The puzzle of NATO-Ukraine relations the …THE IMPORTANCE OF IMAGES IN UKRAINE'S BID FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP Volodymyr Savchenko Major, Ukrainian Army B.S., Military Institute of Taras

Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive

Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection

2007-03

The puzzle of NATO-Ukraine relations the

importance of images in Ukraine's bid for NATO membership

Savchenko, Volodymyr

Monterey, California

http://hdl.handle.net/10945/3668

NAVAL

POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

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THE PUZZLE OF NATO-UKRAINE RELATIONS: THE IMPORTANCE OF IMAGES IN UKRAINE'S BID FOR

NATO MEMBERSHIP

by

Volodymyr Savchenko

March 2007

Thesis Advisor: Donald Abenheim Second Reader: Mikhail Tsypkin

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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: The Puzzle of NATO-Ukraine Relations: The Importance of Images in Ukraine's Bid for NATO Membership 6. AUTHOR(S) Volodymyr Savchenko

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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis examines the puzzle of NATO-Ukraine relations and the uncertainty that characterizes the nation’s

integration into NATO. Despite Ukraine's pluralistic reforms, considerable democratic advances and President Victor Yushchenko's continuous assertion of the high priority given Euro-Atlantic integration in Ukrainian foreign policy, NATO does not perceive Ukraine as a potential ally. In addition, the majority of the Ukrainian population holds a distorted and negative image of NATO and objects to the idea that their nation will join the Alliance.

The politico-psychological realm of international relations theory offers a framework to demonstrate the importance of images in NATO-Ukraine relations and thus explains the puzzling nature of Ukraine’s relationship with the Alliance. Historically, NATO's perception of Ukraine focused on Ukraine's international behavior and foreign policy motivations, and this perception affected the forms of cooperation the Alliance proposed to Ukraine. Unless Ukraine is perceived as a stable ally, it will not be invited to be part of the NATO Membership Action Plan, and the main priority of Ukraine's foreign policy–full integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions–will remain impossible. Being seen as a NATO ally, as well as reversing the Ukrainian public's negative view of the Alliance, is a major responsibility of the Ukrainian leadership. However, it is also crucially important that Western democracies keep the door open for Ukraine.

15. NUMBER OF PAGES

83

14. SUBJECT TERMS Ukraine, Euro-Atlantic Integration, NATO

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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

THE PUZZLE OF NATO-UKRAINE RELATIONS: THE IMPORTANCE OF IMAGES IN UKRAINE'S BID FOR NATO

MEMBERSHIP

Volodymyr Savchenko Major, Ukrainian Army

B.S., Military Institute of Taras Shevchenko National University, Kyiv, 1998

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

March 2007

Author: Volodymyr Savchenko Approved by: Donald Abenheim Thesis Advisor Mikhail Tsypkin Second Reader Douglas Porch Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

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v

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the puzzle of NATO-Ukraine relations and the uncertainty

that characterizes the nation’s integration into NATO. Despite Ukraine's pluralistic

reforms, considerable democratic advances and President Victor Yushchenko's

continuous assertion of the high priority given Euro-Atlantic integration in Ukrainian

foreign policy, NATO does not perceive Ukraine as a potential ally. In addition, the

majority of the Ukrainian population holds a distorted and negative image of NATO and

objects to the idea that their nation will join the Alliance.

The politico-psychological realm of international relations theory offers a

framework to demonstrate the importance of images in NATO-Ukraine relations and thus

explains the puzzling nature of Ukraine’s relationship with the Alliance. Historically,

NATO's perception of Ukraine focused on Ukraine's international behavior and foreign

policy motivations, and this perception affected the forms of cooperation the Alliance

proposed to Ukraine. Unless Ukraine is perceived as a stable ally, it will not be invited to

be part of the NATO Membership Action Plan, and the main priority of Ukraine's foreign

policy–full integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions–will remain

impossible. Being seen as a NATO ally, as well as reversing the Ukrainian public's

negative view of the Alliance, is a major responsibility of the Ukrainian leadership.

