The Quang Tri Border Areas - Marines.mil - The Official …. Marines in... · · 2012-10-11The Quang Tri Border Areas ... by skirmishes with NVA screening forces and by th e seizure

CHAPTER 5

The Quang Tri Border AreasNo Change in Tactics—The DMZ Front—Brigade Mauls 27th—The 9th Battles the 36th

The Vietnam Salient—Apache Snow—Central DMZ Battles—Eastern Quang Tri and Thua Thie n

No Change in Tactics

Reviewing his tour as Commanding General, 3 dMarine Division, shortly before his reassignment ,Major General Raymond G. Davis noted, with pride ,that the forces under his command were "now in aposture where we totally control Quang Tri Province . ""However," he continued, "we cannot lower our guardor decrease our forces one iota so long as the enem yretains his total sanctuary in Laos and in and abov ethe DMZ ."' On 14 April 1969, General Davis was suc-ceeded by Major General William K. Jones, ahardened veteran of Tarawa, where he earned the Sil-ver Star ; of Saipan, where he was awarded the Nav yCross ; and of Korea where he commanded the 1st Ma-rines . Unlike Davis, Jones found .it unnecessary to re -orient the tactical disposition of the division . Hecompletely agreed with General Davis' concept ofoperations and "simply continued the various action sDavis had initiated ." 2

Neither Davis nor Jones lowered their guard, no rthat of the division. Even though the enemy had large-ly been forced to withdraw to nearby North Vietnamand Laos, General Davis and then General Jones con-tinued to maintain a strong, mobile posture charac-terized by essentially company-size operations . AsGeneral Davis described the tactic :

A company will be put into an area two or three kilome-ters on a side, they'll cut an L[anding] Z[one] for resuppl yand medevac, and they'll work day and night activities un-til they've thoroughly searched out this area . By thoroughl ysearching out I mean : on every trail, every hill knob, everydraw, every finger— total search-out of the area . Then they' dbe lifted to another place ?

Relying on this tactic, the division initiated severa loperations in March throughout the border areas ofQuang Tri Province with the aim of preempting ene-my efforts to infiltrate major formations and supplie sfrom cross-border sanctuaries or to use northern ICT Zredoubts and lines of communication to stage andmove those supplies forward . The March campaign inwestern and northwestern Quang Tri did not developheavy contact ; rather, the actions were characterized

by skirmishes with NVA screening forces and by th eseizure of numerous, and often extensive, munitionsand supply caches .

The DMZ Fron t

Combat action along the Demilitarized Zone, fro mthe Laotian border east to coastal Cua Viet, had re-mained intermittent during January and February.Enemy forces engaged by 3d Marine Division, Army,and ARVN units were, by and large, elements of thre eindependent NVA Regiments, the 27th, 138th, and246th, all tasked with screening the DMZ front . Onlyoccasionally encountered or employed in strength ,these units primarily undertook reconnaissance mis-sions, shellings, ambushes, probing and sapper attacks ,and assisted in the movement of arms and supplies tolocal force Viet Cong units and guerrillas . But by theend of February, forward elements of the three regi-ments had gained key terrain south of the DMZ, es-pecially in northwestern Quang Tri Province, wher ethe 246th NVA Regiment continued to push slowl ysouthward .

Under the operational control of Task Force Hote lat Vandegrift Combat Base, commanded by Brigadie rGeneral Garretson until relieved by Brigadier Genera lRobert B. Carney, Jr. at the end of March, the 4th Ma-rines was given the mission of destroying the 246thor driving the enemy regiment back into the sanctu-ary of the Demilitarized Zone . Once the enemy wasforced to withdraw, Colonel William F. Goggin's Ma-rines were to secure key terrain features on the DMZ' ssouthern edge, and then move into the southern por-tion of the zone . The codename assigned to the 4thMarines counterattack was Operation Purple Martin .

The first day of March found the three battalion sof Colonel Goggin's regiment patrolling along a broadfront, 5,000 to 10,000 meters south of the DMZ . The3d Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel William A .Donald, continued to clear the northern portion o fthe area of operations, north of Fire Support Base Rus -sell ; Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E . Hopkins' 2d Bat-talion conducted search operations north of FireSupport Base Neville ; and the 1st Battalion, under

52

THE QUANG TRI BORDER AREAS

5 3

Lieutenant Colonel George T. Sargent, Jr., cleared thenortheastern portion of the area of operations, nearElliott Combat Base (Rockpile) . First Lieutenant JamesM. Herron's Company C initiated the first significantengagement with the 246th as it attempted to reoc-cupy LZ Mack, north of Elliott, in preparation for th eregiment's move deeper into the area .

The action began at 0430 when the company's nigh tdefensive position received four rounds of 60mm mor-tar fire, resulting in three casualties . Shortly after dawnthe following morning, Lieutenant Herron's companybegan its assault . Supported by over 3,000 rounds ofartillery fired by batteries of Lieutenant Colonel Eu-gene D. Foxworth, Jr.'s 3d Battalion, 12th Marines, twoplatoons first seized a small knoll north of the heavi-ly fortified landing zone and then swept toward thesummit . However, when the Marines reached the hill -top, three enemy mortars opened up, forcing the tw oplatoons to withdraw with heavy casualties . Durin gthe assault, Company L, 3d Battalion moved up t oserve as a reserve force, and overall conduct of the at -tack placed under the control of Lieutenant ColonelDonald, the 3d Battalion's commanding officer .

Hampered by dense fog and misting rain, and con-sequently a lack of air support, the two companies con-solidated their defensive positions and prepared fora second attack. During the next three days, the ene-my subjected Companies C and L to a continuous bar-rage of 60mm and 82mm mortars, sniper fire, an dground attacks, resulting in more than 15 Marin ecasualties . Shortly after midafternoon on the 5th, fol-lowing another extensive artillery preparation, Lieu -tenant Herron' s company again assaulted Mack . Onc emore two platoons were used, one to secure the smal lhill north of the landing zone in order to provid ecovering fire, and the other to move on the summit .The scheme of maneuver proved successful and theassaulting platoon reached the crest of the hill, wher esquad and fire teams fanned out, methodically clear-ing one enemy-infested bunker after another .

The enemy's determined defense of Mack charac-terized the type of engagement experienced by the 4t hMarines throughout the area of operations : elementsof the 246th were prepared to fight . Well-equippedand well-supplied, North Vietnamese troops gave u pterrain only when physically dislodged .

MajGen William K. Jones, left, assumes command of the 3d Marine Division from Maj-Gen Raymond G. Davis at Dong Ha on 14 April. Jones, like his predecessor, would con-tinue to place major emphasis on blocking enemy infiltration and capturing supplies .

Abel Papers, Marine Corps Historical Center

54

HIGH MOBILITY AND STANDDOWN

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A19253 7

Infantrymen of the 4th Marines cross a jungle streamjust south of the Demilitarized Zone in search ofever-elusive North Vietnamese Army infiltrators .

Sweeping near LZ Catapult on the 9th, CompanyG, 2d Battalion, engaged yet another large and de-termined enemy unit in battle . The landing zone ,abandoned a year before, was significant as it was lo-cated 4,000 meters north of Fire Support Base Nevill eand dominated the extensive enemy trail network ofthe upper Cam Lo Valley. With intelligence informa-tion which confirmed not only North Vietnamese oc-cupation of the general area, but their intention t ohold the landing zone and surrounding terrain, Com-pany G was given the difficult mission of resecuringCatapult.

As Company G, under the command of Captai nJoseph M. Dwyer, moved slowly and cautiously fro mthe south along a ridge toward the landing zone, sup -

ported exclusively by artillery as air was unavailabl edue to weather, resistance became increasingly stub -born. Entrenched enemy troops employed snipers ,claymore mines, and ambushes to halt or delay th ecompany's progress . On 10 March, Dwyer's Marine sbroke through the enemy's outer defenses and engage da number of determined NVA troops in a running fire -fight which lasted throughout the day.

The next morning, as Dwyer's company continue dthe assault toward Catapult, the North Vietnames elaunched a counterattack . Employing small arms ,grenades, and RPG's, the enemy hit Company G o nthree sides . Fighting at close quarters, at times les sthan five meters, Dwyer's Marines suffered four kille dand 13 wounded, including three killed and fou rwounded as a result of a 105mm short round . The vio-lent fight, which lasted most of the day, finally brokethe enemy ' s attempt to hold the landing zone . Whenthe company completely secured Catapult on the 14th ,Dwye r' s Marines discovered 24 enemy bodies, all kille deither by artillery or small arms fire.

While Dwyer's Marines were heavily engaged o nCatapult, another sharp battle took place 12 kilome-ters to the east . On 13 March, Lieutenant Colone lDonald 's battalion continued its push along th elengthy ridgeline from LZ Mack toward LZ Sierra .Abandoned two months earlier, Sierra was now in NVAhands, and had been used by the enemy as a morta rsite in an effort to blunt the Marine assault on L ZMack, 2,000 meters to the southeast . A dense fog ham-pered direct air support, forcing the battalion to relysolely on artillery and a small number of radar -controlled bomb drops . The terrain proved rugged .Punctuated by deep draws and steep hills, the ridge -line offered few avenues of approach, and as a result ,every meter presented a threat of mines.

Lieutenant Colonel Donald assigned Company M ,under the command of First Lieutenant Edwin C . Kel-ley, Jr ., the task of resecuring Sierra, and First Lieu -tenant John P . Kiley's Company I the taking of a hil lnorth of Sierra, commonly known as Sierra North .Companies K and L would be held in reserve . As Kel-ley's Marines began their advance, it soon became ap-parent that the landing zone was defended by adetermined NVA platoon, located in well-constructedbunkers, capable of withstanding a direct hit by a105mm artillery round . Supported by heavy coverin gfire emanating south of the landing zone, two of Kel-ley's platoons assaulted from the east through a hai lof intense enemy small arms and mortar fire . Oncethe advance was underway, Kelley's squads and fire


5 5

teams maneuvered from bunker to bunker, destroy-ing the stubbornly entrenched enemy troops . Com-pany M secured Sierra by late afternoon at a cost o f10 Marines killed and 35 wounded ; 23 enemy troop slay dead in the smoldering ruins .

The following morning, Kiley ' s Marines advance don Sierra North in a well-executed envelopment fro mthe south . "Two hundred meters from the objective,"Lieutenant Kiley recalled, "NVA were spotted on th ehill, and there proved to be 11 in number. We wer emoving in a column ; 2d Platoon had the point, fol-lowed by the CP group, then 1st Platoon, and then3d Platoon . . . . I set up the company CP with oneplatoon as security, moved 2d Platoon up the hill fol-lowed by 1st"4 As Marines of the 2d Platoon emerge dfrom the heavily wooded area surrounding the crestof the hill, they laid down a heavy base of fire in ord-er to permit the 1st Platoon to attack through . Theenemy, apparently expecting an attack from the north ,as 10-inch claymores were found facing only in thatdirection, were surprised inside their bunkers . 5

While Company I was engaged on Sierra North, ele -ments of the 246th attacked Captain Kelley 's compa-ny position, initiating the action by downing a CH-4 6medical evacuation helicopter with an RPG round .Kelley's Marines beat back the assault, and again, tube sof the 3d Battalion, 12th Marines accounted for al lthe supporting fires. "After their counterattack failed,"reported the battalion executive officer, Major Ray-mond D. Walters, "what forces they had withdrew andwe didn't see any more of them in that area . So it be -came apparent that we had cleaned them out ther eand we decided to go on with our primary missio nwhich was to establish our patrol bases in the DM Z. . . . Shortly after we commenced our DMZ patrols ,we got an additional mission of constructing landin gzones along the DMZ" e

On 20 March, the long-anticipated assault on aban-doned Fire Support Base Argonne, to secure the regi-ment's western flank, began . The base, located on Hil l1308, two kilometers east of the border, offered ob-servation into Laos and onto portions of the enemy' sinfamous Ho Chi Minh Trail . Planned for almost amonth, the assault had been postponed due t oweather and lack of helicopter support, then heavil ycommitted to the 9th Marines in the Da Krong Val -ley. By the 19th, the weather cleared and aircraft be -came available . At 2230, Colonel Goggin decided t oconduct the assault the following day.

The proposed scheme of maneuver called for a three

company advance, with one company landing on Ar-gonne and two companies moving into the valley tothe north . A reconnaissance team would be inserte dprior to the assault and would guide the troop-lade nhelicopters into the landing zone . Goggin gave Lieute -nant Colonel Sargen t 's 1st Battalion the task of secur -ing Argonne, and in anticipation Sargent had movedhis companies to FSB Alpine (Lang Hoan Tap), 1 6kilometers to the south-southeast . With the Marine sof the 1st Battalion came tons of supplies for the sup -port of the Argonne assault and planned operation snearby. The establishment of a mini-logistical suppl yarea on Alpine would prove an asset in the comin gdays by lessening the distance required for helicopte rresupply lifts during periods of poor weather .

At 0930 on the 20th, after an extensive artillery an dair preparation, team "Frostburg" from the 3d Recon-naissance Battalion moved toward the upper landin gzone on Argonne by air. As the helicopter carryingthe team approached the zone, an explosion rockedthe area and a volley of small arms fire ripped throug hthe aircraft cockpit, killing the pilot and woundin gthe copilot . Despite his wounds, the copilot brough tthe helicopter in and the team jumped out, immedi-ately forming a hasty 360 degree perimeter around thedowned aircraft. Within minutes of the crash, theNVA struck . After repelling the enemy's initial charge,the team leader surveyed the situation, and request-ed an immediate extraction . Following the team'sdeparture, the first transport helicopter attempted t oland with Lieutenant Colonel Sargent and elementsof Company D on board . The downed UH-l E("Huey") used by the team prevented the CH-46 Dtransport from entering the upper zone ; consequent-ly, Sargent shifted the main assault to the lower zone.

The assault troops of Captain Joe B. Green's Com-pany D received only sporadic sniper fire upon land-ing in the lower zone, but as the lead element sadvanced toward the upper zone, enemy small arm sand automatic weapons fire emanating from a mutu-ally supporting bunker system intensified . Like the ac-tions on Mack, Sierra, and Catapult, the Marine thrus ton Argonne consisted of destroying the enemy by em-ploying small fire teams methodically to clear eac hbunker. The company directed a heavy base of smal larms fire toward bunker entrances, as one or two Ma -rines crawled to within grenade range, and then as-saulted the enemy fortifications . The battle to resecureArgonne continued until dark. Green's companysuffered six killed and 11 wounded in the daylong ad-

56

HIGH MOBILITY AND STANDOWN

vance, while accounting for 15 NVA dead . Due to th eheavy fighting on Argonne, Lieutenant Colonel Sar-gent cancelled the helilift of the remaining two com-panies into the valley north of the landing zone .

At 0815 the following morning, an enemy morta rbarrage of twelve 82mm rounds fell on the battalion' scommand post on Argonne, killing Lieutenan tColonel Sargent ; Second Lieutenant Carl R . Wilson ,Jr., the battalion S-2 ; two enlisted Marines and wound-ing 12 others . Later, as a medical evacuation helicop-ter extracted the casualties of the first attack, 10 mor erounds hit the landing zone, resulting in an additiona lthree killed and 11 wounded . The same day, Compa-nies A and C lifted into an area south of the landingzone and began a sweep to the north . But with Ar-gonne under mortar siege, Colonel Goggin modifie dthe mission of the two companies, ordering Compa-ny A, under Captain Henry W. "Buzz" Buse III, so nof Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacif-ic, Lieutenant General Henry W. Buse, Jr., to movewest, toward the Laotian border, in search of the sus-pected enemy mortar sites, and Company C to Ar-gonne's relief. On 23 March, while the remainder o fthe battalion conducted search operations near Ar-gonne in an effort to locate additional enemy harbo rand mortar sites, Company B swept six kilometer stoward the high ground to the northeast, where it es -

tablished Fire Support Base Greene, opening th enorthern portion of the area of operation .

With the regiment firmly established within thearea of operations and initial objectives achieved, Lieu -tenant Colonel Donald ' s 3d Battalion began recon-naissance operations within the Demilitarized Zon eon 25 March. Companies I and K, deployed on hilltop ssouth of the DMZ, overlooking major trail networks ,were assigned the task . The size of reconnaissancepatrols introduced within the zone were to be limited ,according to the rules of engagement, to no more thana reinforced squad . Therefore, a typical 3d Battalionpatrol included a squad of 14 Marines reinforced bya forward air controller, forward observer, platoon lead -er, corpsman, and a machine gun team? Should apatrol become involved in a heavy engagement, a"Sparrow Hawk" reaction force would be deployed t oaid in the squad's extraction, and only its extraction .

According to Major Walters, "contact within theDMZ was light . We did find a considerable amountof ammunition, bunkers, complexes, and we blewthem as we went . But they weren't there to defendthose positions and we never really got into a goo dfight in the DMZ at all . A couple of times we hadto call in a Sparrow [reaction force] and extract th esquads, but never did we get into any serious troublein the DMZ."8 Lieutenant Colonel Donald 's battal-

During a lull in fighting, LCdr Frederick E . Whitaker, chaplain for the 3d Battalion, 4thMarines conducts services for Company M on a ridgeline north of Elliott Combat Base .

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A192846


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Members of Company D, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines load another 81mm mortar round a sthe team prepares to fire on an enemy mortar threatening the battalion near Argonne .

ion maintained patrols within the DMZ, as well as inthe vicinity of Landing Zones Sierra and Mack, bothdesigned to halt enemy infiltration, until the end o fthe operation .

Near Argonne, Captain Buse 's company continue dto sweep northwest toward the high ground, Hill 1154 ,just east of the Laotian border . After a brief fireligh ton the 25th, Buse's Marines pushed through a bunke rsystem, suffering only two wounded, but an artilleryshort round inflicted an additional three killed an d15 wounded . With mortar fire again directed agains tArgonne, Buse was ordered by Lieutenant Colone lClair E. Willcox, who had taken command of the 1s tBattalion following the death of Lieutenant ColonelSargent, to take Hill 1154 and silence the enemy tubes .On 28 March, after fighting off an NVA platoon, th eMarines of Company A pushed through yet anotherbunker complex and captured the hill . With Hill 115 4in Marine hands, enemy activity around and harass-ment of the regiment's western-most fire support bas erapidly decreased .

First Battalion Marines continued search operations

in the vicinity of Argonne until 3 April when the com-mand group and the remainder of Company B movedby helicopter to Fire Support Base Greene . Compan yA Marines searched west and then northeast of Ar-gonne, moving to Greene on the 7th . Companies Cand D swept north from Argonne, conducting opera-tions along the DMZ northeast of LZ Bell . The twocompanies maintained search operations in the area forthe remainder of Purple Martin . After more than twoweeks of fighting around Argonne, Willcox's battalio naccomplished its mission ; enemy infiltration routeswere disrupted, and forces guarding the Ho Chi MinhTrail pushed back into Laos with considerabl ecasualties .

