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The Role of Non-State Actors in the International Climate Change Negotiations: Understanding Agency through Functionality Profiles Naghmeh Nasiritousia, Mattias Hjerpea, and Björn-Ola Linnéra a Centre for Climate Science and Policy Research, Linköping University, Nya Kåkenhus, SE-601 74, Norrköping, Sweden

naghmeh.nasiritousi@liu.se, + 46 11 36 34 97

mattias.hjerpe@liu.se, +46 11 36 34 38

Abstract Globalization processes have rendered non-state actors as an integral part of global governance. The extensive body of literature that has examined non-state actor involvement in global governance has focused mainly on whether and how non-state actors can influence states. Less attention has been paid to the power structures of non-state actors to answer questions about which non-state actors are most successful in exercising authority, and more precisely what governance functions non-state actors are perceived to fulfil. These questions are important in assessing what the efficiency and distributive effects of greater participation by non-state actors in international negotiations are. Using unique survey material from COP-17, we propose that different categories of non-state actors have diverse functionality profiles and that these can vary in strength from strong to weak. We further suggest that the different functionality profiles are derived from particular power sources and that agency is a function of these profiles. The study thereby contributes to two strands in the literature: one theoretical focusing on the rise in authority of non-state actors in international climate change governance and the other pertaining to the rather under-researched development of methods to study non-state actor involvement. Key words: non-state actors, climate change, global environmental governance, legitimacy Work in progress, all comments welcome! To be presented at the ECPR Graduate Conference, Bremen, Germany, 4th - 6th July 2012.

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1 Introduction

Globalization processes have rendered non-state actors as an integral part of global

governance. As has been witnessed ‒ not least in global climate governance ‒ a

growing number of non-state actors participate at global conferences and authority is

increasingly exercised by non-state actors in the implementation of international treaties

and decisions (Andonova et al 2009; Bäckstrand 2008; Auer 2000). With the

international climate change negotiations continuing to be locked into inadequate levels

of commitments by states (UNEP 2010), non-state actors are expected to play a more

pronounced role. This development has widely been perceived as a way of increasing

not only efficiency, but also legitimacy, in global governance.

However, with non-state actors operating at the domestic, international and

transnational levels, it is important to understand factors that contribute to different

levels of authority for different actors. The extensive body of literature that has

examined non-state actor involvement in global governance has focused mainly on

whether and how non-state actors can influence states (Betsill and Corell 2001; Newell

2000). Less attention has been paid to the power structures of non-state actors to answer

questions about which non-state actors are most successful in exercising authority in

global governance, and more precisely what governance functions non-state actors are

perceived to fulfil.

In this paper we examine the implications of the “participatory turn” in global

environmental governance (Bäckstrand 2006) and argue that greater attention be

directed at the question of who is participating and to what capacity. While

acknowledging that non-state actors are not a homogenous group, many studies either

discuss the role of non-state actors1 in general terms, or generalize based on case studies

of one type of non-state actors (Betsill and Corell 2001; Fisher and Green 2004; Scholte

2002). This implies that systematic comparison of perceptions of the authority and

functions across groups of non-state actors is largely lacking. In addition, the role of

other actor categories – such as local government associations, indigenous groups and

trade unions – has received less attention. This is significant as non-state actors play a

range of roles and, in the words of Keck and Sikkink (1999: 99), “to understand how

change occurs in the world polity we have to unpack the different categories of

1 Other terms used in studies are civil society actors, non-governmental organizations or stakeholders. Here we use the term non-state actor to mean any group that is not a sovereign state, while excluding armed groups.

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transnational actors, and understand the quite different logic and process in these

different categories”. In sum, to date research has not offered a sufficient analysis for

the comparative advantage of certain non-state actors over others in exercising authority

in global governance.

The aim of this paper is to present a more systematic comparison of the

perceived roles of non-state actors in the global climate governance complex and to

elaborate on the images and self-images of the governance functions they potentially

perform. To our knowledge, systematic analysis of the perceptions among policy-

makers and other actors of which governance functions different non-state actors wield

has not been performed. Using unique survey material from COP-17, we explore what

the most important functions different categories of non-state actors are perceived to

perform in international governance of climate change. This question is important in

assessing what the efficiency and distributive effects of greater participation by non-

state actors in international negotiations are. The paper also explores if and how surveys

can be employed to enable such systematic comparisons. The study thereby contributes

to two strands in the literature: one theoretical focusing on the rise in authority of non-

state actors in climate change governance and the other pertaining to the rather under-

researched development of methods to study non-state actor involvement.

