Integrative Humanism Journal - Ghana Vol 2 No. 1

INTEGRATIVE HUMANISM AND THE QUESTION OF PERSONAL

IDENTITY

MAMADU, TERVER TITUS (Ph.D CANDIDATE)DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR

CALABAR

Abstract

The Western and African philosophical conceptions ofpersonhood or personal identitydiffer greatly. This point of divergences or differences has created a problem of whatactually constitutes the real personhood and how he could maintain his identity throughtime, place, history, age and circumstance. In an attempt to reconcile these differences inthe Western and African thought, the paper has achieved the following points. First, itpromotes the value, respect and dignity of the human person within the frame work ofintegrative humanism. Second, it shows that both the individualistic-materialism andreductionism ofpersonhood in Western thought (which is projected by Aristotle's, Rene-Descartes', and David Hume's notion of personhood), and the African philosophicalconcept ofpersonhood, which is based on communalisticspirit, are quite limited. Third,the paper has shown also the limitation involves the bifurcating ontological conceptionof the human person as being either spiritual or material. Fourth, thepaperfurthermore,shows that the question of personal identity is best answered within the framework ofintegrative humanism due its effort to bridge the gap between different philosophicalsystems, philosophic heritage and tradition ofour cultural beliefs, ideologies and values.This isfinallyfollowed by our critical evaluation and conclusion.

Introduction

A critical examination of the issues and events of our modem society portraysone reality that has assumed greater importance in our times. This is the fact that thehuman person is gradually losing his value, self respect and dignity due to thedevelopment of Western science and technology, modernization and computerization.Sequel to this development, other vital issues that concern African traditional conceptionof personhood or personal identity are gradually being watered down. This is largely dueto some Western influences on the people of Africa. While it is true that Western scienceand culture have made a lot of positive changes in the world, it is unexaggerated to saythat Western science and culture have done much harm than good to the conception ofhuman person today. Apart from the fact that Western science and culture have reducedthe conception of man to a "machine", they have affected the original conception of a

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man as a "sacrosanct" being. For instance, the issue of human cloning or ernbryonicformation in the scientific laboratory has posed a very serious challenge or limit to ouroriginal conception of human person. Thus, it has become so difficult to define theindividual's identity or personhood from its natural dispositions without any interferenceby Western science and technology. George Ehusani captures this clearly when he saysthat:

The ambiguity of modem Western technological civilization, that onecould say with some justifications that the twentieth century has seen theemergence of the machine and the disappearance of the personhood (1)

The disappearance of the person's identity or personhood is due to the new trendof scientific encroachments into the dignity and value of human life. Therefore, inreacting to this new trend of scientific development and the Western scientific andculture reductionism of the human person, this paper seeks to analyze the question ofpersonal identity from the perspective of African traditional conception of man. Afterdoing this, the paper shall not only call the attention of all to the traditional conception ofpersonhood or personal identity and how scientific development has led to thedehumanization of man, but also propose ways by which the philosophy of "integrativehumanism" as proposed by Prof. Ozumba could better the lots of human beings in themodem society..

The Western Concept of Personal Identity

Personal identity is a derivative of the Latin words, "persona" meaning mask' oi""actor's mask" and ''identicus^' meaning "the sameness" or "identical". Literally,personal identity is defined as "the sameness of an actor's mask". That is, an actor whomaintains the same performance or action on the stage. Personal identity is beingassociated with person or self. Any individual, whether an inanimate thing, a livingorganism or a conscious self, is identical in so far as it's preserves from moment tomoment a similarity of stmcture {Dictionary of Philosophy, 229). Personal identity,therefore, is a general notion that an individual remains the same, despite, the biologicaland physiological changes of his/her components. In other words, there is "sameness"amidst the "changes" in the structure of a person.

