Thom Brooks Hegels Political Philosophy a Systematic Reading of the Philosophy of Right 2007

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A genuinely novel and interesting commentary on Hegels Philosophy of Right.Professor Mark Bevir, University of California, Berkeley

A very welcome addition to the literature on Hegels political philosophy.Professor Stephen Houlgate, University of Warwick

Hegels Elements of the Philosophy of Right is widely acknowledged to be one of the most important works in the history of political philosophy. It is broadly agreed that Hegel intended this work to be interpreted as a signicant part of his greater system of speculative philosophy. Where disagreement occurs is on the question of the relevance of Hegels larger philosophical system to understanding his Philosophy of Right.

This is the rst book on the subject to take Hegels system of speculative philosophy seriously as an important component of any robust understanding of his Philosophy of Right. It sets out the dierence between systematic and non-systematic readings of the text before discussing important, relevant features of Hegels system, in particular the unique structure of his philosophical arguments.

The greater part of the book demonstrates the results of this systematic reading by exploring several areas of Hegels political philosophy: his theories of property, punishment, morality, law, monarchy, and war. It is shown that by looking beyond the text to Hegels larger philosophical system, we can achieve an improved understanding of Hegels Philosophy of Right.

Thom Brooks is a Reader in Political and Legal Philosophy at the University of Newcastle. He is editor of Locke and Law (2006) and Rousseau and Law (2005), co-editor (with Fabian Freyenhagen) of The Legacy of John Rawls (2005) and founding editor of the Journal of Moral Philosophy.

A SYSTEMATIC READING of

the PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT

THOM BROOKS

HEGELS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

HEGELS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

A SYSTEMATIC READING of

the PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT

THOM BROOKS

ISBN 978 0 7486 2574 1

Front cover image: photograph of Tynemouth Castle Thom Brooks

Jacket design: Cathy Sprent

Edinburgh University Press22 George Square

Edinburgh EH8 9LF

www.eup.ed.ac.uk

Hegels Political Philosophy

Hegels PoliticalPhilosophy

A Systematic Reading of the Philosophy of Right

Thom Brooks

Edinburgh University Press

# Thom Brooks, 2007

Edinburgh University Press Ltd22 George Square, Edinburgh

Typeset in Goudy Old Style byIolaire Typesetting, Newtonmore, andprinted and bound in Great Britain byBiddles Ltd, Kings Lynn, Norfolk

A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 978 0 7486 2574 1 (hardback)

The right of Thom Brooks to be identifiedas author of this work has been assertedin accordance with the Copyright, Designsand Patents Act 1988.

Contents

Preface viiAcknowledgements xiAbbreviations xiii

Introduction 11. System 132. Property 293. Punishment 394. Morality 525. Family 626. Law 827. Monarchy 968. War 114Conclusion 129

Notes 133Bibliography 183Index 199

Preface

This book is the development of far more than countless sleepless nights atthe keyboard. I have benefited tremendously from the kindness and goodadvice of many people over the several years I have studied Hegelsphilosophy, these studies culminating in this book. I simply must beginby indicating my sincere thanks to them in this preface.Avital Simhony first introduced me to Hegels Philosophy of Right while I

was a M.A. student in political science at Arizona State in 1998. Much ofmy academic life has been spent trying to make sense of this text ever since.I am forever grateful to her for both introducing me to the richness ofHegels philosophy (and of British Idealism), as well as her continued helpover the years.Brian OConnor deserves much credit for his enduring encouragement of

my work on Hegel since acting as my supervisor at University CollegeDublin for a M.A. in philosophy. Under his tutelage, my interest inboth Hegels views on punishment and legal theory first blossomed, aswell as my initial suspicions that something was amiss with so-called non-metaphysical approaches to the study of Hegel. I am deeply grateful to hiscontinued help since.I simply cannot thank enough everyone at the University of Sheffields

Department of Philosophy where much of the work for this book wasundertaken. None have been as helpful as Bob Stern and I dedicate thisbook to him with the deepest gratitude a student may offer his teacher. Hehas been far more than a philosophy supervisor, but also a dear friend. Mysecondary supervisor, Leif Wenar, has been equally kind and overlygenerous with his sage advice. I have benefited tremendously both fromtheir advice and their example. No student could have been more fortunateto enjoy such support. I simply could not be more in their debt.Furthermore, I must thank my University of Newcastle colleagues,

especially the Newcastle Political Philosophy Group and, primarily, PeterJones, for their support and encouragement of this project, providing mewith a highly stimulating place to work. My research has benefited

vii


tremendously from a year-long research sabbatical. I must thank both theSchool of Geography, Politics and Sociology (where my Department ofPolitics is based), an Arts and Humanities Research Fund Award fromNewcastle University, and generous funding from the Arts and HumanitiesResearch Council for making this leave possible.This book began life as my Ph.D. thesis in Philosophy at the University

of Sheffield and it has since been substantially revised and expanded byseveral chapters.* The following chapters have been presented at a varietyof conferences and invited speaker seminars, including the AmericanPhilosophical Association Eastern Division annual conference held atWashington, DC; the Classical Associations annual conference heldat Newcastle; the Departments of Politics at the Universities of Edinburgh,Newcastle and Sheffield; the Global Studies Associations annual confer-ence held at Newcastle; the Hegel Society of Great Britains annualconference held at St Edmund Hall, Oxford; the Internationalen Vereini-gung fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie conference held at Lund University;the Newcastle Political Philosophy Group weekly workshops; the PoliticalStudies Association annual conferences held at the Universities of Leedsand Leicester; the School of Philosophy at University College Dublin; andthe Senior Philosophy Postgraduate Seminar at the University of Sheffield.Bob Stern and Leif Wenar tirelessly read through many of this books

chapters at each stage. Fabian Freyenhagen discussed the full contents ofthis book at length and read several drafts in full. I must thank my Ph.D.examiners, Chris Bennett and Dudley Knowles, for their probing questions,written comments, and helpful advice. I have also benefited from commentsand discussions with a number of friends and colleagues, not least includingMark Bevir, Brian Bix, Gary Browning, John Callanan, Joy Chaudhuri,Jerry Cohen, James Connolly, Marek Dalibor, Wayne Davis, John Divers,Lynn Dobson, Iain Hampsher-Monk, Tim Hayward, Ken Himma, ChrisHookway, Gerry Hough, Stephen Houlgate, Michael Inwood, Peter Jones,Duncan Kelly, Tim Kelsall, Jim Kreines, Judith Lichtenberg, Ali Madani-pour, David Merrill, Mari Mikkola, Dermot Moran, Dean Moyar, RichardMullender, Brian OConnor, Jim OShea, Mike Otsuka, James Pattison,Henry Richardson, Michael Rosen, Doug Ryan, Avital Simhony, JohnSkorupski, Alison Stone, Jens Timmermann, Mark Tunick, Colin Tyler,Andrew Vincent, Ken Westphal, Kathryn Wilkinson, Jo Wolff, and AllenWood. While the usual qualifications apply, I am certain this book hasbenefited substantially from their help and good advice no matter how closeor far the book settles their queries.

* See Thom Brooks, Taking the System Seriously: Themes in Hegels Philosophy of Right(Ph.D. thesis, 2004), University of Sheffield.

viii

Preface

Of course, I must warmly thank Edinburgh University Press and, mostespecially, Nicola Ramsey, for their support of this project from its verybeginning. It is a true joy to work with such a wonderful team. Indeed,thanks must also extend to my copy editor, Lyn Flight, and EdinburghUniversity Presss anonymous referees who provided very helpful sugges-tions for how my project could be improved further. I must also thankAngie Hogg and Shirley Mulvenna for their assistance in preparing themanuscript.Finally, special mention must be made of my cats, Miles and Ella, who

never tired of running over to my study to accompany me as I began yetanother all-nighter writing this book, and my family and especially myparents, Alan and Kathy, who supported my studies moving from mynative Connecticut to New Jersey to Arizona and then to Dublin toSheffield and at last to Newcastle. My parents may never understandwhy I am so attracted to philosophy, not least to Hegels philosophy, butwithout their love and support this project would have never been possible.

T.A.K.B.Tynemouth, England

April 2007

ix

Acknowledgements

This book includes some of my previously published work:

Chapter 3 (punishment) uses substantially revised material from my IsHegel a Retributivist?, Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 49/50(2004), pp. 11326.

Chapter 7 (monarchy) is a slightly revised version of my No RubberStamp: Hegels Constitutional Monarch, History of Political Thought 28(2007), pp. 91119.

I am most grateful to their publishers for permission to include this work inwhat follows.

xi

Abbreviations

All references to work by Hegel and Kant will follow the below abbrevia-tions:

Works by Hegel

EL Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (I): Logic

G.W. F. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the Encyclopaedia ofPhilosophical Sciences with the Zusatze, (trans.) T. F. Geraets, W. A.Suchting, and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1991).References will indicate section numbers with remarks by R andadditions by A.