The paper is structured as follows. The next section surveys the literature on

governance functions of non-state participation in international negotiations, with a

particular focus on climate change governance. We present a theoretical framework for

understanding how functions and authority of non-state actors are interlinked.

Subsequently, section three presents the survey design. Here, the methods and materials

used are described but also, more importantly, a general reflection upon methodological

aspects of non-state involvement in global (environmental) governance is offered.

Findings from the surveys are presented in section four, primarily organized around two

tables: (i) (overall) perceptions on governance functions performed by a cross-section of

non-state actors, and (ii) parties, self/own, other actor perceptions of functions for

specific non-state actors. Lastly section five concludes.

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2 State of the Art and Theory

There is a consensus in the literature that non-state actors play a significant role in

global environmental governance (Andanova et al 2009; Betsill and Corell 2001; Zürn

1998). At the intergovernmental level, non-state actors seek to shape policies and

norms. They can lobby states to ensure either general or specific policy outcomes or

draw attention to particular concerns. They often also seek to raise their own profile by

highlighting specific causes or their constituencies as being important for the

effectiveness of the issue under negotiation. Their activities in and around

intergovernmental negotiations have thus been described as “NGO diplomacy” (Betsill

and Corell 2008). Non-state actors participating in intergovernmental meetings can

therefore be considered both as stakeholders and as international lobby organizations.

At the transnational level, new forms of governance arrangements mean that

non-state actors have new opportunities to exercise authority2 and take on greater

responsibility to manage collective challenges. This type of governance has been called

the “transnational regime complex” (Abbott 2011) or a form of “transnational

neopluralism” (Cerny 2010). The defining feature of this new governance is that it is

decentralized, polycentric and fragmented (Abbott 2011). The lack of centralized

governance arrangements means that non-state actors have taken on new roles and

challenged the monopoly of states in some areas, including establishing policies,

practices and norms. This is manifest in the plethora of experimental initiatives

conducted by private actors in the field of climate change (Hoffman 2011). At the

transnational level, therefore, non-state actors can be considered both as implementers

and governors in their own right.

While much of the early literature was concerned with exploring whether non-

state actors represent a challenge to state power (Mathews 1997), in recent years the

focus has been more on an empirical documentation of their activities and examining

their influence in international governance (Betsill and Corell 2001; Newell 2000).

According to the current literature, these “political entrepreneurs” (Keck and Sikkink

1999) are important players that carry out a multitude of roles, including information-

sharing; capacity-building and implementation; and rule-setting (Andonova et al 2009).

2 Authority is defined as “legitimized power, operating within the international arena” (Hall and Biersteker 2002:3)

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The literature however suffers from at least two weaknesses. First, studies have

generally been good at mapping the new participatory arrangements in international

environmental governance, but have focused less on explaining the distributive effects

of greater non-state actor involvement. For example, several studies examine non-state

actor initiatives in the field of climate change governance without considering how

authority and power differences amongst groups of non-state actors affect normative

aspects of global democracy. This is particularly noticeable in studies that explore the

influence of non-state actors in international environmental governance, which tend to

focus on the role of influential environmental NGOs (Betsill 2008; Gulbrandsen and

Andresen 2004) or business NGOs (Vormedal 2008 and Falkner 2009) rather than on

marginalized groups. This means that there has been less focus on groups of non-state

actors that may exert little influence in the same structural setting, which implies that

the literature may have produced a distorted picture of the successes of non-state actors

in international negotiations. This also means that while the literature points to the

power of non-state actors in international governance in general, it does not examine the

interplay between actors and which ones are more effective in exercising authority.

Therefore, the literature cannot say whose interests are being voiced in international

fora. This raises questions about the legitimacy of global governance.

This brings us to the second weakness, which is that the literature that does look

at the normative aspects of new types of actors in global governance, tends to focus on

issues of representativeness at the decision-making level rather than participation across

the whole policy cycle. While issues of representativeness are of central concern to

constitutionalist, pluralist and deliberative approaches to democratic governance

(Dingwerth 2007), issues pertaining to the actual governance functions of different

types of non-state actors have received little attention. Not all groups of non-state actors

elect to participate at the inter-governmental policy level, but those that do often use

their participation as a platform for furthering their work outside the intergovernmental

arena. Thus, while procedures for participating in international decision-making are an

important aspect of global democracy, it is also pertinent to examine what outcome this

greater participation has on authority across the whole policy-cycle amongst groups of

non-state actors. We argue that even with equal rules for non-state actor participation in

international negotiations, differences between categories of non-state actors means that

their participation leads to different capacities in exercising authority.