Throughout April and into the first week of May ,the number of 4th Marines engagements with screen-ing elements of the 246th NVA Regiment remainedrelatively constant . Enemy troops encountered, like th emonth before, were well-equipped, well-supplied, andprepared to defend key terrain . On 10 April, whilesearching a section of the upper Song Cam Lo Valley ,two kilometers south of the DMZ, Marines of Corn-

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pany E, 2d Battalion received fire from a well -camouflaged enemy cave complex . Advancing slowl ytoward the complex, set in towering cliffs borderin gthe river, Captain Albert H . Hill's company capturedtwo wounded enemy soldiers, one of whom proved t obe the commander of the 1st Company, 1st Battal-ion, 246th Regiment. Both were extracted immedi-ately and were of considerable intelligence value .

Captain Hill, in order to clear the cave complex,combined both psychological techniques and accept-ed tactics designed for assaulting a fortified position.A psychological operations team, under the battalion' sintelligence officer, was brought in as was a flame sec -tion . Using a loudspeaker, the team, in the face of ene -my hurled obscenities, endeavored to coax the NorthVietnamese troops into surrendering. Three enemysoldiers yielded to the team's entreaties, but the re-mainder refused, and the company, preceded byflamethrowers, assaulted the complex. After clearingthe caves, Hill's Marines began a thorough search ofthe labyrinth, which yielded a substantial cache of in-dividual weapons and ammunition .

By 25 April, having accomplished their goal ofpushing the NVA back into the Demilitarized Zone ,Hill's company and the remainder of the 2d Battal-ion, were ordered south, beyond the range of enem y82mm mortars emplaced within the DMZ . ColonelGoggin directed the 1st and 3d Battalions to do like -

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wise, but still maintain their reconnaissance effortswithin the zone . These positions were being held o n8 May when Operation Purple Martin came to an end .

"Our objectives," noted Major George X . McKen-na, the regimental S-3, "were to search and destroythroughout our AO, to push the enemy back, clea rhim away from our fire support bases, and push himas far north as possible, up to the southern limits ofthe DMZ . This was accomplished by late April, whenall of our units were within 500 meters of the DMZ ,strung over 35 to 40,000 meters on an east-west axis"8The battle had been hard fought . Before it yieldedto the 4th Marines and withdrew into the Demilita-rized Zone and westward into Laos, the 246th NVARegiment suffered over 347 casualties, three times thatof Colonel Goggin's regiment .

Brigade Mauls 27th

With the 4th Marines heavily engaged against th e246th to the northwest, elements of the 1st Brigade ,5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) began areconnaissance-in-force operation in the Khe Chu aValley, north of Dong Ha Mountain (FSB Fuller), be-tween Charlie-3 and the Elliott Combat Base. Unit sof the brigade, up to mid-March, had concentrate don weeding out enemy troops in areas south of Land-ing Zone Sharon, and along the coastal lowlands fro mCua Viet to Wunder Beach . But as elements of the


5 9

27th NVA Regiment moved south from the DMZ, wes tof Cam Lo, with the aim of cutting Route 9, Davi sdirected units of the brigade to advance westward t ocounter the enemy threat .

Codenamed Montana Mauler, the counter -infiltration operation called for two tank troops of th e3d Squadron, 5th Armored Cavalry, reinforced withinfantry, to enter the Khe Chua Valley and attemp t

to engage the 27th Regiment. Once the cavalry troop sencountered enemy units, the 1st Battalion, 11th In-fantry would be brought in to reinforce .

Troops A and B, 3d Squadron, 5th Armored Caval-ry, each with a platoon of infantry from Company D ,1st Battalion, 11th Infantry, swept into the valley fro m

the east on 23 March . The two cavalry troops observe dsmall groups of enemy to the north, and raked themwith tank and artillery from fire support bases withi n

range. The troops made few additional sightings asthey worked westward along separate axes, finally link-ing up in mid-valley early in the afternoon .

At 1000 the following morning, lead elements o fthe cavalry troops encountered an unknown numbe rof NVA soldiers entrenched in bunkers, north of th e

valley. After an exchange of small arms, automati cweapons, RPG, and tank fire, the brigade units pulle dback in order to employ artillery against the enem yforce, now estimated to be a battalion in strength . Arequest was made to Task Force Hotel for reinforce-ments, which in turn ordered Company I, 3d Battal-ion, 9th Marines, under Captain Joseph U. Arroyo,immediately airlifted into a makeshift landing zone

south of the engaged Army troops . The brigade als oalerted two companies of the 1st Battalion, 11th In-fantry to prepare for an assault, on order, into an areanorth of the valley.

The enemy proved surprisingly elusive as Marin eand Army units advanced slowly westward along th esouthern portion of the valley the following day. Thetwo companies of the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry con -ducted their planned air assault north of the valley,completing the movement by mid-afternoon . Due tothe lack of significant engagements throughout theday, the brigade directed the 1st Battalion, with Ar-royo's Marines attached, to sweep northward on the26th in order to regain contact with the enemy bat-talion, suspected to have withdrawn further north .

At 0330, 26 March, before the sweep could be in-itiated, the enemy struck at the night defensive posi-tions of the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry with smal larms, automatic weapons, mortar, and RPG fire, fro mthe north, west, and east, inflicting few casualties . At

daybreak, the battalion observed enemy movement to

the north . As Army infantry elements probed in thatdirection, contact was reestablished and air strikes andartillery employed periodically throughout the day o nthe suspected enemy positions without much success .Experiencing difficulty not only with entrenched ene-my troops, but also with the oppressive heat, as tem-peratures approached 105 degrees, the two companie sreturned to their positions of the previous night and

prepared to resume the attack on the 27th. Meanwhile,Arroyo's Marines advanced northwest without incident ,while the two armored cavalry troops searched the are a

near their previous day's position, finding document sand weapons indicating the presence of the 1st Bat-

talion, 27th NVA Regiment.The 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry resumed its north -

ward advance on the 27th, with Company B assigne dto secure the high ground on the right flank, support-ed by Company A . Arroyo's Marines received the taskof seizing the high ground on the battalion's left .Shortly after beginning their sweep, Companies A andB fell in with elements of the 27th, occupying bunkers

to the companies ' northeast. Air strikes were called, fol -

lowed by artillery fire on terrain ahead of the line o f

march . Midday found the two Army infantry compa-nies just short of their objective . Meanwhile, CompanyC helilifted into blocking positions near Hill 208, th e

enemy's main position . As Company B moved fowar dtoward the high ground, its objective, the enemy agai n

struck with mortar fire and a ground counter-assaul tfrom the north. Again, the Army commander calle dair strikes and artillery to support the fires of Compa-ny B, which repulsed the enemy assault after an hour.

Shortly thereafter, Company A too came under attack .And again tactical air struck the disruptive blow . Ar-royo's Marines took their objective on the left withou t

incident . The day's heavy fighting accounted for 120enemy soldiers killed, while friendly losses numbere d

13 . Company B lost all of its officers except for a for -

ward observer, who took command of the companyduring the latter stages of the day's fighting .

The three companies of the 1st Battalion, 11th In-fantry, supplemented by Company I, 9th Marines, re-sumed search operations on the 28th, encounterin g

few enemy troops . As added reinforcement, the re-maining elements of Company D, 1st Battalion, 11t hInfantry helilifted into the area from FSB Sharon. Alsoduring the day, elements of the 3d Squadron, 5th Ar-mored Cavalry moved into the eastern portion of th eKhe Chua Valley in support of Company C on th eright flank, which occupied Hill 208 .

60


The following day turned out to be one of heav yfighting with considerable losses inflicted on the ene-my. While attempting to secure a position in supportof the planned helicopter assault by Arroyo's Marines ,troops of Company D engaged an NVA force occupy-ing a bunker complex on the right flank . Employingsmall arms, riot control agents (CS gas), and air strikes ,the company accounted for five NVA killed . Movingnorth along a ridge, west of Company D, CompanyA also came under heavy attack, estimated at an NVAcompany. Attacking from the north, the enemy usedsmall arms and RPG fire in an attempt to outflan kand isolate the company's northernmost platoon . Ex-pertly directed small arms and helicopter gunship fire,followed by massive air strikes, met the advance . A selements of Company B reinforced Company A, allunits then came under mortar attacks from the north -west . In heavy fighting, Army and Marine defender sfinally broke the enemy's daylong ground and mor-tar assault, counting more than 30 NVA dead .

During the next four days, the 1st Battalion, 11thInfantry conducted extensive search and clear opera-tions over the battleground, moving in an east -southeast direction, looking for bypassed enemy po -

sitions and personnel . The 1st Battalion, 2d ARVNRegiment, helilifted into the area of operations on th e29th, initially searched along the southern boundary ofthe DMZ west of Con Thien, and then joined the 11t hInfantry in a sweep of the northern half of the battl earea . The combined Army, Marine, and ARVN forc eencountered few enemy troops, and consequently, th eoperation was terminated on 3 April . Elements of th e27th NUA Regiment lost close to 300 troops as a resul tof the short allied strike into the Khe Chua Valley .

With the end of Montana Mauler, Arroyo' s Marine sreturned to the 9th Marines while the 1st Battalion ,11th Infantry split . Company A returned to the coasta llowlands, while Companies B and C, joined by Troo pA, 4th Squadron, 12th Cavalry ; and Battery B, 1st Bat -talion, 40th Artillery ; formed Task Force 1/11 andmoved south . At Ca Lu, east of Vandegrift Comba tBase, the task force was joined by Task Force 3/5, com -posed of Troops A and B, 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry ;elements of Company D, 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry ;and Battery B, 5th Battalion, 4th Artillery, in a swee pof the Ba Long Valley. Beginning at the western endof the valley, the two task forces swept eastward alongthe Song Quang Tri, clearing Route 556, in a five-da y

Crouched in elephant grass, a Marine witnesses the results of a close air support missio nflown by an F-4 Phantom. From bases at Da Nang and Chu Lai, Marine Phantoms provid-ed air support for allied ground units operating throughout the I Corps Tactical Zone .

Marine Corps Historical Collection


6 1

Marine Corps Historical Collectio n

A veteran of the Combined Action Program, Col Ed-ward F. Danowitz assumed command of the 9th Ma-rines from Col Robert H. Barrow on 9 April 1969.

operation, codenamed Ellis Ravine. The operation ter-minated on 13 April with disappointing results : oneViet Cong killed and his weapon captured .

The 9th Battles the 36th

The central portion of the Demilitarized Zone re-mained the main arena in which heavy fighting tookplace during April, as Marine and ARVN units fough ta series of heated engagements with enemy forces con-centrated in the region between Con Thien and Mut-ter's Ridge, 14 kilometers to the southwest . Elements ofthe 36th NVA Regiment apparently began infiltratin ginto the central DMZ region of Quang Tri Province i n

early April as replacement for the 27th NVA Regiment,which had sustained severe losses during Operatio nMontana Mauler. Although provided guides and liai-son personnel from the departing 27th, infiltratingunits of the 36th clearly were unfamiliar with the ter -rain and the maneuver capabilities and disposition o fallied troops in the area, a factor which ultimately wasto cost the regiment the equivalent of one battalion .

With the end of Operation Dewey Canyon, TaskForce Hotel gave the 9th Marines the mission of secur-ing a number of allied installations within the 3d Di -vision's area of operation, replacing units of the 3d

and 4th Marines, heavily engaged in western Quan g

Tri Province. Although still headquartered at Van-degrift Combat Base, but now under the command

of Colonel Edward F. Danowitz, who replaced Colone lBarrow on 9 April, companies of the regiment werescattered from Oceanview on the coast to Fire Sup -port Base Alpine, north of Lang Vei .

The first of a series of separate contacts with the 36th

Regiment took place about seven kilometers northwes tof Cam Lo on 9 April, when, at 1030, a 1st Battalion ,9th Marines patrol, moving toward a predetermine dhelicopter extraction point, encountered an enem y

unit estimated at 30 to 40 troops . Engaging the ene-my in a day-long running firefight, the patrol kille d19 NVA, before being successfully extracted during th elate evening . Two days later, on the 11th, a secondpatrol from Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J . Culkin' sbattalion detected 20 enemy soldiers, five kilometersnorthwest of the 9 April contact .* Artillery fire andfixed-wing air strikes claimed 16 NVA ; no Marin e

casualties resulted from either action .

Minor skirmishes between the 9th Marines and for -

ward elements of the 36th continued across the cen-tral DMZ front until the 21st . At 1440, a reinforcedNVA company, armed with automatic weapons, RPGs,satchel charges, and supported by mortars, struck a tCompany G, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, under Firs tLieutenant James M . Horn, eight kilometers north -east of Elliott Combat Base . Horn's company, scattere din three separate, mutually supporting night defen-sive postions, contained the enemy 's initial thrust, thencounterattacked behind supporting air and artiller y

fires, forcing the enemy to flee northward . Results ofthe night-long battle were 42 NVA killed, 3 take nprisoner, and 27 weapons captured ; Company G losteight killed and 23 wounded .

On 23 April, Captain Donald K. Shockey, Jr :s Com -pany E, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines encountered an ene-my force in the open moving south, midway betwee nCam Lo and Elliott, three kilometers north of Route9 . Engaging the force with small arms and artiller yfire, Shockey' s Marines pursued the enemy unit, fi-nally driving it into caves . Launching an assault agains tthe heavily fortified position just before noon, Shock-ey's company seized the site after two hours of fierc ecombat, killing 14 NVA troops and capturing a n82mm mortar, while losing eight killed and 17 wound -

*Lieutenant Colonel Culkin relieved Lieutenant Colonel GeorgeW. Smith as commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marine son 31 March .

62

HIGH MOBILITY AND STANDDOW N

ed. As the month closed, the 9th Marines bega npreparing to be relieved by elements of the 3d an d4th Marines .

One day earlier, on the 22d, two battalions of th e2d ARVN Regiment joined the 9th Marines in clear-ing the front ; the 4th Battalion, brought in by Ma-rine helicopters, landed 13 kilometers northwest ofCam Lo and began a sweep to the east, while the 5t hBattalion, supported by Marine tanks of Company B ,3d Tank Battalion, attacked from the east . Thismaneuver, calculated to trap elements of the 36thRegiment between the two battalions, achieved its firstsolid contact on the 27th, when an unknown-size ene-my force mounted a night attack against the 4th Bat-talion, deployed on Hill 208, site of heavy actio nduring Operation Montana Mauler . The ARVN bat-talion held its position, killing 27 enemy troops andcapturing 17 weapons .

Five days of heavy combat followed, the brunt o fwhich was borne by the 2d ARVN Regiment . Employ-

ing the combined firepower of air, artillery, and tank sof Company B and then Company A, the two Viet-namese battalions pressed the attack, killing nearly 25 0enemy troops by 2 May. Action thereafter was limite dlargely to mopping up isolated pockets of resistance .

While there was evidence of increased North Viet-namese Army presence in crossborder areas of theDemilitarized Zone, and attempts to infiltrate troopsinto the central region of Quang Tri Province durin gMarch and April, the enemy launched no massive ef-fort to contest the region . He instead withdrew hisforces into DMZ sanctuaries when pressed by the 4t hMarines and the combined efforts of the 2d ARVNRegiment, 9th Marines, and the Army's 1st Brigade ,5th Infantry Division .

The Vietnam Salien t

During the 1968 siege of Khe Sanh, the North Viet-namese employed armored elements against the Spe-cial Forces camp at Lang Vei, 13 kilometers north o f

Col Paul D. Lafond, Commanding Officer, 3d Marines briefs, from left, MajGen Car lA . Youngdale, Deputy Commanding General, III MAF ; LtGen Henry W. Buse, Jr., Com-manding General, FMFPac; MajGen Raymond G. Davis; and BGen Frank E . Garretson ,Commanding General, Task Force Hotel, on search operations in the Vietnam Salient .



6 3

Abel Papers, Marine Corps Historical Cente r

LtCol James J. McMonagle's 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, in search of North Vietnames esoldiers, patrols an enemy infiltration route littered with vehicle wreckage near Laos .

Route 926, which enters that portion of Quang TriProvince protruding southeast into Laos, commonl ytermed the "Vietnam Salient ." Intelligence gained dur-ing early March 1969 from reconnaissance team report sand sensors indicated a sizable increase in truck an dtracked vehicle activity in the area, adding credence t othe possibility that again enemy support and mecha-nized units had entered South Vietnam . The enemy' s"logistics nose" needed to be blunted once more .

North Vietnamese use of Route 616, an extensio nof Route 926 from Laos, for the movement and stag-ing of supplies and infiltrating troops, was to be ex-pected . With 9th Marines' Operation Dewey Canyo nin Base Area 611 and 101st Airborne Division's Oper-ation Massachusetts Striker in the A Shau Valley clog-ging the enemy's primary lines of communication t othe south, he was obliged to seek an alternate route .Moreover, the area' s rugged terrain and position, sur-rounded on three sides by Laos, offered a majoradvantage—security.

Terrain within the salient, while providing Nort hVietnamese Army support and logistical units with amargin of security, posed no major obstacle to Ma-rines . The western area, bordering the Song Xe Po nand Laos, generally consisted of a large `U' shaped val-ley, surrounded by high ground with a jungle-covere dhill mass at the center. Terrain in the eastern and

northern portions of the salient, roughly south o fRoute 9, consisted of rugged mountains, punctuatedby valleys covered with elephant grass and scru bgrowth . As in Operation Dewey Canyon, Marine swould use the now-standard mobile concept of oper-ations ; establishing fire support bases on the hig hground and then moving out under an artillery um-brella in company search operations .

Elements of the 3d Marine Division had penetrat-ed the salient twice before. In June of 1968, a multi -regiment campaign virtually destroyed two regiment sof the 308th NVA Division . Three months later, areconnaissance-in-force conducted by the 9th Marinesencountered no significant enemy force . Task Forc eHotel assigned the mission of confirming the enemy' spresence and again clearing the salient to Colonel PaulD. Lafond's 3d Marines, recently returned to QuangTri Province after participating with units of the 1s tMarine Division in Operation Taylor Common, south -west of Da Nang .

