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Theories, Policies, and the Improvement of EducationalPracticeGraham W. F. Orpwood aa The Ontario Institute for Studies in EducationPublished online: 09 Jul 2006.
To cite this article: Graham W. F. Orpwood (1979) Theories, Policies, and the Improvement of Educational Practice, TheReview of Education, 5:3, 203-214, DOI: 10.1080/0098559790050306
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Theories, Policies,and the Improvement ofEducational Practice
Joseph D. Novak. A Theory of Education. Ithaca, New York: CornellUniversity Press, 1977. 295 pp. $15.00, cloth.
Graham W. F. OrpwoodThe Ontario Institute for Studies in Education
"Substantial improvement in educational practices," writes Pro-fessor Novak in the opening chapter of A Theory of Education, "[is]not likely to occur without a workable theory of education andwithout the new educational practices that can be derived fromsuch a theory" (p. 17). Clearly, his belief in the corollary is theinspiration for this scholarly if unusual attempt to synthesize acomprehensive educational theory.
It is scholarly in that it weaves threads from a variety of traditionsof study—philosophy, psychology, sociology, curriculum and instruc-tion, and school administration—into a rich fabric in whicheducational theory and practice are systematically and thoughtfullyreconceptualized. It is refreshingly unusual, since comprehensiveworks such as this seem to be attempted only rarely these days; toooften, educational writing is so intensively specialized in narrowareas of research, that its connection with the problems ofeducational practice seems somewhat tenuous. Novak's book, bycontrast, is concerned with a broad range of educational issues, andhis attempt at a theory which can attend to all of them is, to use hisown word, "audacious."D
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The book addresses two potential audiences. First, it is designedto speak directly to educational practitioners, and especially tothose responsible for planning curriculum and instruction inschools. Second, it is addressed to the author's colleagues in theacademic world of education, specifically "to encourage a morescientific study of educational problems" (p. 20). As a curriculumresearcher, based in an academic environment but presentlyworking with school-based practitioners, I find myself respondingto the book from both perspectives. First, however, it is importantthat the reader be aware of the scope and substance of Novak'stheory.
I.
The book is very carefully and clearly structured, and this aids thereader enormously in finding his way through an otherwisebewildering territory. For example, the entire book is summarizedin an opening chapter, and each of the sections which followexpands on the concepts introduced in this "overview." Forpresent purposes, the book can be seen as having four suchsections: a philosophical section in which the goals of educationare discussed; a psychological section examining alternative learn-ing theories; a section devoted to issues involved in planningcurriculum and instruction; and, finally, an autobiographicalsection entitled "Empirical Validation," in which the results ofsome twenty years' research in education are called upon toprovide support to the theory. The author's central argument linkseach of these sections into a complete theoretical structure whichis sufficiently complex that only the most outstanding features canbe described here.
Although the theory is built—as Novak insists it must be—arounda theory of learning, its logical foundation is a claim for the goalsand purposes of education. "Every culture," he writes, "has aframework of concepts and practices. The task of education is totransmit to the children in that culture the concepts and practicesthey will need as adults" (p. 17). The argument for this claim, whichis incorporated in an extended analysis of the views of selectedphilosophers of science, can be summarized as follows:
(1) United States federal funding of curriculum development over theDow
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past twenty years has favored projects emphasizing the methods ofinquiry used by the disciplines.(2) This emphasis reflects the views of such philosophers of science asKarl Popper concerning the distinguishing characteristics of thedisciplines.(3) There is an alternative view of the disciplines set out by Kuhn andToulmin—that the disciplines are characterized by their evolvingconceptual frameworks.(4) Popper's view is "outmoded" (p. 54); Kuhn's and Toulmin's are to bepreferred.(5) Federal funding was thus unfortunately misplaced; the goals ofeducation should be to transmit to students the evolving conceptualframeworks present in the culture.
This line of argument raises some important questions which willbe attended to later. For the present, however, let us see how such afoundation enables the construction of the theory proper.
Having established what he regards as appropriate goals for theeducational enterprise, Novak next moves to a consideration of thecentral part of his educational theory—a theory of human learning.He has already stated (in the Preface) his firm belief that learningtheory must occupy the most important place in any theory ofeducation.