However, it is also crucially important that Western democracies keep the door open for

Ukraine.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE ..............................................................1 B. SIGNIFICANCE AND METHODOLOGY ..................................................2

II. THE ROLE OF IMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE COGNITIVE APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY .............................................5 A. POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE COGNITIVE APPROACH ....5 B. IMAGES, BEHAVIOR AND MOTIVATIONS............................................6 C. THE IMPORTANCE OF MINIMIZING MISPERCEPTIONS ................9

III. THE IMAGE OF UKRAINE AND ITS IMPACT ON NATO-UKRAINE RELATIONS..............................................................................................................11 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................11 B. INITIAL IMAGE OF INDEPENDENT UKRAINE ..................................11 C. UKRAINE'S IMAGE CHANGES WITH THE PARTNERSHIP FOR

PEACE PROGRAM......................................................................................13 D. ROLE OF THE CHARTER ON A DISTINCTIVE PARTNERSHIP

(MADRID, 1997) ............................................................................................15 E. FROM MADRID TO PRAGUE: UKRAINE DECLARES ITS

DESIRE TO JOIN NATO (2002) .................................................................17 F. FORGOTTEN ASPIRATIONS FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP AND

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR UKRAINE'S IMAGE (2002-2004) .............22 G. IMPACT OF THE 2004 ORANGE REVOLUTION ON UKRAINE'S

IMAGE AND THE REVIVAL OF UKRAINIAN ASPIRATIONS FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP........................................................................24

H. EFFECT OF INTERNAL POLITICAL INSTABILITY ON UKRAINE'S IMAGE ....................................................................................26

I. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................29

IV. EFFECT OF NATO MEMBERS’ FOREIGN POLICY ON UKRAINE: NATO AND EU INTERDEPENDENCE ................................................................31 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................31 B. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD UKRAINE.......................................31

1. U.S. Policy toward Ukraine, 1991-2004 ...........................................32 2. U.S. Policy after the 2004 Orange Revolution.................................35 3. U.S. Policy after the 2006 Parliamentary Elections ........................38

C. NATO-EU INTERDEPENDENCE AND EUROPEAN AMBIVALENCE TOWARD UKRAINE....................................................39 1. France's Position ................................................................................40 2. Germany's Position............................................................................43 3. The Importance of Polish Support ...................................................46

D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................48

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V. UKRAINIAN PUBLIC OPINION: THE MAJOR OBSTACLE TO NATO MEMBERSHIP..........................................................................................................49 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................49 B. POLL RESULTS ...........................................................................................49 C. MAJOR STEREOTYPES INFLUENCING PUBLIC OPINION.............51

1. NATO Perceived as an Enemy..........................................................51 2. NATO Perceived as Seeking Ukrainian Territory..........................52 3. NATO Membership Perceived as a Heavy Burden on the

Budget .................................................................................................53 D. RUSSIAN IMPACT ON NATO-UKRAINE RELATIONS AND

PUBLIC OPINION........................................................................................54 E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................56

VI. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................59 A. RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH ................................................................59 B. THE WAY AHEAD.......................................................................................61

LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................63

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................69

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Ukrainian Forces Contribution to International Peace-keeping Operations on the Territory of Former Yugoslavia............................................................19

Table 2. Public Opinion on Ukraine’s Integration into NATO (2002)..........................50 Table 3. Public Opinion on Ukraine’s Integration into NATO (2006)..........................50

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge and thank my advisors professors Donald Abenheim

and Mikhail Tsypkin for their wisdom, encouragement, skillful guidance and patience

while working with me. I express my deep appreciation to the faculty and staff of the

National Security Affairs Department for their dedication to excellence in education and

for my experience to study at Naval Postgraduate School.

My thanks also extend to the Dudley Knox Library personnel who greatly

facilitated my work by providing professional assistance in my bibliographic research. I

also wish to thank Debra Rosenthal and Nancy Sharrock, the editors of my thesis, who

spent long hard hours rendering my English more readable.

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1

I. INTRODUCTION

A. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE This study analyzes the role of images in NATO-Ukraine relations, demonstrating

their influence over the outcomes of domestic and foreign policy. After gaining

independence in 1991, Ukraine began a gradual rapprochement with the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO) just as the Alliance itself reached out to Central and Eastern

Europe, first with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and later through the

Partnership for Peace (PfP). At the start of a new century, Ukraine faces considerable

difficulties in its pursuit of NATO membership because of the complex link between

domestic politics and changes in the state system in Central and Eastern Europe.