EN Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (II): The Philosophy ofNature

G. W. F. Hegel, Hegels Philosophy of Nature: Being Part Two of theEncyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830) Translated fromNicolin and Poggelers Edition (1959) and from the Zusatze in MicheletsText (1847), (trans.) A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970).References will indicate section numbers with remarks by R andadditions by A.

ERB On the English Reform Bill

G. W. F. Hegel, On the English Reform Bill, in his PoliticalWritings, (eds) Laurence Dickey and H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 23470. Cited by pagenumber.

ES Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (III): The Philosophy of Spirit

G. W. F. Hegel, Hegels Philosophy of Mind [Geist]: Part Three of theEncyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830) Translated from

xiii


Nicolin and Poggelers Edition (1959) and from the Zusatze in MicheletsText (1847), (trans.) A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971).References will indicate section numbers with remarks by R andadditions by A.

GC The German Constitution

G. W. F. Hegel, The German Constitution, in his PoliticalWritings, (eds) Laurence Dickey and H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 6101. Cited by pagenumber.

IA Inaugural Address

G. W. F. Hegel, Inaugural Address, Delivered at the University ofBerlin (22 October 1818), in his Political Writings, (eds) LaurenceDickey and H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1999), pp. 1815. Cited by page number.

LA Lectures on Aesthetics

G. W. F. Hegel, Hegels Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, 2 vols,(trans.) T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). Citedby page number.

LHP Lectures on the History of Philosophy

G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 3 vols, (trans.)E. S. Haldane (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.,1892). Cited by page number.

LNR Lectures on Natural Right

G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science: TheFirst Philosophy of Right, Heidelberg 18171818 with Additions from theLectures of 18181819, (trans.) J. Michael Stewart and Peter C.Hodgson (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995).References will indicate section numbers with remarks by R.

LPH Lectures on the Philosophy of History

G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History:Introduction: Reason in History, (trans.) H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1975). Cited by page number.

xiv

Abbreviations

NL Natural Law

G. W. F. Hegel,Natural Law: The Scientific Ways of Treating NaturalLaw, Its Place in Moral Philosophy, and Its Relation to the PositiveSciences of Law, (trans.) T. M. Knox (Philadelphia, PA: Universityof Pennsylvania Press, 1975). Cited by page number.

PH Philosophy of History

G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, (trans.) J. Sibree (NewYork: Dover, 1956). Cited by page number.

PR Philosophy of Right

G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, vol. 7, (eds)Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main:Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970). All English translations are fromG.W. F.Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, (ed.) Allen W. Wood,(trans.) H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1991) unless otherwise noted. References will indicate sectionnumbers with remarks by R and additions by A.

PS Phenomenology of Spirit

G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, (trans.) A. V. Miller(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). Cited by page number.

PW Political Writings

G. W. F. Hegel, Political Writings, (trans.) T. M. Knox (Oxford:Clarendon, 1964). Cited by page number.

RRS The Relationship of Religion to the State

G. W. F. Hegel, The Relationship of Religion to the State, in hisPolitical Writings, (eds.) Laurence Dickey and H. B. Nisbet (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 22533. Cited bypage number.

SEL System of Ethical Life

G. W. F. Hegel, Hegels System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy ofSpirit, (eds and trans.) H. S. Harris and T. M. Knox (Albany, NY:State University of New York Press, 1979). Cited by page number.

xv


SL Science of Logic

G. W. F. Hegel, Hegels Science of Logic, (trans.) A. V. Miller(Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1969/1999). Cited by pagenumber.

TAC Tercentenary of the Submission of the Augsburg Confession

G. W. F. Hegel, Address on the Tercentenary of the Submission ofthe Augsburg Confession, in his Political Writings, (eds) LaurenceDickey and H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1999), pp. 18696. Cited by page number.

Works by Kant

CI Critique of Pure Reason

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, (trans.) Werner S. Pluhar,Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1996). Cited by first edition (A) andsecond edition (B) page numbers.

CII Critique of Practical Reason

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, (trans.) Mary Gregor(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). References willindicate volume of page number in the Prussian Academy edition ofKants works.

CIII Critique of Judgement

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, (trans.) Werner S. Pluhar(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1987). References will indicate volumeof page number in the Prussian Academy edition of Kants works.

G Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, (trans.)Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).References will indicate volume of page number in the PrussianAcademy edition of Kants works.

MM Metaphysics of Morals

Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, (trans.) Mary Gregor(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). References willindicate volume of page number in the Prussian Academy edition ofKants works.

xvi

Abbreviations

R Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason

Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason andOther Writings, (eds and trans.) Allen Wood and George diGiovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Refer-ences will indicate volume of page number in the Prussian Academyedition of Kants works.

xvii

For my teacher, Bob Stern

The duty of philosophy was, rather, to remove the deception arising frommisinterpretation, even at the cost of destroying the most highly extolledand cherished delusion.

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason

Philosophy would indeed be the easiest of studies, if we might arrive at truthby assuming that one of two accounts must be true, and prove the one bydisproving the other; but in philosophy this is just what can not be done.

F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies

These texts have much to teach us . . . We dont study them in the hope offinding some philosophical argument, some analytic idea that will bedirectly useful for our present-day philosophical questions in the way theyarise for us. No, we study Hume, Leibniz, and Kant because they expressdeep and distinctive philosophical doctrines.In discussing Hegel (17701831), I have much the same aim.

John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy

Some of the gravest misunderstandings that obscure the Philosophy of Rightcan be removed simply by considering the place of the work in Hegelssystem.

Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution

Introduction

I The reception of Hegels Philosophy of Right

It is perhaps ironic that the Anglo-American reception of G. W. F. Hegelsthe Philosophy of Right first published in 1821 has developed along its owndialectical path.1 In essence, Hegels dialectic unfolds in the following way:we begin with an initial standpoint, we then next move toward a con-sideration of its opposite standpoint, and then we arrive at a middle positionbetween these initial two extremes. The ensuing reception of the Philosophyof Right curiously follows a similar tale of moving from one position to itsopposite, only to settle at a middle position between the two earlierextremes.The first great debate on the Philosophy of Right was over its political

sympathies. From its first appearance, it had been charged with endorsing adangerous conservatism bordering on totalitarianism and fascism.2 Forexample, Karl Popper described Hegel as the father of modern historicismand totalitarianism.3 Hegels defenders later argued not only that thesecharges were untrue, but that, in fact, Hegels views are consistent withliberalism.4 The debate on whether Hegels political philosophy is eitherconservative or liberal is now over. Today, the overwhelming majority ofcommentators accept that Hegels views are best viewed as politicallymoderate, in between the extremes of conservatism and liberalism.5 Thus,the history of the first debate is a movement from one standpoint to itsopposite, only to settle at a middle position between the two earlierextremes.6

The second great debate on the Philosophy of Right is over its relationshipto metaphysics. Commentators have divided themselves into opposingcamps: the metaphysical approach to the study of Hegels work andthe non-metaphysical approach to Hegels work. We might be easilymisled from the start into thinking that this debate centres on whetherthere is (or is not) metaphysics to be found in Hegels Philosophy of Right. In

1


fact, this is virtually nowhere in doubt. All commentators on both sidesaccept that the Philosophy of Right contains a metaphysical account. Instead,the debate has developed into an argument over how strongly metaphysical(and, in particular, how Platonist) Hegels Philosophy of Right is, in fact.Of course, metaphysics may represent many different things. In the

most basic of terms, metaphysical existence is something that exists, but notin a physical form. Thus, items such as human rights are metaphysicalentities. The right to life may be said to be real and substantiated in law.However, rights are not physical objects like books containing statutes or apet cat at ones feet.It is quite clear that a metaphysics of this variety is at play in the

Philosophy of Right. From its opening pages, Hegel tells us that the text isprimarily concerned with the concept of right and its actualization (PR, 1).Hegel presents us with a metaphysical picture of right insofar as hisargument is not merely that right exists, but that we can understand itsexistence in different degrees of existing. Thus, we can speak of some forms ofright being more real than others. This view of right links with a wideraccount of freedom: we can speak of freedom having more or less existencejust as we can of right (see PR, 1A). We will examine this picture in moredetail in Chapter 1. However, it is helpful to note from the start that Hegelsviews are metaphysical at least in this most basic sense.Some commentators, such as Terry Pinkard, have sought to challenge this

most basic understanding of metaphysics, essentially separating ontologyfrom metaphysics.7 In essence, this view agrees with John Rawlss character-ization ofmetaphysics whereby it is thought to amount to nomore than plainobscurity, controversial moral or religious claims.8 When we claim anargument is metaphysical, we make reference only to a particular subsetof metaphysics writ large. Claims are labelled ontological rather thanmetaphysical to denote the former as amore reasonable or less controversialmetaphysical claim.Ontological arguments remainmetaphysical arguments,even if some commentators prefer to speak about the two as altogetherdifferent enterprises.9 When it is said that Hegel endorses ontology and notmetaphysics, it is essential that we understand precisely what is being said,namely, that Hegels metaphysics is not as obscure or controversial as hasbeen previously thought. Oddly, an ontological (and allegedly non-meta-physical) reading of Hegel remains a metaphysical reading. In fact, virtuallyall non-metaphysical readings ofHegelsPhilosophy of Right admit that they donot hold the position that this work lacks metaphysics in any strong sense.Instead, the argument is that a less controversial and more reasonableconception of Hegels metaphysics can be offered.10 It is well worth trumpet-ing this important point that is too often overlooked.