An exposition of Ausubel's "assimilation" theory of learningthen follows together with an argument for its place at the center ofa theory of education. His designation of concept learning as theappropriate goal of education makes Ausubel's theory an easychoice, as it places the meaningful learning of concepts in a centralrole. This is, as Novak points out, in marked contrast to theemphasis of behaviorist theories on observable behaviors and onthe contingency of stimulus and response. Once the developmentof conceptual structures is selected as the goal, it is straightforwardto recognize the relevance of Ausubel's theory compared with thatof, say, Gagne. In addition, Novak points out that "many educa-tional issues can be resolved into factors that deal primarily with thequality and extent of progressive differentiation and integrativereconciliation of concepts" (p. 94), two "key ideas" of Ausubel'stheory. Behaviorist theories are dealt with somewhat more sum-marily. Skinner's, for example, whatever its inherent strengths andweaknesses, is held to be "almost useless as a source of guidance indesigning and planning curricula, instruction and research inschools" (p. 70). He goes on to argue that Ausubel's theory issimilarly preferable to those of Piaget or Gagne. Thus, Novak's
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theory of education has both a set of goals and a set of psycho-logical principles to guide toward their attainment. The thirdsection attends to the practical application of these principles forplanning curricula and instruction in schools.
For problems of planning curriculum and instruction, Novakadopts (with little criticism or argument) Johnson's systems modelof these processes. With Johnson, he claims that failure to dis-tinguish clearly issues to do with the curriculum (i. e., content) fromthose of instruction (i. e., teaching approach) amounts to care-lessness, and that the need for such a distinction is supported by hispersonal experiences. He then goes on to demonstrate thatJohnson's model of curriculum and instruction is entirely con-sistent with Ausubel's theory of learning. "No curriculum theoristin the past," he notes, "has shown the relevance of learning theoryin the design of curriculum" (p. 134). His explanation for this issimple: "learning theories that preceded Ausubel's were notparticularly relevant to curriculum" (p. 134).
Thus, Novak's theoretical framework is complete, having goals,principles, and a model for action. The remaining parts of thissection are devoted to the derivation of a large number of detailedcomments and prescriptions concerning a broad range of problemsof educational practice. He is concerned with curriculum planning(e. g., the use of "conceptual schemes" as the basis for a sciencecurriculum), with instructional strategies (e. g., modular coursesand computer-assisted instruction are discussed), and with evalua-tion. Finally, the application of the theory is extended to problemsof school organization and administration.
The fourth and final section of this remarkable book describestwenty years of research in the field of education. It containssummaries of studies conducted by Novak, his students, and hisassocfates, beginning with his own doctoral thesis in 1954 andcontinuing to the present. It is inappropriate here to describe thissection in detail. Its intended function is perhaps best summed upin the author's introductory words: "This chapter will illustrate thatappropriate empirical studies can lead to better educationalpractices; it is the empirical leg of the educational theory presentedin this book" (p. 208). Thus, the "theory of education" is de-veloped, applied, and validated. As noted earlier, the bookrepresents an ambitious undertaking; it is evident also that, as theproduct of a lengthy career in educational research, it cannot belightly dismissed. It is therefore with considerable caution that Iattempt to respond to it.
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II.
In the first part of this review, I have tried to show how Novak'stheory of education develops consistently from its fundamentalclaim for the goals of education. The argument for this claim was setout earlier in five parts, and it is with the last two of these that 1 nowtake issue. They are reproduced here for the convenience of thereader.
4. Popper's view (concerningthe nature of the disciplines) is outmoded;Kuhn's and Toulmin's are to be preferred.5. Federal funding (of curriculum development projects) was thusunfortunately misplaced; the goals of education should be to transmitto students the evolving conceptual frameworks present in the culture.
I argue, first, that differences between the views of Popper andthose of Kuhn and Toulmin are greatly exaggerated; second, thatwhatever the outcome of that debate, no direct conclusion may bedrawn concerning the goals of education; third, that Novak'sselection of goals effectively preempts significant discussion of therelationship between psychology (and other areas of "theory") andeducational practice; and fourth, that Novak seriously under-estimates the responsibility of practitioners to select goals andimplementation procedures, for which they are politically ac-countable. Finally, in the light of these comments, I attempt toreassess the potential contribution of Novak's work to educationalthought and practice.
Issues within the Philosophy of ScienceNovak's cas.e for the goals of education rests, in part, on what heperceives to be a clear dichotomy between two views concerningthe nature of science. One of these (represented, according toNovak, by Karl Popper) characterizes science in terms of its logicand methodology, whereas the other (represented by Kuhn,Elkana, and Toulmin) places its focus on the evolving conceptualframeworks of the discipline.