Although NATO's Article X presents the possibility of membership, NATO is hesitant to

invite Ukraine to join the Membership Action Plan, the feature of PfP that eradicates the

final hurdles to membership. Ukrainian leaders repeatedly assert the nation's willingness

to join the Alliance, stressing considerable recent democratic advances. Nonetheless, it

appears that NATO does not see Ukraine as a potential member. The most popular

explanation for this state of affairs is that NATO is not sure that Ukrainian aspirations to

join NATO are genuine.1

More than half of the Ukrainian population holds a negative image of NATO.

Negative public opinion of NATO can be explained by several factors, including weak

awareness of NATO, ignorance of NATO's post-Cold War transformation and anti-

NATO propaganda. Given the negative public view of NATO, a national referendum on

Alliance membership would probably fail. However, Ukraine’s President Victor

Yushchenko notes, “Euro-Atlantic integration is the priority for Ukrainian foreign policy

and meets its national interests.”2 Given the inconsistency between the popular image of

1 “Ukraine: Kyiv's Pro-Western Policy in Doubt,” Radio Free Europe, 16 Jul 2006, available from

http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/07/a29ac932-4f29-4a8d-affb-ed8ca08d5d89.html, accessed 11 January 2007.

2 “Yushchenko Points Out Top Priority and Strategic Aims of Ukraine,” ForUm, 6 December 2006, available from http://en.for-ua.com/news/2006/12/06/150733.html, accessed 26 January 2007.

2

NATO and the priority placed on NATO integration by the national leadership, reversing

NATO's negative image must be a great concern for Ukrainian authorities.

The politico-psychological realm of international relations offers a framework to

explain the importance of images in NATO-Ukraine relations as function of domestic and

international policy and politics. Tracing the chronology of NATO-Ukraine relations

since 1991, the thesis explains how such images have shaped the framework of NATO-

Ukraine relations historically, and addresses current images and their influence over the

Ukrainian aspiration for membership in the Alliance.

B. SIGNIFICANCE AND METHODOLOGY According to Yushchenko, membership in the Alliance will provide the necessary

foundation for Ukraine's future as an independent state and active contributor to

European and Euro-Atlantic security.3 If Ukraine continues to be a “secondary actor,”

even with “Distinctive Partner” status, the nation risks remaining a buffer zone between

East and West—a new kind of Zwischeneuropa. This policy could lead to such disastrous

consequences as the partitioning of the country, or its reverting once again to the status of

a Kremlin vassal.

Persistent internal political instability in Ukraine affects the state’s international

behavior and negatively influences how it is perceived by NATO and its key members.

The distorted image of the Alliance held by Ukrainian society, which greatly determines

the national (intra-actor) level of behavior, puts the consistency and sincerity of

Ukraine’s leadership endeavors into doubt.4 These negative images might block the

state’s integration into NATO even if all membership-oriented reforms are successfully

implemented.

There is a considerable U.S. literature on NATO enlargement, and a smaller

literature on NATO-Ukraine relations. However, there are significant deficits in the

literature, as Ukrainian academic writing neglects the role of images in the relationship

3 “Yushchenko Points Out Top Priority and Strategic Aims of Ukraine.” 4 J. Thomas Price, “Behavior Modes: Toward a Theory of Decision Making,” Journal of Politics, Vol.

37, May 1975, 11, available from: http://www.jstor.org/view/00223816/di976574/97p04667/0, accessed 22 August 2006.

3

between NATO and Ukraine. Statements by U.S. officials, Congressional reports and

other sources depicting the U.S. stance towards Ukrainian membership in the Alliance are

of special interest in this thesis. The U.S. support of Ukrainian Euro-Atlantic endeavors

serves as an example, providing empirical evidence of how changes in images result in

changes in foreign policy.

In order to explain the choice of the cognitive approach toward the research and

support the hypothesis, both primary and secondary sources are used in this thesis.

Various academic works, including material by scholars on political psychology and the

cognitive approach in political science, are the basis for hypothesis development and

testing and aid in interpreting the empirical evidence. Primary sources, including

interview transcripts, Congressional hearings, articles, and statements by NATO and

Ukrainian leaders serve as empirical evidence in the assessment of the hypothesis.

Chapter II provides the theoretical background on the politico-psychological

(cognitive) approach to the study of foreign relations and the decision making process.

