The Structural Causes of Japan’s Low TFP Growth...The Structural Causes of Japan’s Low TFP Growth Prepared for a seminar at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia‐Pacific Research Center,

The Structural Causes of Japan’s Low TFP Growth

Prepared for a seminar at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia‐Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, April 27, 2016

Kyoji Fukao(Hitotsubashi University)

1

Motivation

• Although Japan had largely resolved the problem of banks’ non‐performing loans and firms’ damaged balance sheets by the early 2000s, productivity growth hardly accelerated, resulting in what now are “two lost decades.”

• This presentation examines the underlying reasons of Japan’s low TFP growth from a long‐term and structural perspective using a industry‐level database and micro‐level data.

2

0

10

20

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40

50

60

70

1947

1950

1953

1956

1959

1962

1965

1968

1971

1974

1977

1980

1983

1986

1989

1992

1995

1998

2001

2004

2007

2010

US dollars in 2012 prices

United States, gross value added per hour worked, US dollars in 2012prices

Japan, gross value added per hour worked, converted into US dollars in2012 prices using 2012 PPP (106.0 yen/dollar)

Japan, gross value added per hour worked, converted into US dollars in2012 prices using market exchange rate of 2012 (79.8 yen/dollar)

Labor Productivity Level: US‐Japan Comparison

3

Japan’s catch‐up in labor productivity stopped around 1990. The main reason is the slowdown in Japan’s TFP growth from 1990.

Source: OECD.Stat

Motivation (Contd.)

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

TFP level of the manufacturing sectorassuming that the TFP growth rate after 1991had been the same as the average annual TFPgrowth rate in 1970-1991.Manufacturing

Non-manufacturing (market economy)

Motivation (Contd.)Both the manufacturing and the non‐manufacturing sector are responsible for the decline in macro TFP growth after 1991.

4Notes: TFP values are on a value-added basis. The non-manufacturing sector (market economy) does not include imputed rent for owner-occupied dwellings.Source: JIP Database 2013.

According to recent work by Jorgenson, Nomura, and Samuels (forthcoming), Japan’s catching‐up to the US in terms of TFP stopped in many sectors.

5

Source: Jorgenson, Nomura, and Samuels (forthcoming).

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

19.Motor Vehicles

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

29. Wholesale and Retail

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

11.Chemical Products

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

17. Computer and Electronic Products

0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.41.61.82.0

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

27.Communications

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

33.Medical Care

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

14.Primary Metal

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

18. Other Electrical Machinery

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

3.Construction

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

34. Other Service

0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.41.61.82.0

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

1.Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery(US)

(Japan)

(Productitivy Level in the U.S. in 1955=1.0)

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

16.Machinery

Motivation (Contd.)

1. Slowdown of TFP Growth in the Manufacturing Sector

2. Why Was Japan Left Behind in the ICT Revolution

3. Increase of Part‐Time Workers

4. Policies Needed for Productivity Growth

Structure of the Presentation

6

7

From 1990 onward, the within effect steadily declined and the negative exit effect expanded (that is, productive factories were shut down, while less productive factories remained). These two trends reduced TFP growth in the manufacturing sector substantially.


-1.0%

-0.5%

0.0%

0.5%

1.0%

1.5%

2.0%

2.5%

3.0%

1981-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005

Within effectReallocation effectEntry effectExit effectAnnual TFP growth rate

Decomposition of TFP Growth in the Manufacturing Sector(Annual Rate, %)

Productivity Dynamics in the Manufacturing Sector

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000

Average TFPgrowthTop quantile interms of salesSecondquantileThird quantile

Why Did the Within Effect Decline?

8

• In the manufacturing sector, the TFP growth of large firms has actually accelerated. Small and medium‐sized firms (SMEs) have been left behind (Fukao and Kwon 2006).

Possible reasons: (a) SMEs left behind in R&D and internationalization(in Japan, the R&D intensity of SMEs is much lower than that of larger firms)(b) decrease in technology spillovers from large firms.

TFP Growth by Factory Size (Annual Growth Rate, %)

9

Japan’s leading export industries, such as automobiles, have relocated production abroad. And probably because of this and other factors such as restructuring at large assemblers, buyer‐supplier relationships in the automobile industry in Japan have become more open (Ikeuchi et al. 2015).