The scheme of maneuver for the 3d Marines' thrustinto the Vietnam Salient, codenamed Maine Crag ,called for the 1st and 2d Battalions to conduct helicop-ter assaults from FSB Snapper, four kilometerssoutheast of Lang Vei, to seize and establish fire sup -port bases in the southern portion of the salient, an dthen fan out in company-size search and clear opera-

64


tions, blocking the western terminus of Route 616 a tthe Laotian border . Concurrently, a U.S . Army taskforce, under the operational control of the 3d Marines ,would attack westward from the Vandegrift-Ca Lucomplex along Route 9 to Lang Vei, thence southward ,linking up with the Marines . Subsequently, the 3d Ma-rines in coordination with elements of the 2d ARVNRegiment, would attack eastward along Route 616 i na deliberate search to locate and destroy enemy forces ,fortifications, and supply caches . Although as initial-ly planned, the operation was to begin with a two -battalion helicopter advance into the salient, ba dweather made it necessary to launch a single battal-ion by foot from Route 91 0

On 10 March, in preparation, Lieutenant ColonelJames J. McMonagle's 2d Battalion, 3d Marineshelilifted into LZ Hawk, just south of Route 9, an dbegan overland movement to FSB Snapper, seve nkilometers to the southwest, by way of the Khe SanhPlateau. Supported by 155mm howitzers of the 1s tProvisional Howitzer Battery on FSB Cates, the bat-talion reached Snapper after a night's forced march ."It was a moonless night," remembered LieutenantColonel McMonagle, "there were quite a bit of streamsthat we had to cross, a heck of a lot of elephant gras swhich impeded movement, and the matter of main-taining direction by Foxtrot Company, who had thepoint on this, was a real task and it was really amaz-ing how they were able to find this place goingthrough elephant grass at that time of the evening ,but they did ."" The following morning, the battal-ion initiated search operations in the vicinity of th efire support base .

Operation Maine Crag officially began on the 15th ,as Battery A, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines lifted intoSnapper, and three companies of Lieutenant Colone lMcMonagle's battalion pushed overland toward Rout e616, reaching FSB Saigon, overlooking the road, th efollowing day. On the 17th, Companies G and H con-tinued southwest to Route 616, leaving Company Fas security for Battery C, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines ,which had moved from Vandegrift to Saigon .

As elements of McMonagle's battalion probed th esalient they encountered few enemy troops ; those the ydid encounter consisted primarily of solitary snipersand ambushers, who quickly disappeared into th eheavy jungle growth when engaged by the battalion' spoint. But on the 18th, these solitary engagement sproduced tangible results . While in ambush position salong Route 616, Marines of Company G observed two

east-bound enemy trucks approach their position . Al-lowing the first truck, which was empty, to pass, th eambush opened fire on the second, destroying it an dits cargo of 122mm rocket and mortar ammunition .The Marines then attacked the security element of th elead truck, which had halted a short distance dow nthe road . The following morning, the enemy sen tseven soldiers to check out the ambush site, and Com-pany G ambushed them also. 1 2

On the 19th, Colonel Lafond ' s 3d Marines assume doperational control of Task Force Remagen, under thecommand of Army Lieutenant Colonel Carmelo P .Milia, which consisted of Company B, 1st Battalion ,61st Mechanized Infantry ; Company C, 1st Battalion ,77th Armor ; Battery C, 1st Battalion, 40th Artiller y(105mm self-propelled) ; two M42 self-propelled"Dusters" (dual-mounted 40mm cannons) from 1s tBattalion, 44th Artillery (AWSP) ; 4 .2mm mortars (self-propelled) from 1st Battalion, 77th Armor ; and Armyand Marine bulldozers, organized into three teams .The task force, which had advanced along Route 9from Ca Lu to the Khe Sanh Plateau, was to turn southand establish blocking positions at the western endof Route 616 in the vicinity of the Song Xe Pon andinitiate search operations, effectively screening the 3dMarines, operating to the east .

Three companies of Lieutenant Colonel John S .Kyle ' s 1st Battalion helilifted into FSB Saigon on th e19th, and then moved to the southwest, supported b ytwo Ontos disguised as bulldozers, toward the Laoti-an border .* Concurrently, Companies G, H, and late rE, continued moving eastward along Route 616 ,searching the draws and ridgelines and encounterin ga number of squad-size enemy groups in protectivebunker complexes . The ensuing firefights were usuallyof short duration and involved few casualties . On 20March, however, a water patrol from Company H wa sambushed as it approached a stream approximatel y1,000 meters north of the road, resulting in three Ma-rines killed and 15 wounded .

Patrolling near the Phou Nhoi Hill mass, the are aof the previous day's ambush, First Lieutenant Wil-liam C . Helton's Company H on the 21st discovere dwhat appeared to be an extensive staging area for ap-proximately 150 enemy troops and a storage site con-taining rice and other foodstuffs . Between shor tfirefights with security forces, the Marines of Compa-ny H eventually found a rice cache totaling over 35 0

*The Ontos was a lightly armored, tracked antitank vehicle arme dwith six coaxially-mounted 106mm recoilless rifles .


65

66


Abel Papers, Marine Corps His orical Center

A camouflaged Russian truck used by the North Viet-namese to transport supplies from Laotian supportbases into South Vietnam that was uncovered by the3d Marines during operations in the Vietnam Salient .

tons . The significant feature of the rice find was thatit was of high quality and contained in bags withChinese markings—evidence that rice denial opera-tions in the coastal lowlands were having the desire deffect on NVA efforts to live off the land . In the samegeneral search area, Lieutenant Helton's Marines foun dsizeable amounts of small arms, mortar, and RPG am -munition, and 7,000 pounds of salt, loaded in aFrench truck with Russian tires and American mark-ings . The captured rice was subsequently extractedfrom the storage site, moved to the coastal lowlands ,and distributed to refugees recently resettled withi nQuang Tri Province.

During the next several days, the three companie sof Lieutenant Colonel McMonagle's 2d Battalion con-tinued to search the area bordering the eastern bound-ary of the salient, finding additional caches ofmunitions and food while encountering few largegroups of enemy troops . "What we had in effect work-ing there," reported Lieutenant Colonel McMonagle ,"was Echo Company on the north, . . . Hotel Com-pany on the west, Gulf Company on the south, and

the enemy was ricocheting off of these three compa-nies . . . . Those that did manage to get through, an dit was very easy for him because the vegetation wasthick and there were a number of trails that couldn ' tbe physically covered, the AO [aerial observer] was abl eto pick them up ." 3 After initial enemy attempts t odefend the storage sites, the Marines met very littl eopposition as search operations progressed . Docu-ments and prisoner interrogation confirmed the as-sumption that the entire area was lightly defended b yservice units and newly infiltrated troops .

In the first two weeks of April, the NVA launche d14 attacks-by-fire against 3d Marines and ARVN po-sitions, employing mortars, 85mm field guns, an d122mm rockets, all fired from sanctuaries in Laos .However, by this point the principal storage sites i nthe area had been uncovered, and allied units begansweeping out of the salient . On 6 April, operationa lcontrol of Task Force Remagen passed from the 3d Ma -rines to Task Force Hotel at Vandegrift Combat Base ,as the Army task force moved out of the salient an dbegan operations near the Khe Sanh Plateau . "Thi sforce," noted Colonel Lafond, "was a tremendous as-sist to the 3d Marines and gave us an anti-tank capa-bility that as it turned out wasn ' t completely necessaryin that we received no tank attack from the enemy,but one can never be sure that its very presence didn' tdeter such an attack ."" Withdrawal operations con-tinued as the 3d Battalion, 2d ARVN Regimen thelilifted to Dong Ha City on the 16th . The ARVNBattalion had made few significant enemy contacts ,except for fending off an NVA attack, during it smonth-long search operation around FSB Torch, nort hof Route 616 . However, "on one occasion which shoul dbe highlighted," reported Colonel Lafond, "at a tim ewhen 2/3 had temporarily moved outside the artiller yfan from Saigon, ARVN artillery from Fire Suppor tBase Torch supported the 2d Battalion, 3d Marine scontacts near the rice caches. This support was superb,it was responsive, and it was fast, and it was accurate .'"

Elements of the 3d Marines, instead of being ex-tracted, moved from the salient in mid-April to an areaof the lower Song Da Krong Valley, bordering on Laos .The next two weeks, as companies rotated to Cua Vie tfor a period of rest and resupply, the regiment sweptthe area encountering few enemy troops . The last daysof April and first two days of May saw the battalion sslowly pulled out of the area and helilifted to the cen-tral portion of Quang Tri Province, south of the DMZ ,where they were positioned for Operation Virgini aRidge .


6 7

The seven-week, combined 3d Marines, Army, andARVN thrust into the Vietnam Salient and lower D aKrong hit the enemy quite literally in the breadbasket, where he did not have the wherewithal to resis teffectively. In addition to losing over 600 tons of rice ,7,000 pounds each of sugar and salt, and 2,000 pound seach of powdered milk, peanut butter, and miscellane-ous canned food, the enemy lost 207 soldiers, over 40 0weapons, and 775,000 rounds of assorted ammunition .

Apache Snow

Despite the success of the 9th Marines in Opera-tion Dewey Canyon and the recent accomplishment sof the 3d Marines in the Vietnam Salient, reports fro mBru tribesmen and North Vietnamese Army defectors(Hoi Chanhs) indicated that several regimental-siz eenemy units remained located in the northern por-tion of Base Area 611, south of the salient . It was be-lieved that elements of the 6th and 9th NVA InfantryRegiments, the 675th Artillery Regiment, and vari-ous support units, operated within the area . In addi-tion, aerial reconnaissance reports confirmed the belie fthat Route 922 was under repair, and that the NVAwere again moving men and materiel into the north-ern A Shau Valley and then eastward into Base Area

101, located astride the Quang Tri-Thua Thien provin-cial boundary.

Under the overall control of Lieutenant GeneralRichard G . Stilwell's XXIV Corps at Phu Bai, element sof the 3d Marine Division and 101st Airborne Division,in coordination with the 1st ARVN Division, were or-dered to conduct operations, codenamed Apach eSnow, in the northern A Shau and southern Da Kron gValleys, cutting enemy supply and infiltration routesat the Laotian border, and destroying enemy forces ,base camps, and supply caches . D-Day was set for 1 5May, but subsequently moved forward to the 10th.

XXIV Corps assigned the 1st and 2d Battalions, 9thMarines the task of occupying the southern Da Kron gand blocking enemy escape routes into Laos alon gRoute 922 . On 3 May, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J .Culkin's 1st Battalion lifted into FSB McClintock an d12 Tarawa, replacing elements of the 3d Battalion, 3 dMarines . From its Tarawa position, the battalio ndeployed one of its companies, Company D, com-manded by Captain Leonard F. Chapman III, son ofMarine Commandant Leonard F. Chapman, Jr ., over-land to reestablish Fire Support Base Razor. " Travel-ing the tedious and the difficult terrain," reportedColonel Edward F. Danowitz, "Delta Company was

Vietnamese Regional Force soldiers load the tons of rice captured by the 3d Marines i nthe Vietnam Salient onto trucks for distribution to the refugees of Quang Tri Province .The secured rice was enough to feed more than 5,000 enemy soldiers for one month .


68

HIGH MOBILITY AND STANDOWN

able to uncover FSB Razor, therefore eliminating th enecessity for a heliborne assault, saving the require-ment for supporting arms, maintaining the securit yand secrecy of the operation, and in effect adding t othe feasibility of the landing" of the 2d Battalion, 9thMarines, under Lieutenant Colonel George C . Fox, o nthe 7th .16 Operation Apache Snow began for the 9thMarines on the 10th, when Culkin's battalion leap -frogged south over Fox's battalion and assaulted int oFSB Erskine, overlooking the upper Song Da Kron gand Route 922 . The lift into Erskine was not withou tincident, as enemy fire downed a CH-46 transpor thelicopter, killing seven Marines and wounding five .

During the early stages of the operation, it becameapparent that large-size enemy units had yet to recon-stitute within the Da Krong Valley following theirdefeat in Dewey Canyon two months earlier . Culkin'sbattalion, continuously patrolling in the vicinity ofErskine and Route 922, skirmished with several smal lNVA units with disappointing results, and towards th eend of May swept east, initiating patrol operations nearabandoned FSB Lightning. Lieutenant Colonel Fox' s2d Battalion, patrolling from FSB Razor and LZ Dal-las, eight kilometers north-northeast of Erskine, en -countered numerous small enemy units . On 23 May,for example, a platoon from Company F engaged fiveNVA, occupying a bunker complex along a stream, fivekilometers west-southwest of Razor . As one Marin esquad maneuvered against the concealed enemy po-sition, the remainder of the unit massed small arm sand automatic weapons fire on the bunkers . The en -suing assault accounted for four enemy killed and oneprisoner. The platoon sustained no casualties duringthe brief encounter.

While the Da Krong remained relatively quiet, th esame could not be said for the A Shau where XXI VCorps tasked four battalions of the 101st Airborne Di -vision (Airmobile), in coordination with elements ofthe 1st ARVN Division, with the destruction of enemyconcentrations within the valley. On the morning of10 May, Army and ARVN battalions helilifted into thevalley and began multiple sweeps toward the Laotianborder. While patrolling near the border the follow-ing day, Company B, 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry en -countered an unknown size enemy force, positione din a well-defended hut and bunker complex at the baseof Hill 937 (Dong Ap Bia), three kilometers south -west of A Luoi . Over the next four days, the battalio nendeavored to push through the complex toward thesummit, supported by heavy volumes of artillery, mor -

tar, gunship, and tactical air fire, without much suc-cess . On 15 May, the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantrymoved to assist the mired battalion . Both battalion sthen mounted a counterattack and pursued the enemyup the hill, meeting stubborn resistance as theypushed their way up the jungle-covered slopes . Thetempo of the battle increased as the attacking forc eneared the crest of Hill 937, encountering fresh, well -disciplined NVA forces defending one fortified, mutu-ally supporting bunker complex after another . As aresult, elements of the 2d Battalion, 506th Infantr ywere committed on the 18th, followed by the 2d Bat-talion, 501st Infantry and 2d Battalion, 3d ARV NRegiment on the 19th .

By the morning of the 20th, with all battalions i nposition, they joined in the final assault on the con-tested hill complex . Once taken, the combined Armyand ARVN force then pursued the remaining enemyelements southwest down a ridgeline to the Laotianborder, less than three kilometers from the crest ofthe hill .'' The weeklong battle cost the 9th and 29thNVA Regiments more than 500 killed . Testifying tofierce fighting on the hill, later termed "Hamburge rHill" by the remaining infantrymen of the 3d Battal-ion, 187th Infantry, was the friendly toll—44 soldier skilled and 297 wounded .

Dong Ap Bia secure, the battalions involved re -oriented their search operations in an effort to des -troy remnants of the two NVA regiments . Althoughoperations throughout the A Shau continued until 7June, the NVA avoided all but minor engagements .

With Army and ARVN forces heavily engaged inthe A Shau, a platoon from Company C, 3d Enginee rBattalion completed the first of three cuts of Rout e922 in the Da Krong on 25 May. Two were 12 feet wideand 20 feet deep, and the third, 12 feet wide and 1 0feet deep . The following day, the platoon caused two50-meter landslides and blew a 50-meter, enem yhand-constructed revetment. With the interdiction ofRoute 922 complete, Culkin' s battalion lifted out ofthe area of operations and returned to VandegriftCombat Base on the 27th, followed by Fox's battalion ."Contact with the enemy during the initial phases ofthe [three-week] operation," noted Colonel Danowitz ,"was light and it continued to be light, mainly agains tsmall elements, reconnaissance units or screening forc efor the major North Vietnamese forces, which accord-ing to the progress of the operation, indicated tha tthey had moved into Laos as well as south into th earea of the 1st ARVN, but were not to remain to stan dand fight against the 9th Marines" le


6 9


Marine 105mm howitzer crews watch as an Army CH-47 Chinook helicopter hovers afte rlanding ammunition at Fire Support Base Razor. The artillerymen were supporting th ejoint 101st Airborne-9th Marines attack, code-named Apache Snow, into the A Shau Valley .

The 3d Marine Division' s mobile posture, involvin gthe continuous deployment of maneuver battalions inwestern Quang Tri Province, succeeded in reducing th eenemy threat from the west . During June, Colone lDanowitz's 9th Marines continued the effort, par-ticipating in Operations Cameron Falls and Uta hMesa . These two concurrent operations were targete dagainst elements of the 304th NVA Division, attempt-ing to reestablish a presence south of Route 9 .

Evidence from reconnaissance and other intelligenc esources suggested that divisional troops had infiltrat-ed into the lower Da Krong Valley, moved east alon gRoute 616, and then north along the river . In addi-tion, the series of rocket attacks on Vandegrift Com-bat Base in May signaled the start of a period o fplanned pressure on allied positions by the 57th NVARegiment, 304th Division . Task Force Hotel assigne dDanowitz's Marines the mission of conducting searc hand destroy operations in an area bordered on th enorth by the Song Quang Tri, on the south by the D aKrong, on the east by Fire Support Base Shepherd ,and on the west by Fire Support Base Henderson ; anarea considered critical to the security of not only Van-degrift Combat Base, but of the Ba Long Valley, entry -way from the west into the population centers o fQuang Tri and Dong Ha .

Operation Cameron Falls, which began on 29 May,shifted the efforts of the 9th Marines from th esouthern Da Krong to the northern extremities of th emountainous river valley, south of Vandegrift . Move-ment into the objective area went unopposed as Lieu -tenant Colonel Fox's 2d Battalion occupied Fire Sup -port Base Whisman and the 3d Battalion, under Lieu -tenant Colonel Oral R. Swigart, Jr., FSB Shepherd, be -low FSB Cates, on Route 9 . In establishing its positio non Whisman, Marines of the 2d Battalion, accordin gto Colonel Danowitz, "rapidly and wisely selected po-sitions for the defense of the fire support base ; plac-ing wire, fighting holes, obstacles, and of course ,claymores, and tripflares in their protective defens eplan. The defensive fire plan was fired and prepare dprior to last light" This preparation paid off for at 021 5on the 1st, a small enemy force attempting to prob eWhisman hit a listening post, causing the death oftwo Marines and alerting the fire base. As a result,defenders from Company G ably countered the sub-sequent heavy attack against the base, killing 19 o fthe enemy while suffering minor casualties . This at -tack on Whisman, remarked Colonel Danowitz, "wa san unusual aspect of the operation, because never be -fore had the enemy been able to strike within hour sof the initial establishment of the fire support base .