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In sum, we lack frameworks to understand authority across different sets of non-

state actors in a given structural setting and the implications of this participation for

global democracy. In this paper we argue that authority is linked to the different

functions that actors perform. In order to assess authority amongst categories of non-

state actors, we next turn to the issue of differing power sources and functions.

2.1 Understanding Functions of Non-state actors in Global Environmental Governance

Non-state actors represent a range of interests and discourses. Their activities

take place at different levels – from the local to the global. There is by now a broad

literature that looks at how non-state actors are turned into agents by virtue of their

authority.3 The most common analytical perspectives hold that authority is a function of

unequal knowledge of rules and access to resources as well as differing capabilities

(O’Neill et al. 2004; Fisher and Green 2004). We suggest, however, that authority can

also be a function of the role that different non-state actors play.

In this paper, we propose that different categories of non-state actors have

diverse functionality profiles and that these can vary in strength from strong to weak.

By functionality profiles we mean the combination of functions associated with a

category of non-state actor. We further suggest that the different functionality profiles

are derived from particular power sources and that authority is a function of these

profiles. Therefore, in order to obtain a fuller picture of non-state actor authority, it is

necessary to examine factors pertaining to the sources of power and the activities and

roles of non-state actors.

While non-state actors often lack traditional forms of power, the literature has

outlined their alternative sources of power. The key skills and resources that non-state

actors bring to the negotiating table have been identified by Gulbrandsen and Andresen

(2004:58) as being derived from their intellectual base, membership base, political base,

and financial base. More specifically, the different sources of non-state actor power are

believed to include knowledge and information (Keck and Sikkink 1999; Betsill and

Corell 2008); economic resources and structural power (Levy and Newell 2000; Newell

2000; Rowlands 2001; Beck 2005; Falkner 2009); organizational capacity, transnational

3 See for example Dellas et al. 2011

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networking and mobilization capacity (Falkner 2009); and legitimacy (Gough and

Shackley 2001). Concerning the latter factor, the former Secretary-General of the

United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali has expressed that “non-governmental

organizations are a basic form of popular representation in the present day world. Their

participation in international organizations is, in a way, a guarantee of the political

legitimacy of those international organizations” (cited by P. Mucke 1997).

Thus we can identify a number of types of power that non-state actors may

wield to differing degrees. Borrowing from Keck and Sikkink (1999:95) and Boström

and Tamm Hallström (2010:43), we build a typology of power sources used by non-

state actors to gain authority in international politics. These are symbolic (legitimacy),

cognitive (knowledge, expertise), social (access to networks), leverage (access to key

actors) and material/structural (access to resources) power. Different categories of non-

state actors may thus wield these types of power to different strengths and in different

combinations.

Because of their differing power sources, different types of non-state actors can

be expected to place greater emphasis on certain activities and roles. We adapt Albin’s

(1999) typology of NGO activities4 and propose nine key dimensions of non-state actor

activities at international negotiations: Influence the agenda, propose solutions, provide

information and expertise, influence decisions and policy-makers, awareness raising,

implement action on the ground, evaluate consequences of policies and measures,

represent public opinion, represent marginalized voices . This categorization shows that

non-state actors have roles to play throughout the policy cycle. Because the different

activities require different sets of power assets, we expect that diverse categories of non-

state actors will be associated with some of these functions more than others.

Thus, depending on the combination of power sources held by a certain category

of non-state actors, the function they have in environmental governance will differ. For

example, because of the material and leverage powers of business and industry groups,

they can be expected to be particularly strong on influencing decisions and policy

makers. In contrast, environmental NGOs can be considered to draw strength from their

cognitive and social powers because of their usually large membership and mobilization

capacity. These types of membership organizations can also use symbolic power if they

4 Albin (1999) identifies the following activities: problem definition, agenda setting, and goal setting; enforcement of principles and norms; provision of information and expertise; public advocacy and mobilization; lobbying; direct participation in the formulation of international agreements; and monitoring and other assistance with compliance.

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are seen as representing public opinion that is not represented elsewhere, such as adding

a voice for the environment or future generations. As such, they may raise awareness

and influence policy makers. On the other hand, issues of representativeness means that

their advice may be considered biased at times.

Symbolic and cognitive power may also be the main strengths of indigenous

groups and trade unions. However, as they represent specific communities and possess

knowledge on particular issues, their contribution may be valuable on limited issues.

Other groups where cognitive power is one of the key power sources are academic

NGOs and intergovernmental organizations. These organizations can draw on their

knowledge and skills to introduce new ideas and develop creative policy solutions.