Hollowing‐Out Problem

05

101520253035404550

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

trill

ion

yen

Imports, Exports and Production Abroad of Transportation Machinery

Imports

Exports

Production abroad

Communication equipment

Motor vehicles

Electronic parts

Pharmaceutical products

Motor vehicle parts and accessories

Glass and its products

Electronic data processing machines and electronic

equipment

Miscellaneous electrical machinery equipment

Beverages

Household electric appliances

-1.2%

-1.0%

-0.8%

-0.6%

-0.4%

-0.2%

0.0%

0.2%

0.4%

-30% -20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40%

Gross output increase by Japanese MNEs in Asia: 1990-2002/Total gross output in Japan: 1990

Exit effect: 1990-2003Overseas Production and the Exit Effect at Home

10

There is a statistically significant negative correlation between the industry‐level exit effect and industry‐level gross output growth by Japanese multinational enterprises (MNEs) in Asia. MNEs have higher productivity than non‐MNEs (Fukao 2012) and many of them have relocated, or are relocating, production activities abroad.

Why Was the Exit Effect Negative?

11

‐1.50%

‐1.00%

‐0.50%

0.00%

0.50%

1.00%

1.50%

Shiz

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Entry effect

Exit effect

Reallocation effect

Within effect

TFP growth

The large negative exit effect appears to be mainly concentrated in industrial districts in prefectures such as Kanagawa, Tokyo, and Osaka. The closure of productive factories, most of which are owned by R&D-intensive firms, potentially reduced geographical spillovers to SMEs in these districts (Belderbos et al. 2013).

Decomposition of TFP Growth in the Manufacturing Sector: By Prefecture, 1997-2007






12

2. Why Was Japan Left Behind in the ICT RevolutionComparison of the sources of labor productivity growth in Japan and the United States after 1990 shows that Japan’s labor productivity growth was lower than that of the US because of Japan’s slow ICT capital deepening and lower TFP growth. (Jorgenson, Nomura, and Samuels 2015 report similar results for the period 1991‐2012.) On the other hand, non‐ICT capital deepening and labor quality improvements were swifter in Japan than the US.

13

Japan-US Comparison of Sources of Labor Productivity Growth (annual rate, %)

Sources: JIP Database 2014 and EU KLEMS ISIC Rev. 3, March 2011 Update.

Japan: 1990-2010 US: 1990-2007Labor productivity growth 1.8 2.4 Contibution of ICT capital deepning 0.4 0.8 Contibution of non-ICT capital deepning 0.5 0.3 Contribution of labor quality improvement 0.5 0.3 Contribution of TFP growth 0.4 1.1

2. Why Was Japan Left Behind in the ICT Revolution (Contd.)

ICT‐capital deepening in Japan was much slower than in the US in all sectors. The slower ICT‐capital deepening in distribution and total manufacturing, excluding electrical machinery, probably is an especially serious problem. The reason is that these are ICT‐intensive sectors and the main engine of the ICT revolution in the US. In the US, the TFP growth rates of these sectors accelerated from the mid‐1990s.

14

Japan-US Comparison of Contribution of ICT-Capital Deepening to Labor Productivity Growth by Sector (annual rate, %)


Japan: 1990-2010 US: 1990-2007ICT goods and services 1.0 1.7Total manufacturing, excluding electrical 0.4 0.6Production of other goods 0.1 0.3Distribution 0.2 0.7Finance and business, excluding real estate 0.9 1.4Personal services 0.1 0.2Market economy 0.4 0.8

Japan: 1990-2010 US: 1990-2007Each sector's labor input share in thetotal market economy in Japan(1990-2010 average, %)

ICT goods and services 6.4 6.5 5.0Total manufacturing, excluding electrical 0.3 1.1 21.0Production of other goods -1.2 -1.1 18.8Distribution 0.7 2.4 25.8Finance and business, excluding real estate -0.3 -0.4 13.9Personal services -0.6 0.5 15.6Market economy 0.4 1.1 100.0


In distribution and total manufacturing, excluding electrical machinery, TFP growth in the US after 1990 was much higher than in Japan.

15

Japan-US Comparison of TFP Growth by Sector (annual rate, %)



16

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.019

7019

7119

7219

7319

7419

7519

7619

7719

7819

7919

8019

8119

8219

8319

8419

8519

8619

8719

8819

8919

9019

9119

9219

9319

9419

9519

9619

9719

9819

9920

0020

0120

0220

0320

0420

0520

0620

0720

0820

09

UKUSItalyGermanyJapan

ICT Investment-Gross Value Added Ratio in Major Developed Economies: Distribution Services

It appears that the ICT revolution did not happen in Japan simply because Japan has not accumulated sufficient ICT capital (Fukao 2013).

Source: EU KLEMS Database, Rolling Updates.