International behavior and foreign policy motivations as “construction material” for

different types of images are given special attention in this chapter.

Chapter III examines the emergence and evolution of Ukraine's image since

independence. Tracing the chronology of NATO-Ukraine relations reveals the factors

that contribute to NATO's view of Ukraine and how the country's image has shaped

different frameworks of cooperation.

Chapter IV depicts and explains the stance of particular NATO members towards

Ukrainian membership in NATO. Examining the specific views of key NATO powers on

the further enlargement of the Alliance and Ukrainian membership in NATO helps to

explain the divergence in their positions.

Chapter V describes the nature and sources of the distorted image of NATO held

by the majority of the Ukrainian population. Negative public opinion of NATO is rooted

in old fears and stereotypes and is nurtured by a widespread anti-NATO propaganda

campaign in Ukraine. The anti-NATO campaign serves to maintain and increase the

popularity of particular political parties and organizations in regions of Ukraine where

4

ethnic Russians are in the majority. This heavily influences public opinion of NATO and

makes it difficult for the average Ukrainian to make a conscious, informed choice in the

referendum on NATO membership. The urgency of the campaign to inform the

Ukrainian population about Euro-Atlantic integration and its purposes is obvious. The

current status of this problem is alarming but not hopeless.

In concluding the thesis, Chapter VI underlines the importance of images in

shaping the formats of international cooperation and makes recommendations to

minimize or eliminate the impact of misperceptions about the Ukrainian aspiration for

membership in NATO.

5

II. THE ROLE OF IMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE COGNITIVE APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY

A. POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE COGNITIVE APPROACH This chapter provides a theoretical background for the thesis by explaining the

relevance of the cognitive approach to the study of international relations and its

applicability to the study of NATO-Ukraine relations in particular.

The cognitive approach focuses on foreign policy as a “product.” Concepts from

political psychology are used to explain the role of images, perceptions and

misperceptions in the outcomes of foreign policy. Virginia Sapiro defines political

psychology as “an interdisciplinary academic field dedicated to the relationship between

psychology and political science, with a focus on the role of human thought, emotion,

and behavior in politics.”5 According to Shanto Iyengar and William McGuire, “the

cross-fertilization between political science and psychology has risen to a modestly active

level since its beginnings in the 1940s.”6 James Kuklinski stresses the dramatic growth of

published research on political psychology during the last decade, noting that “the

increased influence of psychologically oriented research is undeniable, which renders

questions about its value to the study of politics even more crucial.”7 Although political

psychologists are criticized for reducing politics to psychological phenomenon (which

Kuklinski calls the only consistent criticism of the science8), their methods are workable,

especially for studying the decision making process in the field of international relations.

In defining the cognitive approach, Hillel J. Einhorn and Robin M. Hogarth also

point out its unique niche in the theory of international relations. The cognitive approach,

they say,

5 Virginia Sapiro, “Introduction to Political Psychology,” Political Science 267, 2000, available from

http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/users/sapiro/ps267/ps267.htm, accessed 28 August 2006. 6 Shanto Iyengar and William J. McGuire, Explorations in Political Psychology (Durham, NC: Duke

University Press, 1993), 26. 7 James H. Kuklinski, Thinking about Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

2002), 9. 8 Kuklinski, 9.

6

assumes a complex, and realistic, psychology about human reasoning and decision-making. Humans and policy makers are cognitive actors. To understand and predict behavior, we have to deal with the realities of human rationality, that is, with bounded rationality. Therefore the process of cognition goes beyond the pure concept of rationality in actors’ behavior presented by the realist camp in the science of international relations and thus helps to explain the decisions, which can seem irrational from their point of view.9

Scholars compare such situations with molecules that seem not to follow the laws

of physics, and thus require a closer look.10 According to political psychologists,

behavior is one of the determinants of the images that appear and evolve in actors’

system of beliefs. The system of beliefs, including images, serves as a filter through

which the “drafts” of the decision pass and take shape.

B. IMAGES, BEHAVIOR AND MOTIVATIONS It is obvious that the images or perceptions of an actor held by others are shaped

in their belief system by judgments they make of the actor’s behavior. At the same time,

awareness of the actor’s motivations is indispensable for analyzing the actor’s behavior.

Therefore, the analysis of images in the sphere of international relations must be

supported by a parallel analysis of the important determinants of those images–

international behavior and foreign policy motivations.