70


But in this case it was attempted and very readil y

thwarted"' 9During the attack on Whisman, a prisoner as well as

a defector were taken, both of whom acknowledged theexistence of a command post of the 57th NVA Regi-ment to the southwest of the fire support base. Ex-ploiting this information, Lieutenant Colonel Fox dir-ected Companies F and G toward the area reported t ocontain the enemy headquarters . But before this couldbe accomplished, the battalion received fresh intelli-gence indicating the movement of a large enemy forcenortheast toward Hill 824 (Dong Cho) . Danowit ztherefore redirected the attack toward the hill mass ,with the two companies of the 2d Battalion moving t othe northeast along the Da Krong, and two companie sof the 3d Battalion advancing east from Shepherd ."The terrain," reported Lieutenant Colonel Swigart ,"was very rough, characterized by triple-canopy rai nforest and elephant grass that ran as high as 12 feet. . . . Because of the hot weather, I guess the troop ssuffered more in the elephant grass than they did i nthe triple-canopy because down in the 12-foot-hig helephant grass, there was no breeze at all, in fact ther ewas the feeling that you couldn't breathe properly" 2 0

As elements of the two battalions converged on Hill

824, it became increasingly evident that the enemywas deployed around the hill in strength . Advancin g

to the northeast on 5 June, Company H encountered adug-in enemy battalion on the southern banks of the

Da Krong. During the initial engagement, which last-ed more than 12 hours, 29 enemy troops were killed ;subsequent sweeps of the area revealed additional bod -ies, numerous bunkers, caves, and living quarters, al l

of which were destroyed . As Marines of Swigart's bat-talion continued to move toward the hill, they too en -countered and engaged sizable enemy forces . "Theenemy encountered," noted Lieutenant ColonelSwigart, "were quite effective, they were well-armed ,well-supplied, they had on new uniforms, and indi-cations were that they were an enemy force that ha dbeen newly introduced into the area of operations" 2 1

On 11 June, elements of the 2d Battalion resecure dFire Support Base Henderson in preparation for thepositioning of two batteries of the 2d Battalion, 12thMarines . The remainder of Fox's battalion continue dsearch operations along the Da Krong in the south -western sector of the assigned regimental area, wit hlittle success, until the 15th, when the battalionreturned to Vandegrift Combat Base .

View of Dong Ap Bia, or Hamburger Hill, after it was secured by elements of the 3 dBrigade, 101st Airborne Division, which suffered more than 300 casualties in taking the hill .

Author 's Collection


7 1

Swigart's Marines continued company sweeps in th eDong Cho Mountain complex until the 18th when or-dered to reorient their advance toward the western por-tion of the area of operations, south of Shepherd, inan effort to exploit a number of reconnaissance sight-ings . On the 23d, Task Force Hotel shifted operationa lcontrol of the battalion to Task Force Guadalcanal i nanticipation of the battalion's relief of the 1st Battal-ion, 9th Marines .

Intelligence gained during Operation Camero nFalls, in addition to sensor reports, aerial observation ,and reconnaissance patrol reports, indicated that dur-ing May and early June, elements of a second regi-ment of the 304th NVA Division, the 24th, andattached support units, had infiltrated south and east ,toward the Khe Sanh Plateau. As a result, a joint taskforce, codenamed Guadalcanal, consisting of the 1s tBattalion, 9th Marines and Task Force Mustang fro mthe 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) ,was established, and in coordination with the 2d an d3d Battalions, 2d ARVN Regiment, directed by Tas kForce Hotel to drive the NVA out .

The joint Marine, Army, and ARVN effort in theKhe Sanh Plateau, codenamed Utah Mesa, began o n12 June with the helilift of Lieutenant Colonel Cul-kin's 1st Battalion, 9th Marines into 12 Bison and FS BCates, and the 3d Battalion, 2d ARVN Regiment intoFSB Quantico, northeast of Khe Sanh . Their missio nwas to conduct offensive sweeps west to Khe Sanh ,destroying troops and supplies, securing the division' swestern flank, and spoiling any enemy attempte dbuildup which might threaten allied installations an dlines of communications . ARVN forces, although con-sidered an integral element, operated in a separat earea, generally north of the Marine and Army taskforce, which gradually advanced to the southwest ,along an axis centered on Route 9 .

On 13 June, the 2d Battalion, 2d ARVN Regiment ,lifted into LZ Cokawa, north of FSB Cates, and be-gan searching to the west . Two days later, Culkin'sCompany D moved to LZ Horn in order to secure th eflanks of Task Force Mustang, which consisted of Com -panies B and C, 1st Battalion, 61st Mechanized In-fantry, and Company B, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor ,advancing west along Route 9 .

Reacting to the combined thrust, elements of th e24th Regiment conducted a series of night attacksagainst allied units, the first taking place on 18th . Be-tween 0335 and 0530, an estimated 100 NVA troop sattacked Company B, 61st Infantry's night defensive

postion, east of Lang Vei. Using machine gun and RP Gfire, the enemy broke through the perimeter and en -gaged Army troops in heavy close combat . At dawn ,the enemy withdrew, leaving 11 bodies inside thedefensive wire and 30 outside, in addition to 1 2weapons and 100 satchel charges . Company B lost 1 1killed and 15 wounded as a result of the attack .

Later that morning, a squad-size reconnaissanc epatrol from Company C, 9th Marines, while search-ing an area three kilometers southeast of Khe Sanh ,engaged a well-armed, well-entrenched, and well -camouflaged NVA company. The enemy initiated th eambush with a burst of .50 caliber machine gun fire ,instantly killing three Marines . The squad returne dfire, knocking out the machine gun position, andcalled for reinforcements . The enemy company thenmaneuvered to outflank the squad; however, thesquad, having linked up with a nearby platoon, struc kthe enemy's right flank . The remainder of CompanyC joined the battle and assaulted the enemy position ,driving the NVA company southward, into artilleryblocking fires .

Continuing the push westward, elements of the taskforce were again struck on the 20th . Early that morn-ing, the enemy, in three separate ground attacks, hitthe combined position of Company B, 61st Infantr yand Company D, 9th Marines . With the assistance ofhelicopter gunship fire, fixed-wing air strikes, and ar-tillery, Army and Marine infantrymen repulsed the as-saults, accounting for 27 NVA dead . Two days later,Marines of the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines effected arelief-in-place of Culkin's battalion, which then move dto Vandegrift Combat Base, where it stood down i npreparation for redeployment to Okinawa.

Throughout the remainder of the operation, thenumber of engagements between allied forces and ele-ments of the 24th remained high, as small enem yunits, in an attempt to halt the advance, continue dto attack friendly night defensive positions, bu twithout success . On 24 June, two NVA platoons as -sailed the positions of Company K, 9th Marines, southof Route 9 . "On the morning of the 24th at abou t0130," reported First Lieutenant Patrick P. Oates, com-manding the 1st Platoon, "our ambush, which was ou tabout 75 meters, was hit from three different sides.They were hit mainly by chicoms [grenades] and smallarms fire . This alerted the lines, everybody got onstand-to and the ambush started filtering in one byone . . . . Nobody on the sector of the lines wher ethe ambush was, opened-up until after all of the am-

72



Engineers accompanying the 9th Marines clear a land-ing zone for resupply and medical evacuation helicop-ters in heavily wooded terrain south of Vandegrzft.

bush was in with the exception of the one Marine wh owas killed." At about the same time, other sectionsof the company's position came under fire . "After thelast of the ambush came in," continued Lieutenan tOates, "1st Platoon sector started receiving heavy smal larms fire, at which time we called in 60mm morta rmissions which gave us outstanding support, an dknocked out the depth of the attack and broke up themain attack . We had several different occasions wher ethey came very close to the line and then the troopscould hear them crawling through the elephant gras son their retreat . This firefight lasted about four an da half hours . . . . At approximately 7 a .m. we starte da sweep of the area and that is when we started com-ing up with all the bodies and gear. Closest bodie swere about 10 to 15 meters from the lines ; there wefound AKs and Chinese light machine guns "

On the morning of the 26th, Company K move dwestward toward a series of knobs where it set-in forthe night and where it was again struck . "We had areal fine perimeter that night," reported LieutenantOates, "and we were hit . . . by an estimated two com -

panies of NVA . This firefight lasted between two andone half and three hours and we had good suppor tall the way around . . . . On the morning of the 27th ,we did find numerous rifles and automatic weapons ,and this time two flamethrowers showed up . Durin gboth of these fire fights, on the 24th and 26th, thefire discipline that we had was very good "22 As a resul tof both actions, the enemy lost 41 killed . In yet anothe rattack, two enemy companies struck at Company I ,9th Marines, on FSB Tenaru, east of Lang Vei, on th e27th, losing another 22 dead . In all attacks, the enemyfailed to penetrate beyond the defensive wire .

On 2 July, the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, underMajor Robert L . Modjeski, who had replaced Lieu -tenant Colonel Fox on the 22d, helilifted 14 kilome-ters south of Khe Sanh in order to reactivate FSB Sparkand conduct sweeps of Route 926 in support of Tas kForce Guadalcanal . Shortly after reoccupying the base ,Modjeski noted, "the NVA immediately bega nregistering 82mm mortars on the position . Towardsevening a brisk mortar exchange built up which ou rartillery also entered into. The battalion sustainedabout 40 casaulties, mostly from mortar shrapnel ." Thefollowing morning, Modjeski sent his maneuver com-panies in search of the enemy mortars, which subse-quently displaced out of range 2 3 With the regimen talerted for redeployment to Okinawa, the 2d and 3 dBattalions were pulled out of the Khe Sanh Plateauand returned to Vandegrift Combat Base on the 6th ,thus terminating Operation Utah Mesa .

When it appeared that the enemy was seeking t oreestablish a strong presence in western Quang Tri Pro -vince following the Dewey Canyon defeat, the 3d Ma-rine Division, in conjunction with Army and ARVNforces, fought back . In the four major allied strikes intothe area, the North Vietnamese lost over 600 troop sand a number of important supply depots . As a resul tof the continued pressure, the enemy units were agai nforced to withdraw into their Laotian sanctuaries .

Central DMZ Battles

During May and June, the central and western por-tions of Quang Tri Province, just south of th eDemilitarized Zone and north of Route 9, were agai ntargeted by the 3d Marine Division . The enemy, how-ever, failed to expose his large units, favoring instea dsapper and indirect fire attacks against allied installa-tions, while holding his major forces in sanctuarie snorth of the DMZ .

The 36th NVA Regiment, 308th Division, whichhad replaced the 27th in central Quang Tri following


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Operations of the 9th Marines ,May-August 1969

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the latter regiment's defeat, was itself driven back intothe zone during the successful 9th Marines, ARVN ,and 1st Brigade operations in March and April . Butby the beginning of May, elements of the 27th and36th again began to filter back into the central por-tion of the province. Colonel Lafon d' s 3d Marines, hav-ing successfully cleared the Vietnam Salient i nOperation Maine Crag, was tasked with destroying th eremnants of both regiments, and preventing any ene-my attempts at interdicting Route 9 or interfering wit hthe ongoing rice harvest .

On 2 May, Lafond's regiment began Operation Vir-ginia Ridge, as Lieutenant Colonel John S. Kyle's 1stBattalion assaulted into LZ Sparrow, eight kilometer snorthwest of Cam Lo, immediately engaging smal lgroups of NVA . The 3d Battalion, under LieutenantColonel Richard C . Schulze, secured Fire SupportBases Fuller and Pete, northeast of Elliott CombatBase, and began sweeping north toward the DMZ ,while the Marines of Lieutenant Colonel McMonagle' s2d Battalion provided security for Con Thien ,Charlie-2, Cam ID Bridge, Cam Lo District Headquart-ers, Khe Gio Bridge, and Route 9, and furnished con-tingents for mine sweeps emanating from all fixed in -

See Reference Map, Sections 10-12, 16, 1 7

stallations and roving patrols of the surroundin gterrain ? 4

By 6 May, Kyle's battalion had swept west onto Mut -ter's Ridge, near Landing Zones Ironsides and Junior ,three kilometers from Sparrow . Four days later at 0415 ,Company D, in a night defensive position west of Iron -sides, came under attack by an estimated NVA platoo nemploying RPG, grenades, and small arms fire . Afte r10 minutes the enemy broke contact and withdrew t othe northeast, leaving eight Marines dead and 1 0wounded .

Constant patrolling and company sweeps were th erule as Kyle's battalion continued westward an dSchulze's 3d battalion move north, engaging smal lgroups of enemy troops. On 16 May, a patrol fromCompany M, operating north of LZ Champ, receive dsmall arms and RPG fire from approximately 10 ene-my troops entrenched in bunkers . The platoon-siz epatrol, using air, artillery, mortars, and CS gas, maneu-vered up to and through the bunker complex, killin gfour and capturing one weapon .

During the remainder of May, the 1st Battalion, no wunder Lieutenant Colonel David G . Herron, who had

74


replaced Kyle on the 11th, turned and swept eas ttoward LZ Comet and Alpha-4, as did the 3d Battal-ion . Engagements with infiltrating troops of the 27thand 36th remained light except for a number of at -tacks against Marine positions . Twenty NVA, employ-ing grenades, probed the perimeter of Company Co n20 May without breaching the wire . A search at firs tlight revealed 15 enemy bodies and a number o fweapons ; Company C lost three killed and eigh twounded . Two days later, Company B trapped 30 NVAbetween the company ' s night position and a platoonambush. Using 60mm mortars and small arms fire ,the company routed the enemy, killing 19 and cap-turing two prisoners .

While Herron and Schulze's battalions advance deastward, just south of the Demilitarized Zone, thedivision directed both to begin a series of reconnais-sance patrols within the zone. These patrols were tocollect evidence of enemy troop presence and, if pos-sible, capture prisoners . However, the patrols ex-perienced limited success, as it was necessary to pu ta company within mortar range of the zone in orde rto provide patrol support . The supporting companies ,as a result, were subjected to numerous enemy morta r

A CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter lowers a load of sup -plies at a 3d Marine Division fire base. The supplies,flown out from Force Logistic Support Group Bravo atDong Ha, included rations, water, and all types of am -munition to sustain not only the artillery battery, butground forces operating in the surrounding terrain .


attacks, sustaining losses that proved to be unaccept-able. The special patrols were thus discontinued anda two- to three-kilometer patrol zone reestablished be -low the DMZ .

The first of several B-52 raids (Arc Lights) carrie dout during the operation within the 3d Marines' are aof responsibility, just south of the DMZ, occurred o nthe night of 6-7 June. Based on continuous enemy ac-tivity over the previous several weeks, the eastern por -tion of Mutter's Ridge, Foxtrot Ridge, and Helicopte rValley were struck by six separate Arc Lights . Withinan hour of the last bomb drop, Marines of Lieutenan tColonel McMonagle's 2d Battalion conducte dheliborne assaults into a number of landing zones nea rJunior, in an effort to exploit the strikes and conduc tbomb damage assessment (BDA). The Marines foundfew enemy dead, but numerous bunkers destroyed ,and the concealing foliage ripped away from severa lknown and suspected enemy redoubts . The destruc-tion was so devastating, that it was suspected manymore NVA soldiers lost their lives than were found .After exploiting the area, the 2d Battalion move dsouth, conducting search and clear operations nort hof Route 9 .

In mid June, the regiment received a number of in-telligence reports from local informants indicating thata large unknown enemy unit was in the process of in -filtrating from the DMZ into a portion of LeatherneckSquare, southwest of Gio Linh . "It looked to us,"reported Captain William J . Quigley, regimental S-2 ," like an indication that he was either going to attackC-2, which at that time was in our AO, or he was af-ter C-1 in the ARVN AO. But he was definitely com-ing down for something . For this operation we selectedthe 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, and because of bein gin close proximity to the DMZ as it was where the ene -my was building up, we needed to try somethin gunique to see if we could catch the enemy off-balanc eand not tip our hands . "

The battalion loaded on trucks after dark on the16th and then advanced up Route 1 in column ,"brazenly heading right for the DMZ, which had neve rbeen done before, and nobody would ever think o fdoing a thing like this ." The bold plan worked ; "whenthe 3d Battalion was moving up Route 1 toward theDMZ, elements of the 27th Regiment and the 33dSapper Battalion were going the other way southward .""Actually," reported Quigley, "what happened was thatwe passed one another; the 3d Battalion being on th eroad and them people coming down through the flat-


7 5

lands, heading toward Charlie-1 . . . . The timing wasjust one of those things, just once in a hundred thatyou run into, that we hit them on the way down ,caught them coming down from the DMZ ; he wasdecimated by artillery fire ." "In fact," Quigley con-tinued, "he got hurt so bad that his own sappers fro mthe 33d Sapper Battalion, when they did reachCharlie-1, they ran into the Charlie-1 minefields .Which of course is a very unusual thing for a sappe rto do. The ARVNs on their contact at Charlie-1 hun g56 of the people up in the wire . The 3d Battalion i nthe meantime sliced in behind them, separating the mfrom the DMZ." 2 5

The night sweep by Schulze's Marines from Gi oLinh, southwest toward Con Thien proceeded withou tincident . At 0930 the next morning, Company M en -gaged an estimated enemy company occupying hedg-erows, three kilometers west of the former Marin eartillery position. A half hour later, Company L, twokilometers to the south, engaged an unknown-siz eenemy force in fortified positions on a small hill. Bothfirefights raged throughout the morning until the ene-my broke contact and fled southward, leaving 20 dead.

At midday, Schulze's command group, accompa-nied by a platoon from Company K and a section o f106mm recoilless rifles, moved westward in trace ofthe attacking companies . At 1400, while the grou pestablished a forward command post, two kilometerseast of Company L, an estimated NVA companylaunched an intense mortar-supported ground attackagainst the Marines . The command group ' s securityforce, employing the recoilless rifles and small arms ,repulsed the enemy force, killing 37 and capturin gthree . During the height of the action, a platoon fromCompany L, maneuvering from the west to reinforc ethe command group, engaged an NVA platoon in abunker complex. Under the cover of air strikes, th eplatoon assaulted the enemy position, killing eigh tNVA and seizing 14 weapons .

Throughout the afternoon, aerial observers directedair strikes and artillery fires on the withdrawing enemyforce . Fixed-wing strikes accounted for 57 enemy killed ,while another 13 were credited to the artillery . Com-panies F and G, 2d Battalion, the designated divisio nreaction companies, and Companies A and B, 3d Tan kBattalion, were committed to the battle late in th eafternoon, but the enemy force had fled the area, andsignificant contact was not reestablished . The actionon the 17th resulted in 193 enemy killed, 9 prisonerstaken, and 77 weapons seized . Schulze's battalion ,although losing 19 killed and 28 wounded, continued


Carrying an M60, the standard automatic weapon use dby American forces, a machine gunner and his assis-tant from the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines enter a clear-ing during a patrol south of the Demilitarized Zone .

search operations in the area until the 21st, when i tmoved to Cua Viet for a period of rehabilitation .

With the enemy limiting his activity during the re-mainder of Operation Virginia Ridge, which termi-nated on 16 July, Colonel Wilbur F Simlik's regiment *continued search operations throughout the area o foperations : the 1st Battalion centered on Alpha-4 ; the2d Battalion north of Route 9 at FSB Fuller ; and th e3d Battalion, after its return from Cua Viet, operat-ing from Cam Lo.

Also operating within close proximity of th eDemilitarized Zone, but west of Colonel Simlik's 3 dMarines, was the 4th Marines . With the terminationof Operation Purple Martin on 7 May, the 4th Ma-rines remained in place, initiating a two-month oper-ation, codenamed Herkimer Mountain . Continuallypressured by Colonel Goggin's regiment, the bulk o f

*Colonel Simlik replaced Colonel Paul D. Lafond as Command-ing Officer, 3d Marines on 28 June.

