 4 Thomas Parrish, Ibid p. 276

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transcripts andotherdocumentsmight reveal hithertounknownweaknesses inAmericanandBritishcryptography,weaknessesthatmightprovefatalinanyfutureconflict.Therearecurrentlyveryfeworiginalsourcesfordiscoveringsomethingofwhatactuallywenton in theseTICOMoperations.Writers suchasRichardAldrich (GCHQHarper2010)andNigelWest(GCHQtheSecretWirelessWar,Weidenfield1986)hereintheUKandJamesBamford(BodyofSecrets,Century2001)andThomasParrish(TheAmericanCodebreakers,Stein1986) in theUSAwhohaveallwrittenaboutSigintandTICOMinparticularhaveallhadtogotothesesamesources.Whatarethey?FirstlythereistheNSATICOMreport(inninevolumes), immenselydetailedandfreelyavailableontheweb(apartfromsomeveryobvious redaction),which is particularly good and essential readingwhen it comes to ananalysisofwhereandwhattheGermansachievedwithinSigint.TheyarenolongersecretbutthereisconsiderableevidenceofinformationstillbeingwithheldbythefrequentuseofblackinkonthereportsontheNSATICOMwebsite.Thereportstellusingreatdetailwhowere inthevariousteamsandhasreportsonall the interrogationsthattookplace.Whattheydolackthough,ismuchinthewayofdetailedpersonalaccountsoftheextraordinaryevents.Wedo,though,haveindirectlythesecondsource,thediaryofDrPaulK.Whitaker,amemberofoneof the teams. Added to this, therearehisphotographsandnoteswhichhave never been published in full but have been seen and are referred to frequently.Bamford,oneoftheleadingauthoritiesontheworldofSigint,notsurprisinglyclaimsthathehasacopyofthisdiaryandhe,indisputablyalsointerviewedWhitakerinJanuary1999.Thomas Parrish, another writer on Sigint, was fulsome in his praise for Whitaker andacknowledgesfreelythatitisfromthisdiary,journals,ordersandhisphotographsthatwecan learnsomuchthroughhisworkaboutthegemsuncoveredbytheTICOMteams. It isparticularlyimportantasWhitakeriscurrently,probably,theonlysourcewhenitcomestolearning about the search for and finding the German equipment that was found to becapableofreadingthemostadvancedofRussianteleprintercommunications;asfarascanbeestablisheditsexistenceisnotmentionedintheTICOMreportandstill(asat2012)hastobe formallyconfirmedbyNSAandGCHQalthoughpublicationhasbeenpromised.Thethird source is part of an oral history project carried out by NSA in which Levensen5 isinterviewed about his time in Sigint both in theUSA and Bletchley Park,which has beenquoted fromhereandalsoDrHowardCampaigne’s recollections.6 Levenson isparticularlyhelpfulforlearningaboutJellyfish-FieldMarshallKesselring’sGeheimschreiberlinklabelledJellyfishbyB.P..More than a month before Hitler's death, the TICOM operation moved into a newphase. Planningwas complete althoughmany aspects of the original plan, not least, thehare-brainedideaofparachutingintoGermanyteamsofexperts,hadbeendropped.ItwasnowenvisagedthatsmallteamsofAmericanandBritishcodebreakerswouldboardaircraftinsouthernEnglandandheadtowardsGermanyviaFrance.Theseteamswouldbepartofaunique,highlysecretorganisationwhosemission inthe lastdaysofthewarwasto locateand capture asmanyGerman cryptologists and ciphermachines as possible. Armedwiththese,Alliedcryptologistshopedtodiscoverwhichoftheirciphersystemsmighthavebeenbroken,andhadbeenvulnerabletoattack.Atthesametime,becausetheGermanswerebelievedtohavedevelopedadvancedsystemscapableofbeingabletoattackSovietcodesandciphers,iftheycouldgettheirhandsonthemwithouttheRussiansknowing,theWestcouldpossiblygainaninvaluableshortcuttofindingwaystobreakRussianciphersystems,

5 NSA-OH-40-80. 25/11/80 6 NSA-OH-20-83

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makingupforthetimethathadbeenlostbetween1938and1944.Thekey,however,wasfindingtheGermanmenandmachinesbeforetheRussians.TICOMwasfinallyunderway.

ThiswasnotthefirstoronlyattemptthattheAmericanshadmadetogettheirhandsonGermanUltrainadvanceoftheRussians.7On7April,ColonelRobertS.Allen,aG-2withtheUS3rdArmy,hadbeeninvestigatingcapturedGermansignals installationswhich,becausetheyhadbeenfairlyfarforward,werenowbehindtheadvancingUSline.Thismissionwassuccessful and so, encouraged by this, Allen and his team joined another officer, whosupposedly knew the enemy’s current positions, to carry out a further mission.Unfortunatelyhe led themso far forward that they, in turn,were capturedbyaGermanunit.FortunatelyitwasthelastchaoticdaysoftheconflictandtheyweresoonreleasedbyadvancingUStroops.TheGermanshadnothadthetimeortheopportunitytointerrogatethem.

Intheplanningforthemission,thelocationofthecentreswhichwereofpotentialinteresttoTICOMhadbeenpinpointedbymeansofUltradecryptsofmessagesandalso throughprisonerofwarinterrogations.Nearlyalloftheknownkeycryptologictargetswerelocatedin Berlin, which gave an added urgency to the undertaking. Under the Three-Poweragreement,ratifiedattheYaltaconferenceinFebruary1945,RussianforceswouldshortlyoccupythesurroundingareaandthefinalfateofBerlinhadyettobefinalised,theGermanshadstillnotsurrendered.So,astheoriginalTICOMreportputit,‘theplancontemplatedasimultaneous seizure and exploitation of the chief Sigint centers through an air-borneaction’. TheTarget IntelligenceCommitteehadoriginallyenvisagedanairborneoperationtakingplaceevenbeforethetotalCollapseofGermanyandwithexpertsbeingdroppedintoareaswhichstillhadtobeoccupiedinordertoseizeimportantGermansignalsintelligencetargets.Thiswouldinvolveparachutingrighttotheactualfront;possiblyintobuilt-upareas,supported by a battalion from the 101st ParachuteDivision. Thiswas gung-hoUSA at itsbest. The theory was that the paratroopers would hold on until relieved by a rapidlyapproachingUSarmouredcolumn.Therewaspossiblyaslightsnagasthereisnorecordofanyof thoseselected for the teamseverparticipating inanyparachute training.Certainlynoneof theBritish contingenthadanypreviousexperience.As far as canbeestablished,mostoftheUScontingent,apartfromLevensenhadreceivedminimalmilitarytrainingpriortotheirbeingcommissioned.Bythespringof1945conditionsforcarryingouttheproposedairborne missions had deteriorated. This original plan – to parachute them in to Berlinsupported by a battalion of paratroopers – was finally (not surprisingly) consideredimpractical andunduly hazardous. In addition to thedangers from landing almost on theGermanfrontline,whatwouldhappenshouldtheRussianforcesgottherefirst,whichwasextremelylikelyandtheylandedintheirlaps?Afterall,thosechosenforthemissionwereprivytosomeofthemostimportantsecretsofthewar.

Therewas evidence that the German Sigint agencies, at least those ofwhich the Allieswere aware,weredispersingor retreating toother locations, often in completedisorder,couldno longerbe locatedwithanydegreeofaccuracyandso thepossibility thatAnglo-Americanparachuteunitscouldseizeworthwhilepersonnelandmaterialandholdtheminthemidst and confusionofMajorbattleswas remote. Therewasalso thegrowing threatfrom the rapid advance of the Soviet armies. They could well have provided a very7 Ibid p. 275

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unwelcomewelcomingparty;theplanwas,afterall,potentiallyaflagrantcontraventionoftheYaltaagreement.

TICOMfinallydecidedinMarch1945that,insteadofthisairbornemission,theywouldsetupsixUS–UKtargetexploitationteamsinEnglandwhichwouldbesentintoenemyterritoryas either the British or US troops overran it. Their statedmissionwas to ‘take over andexploit,inanywaypossible,newlydiscoveredtargetsofsignalsintelligenceinterestandtosearchforothersignalsintelligencetargets,equipmentandpersonnel’.FourobjectivesfortheTICOMTeamswerelaiddown:

a) TolearntheextentoftheGermancryptanalyticeffortsagainstEnglandandUSAb)TopreventtheresultsofsuchGermancryptanalysisfromfallingintounauthorisedorSoviethandsastheGermanarmiesretreatedandcollapsed.

c)ToexploitwhattheGermancryptologichadalreadyachieved.d)TouncoveritemsofpotentialsignalintelligencevalueinprosecutingthewaragainstJapanintheFarEast.At this stage therewas no specificmention of any investigation into theGerman SiginteffortagainsttheSovietsalthoughitwasundoubtedlyaprimetargetdespitetheUSSRstillbeingAllies.Itwouldbenaïvetothinkotherwise,butreluctancetorecorditasanobjectiveintheformalstatementofintentisquiteunderstandable.TheinitialplanningofthemissionandoperationofTICOMwascarriedoutmainlyatGC&CS (GCHQ). Detailed briefs were compiled based on locations which had been learnedmainly from personnel who had served in other German cryptographical organisations,whichwerebytheninthehandsoftheAllies.Finally,itwasdecidedtoconcentrateonsixtargetsallofwhichwereintheBerlinarea.

PriorityNo.1wasgiventotheSignalIntelligenceAgencyoftheSupremeCommandof theArmed Forces (OKW/Chi)whichwas thought to be the principal diplomaticcryptographic agency. It was thought by some – eventually erroneously – that itmightevenhavebeentheGermanequivalentofGC&CS.PriorityNo.2wasassignedtofindingthreeagencies.FirstlytheArmyInspectorate7/VI (OKH/IN 7/VI) which had been tentatively located in the Jüterbog area;secondly, the Signal IntelligenceAgencyof theAir ForceHighCommand (OKW/LNABT/350whose location had been pinpointed as being at Potsdam–Wildpark and,thirdly,theSignal IntelligenceAgencyoftheNavyHighCommand(OKM/4)SKL/11)bythenknowntobelocatedatEberswalde.

Training started as Aldrich put it, ‘suddenly boffins in glasses and cardigans (a touch ofpoetic licence on his part, perhaps) found themselves turned into amateur commandos’.8Whiskedawaytoaquarry(morelikelytohavebeenaderelictclaypitinthelocalbrickfieldsif it had ever happened) near Bletchley, those selected for the task were given ‘a shortcourse in the use of sub-machine (Sten) guns and hand grenades’. These newly acquiredskills– ifthis iswhattheywere-fortunatelywerenevertobeputtothetest.ApartfromthisaccountbyAldrichthereisnoevidenceofanyofthistrainingactuallyhappeningbutitisnotunreasonable toexpect some trainingdid takeplacedespite the fact thatwith the

8GCHQ. Richard J Aldrich, pp. 48–56.

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virtual Collapse of Nazi Germany well under way the need for these military skills hadconsiderablylessened.

TheTICOMmissionwasoftheutmostimportancebecauseUSandBritishcryptographersdidnotknowthen,withanydegreeofcertainty,theextenttowhichtheircommunicationswere secure or insecure, nor did they know the extent of the enemy’s cryptanalyticcapabilities, strengths and materials apart from what had been established from POWinterrogationsandconjectureorinferencefromUSA–UKcryptanalysisofGermansystems.GermansuccesseswereobviouslyunpublicisedaswerethoseofGC&CS,buttheywouldundoubtedlyhaveexistedandwouldhavebeenreflectedinhigherAlliedcasualtylistsandthe lessened success of Allied tactics and strategy. The stories of these teams striving tolocatewhatcouldbevitalinformationinthoseconfuseddaysjustbeforeandafterGermancapitulation makes both entertaining and instructive reading and when so doing it issometimesdifficulttothinkthatthiswashappeninginthelastfewdaysofawarthathadtorn Europe apart and had led to the virtual destruction of one of Europe’s greatestcountries.What is thought-provoking is the fact that included amongst those selected to join theteamsweresomanywhowereprivytosomeofthemost importantsecretsofWW2andhadtheyhavebeencapturedbyeithertheGermansortheRussianstherepercussionscouldhave had the most serious effect on the outcome of the Cold War. The first team wasdespatched in April 1945 to the Berchtesgaden area in the Bavarian Alps charged withsearchingfortheremnantsof theSignal IntelligenceAgencyoftheSupremeCommandoftheArmedForces(OKW/Chi).ItdiscoveredtheformerheadquartersofGoering’sResearchBureau(FA)andcapturedortracedinvariousPOWcampsahandfulofitspersonnel.TheyalsolocatedaGermanunitdesignedtointerceptRussiannon-Morse(Baudot)traffic.AlthoughB.P.hadsolvedthemysteriesofthecurrentEnigmatherewasstilltheproblemoftheGeheimschreiberorsecretwriter,whichuntilthen,seemingly,hadbeenreservedfortheveryhighestlevelmessagesincludingthosecomingfromHitlerpersonally.WhentheUSNavyhadbecomeawarethatBritishteamssuchastheTesteryandtheNewmanryworkingatBletchleyParkhadmadesubstantialprogress,thankstotheeffortsofBillTutteandPeterHilton under Max Newman of the Newmanry, against the German high-level onlineteleprinter traffic (Fish), the Head of US naval cryptanalysis instructed his top technicalexpert,CaptainEngstromtosendsomeonetojoinTICOM,appreciatingthatitcouldholdsomuchpotentialforthefuture.LieutenantCommanderCampaignewaspickedsincehehadalreadyworkedforayearintheNewmanryatGC&CS,andwasideallysuitedfortherole.He,togetherwithfellowAmericans,Whitaker,NorlandandLevensenjoinedMajorTesterinateamgivingitaverygoodcoverageofFishbothmathematicallyandlinguistically.Althoughsignalshadbeendetectedwellbeforetheoutbreakofwar,thefirstFISHtraffic(given the codenameTunny)hadbeen interceptedbyGC&CS inmid-1941,with the firstSturgeoncircuitbeingdetectedlaterthatyear.ByJanuary1942,BletchleyParkunderstoodthedesignandoperationofTunnyandbymid-yearhadanalysedtheSturgeonsystem.ThedecisionwasmadetoconcentrateontheTunnytraffic,whichpromisedabetterintelligenceyield.GC&CS’sknowledgeoftheSZ-42wasderivedpurelyfromcryptanalysis.TICOMofficerLieutenantArthurJ.Levensenrecalled‘...(GC&CS)wantedtocapturethese...machines.Enigmamachineswehadtonsof.ButTunnymachineswe'dneverseenandweweremostanxioustoseethem’.