The general notion of Westem thought on personal identity is centered on theprinciples of individualism and materialistic- reductionism. In the first part, man isconsidered authentically identical by reason of maintaining his individual existence,which is separate from others. In this sense, Rene- Descartes (who is considered thefather of Westem modem philosophy) argues that "the human person is a thinkingsubstance". The thinking part of man, namely: reason is given preference above his

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material body. This culminates in Descartes' popular dictum that "I think, therefore, Iexist" (cogito ergo sum). This individualistic conception of man negates thecommunalistic conception of man. Hence, man's identity is chiefly that of "self or "I"and does not involve the "others". Commenting on this point, Reid says that: "mypersonal identity is the continuous existence of the indivisible thing that I call myself(340).Thus, the nature of this "self or "I" is associated with that which thinks anddeliberates or acts. My thoughts can change, my actions can change, my feelings canchange. Their existence is not permanent. But the "self or "I" to which the thoughts,actions and feelings belong does not change: it is permanent and has "the same relationto all succeeding thoughts, actions and feelings which I call mine" (Reid, 341). Reid'sconception of personal identity here is more of individualistic physiological character ofman. It also entails bodily identity which is expressed through behavioural actions.

The second principle of personal identity holds that man remains "the same" or"identical" due to his physical or material components which are permanently fixed.Here, the materialistic or mechanical structure of a man forms his identity. For instance,Thomas Hobbes formulated one of the earliest physiologies, and adopted amethodological materialism and enthusiastically pursued the possibility of reaching anew scientific understanding of man's identical structure. He assumes that only matterexists and consequently introduced his "Leviathan'' by an explicit comparismor "man asmachine" (17). He compared the parts of human beings to the parts of machine as well.And in explaining mans bodily identity as being the true expressions of his personalidentity Hobbes assigns this fundamental role of identity to passions. Importantly, man'sidentity is a materialistic tendency governed by passions. Therefore, a man's identity iscompared to the passions to acquire wealth, honour, command, power and even toovercome his enemy or death,material tendencies or position become the paramount ofan individual expression of his personal identity. Thus, the human person changes hisidentity if the conditions of his immediate environment and material components do notremain the same.

Also, the thirdprinciple that characterizes Western thought on personal identity isbased on the idea of reductionism. Reductionism as a theory holds that an individual'sidentity is not permanent but changes through time, succession and circumstance. Thistheory maintains that to talkof personal identity is purely an imaginative ideaanda merehabit of associating different ideas as though they were the same. David Hume whowrote extensively on the problem of personal identity has this in view; the understandingof personal identity is based purely on our idea of relation, association and succession ofevents through time. First, the idea of relation suggests two senses; "either the quality bywhich two ideas are connected together in the imagination" or "the particularcircumstance in which even upon the arbitrary union of two ideas in the fancy, we may

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think proper to compare them" (13). In observing the identity of a person, Hume notes,we do maintain a constant relation of ideas about an individual person either by way ofperception or imagination. Secondly, Hume's conception ofpersonal identity is "a habitof associating ideas about a particular person through experience or perception" (14).The association of ideas about a person's identity is due to the perception constantly ofhis bodily identity or behavioural actions. It is through identity as being constantlyfixed without any change. For Hume, "our beliefs about bodies, our own and those ofthings and persons, emerge as products of the operation of these principles ofassociation" (251). It is so clear that when Hume discusses the unity of the self, heconsiders it as a train of impressions and ideas, the interconnections of which theprinciples of association govern. In other words, the principles ofassociation govern theinterrelationships of the impressions and ideas within the self. Finally, Hume'sconception ofidentity is based on the fact that "we have a distinct idea ofa person or anobject that remains invariable and uninterrupted through a supposed variation of time(253). Hence,diversity in opposition, according to Hume means "a distinct idea ofseveral different persons or objects existing in succession and connected together by aclose relation" (253).

Hume's central thesis on personal identity is that it is merely a presumption tothink of self or person as maintaining an identity that is constantly fixed without anychange. In other words, it is simply mere fantasies or impressions that we develop aboutourselves that make us to feel we have identical nature. Hume s criticism follows thatthere is no way we can account for "identical" and change that permeate our ownunderstanding of different events. If we may ask: what informs us today, inspite of thechanges wrought by time, that person A, before us now, is the person B whom weformerly knew and that person C, also before us now is not? What makes the "I" or"Self different from the "you"? What am I? What kind of entity, what kind of person(being) do I often remain? What constitutes my person?. These questions which arefundamental to the problem of personal identity remain unanswered, if we are to followthe Western thought as discussed above. Neither Descartes, Hobbes nor Hume who aretypical examples of Western thought does proffer solution to the question of personalidentity. For them, an individual person maintains his identical nature or personhood byhis biological and material components. In this regard, the Western conception of humanperson is either based on vitalism or mechanics. On the vitalist's conception, human lifeis seen as a singular, original phenomenon, irreducible to matter, but traces its origin tothe one, the Nous, the Logos, God, and angelic intelligence, the spirit (Modin, 32). Thisintroduces the idea of"man as a spiritual substance". The principle of mechanics, on theother hand, is based on the materialistic or scientific interpretation of human life as asingular organization of matter" (Mondin, 33). Man is reduced to matter or machine bythe different bodily components or parts. Hence, by losing any vital part of his body, the