2

Introduction

The difference then between metaphysical and non-metaphysical read-ings is as follows. Metaphysical readings of Hegels work tend to highlightboth Hegels insistence that some states can be considered more true oractual than others, as well as the priority and special place of religion inHegels account.11 Non-metaphysical readings of Hegels work argue that wecan understand Hegels views on actuality and actualization as less strongmetaphysical conceptions (often described as an ontology and not ametaphysics) and focus on a single work by Hegel such as the Philosophyof Right to the exclusion of Hegels additional writings.12

This second debate has moved from one position (that is, the metaphy-sical reading) to its opposite (that is, the non-metaphysical reading). Theargument of this book is that this debate can be transformed in settling on amiddle position between the two: a perspective that can bring out the bestin both approaches. This position is the systematic reading of Hegelswork. In this book, I will be offering a systematic reading of HegelsPhilosophy of Right.

II The systematic reading of Hegels work

The fact that non-metaphysical approaches tend to centre on a particularwork such as the Philosophy of Right to the exclusion of Hegels otherswritings casts light on where the true difference lies between the non-metaphysical and metaphysical approaches. Namely, the debate betweenthe non-metaphysical and metaphysical approaches is not that only themetaphysical approach accepts some degree of metaphysics in Hegels work.Both approaches accept this fact. It is then not a question of if Hegels workis metaphysical, but how metaphysical his work is, in fact. It is not aquestion of whether or not metaphysics can be found, but how much thereis to be found. Thus, at the heart of this debate is not metaphysics, but adistinctive vantage point to the reading of Hegels work. The non-meta-physical reading is, therefore, not a reading that denies metaphysics; but,rather, it is a reading that denies an explanatory role for Hegels system.Therefore, the non-metaphysical approach is best understood as a non-systematic reading of Hegels work. A non-systematic reading of Hegels workviews a given piece of Hegels writing apart from Hegels larger philosophicalsystem. Systematic readings of Hegels corpus view Hegels writings withinthe context of his larger system.13

In order to clarify this crucial point, it is important to note some generalfeatures of Hegels system and its alleged relationship with his Philosophy ofRight. Hegels system is presented in full within his Encyclopaedia of thePhilosophical Sciences in Outline. The Encyclopaedia is composed of three

3


parts: Logic; Philosophy of Nature; and Philosophy of Spirit. Hegel clearly statesthat his Philosophy of Right is an elaboration of Objective Spirit [des objectiveGeist] within the last part of the system, the Philosophy of Spirit.14 Thus, thePhilosophy of Right is a part of his system of philosophy and meant to beunderstood as such. For example, Hegel says that the Philosophy of Right:

is a more extensive, and in particular a more systematic, exposition of thesame basic concepts which, in relation to this part of philosophy, arealready contained in a previous work designed to accompany my lectures,namely my Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. (PR, p. 9)

As a part of the larger system of philosophy, Hegel is also quite clear that thePhilosophy of Right should be understood within the context of the largersystem and, in particular, its foundation in his conception of logic. He says,it will readily be noticed that the work as a whole, like the development[Ausbildung] of its parts, is based on the logical spirit. It is also chiefly fromthis point of view that I would wish this treatise to be understood andjudged (PR, p. 10 (translation modified)).15 Nor is this view surprising. Inthe preface to his system, Hegel first announces that my view . . . can onlybe justified by the exposition of the system itself (PS, pp. 910). Any part ofthe system is meant to be understood within the context of the largersystem. This is as true for the Philosophy of Right as it is for all other parts ofHegels system.Virtually all commentators accept Hegels self-understanding of his

project. That is, all agree that the Philosophy of Right, as intended by Hegel,is to be understood within the wider context of his larger philosophicalsystem. Where commentators differ is on the question of how important thesystem is to understand the Philosophy of Right in actual fact. Thus, allcommentators may agree that Hegel did intend his work to be understood ina particular way, but they disagree on how correct Hegel was to have thisself-understanding of his own work. Those that adhere to the systematicreading of Hegels writings work along with Hegels self-understanding inexplicating the features of his thought against the backdrop of his philo-sophical system. The second camp, or non-systematic reading, clearlycontravenes Hegels own self-understanding of his project in electing toview the component parts of Hegels writings independently of their widercontext in a great philosophical whole. In addition, the systematic readingholds that Hegels system has explanatory power in understanding hiswork.16 This is denied by the non-systematic reading who argue, forexample, that we can properly comprehend writings, such as the Philosophyof Right, independently of his larger system.

4

Introduction

It should now be clear that the systematic and non-systematic readingsoffer distinctly different approaches to the study of Hegels philosophy.Before returning to the question of the relationship of these readings to themetaphysical versus non-metaphysical debates, it may appear that the newsystematic approach being described here (and defended in this book) is notso new after all. I am certainly not the first person to argue that Hegelssystem plays an important role in our properly understanding his Philosophyof Right. This general position is also taken up in different ways and tovarying degrees by others, such as Will Dudley, Stephen Houlgate, MichaelInwood, Michael Rosen, Stanley Rosen, Robert Stern, Robert Bruce Ware,and Robert Williams amongst others.17 However, my interpretation ofHegels views differs from these scholars in several respects. First, the greatmajority are more attracted to other areas of Hegels philosophy, namely,his epistemology and metaphysics, rather than his social and politicalthought. Hegels Philosophy of Right has not been a primary focus for mostinterpreters favourable to a systematic understanding of Hegels work.Secondly, those few commentators who have considered Hegels politicalphilosophy have not attempted a systematic reading with neither the clearunderstanding of their reading as a systematic reading of Hegels work northe scale of the study offered here which concerns all general parts of HegelsPhilosophy of Right. The systematic reading on offer is unique and distinctiveto what we find in the literature, although it clearly builds off past relatedwork.18

My systematic approach to understanding Hegels Philosophy of Right iscurrently both controversial and unpopular. The more dominant view andnear consensus of scholars working on Hegels political philosophy is that asystematic reading is misguided. The non-systematic reading of HegelsPhilosophy of Right claims that the arguments Hegel puts forth in this workcan be accurately reconstructed within the Philosophy of Right withoutsubstantive recourse to other parts of his system, and most especiallywithout reliance on Hegels logic that underpins his system. For example,following Paul Franco, the non-systematic approach claims that, while onthe one hand, [t]he argument of the Philosophy of Right is incomprehensiblewithout some acquaintance with Hegels logic, it is nonetheless true, on theother hand, that [m]uch of the argument of the Philosophy of Right isintelligible on its own and can be evaluated without reference to the logic.19

Similarly, Frederick Neuhouser argues:

even though Hegels social theory is undeniably embedded within a morecomprehensive philosophical vision one that includes views about thenature of ultimate reality and the meaning of human history it is

5


possible, to a surprisingly large extent, to understand his account of whatmakes the rational social order rational and to appreciate its force evenwhile abstracting from those more fundamental doctrines.20

Thus, again, the non-systematic reading does not deny that a robustunderstanding of Hegels political philosophy clearly must take someaccount of its relationship with metaphysics.21 Instead, the non-systematicaccount argues that the Philosophy of Right is sufficiently comprehensibleindependently of Hegels larger system and its logic. Other commentatorswho broadly share the non-systematic reading include Michael Hardimon,Dudley Knowles, Alan Patten, Steven Smith, Peter Steinberger, CharlesTaylor, and Allen Wood, amongst others.22

It must be said that the non-systematic reading has a particular virtue.That is, they ask us to buckle down to the study of the text of thePhilosophy of Right and try to work out the context of his arguments ashe elaborates it in that text.23 Their proponents often note that we cangain an improved understanding of Hegels political philosophy indirectly focusing our attention on this text, rather than diverting ourattention elsewhere. Indeed, the non-systematic approach has not onlyrevolutionized the popularity of Hegels political philosophy, but broughtwith it a more intelligent understanding of the Philosophy of Right thanprevious attempts. Therefore, it is important that if a systematic readingwere to replace non-systematic accounts, then this systematic readingshould improve upon, not detract from, the many advances to ourknowledge of the Philosophy of Right that non-systematic readings haveoffered us already.24

III Why is the non-systematic approach often anon-metaphysical approach?