76


enemy units operating northwest of Elliott Comba tBase had been forced to withdraw northward int oNorth Vietnamese havens, leaving behind rovingbands of sapper, rocket, and reconnaissance unitswhich attempted to disrupt Marine combat an dlogistical operations . As in Purple Martin, the regi-ment's mission remained the same, Major Charles W .Cobb, Jr ., S-3 of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, noted :

Our primary mission, of course, was to conduct offensiveoperations north of, and occupy, Fire Support Bases Nevilleand Russell . And we had in the back of our minds that th ereal reason we were out there in this AO was to deny theenemy the use of the avenues of approach from the Laotia nborder through the west, down around the Lang Ho Valleyand the Route that traveled from the northwest to th esoutheast right through the northern part of our AO an djust south of the DMZ, the Cam Lo River Valley. Both ofthese areas had been used, based on the intelligence infor-mation we received, by the enemy over a period of years ,and by occupying the areas that we did and by keeping th ecompanies out on the move constantly, . . . I really thin kwe kept them honest and negated their attempts, if ther ewere any, to use these avenues of approach into the 4th Ma-rines A02 6

The operation began with the 1st Battalion, 4th Ma-rines relieving the 2d Battalion on LZ Catapult an dFSB Neville, which then moved to Cua Viet for a peri-od of rehabilitation . The 3d Battalion, 4th Marinescontinued to operate from FSB Russell and LZ Sierra ,to the northeast, while the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines ,awaiting redeployment, manned installations fromVandegrift Combat Base to Hill 950 (FSB Cates), wes talong Route 9 . Participation of the 9th Marines varie dduring the operation as elements were shifted to othe roperations throughout the divisional area of opera-tions, and then redeployed .

Enemy activity remained at a low level as 4th an d9th Marines fought sporadic engagements with smallgroups of NVA . The first significant fight took plac eat 1610 on 10 May. While moving north from Neville ,Company B, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines took small arm sfire, wounding five Marines . Pressing the attack, th eMarines moved onto the high ground and continuedthe pursuit until the enemy broke contact . Air strikesand artillery were called, but with unknown results .The following day, a local security patrol from Com-pany K, 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, near LZ Dodg eon the DMZ, surprised two well-armed NVA movingtoward the company's night defensive position . Theenemy soldiers were taken under fire ; a sweep th efollowing morning revealed two bodies with TNTstrapped to their waists .

Goggin's Marines conducted extensive and continu-ous patrols throughout the ever-shrinking area of oper-ations during the remainder of May and into June .Engagements with small groups of NVA soldiers wer einfrequent and of a short duration, as the enemyquickly withdrew when pressed . Noteworthy incidents ,however, took place, one of which Major Cob bdescribed :

A recon insert into the DMZ, which was put in some -time around the 7th or 8th of June, ran into some problem sand they had a platoon commander killed and they wer esurrounded during most of the night . And we received anorder from regiment that the "Sparrow Hawk," which is th eready platoon that is maintained at Vandegrift Combat Bas eunder the OP control of the 3d Marine Division and isdeployable on short notice to any trouble spots, would b eflown up to the LZ located in the vicinity of Bravo Compa-ny and join up with them and move into the DMZ and hel pextract these recon people. While the planning of this wa sgoing on, there was another recon team in heavy contac tabout 4,000 meters from them inside the DMZ . Originall ythe plan was to take out the recon inserts as they normall ydo by helicopter, but in the process they had two CH-46sshot down: one of the crews immediately was picked up, th eother crew joined one of the recon teams and set in for th enight . And it was at that point that the decision was mad eto not lose anymore helicopters and that we would send BCompany up in there, reinforced by the "Sparrow Hawk "platoon and also a reaction force from the 3d Recon Battal-ion to go up and bring them out of the DMZ . There weremany complications in this operation that gave us some trou-ble . The tremendous heat for one thing down in the valley sand draws without any breeze ; the high temperatures ; th esteep terrain ; and the jungle canopy and the growth, th ebrier and bramble, that resulted in the troops having to cu ttheir way through and it seemed like an endless task to even-tually get to these people and then extract them . They ha dto get resupplied with water and chow and the whole oper-ation took a little better than two days before it was finall yover with . . . . The operation went off pretty well withou tlosing any more people? 7

Month's end found Goggin's Marines fending off n oenemy attack other than attacks by fire against theregiment's installations 2 8

Eastern Quang Tri and Thua Thien

While a majority of Marine operations were con -ducted in central and western Quang Tri Province ,responsibility for the coastal lowlands and piedmon twas divided between the 2d ARVN Regiment and 1s tBrigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) . TheARVN Regiment operated mainly in Leathernec kSquare, while the 1st Brigade secured the coast fro mthe DMZ south to the Quang Tri/Thua Thien Provin-cial boundary. Consisting of the 1st Battalion, 11th In-fantry ; 1st Battalion, 61st Infantry (Mechanized) ; 1st


7 7


Two 3d Division Marines escort a captured North Vietnamese Army soldier to the unit' scommand post where he will be questioned by division intelligence personnel in an ef-fort to obtain information as to his unit's location, strength, morale, and objectives .

Battalion, 77th Armor ; and elements of the 4th Bat-talion, 12th Cavalry ; 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry ; 1s tBattalion, 40th Artillery; and the Marine 1st Amphib-ian Tractor Battalion, the brigade operated from CampRed Devil (Dong Ha Combat Base), LZ Sharon, LZNancy, and Wunder Beach . In addition to periodicall yproviding task groups to assist Marines, the brigad econducted a number of independent operations i nsouthwestern Quang Tri Province, while securing majo rallied coastal installations .

During March and April, elements of th emechanized brigade conducted search and clear opera-tions in Base Area 101, southwest of Quang Tri Com-bat Base. In May, following Montana Mauler and Elli sRavine in central Quang Tri, the brigade again move dinto Base Area 101, with elements also operating inthe coastal lowlands near Landing Zones Nancy an dSharon . The brigade's mission was to prevent enem yforces from entering or leaving populated areas an dto deny the enemy rice by destroying his rice-gatherin gforces . During Operation Massachusetts Bay, which be -

gan on 7 May and concluded on 18 June, element sof the brigade saw light contact, consisting of ambush -es and probes, and accounted for 61 enemy killed an d50 suspects detained . With the termination of Mas-sachusetts Bay, the brigade began the follow-up oper-ation, Iroquois Grove, in the same area and with a nidentical mission .

In Thua Thien Province to the south, the 101st Air -borne Division prepared to conduct the follow-o ndivision-level operation, Kentucky Jumper, with thetermination of Operation Nevada Eagle on 28 Febru-ary. This operation, begun on 1 March, continued thecombined 101st Airborne and 1st ARVN Division ef-fort in support of the Republic's Accelerated Pacifica-tion Campaign in the coastal lowlands around Hue ,and forays into the mountains of western Thua Thie nProvince in an attempt to halt infiltration from Laos .Operation Kentucky Jumper (1 March - 14 August )included the following sub-operations: Bristol Boots(25 April - 15 May) directed against elements of th e5th NVA Regiment in the Ruong Ruong Valley; Mas-

78


sachusetts Striker (1 March - 8 May) in the southernA Shau Valley and northern regions of Quang NamProvince; and Montgomery Rendezvous (7 June - 14August), directed against Viet Cong forces operatin gin Phu Loc and Hien Doc Districts, south of Hue .

Also during this period, the 3d Brigade, 101st Air -borne Division participated in the XXIV Corps oper-ation, Apache Snow (10 May - 7 June), in the norther nA Shau Valley. In addition, the 1st Brigade joined theAmerical Division in southern I Corps, assisting th edivision for three months in Operation Lamar Plain .

Throughout the first six months of 1969, Marine ,Army, and ARVN troops continued the relentless andsuccessful pursuit and destruction of enemy forces innorthern I Corps. From the Da Krong Valley and Viet-nam Salient in the west to Leatherneck Square in theeast, and along the Demilitarized Zone within Quan gTri Province, troops of the 3d, 4th, and 9th Marine saggressively and repeatedly forced the enemy to with -draw into cross-border sanctuaries, thereby spoilin gany attempt at a military victory in far northern ICorps .

PART I I

SOUTHERN I CORPS BATTLEGROUND

CHAPTER 6

Destruction of Base Area 11 2

Defense of Da Nang —Attack into 112— "A Little Urban Renewal"—Americal 's TAOI

Defense of Da Nang

The surge in enemy ground combat activity witnes-sed during the last months of 1968 in the provincesof Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai, whic hcomposed southern I Corps Tactical Zone, moderat-ed somewhat as 1969 began. The eastern portion ofQuang Nam Province, however, again produced th ehighest level of enemy action as NVA and VC forcessubordinate to the 4th Front Headquarters pursueda limited tactical course of ground, rocket, and mor-tar attacks against friendly installations, in prepara-tion, many allied intelligence analysts thought, for amajor thrust against Da Nang . In addition, the enemypersisted in attempts to control the civilian popula-tion and major rice-producing areas of the provinc eby resorting to terrorism, intimidation, kidnappings ,and the assassination of local government officials .Operating within the boundaries of Quang Nam, an dsubject to the 4th Front, was the 2dNUA Division andits subordinate regiments : the 1st Viet Cong ; 21stNVA ; 31st Independent ; 36th NVA ; 38th NVA ; 141stNVA ; 68B NVA Artillery (Rocket) ; and the 368B NVAArtillery (Rocket) . All were thought to be located i nthe mountains either southwest of Da Nang, or thos eastride the provincial border with Quang Tin .

In the southern two provinces of I Corps, Quang Ti nand Quang Ngai, regiments controlled by Headquart-ers Military Region 5 and the 3dNVA Division — the2d Viet Cong, 3d NVA, 22dNVA, 31st NVA, and the401st VC (Sapper) —continued to confine their activi -ties primarily to scattered attacks by fire, interdictio nof friendly lines of communication, and the harass-ment of villages, hamlets, and refugee camps sur-rounding the cities of Tam Ky and Quang Ngai .

Facing the estimated 37,300 enemy troops in th ethree provinces at the beginning of 1969, were twomajor United States combat units : the Army's 23d In-fantry (Americal) Division under the command o fMajor General Charles M . Gettys, and Major GeneralOrmond R . Simpson ' s 1st Marine Division .

A Texan by birth, Major General Simpson entere dthe Marine Corps in 1936 and served in the Pacifi cduring World War II . When the Government of


MajGen Ormond R . Simpson, as Commanding Gen-eral, 1st Marine Division, coordinated the activitiesoffour Marine regiments in the defense of Da Nang .

Thailand requested American troops during the Lao-tian Crisis in 1962, CinCPac ordered then-Brigadie rGeneral Simpson to Southeast Asia as Commandin gGeneral, 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, as well a sNaval Component Commander, Joint Task Force 116 .Following a tour as Commanding General, Marin eCorps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, he assumed com-mand of the 1st Marine Division from Major Genera lCarl A . Youngdale on 20 December 1968 .

Under Simpson, the division performed a variety ofmissions . The division's general task, like that of al lother United States combat units, was to locate anddestroy enemy forces, installations, and LOCs [linesof communication] within its assigned area of respon-sibility, in coordination with South Vietnamese andother allied forces . Its primary mission was the defens e

80

DESTRUCTION OF BASE AREA 112

8 1

of Da Nang and the more than one million SouthVietnamese living within the city or nearby. As Gener-al Simpson later commented : "The 1st Marine Divi-sion was, far beyond all else, tied to the defense ofthe Da Nang Vital Area. This was exactly as it shoul dhave been. Da Nang was clearly a textbook exampleof a ` Vital Area .' Here were military headquarters, po-litical headquarters and officials, a great seaport, asplendid airfield, a vast array of logistical support ap-paratus including supplies of every variety, equipment,medical establishments, to say nothing of nearly on emillion Vietnamese . U.S . Forces could not have oper-ated in ICTZ without Da Nang ." Therefore, the divi-sion's infantry units and supporting arms were to b e"disposed to provide maximum security for the D aNang vital area, installations and LOCs of greatest po-litical, economic and military importance ." '

Among the secondary tasks assigned the divisionwere to provide security for the continuing engineereffort to improve National Route 1 and logistics craftoperating in inland waterways, and to assist Viet-namese forces in the pacification effort . In addition ,it was to carry on surveillance, reconnaissance withinits tactical area of responsibility (TAOR), and "suchother places as assigned''* Elements of the divisio nwere also required to furnish support for combine daction platoons, Civilian Irregular Defense Grou pcamps, and government district headquarters . Finally,the division was to provide one reinforced battalio nfor deployment anywhere in South Vietnam o n12-hour notice, and two additional battalions withi n24 hours .2

Stretching from above the strategic Hai Van Pass inthe north to the rugged Que Son Mountains in th esouth, the division's TAOR encompassed approximate-ly 1,100 square miles and included most of Quan gNam and small portions of Thua Thien and Quan gTin Provinces . From the flat sand beaches along th eSouth China Sea and the wide bay of Da Nang, the

*TAOR, as defined at this time, was "the area assigned to th e1st Marine Division in which the responsibility and authority fo rthe development and maintenance of installations, control of move-ment, and the control of tactical operations involving troops unde rdivision control is vested in the Commanding General, 1st Marin eDivision . All fire and maneuver conducted within the TAOR, o rthe effect of which impinge upon the TAOR, must be coordinate dwith the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division." TAOR differedfrom an area of operations (AO), which was "an area where force sconduct operations during specific periods of time," and which coul dbe an area within or outside of an existing TAOR . (Anx C, 1stMarDi vOpO 301-YR, dtd 6Feb69, in 1stMarDiv ComdC, Feb69) .

terrain rose westward into the jungle-covered moun-tains of the Annamite Chain and opened out to th esouth and southwest into the flat, treeline-broken, rice-paddy country of the An Hoa-Song Thu Bon basins ,and Go Noi Island . It was heavily populated terrai nwhich offered the enemy numerous places of defens eand concealment, and the Marines a difficult choreof routing them out .

The type of warfare carried on in southern I Corp sTactical Zone was in marked contrast to that fough tin northern I Corps, where, as Colonel Robert H . Bar-row later noted, "anything that moved you could shootat because he was the enemy ; you did not have toseparate the armed threat from the civilian popula-tion ." Barrow came to appreciate " the most difficult ;the most arduous ; dirty ; psychologically bad situatio nthat confronted those who fought the kind of war thatwas necessary to fight down in the Da Nang" area ."Those Marines who went out day after day conduct-ing, . . . combat patrols, almost knowing that some -where on their route of movement, they were goingto have some sort of surprise visited on them, eithe ran ambush or explosive device . . . . I think that isthe worst kind of warfare, not being able to see th eenemy. You can't shoot back at him . You are kind ofhelpless . It is easy to become fatalistic, as indeed a lo tof our young men did .' 3

Centered on Da Nang, the division deployed its fou rinfantry regiments, the 1st, 5th, 7th, and elements o fthe 26th Marines, in a series of radiating belts . To th enorth, Colonel Clyde W. Hunter ' s 26th Marines se -cured portions of the Hai Van Pass and sections o fRoute 1 . Colonel Herbert L. Beckington's 7th Marine spatrolled the scrub-covered piedmont and moun-tainous jungle that rose to the west . To the southwest ,the 5th Marines, under the command of ColonelJames B. Ord, Jr., scoured the An Hoa and Song ThuBon basins . Included within the regiment's area o fresponsibility was the infamous Arizona Territory, tha trice paddy-dotted, enemy-infested region set betwee nthe Song Thu Bon and Song Vu Gia . South of DaNang and north of the area assigned the Korean Ma-rines was Colonel Robert G. Lauffer's 1st Marines ,whose area of operations included Dodge City, Go No iIsland, and portions of the coastal lowlands . A rein -forced artillery regiment, the 11th Marines, provide dfire support for the four infantry regiments, while th e1st Reconnaissance Battalion and 1st Tank Battalio nsupplemented and reinforced their efforts, as did con-tingents of engineer, transport, and service troops .

Like all allied forces, the 1st Marine Division coor-

82


Enemy Order of Battl eSouthern ICT ZJanuary 196 9

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dinated its efforts with South Vietnamese and Korea nMarine forces within Quang Nam Province . The fou rbattalions of the Republic of Korea's 2d MarineBrigade, based at Hoi An, about 27 kilometerssoutheast of Da Nang, defended a small TAOR stretch -ing from the South China Sea inland to the foothillsof the Que Son Mountains . South Vietnamese forceswithin the province were considerable . Regular ARVNforces consisted of the four-battalion 51st Regiment ;the 1st Ranger Group of three battalions ; and sup-porting armor, artillery, and service troops . CivilianIrregular Defense Groups based at Thuong Duc andat Nong Son, deep in the mountains, interdicted im-portant enemy infiltration routes . Protecting thepopulated areas were Regional Force companies, Popu-lar Force platoons, and a large contingent of the Na-tional Police Field Force .

Despite four years of bitter warfare in Quang Na mas the new year began, Marines, together with Sout hVietnamese and Korean units, faced an estimated forceof 24 enemy infantry and support battalions .Although massing from time to time, the enemy

See Reference Map, Sections 18-3 6

generally adhered to a defensive pattern establishe dduring late summer 1968, a posture of consisten trefusal to engage friendly forces in a large-scale con-frontation . Clearly the enemy was attempting to recon -stitute and conserve his troops by holding hi sformations to relatively secure areas . But the enem ywas to be afforded no respite, as 1st Division Marine scarried the war into the areas the Viet Cong and NorthVietnamese considered safe from attack .

Attack into 11 2

Numbered among the goals assigned III MAF b yboth CinCPac and MACV in 1968, was the neutrali-zation of eight enemy base areas within ICTZ .Although not sharply defined, these eight geographicregions were known to harbor training and logistica lsupport facilities of enemy regular and guerrilla forces .Since these areas often covered hundreds of squar ekilometers of mountainous hinterland and piedmont ,and were criss-crossed by thousands of hidden paths ,roads, and waterways, absolute neutralization was im -practical, if not impossible . It was the destruction an ddislocation of the enemy's logistical facilities within


8 3

Marine Corps Historical Collectio n

An infantryman of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines examines several captured 140mm ene-my rockets, positioned on earthen firing ramps and ready for launch against Da Nang .

these areas, and the eventual degradation of his corn-

On 25 October 1968, a number of Delta Force recon-bat capabilities, to which CinCPac referred whendefining "neutralization" as a condition when the area swere "no longer able to be used for their intende dpurpose ." 4

During 1968, III MAF conducted 21 operations i nthe eight enemy base areas. As a result of these oper-ations, two base areas were "neutralized" : Base Area100 in Quang Tin Province ; and Base Area 116 inQuang Nam . However, one new base area was estab-lished . Designated Base Area 112, it was located in th emountainous region of Quang Nam Province south -west of An Hoa, directly threatening the heavily popu-lated coastal region between Da Nang and Tam Ky.