Thomas Price puts the notion of “behavior” into the framework of interaction.11

For him, “the forms of interaction are divided into two categories (levels): interactor and

intra-actor.”12 International behavior is represented as an interactor level of interaction.

The second level, the intra-actor level, is a “nation-individual level of interaction, or

interaction between a government and its citizens.”13 The actor (the foreign policy

9 Kuklinski, 9. 10 Hillel J. Einhorn and Robin M. Hogarth, “Behavioral Decision Theory: Process of Judgment and

Choice,” 1981, available from http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.ps.32.020181.000413, accessed 22 August 2006.

11 Price, 11. 12 Price, 11. 13 Price, 11.

7

maker) “is dependent on the nation and is a subject to the nation’s jurisdiction.”14 Given

the subject of this thesis, this approach deserves special attention. Membership in NATO

has been declared a major priority of Ukrainian foreign policy. However, the national

(intra-actor) level of behavior (persistent negative public opinion toward NATO)

contradicts the international (interactor) level of behavior, which puts its consistency,

persistence, and the overall sincerity into doubt.

Behavior is driven by motivations. As Richard W. Cottam says,

motivations in foreign policy represent a compound of factors that predispose a government and people to move in a decisional direction in foreign affairs… Motivations in foreign policy should be approached by developing a predispositional base, or list of needs, the satisfaction of which predisposes an actor toward various action patterns.15

One of the best known criticisms of studying motivations comes from the

“anthropologist” of realist theory in international relations, Hans Morgenthau, who

argues that “individual motivations for the international analyst are unknowable and

hence a subject better avoided.”16 Cottam answers by arguing that, “although H.

Morgenthau rejected the importance of studying the individual motivations, his

prescriptions are founded on motivational assumptions that are basic to his entire thought:

that collective man, like individual man, is power driven.”17

The importance of images and perceptions (and misperceptions) in international

relations may be considered the stronghold of the politico-psychological approach. The

most obvious proof of the importance of images can be found in the study of international

conflict and conflict resolution. In this context, R. William Ayres points out that

14 Price, 11. 15 Price, 32. 16 Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf,

1973), 6. 17 Richard W. Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Case Study (Pittsburgh: University of

Pittsburg Press, 1977), 31.

8

“breaking down the stereotypes and images which conflicting parties hold of each other

is one, if not the main task for the process of conflict mediation.”18 He states that

by bringing conflicting parties together, providing clearer communication of each side’s views, allowing the airing of grievances, etc., they will begin to view each other less as adversaries and more as partners … Change in perceptions leads to a lowering of barriers to conflict settlement.19

To provide a good example of the role of images, Ayres narrows his research to

one type of the image–the image of the “enemy.” Studies of the enemy image are among

the most powerful from the first generation of scholarship in political psychology. One of

its most famous representatives, Ole Holsti, believes that “the concept of the enemy

helped to end and sustain international conflict over time.”20 However, although

important, the image of the enemy is not the only one that deserves careful attention.

Richard K. Herman and Michael P. Fischerkeller argue that while the study of images is

valuable for the field of international relations theory, “theories of image that rest only on

the enemy concept lack the analytical tools with which to make the differentiations

between threat- and opportunity based motivational compound.”21 They propose a

broader theory of “ideal images” that capture five different types of strategic perception:

images of enemy, degenerate, colony, imperialist and ally.22

Images are complex. The types of perceptions represent five ideal images,

meaning that no perception of foreign relations actors can be limited to only one image.

Nevertheless, the image of the ally is most stressed in this thesis. While the thesis argues

that mutual perception and images in the sphere of NATO-Ukraine relations represent

18 R. William Ayres, “Mediating International Conflicts: Is Image Change Necessary?” Journal of

Peace Research, Vol. 34, November 1997, 3, available from http://jpr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/34/4/431, accessed 28 August 2006.

19 Ayres, 2. 20 Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey and Patrick J. Haney, Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and

Change (Oxford, OH: Miami University Press, 1995), 55. 21 Richard K. Hermann and Michael P. Fischerkeller, “Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model:

Cognitive Strategic Research After the Cold War,” International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3, Summer 1995, 416, available from http://www.jstor.org/view/00208183/dm980291/98p0181k/0, accessed 28 August 2006.