One shared feature of the divide between systematic and non-systematicreadings is that those who generally adhere to a systematic reading alsoadhere to a metaphysical reading; those who generally adhere to a non-systematic reading also adhere to a non-metaphysical reading. It might thenseem that I am simply changing the names of each camp without makingany contribution to help transform the debate. My reply to this worry isstraightforward; that is, I have argued that the debate between metaphysicaland non-metaphysical accounts does not centre on whether or not Hegelsaccount is or is not metaphysical. Instead, metaphysical accounts haveamplified the role of metaphysics in Hegels account where non-metaphy-sical accounts have tried to quieten the role of metaphysics. Thus, the

6

Introduction

debate is over howmetaphysical Hegels account is in the Philosophy of Right,rather than whether his account is metaphysical.In this section, I will explain how non-metaphysical readings have sought

to contain and minimise metaphysics when interpreting Hegels work,namely, by adopting a non-systematic approach. No commentator usesthe term non-systematic, yet it accurately captures the heart of theirposition. Perhaps a classic statement in support of this reading is offered byZ. A. Pelczynski. He says:

Hegels political thought can be read, understood, and appreciatedwithout having to come to terms with his metaphysics. Some of hisassertions may seem less well grounded than they might otherwise havebeen; some of his statements and beliefs may puzzle one; some intellectualcuriosity may be unsatisfied when metaphysics is left out; a solid volumeof political theory and political thinking will still remain.25

Behind this reading of Hegels Philosophy of Right is a desire to extricate thiswork (for example, the Philosophy of Right) from his system (for example, theEncyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences and its Logic, in particular)26 asthese commentators believe the system and its logic are fundamentallyindefensible.27 Thus, their collective position is that if the Philosophy of Rightcould be understood apart from Hegels contentious system and its logic,then perhaps we can inoculate the Philosophy of Right from the defects andshortcomings of Hegels system and its logic.28 In other words, it will notmatter if other parts of Hegels system cannot be defended if we candemonstrate that these areas of Hegels thought do not have any sub-stantive impact on the contents of the Philosophy of Right. This desire toinoculate the Philosophy of Right is a primary motivation behind non-systematic readings of this work.Allen Wood argues that there are at least three main reasons why we

should avoid a systematic reading of Hegels Philosophy of Right: (1) only alimited audience would become interested in Hegels thought; (2) we wouldhave to defend this system as a proper foundation for philosophy; and (3) inorder to defend Hegels views today, we would have to argue that his socialand political thought should be of general interest even if his system hasbeen discredited.29 One reaction to this might be to ask several questions.Why is it relevant to understanding Hegels texts that it should be donein such a way that we must increase his audience? Why should we beconcerned about the size of our audience in the first place when interpretingthe Philosophy of Right? If the system is indefensible and yet relevant tounderstanding Hegels political thought, then why should we simply turn a

7


blind eye and ignore this system?30 Why must we defend the views ofanyone, and not least Hegel, on the grounds that they should be of generalinterest? For these reasons, I do not find Woods three justifications for whywe should adopt a non-systematic reading particularly persuasive as itstands.Behind these worries looms a larger concern about making Hegel

compelling.31 For example, Dudley Knowles offers a well stated point:

The story that is told about the component institutions of Ethical Lifewill be persuasive, if and where it is persuasive, not because it obeys thecanons of a dialectical logic but because it details how these institutionspromote persons aspirations to freedom.32

Of course, the main question here is persuasive to whom? In this and otherinstances, interpreters in the non-systematic camp imply persuasive tomodern readers.33 A number of caveats are in order. In criticizing the non-systematic approach, I do not mean to suggest that there is somethingwrong with seeking to draw greater attention to important figures and ideas.Nor would I want to give the impression that I believe there is somethingundesirable about interpreting the thoughts of others with at least amodicum of charity. Instead, I wish only to convey my view that thisapproach at least gives the appearance of placing greater emphasis onreinterpreting Hegels positions as defensible rather than offering us aperspective on Hegels various positions that Hegel would recognise ashis own.34

I do not deny that the business of discerning what a philosopher would(and would not) take to be his or her true position on any given issue is adifficult and controversial task indeed.35 In addition, I would agree with afurther statement by a member of this non-systematic camp, Robert Pippin,when he says:

Without any systematic attempt to rely on the incredibly opaque detailsof the Science of Logic to understand Hegels full or real position, hisclaims about the historical character of human spirit . . . about themodern nation state, or even some aspects of his general antifounda-tionalist holism, can all be discussed more manageably, in their ownright, as independently valuable insights.36

My disagreement with the non-systematic view is when these indepen-dently valuable insights of Hegel are dressed up as Hegels view on aparticular topic. Nor am I persuaded that we should avoid considering how

8

Introduction

Hegels system even in the modest presentation offered in this book informs the discussion of his Philosophy of Right on the grounds, according toWood, that taking the system seriously would also dictate that you write abook not about Hegels ethics but about his logic.37 Here Wood seems moreinterested in discussing only what is of contemporary relevance in Hegelsviews (as Hegels actual view, as it were), rather than giving us a morecomprehensive reading that Hegels explicit views may call for, in actualfact.38 Wood may even ultimately concede this point, as he says: Myprincipal aim in [Hegels Ethical Thought] was to contribute to contemporarydiscussions of the history of ethics and ethical theory by showing the directrelevance of Hegels thought to issues that still interest moral philoso-phers.39 Implied in this passage is the thought that areas of Hegels thoughtthat have indirect or no relevance to contemporary discussions were beyondWoods consideration when presenting Hegels positions on various issuesin Woods own work.I do not deny that Hegel offers us valuable insights in his work

independently of his larger philosophical system that may be of importantcontemporary interest.40 What I deny is the adequacy of the non-systematicapproach to offer us an accurate portrayal of positions in Hegels politicalthought. It is worth noting here statements by Steven Smith and AllenWood. Smith says:

But even while Hegel may have succumbed to the temptation ofproviding his views with some kind of metaphysical grounding, intellec-tual fashions change, and what was once considered a strength is now anembarrassing weakness. Yet rather than condemn Hegel to the dustbin ofhistory, it remains possible to salvage his useful political insights fromtheir speculative wrappings.41

A similar view is presented by Wood:

Because Hegel regards speculative logic as the foundation of his system,we might conclude from its failure that nothing in his philosophy couldany longer be deserving of our interest. But that would be quite wrong.The fact is rather that Hegels great positive achievements as a philo-sopher do not lie where he thought they did, in his system of speculativelogic, but in a quite different realm, in his reflections on the social andspiritual predicament of modern Western European culture.42

In both cases, Smith and Wood argue that we should avoid focusing onHegels system and its logic because it has fallen out of favour with

9


contemporary philosophers and not because the system and its logic lacksexplanatory force in understanding Hegels Philosophy of Right. To thisend, they both seem more concerned with making Hegel plausible, ratherthan providing us with a more historically accurate picture.43 I do notdeny the value of such an approach. Indeed, a non-systematic reading ofHegels Philosophy of Right may have a wider and more receptive audiencethan it might otherwise have received. The cost of its popularity is asacrifice of a more accurate understanding of Hegel. Thus, the Hegel wemay be most willing to embrace is a reconstructed Hegel, far removedfrom the real thing or, as Beiser argues, We make Hegel alive andrelevant, a useful contributor to our concerns; but that is only becausewe put our views into his mouth. What we learn from Hegel is then onlywhat have read into him.44

IV Plan for the book

This book is divided into a series of chapters, each largely self-standing. Itbegins with an explanation of Hegels system and the following chaptersemploy an analysis of various issues in Hegels Philosophy of Right in light ofits relation to the system. In every case, there is an emphasis on the contextof each issue in question and the structure of Hegels arguments. Moreover,each chapter challenges conventional readings of Hegels Philosophy of Right,offering a new understanding of key issues, such as Hegels views onproperty, punishment, morality, family, law, monarchy, and war. Eachof these issues is discussed within its own chapter.A few final qualifications may be in order before concluding this

