The Rise of Détente and ‘Triangular Diplomacy’, 1963-72

Young & Kent: International Relations since 1945

1963: in the wake of Cuba

• Signs of Détente?– Kennedy’s American University

speech– ‘Hot line’ agreement – Partial Test Ban Treaty

• Cold War goes on– Berlin tension– Multilateral Nuclear Force

Pressures for Détente in Europe

• Mutual fear of war• Western Europe

– fragmentation: de Gaulle– Harmel Report– Brandt and Ostpolitik

• Eastern bloc– fragmentation: China, Romania– desire for trade/technology– fall of Khrushchev

Nuclear Balance• Dawn of ‘Mutual Assured Destruction’• ‘Triad’ of weapons:

– Aircraft– Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)– Submarine-launched ballistic missiles

(SLBMs)• Threats to the balance:

– Anti-Ballistic Missile– Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle

Détente Delayed, 1964-68

• Limited East-West agreement– Glassboro’ mini-summit– Non-Proliferation Treaty– Proposed Strategic Arms Limitation

Talks

• Barriers to progress– Vietnam– Czechoslovakia: ‘Prague Spring’– No Johnson-Brezhnev summit

Nixon’s Approach

• Inaugural speech: ‘an era of negotiations’

• End Vietnam war: Nixon Doctrine• But détente only on conditions:

– Concrete agreements not just a change in atmosphere

– Soviets to show restraint– ‘Linkage’

‘Linkage’ in practice

• US view: if Soviets want strategic arms talks and trade, they must not exploit conflicts in the Third World

• Series of crises in 1970-71:– Chile: election of Allende– Cienfuegos– Jordanian civil war– Indo-Pakistan War

‘Triangular Diplomacy’

• Sino-Soviet ‘split’• Chinese fear USSR more than US

– Border clashes of 1969

• Nixon ready for ‘opening’ to China– Trade barriers relaxed– ‘Ping-Pong diplomacy’– China enters UN

• US plays off China and USSR

1972: two summits

• Beijing Summit, February 1972– Nixon and Mao– Shanghai Communique

• Moscow Summit, May 1972– Nixon and Brezhnev– went ahead despite crisis in Vietnam– several agreements: trade, space, etc.– ‘Basic Principles’

SALT I: highpoint of Moscow

• Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty– Two ABM ‘fields’ and 200 missiles

each

• ‘Interim Agreement on Offensive Missiles’– ICBMs: 1054 US, 1618 Soviet– SLBMs: 656 US, 740 Soviet– Bombers: 455 US, 140 Soviet– To last five years: SALT II to follow

Moscow: success or failure?

• The successes:– Well-choreographed– Numerous agreements– SALT a significant nuclear arms deal

• The limits:– Soviets never accepted ‘linkage’– Unclear what ‘basic principles’ meant– SALT failed to control MIRVs– ‘unequal ceilings’ in SALT