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Fired by this success, very soon after other teamswere despatched to other areas astheywereoverrunbytheadvancingUSandBritishforcesandsometimesarrivingaheadofthem.PaulNeff, aUSArmyMajorat the timehas since told this story9 of,how inMarch1945,severalTICOMteamsbegantospreadoutacrossGermanyinsearchofcodebreakers,codebooksandtheirequipmentandHowardCampaigne,anothermemberoftheteamshastoldthestoryofhispartinthehuntforFish.10The groups arrived by air at Paris by air from Croydon Airport. The Kaufbeuren team,knownasTeam1,consistedofnineofficers,fiveBritishandfourAmericanswithtwoBritishORs acting as radio operators and two US drivers. Campaigne was the senior US officerwhilst Wing Commander Oeser was the senior British officer and in overall command.Members of the team brought various talents: Major McIntosh for example was adistinguishedlinguisticsexpertalthoughhisspecialityMiddleEnglishwouldnotbetoomuchuseon thecurrentassignment.Captain LouStonewas there, representing theUSSpecialBranch which by then had taken over the Signal Security Agency from the Signal Corps.TICOMTeam1wouldkeeptheireyespeeledforFISHmachinesdespitenotknowingwhatthey were looking for as they investigated Bavaria. This team had been instructed to‘proceed toKaufbeuren,Germanyand then return toParisafterapproximately30days’.11Anotheroneof thegroupswas togo toFlensburgwhereGrandAdmiralDönitz,whohadbeennominatedthesuccessortoHitler,hadestablishedhisGovernment.ThewarwascontinuingfiercelyinsomepartsofGermany,notablyBerlinwhilst,inothers,negotiationswerealreadywellunderwayfortheunconditionalsurrenderofGermany.WhentheteamarrivedattheKaufbeurenairfieldinSouthernBavariawhichhadformerlybeenFliegerhorstKommandanturAtheyfoundsomethingintheorderof15,000prisonersofwaraimlesslymillingaround.Theymadetheirwaythroughthecrowds,finallyreachingtheirobjective–BuildingWings10and11.ThesehadbeenspeciallysealedoffwhentheUStroops had occupied Kaufbeuren the previous week, their significance fortunately beingrealised.OnenteringWing10,theLuftwaffecommunicationscentre,theywereconfrontedbyaroomfullofT-52Geheimschreibermachines,theverymachinesthatsomeofthemhadworkedoninprinciplebeforebuthadneverbeforeseen.Unfortunately,beforefleeing,theGermanshadsmashedthemachinesandtheirrotorsweremissing.Thesecouldhavemadea Major impact on the outcome of the war had they been put into universal operationearlier, replacing Enigma. The Siemens T-52D was undoubtedly, with the technologyavailablethen,thenearesttoan‘unbreakable’machine.According to Whitaker’s diary, a couple of nights after their arrival in Paris, his team

movedon toHeidelberg, stayingat theViktoriaHotelwhichhedescribesasbeingbleakandbare.While theywerethere,Germanysurrenderedunconditionally.Thenextday8MaywouldbeofficiallyproclaimedVEdaywhichtheycelebratedinstyle.The team then moved on to Augsburg in the south-west of Bavaria. Later, asubsidiarygroupofTeam1underMajorRalphTesteroftheIntelligenceCorps,HeadoftheTesteryatB.P.foundan intactT-52machine inthetownofPfunds40milessouthwest of Innsbruck. Its greatest coup, however, was when few days later, asalreadymentioned,anarmytaskforcenearBerchtesgadencapturedintacttheradioteleprinter communications train which had been attached to Field MarshalKesselring’s headquarters. This mobile station was the field end of the

9. James Bamford, Body of Secrets, Doubleday, 2001 10 Ibid. 11 SHAEF orders 3 May 1945

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communications circuit betweenBerlin andOBWest,whichhadbeen codenamedJellyfish by B.P.. This communications train consisted of a convoy of six Germansignal trucks completewith SZ-42 Tunnymachines and their operating personnel.Eachtruckhadradiotransmitters,antennae,radioreceivers,andencryptiondevices.Equippedwith twobunks, theyweredesigned tobe lived inby thedriver andhishelper,whoalsosetupandoperatedtheequipment.

Thearmytask force turned theconvoyover toTICOMandMajorTesterandLieutenantLevensenwere ordered to accompany this convoy on the long drive back to the channelports,makingslowprogress,guardedbytheirownGermanprisoners.They left for Augsburg on May 16 with these six Diesel trucks and twelve prisoners.Crossing Europe just a few days after the surrender was problematic, finding fuel andgetting permissions to cross various army areas extended the trip. Then they ran intoproblemsinBrussels.AsLevensenlaterexplained:

Whenwegot toBelgium…Thesetruckshadno ‘capture’numbersandwe lookedlikeGermantroops.AndthepeoplewereverymadattheGermansandtheywerethrowingthingsatthetruck.Igothitoncewhentheythrewatincanorsomething…becausetherewerehardfeelings,anditwassoobvious.WeneverbotheredtowriteCapturenumbersonthetrucksorgiveanyidentification.Wedidputabigstar,bigwhitestar,butforallpurposesitlookedjustliketheGermantrucksthatthenatives(Belgians) had seen during the war. They must have thought, "Well, if theWehrmacht isback,what's goingonhere?"Theydidn't askquestionseither. Theywere just waiting for something, as I say.When I walked off, (the prisoners) gotscaredtodeath,theysaid,"No,no,stayaround."

Theteamfinally loadedthetrucksontoanLST(tanklandingship)atOstendattheendoftheweek,andbythenextdaytheywerebackinBeaconsfieldwherethetrucksweresetupandtheGermansdemonstratedtheirusetotheBletchleyParkexperts.Whilst inAugsburgtheteamwerebasedinabarracks-likebuildingwhichhadpreviouslyserved as a Luftwaffe headquarters where they discovered in the basement aHauptnachrichtenstelle,asignalscentre.Thesuddennessof thedepartureof thepreviousoccupantswasamplyconfirmedbythecontentsofatapewhichhadbeentransmittedononeoftheteleprinters.Afterremarkinginonemessagethat‘therewereAlliedtroopsinthevicinity’ it suddenly ended with the words ‘My God, they are here now’.12 According toWhitaker,itlookedasiftheAmericanshadappearedsosuddenlyattheinstallationthattheGermanshadfledbeforehavingachancetodestroytheirequipment.MajorTesterhadbeenattheforefrontoftheBletchleyefforttobreakFishtraffic intheTestery working closely with the Newmanry. Accompanied by two Americans, MajorEldridgeandCaptainForminiak,heleftWhitakerandtherestofhisteamatAugsburg,andtheyhadgonetoatowncalledPfunds,southwestofInnsbruck,almostontheSwissborder,wheretheGerman19thArmywaswaitingtobedisarmedandcompletetheformalitiesofsurrender.TheretheywereshownintothecommunicationscentrewheretheyfinallyfoundaGeheimschreiberinperfectworkingorder.Onecanalmostimaginethefeelingofelation.Thenextday,theteamsetupaninterrogationcentreinKaufbeurenattheRathaus(townhall),oneofthetasksbeingtogetdescriptionsoftheseniorGermanofficerswhohadleft.TheythenmovedonthenextdaytoBerchtesgadenandtheretheyhadtheextraordinary

12ThomasParrish,TheAmericanCodebreakers,p.279

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experienceofactuallybeingabletoseetheruinsofHitler’sBerghof,hisnotoriousmountainretreat,fromtheirbillet,onlyafewdaysoftheunconditionalsurrender.OscarOeser,whohadbrieflylefttheteamatKaufbeurenreturnedandrejoinedthem.Theywereabletofindtime topayavisit towhat remainedof theBerghofandalso tovisit theReichkanzle, theofficialofficeofthechancellorofGermanyontheoutskirtsoftown.The twenty-first ofMaywas a day that Thomas Parrish in his book describes as having‘somethingofthequalityofthemoment in1922whenHowardCarterfirstbrokethroughintoTutankhamen’stomb’.ApartyfromTICOMTeam1, includingLieutenantCommanderCampaigne,Major Rushworth and Captain Carterwere, at the POW camp at Bad AiblingsearchingforGermanSIGINTpersonnel.TheyhadreceivedatipthatoneGermanprisonerinparticular,(latertobeidentifiedasUnteroffizierDietrichSuschowk),knewabout‘certainsignalsintelligenceequipmentanddocumentationtodowiththeinterceptionanddecodingofRussiantraffic’andwantedtotalktosomeonewho‘knewaboutthesethings’.Couldthisbewhattheywerelookingfor?TheyfoundSuschowkamongstthePOWsandheexplainedtotheTICOMteamthatheworkedforGeneralderNachrichtenaufklarung (GdNA)GruppeVI,aplatoon-sizeunitwhichuntilrecentlyhadbeenresponsibleforinterceptinghigh-levelSoviet radio teleprinter traffic and that the last Gruppe VI task had been interceptingRussiantrafficatthePionier-Kaserne,abarracksatRosenheiminBavaria.Interviewinghimfurther they established that there had been an independent unit OKH/GdNA makingGteletypetransmissionswhichthroughout1942–44hadoperatedatLötzeninEastPrussiaunderHorchleitstelleOst,thecentralcryptanalysisandevaluationcentreforRussiantraffic.Heexplained thatheandhis colleagueswanted tocollaboratewith theAlliesasmuchaspossible and to continue the attack on Russian signals traffic and to this end, theywerewillingtoshowtheteamwheretheyhadburiedtheequipmentandtohelpre-assembleanddemonstrate itscapabilities.Theteamwasastounded. Itwasalmostunbelievable; if true,anextraordinaryopportunityexceedingallexpectations.Theteamhadabsolutelynoideaofwhattheymightbeledtoandfindanditscapabilitiesbutfortunatelytheyfolloweditup.With the help of evenmore information fromSuschowk, they roundedup the remainingmembersofGruppeVIwhowerestillintheCampandtheTICOMteamtookthembacktoRosenheimtoseeiftheycouldrecoverthebootyaspromised.TheGermanPOWshadgotitrightwhen they thought that theyhad somethingworthwhile to sell. There itwas, safelyburiedunderthecobblesofthecourtyard.Theprisonersgottoworkquicklythefollowingmorning,diggingupthecobblestoneswhichrevealedaveritabletreasuretroveofpackingcases.Theyrecoveredenoughequipmenttofilladozenlargechests,53smallerchestsandanother53boxestotallingabout7½tons.Suschowk(whoseemedtobetakingthelead)andhisunitthenvolunteeredtoputoneofthemachinestogetherandtodemonstratethat itwasstillingoodworkingorder.Thenextmorning,theteamfoundontheirreturnthattheworkundertheyoungbutdynamicsergeantwasalreadywelladvancedwithoneofthesetsalreadyupandrunningandreceivingtraffic.Whitaker,whoarrivedashorttimelaterwasamazed: ‘theywereworking likebeaversbeforeeverwearrived . . .Theyhadoneof themachinessetupandreceivingtrafficwhenwegotthere’.13In addition to theequipment thathadbeenunearthedand thehelp from the interceptoperatorsatremendousamounthadbeengainedfrominterrogationsthattheycarriedout.ItcameasagreatsurprisetotheinterrogatorsthattheGermans,evenatthatlowlevel,hadknownasearlyas the1940s that theEnigma that theywereusingwasnot securebut to

13 Bamford p. 14.

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quoteHowardCampaigne, ‘theyhadconcludedthat itwouldtakeawholebuilding fullofequipmenttodoit’.14Thiswasanastoundingdiscovery.LieutenantCommanderHowardCampaigne,theseniorAmericannavalintelligenceofficerofTeam1,hadreturnedtoEnglandinearlyJune,butwithintwoweeks,wassentback inthefieldastheoffciicer-in-chargeOICofasmall,newlyformedTICOMTeam4.Joininghimthis timewereLieutenantEvelynTalbot-Ponsonbyof theRoyalNavy,andAmericannavalofficer Lieutenant Christopher Huntington, with Corporal A.G. Able, Royal Signals,responsible for communications. Captain M.A.G. Howgate of the Intelligence Corps whonormallyworkedinHut6Block(d)andblockCworkingonTA/Sixtajoinedthemlater.15Themainpurposeof the tripwas to return to southernGermany todouble-checkon anumberoftargetstheTeam1searchhadinitiallypassedoverquickly.Thisteam,TICOM4,joinedupwithatroopfrom30A.Uandaccompaniedthemonasearchforlargenumberofmiscellaneous naval targets in Bavaria; the most interesting included a variety of sitesworkingonV-2components.16Often,tipsfromlocalintelligenceofficersledtodeadends.AsCampaignelaterexplained:

…weheardtherewasaresearchestablishmentup intheTyroleanMountainsonalakewayupthere…Therewas…aguard,aUSguardatthedoor…Andsowewentup to the guard and identified ourselves and said, ‘What went on here?’ …apparently,ithadtodowithseaplanes,becausetheyhadbeenrunningexperimentswithpontoons...but[therewas]nothingtherethatwas…cryptanalytic.