Introduction. First, it is nowhere my intention to defend Hegels account,45

but only to explain what is his account. In what follows, I believe there havebeen some rather serious misinterpretations of his views that my readingseeks to correct. My task is to present topics in Hegels Philosophy of Right ina more robust and accurate account to help transform future debates on hiswork. It is not my task to try to modify Hegels complete positions in orderto make them more attractive to contemporary readers nor to explain themaway. In my view, it is relatively unnecessary to defend the contemporaryrelevance of Hegels political philosophy given the tremendous and wide-spread interest so many already have in his work, clearly demonstrating therelevance of his work for us. I leave the task of selling Hegel to others.Again, my aim is simply to offer an improved account of his positions thatmore accurately reflects his statements on these positions.Secondly, my second task is to sublate the so-called metaphysical and

non-metaphysical debate in favour of a systematic reading which occupies

10

Introduction

their middle ground. Of course, it is impossible to cover every importanttopic in Hegels Philosophy of Right, although those this book does coverrange over the entirety of the Philosophy of Right and, it is hoped, provide avery clear argument in favour of the new systematic approach I am puttingforward. I nowhere claim that a more robust story cannot be told of how thesystem helps us understand the Philosophy of Right. This book seeks no morethan to break new ground and forever change the views of commentatorswho believe we can understand the Philosophy of Right without referenceto Hegels larger system. I would certainly invite others to join me inpromoting and expanding systematic readings of Hegels Philosophy of Rightand his many other works. However, my task in this book is more modest.Thus, I do not deny that an even more robust systematic reading of thePhilosophy of Right is possible (we might call this a strong systematic reading)and I invite others to join in the project of developing this account. Thatsaid, my aim here is a more modest systematic reading of the Philosophy ofRight (which we might call a weak systematic reading) that demonstrates thenecessity of the systematic account. The first goal must be to transformreadings of Hegels work beyond metaphysical and non-metaphysicalapproaches toward a systematic (versus a non-systematic) approach beforefurther development can take place.I hope that in this Introduction I have made my intentions clear. The

current debate between so-called metaphysical and non-metaphysical read-ings is a false debate because it pretends to centre on the issue of whether ornot metaphysics is a part of Hegels account. Instead, these opposing campsdo not deny the existence of metaphysics for Hegel, but how much meta-physics we might find. I have argued, therefore, that not only are the termsmetaphysical approach and non-metaphysical approach misleading, butthat we should jettison them in favour of, respectfully, the systematicapproach and the non-systematic approach. This latter characterizationbest captures what is at stake in this current debate. In the chapters thatfollow, I will offer a defence of the systematic approach to the study of thePhilosophy of Right.Controversies over Hegels work normally move from one position to its

opposite and then settle at a middle position. I believe that this is true withthe metaphysical debate likewise. In the end, a systematic approach seeks tobring out the best in both approaches and occupies a position in betweenmetaphysical and non-metaphysical accounts.46 It neither denies a space formetaphysics in Hegels work nor aspires to amplify the role of metaphysics.Instead, it seeks no more than to continue the good work of the non-metaphysical reading in improving our knowledge of the Philosophy ofRights contents, while following in the tradition of the metaphysical reading

11


by offering an account of Hegels philosophy that it is keeping with Hegelsown self-understanding of his project. Discussion of this project is possiblewithout diverting our attention far from the pages of the Philosophy of Right.Whether or not the systematic reading is an improved reading will be borneout in the chapters below. As they say, the proof is in the pudding. This isno less true for books on Hegels philosophy.

12

Chapter 1

System

I Introduction

Hegel never intended his Philosophy of Right to stand on its own, but insteadit was meant to be read against the backdrop of his larger philosophicalsystem, which he lays out in his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences.Hegels intentions are clear from the first passages in the preface to thePhilosophy of Right, where he says:

This textbook is a more extensive, and in particular a more systematic,exposition of the same basic concepts which, in relation to this part ofphilosophy, are already contained in a previous work designed toaccompany my lectures, namely my Encyclopaedia of the PhilosophicalSciences. (PR, p. 9)

The Encyclopaedia outlines Hegels philosophy with respect to a largevariety of topics, including logic, nature, politics, and religion. Hegelwrote supplementary texts for use in his lectures that expanded histreatment of topics in the Encyclopaedia at much greater length through-out his career. The Philosophy of Right is itself such a text, providing amore extensive . . . exposition of the same basic concepts . . . alreadycontained in the Encyclopaedia as we have seen above. In particular, thePhilosophy of Right is a greater exposition of Hegels views on politicsfound in sections 483552 of the Encyclopaedia, a part of the systemthat Hegel calls Objective Spirit [Objektiv Geist]. It is clear that thePhilosophy of Right was written as an integral part of Hegels largerphilosophical system.1 This fact alone is cause to take seriously asystematic reading of the Philosophy of Right that interprets this textwithin the context of Hegels wider system.It is also equally clear that Hegel intended his audience to interpret the

Philosophy of Right precisely, within the context of his system. He says:

13


I have presupposed a familiarity with scientific method . . . it will readilybe noticed that the work as a whole, like the construction [Ausbildung] ofits parts, is based on the logical spirit. It is also chiefly from this point of viewthat I would wish this treatise to be understood and judged. (PR, p. 10(emphasis added))

Any interpretation that deviates from this perspective should be treatedwith indifference because it is reading Hegels work out of context (PR,p. 23). Hegel not only held this position on how the Philosophy of Rightshould be read and understood, but all of his work: my work . . . can onlybe justified by the exposition of the system itself (PS, pp. 910). A primarytask of this chapter is to explain Hegels views on logic and how they providethe scientific method that give unity to his philosophical system.Hegels clear self-understanding is that his work is part of a larger

philosophical system. All his mature writings flesh out this vision andthey will be our focus for the remainder of this book.2 Individual texts arenot independent texts, but component parts of a greater whole to beinterpreted within the context of this larger system. Hegels intends hisaudience to engage in a systematic reading of his work. The systematicreading holds that texts should be understood in relation to the widersystem.3 By contrast, a non-systematic reading of Hegels work wouldinterpret an individual text independently of his larger system in contra-vention of Hegels clear self-understanding of his project.Commentators disagree over two issues. First, there is disagreement on

the proper interpretation of Hegels system and its logic. For example, someunderstand Hegel to be engaged in a sheer neo-Platonic fantasy, whileothers claim his logic has minimal metaphysical commitments.4 Secondly,commentators agree that Hegels self-understanding is how I have describedit above; however, they disagree on the question of whether or not applyinga systematic reading of Hegels Philosophy of Right will make the text moreintelligible and improve on contemporary interpretations.5 Thus, no onedoubts what Hegel claims for his system. Indeed, for example, Allen Woodnotes readily that Hegel is the most methodologically self-conscious ofall philosophers in the Western tradition.6 We would then expect to offeran interpretation that makes good Hegels self-understanding given hisextraordinarily high degree of methodological self-consciousness. Whatcommentators doubt is that such an interpretation will shed greater lighton what we already know of Hegels Philosophy of Right.In this chapter, I will present only a very general picture of Hegels system

and its logic. My aim is to provide a view that is acceptable both tocommentators who believe Hegel presents a strong metaphysical account

14

System

and those who believe that he does not. I will argue that on whichever sidewe find ourselves we can agree upon certain basic features of Hegels systemand the Philosophy of Rights place within this system. These features includean understanding of (a) the dialectical structure of Hegels arguments and(b) the technical vocabulary Hegel employs in his arguments. The followingchapters will then demonstrate that if we can agree on this general picture ofHegels system and its relationship to the Philosophy of Right we can enrichour understanding of the Philosophy of Right and open up new readings ofthis text closer to both his self-understanding and the text of the Philosophyof Right itself. Of course, whether or not my project is successful will dependon how far readers are persuaded by my accounts of particular topics in thePhilosophy of Right.The plan for this chapter is as follows. I will offer a general background

explanation of Hegels system and its logic with the primary aim of makingclear the relationship between Hegels system and his Philosophy of Right. Iwill begin with an analysis of Hegels logic which underpins his widersystem. This discussion will be followed with an explanation of how thelogic relates to his wider system and then how this system relates to thePhilosophy of Right.