91.1 91.083.1 80.3

90.698.2

75.966.2

59.673.6

40.533.3

20.3

57.4 60.5

6.7 3.27.9 12.5

8.91.3

16.226.6 34.2

23.3

56.9

53.7

58.3

33.3 31.0

1.61.6 5.2 3.7

0.2 0.43.6 3.2 5.1 3.1 0.6

8.8

10.0

5.6 4.00.6 4.2 3.7 3.4 0.3 0.1 4.3 4.1 1.1 2.0 4.1

11.33.7 4.5

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Prim

ary

indu

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Che

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etal

and

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Mac

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Oth

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hold

serv

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Established after 2002

Established in 1997-2001

Established in 1975-1996

Established before 1974

We can point out many important structural impediments to ICT investment in Japan (Fukao, Ikeuchi, Kim, and Kwon 2015).1. One of the main contributions of the introduction of ICT is that it

allows firms to save unskilled labor input. However, because of the high job security in Japan, it may be difficult for firms to actually cut jobs.

17

2. Why Was Japan Left Behind in the ICT Revolution (contd.)

2. Young and growing firms tend to be more active in ICT investment. However, because of the low entry and exit rates in Japan, firms that have been around for 40 years or more have a majority of market share in most industries.

Sales Share by Firm Age Group

3. In Japan, the market for business process outsourcing (BPO), which includes outsourcing of ICT processes, is not well developed (METI 2014). Access to efficient vendors of ICT services is a key factor for smaller firms’ procuring ICT input at a reasonable price. Moreover, because of the life‐time employment system, ICT experts in Japan tend to prefer working in large firms (NISTEP 1993). These two factors make ICT input more expensive for smaller firms.

Source: Fukao, Ikeuchi, Kim, and Kwon (2015).The underdevelopment of the BPO market in Japan is closely related with the rigidity of the labor market. Since it is difficult for Japanese firms to lay off workers, Japanese firms hesitate to restructure costly internal business process divisions. Moreover, even when they restructure such divisions, they often relocate workers in such divisions to affiliates or firms in the same business group and procure business process services from the firms to which they transferred former employees. Because of these constraints, Japanese firms cannot procure business services from the most productive vendors, reducing the benefit of BPO and keeping the BPO market underdeveloped (Fukao, Ikeuchi, Kim, and Kwon 2015). 18


Number of employees ICT input / VA (%)Median Median

Group_EMP1 (largest) 1,783 3.8Group_EMP2 472 2.8Group_EMP3 201 2.2Group_EMP4 89 1.9

Total 307 2.6

Group

4. The supply of ICT software experts in Japan is much smaller than that in the United States (Arora, Branstetter, and Drev 2011).

5. The scarcity of ICT software experts and the less developed market for outsourcing of ICT processes likely make ICT input prices in Japan more expensive for smaller than for larger firms. Moreover, such small firms are much more prevalent in Japan than in the United States in most sectors.

19


Firm size (No. of employees)(a) 1 to 4 1,574,110 5% 6,262,490 5% 625,195 11% 1,101,567 4%(b) 5 to 9 1,993,335 6% 7,274,534 6% 415,987 7% 1,569,985 6%(c) 10 to 19 2,736,690 9% 8,794,210 7% 628,979 11% 2,064,520 8%(d) 20 to 49 4,188,269 13% 12,260,057 10% 669,467 12% 2,942,955 12%(e) 50 to 99 3,166,835 10% 8,868,873 7% 341,953 6% 1,870,352 7%(f) 100 to 249 4,144,598 13% 10,497,066 9% 422,022 8% 1,638,001 6%(g) 250 to 499 2,794,966 9% 6,762,233 6% 339,030 6% 929,095 4%(h) 500 to 999 2,573,958 8% 6,063,319 5% 353,124 6% 794,140 3%(i) 1000+ 8,935,484 28% 52,125,133 44% 1,780,906 32% 12,524,996 49%Total 32,108,245 118,907,915 5,576,663 25,435,611Note) Japan: Establishment and Enterprise Census for 2001 and 2006, USA: Business Dynamics Statistics

All industries

2006 2006Japan United States

RetailJapan United States2006 2006

Source: Fukao, Ikeuchi, Kim, and Kwon (2015).

6. In addition, ICT input prices in Japan are higher than in the United States.

Japan‐US ICT Service Price Comparison for 2012

Source: Fukao, Ikeuchi, Kim, and Kwon (2015). The original data are from METI, The Survey on Foreign and Domestic Price Differentials for Industrial Intermediate Input 2012.