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human person looses his "real" identity and by maintaining all his biological/physicalparts, the human person maintains his identity. Hence, just as a machine loses its beautyorwears its parts when constantly put in use, so does a person's identity wears ordies offthrough its life's activity.

Both conceptions of the human person, whether the vitalist or mechanicalconception of human life, remain inadequate to our understanding of personal identity.This is because the identity of a human person is not sufficiently interpreted from thespiritual substance only. But it must be a combination of both material and spiritualentities. Quoting Correct, J. Odok and Edor, J. echoed that "a material being acts notonly in itself, but in the other. Hence its activity is in part determined by the other" (71).This points to the fact that the form (the material) and essence (immaterial) that is,biological and spiritual substances of man must be integrally brought together for aharmious co-existence. It is only from this frame work of integrative humanism, which Ishall expound later that the human person could be valued in this wholistic identity, butnot as a machine part or superfluous spiritual entity (a typical of Western bifurcatingontology and its conception of man).

The African Original Idea of Personal Identity

The general African belief concerning man is that he is made up of body(material) and soul (immaterial). Although, there may be variations of this idea from oneAfrican society to another, "the fundamental assumption among them is the unity of thepersonality of man" (Opuku,l). The human person, for the Africans, is a compositebeing. He is a physical/biological as well as religious/spiritual being. The physical andspiritual parts complement each other such that whether at the point of life (birth) or thepoint of death, the human person is a complete being. Although, death is for theAfricansa temporal separation of the body and soul, it does not end life. Our life (soul) does notgo out of existence, but continues to re-incamate in different patterns. The body, on theother hand, disintegrates or decays completely at the time of death. Without the soul(spirit), the body is lifeless, a non-living body. He is no longer a human person, if thespirit (soul) which is life, is separated from the body that is mortal. The immortal spirit(soul) on its own cannot be self, unless it complements the body or is being united to thebody. The soul and the body in a complementary force define the self. The self is whatgivesautonomy and unit of identity to the human person. Odok and Edor's interpretationof Okere follows that the Igbo word for self, "Onwe" has its root in the verb "Inwe"which means to own or to posses (72). The self (Onwe), which has its variations in Igboexpressions such as Ike and Ogwe, for Okere, is the fundamental identityof an individualbeing. As cited by Odok and Edor, Okere says that:

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Onwe... roughly meaning self, is the core of identity, perduring andenduring all human experience. It is not describe and has no name and nofunction except as the ultimate author of all the functions of theindividual, the carrier of all experience. It is the link between theexperiences of yesterday and today, the basis of that proprietorship bywhich these fleeting multitudes of experience are and are mine (72).

Okere's citation above has this in view that the human person or self is the primaryquality of real being and the first principle of being is identity. The self, a part from,maintaining its real identity, has its basic unit of autonomy. The. self of personhood inmaintaining its unit of identity and autonomy does not find its full expression without theothers. Hence, the African concept of the human person cannot be isolated from thecommunity. It is only in relation with the community that the identity of the individual isperceptible (Ezekwonna, 63). Citing Bujo who has the same view of the Africanconception of personal identity, Ezekwonna further says that "without communitarianrelationship there is no identity for the Africa person. Only together with others can onebecome a human person and achieve freedom, which again should be exercised in acommunication manner" (63). This presents the point that the self, though identical andautonomous in nature, does not find full expression in isolation. The units of identity andautonomy in self or human person do not present man as an individualistic being, but acommunal being.