II Logic and system

In 1816, Hegel published the first edition of his Encyclopaedia of thePhilosophical Sciences, which was later expanded in later editions, culminat-ing in its publication in three separate volumes in the third edition of 1830.This work contains an outline of Hegels complete philosophical system. Wecan then speak interchangeably of the Encyclopaedia and Hegels system ofphilosophy because the two are one and the same.The first part of the system has become known as the Encyclopaedia Logic

as, namely, the first volume of the Encyclopaedia whose subject-matter isspeculative logic.7 Not unlike much of Hegels system, Hegel wrote anexpanded version of the Encyclopaedia Logic entitled the Science of Logic,which appeared (as volume one) in 1812 and (volume two) in 1816. Thesecond edition of the Science of Logic was then published in 1831. Thus, theEncyclopaedia Logic and the Science of Logic were developed alongside oneanother over a timeframe of nearly two decades. In what follows, I will referto them both interchangeably as Hegels singular logic, differentiatingthem only in specific reference to one or the other. It is plausible to discussthem together because one is merely an elaboration of the other and theyare virtually identical in form and content.8 Nevertheless, for Hegel, onlythe Science of Logic presents his fully developed understanding of logic

15


(PR, p. 10). Interestingly, this does not deny that a more developed logic orsystem is possible. Hegel reminds us:

I could not pretend that the method which I follow in this system of logic or rather which this system in its own self follows is not capable ofgreater completeness, of much elaboration in detail; but at the same timeI know that it is the only true method. (SL, p. 54)9

Hegel is then open to even further development of his logic beyond his ownpresentation of it. However, it clearly remains the case that he considers hisScience of Logic the most extensive treatment of logic that he accepts as true.Hegels logic plays a fundamental role in the development of his larger

philosophical system.10 The logic is meant to provide us with the structureof rationality. Once we comprehend the shape of this structure we can thenapply this logic to uncover the rationality existent with regards to nature(in a Philosophy of Nature) and human affairs (in a Philosophy of Spirit). In thissection, I will first offer an explanation of the aims and ambitions of Hegelslogic. I will next explain the relationship between the logic and the largerphilosophical system. My purpose is to provide a background understand-ing of Hegels project that is relatively uncontroversial amongst Hegelscholars. This understanding will provide the main features of the systema-tic reading of Hegels work that I will employ in the following chapters.The logic aims to provide us with an understanding of rationality: it is

the science of thinking (EL, 19).11 Hegel often characterizes his logic asa speculative logic, where speculative is understood as nothing but therational (EL, 82A). Speculative logic is a way of thinking withoutpresuppositions: thoughts as thoughts, in their complete abstraction(SL, p. 34).12 Logic is understood to be presuppositionless insofar as itdemands that we suspend our assumptions about the world and ration-ality.13 Hegel asks us to consider thought in its purity in order to discern itsfull developmental structure. The knowledge of this structure underpins theentirety of his philosophical system.For Hegel, philosophy is to be understood as a thinking consideration of

objects (EL, 2). The development of our thought about the existence of anobject is matched by the reality of the object. We do not simply think, but,instead, we think of something, such as an object of thought.14 This objectbecomes more real for us in proportion to the progressive development ofour thoughts of this object. Thus, for example, Hegel will speak of a statebeing bad to the degree that it is untrue or not actual.15 For this reason,Hegel argues that the content of philosophy is actuality and philosophy isthe self-conscious comprehension of all that rationally exists, or the Idea

16

System

(or the absolute truth and all truth) (EL, 6, 236).16 This Idea is thoughtin its self-developing totality of its own peculiar determinations (EL, 19).17

Hegel explains the relationship between actuality and reality in hisfamous double saying [Doppelsatz]:18

What is rational is actual;and what is actual is rational. (PR, p. 20)

Hegel explains this relationship in the following way:

It is this very relation of philosophy to actuality which is the subject ofmisunderstandings . . . since philosophy is exploration of the rational, it isfor that very reason the comprehension of the present and the actual, not thesetting up of a world beyond which exists God knows where. (PR, p. 20)

These passages make clear that Hegel is offering a distinction between whatexists and what actually exists. The task of philosophy is to distinguish towhat degree something actually exists. We do not need philosophy to tell uswhat exists as such, but need only to look out of our windows. The task ofdiscerning what actually exists, on the contrary, is a more delicate task. Wecomprehend what is actual when we grasp its rationality, or development inthought. The further we find an object of thought along a trajectory ofrational development, then the more actual we might say this object is forus. Thus, what is actual is rational and vice versa. Furthermore, ourcomprehension of an object of knowledge is a development of thoughtitself. We can then say that our project is then of the present and the actual(PR, p. 20).The development of Hegels logic takes a famous, yet peculiar, shape.

Hegel begins by noting the peculiar status of pure being. Pure being is beingin its utter purity, lacking any particular characteristics. In lacking char-acteristics, pure being appears as a pure nothingness (see EL, 87). A purenothingness is the absence of characteristics. If pure being is being withoutcharacteristics, then the two seem equal. This fact is a matter of somesignificance for Hegel, as this equality of pure being and pure nothingness isthought to generate a transition from the category of pure being towards thecategory of pure nothingness (EL, 88; SL, p. 82).The object of our study pure being has not undergone a change itself.

Instead, the change is with regards to our thinking consideration of purebeing. We began with a conception of pure being as pure being. Ourunderstanding of pure being is henceforth transformed into a new under-standing of pure being as, instead, pure nothingness. The object has not

17


changed, but our thought of it has changed. Nor is this the end of thedevelopment.Hegel notes that the transition from pure being to pure nothingness

presents us with a seeming contradiction. How can being be equal tonothing? We can resolve this apparent conflict by recognizing that whilepure being appears to be equivalent to a pure nothingness, pure being is notsimply a nothing but a nothing from which we proceed beyond nothing tothe category of becoming (SL, p. 73; see SL, p. 93). Our first movement wasfrom pure being to pure nothingness upon understanding pure being as anothingness, lacking characteristics. We now move to the third category ofbecoming in recognizing that pure being is not equally a pure nothingnessin their truth, but that what is before us is neither a pure being lackingin all characteristics nor pure nothingness instead, it is a something (seeSL, 8283).This movement of thought from one category to a second category is a

development as our thinking consideration of the object has developedbeyond our initial consideration.19 After the development, we can recognizethat pure being is also a pure nothingness. This is an advance in ourknowledge, however abstract its nature. Our advance in knowledge is animmanent, rather than an external, development. We have not addedanything from outside the object in our consideration. Instead, we patientlyallow the development of our knowledge of the object to arise from withinitself. In this way, Hegel argues that all categorical transitions point beyondthemselves.20 When we move from one category to another we, followingStephen Houlgate, render explicit what is implicit in those earlier cate-gories.21 We allow thought to develop itself from its own resources, ratherthan follow a route that has been marked out for it in advance.22 Finally,each movement is necessary: we move from one and only one category froma previous category.23 Pure being leads us necessarily to pure nothingness.The necessity of this movement is a further confirmation of the immanentstructure of thought that it unfolds for us within a presuppositionlessconsideration of thought itself. Thus, one learns from logic how to thinkgiven the fact that the developmental structure of rationality presented byHegel often moves away from our everyday commonsensical expectations(SL, p. 26). Hegel argues that his speculative logic is a philosophical mannerof progressing from one topic to another (PR, p. 10). In other words, what iscrucial in Hegels account is not merely the fact that we progress from onecategory to another category, but how we progress from one to the next.The movement from the category of pure being to the categories of pure

nothingness and then becoming is a peculiar movement. The structure isorganized between an apparent contradiction between two opposites whose

18

System

opposition vanishes into a third category. This threefold structure is Hegelsinfamous dialectic. The dialectic explicitly does not follow a structure(properly attributable to Fichtes Science of Knowledge) of thesis-antith-esis-synthesis:24 commentators who claim Hegels philosophy ends in asynthesis reveal their poor understanding of Hegels logic.25 Indeed, Hegelrejects synthesis on the grounds that the third movement does not bringtwo things together in an internal unity, because it treats the first twomovements as externally related (see SL, p. 96). Instead, for Hegel, the thirdmovement sublates [Aufheben] the first two categories and, in so doing,preserves their relationship while pointing towards a new third category.Hegel explains: To sublate has a twofold meaning in the language [ofspeculative philosophy]: on the one hand it means to preserve, to maintain,and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to (SL, p. 107; seeEL, 96A). For Hegel, sublation is one of the most important notions inphilosophy, playing a central role in his logic (SL, p. 106). A characteristicof sublation is that it allows us to speak of a negation of a negation as apositive movement.26 For example, pure beings initial conceptual move-ment was towards its opposite, pure nothingness. This is the first negation.The negation of this negation takes place in the further movement frompure nothingness to becoming. In this movement, pure beings uniquenessand its apparent identity with pure nothingness are both effectively can-celled. For Hegel, this negation of a negation generates a positive resultfrom within thoughts own resources, accommodating the previous cate-gories while immanently producing a new category. Categories are createdfrom previous categories according to this dialectical structure.Hegels explanation of the movement from one category to another

category is at once a logic and a metaphysics. Recall that, for Hegel, thedevelopment of logic is a development of both our thought and the actualityof our object: the greater our comprehension, the more actual it becomes forus. Thus, John Burbridge is correct to argue:

That is why the logic is true of the world, why it can be calleda metaphysics: because it is the essential structure, now made self-conscious, of all that the world actually does . . . It comprehends allthat is.27

Indeed, it is clear that Hegels self-understanding of his logic is that it is ametaphysics. He says, Thus logic coincides with metaphysics, with thescience of things grasped in thoughts (EL, 24). Elsewhere he tells us thathis logic constitutes metaphysics proper (SL, p. 27). Logic is metaphysicsbecause the former presents us with the proper tools namely, the