It seems to me that posing such a dichotomy is unfair both to thephilosophers cited and to the nature of science itself. First, it is byno means clear that Kuhn and Popper are in fact in such a basicdisagreement. Elkana, in a passage quoted by Novak, suggests thatwhile Popper is concerned with the detailed "tactics" of scientificmethod, Kuhn is taking a longer view of the "strategy of science"(Novak, p. 46). Earlier in the same paper, Elkana points out that both
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Popper and Kuhn share an "anti-positivistic philosophy" and that anumber of different philosophers "have each developed a dif-ferent aspect of the new tradition in philosophy of science" (Elkana1970, p. 28). Kuhn himself seems puzzled by attitudes such asNovak's concerning the relationship between his views and thoseof Popper. He (Kuhn) writes: "On almost all the occasions when weturn explicitly to the same problems, Sir Karl's view of science andmy own are very nearly identical" (1970, p. 1). That there are alsoreal and significant differences no careful reader can deny. But tosuggest, as Novak appears to (p. 23), that one of these views is"r ight" and the other "wrong" is at best simplistic and at worst adistortion of the reality.
An alternative and, in my view, more fruitful framework forexamining both the views of Kuhn and Popper and also the natureof the disciplines in general is provided by the British philosopherof education, Paul Hirst. Ina(now) classic paper (1965), he analyzesknowledge into a series of distinct "forms," of which the physicalsciences are one. This analysis is based on what he claims are four"distinguishing features:"
(1) distinctive concepts peculiar to each form;(2) distinctive logical structures;(3) distinctive expressions testable against experience;(4) distinctive techniques for exploring experience and testing ofexpressions, (pp. 128-29)
Such an analysis as this enables us to recognize that whereas Popperchooses to focus chiefly on some features, Kuhn elects to focus onothers, as suggested earlier by Elkana. Furthermore, as Kuhnhimself notes, when both choose to examine the same feature,there is little disagreement. The chief area for disagreement wouldappear to be the ways in which these features correspond to theprofessional practice of scientists as recorded in the history of thediscipline.
Fascinating though such a debate is, space does not permitfurther study of it here, nor of the significant contribution made toit by Toulmin. It is important now to consider how, even if all thephilosophical issues were to be resolved, the outcome of such adiscussion can or should influence the selection of educationalgoals.
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Philosophy of Science and the Selection of Educational GoalsThe hope that the goals of education could be determined by aprocess of rational or scientific inquiry has long been cherished byeducators. Novak's faith in the potential of scientific methods andtheory for improving educational practice is expressed frequentlyin the book, and his remarks quoted at the beginning of this revieware typical. In this respect, his work mirrors that of the compilers ofthe Twenty-Sixth yearbook of the National Society for the Study ofEducation written over fifty years ago. The failure of that enterprisehas been the object of a penetrating analysis by Decker Walker(1975), and his comments of their efforts are apt here also: "Themembers of the Committee attempted to resolve practical disputes—disputes over what should be done about the curriculum—as ifthey were theoretical disputes—disputes over what is true aboutthe curriculum or about the conditions on which it depends"(Walker 1975, p. 4). Novak's book is shot through with instances ofthe same mistaken notion about the nature of educational prob-lems. There is space here to discuss only one of these in more detail.
An argument for a particular set of goals for education is properlyconsidered a practical argument; it is an argument about what todo, rather than about what is the case. As such, to be logicallydefensible, it must follow the canons of practical reasoning (seeGauthier 1963), which require that an argument leading to aprescriptive conclusion must be based on a normative premise(embodying values) and not exclusively on empirical premises. Ihave argued this point at some length elsewhere, particularly as itapplies to the goals of science education (Orpwood 1978), and it isunnecessary to amplify that argument here. It is therefore logicallyindefensible to argue from any one view of the nature of sciencedirectly to a prescription of educational goals. Whatever theoutcome of the debate between Popper, Kuhn, Toulmin, andothers about the nature of science, no direct conclusions can bedrawn for what is appropriate for educational practice.
This is not to say, of course, that the philosophy of science isirrelevant to educational practice or to the selection of educationalgoals. A small but growing body of work in science educationresearch attests to the potential value of perspectives drawn fromthe philosophy of science for illuminating educational practices(see, for example, Roberts and Russell 1975). More particularly, anunderstanding of the nature of the scientific enterprise can suggest
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ways in which the subject matter of science can legitimately beused to a variety of curricular ends. This notion (of subject matter as"vehicle") is explored in general terms by Soltis (1968) andillustrated in the case of science by Roberts (1978). In both of theseinstances, however, claims are made analytically for what can bedone, not normatively for what ought to be done.
The Use of Theory in Educational PracticeThe distinction between the theoretic and the practical, discussedabove, has implications for education which both stretch beyondthe selection of goals, yet are intimately bound up in that process.One of these is the question of how practitioners can use theproducts of educational research in determining their methods ofprocedure.