Talbot-Ponsonby had another bizarre experience when he accompanied 30 A.U. to theIslandofMainauinLakeConstancetofollowupatipaboutasupposedexperimentalstationevacuatedfromPeenemünde.Atthegatetothecompound,theywererefusedadmittancebecause the islandwas neutral territory, the property of PrinceBernadotte of Sweden, aneutral country, despite the fact that the French were currently using it as a displacedpersonscentre.FurtherinquirieswiththechiefmedicalofficerbroughtforththeclaimthattwounidentifiedBritish intelligenceofficershadalready visited the island. The team sentbacktoConstancetogetpasses,butfoundthatallofficialofficesinthetownwereclosed.Onaskingwhytheyweretoldthat‘itwasinhonourofavisitbytheSultanofMorocco’.Thisincident serves to illustrate the confused situation, poor communications and conflictinginterests that were to plague TICOM throughout its searches. Sadly, most of the targetsinvestigatedbythe30A.U. teamwereunproductive fromaSigintviewpoint,havingbeenthoroughlypickedoverpreviouslybyotherAlliedIntelteams.CampaigneandhismenfinallyarrivedattheSchliersee,abeautyspotintheBavarianpre-Alps,followinguponatipreceivedon26June.TheretheymetaHauptmannKunz,aformerViennapoliceofficer,whowasby thenaffiliated to theFreiheitsaktionBayern (F.A.B.),ananti-NazimilitiagroupsetupinthelastdaysofthewarbythosekeentosurrenderandnowveryeagertoingratiateitselfwiththeAlliedmilitarygovernment.Heledthemonacarefulsearchof variousbuildings in the town, including threehospitals, the railway station, the

14 James Bamford, Body of Secrets, Doubleday 1998 p. 17. 15 Nicknamed ‘Milky’ he was a keen member of the B.P. Drama Group, starring amongst several productions in J.B. Priestley’s play They Came to a City. 16 In September 1942, the Director of Naval Intelligence authorised the formation of the Special Intelligence Unit, comprising 33 (Royal Marines) Troop, 34 (Army) Troop, 35 (Royal Air Force) Troop and 36 (Royal Navy) Troop. The Special Intelligence Unit was later renamed 30 RN Commando (Special Engineering Unit), and was redesignated 30 Assault Unit in December 1943. One of the key figures involved in the unit's organisation was Ian Fleming (later author of the James Bond novels). They were tasked to move ahead of advancing Allied forces, or to undertake covert infiLieutenantrations into enemy territory by land, sea or air, to capture much-needed intelligence in the form of codes, documents, equipment or enemy personnel. They often worked closely with the Intelligence Corps' field security sections.

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schoolandadjacentbookdepository,thepostofficeandtelephoneexchange,ahotel,andthesiteofanearbylandslideontherailway.Exceptforanumberofabandonedteleprintersand telephonesets, they foundnoother itemsofSigint interest.However, theyheardaninterestingrumourfrommorethanonesource.Campaignelaterrecountedthestory:‘WeweretoldthatonMay1stor2nd,therewasatrainthatcameintothetownandparkedonasidingonthefarsideofthelake,acrossthelakefromtown,andhadstoodthereforadayorso.Andthereweresomesoldiersarounditandthey(theinformants)thoughtthattheyhadunloadedthestuffand threw it in the lake.Well,wedida little searching.The lake'skindofdeepandwecouldn'tdoanything.Butwerecommendedthatitshouldbedragged’.ThenextdayKunz led the teamup themountain tosearch thesurroundingcountryside.Somedebris fromtheGermanArmywas found insomeof the local farms,butapart fromthisnothingunusualorimportant.TheyalsovisitedHimmler’shuntinglodgeandfolloweduponyetanotherrumouraboutaGermanArmyradiostationthathadbeenactiveintheareabut,again,foundnothing.Onthe28th,whilegettingtheunit’sradiorepairedatanearbyUSArmyartilleryunit,CaptainHowgatewastoldbytheunitsignalsofficerofa largechestofwirelessequipmentthathadbeenfoundinacanyonabovethemunicipalityofBayrischzell.Thesergeantinchargeoftheoriginalsearchpartyledthemtoafewremainingboxesfurtheruptheravine,butthattheycontainedonlyfood.Afteracoupleof fruitlesshourstryingtotrack down the original source of the informationwho turnedout to be the local bathingpoolattendant,theyabandonedthesearch.NordidtheyfindanytraceofthemysteriousDrSchädelwhosenamehadrepeatedlycomeupduringinterrogations.17In the final report of theSchliersee search,Campaigne concluded that theOKW/Chiarchivesmighthavebeeneitherdumpedintothelakefromtherailwaytracksnearthelandslide,buriedupinthemountainsorevacuatedfurthertothesouth.Before the TICOM teams began their investigations in Germany it was known that theSupreme Command of the German Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht,abbreviated OKW) contained a Signal Intelligence section OKW/Chi). Before TICOM,knowledge of the activities ofOKW/Chiwas very limited, but itwas assumed that, as thehighestechelonsignalintelligenceservice,itwouldcoordinateandperhapsdirectthesignalintelligenceworkof thearmy,navyandair forceandwouldprobably assemble theablestcryptanalysts for attacks on systems with which the signal intelligence services of theseparate branches were unable to cope. Consequently OKW/Chi was given first priorityamongtheTICOMtargets.BythetimetheTICOMteamsbeganoperations,OKW/ChihadleftBerlinandhadseparated,aswaslearnedlater,intoanorthernandsoutherngroup.Shortlyafterwardsmostof theirdocumentshadbeendisposedofandmostof thepersonnelhadbeenswallowedupbyoneoranotherofthelargeprisoncampshastilysetuptoreceivethedefeated German armed forces. From there, they were released into civilian life, oftenwithoutleavingatraceintherecords.TICOMTeam5wasanadhocteamquicklyformedtoexploitthediscoveryofthemissingarchivesofOKW/Chi.Butforastrokeofluckthesearchivesmighthaveremainedlostforever.InthelastweekofJuly at Lake Schliersee, a soldier from the 3rd US Army drowned.While dragging for thebody,rescuerssnaggedaboxfromthenorthendofthelake.Uponinspection,itturnedouttobeawaterproofboxcontaininganumberoftranslationsofdecodedmessagesandafileofcorrespondenceaddressedtoOKW/Chi.Onlearningofthis,TICOM,havingalreadyactedon Campaigne’s request for a dive team for the Schliersee, paired the recently returned17 SSgt Dr Schädel was head of the archives of OKW/Chi.V where copies of the broken and translated messages and of the broadcast reports were filed and presumably indexed, and so was potentially a valuable source of information

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Lieutenant Talbot-Ponsonby (who worked in the Naval Section in Hut 4) with US ArmyLieutenant Alfred P. Fehl (a traffic analysis specialist whoworked in Block D and Block GTA/SIXTAandHut3atBletchleyPark)andquicklydispatchedthemasTeam5.Stopping inParisfortheusualroundofclearancesanddiscussions,theythenproceededoverlandtotheSchliersee, arriving on 8 August after reinforcing the teamwith Captain Richard FarrickerfromSignalSecurityDetachmentDand1stLieutenantGeneSilber,aSIGINTofficerfromthe3rdArmy.Starting at the north end of the lake near the Schloss Freudenberg where the box wasrecovered, the team did an initial survey, finding the beach still littered with abandonedradiosandteleprinters.Talbot-PonsonbyandFehlthenattemptedtodragthelakenearthelandslideonthewestsideofthelakesnagginganobjectseveraltimes,butitwastooheavyto recover.While thiswasongoing,a further inquiry launched into thewhereaboutsofDrSchädelbythelocalCounterintelligenceCorpsdetachmentproducednoresults.The next day the team, with the assistance of some engineers, took soundings anddiscovered that thedepths in the targetareas ranged from20 to50 feet.Amoredetailedsurvey by a navy diving officer resulted in confirmation that the job was within thecapabilitiesoftheUSArmypierdiverswhowouldhavetobebroughtinfromLeHavre.On17August,Talbot-PonsonbyreturnedtotheUKleavingFehlinchargeoftheoperation.Aweeklater,asmallpartyofarmyengineersarrivedwithpontoonsandbeganbuildingaraftfor use in the diving operations. The leading group of the 1051st Construction and RepairGroup,thepierdivers,begantoarriveon2September,withtherestoftheirpartyarrivingwithequipmentaweeklater.DivingoperationsbeganonTuesday11Septemberandlastedaweek.Thefirstareaworkedwasthesiteoftherecoveryoftheoriginalbox,andalthoughthemurkywatercomplicateddivingoperations,thesiteyielded28boxes,mostfoundbelowtheslopeat30to50 feet. Itappearedthat thematerialshadbeenhastilydumpedfromaboat. The second area explored near the landslide, revealed seven boxes of discardedequipment from the local German SS artillery school, but produced no signal intelligencematerial.The recovered boxes were transported to the 3rd Army Signals Intelligence Battalion atCamp Goulette where they were stored in a vault. There they were sorted under thesupervisionoftheTICOMteam,non-relevantequipmentwasdiscardedandtheremainder,reboxed, and sealed for transport. This resulted in 19 boxes, totalling 188 cubic feet andweighing 8162 pounds. No attempt wasmade to dry out the documents, instead TICOMwanted thematerialsmoved toEnglandasquicklyaspossible. Fehlarranged foranairlift,andonFriday5October,twoC-47slandedatBigginHillwheretrucksmetthemtocarrythecargotoBletchleyPark.ThesearchfortheOKW/Chiarchiveswascomplete.

TICOMTeam6,formedinFebruary1945,wasajointteamdedicatedtothecaptureandinvestigation of German naval Sigint targets; in particular, the GermanNaval IntelligenceCentre–thoughtatthattimetobeatLanke–andtheGermanSigintheadquartersbelievedtobeatEberswalde,bothintheBerlinarea.However,theSovietoffensivethatmonthhaddriventheseunitsnorth-westintoSchleswig–Holstein,closertothenavalbasesaroundKielandDönitz’sheadquartersinFlensburgwherehewouldfinallysetuphisGovernmentafterHitler’s suicide.Aftercrossing theRhine, thisareabecameunder thecontrolof21stArmyGroup,whichallowedTICOMunlimitedaccess to thesesuspectedSigint sites.Asa result,despitebeingknownasTICOM6itwasinfactthefirstTICOMteamtobesentout.

