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The True Story of How the Soldiers
Won the Battle and the Generals Lost Iraq in 1991
A Presentation by Douglas Macgregor,
Colonel (ret) U.S. Army Author
10 March 2010 Naval Institute Press, 2009
"The political object is a goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose." Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege
“Why are you stopping?” asked the Republican Guard commander who was now a prisoner of war in the hands of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment. “Why do you not go to Baghdad? You have the power. Your army rules the heavens and the earth…” In a voice filled with more anguish and frustration than fear, my new Iraqi prisoner of war looked me straight in the eye and said in heavily accented English, “Major, you must go to Baghdad and end this. You must save Iraq . . .” . . . Along the 73 Easting in the Iraqi desert 2200 hours, 26 February 1991
28 February 1991 ”The gate's closed… What isn't escaping is heavy tanks, what isn't escaping is artillery pieces… I'm talking about the gate that closed on the war machine that is out there.“ General Norman Schwarzkopf, CDR, U.S. Central Command, 25 March, 1991 “According to the new estimates, which represent a consensus view among CIA, DIA and NSA, about 700 of Iraq's estimated 4,550 tanks in southern Iraq and Kuwait escaped. About 1,430 of Iraq's 2,880 armored personnel carriers are now believed to have escaped... American generals say they have accomplished their mission and show no interest in reopening hostilities.” Michael Gordon with Eric Schmitt, “After the war; much more armor than US believed fled back to Iraq,” The New York Times, 25 March, 1991. 27 March 1991 In addition, the general (Schwarzkopf) said in the interview, major Republican Guard units had "bugged out" before the main attack by American forces and crossed the Euphrates River… When the shooting stopped, the general said, he was "suckered" by Iraqi military commanders who asked for and received permission to fly helicopters over Iraq.”
Patrick E. Tyler, “After the War; Schwarzkopf Says Truce Enabled Iraqis to Escape,” The New York Times, 27 March 1991.
Desert Storm, as the 1991 Gulf War is known, was publicized to the American people and to the world as a total victory and a triumph of American military might.
But the truth was there for anyone interested in finding it.
“The first Bush administration's decision to abandon the March uprising was a mistake of historic proportions. With U.S. help, or even neutrality, the March uprising could have succeeded, thus avoiding the need for a second costly war… An American may understand what happened in 1991 as carelessness – inexcusable, but not malicious. An Iraqi Shiite saw a superpower that called for a rebellion and then ensured its failure.” Peter Galbraith, The Ghosts of 1991, 30 November 2006.
•1 March – April 1991. Postwar Iraqi Uprising crushed by loyalist forces spearheaded by the Iraqi Republican Guard.
•27 August 1992 Operation Southern Watch established.
•7 October 1994. 80,000 Iraqi troops including two veteran Republican Guard divisions move South toward Kuwaiti Border. Madeleine K. Albright tells the UN Security Council “Iraq might soon have some 60,000 troops and 1,000 tanks poised to attack Kuwait.” U.S. responds putting 36,000 troops on planes and setting another 160,000 in motion. (SH plays yo-yo with US)
•1 January 1997 Operation Northern Watch established.
•31 October 1998 President Clinton signs the Iraqi Liberation Act into law. December 1998. Iraq accepts U.N.-sponsored “oil-for-food” program.
•16 December 1998. Operation Desert Fox: a four-day bombing campaign against Iraq. Stated goal: Disrupt Saddam's grip on power. Air strikes by US and UK forces continue weekly into 2001. (7-14 tons per month on average)
•June 2002 – March 2003. Operation Southern Focus. (54.6 tons dropped on Iraq in September 2002)
•16 October 2002. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution enacted.
•20 March 2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom Begins.
Just as World War II began where World War I left off, Operation Iraqi Freedom began where Desert Storm ended in 1991.
“By 2000, Arab leaders realized Saddam was more popular with their subjects than they… Diplomatically, the U.S. was more “in a box” than Iraq.” Angelo Codevilla, Advice to War Presidents, (Basic Books, 2009), page 107.