22 Hermann and Fischerkeller, 426.

9

important obstacles to the state’s integration into the Alliance, it is also important to

recognize the types of motivations and behavior by both parties that impede Ukraine's

acquisition of the image of “ally” in the eyes of NATO—an image which it needs for

successful integration into the Alliance.

C. THE IMPORTANCE OF MINIMIZING MISPERCEPTIONS In Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Robert Jervis raises an

argument for the necessity of minimizing misperceptions in order to make more grounded

decisions in the sphere of international relations. In his view, a decision maker should be

extremely vigilant because of the costs of various kinds of misperception.23

The reluctance of specific NATO members to recognize the changes in Ukraine

and support Ukrainian Euro-Atlantic integration endeavors provide empirical support for

Jervis's argument. The ambivalence of France and Germany about the type of relations

they want with Ukraine is a good example. Their reluctance to see Ukraine as a future

member of NATO and the European Union (EU) and to provide their support is

explained by their unwillingness to damage relations with Russia. Although it makes

sense to avoid annoying Russia (and risking the loss of considerable economic and

energy benefits), there are other undesirable consequences of choosing the wrong policy.

First, without their important political and economic assistance to help Ukraine integrate

into the family of Western democracies, the risk that Ukraine will return to the Russian

orbit is high. A resurgence of Russian political, economic and military domination on the

western borders of Ukraine and eastern borders of the EU is definitely not seen as

desirable. Second, further marginalization of the Ukrainian democracy would undermine

the EU's principle of promoting democracy and raise the question of the “finalité

Européenne” in general.24

23 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton

University Press, 1976), 424. 24 See “The EU's Human Rights and Democratization Policy: Funding Activities to Promote Human

Rights and Democratization,” available from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/human_rights/intro/index.htm#9, accessed 14 January 2006.

10

Therefore, for research purposes this thesis concentrates on the emergence of the

initial images of independent Ukraine and NATO in 1991, the evolution of those images,

and their influence on the framework of NATO-Ukraine relations. The analysis of

different NATO perceptions of Ukraine, Ukraine’s foreign policy motivations and its

international behavior during different historical periods helps explain the different

formats of cooperation that NATO proposed to Ukraine. Also examined are specific

NATO members' foreign policy motivations and international behavior which affect

NATO’s image in the eyes of Ukrainian society.

11

III. THE IMAGE OF UKRAINE AND ITS IMPACT ON NATO-UKRAINE RELATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION An analysis of the roots and the character of foreign policy motivations and

international behavior of Ukraine during different periods allows judgments on the

international image of the state. This chapter traces the chronology of NATO-Ukraine

relations and explains how different views on Ukraine conditioned the formats of

cooperation proposed by the Alliance. This chapter demonstrates that Ukraine’s readiness

to meet the criteria of NATO membership will not guarantee the state membership if it is

not perceived as stable NATO ally.

B. INITIAL IMAGE OF INDEPENDENT UKRAINE It would be a mistake to say that the initial format of NATO-Ukraine relations

was shaped by the Alliance's image of the newly independent state. However, for the

following reasons this fact does not undermine the main argument of this thesis. First,

NATO-Ukraine relations began in 1992, when Ukraine joined the North Atlantic

Cooperation Council (NACC), which was NATO’s initiative for all non-NATO European

countries, including Ukraine. Second, the emergence of an independent Ukraine was not

accompanied by a clear and specifically “Ukrainian” image which influenced its relations

with NATO. Third, the decision to join the NACC was not based on clearly identified

specifically “Ukrainian” national priorities and motivations for international security.

Such foreign policy priorities and motivations were simply not identified.

The lack of clear foreign policy motivations is among the indicators of a

“degenerate” image, according to the classification proposed by Hermann and

Fischerkeller.25 The degenerate image characterizes states where “leaders are more

concerned with preserving what they have than with a vision for the future, states are less

strong than they could be, and decision making is confused.”26 Although Ukraine did not

25 Hermann and Fischerkeller, 428. 26 Hermann and Fischerkeller, 428.

12

fit this image perfectly, the state faced a number of domestic problems which did prevent

it from elaborating an effective and fruitful foreign policy strategy.

Along with a deep socioeconomic crisis after the collapse of the Soviet Union,

Ukraine inherited a set of problems which required considerable resources to resolve.