Because of their connections at different levels of governance and their financial

strength, intergovernmental organizations also wield leverage and material powers and

can therefore be expected to be active in implementing decisions in member countries.

Different categories of non-state actors thus have different functions in the

negotiations depending on their power sources. While they may be strong in certain

areas, they may be weaker in others. Because power sources are distributed unequally

across categories of non-state actors and because no actor dominates all types of power

sources, no one group can be expected to have a privileged position across all stages of

the policy process. For example, even though business and industry groups could be

considered to have an advantage over other groups because of their material and

leverage powers, their authority is limited by a number of factors. Boström and Tamm

Hallström (2010: 43) for instance note that “TNCs may have incredible power, but they

are short of the symbolic power that relates to environmental and social responsibility”.

Business and industry groups can therefore be expected to play weaker roles in the

enforcement of principles and norms and in adding legitimacy to the process.

This theoretical framework thus outlines how functionality profiles can be used

to understand how different power sources provide authority to certain categories of

non-state actors across the policy cycle. In other words, it provides a link to understand

how actors come to be perceived as agents for particular governance functions. While

acknowledging that empowerment and disenfranchisement is related to the

characteristics of individual actors as suggested by Fisher and Green (2004), this

framework adds another dimension to the question of how certain actors are perceived

as being authoritative in certain policy functions. This issue is explored below in the

context of climate change governance.

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2.2 Understanding Functions of Non-State Actors in Climate Change Governance

Climate change governance is an issue area that cannot be understood without

examining the role of non-state actors. While the focus of much governance activity in

this field is centred around the international negotiations under the United Nations

Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), non-state actors are

instrumental in shaping the contours of climate change governance, including through

private, hybrid, networked and community-based governance (Dellas et al. 2011; Abott

2011; Andonova et al 2009; Corell and Betsill 2001). Climate change governance

therefore offers a rich test-case for our empirical study.

While we do not attempt to systematically explore the authority of non-state

actors in climate change governance, we seek to undertake a first step in the mapping of

perceived functions and influence of different categories of non-state actors.

Specifically, we focus on the official categorization of types of organizations used by

the UNFCCC. In the UNFCCC system non-state actors are divided into constituency

groups, which include Business and industry non-governmental organizations

(BINGO), Environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGO), Indigenous

peoples organizations (IPO), Local government and municipal authorities (LGMA),

Research and independent non-governmental organizations (RINGO), Trade Unions

non-governmental organizations (TUNGO), and Farmers and agricultural NGOs,

Women and Gender, and Youth (YOUNGO).5 Another group of observer organizations

is constituted by intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as the World Bank and

UNEP.

The use of this categorization allows us to explore whether the power sources

associated with particular types of non-state actors has additional explanatory power

that goes beyond previous analyses of individual non-state actors. While being well

aware that there are large differences within these categories, organizations align

themselves with a constituency when becoming an observer organization to the

UNFCCC. Constituencies are thus intended to be loose groups, which represent

“diverse but broadly clustered interests or perspectives” (UNFCCC 2011). The different

constituencies can therefore not be considered as monolithic blocks; rather, they

represent a broad spectrum of interests which are often also conflicting. According to

Boström and Tamm Hallström (2010) more divided constituencies could find it more

5 http://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/ngo/application/pdf/constituency_2011_english.pdf

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difficult to exert social power. Nevertheless, there are typically greater commonalities

within a constituency than between constituencies.

Thus, while non-state actors compete over exerting authority, they have different

power sources and play different roles. The rivalry between different non-state actors

has been particularly stark in the climate change negotiations, which makes it an

interesting test for exploring the different functions played by non-state actors. The

question of which non-state actors have been most successful in advancing their

interests and why in international climate governance remains largely unexplored. This

paper suggests that we cannot fully understand the authority of non-state actors if we do

not consider their distinct roles and functions within environmental governance. This

first step will allow us to see what differences in perception of roles that exists between

these broad interest alignments.

3 Data and Measures

In order to compare the different functions of non-state actors in the climate

change negotiations, this paper uses questionnaire data from COP 17/CMP 7 that took

place in Durban, South Africa, in December 2011. In a second step, we also look at

what roles non-state actors stress in their submissions to the UNFCCC on the matter of

why their participation should be enhanced. These submissions were made to the

Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) in 2010 as part of an on-going discussion of

how to enhance non-state actor participation in the climate change negotiations.6 Most

of the submissions were made by BINGOs and ENGOs however, which means that

there is little information from the other categories of non-state actors. Nevertheless, the

submissions can provide insights into how these two groups of actors wish to portray

their roles in international climate governance. These self-images will therefore be

compared to the results obtained in the questionnaire to examine their validity.