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The team was under the command of Commander A.M.S. Mackenzie, RNVR who washeadofNavalSectionIVResearchatGC&CS,havingjoinedB.P.inJune1940andworkedinHut4andBlockBwithLieutenantJohnNuelsen,USNRashisexecutiveofficersupportedbytwoBritishandtwoAmericanjuniornavalofficers.Theteam,activatedon15April,wassenttoHollandto linkupwith30AU,thenheadquarteredatVenlo.Forthenexttwomonths,theyfollowed(andsometimesled)thearmyintonorthernGermany,capturinganumberofimportant naval intelligence targets including the German Naval Y (intercept) station atNeumunster and the top secret Kurier station at Bokel, which had transmitted burst-encryptedmessages toU-boats. The capture ofFlusslauf, a newGerman cipher thatwasduetogointoforceon5MayandwhichwouldhavethreatenedtheabilityofGC&CStoread Ultra during the final critical days of the war, was potentially extremely important.Theywere also involved in the capture ofOKM4/SKL III (theB-Dienst), the KriegsmarineSigintorganisationwhichhadbeenevacuatedtotheNavalSignalSchoolatFlensburg.Thiswas one of the two German Sigint organisations (the other being the Foreign Office,mentionedearlier)thatwerecapturedintact.By3May,whentheGermancollapseappearedtobeimminent,TICOMdecidedtoexpandTeam 6 responsibilities to cover additional military targets, including OKW/Chi. Fouradditionalarmyofficers,twoBritishandtwoAmericans,MajorMorrison18andLieutenantsLaptook,KirbyandWOIIMorgan19,arrived inVenlo twodays later.TICOMwereabout tohave a little bit of luck since, discovered accompanying the German surrender party toSHAEF Headquarters in Reims on 6May, was Lieutenant ColonelMetting, the second incommandofOKW/Chi.AlsotakenintocustodyatthesametimewastheOKW/Chichiefofthe mathematical cryptanalyst section, Dr Erich Hüttenhain, along with his assistant DrWaltherFricke.Theseweretwoofthemostsought-afterprizes.WhenTeam6asawholearrivedinFlensburgon19May,MorrisonandKirbymadecontactwithColonelHugoKettlerwho had been chief of OKW/Chi since the summer of 1943. These prisoners provided afountofinformationtoTICOM.However,onekeyofficialwasmissingfromthehaul.WilliamFenner, the Chief Cryptanalyst and a founding member of OKW/Chi, was not with theFlensburggroup,but,rather,itwasdiscovered,hadledanOKW/soperationalgrouptotheSouth.MostoftheleadershipofOKW/ChihadbeencapturedatFlensburgandinterrogatedbyTICOMteam6.ColonelHugoKettlerhad‘impressedhisinterrogatorsasanalert,intelligentofficer’ who was willing to cooperate. However, unfortunately Kettler was primarily anadministrator who had little knowledge of the technical aspects of his command’scryptologicactivities.Nevertheless,hegaveTICOMthetipthatthearchivesofOKW/ChihadbeenevacuatedtotheSchliersee,amountainouslakesouthofMunichwhichwaslatertobe found tobe correct.LieutenantColonelMettingwas a regular signals officerwhohadworked his way up to hold a number of important posts in command of intercept andcryptologic units. From November 1941 to June 1943, he had commanded the army’scryptologiccentre,Inspectorate7/VI.HethencommandedasignalbattalionontheeasternfrontforafewmonthsuntilassignedasthesecondincommandatOKW/ChiinDecember1943. Metting, although primarily an administrator, was well positioned to explainOKW/Chi’s charter, organisation, personnel strengths, chainof commandand liaisonwithother agencies. His knowledge appeared to bemore extensive than Kettler’s and hewas18 Major Eric K Morrison of the Intelligence Corps. B.P. from 1941 to 45. Worked in Hut 3, Block D (6), Block G, Special Liaison Party and later SIXTA. Involved in traffic analysis, he specialised in the development of diagrams identifying German Morse networks 19 WO II Donald Cecil Morgan served at B.P. from October 1943 to 1945 in Block A and Block B naval section and went on to work on Japanese JN11 naval auxiliary code.

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valuedenoughtobelatertransportedtoEnglandformorein-depthinterrogation.SpecialistDrErichHüttenhainwasamathematicianhiredbyOKW/Chiin1937tobuilduparesearchsectionthatinvestigatedthemostdifficultenemysystemsthatwerebeyondthecapacityofthe regular cryptanalysis section, and to investigate the security of the German’s ownsystems.Asaworkingcryptanalyst,heprovideddetailedtechnicalknowledgeoftheworkofOKW/Chi, and at this point provided the most useful information for the TICOMinvestigators. He and his assistant Dr Walther Fricke were considered such high-valueprisoners that they toowere evacuated to Englandon30 June.After thewarHüttenhainwent to work in the US assisting in the building of cryptologic machines and compilingreports on the successes of German cryptanalysts. In 1947 he returned to Germany andbecamethechiefofcryptanalysisfortheGehlen(Spy)Organisation.In the secondweek ofMarch 1945, US forces advancing in Saxony bypassed the smallvillage of Burgscheidungen. Troops from the 102nd Cavalry Regt were sent to provideprotectiontothevillageanditscastle.Afewdayslater,onMarch18th2ndLieutenantAlfredFennof theFirstArmymilitary governmentdetachmentmade contactwith theownerofthelocalschloss,GrafvonderSchulenbergandhisinterpreterFräuleinFriedrichs.AlthoughtheyweresomewhatevasivehewasabletoestablishthatasectionoftheGermanForeignOffice was located there. Returning three days later for a second visit, he learned fromFräulein Friedrichs that the unitwas in fact the cryptologic bureau of the ForeignOffice,knownasPerZ.S.TICOMwerenotifiedandTeam2wasformedanddespatchedarrivingintheareabythemiddleofApril.NefftoldthestoryofhowadvancingUStroopshad‘runacrossthesepeople,Germans,inthiscastle...[who]hadbeeninthecryptographicbusiness,signalsintelligence,allofthem.Bongo.QuicklyBletchleysentme.Withinafewdays,NeffwasatthecastleintheGermanstateofSaxony.‘Thewarwasstillgoingonandwewereprettyfarforward,’Neffsaid.‘Wesorted thepeople out, interrogated, tried to findoutwhat theywereworkingon,wheretheyhad stoodwith it, tried to get our hands on all the papers thatwere left ... Butmyproblembecame-whatarewegoingtodowiththem?Becausetheyapparentlyhadalotofgoodinformation...TheseGermans,asyoumightknow,hadbeenworkingontheRussiaproblemtoo."Neffhadstumbledintoagoldmine,becausenotonlyhadthecodebreakersworkedonRussiancodesandciphers,butthecastlealsocontainedaGermanForeignOfficesignalsintelligencearchive.Neff'sdilemmawasthelocationofthecastle,whichwaslocatedinterritoryassignedtotheSovietsandRussiantroopswerequicklymovingintothearea.Heneededtogetthepeopleandcodebreakingmaterialsoutfast.NeffcontactedColonelGeorgeBicher,inchargeoftheAmericanTICOMunitinLondon,andsuggestedshippingthedocumentstogetherwiththeGermancodebreakerstoEngland.Butthe issue of transporting the prisoners across the English Channel became very sensitive.Theywerecivilian,notmilitarypersonnel,‘Apparentlytheyhadahardtimewhenthisthinghit London because they couldn't decide what to do. They had to clear it [up to] theAttorneyGeneralorwhateverhe'scalledoverthere.Isitlegaltodo?’EventuallytheBritishagreedtohavetheGermanssecretlytransferredtoEngland.‘Wegotaplaneoneday,’saidNeff,‘escortedthiscrowddowntotheairfield,putthemontheplane,andflewthemovertoLondon.TheBritishpickedthemupoverthereandgavethemaplacetostay,fedthem,andinterrogatedthehelloutofthem.Now,whathappenedtothoseTICOMrecordsIdon'tknow.’(Thepublicstilldonotknow).

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It was the oldest, but smallest of the German services, employing by 1945 180–200personnel. Pers ZS traces its rootsback to thePolitical IntelligenceBureauof the ForeignOfficeoftheimmediatepost-WWIperiod.Ahandfulofits1919employeeswerestillontherollsoftheagencyin1945;thusPersZS,althoughsmallinnumber,washighlyexperienced.Pers ZS was the cryptanalysts branch of the Pers Z section, which also includedcryptographic,communications,andadministrationsections.Theirprincipaleffortwasthecryptanalystsof foreigndiplomaticcodesandciphers,attacking thediplomatic systemsofapproximately50countriesanddespiteitssmallsizewasabletoreadsubstantialsegmentsofthemedium-gradesystemsofanumberofMajorpowers includingEngland,theUnitedStates, France, Italy, China and Japan. According to TICOM, Pers ZS ‘evidenced anextraordinarydegreeof competence’. Per Z.Sbecameoneof the feworganisations tobecapturedwithdocuments,personnelandequipmentintact.Theteam,underthecommandofLieutenantColonelsEvansandNeffbegantheirworkofinterviewing the prisoners and cataloguing the documents in the field. Initial fieldinterrogationsofPerZSpersonnelrevealedconsiderableinformationontheorganisationalstructure and names and titles of many members. They also revealed a number ofpersonalityconflictswithinthegroup,particularlydisagreementsonhowfartocooperate.TICOMwasverycarefulinthehandlingofitsprisoners,ensuringthattheywerewelltreatedandkeeping themseparated fromotherNazi POWs toavoid thembeing influenced theirattitudes.Inadditiontopersonnel,TICOMdiscoveredalargenumberofdocumentsstoredin filingcabinetsrecoveringmanyHollerithmachines.Someof theGermanpersonnelhadalready scattered and Evans and Captain Adams on 28 April chased down Senior Per S ZcryptanalystsDrAdolfPaschkeandDrWernerKunzeas theywerebeing transportedtoaFirst Army POW cage. Trips to Zschepplin and Mühlhausen yielded a handful of otherpersonnel,andplansweresoonmadetoevacuatethekeymemberstoEnglandbyair.Badweather and political issues delayed the trip, and TICOM was concerned that the slowprogresswoulddiscouragetheGermans’cooperativeattitudeandlowertheirmorale.Later,Neff commented that ‘themost difficult part of themission had been getting diplomaticpermissionfromtheBritishtoevacuatetheGermanpersonneltoEnglandforinterrogation’.ReadingNeff’sinterviewsitissoonapparentthathewasnotexactlypro-British.Burgscheidungenwaslocatedinthe‘soontobeoccupied’SovietzoneandsothedecisionwasmadetoevacuateallthePerSZcivilianstoMarburgintheAmericanarea,includingthefamiliesofthosewhoweretobeevacuatedtoEngland.Thistookplaceon11May,thetroopsguardingBurgscheidungenwererelievedandTeam3returnedtoParis.Twodayslater,Russiantroopsovertookthatarea.WhatmighthavehappenedtotheseGermanPOW’sandtheirfamiliesontheirarrivalinEnglandissomethingthatisstillnotclear.In themeantime, theactivityatSteepleClaydonwasbeginningtoattractattention.ThePost office delivered a complaint that therewas interferencewith local reception of theBBC.Inaddition,theamountofequipmentthegroupwaspoweringwasexceedingthelocal15 amps limit, causing brownouts in the local area. It was soon decided that, for bothtechnical and security reasons, the operation had to be moved to a more permanentlocation.LieutenantCommanderHowardCampaigne,theseniorAmericannavalintelligenceofficerofTeam1,returnedtoEngland inearlyJune,butwithintwoweeks,wassentbacktothefieldastheOICofasmall,newlyformedTICOMTeam4.JoininghimwereLieutenantEvelynTalbot-Ponsonby of the Royal Navy, and American naval officer Lieutenant Christopher

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Huntington,withCorporal A.G.Able, Royal Signals, responsible for their communications.CaptainM.A.G.Howgate,oftheIntelligenceCorpsjoinedthem,later.Themainpurposeof this tripwas to return to southernGermany todouble checkonanumberoftargetstheTeam1searchhadpassedoverquickly.ThisTeamTICOM4, joinedup with a troop of 30 A.U. and accompanied them on a search for large number ofmiscellaneous naval targets in Bavaria; the most interesting included a variety of sitesworkingonV-2components.Often,tipsfromlocalintelligenceofficersledtodeadends.AsCampaignelaterexplained:

…weheardtherewasaresearchestablishmentupintheTyroleanMountainsonalakewayupthere…Therewas…aguard,aUSguardatthedoor…Andsowewentup to the guard and identified ourselves and said, ‘What went on here?’ …apparently,ithadtodowithseaplanes,becausetheyhadbeenrunningexperimentswithpontoons...but(therewas)nothingtherethatwas…cryptanalytic.

Themainpurposeof this tripwas to return to southernGermany todouble checkonanumberoftargetstheTeam1searchhadpassedoverquickly.ThisTeamTICOM4, joinedup with a troop of 30 A.U. and accompanied them on a search for large number ofmiscellaneous naval targets in Bavaria; the most interesting included a variety of sitesworkingonV-2components.Often,tipsfromlocalintelligenceofficersledtodeadends.OKW/Chibegan to disintegrate at the end of thewar.Most sections hadmoved out ofBerlinbyMarch1945,sometotheArmySignalSchoolatHalle,whiletheagency’sarchivesmovedtoLauf.ByApril,mostoftheagency’spersonnelapartfromthosetheagencywhohadgonenorthto jointheremnantsof theGermangovernmentnearFlensburgbegantomove towards south Germany, breaking up into different transport trains, with most ofthemultimatelyendingupatWerfen,nearSalzburg,wheretheywouldlaterbecapturedbyAmericantroops.WhilstKettler, Metting and Hüttenhain went north, Wilhelm Fenner, the ChiefCryptanalyst, led the remnants of OKW/Chiinto Austria. On 23 April 1945, OKW/Chiwasofficially dissolved and its personnel were incorporated into the southern branch of theArmy’s GdNA. In anticipation of the arrival of the American Army, all the remainingmaterialswereburntorthrownintoariver.Afterthesurrenderon8May,allthepersonnelleftwerereleased.TheGermansofficiallydischargedFennerfromgovernmentserviceon19June with only a letter of recommendation. He then made his way back to Landshut,Bavaria, later finding a job as an car and bicyclemechanic in nearby Straubing. He livedquietlythereuntilbeingpickedupbytheoccupationauthoritiesandheldasawitnessfortheNuremberg trials in Julyof 1946. FromSeptember toDecemberhewas interrogated,while being held at Haus Alaska, a building on the grounds of the 7707th EuropeanCommandIntelligenceCenteratOberusel.ReportsbaseduponhisinformationcontinuedtobeissuedbytheASA(precursorofNSA)untilaslateas1950.TherewaslittleleftfortheTICOMteamstoachieve.Theyhad,withoutdoubt,exceededthewildestofexpectations.Andthemembers?Theyhadseentheenemyatfirst-handandtheappallingresultsoflosingawarandofunconditionalsurrender.WeretheyeverabletotellanyonethattheyhadbeeninFrance,GermanyandHollandandwhattheyhaddone?Ordidtheyhavetoputthemonththattheyhadspentvirtuallyonthefrontlinebehindthemandreturntocivilian life; formanytheworldofknittedcardigans,thepipeandaglassofsherry in thecommonroomordinnerathigh tableor in theSCR?Were theyable to telltheirfamiliesoftheirextraordinaryadventures?