Research activities in education are most often directed at theoryconstruction and testing, and those described by Novak in the finalsection of his book are typical in this regard. Now theories, asSchwab (1969) and others have pointed out, are necessarily ladenwith biases and assumptions because of the manner of theirmaking. For instance, they are necessarily selective of the phenom-ena they attempt to explain, attending to some aspects of asituation while ignoring others. Furthermore, they are concernedonly with generalizable aspects of a situation rather than with thepeculiar or idiosyncratic. These features of theory constructioninevitably result in theories which are never a true reflection ofreality but which incorporate their own biases.
Practitioners, however, are concerned with concrete unab-stracted realities of learners, classrooms, and subject matter. Theymust make choices among courses of action which take intoaccount the particular and the idiosyncratic in their situation.Under such circumstances the direct (one is tempted to say"mindless") application of a theory (whether of learning, ofknowledge, of society, or of any other aspect of education) is quiteinappropriate, however sound that theory may be. The practitionermust deliberate over multiple possible courses of action, eachperhaps having some theoretical support, and choose (in Schwab'swords) "not the right alternative, for there is no such thing, but thebest one" (1969, p. 21).
From this perspective, one can see that Novak's discussion ofalternative theories of learning, interesting though it is in its ownterms, can be of little direct value to the practitioner. It is only in theD
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context of a particular problematic situation that the actualcontribution of Ausubel's (or Gagne's or Pigat's) theory can beassessed, and even then not in absolute terms but in terms of itsability to suggest a defensible course of action. It should be notedhere that neither the intrinsic merit of Ausubel's learning theorynor its potential to contribute to educational practice is at issue, butits direct and somewhat simplistic application to a wide variety ofeducational problems. Thus one can see how Novak's selection ofeducational goals, which in turn led to his logical adoption ofAusubel's theory, enabled him to sidestep these significant prac-tical difficulties. In deliberation over possible courses of action, ineducation as elsewhere, the goals and the means by which they areattained are inextricably tied together. And this uncomfortable factof educational life leads rapidly to my final criticism of Novak'stheory.
Education and the Political ArtsChoices for public schools of educational goals and of proceduresfor their implementation are, in the final analysis, the responsibilityof practitioners. They are accountable for the adequate fulfillmentof these responsibilities not to any discipline of study, but to localtaxpayers through the latter's elected representatives. It is there-fore inevitable that these choices are to a significant degreepolitical in character as are other matters of public policy.
Such a view of education, though ancient in origin, is only rarelyportrayed in modern educational writing. Aristotle, in his accountof the "master art" of politics, identifies as the paradigmatic case ofa political problem the question of public education.
That education should be regulated by law and should be an affair ofstate is not to be denied, but what should be the character of this publiceducation, and how young persons should be educated, are questionswhich remain to be considered. As things are, there is disagreementabout the subjects. For mankind are by no means agreed about thethings to be taught, whether we look to virtue or the best life. Neither isit clear whether education is more concerned with intellectual or moralvirtue. The existing practice is perplexing; no one knows on whatprinciple we should proceed—should the useful in life, or shouldvirtue, or should the higher knowledge be the aim of our training; allthree opinions have been entertained. (The Politics VIII, 2)
Kirst and Walker (1971), by contrast, note that the leading textbooksin curriculum (at that time) "rarely conceive of their subject inD
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political terms" (p. 481). Rather, they point out, curriculumdecision making is portrayed as being, ideally, a rational-scientificprocess in which political "influences" are considered as "aberra-tions rather than as normal and necessary, if not altogetherdesirable, aspects of public policy making" (p. 482).
Given both this view of the policy making responsibilities ofpractitioners and also of the inherent limitations of theory outlinedearlier, it is clear that while educational theory and research canperhaps assist in the political process, it cannot be a substitute for it.The theoretician must therefore grant to the practitioner theprerogative of making decisions consistent with the demands ofthe local situation. The practitioner should also recognize thatresearch can be of help to him in this process. As deliberationsproceed toward decisions, empirical questions will arise whichresearch can respond to. However, research does practice noservice by attempting to make the decisions itself.
By this point, it should be clear that I consider Novak's theory tohave overstepped the proper role of educational theory in itsattempt to prescribe a "right" course for educational practice.However, the perspective that is adopted here also enables aconstructive reassessment of a useful and important role for worksuch as Novak's. The final section of this review is briefly devoted tosuch a reassessment.
III.
The reader of Novak's book is thus faced with a dilemma: Whatuseful function can be served by this "theory of education"? Onthe one hand, it is commended by its internal logic and consistencyof purpose. Also, there is a foundation of systematic and integrativethought and empirical research that cannot be dismissed. Yet, onthe other, as I have tried to demonstrate, there are formidableproblems of both a theoretical and a practical nature with his claimsfor the theory's applicability to educational practice.