Neutralization of Base Areas 100 and 116 in mid -1968 had forced the enemy to shift his training an dlogistical support facilities eastward into the moun-tains between the Song Thu Bon and Song Cai, andbeyond. Early intelligence provided by the U .S . ArmySpecial Forces "Delta Force" confirmed the relocation.*

*Under the Military Assistance Command and the Special Forces ,Project Delta was given a long-range reconnaissance and intelligence -gathering mission . Organized into a reconnaissance element anda reaction force, at full strength Project Delta would comprise abou t600 men, both U.S . and South Vietnamese . The typical reconnais-sance element consisted of eight road patrol teams, and 16 six-ma nreconnaissance teams .

naissance and road teams entered the area in orde rto determine the identity and location of enemy units .The Army intelligence collection effort, codenamedOperation Warbonnet, continued until 14 Novembe rwhen it was terminated prematurely and the Delt aForce teams diverted to other areas within South Viet-nam. Defectors and prisoners rounded up by Marine sduring Operation Meade River in November provide dadditional intelligence regarding unit identification .

Taken together, reconnaissance and prisoner inter -rogation reports provided a somewhat accurate list o fenemy units and probable locations within Base Area112 . Among the units identified were the two maincommand elements which controlled NVA and VC ac -tivities within Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quan gNgai Provinces : Front 4 Headquarters and Headquart-ers Military Region 5 . Attached and directly subor-dinate to the two headquarters elements, and als olocated within the base area were the 21st Regiment,2d NVA Division, 220th Transport Regiment, Q81s t(Deux Xuan) and Q83d (Dai Loc) Local Force Battal-ions, and 2d Battalion, 141st NVA Regiment. Rein -forcing the estimated 3,500 enemy troops were anothe r6,000 located just outside the base area in the QueSon Mountains and on Go Noi Island to the east .

84


Situation appraisals based on the intelligenc ereports, indicated that the enemy units within Bas eArea 112 would not defend in strength, but woul dwithdraw their headquarters, supplies, and personne lto the west and southwest, while attempting to dela yfriendly forces. In addition, the III MAF appraisals ex-pected the enemy to continue to harass allied line sof communication, make maximum use of surprise fir-ing devices, and mount attacks by fire against allie dinstallations, specifically An Hoa Combat Base .5

Desirous of eliminating the threat to Da Nang,MACV suggested that an operation be conducte dagainst the enemy base area as a follow-up to the high -ly successful operation, Meade Rivere Preliminary dis -cussions and planning began in late November, a sBrigadier General Ross T. Dwyer, Jr., Assistant Divi-sion Commander, 1st Marine Division, noted :

There were some planning sessions between respective 1s tDivision staff and III MAF staff, and then we had some o four own discussions in the 1st Division . It was our view tha tthis was something that a regiment could handle itself . Theaction officer level of III MAF indicated we 'd have to havea task force go out there . . . . We didn't think it was reallywarranted . . . from what they were describing to us . Weargued that a reinforced regiment, beefed up out of the exist-ing command structure that was at An Hoa at the time —then the 5th Marines—could do the job . But subsequently ,it was determined, and I think at the III MAF level, thatone, the task force would be formed and would conduct th eoperation, and that additional forces would be made avail -able to perform the mission ?

III MAF passed word to the 1st Division on 1 De-cember to form the required task force organization ."We started from absolute zero," General Dwye rremembered :

Since no task force staff and its equipment was in exis-tence, the rapid organization of a task force headquarterswas an immediate requirement. Under Major General [CarlA .] Youngdale's guidance (he was then CG, 1st Mar Div) ,I selected Colonel Bob Nichols, then an assistant G-3, a smy Chief of Staff. He supervised and directed the forma-tion of the task force headquarters from officers serving i nthe various division staff sections, from Headquarters Bat-talion and from the Communications Company . It was pur-posely designed as a small headquarters because we felt wecould satellite on existing facilities at An Hoa. We had ourinitial meeting of the hastily assembled staff and commence dplanning for the operation and for briefing General Abrams .Time was of the essence since the deadlines were short '

On 4 December, the 1st Marine Division activate dthe temporary command, codenamed Task Forc eYankee, designating General Dwyer, a World War I Iand Korean War veteran and former commanding of-

ficer of the 1st Marines, as its commander.* Later th esame day, task force staff section heads briefed Genera lCreighton Abrams on details of the operation at II I

MAF Headquarters . With no comment or questio nduring the entire briefing, General Abrams at the con-clusion turned to General Dwyer and said, "It sound sfine . Go!"°

Assigned to the task force were three battalions ofColonel James B . Ord's 5th Marines—Lieutenan tColonel Richard F. Daley ' s 1st Battalion, LieutenantColonel James W. Stemple' s 2d Battalion, and Lieu -tenant Colonel Harry E . Atkinson's 3d Battalion—aswere Battalion Landing Team /7 under LieutenantColonel Neil A . Nelson, and elements of the 1st Forc eReconnaissance Company. A small field artillery grou pwas formed from elements of Force Artillery, the 11th ,and later the 12th Marines, consisting initially of on e8-inch, two 155mm, four 105mm, and two howtar bat -teries .** Operating in coordination with Task Forc eYankee would be the 1st ARVN Ranger Group, consist -ing of the 21st, 37th, and the 39th Ranger Battalions ,and one brigade of the Americal Division .

The plan for the upcoming operation, codenamedTaylor Common, hammered out two days before th eformal activation of Task Force Yankee, called for unit sof the task force to conduct a three-phase operatio nto destroy enemy forces, caches, and installations inBase Area 112 and adjacent areas, and to prepare aseries of fire support bases extending along likel yavenues of approach to the base area from the Laotianborder. During phase one, task force units were to con-duct search and clear operations from Liberty Bridg eto An Hoa in coordination with the 1st ARVN Range rGroup' s Operation Le Loi in the An Hoa-Arizona area ,in order to destroy elements of the 2d NVA Division .A series of fire support bases would then be prepare dalong the approaches to 112 . Penetration of the ene-my base area by four Marine battalions and the es-tablishment of bases required to support the extensivesearch and destroy operations would be carried out i nphase two. During the final phase, task force units wer eto conduct reconnaissance and surveillance operations

*At this time there were two assistant division commanders ofthe 1st Marine Division . General Dwyer was stationed with the di -vision, while Brigadier General Carl W. Hoffman was assigned t oIII MAF as Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations .

**The howtar resulted from the blending of two existing weapons :the tube of a 4 .2-inch mortar mounted on the carriage of a 75mmpack howitzer. The result was a helicopter-transportable, high -trajectory weapon . With the increased evolution toward heavy-lifthelicopters and more mobile artillery, the howtar was deleted fro mthe Marine Corps' artillery inventory.


8 5


Aerial photograph looks east down the runway at An Hoa Combat Base, the 1st Divi-sion's western-most logistical facility and home of Task Force Yankee, commanded by BGe nRoss T. Dwyer, Jr., and the 5th Marines, under the command of Col James B . Ord, Jr.

deep into the mountains west of the Song Cai, de-velop fire support bases to sustain forces completin gthe neutralization of 112, and interdict the avenue sof approach from the Laotian border. Vital to allphases of the operation would be the maintenance o fa continuous reconnaissance screen to the north, south ,and west of the maneuvering battalions as theyprogressed westward into the enemy base area .

The weather was a major consideration in the plan-ning as the monsoon season was in full swing . SinceMarines would be operating in rugged terrain far fro mtheir bases and thus dependent on helicopters, therewas thought of waiting for better flying weather . AsGeneral Dwyer noted, "we couldn't have picked aworse time weatherwise for helicopter operations inBase Area 112 ; we were going to be weather sensitive ."But, he continued, "we were at the stage where wewere told to run an operation, and the climatic con-ditions were such they said go ahead and run it . "r o

With the activation of Task Force Yankee on 4 De-cember, Nelson 's Marines, four companies and th ecommand group were released from Operation MeadeRiver, and reembarked on board the Tripoli (LPH 10) ,where all personal gear and organizational equipmentwas packed for debarkation . The following day, as

operational control of the landing team passed to the1st Marine Division and then to the 5th Marines, Com-panies E, F, G, H, and the command group movedby helicopter to An Hoa Combat Base . Simultaneous-ly, the team's rear echelon moved ashore to Camp love ,the 7th Engineer Battalion 's command post at DaNang, where the battalion's administrative and logisti-cal facilities were to be established .

Operation Taylor Common began two days later,on the morning of the 7th, with a heliborne assaultby Lieutenant Colonel Nelson's Marines into th esouthwestern corner of the Arizona Territory, thre ekilometers west of the Song Thu Bon, opposite A nHoa.* The first wave of Marines from Company H ex-perienced no contact as they landed at LZ Champagne ,and were followed immediately by the remaining com-panies and the command group. In trace, the fou rcompanies moved northeast across swollen streams, ric epaddies, and through dense treelines, conductin gsearch and clear operations throughout the widely scat-tered Phu Loi village complex . The 1st ARVN Range r

*' Arizona Territory," or simply Arizona, was the name given t othe rice paddy regions of Dai Lx and Duc Duc Districts lying be-tween the Song Vu Gia and Song Thu Bon . Origin of the term i sunknown .

86


Group assaulted into the northeast corner of the sam earea on the 10th, and began search and clear opera-tions to the southwest, eventually passing throug hblocking positions established by Nelson's Marines ,who then swept southeastward across the Song Th uBon to My Son, and then to An Hoa. Meanwhile, ele-ments of Colonel Ord's 5th Marines, following theirreturn from Meade River, conducted a thorough searchof their northern area of operations, from Libert yBridge to An Hoa .

These three operations, in conjunction with the196th Infantry Brigade's search of the Que Son Moun-tains to the south, completed the initial phase b ysweeping major enemy units from areas adjacent toAn Hoa, Liberty Bridge, and Liberty Road, the mai nsupply route between the two. But the operations werenot without cost . Although engagements with enem yunits were light and scattered during the first fou rdays, surprise firing devices or boobytraps, usually con -sisting of M26 grenades rigged as antipersonnel mines ,wounded eight . Friendly fire killed five and wounde dan equal number of Marines. Both of these problem swere to plague task force Marines throughout the oper-ation, especially those working in the lowlands .

While search and clear operations were in progressaround An Hoa, task force Marines made preparation sfor the move into Base Area 112 . On 9 December, withno additional combat resources available from the 1s tMarine Division, Task Force Yankee assumed opera-tional control of the 1st and 3d Battalions, 3d Marines ,under Colonel Michael M . Spark, from the 3d Marin eDivision : the 1st would join Operation Taylor Corn -

mon on the 13th, and the 3d the following day. Ac -cording to General Davis, the two battalions wereprovided to assist the 1st Marine Division in its "firs t` high mobility' operation out into the hills .""

Also in preparation for the assault, Task Forc eYankee established a main logistical area with 10-da ysupply levels of rations and ammunition at An Hoa ,in addition to a forward direct air support center(DASC) . Located near the artillery fire support coor-dination center (FSCC), in order to pool "Save-a -Plane" information for the protection of aircraft, th eDASC would not only control Marine fixed-wing andhelicopter support, but also Air Force transport air -craft provided by the 15th Aerial Port Squadron, fire -ship (AC-47) or "Spooky," and AC-119 or "Shadow "assistance furnished by the 14th Special Operation sWing, and special mission aircraft for heavy ordnancedrops by the Seventh Air Force within the area of oper-ation . During this period of preparation, the first fou rfire support base sites were selected and bombarded b yB-52, fixed-wing, and concentrated artillery fire wit hthe heaviest barrages directed against the sites desig-nated Lance and Pike . But due to the distance (eigh tkilometers) between Lance, the main artillery supportsite, and An Hoa, a temporary mobile fire suppor tbase, close to Lance and oriented southward, wa sopened . Its mission was to provide complementary firesupport to the Nong Song Civilian Irregular Defens eGroup and two Mobile Strike Force companies oper-ating along the Song Thu Bon and southern TaylorCommon boundary. Battery K, 4th Battalion, 13thMarines, a self-propelled 155mm Howitzer (M109) bat -

A tank of the 1st Tank Battalion conducts a sweep of Liberty Road, the main thorough -fare between Da Nang and An Hoa, in preparation for the build-up at the combat base .



8 7


Photograph provides an overhead view of An Hoa logistics operations center and the pas-senger and cargo pad beyond. The center coordinated the helicopter movement ofper-sonnel and supplies in support of combat operations in Base Area 112 and the Arizona .

tery, supported by Company L, 5th Marines, move doverland on the 10th to establish Fire Base Marne onthe eastern shore of the Song Thu Bon, five kilome-ters from Lance . 1 2

Phase two of Operation Taylor Common began o n11 December with an assault against Hill 575, the sit eselected for Lance. The location had been visuallyreconnoitered prior to preparatory fires by Zone Inter-pretation, Planning, Preparation, and Overfly (ZIPPO )and Fire Base Interpretation, Reconnaissance, Plan-ning, Preparation and Overfly (FIRPPO) Teams to de-termine its suitability as a landing zone and sub-sequent development as a fire support base .* Althoughthe preparatory fires cleared a large proportion of thevegetation from the landing zone, a few large tre etrunks remained, necessitating the use of rappel tech-niques to land engineers and a small security force ,who cleared an area large enough to accommodate ahelicopter. Within two hours, division engineers creat-ed an adequate zone and the main assault elemen t

*ZIPPO and FIRPPO Teams, composed of air, artillery, engineer ,and infantry representatives, determined the selection and suita-bility of a fire support base, and the subsequent placement of guns ,command bunkers, and storage areas .

of Lieutenant Colonel Atkinson's 3d Battalion, 5thMarines landed and established perimeter security fo rthe engineers, who then began construction of artiller ypositions, ammunition and command bunkers, an dfurther enlarged the base .

Once the security force was in position and the sup -porting artillery batteries in place, rifle companies o fAtkinson's battalion radiated from Lance, initiatingdeliberate search and clear operations . The establishedpatrol pattern resembled a clover leaf, expanding asMarines secured areas near the fire support base . Thi spattern of operation characterized the establishmentof the next three support bases : Pike (Hill 214), openedby the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines on 13 December ;Spear (Hill 558), occupied by the 1st Battalion, 3d Ma-rines on the 15th ; and Mace (Hill 375), taken by th e3d Battalion, 3d Marines on the 19th . In construct-ing Spear and Mace, Spark's Marines encountere dproblems. The initial clearing fires were insufficien tand had to be augmented by 10,000-pound demoli-tion bombs (MK121), known as "Combat Traps,"dropped by Air Force C-130 aircraft manned by per-sonnel of the 434th Air Division from Tan Son Nhu tAirbase, near Saigon. Although partially successful on

88


Spear, the explosive force of the bombs was not stron genough to completely clear the required area on theextremely narrow ridgelines selected for Spear an dMace . Standard 500- and 1,000-pound bombs, rockets ,and napalm then were used to clear away the multi -layered, 70- to 80-foot canopy, and thick secondarygrowth which generally covered the terrain in Bas eArea 112 . 1 3

With the establishment of four Marine battalions ,under the operational control of the 3d Marines, inthe eastern zone of Base Area 112, search and destroyoperations against an area of reported enemy activityand concentrated installations began . During the nexttwo weeks, Marines, in their search, found and des-troyed several enemy base camps, fighting positions ,hospitals, and an enemy prison camp: all of which hadbeen vacated before the Marines arrived . Engagementswere few as the enemy withdrew westward, leaving onlya handful of troops to slow the advance . For many Ma-rines, this was their first experience operating in moun-tainous terrain, as Lance Corporal Rick L . Wacklerelated :

This was completely new for me because I had never oper-ated up in the canopied areas . It was a whole new type ofwarfare up there . The density of the woods, vines, jungle ;it' s really thick and it's nagging and tiresome to work in ,and everything is against you up there . . . . Being it wasso thick up there, it was very easy to walk past a ville ; thefoliage and coverage was unbelievable ; you couldn' t detec tanything from what was right or wrong .' "

In conjunction with the search and destroy mission,Task Force Yankee mounted ground operations agains tHills 1050 and 551, subsequently designated Dagge rand Cutlass . Lieutenant Colonel Richard C . Schulze's3d Battalion, 3d Marines secured the former and as-sisted in the establishment of a communicationsretransmission site . Lieutenant Colonel Richard B.Twohey's 1st Battalion, 3d Marines took the latter andbegan to exploit a major trail network identified nearMace. The battalions of the ARVN Ranger Group ,meanwhile, continued search and clear operations i nthe Arizona area, relieving Lieutenant Colonel Nel-son's battalion landing team, which assaulted into th enorthwestern portion of Go Noi Island on 17 Decem-ber. Sweeping south, the battalion displaced to A nHoa Combat Base two days later, having met only ligh tresistance . On the 23d, the 21st and 39th Ranger Bat-talions, operating in the piedmont west of Phu Loi ,encountered and then fought an estimated NVA bat-talion, killing 158 and capturing 18 individual an d10 crew-served weapons .


Fire Support Base Lance was the first of many infan-try and artillery positions constructed in support ofTask Force Yankee operations in the enemy base area .

Near Taylor Common's southern boundary, the twoSpecial Forces Mobile Strike companies and the Non gSong Irregular Company continued reconnaissanceoperations along the upper Song Thu Bon . Althoughthese forces were relatively small, they did providetimely intelligence and proved to be an impedimentto the flow of enemy supplies and troops that previ-ously had used the area as a route into the Que SonMountains and the flatlands beyond . Further south ,the 196th Infantry Brigade continued to maintai nblocking positions, as well as search operations in theQue Sons in order to prevent an enemy escape .

With the new year, Taylor Common moved into th ethird and final phase of operations. Combat actio ncentered on two regions, the An Hoa basin, the scen eof constant enemy activity throughout most of 1968 ,and Base Area 112, the high ground lying to the wes tand southwest .

On 1 January, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines liftedinto Combat Operations Base (COB) Javelin, signalin gthe initiation of operations in the western zone of Bas eArea 112 ; more specifically, the penetration of the larg ebasin between the Ong Thu slope and the Nui Gaing -Yang Brai ridgelines near the Song Cai .* Following theestablishment of Javelin, the bombardment of Hil l508, future site of FSB Maxwell, began . Although

*A combat operations base was similar in character to a fire sup -port base, but did not include artillery.


8 9

more than 177 tons of high explosives were used t oclear a landing zone, the number of exposed treetrunks and the continued enemy small arms fire ,prevented Marines from being inserted by air . As aresult, Lieutenant Colonel Twohey ' s 1st Battalion, 3dMarines landed on nearby Hill 728 and attackedtoward Hill 508 over Hill 401, finally securing the ob-jective on the 15th . With the six 105mm howitzers ofBattery C, 12th Marines in position on Maxwell ,Spark's Marines were ready to pursue enemy forceswestward, searching and clearing the remainder of 112 .