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As far as Bletchleywas concerned therewere nomore intercepts to be decrypted andtranslatedfromGermanalthoughtherewerestillthoseinvolvedinthefightagainstJapanwhichwouldgoonforafurtherthreemonths.Fortheothers,somewouldstayontowritetheofficialhistoriesoftheirhutswhilstothersmadetheirwaybacktotheirvariouscollegesandtotheirvariousoccupationsinthepost-warworld,havingtakenpartinoneofthemostsignificant episodes of the entire war, yet unable to say anything to anyone about theiractivitiesuntil1974andthepublicationof thefirstofficiallyapprovedaccountofUltrabyWinterbotham.Presumablytherewereothers,notintheTICOMteamswhowouldstillhavebeenaroundtohandletheoutputfromtheRussianFishset-up,moving,induecourse,fromBletchleytocharmlessEastcote.There were however several other issues that are still unclear. Firstly, where did theRussiancodebreakingmachinesgotowhentheyfirstarrivedinEngland,andwasitSteepleGaydon?Whentheymovedwheredidtheygotoandforhowlongdidtheyoperate?Andfinally,whathappenedtothepossiblyseveralhundredsofGermanprisoneroperatorswhocameto theUKwith theequipmentback in June1945,brought toEnglandboth toavoidtheir falling in to Russian hands and to use their undoubted skills? Following the TICOMaffair tryingtoestablishwhatactuallyhappened isdifficult.Oftenwhatwearetold isnotcorroboratedbyanyothersource.AccordingtoAldrichtheGermanunitwaslateremployed‘intercepting Soviet enciphered teleprinter trafficwhich the British code-named ‘Caviar’.20DidtheystayontohelpbreakthemainSovietmilitaryciphersknownasthePoet’sSeries?HealsotellsusofateamofGCHQcryptanalystsledbyMajorGerryMorgan,workingwithanAmericannavalteamdecryptinganotherSovietsystemcalledLongfellow.

AccordingtotheauthorMikeSmithwhoserved inthe IntelligenceCorpsandworkedatGCHQ,ASAsucceededincrackingthemainRussianmachineciphers,(presumablyasaresultoftheTICOMeffort,possiblyaslightvariationonthetruth).21Hedescribeshowthis,oneofthemost precious secrets of the early ColdWarwas betrayed to the SovietUnionby anAmerican traitor. On 29 October 1948, later known as Black Friday,Warsaw Pact codes,ciphers,andcommunicationsprocedureswerechanged.ThesecrethadbeenhandedtotheSovietsbytheUStraitorWilliamW.Weisband,theiragentintheASA.

Under the UK/USA agreement B.P. had already agreed to work with the Americans onSoviet codes and ciphers. By September1946, theywere sending theAmericansmaterialproduced from this Russian-enciphered teleprinter system they had codenamed Caviar.AccordingtoSmiththeirbestsuccessescameafteramovefromBletchleyParktoEastcote,Middlesex, when they broke main Soviet military machine ciphers known as the PoetsSeries.

ThisfollowedGCHQ'sbreakingofthefirstPoetsysteminearly1946.CalledColeridge, itwasusedbytheSovietarmy,navyandairforceonmaincommunicationsnetworksintheUSSR.Coleridgegave theWesternalliesan insight intoSovietmilitary strength, capabilityanddispositions.The informationwas secondonly toSovietatomic secretson theBritishintelligencewishlist.

20 Ibid. 21 Michael Smith, The Spying Game, Politicos, 2003 p. 505.

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When was TICOM finally finished? Are there any former German prisoners, military orcivilian(nowwell intheirnineties),seeingouttheirdays insomeBuckinghamshirevillage,never having returned to Germany? Some of the duplicated equipment was certainlyshippedtotheUSAwhereitwasundoubtedlycopiedandused.Didanyofthemfollowit?BamfordtellsofVintHillFarmStationandofabattalionofsolelyAfro-Americansusedtofile andhandle the incrediblenumberof Fishdecrypts, (anextraordinary story in itsownright).22Theworkcertainlydidnotcometoahalt.Figuresofoveronemillion interceptsamonth have been quoted. This activity was believed to have continued until 1956 whenRussianFishtrafficwassaidtohavefinallydriedup.The results obtained by these TICOM teams had been impressive, bearing inmind thatmost of themwere in the services just for the duration,most not professionals in eithermilitary or intelligence worlds. Approximately 4,000 separate German documents werecaptured;thematerialweighingfivetons.Manycryptographicdevicesandmachineswerecapturedand196reportsbasedontheinterrogationofGermanSigintpersonnel,togetherwithothermiscellaneous reportsand translationswere issuedbyTICOM.The importanceandvalueofTICOMcannotbemeasuredonly in suchstatistics. Its truevalue lay inwhatwas revealed to UK/US cryptologists about German Sigint – particularly relating to theBritishandAmericansystemsand,whathasyettoberevealed,theirsuccesseswithSovietcodesandciphers.The POW interrogations carried out by the TICOM teams and the captured documentstogether with the interrogations carried out by CSDIC (Combined Services DetailedInterrogation Centre) gave theUK andUS investigators a reasonably complete picture ofGermansignals intelligence.TheUSArmySecurityAgency, inparticular,obtaineda lotofinformation from the documents and interrogations that was useful in assessing its owncryptanalytic and cryptographic achievements especially their own development of rapidanalyticmachineryandthestateofitsresearchincryptographyand,notleast,thestateofitsresearchincryptographyandthecryptographicsecurityofUSsystems.ThediscoveryoftheRussiancodebreakingmachineanditsoperationformanyyearspost-warwasprobably, somesayalmost certainly, theprincipal reasonwhyboth theNSAandGCHQdrewacurtainaroundsomeoftheTICOMoperations.In1992theNSAdirectoroftheNational Security Agency extended the secrecy order until 2012,making TICOMprobablythelastgreatsecretoftheSecondWorldWarandoneofthefirstsecretsoftheColdWar.GCHQseemedtohavemadenocommentpubliclyonthis.About14yearsago,LouisKruh,apassionateamateurcryptographerandone-timeeditorof Cryptologia, published an illustrated article entitled ‘From Bletchley Park toBerchtesgaden’withtheassistanceofPaulK.Whitaker-themuch-quotedmemberoftheTICOM team, which appeared in Cryptologia July 1987 (Vol. XI, No. 3, 129-141) anddescribed one of the most important findings the team had made.23 The article wasillustratedwithwhatweresaidtobephotographs,presumablyperhapsillicit,thatWhitakerhad takenon themission includingsomeof theGermanequipmentalleged tohavebeenused to intercept and decrypt the high-level Russian system. Three years later thephotographswereagainreproducedinTheAmericanCodebreakers.24.Thesearetheclearestevidence to date that such a machine existed. We have to wait until the embargo byNSA/GCHQisliftedtofindoutiftheyaregenuinelytheRussianFish.Althoughblurred,they

22 Ibid. 23Cryptologia,July1987,No.3pp.129–14124ThomasParrish,TheAmericanCodebreakers.(publishedinhardbackasTheUltraAmericans)

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neverthelesslookveryconvincingandGermansoldiersareclearlyseen.Iftheywereindeedgenuine this is evidence that the equipment did exist although there canbenodoubt ofthis.OncetheGermansmasteredtheinterceptiontechniqueandbuilttheFishmachineitmusthaveprovidedthemwithenormousamountsoftrafficmuchofitsensitive.Apparently, through the Russian Fish intercepts the Anglo–Americans were able to getmillions of messages each month, most of which were in plaintext and of no greatimportance. Nevertheless, when analysed all together they provided unprecedentedintelligenceonSovieteconomicandmilitarymatters.ThedeclassifiedNSAhistoryOnWatchProfiles from theNational SecurityAgency Past 40 years p.15 presents the radio-teletypeplain-textprogramme innothing less than triumphant terms ‘leading to anencyclopaedicknowledgeofwhatwasgoingonintheSovietUnion.Over95%ofwhattheUnitedStatesknewaboutSovietweaponryinthe1940scamefromtheanalysisofplaintextradioprintertraffic’.TheRussianFishstorywasundoubtedlyagreatIntelligencesuccessbut,inthemain,ithadnothingtodowithcodebreakingasthebulkofthemessageswereplaintextandthesystemwashandedtothemonaplate.Thisleadstothe1950scontroversiesandtheroleofSigint.IftheASA(NSA)did,astheyclaimed,havethis‘encyclopaedicknowledgeofwhatwasgoingonintheSovietUnion’howcantheythenexplaintheacknowledged‘bomber intelligencegap’25, the ‘missile intelligencegap’and theKoreanSigintdebacle, allofwhichhavebeenwell documented? Should they have known that the Soviet Union did not have morebombersornuclearmissilesthantheUS?The teams foundthat therewereotherGermanciphermachinesanddeviceswhichwereunder development and some of which could so easily have completely devastated thealliedcryptanalyticaleffortsagainstGermany.Forexample,an irregular-driveEnigmathatwouldhavedefiedall thenknownmethodsofsolution,wasbeingdevelopedat thesametime.ThiswascalledCipherDevice39(Schlüsselgerät39,abbreviatedSG-39).Amechanical,portable, keyboard-operated cipher machine, employing an interacting wheel-motionprinciple applied to Hagelin-type wheels, had been developed, built and partiallydistributed, which would have been completely secure against reconstruction even ifmessages were read in depth. This was called Cipher Device 41 (Schlüsselgerät 41,abbreviated SG-41). It was cryptographically superior to its much smaller US Armyequivalentdevice,ConverterM-209.Aspecialdevice,theEnigmaUhrboxhadalreadybeenintroducedin1944whichreplacedthesteckeringontheWermachtEnigmaplugboardandon which the settings could be changed by simply turning a knob (presumably from thename–everyhour).Despitetheextrasecuritythatthisprovideditwasnotintroducedlaterleadingtospeculationthattherewasaflawwith it (whichtherewas).AtthetimeAnglo–Americancryptanalyticalserviceswouldnothavebeeninapositiontobreakthesedevices.Knowing the German's often faulty or careless use of their cipher machines by theiroperatorsitmight,occasionallyhaveallowedAlliedcryptanalyststodeciphertheoccasionalisolatedmessage,butonthewhole,theyprobablywouldhavebeensecure.ThestoryoftheuseoftheA-3scramblerbytheAlliesandtheGermansuccesseswithitisan interesting and salutary chapter in the history of communications security andintelligence.TheA-3wasbasedona1920sconceptbutwasstillbeingusedbytheUSAin

25 The missile gap was the term used in the United States for the perceived disparity between the number and power of the weapons in the USSR, and US ballistic missile arsenals during the Cold War This gap only existed in exaggerated estimates made by the Gaither Committee in 1957 and in USAF figures. Even the CIA figures that were much lower and gave the US a clear advantage were far above the actual count. Like the bomber gap of only a few years earlier, it was later demonstrated that the gaps were known to be illusory from the start, and were being used solely as a political tool.