There would appear to be more than one way of approaching aresolution of this dilemma. One could conduct an examination ofvarious types of theory—scientific theories, theories of action,informal theories, among others—with a view to determining whattype of theory Novak has constructed and thus, by analogy, how itmight appropriately be applied and tested. Novak himself seems toD
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take this route when he argues that previous theoretical endeavorsin education have failed "not because 'objective' approaches toeducational problems have been inappropriate but because ourviews of the nature of 'objective truth' and the method of gainingnew knowledge have been distorted" (p. 20). He then goes on todevelop what is, for him, a properly scientific attempt at a theory ofeducation. As I have argued earlier, I consider that such an attemptis founded upon a mistaken notion about the nature of theeducational enterprise. Much has been written about the natureand use of theories, and I do not intend to attempt such an analysishere.
Rather, I suggest that a second look at the political nature of theeducational enterprise can be illuminating. In any political arena,decisions are made on the basis of a consideration of alternativepolicy proposals. In the case of comprehensive sets of policyproposals, these alternatives are also called political "platforms."While talk of policy determination and "platforms" most frequent-ly conjures up images of administrative and budgetary debatesrather than curriculum deliberation, there is no intrinsic reasonwhy the "whats" and "hows" of education should not feature instatements of policy alternatives (cf. Walker 1971). Presently,indeed, such as "back to basics" or "education for jobs," functionas political policy alternatives even if they are crudely formulated.
Serious options for educational decision making appropriatelybacked with argument and empirical evidence are less often setout, and for at least two reasons. One is that the personsresponsible for making such decisions in practice (school basedpersonnel) often have neither the opportunity nor the expertise toformulate a range of alternative proposals themselves. And thepeople having opportunity and expertise (academic researchers)too often see their role exclusively as discovering (ruths abouteducational phenomena rather than as generators of alternativecourses of action (complete with estimates of probable costs andconsequences). This latter role is a familiar one to those who workin government. Educators only rarely, it appears, choose to play it.
From this perspective, I see Novak's work as a model policyproposal. It sets out goals, principles for their achievement, andpractical procedures consistent with these principles, togetherwith supportive empirical evidence. The proposals are thus firmlyrooted in a systematically thought out and researched knowledgebase. Two further things are needed before the educator can useD
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such a policy proposal. One is the recognition by all concerned thatthat is what it is—one alternative proposal for action—not astatement of the truth about the world. The second is a series ofother proposals as carefully and expertly put together as Novak'sbut which are promoting other goals and other means for theirattainment. Armed with both of these, the professional educatorcan then begin to deliberate in a more systematic manner than hecan at present, and, thereby, through more reasoned and de-liberate choice, enable the improvements in educational practice,for which Novak and all his readers are concerned, to take place.
References
Aristotle. The Politics.Elkana, Yehuda. "Science, Philosophy of Science and Science Teaching."
Educational Philosophy and Theory II (1970), 15-35.Gauthier, David. Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963.Hirst, Paul H. "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge." In
Philosophical Analysis and Education, edited by Reginald D. Archam-bault. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965.
Kirst, Michael W., and Walker, Decker F. "An Analysis of CurriculumPolicy-Making." Review of Educational Research XLI, no. 5 (1971),479-509.
Kuhn, Thomas S. "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" InCriticism and the Growth of Knowledge, edited by Imre Lakatos andAlan Musgrave. London: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
Orpwood, Graham W. F. "Determining Objectives through Inquiry: ACritique of Its Logical Basis." Paper presented at the 51st annualmeeting of the National Association for Research in Science Teach-ing, Toronto, April 2, 1978.
Roberts, Douglas A. " 'Curriculum Emphases' in Science Education:Alternate Views About the Role of Science in Schools." In Educationin Science and Science in Education (A collection of papers in honorof Fletcher G. Watson, June 1978). In publication.
Roberts, Douglas A., and Russell, Thomas L. "An Alternative Approach toScience Education Research: Drawing from Philosophical Analysis toExamine Practice." Curriculum Theory Network V, no. 2 (1975),107-25.
Schwab, Joseph J. "The Practical: A Language for Curriculum." SchoolReview LXXVIII, no. 1 (November 1969), 1-23.
Soltis, Jonas F. An Introduction to the Analysis of Educational Concepts.Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968.
Walker, Decker F. "A Naturalistic Model for Curriculum Development."School Review LXXX, no. 1 (1971), 51-65."Straining to Lift Ourselves: A Critique of the Foundations of theCurriculum Field." Curriculum Theory Network V, no. 1 (1975), 3-25.
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