Executing heliborne assaults from fire support andcombat bases into selected landing zones, the infantrybattalions fanned out in local search operations, uponthe successful completion of which they moved stil ldeeper into the base area : the 3d Battalion, 3d Ma-rines conducting clearing operations south and wes tof Cutlass through COB Dart to COB Battle-Ax an dFSB Bolo; the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, under Lieu -tenant Colonel Atkinson, continuing operation sthrough COB Broadsword toward FSB Tomahawk ; andLieutenant Colonel Twohey's 1st Battalion conductingsearch operations with companies advancing on

parallel axis north and west of Maxwell, and then de-veloping COB Scimitar on Mai Guy ridgeline overlook -ing the confluence of the Song Cai and Song Boung .By 5 February, units of Task Force Yankee were oper-ating along the entire length of the Song Caiwithin Base Area 112, while 1st Force Reconnaissanc eCompany teams penetrated deep into the western ap-proaches .

The four Marine battalions, radiating from thewidely dispersed combat and fire support bases, de-veloped numerous contacts with evading enemy unit sno larger than platoons, resulting in an undramatic ,but steady, attrition of enemy troops. Beyond thegenerally light ground combat, they uncovered abun-dant evidence confirming substantial enemy strengthwithin the base area . Patrolling units continued to lo-cate many base camps, supply stores, weapons, andammunition caches . On 5 January, for example, Com-pany E, 5th Marines unearthed an arms cache contain-ing 166 rifles and three crew-served weapons, 11kilometers west of An Hoa near FSB Pike. A logisticscomplex discovered by Companies C and D, 1st Bat-talion, 3d Marines, 10 kilometers southwest of Thuon g

A Marine patrol pauses in the dense jungle undergrowth . Fighting not only the terrainbut also excessive heat and humidity, Marines found the search of Base Area 112 exhausting.


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Duc on the 22d, yielded twenty-two 122mm rockets ,a thousand 82mm mortar rounds, 501 RPG rounds ,25 rifles, 17 cases of small arms ammunition, nearl y12 tons of rice, and a pen containing 65 live pigs .

It was during this period that the 3d Marine ssuffered a profound loss . While on visual reconnais-sance south of FSB Maxwell on the 15th, an Arm yUH-1H helicopter received automatic weapons fir ecausing it to crash and burn . On board were ColonelMichael M. Spark; the regimental sergeant major, TedE. McClintock; the commanding officer of the 1st Bat-talion, 12th Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Ermil L .Whisman; and Colonel Spark's radio operator, Lanc eCorporal Fredrick D. Kansik . All, including th ehelicopter's Army crew, were killed . Colonel Paul D .Lafond assumed command of the 3d Marines, whil eLieutenant Colonel Roddey B . Moss took over the 1s tBattalion, 12th Marines .

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Detailed search operations within Base Area 11 2continued throughout the remaining days of Januaryand into February. On the 6th, Task Force Yankee in-itiated operations west of the Song Cai as the 2d Bat-talion, 5th Marines, following a short rest at An Hoa ,assaulted Hill 435, later named Machete, and begansearching north-northwest along the river toward FireSupport Base Saber .

In the An Hoa basin, the new year was marked byoccasional skirmishes with small enemy units movin gbetween An Hoa and Go Noi Island, 10 kilometer sto the northeast . Assigned to secure the area was Lieu-tenant Colonel Richard F. Daley's 1st Battalion, 5thMarines . Combat patrols were the order of the day ,as described by First Lieutenant Ronald E . Pruiett :

The normal way we operate is to go out and set up a com -pany PPB [platoon patrol base] and operate out of that ,sending out platoons and squad-size patrols . The norma l

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patrol covers an area anywhere from 500 meters to a clic kand a half [1,500 meters], depending on terrain and typ eof contact which we expect to make . . . . Normally the onl ycontact we do make is a small unit also . Normally we runinto groups of maybe three, four, or five . The way contac tis normally initiated, they, in most instances, initiate th econtact by firing a few sniper rounds at us and then we wil lgo ahead to commence to maneuver . Again, they are veryslippery, and by the time we maneuver into the area whichthey are at or where we think they are at, they have alreadymade their bird [escape] . , s

The most intense action to occur took place duringthe night of 29 January in the far western sector ofGo Noi Island . At 2200, a squad ambush of CompanyC, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, not a participant i nOperation Taylor Common, observed approximatel y300 enemy troops cross to the southern bank of th eSong Ky Lam, six kilometers west of Dien Ban . Theenemy unit, apparently forced south by 7th MarinesOperation Linn River and ARVN Operation Hun gQuang 1-03, was taken under artillery fire, while th ecompany launched an attack to block the enemy's ad-vance . Engaging the Marines with automatic weaponsand RPG fire, the enemy attempted to escape west -ward, but was intercepted by Company D, 5th Ma-rines, moving from the southwest through head-highelephant grass . Fierce firefights continued throughou tthe night, with Marines employing 155mm artilleryfire and air strikes in support of the attack . By dawn ,

LtCol Richard B. Twohey, center, CommandingOfficer, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, and LtCol Ermil L .Whisman, right, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion ,12th Marines, brief Task Force Yankee commanderBGen Ross T. Dwyer on operations of the battalions .


the enemy had broken into small groups and scattered.A search of the battle area turned up 72 NVA dead ,while numerous drag marks and blood trails punctu-ated the dense growth of elephant grass . Friendlycasualties resulting from the night's action were seve nwounded .

On 7 February, operational control of BattalionLanding Team 2/26, under Lieutenant Colonel Wil-liam F. Sparks, was shifted from the 7th to the 5t hMarines and the BLT joined Operation Taylor Com-mon. Continuing the cordon and search of Go NoiIsland begun early during Operation Linn River, theteam' s Marines encountered sniper fire and a larg enumber of boobytraps as they moved across their as -signed area, destroying tunnel systems, bunkers, an dother enemy-prepared fighting positions . Completingits short sojourn ashore, the battalion landing tea mreturned to the amphibious assault ship, Okinawa(LPH 3), where after a vigorous training period, it wa splaced in reserve for the expected Tet Offensive .

During this same period, BLT 2/26 was joined i nOperation Taylor Common by her sister landing team .On 10 February, by way of a vertical envelopment ,codenamed Defiant Measure, Lieutenant Colone lJ . W. P. Robertson's BLT 3/26 deployed to the Arizona ,relieving the 1st ARVN Ranger Group. Due to the sizeof the team's area of operation (100 square kilome-ters), Robertson assigned each company a separate are ain which to conduct search and destroy missions . Cons-tant sniping at the moving companies, with five orsix NVA tracking each company, characterized actio nduring the first two weeks . Any halt in movemen twould result in sporadic sniper and incoming M7 9grenade fire. Near the end of February, Company Lmade heavy contact killing 75 enemy soldiers and des-troying two .50-caliber antiaircraft positions . Over th enext several days, Robertson's Marines found approxi-mately 20 rockets, mortars, and recoilless rifles in po-sitions from which they could be fired, line-of-sight ,at An Hoa Combat Base. With the close of the oper-ation, BLT 3/26 remained in the Arizona, concentrat-ing on the southern portion of its assigned area whil ebeing subjected to continuous daylight sniper an dnight mortar, RPG, and suicide-squad attacks .

By mid-February, Task Force Yankee essentially ha dneutralized Base Area 112 and established fire sup -port and combat operations bases on the western ap-proaches from the Laotian border. Upon order of the1st Marine Division, General Dwyer, who was replaced

92


on the 14th by Brigadier General Samuel Jaskilka ,reduced the scale of operations by ordering the with-drawal to An Hoa of all forces in 112 with the excep-tion of two companies (L and M) of the 3d Battalion ,5th Marines, each with one battery of direct supportartillery, located on Fire Support Bases Tomahawk an dMaxwell . Due to increased enemy activity in the DMZ ,the 3d Marines command group and its 3d Battalio nwithdrew from Base Area 112 to An Hoa Combat Bas eon 16 February, and redeployed immediately to Don gHa. The 1st Battalion, 3d Marines displaced to Hil l55 the following day, and subsequently airlifted t oDong Ha after participating in a short operation i nthe 5th Marines' northern area of operations .

On 21 February, following three days of rehabilita-tion and refurbishment at An Hoa, Lieutenan tColonel Stemple's 2d Battalion, 5th Marines movedby truck to the Phu Loc (6) Refugee Hamlet, north -east of the combat base on the Song Thu Bon . There ,in coordination with the 1st ARVN Ranger and loca lRegional Force Groups, the battalion initiated block-


ing operations in conjunction with the ARVN attempt

Two Marines enter a bamboo hut in one of the sever -to again find, fix, and destroy enemy forces, fortifica-

al enemy base camps and storage sites discoveredtions, and installations on far western Go Noi Island .

during the thorough search of Base Area 112.

On one of many patrols carried out in the Arizona, Marines of Company D, 1st Battal-ion, 5th Marines search an abandoned hut for hidden enemy troops and supplies .



9 3


Marines of Company D, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines rush a fellow Marine, wounded bya boobytrapped grenade, to a waiting helicopter for evacuation to a nearby medical facility.

Limited land-clearing operations, using high explo-sives, medium dozers, and Rome plows, were to beconducted after the sweep of the island, but a predawnenemy attack carried out against An Hoa Combat Baseduring the Mt holidays forced their cancellation . *

Shortly after midnight on the 23d, the northeas tcorner of the combat base, near the ammunitio nstorage area, was hit with enemy 82mm mortar fire .Under cover of the mortar and small arms fire, enemytroops cut and entered the base's defensive wire, an dfrom that position, using bamboo poles, were able tolob satchel charges into one of the ammunitio ndumps, causing a fire which ignited the remainder .Small arms and mortar fire broke the probe, and th eenemy fled to the northeast, continually engaged by"Spooky" and artillery fire . But the enemy force haddone its job . In addition to the extensive loss of am-

*Of the various types of land-clearing equipment tested in Viet-nam, the standard military D7E tractor, equipped with a heavy -duty protective cab and a special tree-cutting blade manufacture dby the Rome Company of Rome, Georgia, proved to be the mos tversatile and effective . The tractor took its name from the impos-ing blade attached to the front, which sheared off most vegetationsix inches above the ground .

munition, base personnel sustained numerous casual -ties from the night-long series of explosions whic hrocked the ammunition dumps . As a direct result ofthe enemy attack on An Hoa, and minor probes a tLiberty Bridge and on other allied installations withi nthe Da Nang Vital Area, Colonel Ord ordered Stem-ple's battalion to Liberty Bridge, where the battalio nassumed a local security mission .

As the number of enemy-initiated ground and in -direct fire attacks around An Hoa rose, so did th enumber experienced by the units which remained i nBase Area 112 . Almost nightly, Companies L and M ,operating near Fire Support Bases Tomahawk an dMaxwell, reported enemy ground and mortar attack sagainst their defensive positions . The companies re -quested reinforcements and General Jaskilka ordere dthe remainder of Atkinson's battalion redeployed tothe base area in late February. But with the attacksagainst An Hoa and other allied units operating near -by on the increase, Jaskilka again ordered the the 3 dBattalion to withdraw in early March .

Planned as a one-day operation, the withdrawal ofLieutenant Colonel Atkinson's battalion became athree-day battle of disengagement . On 3 March, Com-

94


pany M, while on a sweep near Maxwell, received smal larms and automatic weapons fire from an estimate dentrenched enemy platoon . Three Marines were killedin the attack, two of whose bodies could not be reco-vered due to heavy enemy fire . Forced to maintain itsposition, the company requested additional air an dartillery support . The following day, the Marines mad eanother attempt to retrieve the bodies, but they wer esuccessful in recovering only one . On the 5th a thir dattempt was made to recover the remaining Marin ebody, but as the company attacked the enemy posi-tion, two more Marines were killed and their bodie sleft on the battlefield .

Meanwhile, operations to close Tomahawk and Max -well began . As originally conceived, helicopters wereto extract the infantry companies and two artillery bat-teries simultaneously from both fire bases, but lowclouds and sporadic enemy mortar fire around Maxwel lforced the airborne helicopter controller to concentrat eall lifts on Tomahawk instead . Four 105mm and two155mm howitzers of the 11th Marines, along with on einfantry company, airlifted to An Hoa ; Company Lremained to provide security for a downed CH-5 3helicopter. The following day, Company L lifted to A nHoa and Tomahawk closed .

On 6 March, the Marines of Company M made on elast attempt to recover the bodies of their comrades .In their final drive, enemy fire proved to be too in -tense to warrant the risk of losing additional men, andthe company withdrew. A force reconnaissance teamsubsequently recovered the bodies of the fallen Ma-rines without loss ." Carrying their wounded, the Ma-rines of Company M advanced through the dens ejungle foliage toward Maxwell, encountering sporadicenemy resistance along the way. In one instance th ecompany's point element was taken under fire by anenemy squad, resulting in the wounding of one Ma-rine, who required immediate evacuation . While thecompany maintained its position, a medical evacua-tion helicopter extracted the wounded Marine by hoist .Poor visibility, additional enemy contact, rugged ter -rain, and the slow movement due to the wounde dresulted in Company M arriving at Maxwell after dark ,too late to be lifted to An Hoa along with the artillery.The following day, the last of Atkinson's tired Marine slifted out through sporadic small arms fire, and th efire support base was closed . With the later extractionof all reconnaissance teams operating within the bas earea, Operation Taylor Common came to an end on8 March .

Results of the three-month-long operation were im -

pressive: the destruction of enemy manpower in ex-cess of a regiment ; the capture of 206 tons of rice ,430,000 rounds of ammunition, and 1,100 weapons ;and the neutralization of Base Area 112 . But as Gener -al Dwyer was later to observe :

We knew when we went in—and we pushed these fir ebases all the way out as far as they'd go, almost to theborder—we knew we couldn't stay . And we had pretty muc hcleaned out the area . . . . But when you have to pull out ,they just filtered back in—that was, of course, the natureof the war. "

Marine casualties were 183 killed and 1,487 wound-ed; boobytraps killed 27 and wounded 386 Marines ,while 26 Marines were killed and 103 wounded b yfriendly fire . The ARVN Ranger Group suffered 100killed and 378 wounded, most occurring during oper-ations in the Arizona and on Go Noi Island .

Despite poor flying weather and rough terrain, Ma-rine airpower played a major role in the neutraliza-tion of Base Area 112, and the repeated security sweep sof the lowlands . The F-4 Phantom, A-4 Skyhawk, an dA-6A Intruder pilots of Major General Charles J .Quilter's 1st Marine Aircraft Wing flew numerous tac-tical support missions in marginal weather . During theoperation the Da Nang and Chu Lai-based fixed-win gaircraft flew 3,702 sorties, striking targets with 7,04 2tons of bombs, killing 155 enemy troops, and destroy-ing 624 installations .

Marine helicopters made an equally important con-tribution to the operation . The 10 helicopter squa-drons of Colonel Warren L. MacQuarrie's Marin eAircraft Group 16 at Marble Mountain, and Colone lBruce J . Matheson's Phu Bai-based MAG-36, flew32,619 sorties, carried 61,995 troops, and transporte d10,489 tons of supplies . Besides providing battlefieldmobility to the infantry and close air support whenfixed-wing aircraft were unable to attack targets du eto poor visibility, the pilots of these squadrons accom-plished medical evacuation, reconnaissance, resupply ,and other operational and administrative missions .Army CH-54 "Crane," CH-47 "Chinook," and UH-1 E"Huey" helicopters, " loaned" to the Marines by theAmerical Division supplied additional support . Ai rsupport for Taylor Common was not withou tproblems . While fixed-wing support was well -coordinated and "very timely," helicopter suppor toftentimes was not . Like Colonel Barrow during Oper-ation Dewey Canyon, General Dwyer was critical : "Thehelicopter support I would have to judge overall mixe din performance . It ranged from outstanding, coura-geous, superb helicopter work, to the other end of the


9 5

spectrum where it did not arrive on time, left befor eit should have, [or] went to wrong zones .

"It got to a point," he continued, "that we startedrecording the times that they were supposed to be o nhand, the times they actually arrived, by type of air -craft, so that we kept a plotted curve on them—thei rperformance" A frustrating problem for Genera lDwyer and his ground commanders were lunch breaks ."It was remarkable," he commented, "when they fi-nally did arrive, they would disappear around noon-time—at lunchtime—for a variety of reasons . It wasa startling coincidence of bad radios that had to befixed at lunchtime.' 18 A number of Marine pilots, bothfixed-wing and helicopter, took exception to the re -marks of General Dwyer. Among them was ColonelEdwin H. Finlayson, who served as the 1st Wing' soperations officer at the time. "The fact of this mat -ter is," he explained, "the helicopters as a physica lcharacteristic ran short of fuel after about four hours 'operation and had to return to Marble Mountain fo rfuel since the First Division at the time had not provid-ed for any at their forward bases as the Third Divisio nhad. BGen [Henry W.] Hise [Assistant Wing Com-mander] investigated this complaint and arranged tomove refueling facilities into more forward locations

for subsequent operations which greatly reduced th eproblem ." 19 Despite the problems and resultant criti-cism, Marine aviation, specifically helicopter support ,significantly influenced the results on the battlefield .

`A Little Urban Renewal"

"At first light, I told my [lead] platoon to move i nthere and do that village a job; and take a little bitof Tecumseh Sherman into Chau Son (1) ." After al lthe civilians, mostly women and children, were round -ed up, put on amtracs, and sent to the processin gcenter adjacent to Hill 55 before resettlement, the Ma-rines of Company D, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines move dswiftly through Chau Son (1) destroying bunkers ,fighting holes, and tunnels, and burning huts foun dto contain fighting gear . The actions of Company Dat Chau Son (1) characterized the conduct of the othe rcompanies involved in the short cordon and searchoperation, codenamed Linn River .20

While battalions of the 3d and 5th Marines searche dthe lowlands near An Hoa and Base Area 112, the 1s tMarine Division gave elements of Colonel Herbert L .Beckington 's 7th Marines the task of cordoning andsearching an approximately 10-kilometer-square are asouth of Hill 55, between Route 4 and the Song Th u

Elements of Company D, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines inventory a portion of the tons ofenemy food, supplies, and ammunition captured during Operation Taylor Common.


96


Bon, in support of the Accelerated Pacification Cam-paign. This task was in addition to the regiment ' s nor-mal missions of patrolling the Da Nang rocket belt ,with emphasis on the Song Vu Gia infiltration cor-ridor, and bridge and installation security . Except fo rscattered treelines and a few small hamlets, fallow ric epaddies dotted the area. Long considered a haven fo rlocal guerrilla forces, the area had witnessed severa lallied operations : Linn River would be no different .