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1941whentheywerenotyetatwar.Puttingitverysimply,voicemessageswerechoppedupinsmallpiecesandasubstitutionwasmadebyinvertingfrequenciesandthepieceswerethenscrambled.Themilitarywerefullyawarethattheequipmentwasnot fullsecurebutnevertheless itwaswidely useduntil the SIGSALYwas introduced. TheGermanNazi Postoffice-DeutscheReichspost,wastheorganisationresponsiblefortelephone,telegraphandwireless communications in Germany. The Reichspostminister from 1937 to 1945 wasWilhelmOhnesorge,aconvincedNationalSocialistwithclosetiestoHitler.OhnesorgewasinterestedinthenewradiotechnologiesandwaswillingtofundresearchindecodingtheA-3 device. The unit that handled this operation was the Forschungsstelle der Reichspost(ResearchDepartmentof theReichspost).Oncethe initialdecisionwasmadetocarryouttheresearch,twofactorsmadeitrelativelyeasyforthePostOfficepeople.FirstwasthefactthatthePostOfficealreadyownedanA-3device.Howtheycametoknowoftheexistenceandthenacquirethismachinesoearlyonisnotknown.Thesecondfactorwastheirgiftedengineer Kurt Vetterleinwho headed the effort to decode it. After researching the A-3’soperating procedure Vetterlein and his teamwere successful in building equipment thatdecoded the conversations in real time. The equipment and the team were moved toNoordwijk with its superb aerial system in occupied Holland where the reception wasexcellent. Telephone conversations were recorded and decoded from late 1941 till late1944.ThetranscriptswouldbesentbyteletypetotheSicherheitsdienst(securityserviceoftheSS)andwerethenforwardedtoHitler,Himmler,andotherseniorpersonalitiesoftheThirdReich.ThethreatofBritishcommandoraidsforcedtheGermanteamtomoveinlandtoamoresecurelocationclosetoEindhovenandin1944becauseoftheadvancingAlliedarmiestheyreturnedtoGermany.DrHansWilhelmThost,a journalistandemployeeoftheSDhadastrangebackground. In1935hewastheLondoncorrespondentoftheVölkischerBeobachter,thenewspaperoftheNationalSocialistParty. InOctoberof thatyearhewasorderedto leave thecountry.Theonly reason forhis expulsion seems tobe thathemayhave takenpart in someunlawfulactivity suchasespionage.Whatever thebackground,he laterbecameoneof thepeoplewhowasemployedtranslatingtheincomingA-3materialandhisinterrogation(TICOMI-190‚’’Extracts from reporton interrogationofDrHansWilhelmThost’’)makevery interestingreading. According to his testimony, the Post Office Minister Ohnesorge, although adedicatedNazi,distrustedthemilitaryanddidnotwanttogivethemthetranscriptsoftheinterceptedcommunications.ThatwasthereasonfortheReichspost-SDconnection.Ononeoccasion during his interrogations Thost surprised his interrogators by saying that ‘theaddressforWashingtonwasRepublic2020’.Laterinhisinterrogationhelistedsomeofthemorememorablecallsthathecouldremember:

a)BetweenWarOffice,LondonandBritishArmystaff,Washington.MostofthetimethecallerwasaBrigadierLeslieDawesand, inLondon,BrigadierOwenYoung.Thediscussions concernedBritishordersofAmericanmilitaryequipment.Coverwordswereusedfortheitemssuchas‘grapefruits&‘pineapples‘.b) Between the Ministry of War Transport, London and British Shipping Mission,Washington.Talksconcernedtheallocationofshippingspace.Theatresofwarwerereferredtobyacovername.(‘Arthur’splace’,‘John’splace’).OnecanspeculatethatArthur’splacemayhavebeenSingaporewherethesadlynotoriousGeneralArthurPercivalwasinchargec)MinistryofWarTransport,LondonandrepresentativeofthesameorganisationinWashington.Talksconcernedtheallocationoftankershippingspace.Thostsaidthat

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there was a serious shortage of tanker ships. This was also an indicator of thesuccessorotherwiseoftheU-boatcampaignd) As far as political and diplomatic matters were concerned, calls that he couldrecall included theBritishEmbassy inWashington to theForeignOffice inLondon,TheDutchGovernment inexile inLondonto its representative inWashington,andon one or two occasions, the Soviet ambassador to London,Maisky to the Sovietambassador inWashington.Alsohe recalledconversationsbetweenAnthonyEden(UKforeignsecretary)inWashingtonandChurchillinLondon.e) As far as economicmatterswere concerned, themost interesting callswere ofcoursethosebetweenRooseveltandChurchill-manyofthemrelatingtowhattheUSAwouldsupplyunderLendLease.Theirconversationof29July1943alertedtheGermans to the impending Italian surrender and allowed them to take swiftmeasures against the Italian army. Other top-level people were also recordedincluding: General Mark Clark, Lord Halifax, the British ambassador to the USA,AverellHarriman, the Special Envoy to Europeand the co-ordinatorof Lend LeaseandwhoonceaccompaniedChurchill toMoscowtovisitStalin,andHarryHopkinsthe‘eminencegrise’behindRooseveltandnowthoughtbyseveralhistorianstohavebeenacommunist;ifnot,atleastholdingsympatheticviews.

WalterSchellenberg,headofSDforeignintelligencewasanotherrecipientofthetranscriptsandinhismemoirshementionsoneoftheRoosevelt-Churchilltransatlanticconversations. 26ThePostOfficeoperationwasundoubtedlyagreat successbut itwasnot theonlyeffortagainst the A-3 device. The army directed its own separate operation through the ArmyOrdnance, Development and Testing Group, Signal Branch Group IV - WaffenpruefungAbteilung7/IV.ManyofthebooksoncodebreakingmentiontheVetterleinPostofficestory.However,surprisinglythatisonly50percentofthepuzzle.WhenTICOMreportI-213wasdeclassifiedby theNSA, it toldof aGermanengineernamedMuchewhoworked for theArmy Ordnance, Development and Testing Group, Signal Branch Group IV Section E (WaPruef 7/IVe) headed by Dr Lötze, and his own successes against the A-3 scrambler. Theagencywas involved inwhathedescribedas ‘specialtasks’duringthewar.TheyanalysedanddecodedSovietspeechscramblersandtheyalsobuiltequipmentthatcould interceptand print out Allied multi-channel radio-teletype traffic. Section E also did research inspeechprivacysystems.MuchewasanengineerwithSectionE.From1927to37heworkedfor Heliowatt Werke and in 1937 moved to WaPruef 7/IVe. From then until 1940 heinvestigated domestic and foreign speech privacy systems. At the end of 1940 or thebeginning of 1941 his department started studying the encrypted transatlantic telephonelink. Under his direction, single sideband receiverswere built and the traffic recorded atNordwyk,Holland.Perhaps,surprisinglythiswasthesameplaceasthePostOfficehadtheirinterception facility. He got assistance from Professor Koomans of the Dutch PTT(StaatsbedrijfderPosterijen,TelegrafieenTelefonie) inbuildingthereceivers,surprisingly.From studying the recordingswith specialised equipment the Section E partyworkedouttheoperatingprocedureoftheA-3fromwhich,adescramblingmachineknownas5Bcouldbe built. The equipment was moved from Nordwyk to Ludwigsfelde (near Berlin) in late1942. Ludwigsfelde housed a large army intercept station. According to Muche the 5B

26WalterSchellenberg,TheLabyrinth:TheMemoirsofHitler’sSpymaster,1999.

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machinebecameoperationalinthesummerof1943andhetoorecalledtheconversationsbetweenRoosevelt andChurchillwhich foreshadowed theSicily landingsandallowed theGermanstowithdrawtheirforceswithminimal losses.UnfortunatelyfortheGermansthe5Bmachinewas destroyedby aerial bombardment in late 1943.Muche then spent eightmonths building an improved version which was completed in the summer of 1944 andwhichinterceptedanddecodedthetraffictill1945whentheunitwasforcedtomove.Hehadno ideaas towhathadhappened to themachineat theendof thewar. Fortunatelyinformationaboutthedisposalofthe5BmachineisgiveninTICOMI-203.Kornewasalsoaformermember of theReichspost and confirmed thatMariniok’s statement. The XGerät(nottobeconfusedwithJohannesPlendl’snavigationdeviceofthesamename)hadbeendeveloped by Dr Lötze with the assistance of Muche and had enabled the Germans tointercepttransatlantictelephoneconversations.Askedaboutthehistoryoftheapparatus,hesaidthathehadonlybeeninvolvedwithitfromitsinstallationatLudwigsfeldeinAugust1944.HehadthengoneontoworkwithituntilApril1945whenithadbeentakentotheSchliersee, andhehadhimselfbeenoneof thegroupwhichaccompanied itby truck.Heclaimedthathehadalsobeenontheraftwhentheyhaddroppedtheapparatus intotheSchlierseeoneither1or2May1945.ContrarytoMariniok’sstatement,Kornclaimedthatthe apparatus had been sunk in several sections and not in one piece. The frame,whichconsisted of three large parts, was dropped in sections and the compartments of theapparatusitselfhadbeendroppedseparately.Kornwascertainhecouldpickouttheexactspotwherethepartsweresank,sayingthatthenearestvillagewasMiesbach.Althoughhewas certain that the constructionof theapparatuswouldbeobvious should thepartsberetrieved,KORNthoughtthatnothingwouldworkbecauseofthecorrosiveinfluenceofthewater.ItappearedthatMuchehadbeenjustassuccessfulinhisownwayasVetterleinbutuntil then his story was not known. Although the army’s effort wasted resources byduplicating the Post Office operation, it was nevertheless successful in its own right andprovidedvaluableinformationduringthewar.It had been an invaluable source of intelligence. By eavesdropping on the Alliedconversations theGermans gotmilitary, diplomatic and economic intelligence. In at leastonecase (the Italiansurrender) the information they receivedallowed themto takeswiftmilitary action and pre-empt the Allied plans. That event alone, they felt justified theresourcesspentontheA-3bothbythePostOfficeandthearmy.TheinterceptedcommunicationsbetweenRooseveltandChurchillandotherseniorfiguresareanembarrassingepisode in thesignals intelligencewar.Thepotential for interceptionwas well known. Whenever Churchill made a transatlantic call he had his own personalcensorfullyauthorisedtoterminatethecallinstantlyhadshefeltthattherewasapotentialsecurityproblem,HowevertheAlliesknewtheA-3systemwasvulnerablebuttherewasnoalternativeuntilthearrivaloftheSIGSALYmachinewhichreplaceditwithaquantumleapinterms of security. Thanks to SIGSALY the Allies had absolute security from mid 1943onwards.Itwasofmassiveconstructionconsistingof40racksofequipmentweighingover50tonsandrequired30KWofpower.TheteamdiscoveredthattheGermanshadrecordedsignificantamountsoftrafficfromthissystembuthaderroneouslyconcludedthatitwasacomplexencodingsystem.Still thestoryof theA-3scrambler,and theGermansuccessfulattackonit,isaninterestingchapterinthehistoryofcommunicationssecurity.Germany had sixmain cryptologic organisations inWorldWar II, some of them leftoversfrom earlier days. The estimated total strength including field units and support staffamounted to approximately 30,000 persons. As far as the other Axis powers were

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concerned,ItalyhadtwomainSigintorganisationsandFinland,Austria,Hungaryeachhadone. From this it has been estimated that the total involved in the Axis effort probablyamounted to some 37,000. This, however, was small in comparison with the Anglo–Americaneffort.Thegrand totalofpersonnel involvedat theendof thewar includingallservicesandincludingfieldandoverheadpersonnelwas inexcessof60,000andthisdoesnot include the not insignificant contributionsmade by the Commonwealth and Empire -particularly importantwhen it came to thewar in the Far Eastwhere India andAustraliaweretomakeavitalcontribution.27Of thesixmainGermancryptologicorganisations, fourweremilitaryandtwocivilian.Themilitarywere:a).ThesignalintelligenceagencyoftheArmyHighCommand(OKH/GdNA)whichdealtwithenemy(Allied)armytrafficb).Thesignal intelligenceagencyof theNavyHighCommand (OKH/4SK)whichdealtwithenemynavaltraffic.c). The signal intelligenceagencyof theAir ForceHighCommand (OKL/LNAbt350whichdealtwithenemyAirForcetraffic.d).ThesignalintelligenceagencyoftheSupremeCommandArmedForces(OKW/Chi)whichdealt with enemy, neutral and friendly diplomatic traffic, commercial traffic and newsbroadcasting, particularly that of the BBC. At one time, it was thought that this couldpossiblyhavebeentheNaziequivalentofGC&CS.Thetwocivilianorganisationswere:a).TheForeignOfficecryptanalyticsection(persZs)whichalsodealtwithdiplomatictraffic;friendly,neutralorenemyand:b). Goering’s Research Bureau (FA) which was a Nazi party agency dealing also withdiplomatic traffic, news releases, broadcast monitoring, telephone monitoring and othertypesofcommunicationsintelligencewhetherfriendlyorneutral.The Army High Command agency (Oberkommando des Heeres, General der NachrichterAufklärung)orOKH/GdNAwaslocatedatJüterbogabout60milessouthwestofBerlin.Itsrole included the cryptanalysis andevaluationofAllied army traffic at any level,whetherstrategicoroperational.Italsodidasmallamountofradiobroadcastmonitoring.By1945theagencywasthemainunitoftheGermanArmySignalIntelligenceService.Therewereotherunits:a). Two intercept stations operated directly under the Signals Intelligence Agency andsupplyingitwithinterceptsofAlliedhigh-leveltraffic.b). Nine field signals intelligence regiments assigned to various army groups for theinterception, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis and the evaluation of Allied low-level tacticaltraffic in the army group areas. These regimentswere independent of the Central SignalIntelligenceAgencybutsupplieditwithintercepts.c).AsmallsignalintelligencesectionassignedtotheArmyCommander-in-ChiefWestwhichactedasaco-ordinatingsection for thetwoSignal IntelligenceRegimentsontheWesternFront.Itwasestimatedthatatotalof12,000personnelwereemployedintheseunits.

APPENDIXTWO27 See Australia’s contribution to the TICOM Project.