Africans, therefore, allow themselves to be permeated by the sense of communityliving as a way of securing personhood but theydo not allow theirpersonhood or self tobe destroyed. Thus, we must establish that every individual has rightful control over hislife in African setting, but he must also find his personal identity by belonging to thecommunity. This is why for the Africans, an ostracized person, like osu in Igbo culture,loses his identity, the very moment he is banned from being part of community. When anindividual person has committed so much atrocities, which the community frowns at, heis asked to leave the community or he is being ostracized from taking part incommunity's activities. Achebe captures this point that "the osu who are beingstigmatized as social out casts arenot allowed to have any association with the membersof the community and thus, are fallen apart by losing their identities" (158). In Africanthought, there are certain sins committed that are reparable when sacrifices or libationsare poured to the gods. But abominable acts which condemn the selfidentity are beyondrepairs. Thus, the person who destroys his/her identity by committing abominable actsremains unidentifiable to the community. Personal identity therefore, in African thoughtis not a separate thing or act. Rather, the identity of the person, which is self, is anintegral union of the body and soul (spirit) and full expression of the self (person) to thecommunity.

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The self, which is the true nature of human person is a composite of body andsoul. Again, just as the body and soul (spirit) constitute the human nature and can onlyintermingle to find full expression, so does the human person maintains his real identityonly in relation to the community. This presents the reason why Africans value thehuman person, and why every individual being whether death or alive, small or big, richor poor, health or ill and so on, has special identity.

Personal identity in African setting is not materialistic, but both spiritual andmaterial in nature. A person's identity is not only defined by how much money he has,but how well or meaningful he lives. Therefore, the identity of a person is a wholistic,all-embracing one including psychological, religious, biological, emotional, physical andintellectual being. No matter the position one attains in life or has failed to attain in life,African world-view is that every human person is unique, real and identical in nature andshould not be comprised at the expense of another's personal identity. This is againstWestern materialistic conception of personal identity that it is "what you have that makesyou what you are". Hence, your identity depends on the degree or extent to which youhave attained success in life and have been counted rich, wealthy or successful. From ametaphysical dimension in Africa context, an individual's identity is the self (being). Theself has various aspects: spirit, heart, body and its entire mechanism, yet these are notseparate or separable parts of the self but its attributes and functions. In order to figureout the complex relationship between these attributes and functions, the self expressesitself either as spiritual entity or material entity, though in a harmonious monism that iscomplementary and not the consumptive types of Western coloration (Ijiomah, as citedby Odok and Edor, 73).This implies that an individual's identity is so rich and it cannotbe properly articulated if we are to base our judgment either on the material or spiritualcomponents. But it must be a combination of both components in order to define aperson's identity. How then do Africans originally define a person's identity? What ispersonal identity in African thought?

By way of simple definition, personal identity in African thought is understood asthe quality of real being which ensures a harmonious or integrative monism such that thewhole person remains in mutual love and understanding with the community. Thus, aperson in African thought must be seen as a whole and not just as an isolated individualwho has his own different world view from that of others. The integral person needs anintegral community where his thinking ability and the entirety of his life have meaningfor himself and those found around him. Therefore, the question of personal identity forthe Africans goes beyond the dualistic conception of human person. Apart from the factthat an African person values himself, he/she also sees the presence of the others inhis/herself. He/she considers life as an integrative, harmonious monism.

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FurtheiTnore, the mark of personal identity for the African is stated in two ways.(1) personal names (2) personal relation with others. First, aname is the deep mark ofpersonal identity in African communities and it is impossible to talk of somebodywithout a name which has meaning among Africans. Africans believe that somebody hasno name or who lost a name is a non-person. Mbiti as being cited by Ezekwonnna hasthis in view that for the Africans "the name is the person and many names are oftendescriptive of the individual, particularly names acquired as the person grows" (75).Hence, the first name in African tradition defines the individuality ofthe person.

On the second mark of personal identity which is shown in our relation withothers, as already discussed above, is a mark of solidarity or harmonious monism.Asouzu captures this notion of identity with others in his complementary reflection or(Jbiianyidanda philosophy) when he says that, "anything that exists must serve amissinglink of reality" (39). Here, being assumes its real identity in acomplementary manner. Itdoes not think of"self as an isolated entity, but in a related "wholeness".