19


dialectical structure of thought to discern the true actuality of all thatexists.The metaphysical picture of Hegels project has come in for some heavy

criticism. Many contemporary commentators reject the view that Hegelslogic is metaphysical and instead claim it is an ontology.28 This is despitethe fact that most, if not all, commentators accept that there is metaphysicsto be found in Hegels philosophy.29 Instead, these commentators claim thatwe can understand Hegels metaphysics in a different sense that is lessmysterious and controversial.30 This view borrows from an understandingof a non-metaphysical view we find in the work of John Rawls. He says:

Thus, the aim of justice as fairness as a political conception is practical,and not metaphysical or epistemological. That is, it presents itself not as aconception of justice that is true, but one that can serve as a basis ofinformed and willing political agreement between citizens . . . To securethis agreement we try, so far as we can, to avoid disputed philosophical,as well as disputed moral and religious, questions.31

Rawls distinguishes between metaphysical and non-metaphysical views.A metaphysical view is needlessly controversial, as well as presenting itselfas a true view. The picture presented above of Hegels speculative logicappears to clearly violate both these conditions. The logic is controversialin the construction of its dialectical project and claim to discern actualityfrom mere existence. Moreover, speculative logic purports to give a trueunderstanding of the structure of our thought. However, opacity and truth-claims are not specific to metaphysics and their presence does not warrantour rejection of a particular view as a metaphysical in some unacceptableway.Terry Pinkard offers a different perspective on metaphysics in Hegels

logic. Pinkard says:

The Absolute for Hegelian Logic is therefore that set of categorialprinciples for thinking about systems of the world . . . These categoriesexpress the way the world is; they are not representations of the worldwhich may or may not match up with the way the world is.32

Pinkard is arguing that Hegels views are not metaphysical in the sense thatthere are not Platonic views. That is, the actuality in the world thatspeculative logic allows us to discern is not an actuality in the sky, butgives expression to the world as it is before us on the ground. Hegel, then,does not appeal to an ideal that does not exist in the world and, therefore,

20

System

does not offer us a Platonic picture, Hegels logic is non-metaphysical.However, this picture, too, is not entirely defensible as Hegels views onlogic are used to argue in favour of a variety of ideals that are notsubstantiated in the world, at least at present. For example, the Philosophyof Right itself is an exposition of the Idea of the state, a vision of the statethat serves as an ideal, but one that has never existed.Nevertheless, Hegels logic can be understood as metaphysical in the

obvious sense that it is a study of being and its development:

metaphysics is nothing else but the entire range of the universaldeterminations of thought, as it were, the diamond net into whicheverything is brought and thereby first made intelligible. Every educatedconsciousness has its metaphysics, an instinctive way of thinking, theabsolute power within us of which we become master only when we makeit in turn the object of our knowledge. (EN, 247A)

We may prefer to designate this enterprise as an ontology rather than ametaphysics if only to suggest that the enterprise is not needlessly con-troversial. Nor is the view that Hegels logic is metaphysical in this generalsense a particular subject of wider debate amongst even non-metaphysicalreadings of Hegels work.33 This reading is summed up well by JustusHartnack: Hegels logic is thus an ontological logic. Whatever is, isdetermined by the categories.34

In any event, the point I would like to emphasize is that both a weak anda strong reading of metaphysics of Hegels logic can recognize that it isconcerned with the development of thought within a dialectical structure.What is crucial to my systematic reading of Hegels work is that we at leastagree only on the basic features of this structure. Thus far, the picture ofHegel I have presented can be accepted by either someone who holds ametaphysical view or someone who holds a non-metaphysical view.35

It is worth highlighting the fact that Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit is notpart of his larger system. It is true that Hegel originally entitled the work as thefirst part [Erster Teil] of what was to be a system of science [System derWissenschaft], but it is equally clear that he abandoned this view shortlyafterwards. The relationship of the Phenomenology to the rest of the system is asan entrance exam. It is a test for those who have presuppositions about theworld that they are unable to suspend, in order to beginwithHegelsLogic andfollow the development of thought that is unfolded there. The Phenomenologycharts alternative perspectives on how we know the world and demonstratesthe inadequacy of all of them. For this reason, Hegel calls this discussion thepathway of doubt, or more precisely as the way of despair (PS, p. 49).36

21


Thus, the Phenomenology serves as a test we must pass in order to begin anew life within Hegels larger system (see PS, pp. 4923). It is not a part of thesystem itself.37 A systematic reading of Hegels work, therefore, does notgive the Phenomenology pride of place when interpreting texts that composeHegels larger system. In fact, it is of relatively minor significance forunderstanding Hegels views on the system even if it remains one of hismost popular texts today as a general introduction to his thought. Instead,following Houlgate, Those who are prepared to suspend their ordinarycertainties can bypass the Phenomenology and proceed directly to theLogic.38 Moreover, Terry Pinkard tells us that the Phenomenology is aladder that one kicked away once one had arrived at the proper heights ofHegels system.39 Despite its wide popularity, the Phenomenology does notplay a significant part in our understanding of Hegels philosophicalsystem.40

We now have a sufficient background with which to proceed. Asystematic reading of Hegels work interprets this work within the contextof Hegels philosophical system. This system is presented in his Encyclo-paedia and elaborated at greater length in various works, including thePhilosophy of Right and excluding the Phenomenology of Spirit. What unitesthe system is its peculiar dialectical structure centred on speculative logic.Within this structure, we find the unfolding of thought and being in unitywithin a progressive movement where each movement is necessitated byeach preceding movement. These movements of thought compose arational structure centred on difference and unity.Of fundamental importance, the dialectical structure generated from

Hegels speculative logic informs the entirety of everything that follows inhis philosophical system. Hegel says:

Since the unity of being and nothing as the primary truth now formsonce and for all the basis and element of all that follows, besides becomingitself, all further logical determinations: determinate being, quality, andgenerally all philosophical Ideas, are examples of this unity. (SL, p. 85(translation modified))

The full range of categories presented in Hegels system develop from onecategory to the next according to the dialectical structure of logic. In fact,the organization of categories within this structure is necessary in order forthe categories to capture the immanent development of rationality.41 Therational structure we find in Hegels logic is applied beyond logic in hiswider philosophical system. Hegel says:

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the other philosophical sciences the Philosophy of Nature, and thePhilosophy of Spirit appear, in contrast, as applied logic, so to speak, forthe Logic is their animating soul. Thus, the concern of those othersciences is only to [re]cognize the logical forms in the shapes of nature andspirit, shapes that are only a particular mode of expression of the forms ofpure thinking. (EL, 24A2)42

Logic clearly serves a foundational role in providing a rational structure forHegels system. The movement between categories does not rest withcategories existing in pure thought alone, but categories we can discernin the world, such as space, organicism, free will, and the state. Wecomprehend the existence and necessity of each of these categories preciselyas we have categories of pure thought, namely, in the relationship of allcategories with all other categories within a wider dialectical structure. Ourtask is to recognize the dialectical structure that informs our world andalready exists, rather than determine how this structure should unfoldaccording to a preconceived notion.43

From this general understanding of Hegels larger project, we canunderstand the essential attributes of any reading that takes this projectseriously. Hegels system charts the movement of one category to another.Each category is necessitated by preceding categories. Any robust under-standing of any category in Hegels system must take seriously the place ofcategories within the larger structure. Earlier categories have an explanatoryrole in the necessary development of categories that emerge later. We canonly understand any category in its relationship with other categories.The relationship between categories is at many levels. One level is the

relationship between the three general component parts of Hegels system.Thus, there is a dialectical relationship between the Logic, the Philosophy ofNature, and the Philosophy of Spirit.44 A second level is the relationshipwithin each of these three larger parts between their three individual maininternal component parts. For example, there is a dialectical relationshipwithin the Philosophy of Spirits divisions between subjective spirit, objectivespirit, and absolute spirit. Additionally, there is a third level that existswithin each second level division, again in three parts. Thus, the Philosophyof Spirits section entitled objective spirit has itself three parts abstractright, morality, and ethical life that relate to one another within adialectical structure. Each of these parts, such as abstract right, is itselfcomposed at a fourth level of three component parts sharing likewise in adialectical relationship with one another. The magic of Hegels dialecticalprogression is that each and every category relates to another category in adialectical manner and that these categories compose higher level groupings