20


Relative price: Japan/USTelephone call (within city) 1.62Telephone call (400 km) 3.56Minimum charge for telephone line (business use) 0.99Telephone call (international ) 9.54High-speed digital leased line 4.05International leased line 7.94Minimum charge for ADSL internet connection 1.09Cellular phone call charge (one minute) 3.56Cellular phone monthly fee (packaged plan) 2.92Packaged software (average cost to purchase 100 sets of Windows Vista, Word 2007, and Excel 2007) 2.27Outsourcing of payroll accounting 2.56

7. In order to avoid changes in corporate structure, employment adjustment, and training of workers, Japanese firms tend to choose custom software rather than packaged software, making ICT investment more expensive and network externality effects smaller, because each firm uses different custom software.

21


‐1.0

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

Austria

Belgium

Czech Repu

blic

Denm

ark

Finland

France

Germ

any

Ireland

Italy

Nethe

rland

s

Sovenia

Spain

Swed

en

Unite

d Kingdo

m

Unite

d States

Japan

TFP

Labor composition

Tangibles

Intangibles

Labor productivity growth

Source: Corrado et al. (2012) and Miyagawa and Hisa (2012).

Contribution to the growth in output per hour: 1995 to 2007 (annual rate, %)

22

8. ICT capital and intangible assets are close complements.The contribution of intangible investment to labor productivity growth in Japan is the lowest among the major developed countries. Japan invests a lot in R&D but very little in non‐R&D intangibles.







23

010203040506070 GDP per working hour in 2014: Converted

into US dollars using 2010 PPP

• According to the PIACC, average labor quality in Japan is quite high. But GDP per working hour is much lower than other developed economies.

• Moreover, in the PIACC, many workers indicate that they do not have the opportunity to use their skills in their job.

• Japan does not seem to use its high quality labor efficiently.

Source: Results of PIACC, OECD Skills Outlook 2013.

Source: OECD.Stat

220.00230.00240.00250.00260.00270.00280.00290.00300.00 Literacy proficiency among 16‐65 year olds

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

Non‐manufacturing (non‐market economy)Non‐manufacturing (market economy)ManufacturingPrimary sector

Many firms increased the percentage of part‐time workers in total workers and do not provide intensive training in the case of part‐time workers. This change reduced training expenditure substantially.

25

Percentage of Part-Time Workers by Sector


0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

15‐19 20‐24 25‐29 30‐34 35‐39 40‐44 45‐49 50‐54 55‐59 60‐64 65‐69 70‐

Labor Force Paticipation Rate by Age and Status in Employement: Male (%, 2013)

Regular employees Non‐regular employees Other

The percentage of non‐regular employees is increasing among young male workers. Most aged male workers are not regular employees.

26Source: Labour Force Survey.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

15‐19 20‐24 25‐29 30‐34 35‐39 40‐44 45‐49 50‐54 55‐59 60‐64 65‐69 70‐

Labor Force Paticipation Rate by Age and Status in Employment: Female (%, 2013)

Regular employees Non‐regular employees Other

Most female workers work as non‐regular employees.

27Source: Labour Force Survey.

28

• It seems that firms are increasing the number of part‐time workers in order to maintain the flexibility of employment levels.

• Given the decline of the working age population and economic stagnation, most firms cannot expect their need for employees to steadily increase, as was the case during the high‐speed growth era. At the same time, areas in which individual firms have a competitive advantage over their rivals are changing quickly and Japan’s comparative advantage as whole is also changing over time.

• Given the high job security provided under traditional employment practices, increasing the reliance on part‐time workers is almost the only way for firms to keep both the level and the mix of employment flexible.

Why is the percentage of part‐time workers increasing so rapidly in many industries in Japan?

29

• In order to examine whether firms employ part‐time workers simply to take advantage of lower wage rates or to gain more flexibility in their workforce, Fukao et al. (2006) estimated both the marginal productivity of part‐time workers in comparison with that of regular workers and the compensation of part‐time workers in comparison with that of regular workers, using employer‐employee matched data at the factory level.

• They found that the productivity gap between part‐time workers and regular workers is larger than the wage gap. This means that firms pay a premium to part‐time workers in order to obtain flexibility of employment.

• Such behavior by firms is quite rational in the context of slow economic growth and Japan’s system of high job security. However, at the same time it may also be creating a huge economic loss by reducing human capital accumulation.

Increase of Part‐Time Workers and Accumulation of Human Capital






30


Since the 1990s, some core characteristics of Japanese firms, such as tight customer‐supplier relationships and the life‐time employment system, have become obstacles to their TFP growth in an environment shaped by globalization and slow/negative growth in the working age population.