Identity Crisis ofthe Human Person in Africa Today

The resultant effects of slavery, colonialism, intrusion of foreign religions andpresently, neo-colonialism upon African continent have left more to disgust than tobenefit. Chiefly among these effects is the "crisis of identity" of an Afncan person whofeels that the best land to stay is in Europe and America, the best fashions and P^stige toacquire is that of the West. Worst of all is the fact that our leaders do not think theycould decide for themselves any policy without the Western influence (Mamadu, 77).Apart from the fact that Africans as well as African leaders are mdeep cnsis of what isthe real identity and dignity of the human person in African perspective are gradua ylosing their values upon the Western ideological influence. The nch Afncan culturalheritages are gradually being forgotten. The African person is faced with deep cnsis andfrustrSion in trying to fit into the moulds of Western scientific modernism and globalinfluences. This crisis of identity induces upon the African person psychological trauma,poverty and feeling of alienation. This crisis haunts him or her on the associations he oishe keeps, the political framework in which he or she operates, the ideological positionhe or she is to espouse, the psychological element in his or her disposition, anoperations. It also haunts him or her on the clothes he or she wears the food he or sheeats, the language he or she speaks and the way he or she worships (Onyeocha, 94). As aresult of this identity crisis, the African person no longer feels secure in all aspects oflife. The African person today at the corridor of power, for instance, prefers to staaway billions of naira into foreign accounts and amass wealth to himself even i isnearest neighbour is dying of hunger. This identity crisis has brought today "^jstrusts ofpublic offices, public treasury and other positions of trust. Corruption grea y

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promoted to a wider dimension due to the loss of the sense of lespect, dignity and valueof human persons.

The Western capitalistic and materialistic influences have made Africans today tolose focus of brotherhood (Ujamaa) and spirit of communalism. The Westernindividualistic conception of identity, personhood is now taken over the place of value ofthe human person and dignity among Africans.

Hegel, commenting on the Africa's history said that Africans do not havepersonal identities. For him, Africans are simply qualified as Black negroes or slaves .This dehumanizing effect upon the Africans largely informs us of how the Westconceives of African continent. For Hegel (as for the Western thought), Africans lack"reason" and cannot define their personal identities from animalistic tendencies oremotions. Hence, the perpetuity ofslavery and colonialism including racism is due to thebiased "mind set" and discrimination between the "whites" and "blacks" on the reason ofcolour. This biased which constitutes in what, I call "ethnocentric reductionism", makesthe "whites" feel superior and their opposing black Africans remain "inferior". It waslargely for the same reason that the West felt it is a right and even a duty to bring to "thewhite man's burden" the so called benefits of civilization through a process ofcolonialization. A typical expression of this ethno-centric reductionism and racialistattitude is found in one of DavidHume's lesser works as quoted thus by Odok and Edorwho also quoted from Omi and Anyanwu saying:

I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to whites. Therescarely everywhere a civilized nation of that complexion, nor even anyindividual, eminent either in action or speculation. No ingeniousmanufacturer amongst them, no art, no science. On the other hand, themost rude and barbarous of the white— Have still something eminentabout them, in their valour (75).

The impression here is direct and indirect subjugation, oppression and alienationof the African identity. The alienated African who feels the sense of lost of identity, whatI refer to as "psychic alienation", seeks to achieve self satisfaction and self respect. Butwhere it becomes clear to him that he cannot do away with inferiority complex and senseof inadequacy, the African man feels that the white man remains on the superior "top";the African man goes further to emulate the superior being by the standard of which hisinferiority complex is measured.

Leopold Senghor, one of the pan-Africanists, wrote a work on "Negritude",where heexpounded the ways of upholding the African identity (35). Hefurther rejectedthe cold and inhuman rationalism of the West and on opposing to it, he affirmed the

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waiTnth, the rhythm, the human breath and emotionalism of the Africans (40). Theblameworthiness of the West for "African predicaments", according to Senghor, is aserious reduction and problem upon the African person's identity (40). Hence, the onlyway out for the Africans is to realize their real identity through "consciousness" of unity.Kwame Nkrumah refers to this as "consciencism", a process of re-awakening our mindsto those rich cultural heritages, values system, problems and the possibilities of solvingthese problems, through a personal reflective and conscious effort. In this way, Nkrumahargues that consciencism will bring about African liberation from the menance ofcolonialism and imperialism which have caused both the economic and politicalsubjugations. Thus, consciencism according to Nkrumah, presents "a theory forconsideration of alternative choices necessary for African development" (70). In classstruggles and identity crisis in African, Nkrumah argued: it is only armed struggle thatcan bring this situation to reality, since the liberation of African can in no way beachieved by consent (75). This has called for a collective effort of both the leaders andfollowers. All Africans must literate themselves from identity crisis and work towardsthe common good. It is based on this conception that we shall proceed to articulate thephilosophy of integrative humanism and its relevance.