The paper thereby offers a new approach to the study of non-state actors, which

has thus far been dominated by case studies. While case studies offer detailed analysis

of particular functions of non-state actors, they are limited in scope due to the sheer

6 UNFCCC (2010), paragraph 19

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number cases and wealth of information. For the purposes of mapping functions of a

range of non-state actors, we therefore borrow the methodology used in much of the

good governance literature, where perceptions of experts and public opinion are relied

on to assess degree of corruption, freedom of expression and transparency of countries

around the world (see for example Transparency International and Freedom House).

The questionnaire thus measures perceptions of functions and as Kaufman et al (2008:3)

state, “perceptions matter because agents base their actions on their perceptions,

impression and views”.

The questionnaire was conducted by the International Negotiations Barometer

and surveyed participants in fourteen official side-events during both weeks of the

conference, producing a total of 384 responses. It builds on a pilot study that was

launched at the previous COP/MOP in Cancun, Mexico, in December 2010. We decided

to target COP participants with relatively high familiarity of non-state actor activities,

for which the side-events provide a good venue (Lovell 2007, Schroeder and Lovell

2012). The questionnaire, which is undertaken with the agreement of the UNFCCC

Secretariat, has been collected since COP 13 in Bali and has previously been used to

map functions of side events (Hjerpe & Linnér 2010), and a similar survey of COP

participants has been employed to study leadership questions (Karlsson et al 2011), and

individual preferences for principles for effort sharing (Hjerpe et al 2011).

The question that will be analysed here reads: “Which of the following observer

organizations, if any, does in your view play the most significant role in the areas listed

below.” The non-state actor categories were chosen based on the recognized

constituencies, but due to space constraints we did not include women and gender,

youth, or farmers. Thus the categories asked for are the following: Business groups,

research organisations, environmental NGOs, municipalities and local authorities, trade

unions, intergovernmental organizations, and indigenous peoples. There was also a

category for ‘none of these actors’ for respondents who perceived none of the observer

organizations as playing a significant role for particular functions. For the options of

functions performed, we use our nine dimensions of non-state actor activities from

above. In the context of climate change, we distinguish between taking action on

mitigation and taking action on adaptation as these actions differ in their nature and

scope. The survey therefore outlines the following functions: Influence the international

climate change agenda, propose viable solutions to climate change, provide information

and expertise, influence decisions and policy-makers, raise awareness of climate change

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among the public, take actions on climate change mitigation, take actions on climate

change adaptation, evaluate consequences of policies and measures, represent public

opinion on climate change issues, represent marginalized voices.

We received 276 answers on this question, of which 220 were non-state actors

and 56 were state actors. Geographically the respondents resided in all six major

regions. While not representative for the average COP participant, the responses are

nevertheless heterogeneous enough to capture respondents with different backgrounds

and from most parts of the world.

4 Results

The results show that the non-state actors largely complement each other, with the full

spectrum of activities being covered. The questionnaire data found distinct functionality

profiles for most of the actors. Below, we begin by looking at how participants perceive

the key functions of different categories of non-state actors and, in the case of BINGOs

and ENGOs, comparing them to how they describe themselves in their submissions to

the SBI. Next we divide the respondents into three categories – own, parties, and others

– to see how categories of respondents perceive of functions of different non-state

actors. In particular, it is interesting to examine whether the actors’ self-perceptions of

their constituency match those by parties and other actors since this provides an

indication about the congruence of images held by one group of actors compared to

those held by others..

Table 1 shows COP 17 side event participants’ perceptions of the functions

performed by different categories of non-state actors in global climate governance. The

responses reflect the percentage of respondents who indicated a category of non-state

actor as being most significant for each governance function. A statistical significance

test was carried out to establish whether respondents associated a category of non-state

actors more than (marked with *) or less than (marked with ^) what could be expected

by a random fluctuation of answers at the 1% significance level.

Table 1. COP 17 participant perceptions of the functions performed by various non-state actors in global climate governance (percentages).