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of categories that relate similarly across even higher levels. The generalordering within a dialectical relationship is fairly straightforward, althoughits full presentation is more complex. It is hardly surprising that amidst sucha complicated and involved architectonic so many commentators should goawry.One necessary feature of any systematic reading (weak or strong) is its

awareness of the peculiar structure of Hegels argumentation. Thoughts donot simply follow one another, but are determined as categories within adialectical, rationalist framework.45 This framework encompasses the en-tirety of Hegels philosophical system and it details the full developmentalstructure of thought.46 A systematic reading of Hegels work recognizes therelationship between categories and across levels. This reading is self-consciously aware that to interpret any given feature of Hegels systemrequires an understanding of that features context within the largerphilosophical system. A failure to recognise this context is doomed to leadto an incomplete, if not entirely false, comprehension of any given feature inHegels larger system. This truism holds across all areas of the system and itis no less true in one area than another area.A systematic reading must be sensitive to the structure of Hegels

arguments. Part of this sensitivity necessitates an appreciation of Hegelstechnical vocabulary with which he expounds his arguments.47 In parti-cular, Hegels logic introduces the various terms and concepts that arecentral to understanding any part of the wider system, not least thePhilosophy of Right. These terms and concepts include universal,48 parti-cular,49 and individual,50 as well as actuality,51 the idea,52 and sublation[Aufheben]53 amongst many others. These terms are expanded upon else-where in his system, building off their introduction in logic. If we want tobest understand what Hegel means by individuality or sublation in thePhilosophy of Right or elsewhere, then we should at least be aware of howthese terms originate in speculative logic and are then employed elsewherein the system. Of course, logic is not the only place where Hegel develops histechnical terminology. Indeed, some of these terms such as right [Recht]54

and morality [Moralitat]55 originate in the sections of the systemexpanded upon in the Philosophy of Right itself. However, parts of thesystem other than logic also introduce new terminology central to under-standing the Philosophy of Right, most notably Hegels concept of spirit[Geist],56 as well as right [Recht] and will [Wille]57 in the Philosophy ofSpirit.58

This section has provided only a general view of Hegels philosophicalsystem and the relationship between this system and its speculative logic.My presentation is not meant to be complete in every detail, but only to

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provide the background perspective that motivates a systematic reading ofHegels work. A systematic reading of this work may endorse competingviews of the particular features of logics development or the presence ofmetaphysics in Hegels account. The weak systematic reading offered hereseeks to focus no more than on a sensitivity to the dialectical structure ofHegels presentation of features in his larger system. A necessary part of anyrobust interpretation of these features must account for their place withinHegels philosophical system. No part of Hegels work can be read incomplete isolation from its greater context. In addition, a systematic readingmust in tandem be sensitive to Hegels technical vocabulary which itselfdevelops throughout the system. My discussion here no more than signifieswhy a systematic reading can be justified, offering a picture of its generalfeatures. The defence of this reading is offered in each of the followingchapters below.

III The Philosophy of Right

We have now discussed the general relevant features of Hegels speculativelogic within his greater philosophical system and identified the maincharacteristics of a systematic reading of Hegels work. Before concludingthis chapter and moving toward the following case studies, it is important tobe very clear that (a) the Philosophy of Right can be interpreted as part of thesystem and (b) Hegels self-understanding is that we would interpret this textin that way. If either (a) or (b) is true, then a systematic reading of thePhilosophy of Right becomes possible. If both (a) and (b) are true, then asystematic reading is not only possible, but consistent with both Hegels self-understanding and the structure of the text of the Philosophy of Right.First, it is clear that the Philosophy of Right can be interpreted as a part of

Hegels larger philosophical system. The Philosophy of Right is an elaborationof sections 483552 in the Encyclopaedia, covering the section ObjectiveSpirit. This is in keeping with other texts which elaborate different sectionsof his Encyclopaedia, a project which Hegel engaged in for much of hiscareer. Thus, his Science of Logic is clearly an elaboration of EncyclopaediaLogic. Similarly, the Philosophy of Right is an elaboration of Objective Spiritin the wider Encyclopaedia.Both Objective Spirit and its elaboration in the Philosophy of Right are

presented within the same three divisions (abstract right, morality, andethical life), each division lying in a dialectical relationship to one anotherleading toward the role of a state within world history. Furthermore, whenwe examine each of these three divisions in both places for example,Objective Spirit and the Philosophy of Right we discover the same essential

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subdivisions are present. For example, both subdivide the section abstractright with component sections on property, contract, and wrong. Thesesubdivisions lie in the same dialectical relationship. The structure of Hegelspresentation of both Objective Spirit and the Philosophy of Right are thesame and, thus, his argumentation for component features in both texts isalso the same. We can clearly offer an interpretation of the Philosophy ofRight within the context of Hegels larger philosophical system. ThePhilosophy of Right is without doubt a part of the rationalist structure ofthe system.59

Secondly, it is equally clear that Hegel intended his Philosophy of Right tobe interpreted by a systematic reading of the text. Hegel argues that it willreadily be noticed that the work as a whole, like the development[Ausbildung] of its parts, is based on the logical spirit. It is also chiefly fromthis point of view that I would wish this treatise to be understood andjudged (PR, p. 10 (translation modified)).60 Throughout the Philosophy ofRight, Hegel is at pains to remind the reader that they must possess afamiliarity with the workings of his larger philosophical system if they are tomake best sense of the Philosophy of Right.61 It is because he assumes thisfamiliarity that Hegel does not offer an account of the Philosophy of Rightsdialectical structure. He says:

Since I have fully developed the nature of speculative knowledge in myScience of Logic, I have only occasionally added an explanatory commenton procedure and method in the present outline . . . I have presupposed afamiliarity with [this] scientific method. (PR, p. 10)

If we want to best understand the internal relationship of the individualparts of the Philosophy of Right, then we must comprehend the dialecticalstructure that informs the whole of Hegels philosophical system. Not onlyis the Philosophy of Right explicated in terms of this particular structure, but acomplete justification and explanation of the employment of this structurein the Philosophy of Right is assumed by Hegel (see ES, 408A). Whencommentators speak of Hegels dialectical method in the Philosophy of Right,they must to some degree then offer a systematic understanding of thisdialectic as it is incompletely presented in the Philosophy of Right as such.Similarly, an accurate understanding of not only the structure of thePhilosophy of Right, but also the place of this text within the wider system,is only assumed by Hegel to be known to his readers.62 A systematic readingof the Philosophy of Right is then not only warranted by its dialecticalstructure, but also by Hegels explicit self-understanding.In conclusion, a systematic reading of Hegels Philosophy of Right is not

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only possible, but consistent with Hegels self-understanding of his project.The Philosophy of Right is a more complete elaboration of a particular sectionof the larger philosophical system. There are no major differences betweenthis section and the Philosophy of Right. Furthermore, Hegel is exceptionallyclear in his self-understanding that readers interpret the Philosophy of Rightin a systematic way, within the context of his larger system. Non-systematicreadings of the Philosophy of Right violate both a contextual understandingof its place and Hegels stated intentions of its reception. A systematicreading of the Philosophy of Right seeks to correct both errors, as well asprovide a more insightful understanding of Hegels political philosophy.

IV Conclusion

Hegels clear and widely evident self-understanding of his own philosophicalproject is that his Philosophy of Right should be read and understood as onepart of his larger system of speculative philosophy.63 If we endeavour to takeHegels views seriously, then it necessitates our having a clear under-standing of the relationship between the Philosophy of Right and the largersystem. This chapter has offered a general and relatively uncontroversialunderstanding of Hegels system, his Philosophy of Right, and their relation-ship. The following chapters now endeavour to demonstrate what a readingof the Philosophy of Right within the greater context of Hegels system lookslike and what we gain from this systematic reading.It is worth noting from the beginning that the systematic reading I am

offering is what we might call a weak systematic reading of the Philosophy ofRight, rather than a strong systematic reading. A weak systematic readingproceeds along the path I have outlined here, employing a general picture ofHegels system and its relationship to the Philosophy of Right. It is my beliefthat such a picture can be accepted by so-called non-metaphysical readersand these readers are my primary concern. After all, it is the non-metaphysical reading that masquerades as a non-systematic reading. Noneof this is to suggest that a stronger systematic reading cannot be offered thathighlights far more connections between Hegels system and the Philosophyof Right. A strong systematic reading would entail more space to noteadditional specific features of the system. I am sensitive to the concerns ofnon-systematic commentators that a systematic reading would spend somuch time away from the Philosophy of Right that we then examine thePhilosophy of Right in insufficient detail. A strong systematic reading is thenat least equally plausible as the weak systematic reading. However, theprimary task at hand is convincing those who adopt a non-systematicreading of Hegels Philosophy of Right that any systematic reading of this text

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will bring interpretive benefits. I believe a weak systematic reading canclearly demonstrate these benefits, while offering a general understanding ofHegels project that is relatively uncontroversial for non-systematic com-mentators. The aim of the systematic reading offered here is not simply tooffer a plausible interpretation of the Philosophy of Right, but to convince ofthe need of a systematic reading.In the chapters which follow, I will provide new interpretations of specific

topics in Hegels Philosophy of Right that are sensitive to the systemsparticular argumentative structure and rich technical vocabulary. Thisreading entails interpreting each topic within the context of the gre

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Thom Brooks Hegels Political Philosophy a Systematic Reading of the Philosophy of Right 2007