Integrative Humanism and its Relevance on the Question of Personal identity inAfrica

The term "integrative humanism" is a combination of two English words,integration and humanism. According to Ozumba, the term "integration" has its rootfrom the mathematical concept "Integers" which means "whole numbers (11).Integration here is aresult ofthe combination ofone integer and another which gives riseto "whole numbers". The idea of "whole" is due to the relation of the parts (numericalobjects) in a unified system or structure. Hence,it connotes the fact that the part isindispensable without the whole and vice versa. Humanism, on the other hand, is aphilosophical doctrine that human beings are the central focus of any field of humanendeavour. Humans are seen as being the centre of every philosophical investigation,that is, the notion that humans remain the central focus for every philosophical problem,what Onunwa refers to it as "centripetal orientation". Humanism therefore is thephilosophical position that holds, thus: "every philosophical investigation is gearedtoward solving human problems". In other words, humans are the center ofattraction indifferent spheres of life. There is no knowledge which is obtainable without humansbeing involved and that all humans must be valued, respected or dignified in any field ofhuman endeavour. Humans are also seen as "God - centered" and should be treated as"End" in themselves and not as means to the end.

From the above views, integrative humanism adopts practical, eclectic,ontological, metaphysical, scientific as well as religious underpinnings in its

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philosophical and methodological approach towards understanding human being andtheir relationship to each other. What integrative humanism seeks to achieve is onprimacy of human interests in their physical and spiritual dimensions (Ozumba, 20).Here, integrative humanism aims at a harmonious monistic conception of the humanperson. It relegates the idea ofbifurcating ontology, which is typical ofWestern thought.

Therefore, integrative humanism shows that the human person is at the center ofGod s creation and thus, both the spiritual and material components of human personexist as "integral units within a complementary framework, thereby serving the missinglinks of reality" (Asouzu, 24). This is because integrative humanism approaches thestudy ofall realities in acomplementary mode. Any thing that exist serves amissing linkof reality in a complementary manner or integrative humanistic manner. This makesintegrative humanism to serve as both a philosophy and method. In the words ofOzumba, "integrative humanism as a philosophy adopts a guided but open attitude inapproaching issues of knowledge as they affect human directly or indirectly" (23). Thetotality of reality, both spiritual and material, substance and accident, form and matter,plant and animal worlds exists as integral units, which Ozumba refers to it as "anintegrated ecosystem of which no part can be isolated without dire consequences" (23).On another note, integrative humanism as a method serves either as a way of"interpreting a mass of reality" or "an instrument in conducting a research". It is also, away of bringing a new understanding to bear on old facts (Ozumba, 23). Themethodological approach in the philosophy of integrative humanism is that of"synthesis" between two opposing views, namely: the thesis and anti-thesis. By so doing,Ozumba notes that "integrative humanism is under-girded by the belief that differentshades of reality keep unfolding and this presents researchers with ever-coming newpossibilities ofunderstanding the missing links" (23-24). Due to the synthesis involves inthe method or philosophy of integrative humanism no reality including world ideas,theories, values and disciplines do notexist in isolation. All we everknow or understandabout reality in our existential human condition is a resultant effect of theconglomeration ofdifferent philosophical systems, philosophic heritage and tradition ofour cultural beliefs, ideologies and values. In a nutshell, integrative humanism views thatevery philosophical system, thought or idea contributes something relevant which can beannexed or coordinated with another towards a better understanding ofreality. What weare saying in essence is that integrative humanism does not see any thing or form ofhuman knowledge as exiting in independence. But it is by richly borrowed culturalvalues or ideological underpinnings of any philosophical systems that we can boast ofattaining "knowledge parexcellence". Therefore, whenever we borrow those ideas aboutaphilosophic system, which is rich in itself and annex with the others or many views, weshall attain an integral world view of reality.