 Influence Agenda 

Propose Solutions 

Provide Expertise

Influence Policy‐Makers 

Raise Awareness

Take Mitigation Action 

Take Adaptation Action 

Evaluate Consequences

Represent Public Opinion 

Represent Marginalized 

Voices ENGO  13%  22%*  11%  16%  77%*  13%  16%  12%  44%*  19%* BINGO  35%*  19%*  6%^  39%*  1%^  32%*  9%  4%^  3%^  1%^ RINGO  9%  35%*  67%*  10%  3%^  1%^  2%^  55%*  4%^  1%^ IPO  1%^  3%^  2%^  0%^  3%^  2%^  7%^  1%^  9%  61%* LGMA  2%^  6%^  0%^  7%^  7%^  25%*  41%*  5%^  9%  2%^ TUNGO  1%^  1%^  1%^  3%^  2%^  0%^  1%^  2%^  5%^  5%^ IGO  32%*  11%  12%  19%*  3%^  17%  17%  17%  6%^  1%^ None  7%^  4%^  1%^  6%^  3%^  11%  8%  3%^  19%*  10% 

n=  276  269  268  263  267  264  256  268  267  270 

Legend: * (higher) and ^ (lower) symbolize statistical significance at the selected level (1%).

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The table shows that different categories of non-state actors are perceived as playing a

more significant role in certain functions than others. BINGOs are viewed as being

particularly strong in influencing the agenda, influencing decisions and policy-makers

(rule-setting) and taking mitigation action. This is an expected result and a logical

function of their power sources, which include material and leverage power. The lowest

rating for BINGOs is the role of raising awareness and representing marginalized

voices. This again reflects their constellation of power sources, or in this case their

perceived low level of symbolic power.

A review of the submissions by several BINGOs to the SBI on how to improve

the participation of business organizations shows that these BINGOs view their roles as

being focused on influencing and implementing decisions. For instance, the

International Chamber of Commerce writes that the role of BINGOs includes the

“creation and deployment of technology, finance, investment, trade and capacity

building, participating in international mechanisms and other approaches to promote

mitigation and adaptation” (ICC 2010). Similarly, the Business Council for Sustainable

Energy proposes the creation of standing mechanisms for greater private sector

engagement in international climate governance, which would consist of a high-level

body for sharing expertise to negotiators to assist in their decision-making and a

consultative body to aid in the implementation phase of the agreement (BCSE 2010).

While BINGOs argue that greater engagement will add to the transparency and

legitimacy of the process, the key focus is nevertheless on providing technical support

and sectoral expertise in the negotiation and implementation phases.

The key roles of ENGOs are on the other hand perceived to be raising awareness

and represent public opinion, which could be an indication of their strong cognitive and

social power as they can draw upon a large membership base. While receiving relatively

high ratings across all governance functions, it is slightly surprising that they are not

perceived as being very influential in setting the agenda or influencing policy-makers.

The larger ENGOs have considerable financial strength and, because they are well-

organized, they could be expected to be perceived as being more influential.

Nevertheless, the financial strength of some NGOs is not of the structural nature of that

of BINGOs, for example, since BINGOs are expected to contribute financial resources

to fight climate change on a scale that is not applicable to ENGOs.

The weakest role of ENGOs is perceived as being to provide expertise, which

could perhaps be considered surprising given ENGOs’ activities to spread knowledge

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and expertise. Perhaps this reflects a perception that the information that is spread, for

example through the Climate Action Network’s publication ECO, is not adequately

balanced. Another slightly surprising result is that ENGOs are perceived to be relatively

weak in taking mitigation action. By virtue of their extensive networks, ENGOs could

potentially be an important player in the implementation of climate agreements.

This is also highlighted in their submissions to the SBI. For example, according

to the Climate Action Network “civil society not only plays a fundamental role in

shaping policy, but also is critical in ensuring those policies are effectively

implemented” (CAN 2010). Nevertheless, according to the World Wildlife Fund, their

key roles are to provide information to negotiators, increase legitimacy and

transparency, and to “improve the environmental and social qualities of the agreements

reached” (WWF 2010). The main focus of ENGO activities in global environmental

governance is thus perceived as being advocacy rather than implementation.

The RINGOs, in contrast, are perceived as having strong roles in providing

expertise, evaluating consequences, and proposing solutions. This functionality profile

unsurprisingly reflects their cognitive power. Their weak spot is perceived as being

implementation and interestingly also representing marginalized voices. The latter

weakness may thus contradict the traditional “speaking truth to power” model, where

RINGOs are not perceived as voicing marginalized views.

The LGMA category is strongest in taking implementation action, particularly in

the field of adaptation. LGMAs can be viewed as having high symbolic and leverage

powers, and in some cases also material/structural power, and are therefore perceived to

be at the forefront of implementing climate change policy. What is surprising, however,

is that their symbolic power is not reflected in the function of representing public

opinion on climate change, which is relatively low. This may be reflecting the view that

local elections (to the extent there are elections in different countries) do not capture

public opinion on issues to do with climate change, as voters are often more concerned

with more immediate issues such as local jobs.