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SUMMARYOFTICOMFINDINGSRELATEDTOALLIEDCRYPTOGRPHICSYSTEMSItwasreassuringthatTICOMestablishedthat theAxiscryptanalystshadbeenunabletoread any US Army or Navy High-level cryptographic systems. However both of theunenciphered UK War Office telegraph codes were easily read by the Germans. It wasdiscoveredthatHungaryhadreceivedphotostatcopiesofUSWarDepartmentConfidentialCodeno.2probablyfromtheBulgarianstogetherwithatleastonesetofciphertablesandthiscompromisedmaterialwassharedbetweenGermany,JapanandFinland.MilitaryIntelligenceCodeno.11(BlackCode)wasusedbytheUSMilitaryAttaché,ColonelFellers in Cairo for transmittinghis reports.An Italianwhohadworked formore than20yearsfortheAmericanembassyobtainedorcopiedasafekeywhichenabledtheAmericanBlackCodeanditsenciphermenttablestobecopiedbytheItalianintelligenceauthorities.Fellers was somewhat of an Anglophobe and the British authorities did everything theycould to please him and, as a result, he was particularly well briefed on the Desertcampaign. ItwasnotrealisedthatthecodehadfirstbeenbrokeninNovember1941withthehelpof thestolentablesandthecodebook.Unfortunatelyhis reportshadbeenreadthroughout the summer of 1942 and the information passed on to Rommel (with direresultsfortheBritish intheDesertcampaign).FellersunwittinglygaveRommel justaboutthemost perfect intelligence anyGeneral couldwish for through his frequent reports toWashington.Rommelknewthesourceof this intelligenceandbelieved itwhereasRitchiewasgettingintelligencederivedfromUltrabut,notknowingthesource,didnotputmuchtrust in it.Moreover,Rommel’sradiointelligencecompanyunderCaptainAlfredSeeböhmwas doing pretty well due to poor British radio security. After his drive from Benghazi,Rommel needed time to reorganise before his nextmajor offensive. Fromearly FebruaryuntilMaythetwoarmiesrested.RommelwasstillgettingtheFellersreportsgivinghimaclearpictureofRitchie’sdispositions.Hisplan,however,toswingaroundthesouthernendoftheBritishlinehadbeenrevealedbyHut6Ultraandhismovementsobserved.DespitethishewasstillabletosurpriseandoverruntheHQof7thArmouredDiv.partofNorrie’s30Corps. When Norrie heard that Rommel was attacking he ordered the 22nd ArmouredBrigadetodrivesouthtosupportthe4thArmouredBrigadenotknowingthatithadalreadybeenshattered.BeforeitcouldmoveRommelwasonthem,InJune1942theAmericansputanendtotheFellers leakbychangingtheciphersystemdeprivingRommelofhisprimarysource of intelligence. Hence his surprise at his reception by Auchinleck and the surpriseattackontheItalianSabrathaDivision.TheYservicehadlocatedthepositionofRommel’sradiointelligenceoutfitandrecoveredtheirrecordsintact.Theserevealedthecontributionmade by Fellers and the success of Seebohm’s methods. They also discovered theimportanceofgoodGermanradio intelligence inthe fieldandhowpoorwasBritishradiosecuritywas.Widespreadreformsinradiosecuritywereput inplacewithnewcompaniesformedtomonitorBritishradiosecurity.TheGermanshadalsobeenabletoreadmessages inseveralversionsoftheUSDivisionFieldcodes.Theyhadsolvedbetween10percentand30percentofinterceptedUSArmyM-209messages.Apartfromtheoccasionswherekeyshadbeencapturedthesemessageswereusuallyreadtoolatetobeofanytacticalvaluetotheenemy.TheCSP-1500(M209inUS Army nomenclature) was a portable hand-operated tape printing mechanical devicedesigned for the encipherment of tactical messages, the cryptographic principle beingreciprocal substitutionalphabets.Derived fromamachinecreatedbyBorisHagelin in thelate1930s, SmithCoronaeventuallywenton tobuild125,000at$64.00each.Despite its

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insecurity itwasuse throughout theKoreancampaign. Itwas finallydiscontinued,afteranumberofmodifications,intheearly1960s.Itrepresentedabrilliantachievementforpre-electronictechnology.Itwasanextremelyportablemachinemeasuring3.25x5.5x7”.ItwasparticularlydisconcertingfortheAmericansandtheBritishtofindthatalmost100%ofmessages sent in someother codes – Slidex, Codex and cipher deviceM-94 had beenreadonaregularbasis.SlidexwasasimplemanualciphersystembasedonamatrixoffixedwordsandfrequentlyusedphrasesthathadbeenintroducedintotheBritishArmyaround1943andhadbeenusedheavily throughoutOverlord in June1944. Itwassimultaneouslyusedby theSoviet forces. They found thathadbeeneasilybrokenby theGermansusingnothingbut the interceptedmessages. Ithadneverbeensuitable foranythingother thanshort-termtacticalmessages.Combined Naval Cipher no.3 which was used by the US Navy and the Royal Navy forAtlanticconvoyoperationswasreadalmost100percentbytheGermansfromtheendof1942throughtothemiddleof1943.Thesolutionofthiscipheranditscontinuoususewas,almost certainly, for theAllies themostdisastrous signal intelligence success achievedbythe Germans. Allied convoy shipping losses suffered during this periodwere six times asgreatasduringanyothercomparableperiod.TheBattleoftheAtlanticwasthedominatingfactor throughout thewar; asChurchill said ‘never for onemoment couldwe forget thateverything happening elsewhere on land, seas or in the air depended ultimately on itsoutcome’.In addition to cryptography, theGermanshadbeen involved in intensiveand successfulTrafficAnalysisagainstboththeUKandUSArmyandAirForcesradiocommunications.Thisincludeddirection-finding,analysisofallcall-signandfrequencyallocationsystems;analysisofplaintextandoperatorschataswellasmorecomplexoperationssuchasairborneradarroutetrackingandthemonitoringoftransmitterzerobeattuning.TheimportanceofT.AasaweaponintheintelligencewarwasappreciatedbytheGermansfarearlierthanbyB.P..The outcome of the work of TICOM was that it was agreed that, from an intelligencestandpoint, the results obtained through theGerman cryptographic successes against theAllieshadbeenimportantbutnotdecisive.BothBritishandUSArmyandNavystrategyhadbeensafeso longashigh-level systemswereemployed.Tacticaloperations,however,didsuffer.TheAtlanticconvoylossesduring1942andearly1943havealreadybeenmentioned(whichcouldhaveledtoourBritain’sdefeat)andGermantrafficanalysisandcryptanalysishadprovidedacomprehensiveorderofbattleoftheUSArmyandArmyAirForcebasedintheUK,theMediterraneanandinduecourse,ontheContinent.Oneinterrogationbroughtabout the astonishing statement that ‘no attack of the 8th US Air Force ever came as asurprise’.Whatwas the costof this in termsof aircraft and their crew?Undoubtedly thecompromise by the military attaché in Cairo of Military Intelligence Code no. 11 hadprovided Rommel with intelligence of unquestioned tactical value in the spring of 1942.German successes in the solution of medium- and low-level British military and navalsystemswereconsiderable.The results of the cryptanalytic effort against Russianmilitary communications had notbeenknownpreviouslyandtheywerefoundtohavebeenevengreaterthanthoseagainstBritainand theUSA.Cryptanalysisof thediplomatic communicationsof Italy, Japan, theirAllies andFrance, Turkey,Bulgaria,Greece,Portugal, SpainandSwitzerlandalsoachievedimportantresults.

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APPENDIXTHREEGERMANY’SCRYPTOGRAPHICSUCCESSES

The list of successes by the Germans as listed by TICOM in its findings is impressive, inparticularthoseoftheGermanArmySignal Intelligenceorganisationwhich,fromits initialformationuntiltheendofthewarincludedthefollowing:a)BeforethedeclarationofwarinSeptember1939ithadbeenabletoestablishtheFrench,DutchandBritishordersofbattle.This,inthemain,hadbeenachievedbycryptanalysisofFrench codes and Dutch double-transposition ciphers and through direction-finding andtrafficanalysisdirectedagainstBritishArmysystems.b)DuringtheinvasionofFrancein1940itestablishedtheFrenchmobileorderofbattlebythedecryptionofun-namedFrenchcodes.c) ItestablishedtheRussianarmyorderofbattleandthe locationof itsstrategicreservesfromearlyinthewaruntil1945.Thiswas,inthemain,accomplishedthroughtrafficanalysisandthecryptanalysisofRussian2,3,4and5figurecodesofboththeArmyandthePeople’sCommissariat(NKVD).d)ItgaveRommelintelligenceofgreatoperationalvalueduringthefightingaroundTobruk.This was done by solving the super-encipherment of a compromised unidentified BritishcodewhichtheGermanscalled‘TheBritishWaroffice’.e) Informationwasgainedonoperationsundertakenby theUSArmy inNorthAfricaandthereafterthroughoutthewarthroughthesolutionofConverterM-209traffic.Duringthefighting inSicily, theGermanscaptured just twoweeksafter itwent intoeffect,akey listvalidforonemonthandwereabletoreadthesystemcompletelyfortherestofthemonth.Onothernets,whensufficientdepthwasavailable,between10percentand30percentofM-209 trafficwas readable thoughmostof the trafficwas read too late tobeofany realtacticalvalue.f) InformationconcerningUSAmyactivities in Iceland,Britain,CentralAmericaandNorthAfricawasobtainedbyreadingtheUSArmyDivisionFieldcodesDFC15,16.17,21,25,28andpossiblyothers.g)TacticalinformationrelatingtoAlliedbombingandartillerytargets,weatherreportsandintelligenceon thesizeand locationofAlliedunitspassing throughmilitarypolicecontrolpoints in France was obtained from solutions of Slidex the British device for protectingoperationally low-level traffic. The device was used by both British and US forces andvariousversionsofitwereusuallysolved,inonetothreehours.h)ThetransportationofGermantroopsoverHungarianrailwayscouldbesafelyundertakenusingtheintelligenceobtained.i) Successful cryptanalysiswas carried out on the traffic of Jugoslav andGreek partisans,CzechandRussianagentsandthePolishresistancemovement.TheSignal IntelligenceAgencyof theArmyHighCommand issued threedaily reportsandtheseweresenttotheArmyHighCommand,theNavyHighCommand,theAirForceHighCommand and to the SupremeCommanderArmed Forces.Himmler, as Chief of the EliteGuardalsoreceivedacopyasdidtheReichSecurityOffice.Eachoftheninesignalintelligenceregimentsinthefieldsuppliedintelligencedirectlytothecommandersatarmygroup,armyandcorpslevelsandco-operatedcloselywiththelocalairforcesignalsregiments.

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The German Air Force Signal Intelligence Services’ successes against the RAF and USAAFwere outstanding. They supplied a comprehensive and continuous picture of the battleorderandthedeploymentofUSAAFandRAFunits in theUKandMediterraneantheatresand,aftertheD-Dayinvasion,thecontinentofEurope.Thisinformationcamemainlyfromtraffic analysis, radio-telephonemonitoringandmonitoringofairborne radiodevices. ThesolutionofRAF4-figurecodesfromMarch1940untilNovember1942gavebasicdatawhichwasenlargeduponanduseduntiltheendofthewar.ItgavepromptandaccuratewarningofRAFandUSAAFheavybombermissions.Toagreatdegreethiswastheresultofadvancedmethods of traffic analysis from radio-telephone and radar monitoring. It also gaveimmediatewarningtoGermangroundforcesandfightersquadronsoftacticaloperationsbyAlliedgroundsupportaircraft.AsfarastheWesternFrontwasconcerned,thesolutionofthebombercodes,Slidex,SykoandRekohusedinformationbytheRAFand,forashorttimetheUSAAF,fromcryptanalysiswasvitalthroughoutthewar.Their successes against the Russian Air Forces were even greater. The cryptanalysis ofRussianAirForceground-to-ground2,3,and4figureadministrativeandoperationalcodesand some five figure codesprovideda completeorderofbattle for theRussianAir Forcefrom1937untiltheendofthewar.AlargeamountofintelligenceonRussianArmybattleorderwasalsoobtainedfromtheirstudyofairnetworks.From the partial decipherment of air to ground traffic, plane to ground radio telephonemonitoringandfromradiodirection-findingofbomberswhenairborne,theyhadbeenableto give accurate warnings of all Russian long-range strategic bombing raids, from thecryptanalysis off all theRussianAirArmy’s 2, 3, and4-figure traffic. From traffic analysis,plane-to-plane radio telephone monitoring and from radio direction finding of planes inflight theywereabletowarntheirgroundforcesandfightersquadronsofany impendingoperationsbyRussianfightersandfighterbombers.ThesignalsintelligenceagencyoftheNavyHighCommand(OKM/4SKL111)wasresponsiblefor traffic analysis, cryptanalysis and the evaluation of British, US, Russian, French, andSwedishnaval traffic. Ithadastrengthofabout1,000personnelbutalsohadoperationalcontrolofanadditional fieldorganisationofapproximately2,500. Itwasmadeupof fourdetachments: Flanders, Brittany, Wilmershaven, and Pomerania which were engaged oncryptanalysis of low-level systems, interception and direction-finding. The complement ofeachdetachmentwas200menincluding100interceptoperatorsand10cryptanalysts.Therewereeighteenprimarydirection-findingstationswhosemaindutywas interceptionratherthandirection-finding;eachwithastrengthof100 including60 interceptoperatorsand five cryptanalysts. Therewere twenty-five secondarydirection-finding stationswhosemaindutiesweredirection-findingandtrafficanalysis,eachwithastrengthof26.TheirmainNavalsuccesseswere:

a) In 1939 they were able to establish the wartime organisation and disposition of theBritishfleet,afterhavingsolvedBritishNavalCodeNo.2.TheB-Dienst,createdintheearly1930s, had broken themostwidely used British naval code by 1935.Whenwar came in1939, the B-Dienst specialists had broken enough British naval codes that the GermansknewthepositionsofallBritishwarships.Theyhadfurthersuccessesintheearlystagesofthewar;theBritishwereslowtochangetheircodes.TheB-DienstcouldregularlyreadtheBritishandAlliedMerchantsShips (BAMS)code,whichprovedvaluable for U-boat warfare

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in theearlyphasesof theBattleof theAtlantic. InFebruary1942, theB-Dienstbroke thecodeusedforcommunicationwithmanyoftheAtlanticconvoys.[2]

Before theUS entered theWar at the end of 1941, theB-Dienst could also read severalAmericancodes.ThischangedafterApril1942,whentheUSNavychangedcodesystems;before that, however, the ability to read American message traffic contributed to thesuccess of Operation Paukenschlag the successful U-boat attacks off the American EastCoastinearly1942.