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Commenting on this. Kenneth Kaunda has it that "humanism", which is "Godcentered", is apropelling force towards afull self-realization. For him the human pereonrealizes his true self in God because of "the spintual dimension which is an '"te=ra^l pof the human personality" (20). Kaunda's position is that there is need for Afncans mharness the power inherent in their faith or belief mGod for socially desirable ends. Fothat reason Kaunda is convinced that "humanism operates on the boundary h^fireligion and politics as achannel for the best gifts of all true faith: compassion serviceand love to be lavished on the African people" (23). The point here is that smce manrealizes himself fully by leaning on God, the material dimension which 'yP'"' o'Western mind set, should not be over emphasized. When humans have so much inton the material needs than integrating their spiritual life, it goes to destroy '̂ e'r pe™naidentity Africans should re-channel back their mind sets to the religious (sP'oPw')dimension of life. While it is good that materialism and atbrought about changes in our land, their negative tendencies should not be irnbibed a tteexpense of our spiritual well-being. This confirms Kaunda's P°f•The Africanness, which has its roots in the soil of our continents f®room of Western Universities, is basically a religious phenomenon. We are who areberuse oToL attitude to the mysterious depth in life...." (17). What we are saying inessence is that within an integrative humanism, no cultural 'deology and Phdosophmthought of aparticular people supersede the others. Again, there is no room for exertinthe other's influential stand as being superior while the others are ^regard both the Western rich cultural traditions and scientific expansions do not rele atethe other people's contributions as being unimportant. What Afneans shou ddo 'adopt certain values and philosophic systems of the Western world morder to improher wn cultural values, systems and beliefs. Within the integrative hiimanistic approachAfrican communalistic spirit should be blended with the Western individualistic systesuch that no world view is completely relegated or promoted at the expense of anotherThis implies that the Africanness of the identity and dignity of the human person, whiSeT„k of identity of the person, should not undei^me^materialism and scientific modernism. Rather, we should leant to blend our nch culturheritage, values and educational systems within those of the West. Hence, it is ™P°rtanHofe that any ideology or science that does not see the human person as GodItered" i Z worth a serious study. African Tradition, which views man as acrnlpSte being of spiritual and material dimensions and thus, does not give preferenceoZeSKer^should be harmonized with African spiritual for abalanced worldSrfs good that Africans should borrow some of the Western nch traditions oSitural vL^s and scientific enhancements, we should not forget our nch cul uralherimi InScanness in fostering our identity. In the same vein the Western cuUureSnSSce should not be considered as better or superior. Rather it should be blended

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with, close rich cultural values, traditions and resources of those of Africa within anintegrative humanistic framework. Thus, our strivings should not merely be for aregional union of people as "black" or "white" continents, not even for an exclusive pan-Africanism for the recovery of the African identity or Western capitalistic or Marxianinfluences, but an effective open humanism, which unites all men on the basis of theirpreparedness to understand each other, to contribute to each other and to participate in aunity which is respectful of diversity of culture, race, language and tradition. It is only byso doing that the African person can value himself, his identity and dignity as beingunique and should be protected from negative influences.

Evaluation and Conclusion

The common adage holds that "No man is an island". This implies that no humanperson is so important as to feel secure and happy when he lives alone. That is why,Aristotle concludes that "he who does not need the company of others must either be abeast or a god". Importantly, we shall point out here that it is only within the frameworkof integrative humanism that we shall realize the richness or fullness of human life.

Every human person has the right to be himself, unique and different from allothers, whether white or black, green or yellow. This right is based on the naturalevolution of a people, its history, its wise men, its heroes, its values. Thus, it is only byfull self realization of our uniqueness and God centered humanism that our real identityshall be defined.

Therefore, it is a dehumanization to think of some human beings as beinginferior, while the others superior. Rather, we should think of things or persons existingwithin the framework of integrative humanism, such that anything that exists serves "amissing link of reality". It is based on this understanding that, an individual person doesnot loss his identity in the names of modernism, scientism and technocracy.Materialistic-capitalism and reduction which are typical of Western thought and idea ofegalitarianism, communalism and religiousity which are typical of African thought shallbe integrally brought together. It is only by so doing that we shall appreciate humanbeings as God's creations, dignified and respected without being reduced to materialismand scientific orientations. This is because the human person is a component of body andspirit, which have an integral unit. Hence, it is an absurd, nonsensical, empty statementto think of materialism as a substitute for spiritualism and vice versa.

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