IGOs’ main roles are perceived to be influencing the agenda, decisions and

policy-makers l. Thus, by virtue of their cognitive, leverage and material powers, IGOs

are perceived as being important in the decision-making processes. This view may

support Barnett and Finnemore’s (1999) thesis that IGOs exercise power independently

of the way anticipated by the states that created them and that environmental

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bureaucracies are at the helm of managing global change (Biermann and Siebenhüner

2011).

The two remaining categories – TUNGOs and IPOs – are more diffuse

categories that fewer seemed to have informed opinions about. This may either be

because respondents did not know the functions of these constituencies or because they

believe that they do not fill any of these functions. Thus TUNGOs and IPOs are

perceived to be weak in most functions. For IPOs, representing marginalized voices is

highly significant, which is in line with our expectations. IPOs are viewed as being

particularly weak in influencing decisions and policy-makers, reflecting their relatively

low material/structural and leverage power, the latter of which is often hampered by

language barriers.

Thus the results indicate that certain governance functions, such as raising

awareness, providing expertise and representing marginalized voices, are strongly

associated with one particular category of non-state actors. Other functions, such as

influencing the agenda, proposing viable solutions, and taking mitigation action, are less

strongly associated with a particular category of non-state actors. Because the results

present a cross-section of non-state actor functions, the study adds important nuances to

our understanding of the roles of actors in international negotiations.

In order to verify our results, we also follow Arts’ (1998) ego-perceptions and

alter-perceptions and analyse how other actors’ opinions about what function a

particular category of non-state actor performs differ from the category’s own self-

image. We compared the shares indicating significant roles for three categories of

participants: own actor, parties, and rest of observer respondents. A significant party

share would evidently indicate recognition from the formal negotiating community. In

other words, high correspondence between party and own answers may indicate a

higher propensity that the indicated response holds for scrutiny. A large difference

across the perceptions would on the other hand indicate an interesting issue for further

study, that is, whether the self-image or the other image fits best with observed

behavior? If it is the “own” value that differs, it indicates a self-image issue. If it is the

“party” that differs it indicates skewness in relation to the negotiating community. If it

is the “other” value that differs, it may indicate problems with recognition from other

actor categories. For LGMA, TUNGOs and IPOs there were too few respondents in the

“own” category, and, accordingly, only the shares of delegates and observers are

presented.

Table 2. Non-state actors’ roles from different actor perspectives

      ENGO       BINGO       RINGO        IGO       S  P  O  S  P  O  S  P  O  S  P  O Influence agenda  15% 13% 11% 21%* 33% 39% 8% 4% 10% 30% 36% 31%

Propose solutions  38%* 15% 18% 55%* 16% 11% 53%* 40% 29% 23%* 11% 9%

Information and expertise  21%* 10% 7% 19%* 2% 4% 85%* 65% 64% 32%* 20% 8%

Influence decisions  19% 10% 16% 36% 37% 41% 22%* 10% 8% 14% 21% 20%

Raise awareness  80% 77% 76% 3% 2% 1% 5% 4% 3% 5% 4% 3%

Mitigation action  24%* 12% 8% 63%* 31% 25% 3% 2% 1% 19% 20% 16%

Adaptation action  25%* 14% 12% 29%* 8% 5% 3% 4% 1% 10% 16% 18%

Evaluate consequences  16% 4% 13% 11% 9% 2% 57% 60% 53% 24% 16% 16%

Represent public opinion  54%* 40% 41% 3% 4% 3% 8% 6% 3% 9% 9% 5%

Represent marginalized  19% 15% 20% 0% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 0% 2% 2%

   LGMA     TUNGO    IPO     None    P  O  P  O  P  O  P  O Influence agenda  2% 2% 4% 1% 0% 1% 9% 6%

Propose solutions  4% 6% 2% 0% 2% 3% 11% 2%

Information and expertise  0% 1% 0% 1% 0% 2% 4% 0%

Influence decisions  13% 5% 6% 2% 0% 0% 4% 6%

Raise awareness  6% 7% 2% 2% 4% 3% 2% 3%

Mitigation action  24% 24% 0% 0% 0% 2% 12% 10%

Adaptation action  39% 42% 2% 1% 6% 7% 12% 6%

Evaluate consequences  4% 5% 4% 1% 0% 2% 4% 2%

Represent public opinion  9% 8% 8% 4% 9% 9% 15% 20%

Represent marginalized  4% 1%

4% 5%

60% 61%

11% 9%

Legend: Self (S), Party (P), and Other actor (O) perceptions of

governance functions are given for each category of non-state

actor. The other actor category comprises non-state actor

respondents other than the self column. Star (*) indicates that there

is at least a 10% difference of perceptions between self, party, or

17

18

Table 2 shows non-state actors’ roles from different actor perspectives. We see from the