What people said before 17 January 1991:
“Third U.S. Army Personnel Command estimates VII Corps will take 20,000 casualties in the first five days of fighting the Iraqi Army.” Richard Swain, Lucky War. Third Army in Desert Storm, page 205 “Nobody wanted another Vietnam.” General Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, page 427 “The White House had been accustomed over the years to the military coming in with very large force requirements for contingency plans. This was clearly partly out of caution, but there was also the perception at times it was to dissuade the President from action.” Robert M. Gates, Deputy National Security Advisor, 1990, The Generals’ War, page 154.
“If Saddam withdraws with most of his forces intact, we haven’t really won.” Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor, 1991 from A World Transformed, page 473.
“Franks (LTG, VII Corps CDR) couldn’t make a decision to pee if his pants were on fire.” Unnamed officer quoted by Rick Atkinson in Crusade: The Untold Story of the Gulf War, page 255.
“Iraqi tank crews can fire every 8 to 10 seconds from a static defensive position, but are unable to hit targets beyond 500 meters and nothing that moves.” Lieutenant Colonel (ret), Israeli Defense Force, quoted in Armor Magazine, 1990.
“Attack Iraqi political-military leadership and command and control; gain and maintain air superiority; sever Iraqi supply lines, destroy chemical, biological and nuclear capability; destroy Republican Guard forces in the Kuwaiti Theater; liberate Kuwait.” U.S. Central Command Operations Order 91-001, 17 January 1991
“Pin (the Iraqi Republican Guard) with their backs against the sea, then, go in and wipe them out… Once they’re gone be prepared to continue the attack to Baghdad.” General Norman Schwarzkopf, November 1990.
U.S. and Iraqi Land Forces January –
February 1991:
Iraqi ground forces in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (South of the Euphrates River) included 540,000 troops organized into 12 armored and 30 other divisions including 4550 tanks plus 2,880 armored fighting vehicles (most with 1960s-vintage Soviet and Chinese equipment). 80,000 man Iraqi Republican Guard Corps equipped with 1970 era Soviet tanks, BMPs and artillery. By 21 February 1991 when U.S. and allied ground forces attack into Iraq, Iraqi forces South of the Euphrates were reduced through air attack and desertion to 280,000 troops.
On 21 February 1991, Coalition forces numbered 840,000 men and nearly 8,000 tanks. U.S. ground forces consisted of 116,000 soldiers in the XVIII Airborne Corps, 110,000 soldiers in the VII Corps and 107,000 Marines. The VII Corps, under LTG Frederick Franks Jr., was deployed to the right of XVIII Airborne Corps and consisted of the 1st Infantry Division (mechanized), 1st and 3rd Armored divisions, the British 1st Armored. Div., the U.S. 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment and the U.S. 11th Aviation Brigade.
Limit of Advance on 24 Feb. 1991 at 1700 hours
Limit of Advance on 24 Feb. 1991 at 1000 hours
Limit of Advance on 23 Feb. 1991 at 1500 hours
PL MILLER
PL LONESTAR
PL LITE
PL CORONA
PL COORS
PL COLT
PL BUSCH
PL BUD
PL HARPS
PL BECKS
PL DIXIE
OBJ GATES
OBJ MAY OBJ
MERREL
OBJ FEUCHT Redfox Forward
Reconnaissance Element
Cougar Battlegroup (Main Body)
2nd Cavalry in the VII Corps Attack Across
Southern Iraq
23-24 February 1991
Republican Guard
Limit of Advance on 25 Feb. 1991 at 1000 hours.
PL Blacktop
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
Basrah
Kuwait City
X X
X X
X X UK
PL TANGERINE
2
3
1
1 1
XX
XX
II
II
(3rd Armored Division)
(1st British Armored Division)
(Cougar)
(1st Infantry Division (mechanized))
PL LIME; Planned limit of Advance for the 2nd Cavalry.