31

4. Policies Needed for Productivity Growth (Contd.)

• More rapid restructuring of firms left behind in innovation and internationalization, through M&A and other measures.

• Promotion of entrepreneurs and startups.• Promotion of startup of domestic establishments by Japanese

multinationals through improvement of regional logistics, FTAs, reduction of corporate taxes, etc.)← Hollowing‐out problem also hampers real wage increases in Japan.

• Promotion of ICT and intangible investment. ← It seems that this problem is closely related to the rigidity of Japan’s labor market.

• Restructuring of the labor market (improvement of social safety net, enhancement of labor market liquidity, reduction of unfair gaps between regular and part‐time workers).

32

ReferencesArora, A., L. G. Branstetter, and M. Drev (2011) “Going Soft: How the Rise of Software Based

Innovation Led to the Decline of Japan’s IT Industry and the Resurgence of Silicon Valley,” Global COE Hi‐Stat Discussion Paper Series, No. 199, Hitotsubashi University.

Belderbos, Rene, Kenta Ikeuchi, Kyoji Fukao, Young Gak Kim, and Hyeog Ug Kwon (2013) "Plant Productivity Dynamics and Private and Public R&D Spillovers: Technological, Geographic and Relational Proximity," CEI Working Paper Series 2013‐05, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.

Fukao, Kyoji (2012) The Structural Causes of Japan’s “Two Lost Decades”: Forging a New Growth Strategy, Nikkei Publishing Inc., Tokyo (in Japanese).

Fukao, Kyoji (2013) “Explaining Japan’s Unproductive Two Decades,” Asian Economic Policy Review, vol. 8(2), pp. 193‐213.

Fukao, Kyoji, Ryo Kambayashi, Daiji Kawaguchi,Hyeog Ug Kwon, Young Gak Kim, and Izumi Yokoyama (2006) “Deferred Compensation: Evidence from Employer‐Employee Matched Data from Japan,” Hi‐Stat Discussion Paper Series, no. 187, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.

Fukao, Kyoji, Ikeuchi Kenta, Young Gak Kim, and Hyeog Ug Kwon (2015) “Why Was Japan Left Behind in the ICT Revolution?” RIETI Discussion Paper Series 15‐E‐043.

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Fukao Kyoji and Hyeog Ug Kwon (2006) “Why Did Japan’s TFP Growth Slow Down in the Lost Decade? An Empirical Analysis Based on Firm‐Level Data of Manufacturing Firms,” Japanese Economic Review, vol.57(2), pp.195‐228.

Ikeuchi Kenta, Kyoji Fukao, Hiromichi Goko, Young Gak Kim, and Hyeog Ug Kwon (2015) “Empirical Analysis on the Openness of Buyer‐Supplier Relationships and Productivity in the Japanese Automobile Parts Industry,” RIETI Discussion Paper Series 15‐J‐017 (in Japanese).

Jorgenson, Dale W., Koji Nomura, and Jon D. Samuels (2015) “A Half Century of Trans‐Pacific Competition: Price Level Indices and Productivity Gaps for Japanese and U.S. Industries, 1955‐2012,” RIETI Discussion Paper Series RIETI Discussion Paper Series 15‐E‐054.

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35

図 2：1次サプライヤーの取引先完成車メーカー数

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

5‐8社

2‐4社

1社

出所：『納入マトリックス』Source: Ikeuchi, Fukao, Goko, Kim and Kwon (2015)

36

出所：『納入マトリックス』Source: Ikeuchi, Fukao, Goko, Kim and Kwon (2015)

図 3：品目種別部品メーカー１社あたり納入先完成車メーカー数の平均値

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

5.0

1989 1993 1997 2001 2004 2007 2010

全部品

エンジン部品

電気・電装部品

駆動・伝動部品

懸架・制動部品

車体部品

37

図 5：取引先完成車メーカー数別自動車部品メーカーのTFP指数（対数、1988年取引先完成車メーカー数＝0）

0.000

0.050

0.100

0.150

0.200

0.250

0.300

0.350

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

5‐9社

2‐4社

1社

0社

出所：『工業統計調査』と『納入マトリックス』の接合データ注）自動車部品製造業に属する工場の全要素生産性（TFP）の平均値。完成車メーカーとの取引がない企業の工場のTFPの1988年における平均値を基準とした指数。Source: Ikeuchi, Fukao, Goko, Kim and Kwon (2015)

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The Structural Causes of Japan’s Low TFP Growth...The Structural Causes of Japan’s Low TFP Growth Prepared for a seminar at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia‐Pacific Research Center,