In1941,theUSNavyrefused,forsecurityreasons,toequiptheBritishNavywiththeirECMMark1encryptiondevices,sotheBritishAdmiralty introducedtheNavalCypherNo.3forAlliedradiocommunicationandconvoyco-ordinationintheAtlantic.

b) In the springof1940 theyobtainedcomplete informationon theproposedBritishandFrenchjointNorwayexpeditionOperationStratford,theblockingactionincentralNorwayintendedtopreventanyGermanadvanceandtoprotectthesouthernflankofNorwayfromGerman counter-attacks. Thiswas doneby solvingBritishNaval CodeNo. 4. TheGermaninvasion followed immediately. During the campaign detailed information on potentialAlliedcountermeasureswasgainedfromthetrafficsentinBritishNavyNo4,forexample,intendedBritishlandingfields,transportarrivalschedulesandthedispositionofBritishandFrenchsurfaceforces.c)Throughout1942andpartof1943itprovidedimportantintelligencerelatingtoAtlanticconvoysfromanearly100percentsolutionofCombinedCipherNo.3usedbyBritishandUSNorthAtlanticconvoysTheB-Diensthadconcentratedondecipheringthenewcode,andfinallyweresuccessfulinSeptember1942.FromDecember1942toMay1943,80percentof the intercepted radio messages were read. However, only 10 per cent of them weredecryptedintimetotakeeffectiveaction.DespitethislowsuccessratetheaveragemonthlyAlliedshippinglossesduringthisperiodwereapproximatelysixtimestheaveragemonthlylossesinlaterperiods.TheyalsosolvedtheBritishinter-departmentalcipher,andin1943aBritishRAFtorpedobombertranspositioncipherusedforpracticeexercisesintheChannel.TheyalsocarriedoutD/F’ingattacksagainstAlliednavalandmerchantships,plottingtheirpositions andmovements, passing on this information to local commanders.DetachmentFlandersbasedatBruges,assistedintheescapeofthepocketbattleshipsScharnhorstandGneisenauwhentheymadetheirdashfromBresttoKiel.ThisgroupalsoreadBritishnavaltrafficpriortoandduringtheDiepperaidcontributingtothedisaster.TheSignalIntelligenceAgencyoftheSupremeCommandArmedForcesOberkommandoderWermacht,ChiffrierabteilungabbreviatedtoOKW/Chihadthreemainfunctions:a)Itintercepted,studiedandevaluateddiplomatic,militaryattachéandagenttraffic.b)Itmonitoredandevaluatedcommercial,radiotrafficandnewsbroadcasts.c)ItmadesecuritystudiesofthecodesandciphersusedbytheSupremeCommand,ArmedForces, thearmy, theair forceand thenavyandmanygovernmentdepartments, vetoingfrom1944theuseofthoseitdeemeddangerousandinsecure.OKW/Chioperatedatleast13radiointerceptstationsofitsownandreceivedradiotrafficfrom other agencies as well (notably Goering’s Research Bureau (FA). It also receivedlandlinetrafficfromsourcesunstated.Withtheexceptionofmilitaryattachésystems,itdidnot work on enemy army, navy or air force traffic. Documentary evidence as to itscryptanalyticsuccessesislimited.Thefollowingsummarycoversitsmostimportantknowncryptanalyticachievements.

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a)Themostextensive1939–44successesseemtohavebeenachievedwithFrenchsystems.In particular the electrical Hagelin cipher machine B-211. The French armed forcespurchasedasmallnumberofHagelinmachines(C-36andB-211)intheearly1930s.ThesesystemsprovedsecureduringtheperiodofthephoneywarandtheBattleofFrance.Afterhostilities ended however the cryptanalysts of the army signal intelligence agencyInspectorate 7/VI (laterOKH/GdNA)managed to acquire these ciphermachines and theyfound ways to break the messages. Although their research was only of a theoreticalcharacter, since no new traffic was intercepted on these systems, once the Free FrenchforcesofGeneralDeGaullestartedusingthemagaintheywereinapositiontobenefitfromtheir earlier research. Limited success was also achieved in the solution of the FrenchHagelinmachineBC-38.Animportantmilitaryattachécode(ASAtrigraphFVD)wassolvedatthebeginningofthewar.After1940,allVichy-FrenchsystemswereautomaticallycompromisedoncetheywerefiledwiththeGermanArmisticeCommissionatWiesbaden.b)AtleastfourJapanesediplomaticcodes(includingthosedesignatedbyASAtrigraphsJAE,JAH,andJBA)weresolved.In 1938 and 1939 the agency collaboratedwith the cryptoanalytic section of the ForeignOffice(PersZ)inacurrentsolutionofdailykeysfortheJapaneseRedmachine.c)PrecisedetailsonthesolutionofUSsystemsarenotyetmadeavailablebutwedoknowthat the agency had compromised copies of at least two US State Department codes,namelyBrownandA1.WorkwasalsodoneontheUSStateDepartmentciphersO-1,andO-2,theleadinthesolutionofO-2beingtakenbytheForeignOfficeCryptanalyticsection.d)CroatianEnigmatrafficwassolvedthroughcompromisedmachinewirings.e) Little information is available from the report on any successes with the solution ofEnglishsystems.Polish,Turkish,GreekandLatinAmericansystemsweresolvedextensively.Prior to 1943 appreciable successes were achieved in the solution of Italian diplomaticcodes.During the first half of 1944 important decodes designated as VN’s (VerigesslicheNachrichten) totalled3,000permonth fromwhichonaverage,40 selecteddecodesweresenttoFieldMarshallKeitel,ChiefofArmedForces,toHitlerandbyKeiteltoGeneralJodl,Chiefof theArmedForceOperationsStaff.Theywerealsosent to thearmy,navyandairforcehighcommandsandprobablytothesignalintelligenceagenciesofthesecommands.Inadditionapproximately45specialreportsweresenteverydaytospecialrecipientssuchastheFieldEconomicOffice,thedepartmentoftheArmedForcesPropaganda,theWesternArmiesBranchandJointIntelligence.After 1944 the Signal IntelligenceAgencyof the SupremeCommand issued cryptographicsystems for the Army and inter-service communications. One of its most importantresponsibilitiesby theendof thewarwas theevaluatingof the cryptographic systemsofotherservices.AfilebelongingtoDrErichHüttenhain,itschiefcryptographerindicatedthatcryptographic studies were made on cipher teleprinters, enigma machines, speciallydesignedHagelinmachines,smallcipherdevicesandhandsystems.Asfarasitsownsecuritywasconcerned,OKW/ChiwasresponsibleforthetwomostseriousGermancryptographicmistakesoftheWar:thecontinueduseinhigh-levelGermanmilitarycommunicationsof theplugboardEnigmamachine and the teleprinter cipher attachmentSZ42 in their insecure forms. OKW/Chi rejected the 1943 proposals of the Army SecuritySignalAgency(IN7//IV)thatthe(insecure)SZ42bereplacedbythecipherteleprinterT52D

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whichtheybelievedtobeasecuredevice.ItalsofrownedonsuggestionsthattheinsecureplugboardEnigmabeusedwithpluggablereflectorwheels,achangethatwouldhavemadeitsecure.Approximately800personswereemployedinalldutiesotherthaninterception.8TheGermanForeignOfficeCryptanalyticSection.TheGermanForeignOfficehadtwocryptologicsections:thecryptanalyticsection(PersonalZSonderdienstdesAuswärtigenAmtesabbreviatedPersZS)andthecryptographicsection(PersonalZChiffrierdienstderAuswärtigenAmtesabbreviatedPersXChi)The cryptanalytic section of the Foreign Office (Pers Z S) was the senior Germancryptanalytic agency. It was set up in 1919 or possibly before. At its greatest strength itemployedapproximately200persons.Itsrolewasthesolutionofforeigndiplomaticcodesand ciphers. The section had on small intercept station at Dahlem. For the rest of itsinterceptmaterial it was dependent upon the Signal Intelligence Agency of the SupremeCommandArmedForces(OKWChi),Goering’sResearchBureau(FA)andtheGermanPostOffice.Thecryptanalyticsectionachieveditsgreatestsuccesswithdiplomaticcodes,bothone-partandtwo-part,encipheredandunenciphered.a).From1935to1942Itachievedpractically100percentsuccessinallsolutionsofItaliandiplomaticcodes.b)ItreadtheUSStateDepartmentGrey,BrownandA-1codes.ItalsosucceededinsolvingtheAmericanDiplomaticstripciphersO-1andO-2,theformerinpartialfashionbaseduponacompromise.c) The section solved two British Foreign Office R codes and the British governmenttelegraphcodes.d)In1940,successinthesolutionofFrenchdiplomaticcodeswasestimatedat75percent.e)Anumberofmajordiplomaticcodeswerereadandthere isevidencethatat leastonemajorChinesesystemwassolved.f). TheSectionalsosolvedtwomachineciphers,theJapaneseRedmachinewassolvedin1938andreadcurrentlyuntil1939.ThesectioncollaboratedwiththeOKW/Chiinthisbutitisnotknownwhichagencydeservescreditfortheoriginalsolution.In1941,afterapartialsolutionbyGoering’sResearchBureau(FA)theSwissdiplomaticEnigmatrafficwassolved.Little information is available on the section’s achievements in terms of intelligence. Thedistribution it gave its codes is unknown. The section’s personnel seem to have thoughtprimarily in terms of cryptanalysis as a science rather than in terms of what theirintelligencecontributionmeant toasuccessfulGermandiplomacy.Thiswassimilar to theviewheldbytheciviliansinGC&CS,certainlyinBerkeleyStreet.ThesectionseemstohavebeenbadlyneglectedbyhigherForeignOfficeauthorities,bothwithrespecttotheneedforpersonnelandwithregardtointerestinitswork.

APPENDIXFOURGERMANCRYPTANALYTICMETHODS

Onceagain,theTicomreportisveryhelpful indeedintellingusthatGermancryptanalyticsuccesswasgenerallyagainstmedium-gradesystemswhichconsistedforthemostpartofcodes–eitherencipheredorunenciphered– thesolvingofwhich requiredperseverance,intelligence and linguistic ability but certainly very little of what might be called highercryptanalysisandwhilstsolvingtheserelativelyeasiersystemstheyhadnotdevelopedany

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important cryptanalytic methods not already known or used by the Anglo–Americans.Impressivethoughthis listofsuccesses is, inhighercryptanalysis,especially inthefieldofhigh-grade machine ciphers, the record of what they did not accomplish is, fortunately,almostas long.Althoughtheyweresuccessfulwith the JapaneseRedmachine they failedwith its successor Purple. They failed to solve the US Army Converter M-134c (Sigaba),converterM-228(Sigcum)noritssuccessortheOne-timeTapeSystem(SIGTOT).Theyfailedto solve the joint Army-Navy–British combined cipher machine and it is not even clearwhethertheywereevenawareoftheexistenceoftheAnglo–Americanhighsecuritysystem(SIGSALY)astherewasnotasinglereferencetoit.ItisabsolutelycertainthattheydidnotsolvetheBritishTypexmachine.Itisinterestingthatinalltheirsecuritystudiesthereisnoevidencethat theyhad investigatedanypracticalmethodsofsolving theirownplugboardEnigmaortheirteleprintercipherattachments.Whether the German intelligence organisations deserve praise or censure, the factremains that their cryptoanalytic methods had few, if any, bright highlights. There was,seemingly,noGermanequivalentofBletchleyParkwhich,somehoworother,managedtobringtogetherthethreeservicesandtheForeignOfficeincludingtheSISwhomightbesaidtohavebeenboughtoffbyrunningandcontrollingthesystemforthedistributionofUltraintelligence andwhich helped to salvage something from thewreck of their failures.Wewerelucky!

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