X TAW
52nd BRIGADE OF 52nd
ARMORED DIVISION
IRAQI ARMY
X
TAWALKANA REPUBLICAN
GUARD BRIGADE
(Wolfpack)
(War Eagle)
3
Rear Guard Covering Iraqi
Republican Guard Corps Withdrawal
Plan resulting from decision by LTG Franks late on 25 February to move 2nd Cavalry back into the fight
on 26 February.
Cougar Battle Group Combat Power Soldiers - 1,100 M1A1 Abrams Tanks – 42 Armored Fighting Vehicles (Bradleys) – 41 155mm Self Propelled Howitzers – 8 4.2” Mortars mounted in M113s – 6 M113A2 – 12
Republican Guard Brigade Combat Power Soldiers – 2,100 to 2,300 (estimated) T-72 Tanks – 70 (estimated since tanks from retreating units mixed in during fighting) Armored Fighting Vehicles (all types) – 80+ Artillery Systems (all types) – 20+ Trucks – 40-50
Versus
Ghost Troop
Eagle Troop
Fox Troop
Hawk Company
II
XX
I
Cougar Squadron in the Box Formation on 26 February 1991
Direction of Movement toward
73 Easting
Ten Kilometer Zone of attack.
Box Formation was ten
kilometers deep.
Dragoon Base issued a new fragmentary order (FRAGO) around 0522 hours to the regiment: “2nd ACR [Armored Cavalry Regiment] attacks East to fix Tawalkana Mechanized Division; on order, 1 ID [1st Infantry Division] passes through 2nd ACR to continue the attack East… acknowledge, over!”
“Cougar 32,” I said very slowly and deliberately, “be careful what you report to Dragoon. Be accurate, but don’t give Dragoon Base an excuse to stop us, over.”
MINES
MINES
3AD XX
2nd Cavalry
3 T72 13 BMP
1 T72 1 BMP
3AD XX
2nd Cavalry
17 T72 18 BMP
00
05
59 68 73
Cougar II
Wolfpack
Eagle Troop destroys battalion +
and consolidates along 73 Easting 1645-1700 hrs.
Ghost 3rd Platoon Scouts Arrive 1620 hrs. 2nd Platoon Tanks attack at
1630.
Situation between 1600 and 1700 hours
3 T72s Forward Line of Troops along the 73 Easting 1645
hrs.
1618 hrs Eagle Troop Punches Right to attack main defense.
Ghost Troop
2 T72 Ghost 1st
Platoon Scout Section
destroys T72s in sandstorm
1640 hrs Eagle Troop Smashes through Brigade
Defense to 73 Easting
1618 hrs Cougar attacks East
toward 70 Easting
MINES
MINES
Eagle Troop
29 T72 2 T55 11 BMP 3 MTLB 1 SA13
Ghost Troop
Eagle Troop
Fox Troop
ll
Hawk Company
2nd Squadron
3rd Squadron Iron Troop
Forty minutes after Eagle Troop attacks, Iron Troop attacks to 73
Easting, then falls back behind 70 Easting, 2nd Cavalry Limit of
Advance.
Note: Caisson Battery’s Gun Platoons were
positioned immediately behind Ghost and Eagle
Troops.
Actual Cougar Deployment along
the 73 Easting from 1643 to 0600
hrs
2nd Cavalry’s Limit of Advance 1700 hrs 26 Feb to 0600 hrs 27
Feb along the 70 Easting
Heavy Black Line Marks Cougar
Squadron’s Positions Along the 73 Easting
after 1700 hours 26 February
3rd Armored Division Zone of Attack
N
E
73 Easting
Mortars
Ghost FIST (Deskevich)
Blue 1 (Hanes)
Ghost 5 (Mecca)
Ghost 6 (Sartiano)
Green 1 (Kinsley)
COLT
White 1 (Kilgore)
BMP Bunker
BMP Bunker
(1700 hrs)
Actions in Ghost Troop Zone of Attack along the 73 Easting 1700 to 2100
hours, 26 February 1991 Eagle Troop
Counterattack
Bradley Fighting Vehicle with Scout
Squad
Abrams Tank
73 Easting
(SFC Newman)
73 Easting
70 Easting, 2nd Cavalry
Limit of Advance
4 T 72 tanks, 10 BMPs + BRDMS
Red 1 (Garwick)
“In ten years, we’ll be back.” The Soldiers of Cougar Squadron, 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment in May 1991.