At midday on 27 January, the 1st Battalion, 7th Ma -rines departed Hill 65 and moved east on Route 4 ,accompanied by half a dozen amphibious assault vehi-cles . Once in the objective area, Lieutenant ColonelWilliam F. Bethel's battalion would be joined by th e2d Battalion, 26th Marines, under Lieutenant ColonelWilliam F. Sparks, which was to assault two separat elanding zones the following day, link up with the 1s tBattalion, and establish the initial cordon . Althougheight Sea Knight (CH-46D) helicopters fromHMM-165 did arrive on schedule, their air filters swiftl yclogged with sand, and the lift portion of the opera-tion had to be postponed. Meanwhile, Bethel's bat-talion arrived in the objective area, and not wishin gto disclose the target and mission, moved further eas tand established a temporary blocking position .

The feint to the east "might have fooled some o fthe gooks," noted the acting commanding officer o fCompany B, Second Lieutenant Wyman E . Shuler III ,"but it sure didn't fool all of them," as the assault ele-ments of Lieutenant Colonel Sparks' battalion disco-vered the following morning. The first wave landedat LZ Owl without problem ; the second, however,received heavy small arms fire as it attempted to lan dat LZ Hawk . Four of the six helicopters in the fligh tsustained heavy damage and were forced to return t oHill 55, halting the heliborne assault for three hourswhile Marines awaited replacement aircraft . By late af-ternoon on 29th, with the lifts completed, all unit smoved into position, establishing the initial cordon? '

Supported by three 105mm artillery batteries ,5-inch guns of the heavy cruiser Newport News (CA148), and two platoons of tanks from the 5th Tan kBattalion, the 7th and 26th Marines successively cor-doned and then searched the objective area . Engage-ments during the remainder of the 12-day operatio nwere light, consisting of Marines intercepting enem ytroops attempting to flee the cordon . These smal lgroups of enemy troops were sighted and then engage dby air and artillery ; however, the majority of casual -ties resulted from mortar and sniper fire . Although53 enemy troops were killed, the destruction of for -


As elements of the 7th Marines look on, a South Viet-namese Air Force "Skyraider" drops its ordnance o nan enemy position during Operation Linn River

tifications and tunnel complexes carried out by the twobattalions and accompanying engineer detachment sovershadowed the loss of enemy personnel .

While multi-battalion operations such as Linn Rive rand Taylor Common gathered a majority of the laurels ,small-unit, counter-guerrilla operations were consis-tent in achieving success . When not participatingin major operations far afield, elements of Becking-ton 's 7th and Colonel Clyde W. Hunter' s 26th Ma-rines joined Colonel Robert G. Lauffer's 1st Marinesin saturating the coastal lowlands and piedmont ,north, west, and south of Da Nang with day and nigh tpatrols, ambushes, and company-size operations ,denying the enemy the freedom of action necessar yfor tactical successes within the Da Nang Vital Area . *

As the new year began, elements of the three regi-ments launched an around-the-clock assortment o f10,600 patrols and ambushes, in coordination with 7 8company-size cordon operations, during the month

*The 26th Marines, task-organized as a regimental landing team ,was under operational and administrative control of the 9th Ma-rine Amphibious Brigade . The regiment's in-country compositio nat the beginning of the year included a command group and th e1st Battalion . The remaining two battalions formed the infantryelement of the Seventh Fleet's Special Landing Force .


9 7

against suspected enemy harbor sites and areas of in -tense combat and logistical support traffic with meage rresults . But the relative calm observed in January, t oa degree reminiscent of the period preceding the waveof offensive thrusts of Tet 1968, gave way the follow-ing month to the first significant rise in enemy activi-ty since August 1968. Attempting to counter theexpanding South Vietnamese influence and to pro -vide stronger political leverage, the Quang Nam ene-my leadership again struggled to stage its comba tstrength in the populated piedmont and lowlandspreceding the Tet holidays, but were once moretrapped in the maze of 1st Marine Division patrols andambushes .

Acting on locally obtained intelligence, a patro lfrom Company D, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, on 7February, found an enemy base camp containin gequipment and messing and billeting facilities nea rthe Nam 0 Bridge on the Song Cu De, 13 kilometersnorthwest of Da Nang. Reporting the find, the patro ldeparted, leaving the site untouched . Shortly afte rdark, the full company returned and set up a series

ColRobert G. Lauffer, Commanding Officer, 1st Ma-rines, maps out the movement ofpatrols south of D aNang with his operations officer, MajJames K. Reilly.


of ambushes in order to catch any enemy troops us-ing the facility. Twenty soldiers attempting to moveinto the base camp activated the first trap shortly be -fore midnight . By 0200 the following morning, Com-pany D had surprised two additional NVA units . Ofa total of 45 enemy observed and engaged, the com-pany killed 18 and captured two prisoners .

Enemy attempts to move rockets within range of D aNang during early February, also fell victim to th enumerous Marine patrols and ambushes . On the 8th ,Company L, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines found seve ncomplete 122mm rockets concealed along the banksof the Song Yen, 14 kilometers southwest of the city.On the same day, and two kilometers west, another3d Battalion patrol discovered thirteen 140mm rockets ,temporarily stored in a waterhole . And shortly beforemidnight on the 18th, a Company F, 2d Battalion ,1st Marines ambush, directing artillery on suspecte denemy movement, five kilometers south of MarbleMountain, reported 21 secondary explosions, presuma-bly enemy rockets being destroyed .

By mid-February, encounters with larger enem yunits around the periphery of the Da Nang Vital Are arose . Company D, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, whil epatrolling 22 kilometers south-southwest of the city,located an NVA platoon occupying a bunker system .Under cover of artillery, the company assaulted the po-sition, forcing the enemy to withdraw, leaving 16 dead .A squad was left in the area, and at dusk it ambushe danother enemy platoon attempting to reoccupy th ebunker complex, killing 14 more . Earlier in the day,four kilometers to the east, the 2d Battalion, 51s tARVN Regiment engaged an estimated enemy bat-talion moving north from Go Noi Island . Pinnedagainst the Song Suoi Co Ca, the enemy lost 49 killed .

Despite the lack of strength necessary for a full-scal eoffensive, enemy units within range of Da Nang com-mitted themselves to action on the morning of the23d, the first day of Tet. Rocket and mortar teams werethe first to strike. Attacks against the Da Nang Vita lArea began with a 25-round, 122mm rocket missio ndirected at the Deep Water Pier and continued withsporadic attacks throughout the vital area until dawn .Principal allied losses included the destruction of a nARVN ammunition dump near III MAF Headquarter sand a 450,000-gallon fuel tank near the airbase . OneA-6A fixed-wing aircraft and six helicopters sustaine dlight damage during the attacks .

In addition to a rocket and mortar attack on Logis-tic Support Unit-1 supply areas at An Hoa, which des-

98



99

troyed 15,000 rounds of artillery ammunition an d40,000 gallons of aviation fuel, enemy units also tar-geted the Chu Lai complex . The largest rocket mis-sion of the day—fifty 122mm rockets—targeted th eDa Nang Force Logistic Command and Naval Suppor tActivity installations. Over half the rounds, however ,fell into the ocean with the remaining inflicting limit-ed damage on the LST ramp and one empty fuel tank .

As rocket and mortar teams attacked allied com-mand and logistic facilities within the vital area, ene-my sapper units attempted to disrupt major infantrycommand installations, while still other units move dto cut the principal approaches to the city . Like previ-ous attempts against Da Nang, the effort was detect-ed and repulsed, forcing the enemy to withdraw agai nto avoid total destruction .

Ground action south of Da Nang began shortly aftermidnight on the 23d, when Company K, 3d Battalion ,1st Marines and Company D, 1st Military Police Bat-talion detected enemy troops approaching the twoSong Cau Do bridges . Attacking the yet-unassemble denemy units, the two companies killed 47 Viet Congand captured 11, halting any enemy attempt at clos-ing the two critical highway approaches . A short tim elater, an estimated 70 Viet Cong attacked the com-mand post of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, six kilom-eters south of Marble Mountain . Repelled and forcedto withdraw, the enemy left 17 dead and 4 wounde din the hands of the 1st Marines .

Shortly after dawn on the 23d, a Viet Cong uni twas detected in a factory complex near the Hoa Van gDistrict Headquarters, site of the heavy fighting dur-ing the abortive attempt to take Da Nang in Augus t1968 . Marine units from the airbase forced the enemyinto an isolated, bamboo-encircled cemetery after kill-ing six and capturing two others . In a two-hour fire -fight the following day, the 21st ARVN Range rBattalion assaulted the enemy force, then in th eprocess of withdrawing southward, killing another 57 .

After less than 12 hours of fighting, enemy unit ssent north to attack Da Nang were in retreat . Theirefforts to escape unscathed were shattered by element sof the 1st Marines and 1st Battalion, 51st ARVN Regi-ment, who found them 11 kilometers south of D aNang and struck hard . Maintaining almost constan tcontact for three days, the ARVN and Marine troop skilled 139 and captured 38 weapons .

West of Da Nang, Lieutenant Colonel Francis X .Quinn's 3d Battalion, 7th Marines intercepted an dthen blunted a major three-pronged thrust into the

vital area by elements of the 141st NVA Regiment. Thecentral and southern thrusts aimed at seizing the vil-lage of Tuy Loan and destroying nearby Cobb Bridgein order to prevent allied reinforcements from movin gnorth along Highway 540 . The northern thrust at -tempted to secure a route through Dai La Pass andthen into the 1st Marine Division Command Post o nHill 327. Shortly after midnight on the 23d, a squa dambush from Captain Paul K. Van Riper's Company Mtrapped an enemy force moving east of Hill 10, kill-ing 10 and capturing numerous weapons . Several hourslater, another of Van Riper ' s patrols spotted 40 NVAtroops in the same area and engaged them with ar-tillery. A company search at first light the followingmorning revealed that the patrol had ambushed anenemy mortar company. In addition to securing twocomplete 82mm mortars, the enemy company's firs tsergeant was captured . He later indicated that a major

NVA offensive was underway .

During the morning of the 23d, as elements of th e141st continued to advance, Colonel Quinn first com-mitted Van Riper's company and then the remainde rof the battalion . The constant pressure applied b yQuinn's Marines, which at times approached hand -to-hand encounters, forced the enemy to separate insmall groups which, by the end of the day, congregate din three pockets along the Song Tuy Loan . The pocke teast of Hill 41 was eliminated on the morning of th e24th by Captain Fred T. Fagan, Jr's Company K, whoseMarines captured the acting regimental commande rduring the engagement .* Van Riper 's Marines, in clos efighting, reduced the second pocket centered aroun dthe village of Tuy Loan the same day. The third pock-et, nestled between the An Tan ridgeline and Son gTuy Loan, proved to be more difficult . Under Cap-tain James K. Hall, Marines of Company L, support-ed by artillery and air strikes, assaulted the positionseveral times but were unable to dislodge the enemyfrom the thick stands of bamboo and dense growthof elephant grass that covered the area . Sufferingnumerous casualties, included among them CaptainHall, the company was forced to withdraw an dregroup? 2

At first light on the 26th, Company M and the twoeffective platoons of Company L prepared to move for -

*Under interrogation, the captured regimental commande rprovided information which eventually led to the destruction o fhis own regiment, and to that of the 31st during Operation Okla-homa Hills . (LtCol Merrill L . Bartlett, Comments on draft ms ,1Sep86 [Vietnam 69 Comment File, MCHC, Washington, D .C.]) .

100 HIGH MOBILITY AND STANDDOWN


Sgt Howard" Johnson, a member of Detachment A, Marine Air Support Squadron 3 ,displays a North Vietnamese Army flag captured during one of the several enemy attack son Da Nang-area Marine and other allied positions, which began on 23 February .

ward against the enemy position . Following air strikes ,which consisted of 500-pound retarded bombs ("SnakeEyes"), napalm, and artillery fire, the assault bega nunder a blanket of riot control agent (CS gas) . In aseries of coordinated squad assaults, Van Riper's Ma-rines carried a portion of the objective before stallin gin the face of stiffening enemy resistance at nightfall .The following morning, again under cover of CS gas ,Company M renewed the attack. Moving rapidly, Va nRiper's lead platoon reached the Song Tuy Loan, cut-ting the objective in two while the trace platoon sturned east and west, clearing the remainder of th earea and hunting down surviving enemy troops . "Thecommanding officer was a prisoner and nearly 200 o fhis men were dead," noted Captain Van Riper, "rem-nants of the unit struggled desperately to break con -tact and move to the relative safety of the mountain s. . . . With the collapse of resistance at An Tan Ridge,

the 141st NVA Regiment ceased to exist as an effec-tive fighting force ." 2 3

Two other predawn Tet attacks centered on majorallied command complexes west of Da Nang. On thenorthern slope of Hill 327, security elements for Head-quarters, 26th Marines and 1st Marine Divisio nrepulsed a nocturnal assault by satchel charge -equipped NVA sappers . A similar attack targeted the2d Battalion, 7th Marines compound to the northwest .Although the sappers breached the defensive wire, 2 dBattalion Marines drove the attackers back. At least75 enemy troops were killed or captured in the tw ofutile attempts . Reflecting the intensity of the rocket-and mortar-supported suicide raids, Marine defender slost 18 killed and 80 wounded .

Although Marine patrols and ambushes continue dto engage remnants of the enemy force through March ,the attacks on the Da Nang Vital Area during Tet, in


10 1

essence, were met and broken on 23 February . Strand-ed in the Da Nang-Hoi An-Dai Loc triangle, the ene-my hid, hoping to escape area saturation by Marin esmall units and increased employment of the deadlyscout/sniper teams.* Despite the enemy ' s reluctanceto engage 1st Division Marines, nearly 500 NVA an dVC were taken out of action — a clear gauge of the con -tinued effectiveness of the 1st Marine Division's small -unit campaign in Quang Nam Province .

Americal's TAOI

Headquartered at Chu Lai, about 45 kilometer ssouth of Da Nang, was Major General Charles M . Get-tys ' Americal Division . The division' s Tactical Area ofOperational Interest (TAOI), one of the largest in Viet-nam, encompassed all of Quang Tin and Quang Nga iProvinces and the Que Son District of Quang NamProvince. Spanning the relatively flat coastal lowland sand mountainous central highlands, the division's are acontained approximately 1 .2 million South Viet-namese centered around Tam Ky and Quang Ngai ci-ties . Sharing the TAOI was the 2d ARVN Divisionheadquartered at Quang Ngai and numerous provin-cial forces .

Tactically, the three infantry brigades of the divi-sion were deployed throughout the TAOI in separat eareas of operation . To the north was the Oregon are aof operation; in the center, the Chu Lai ; and, to thesouth was the Duc Pho area of operation . In addition ,there were a number of areas created for specific com-bat operations .

Operations within the Chu Lai TAOI, as the year

began, centered on small unit patrols, ambushes alonginfiltration routes, and security operations along majo rlines of communications, designed to locate an deliminate enemy forces, enhance security of friendl yinstallations, and ensure the safety of the local popu-lation . Employment of patrols in the Chu Lai rocketbelt and detailed searches of Ky Hoa Island success -fully prevented attacks by fire against the airbase an dthe city of An Tan . In addition, a series of preemptiv eoperations was conducted in late January and earlyFebruary north of the Song Tra Khuc to deny the ene-my use of the area as a base from which to launch at -tacks against Quang Ngai City. Encounters remainedlight during the first two months of the year and i n

*Marine two-man scout/sniper teams, observer and rifleman, wer edeployed along heavily traveled enemy infiltration routes . Usingthe standard sniper weapon, a Model 700 Remington rifle with avariable-power telescopic sight, the teams were often credited withfirst-round kills at distances exceeding 1,000 meters .

early March the Chu Lai area of operation was incor-porated into that of Operation Geneva Park .

Americal Division forces conducted combat opera-tions within the Duc Pho area of operation during th efirst two months of the year with emphasis on secur-ing the heavily populated coastal plains, using satu-ration patrols and preemptive assaults in suspecte denemy staging areas . Like those within the Chu Laiarea, engagements remained light until late Februarywhen a series of joint Army-ARVN operations werelaunched along the coastline east of Mo Duc and intothe foothills of the Nui Tam Cap Mountains, all aime dat preventing enemy troops from approaching the cityof Quang Ngai . As with the other areas, in early Marchmilitary actions within the Duc Pho area of operatio nwere terminated and its area incorporated into the Iron

Mountain Operational Zone .

Created in early November 1968, the Oregon are aencompassed the northern portion of the Americal Di -vision TAOI—Quang Tin Province and Que Son Dis-trict of Quang Nam. Engagements were few aselements of two infantry brigades and one cavalrysquadron conducted saturation patrols, reconnais-sance-in-force, and rice-denial operations to locate an ddestroy enemy troop and supply concentrations . On23 February, elements of the 2d NVA Divisionlaunched simultaneous attacks on Tam Ky and agains tthe Civilian Irregular Defense Group camp at Tie n

Phuoc . Americal Division forces were committed tothese two areas and engaged the attacking enem yforces, turning them back before they could achiev eany success . On 18 March, as part of the realignmen tof forces within the Americal Division TAOI, the Ore-gon area of operation was incorporated into the oper-ational zone of Frederick Hill .

In addition to operations conducted within the Ore-gon, Chu Lai, and Duc Pho areas, four separate oper-ations were carried out . As a complement to OperationTaylor Common conducted by Task Force Yankeeagainst Base Area 112, elements of the 196th InfantryBrigade initiated Operation Fayette Canyon on 15 De-cember against the 1st Viet Cong Regiment in An-tenna Valley and the Nui Mat Rang Mountains to th esoutheast . Operation Russell Beach was carried out o nthe Batangan Peninsula, in conjunction with SpecialLanding Force Operation Bold Mariner, to rid the are aof enemy troops and to reintroduce South Vietnames econtrol . In support of the Accelerated Pacificatio nCampaign, Operation Hardin Falls was initiated in th eThang Binh District of Quang Tin Province in De-

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cember and was aimed at destroying local Viet Con gforces, rebuilding war-ravaged hamlets and villages ,and reestablishing South Vietnamese control of th earea . Further south, in Quang Ngai Province, Opera-tion Vernon Lake II continued in the Song Re Valle yagainst elements of the 3d NVA Division, preventing

the enemy force from launching offensive operation sagainst Quang Ngai City and the populated coasta l

lowlands . Due to aggressive Americal operations dur-ing the first two months of 1969, the enemy was un-able to achieve a single military or political objectivewithin the division's TAOI .

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The Quang Tri Border Areas - Marines.mil - The Official …. Marines in... · · 2012-10-11The Quang Tri Border Areas ... by skirmishes with NVA screening forces and by th e seizure