table that all actors agree with the view that the key role for BINGOs is influencing

decisions, for ENGOs is raising awareness, for RINGOs is providing information and

expertise (although RINGOs themselves overestimate this function in relation to state

and other actors), and for IGOs is influencing the agenda. These functions could

therefore be considered as relatively robust. RINGO is the only category which has a

self-image of influencing decisions that is not matched by others’ perceptions of their

role. Parties view RINGOs more as raising awareness than influencing decisions,

perhaps because academics are not used to the lobbying role to the same extent as other

non-state actors even though they themselves believe that they influence decisions and

policy-makers.

Interesting to note is that perceptions do not markedly differ between state

parties and groups of non-state actors other than on certain self-images. For BINGOs,

they appear to underestimate their influence on the agenda compared to how parties and

other non-state actors perceive BINGOs’ role in influencing the agenda. On the other

hand, BINGOs overestimate their role in proposing viable solutions, providing

information and expertise, and taking action on mitigation and adaptation compared to

parties and other non-state actors’ perceptions of BINGO functions. Similarly, ENGOs

are perceived by parties and other non-state actors as being weaker in proposing viable

solutions, providing information and expertise, taking action on mitigation and

adaptation, and representing public opinion compared to their self-image. These

differences in perceptions reflect the importance that the ENGO and BINGO

constituencies assign to their own roles in international climate governance, as was seen

in the submissions mentioned above.

On the whole however, the results imply that organized interests appear to have

stronger functionality profiles than other more loosely formed non-state actors. As

could perhaps be expected, ‘softer’ governance functions, such as raising awareness and

representing marginalized voices, appear to be associated with groups that possess

symbolic and social power, while ‘harder’ governance functions, such as influencing

and implementing decisions, appear to be associated with groups that possess cognitive,

leverage and material power. This finding also implies that power asymmetries are not

only based on structural inequalities based on gender, class, and race as often

highlighted in the literature (Scholte 2002; Fisher and Green 2004; Young 2001), but

may also be dependent on different functionality profiles.

19

5 Conclusion

Non-state actors perform a number of tasks in environmental governance. The services

that they provide to states range from offering policy advice to assisting in the

monitoring of commitments (Raustiala 1997). In this paper we have used results from a

survey from the Durban climate conference to examine how perceptions about the

functions of non-state actors differ depending on their functionality profiles. We show

that different categories of non-state actors are perceived to play distinct roles in climate

change governance and that these functionality profiles are related to particular power

sources. The results indicate that influencing the agenda and decisions is less associated

with internal financial resources than with structural power that can be employed to

affect change. In addition, cognitive power appears to contribute to a perception of

providing information and expertise when the source appears to be neutral and

balanced.

This has implications for the global democracy thesis, as it implies that

increasing participation by non-state actors may work towards reinforcing, rather than

challenging, strong interests. The results indicate that organized interests have the

stronger functionality profiles and may therefore be more able to participate in different

aspects of climate change governance. On the other hand, the results also show that no

single category of non-state actors is strong across all governance functions, indicating

that there is room for cooperation across the categories in order to achieve greater

impact across the policy cycle. The trend toward partnerships in climate change

governance may reflect this insight.

The paper also has implications for the future research agenda. A next step

would involve looking at the outcomes of participation to understand what characterizes

successful non-state actors. Moreover, does the growing participation by non-state

actors in international negotiations enhance environmental outcomes and lead to the

democratization of international affairs? Or is it possible that there is an uneven playing

field for non-state actors just depending their broadly defined role belonging to an

interest group, such that their participation leads to policy distortions? Future studies

can build further on the results presented in this paper to explore what different

governance functions amongst groups of non-state actors say about how authority shifts

over time and what this means for the democratic potential of global governance.

20

The focus of this study has been on international climate governance.

Nevertheless, it is likely that the results can be applied to other contexts and policy

areas. Future research could therefore establish whether these functionality profiles are

applicable to other settings and other governance levels. It is also possible to explore

roles and interactions of non-state actors over time to develop the analysis beyond one-

time instances. A multitude of methodologies are therefore called for to examine

questions of agency, representativeness and accountability in global governance. This

paper has provided a tentative model to inspire new research in this area.

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