“Each service was allowed to attack the way it preferred, with little thought about how an attack in one area would affect the fighting in another. Schwarzkopf yielded too unthinkingly to the Marines’ demand that they be given a major piece of the war and accepted more than he would later acknowledge Franks’ mindset that the Iraqis were a determined enemy that was prepared to stand and fight.” Lieutenant General “Mick Trainor” and Michael Gordon, The Generals’ War, page 432.
Cougar Squadron destroyed 93 Enemy tanks in its zone of attack along with a hundred armored fighting vehicles and trucks. After the battle, more than 500 Republican Guards surrendered. How many died is unknown, but at least 1,100 is a reasonable estimate.
Cougar Squadron lost one Bradley Fighting Vehicle to enemy fire, one man killed and two wounded. NOTE: VII Corps used less than 15 percent of the 70,000 tons of ammunition at its disposal.
Tactical Outcome Strategic Outcome
“Measured in 2010 dollars, the Korean War cost $393,000 per year for every person deployed. And the Vietnam conflict cost $256,000. By contrast, the Iraq and Afghanistan commitments have cost $792,000 per year per person.” Carl Conetta, “The Pentagon’s Runaway Defense Budget,” AntiWar.com, 4 March 2010 “When Lieutenant General William Wallace, Cdr of the U.S. Army’s V Corps, and Major General David H. Petraeus, Cdr of the 101st Airborne Division met on 27 March 2003 at a site near Najaf, only five days after American forces began the attack to Baghdad, the generals were deeply pessimistic. As far as they were concerned, ‘the war was in dismal shape.’ ”
Rick Atkinson, Peter Baker and Thomas E. Ricks, “Confused Start, Decisive End,” Washington Post, April 13, 2003, page A01.
“The American people don’t fully realize what’s going on,” said the 27 year old Staff Sergeant from Buffalo, New York. “They just know back home what the higher-ups here tell them. But the higher-ups don’t go anywhere, and actually they only go to the safe places, places with a little bit of gunfire. They don’t ever (expletive deleted) see what we see on the ground.” Joshua Partlow, “I Don’t Think This Place is Worth Another Soldier’s Life,” The Washington Post, 27 October 2007, page A10. “Cash is my most important weapon in the war on terror.” General David Petraeus, Commander, U.S. Central Command
Desert Storm’s Military Legacy
Sergeant Nels Andrew Moller,
Ghost Troop, 2nd Squadron, 2nd
Armored Cavalry Regiment
killed 26 February 1991.
The battle of 73 Easting offers conclusive evidence that a much more aggressive advance across Southern Iraq by the Army’s VII Corps would have cut off any attempted retreat by the Republican Guard Divisions leading to their destruction or surrender in a larger corps-size battle on the model of Cougar Squadron’s fight along the 73 Easting, solving many of America’s geopolitical concerns without occupying Iraq. Understanding why Desert Storm failed to achieve its true strategic aims in 1991 and why operations since 2001 in Afghanistan and Iraq have been frustrating and expensive, means grasping the difference between the soldier who fights and the generals who command: No amount of courage and competence at the soldier’s level can compensate for deficiencies of leadership and character at the general officer level.
“The distant rear of an army engaged in battle is not the best place from which to judge correctly what is going on in front.”
General U.S. Grant, Memoirs of U.S. Grant, page 152.
Desert Storm’s Military Legacy (continued)