Ukraine was practically left on its own with the consequences of the 1986 Chernobyl

catastrophe, which required 20 percent of the limited Ukrainian budget to clean up

contaminated areas.27 Considering other factors like radiation and related diseases

affecting almost 10 percent of the population, contamination of 2.45 million square

hectares of fertile soil, and the like, it is hard to imagine how Ukraine, struggling with a

deep economic crisis, could manage the situation.28

At the same time, the Chernobyl catastrophe and its disastrous consequences were

among the main reasons for Ukrainian authorities' unprecedented decision to get rid of

the nuclear arsenal they had inherited from the former Soviet Union, the third world’s

largest. Although the initiative was supported financially by international donors, its

implementation required considerable allocations from the state budget. In addition,

Ukraine inherited 900,000 military personnel and abundant surplus military equipment

from the Soviet Union. The necessity of maintaining and at the same time reducing such

a huge military force also required considerable financial outlays, again from the scarce

national budget. And these are only the major problems that Ukraine faces since its

independence.

These and other difficulties characterized the conditions under which Ukraine

established statehood and created preconditions for its further participation in the

European security architecture. In addition, the state’s ability to conduct independent

foreign policy was very restricted. The Ukrainian state apparatus was manned almost

completely by former Soviet Ukrainian communist elites. The new generation of

Ukrainian politicians and diplomats was just emerging and did not participate in state

building.

27 “Chernobyl 'Costs'” available from http://www.ecn.cz/c10/costs.html, accessed 14 February 2006. 28 “Chernobyl, Ukraine” available from http://www.blacksmithinstitute.org/site10a.php, accessed 14

February 2006.

13

As a consequence, the Ukrainians saw NATO and its enlargement as similar, if

not identical to, the position of Russia, upon whom Ukraine had been politically and

economically dependent. The Ukrainian First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs stated

in 1993, with regard to NATO expansion, “the later, the better.”29 Despite the fact that

Ukraine on a number of occasions expressed concern about NATO enlargement, the

Alliance prepared to expand into Central and Eastern Europe, and Ukraine was not a

candidate for membership.30

Therefore, the formation of an initial image of independent Ukraine by NATO

was influenced by Ukrainian foreign policy's lack of clear motivations, priorities and

strategy. Ukraine's obscure motivations and attempts to balance between East and West

(so-called “multi-vector foreign policy”) are explained by the country's dependence on

Western financial donor states on the one hand, and Russian energy resources on the

other. Although Ukraine did not perfectly fit the degenerate image as defined by

Hermann and Fischerkeller, the state’s image at the time did share many characteristics of

the degenerate type.

C. UKRAINE'S IMAGE CHANGES WITH THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE PROGRAM In 1994, Ukraine joined the “Partnership for Peace” (PfP). Two facts about this

deserve special attention. First, this was the first independent decision by Ukrainian

authorities in regard to relations with NATO. Ukraine became the first member of the

Commonwealth of Independent States to join a major program for practical security and

defense cooperation with NATO and individual Partner countries, earlier even than

Russia.31 Second, official Kyiv provided NATO authorities with a Presentation

29 “Materials for the DC Meeting on 15 September 1993,” Oxman to Undersecretary Peter Tarnoff

“Your Deputies’ Meeting on the NATO Summit, Wednesday, 15 September 1993, 11.00 A.M., 14 September 1993.

30 Basic Papers on International Security Policy, April 1996, no. 16, available from http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP16.htm, accessed 31 July 2006.

31 “NATO-Ukraine Cooperation: Security Cooperation and Support for Reform,” 20 December 2006, available from http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-ukraine/index.html, accessed 22 December 2006.

14

Document in which the political goals of Ukraine's participation in PfP were determined,

together with arrangements to achieve these goals using means and powers allocated by

Ukraine for participation in PfP.

Practically, this means it is possible to distinguish Ukraine's motivations in its

foreign policy towards NATO since 1994. The motives can be discerned from the

provisions of both the PfP Framework Document and the Ukrainian Presentation

Document signed by the state leadership. Having signed the PfP Framework Document,

Ukraine “resolved to deepen its political and military ties and to contribute further to the

strengthening of security within the Euro-Atlantic area,” recognizing that “stability and

security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common

action.”32 The first Individual Partnership Program between NATO and Ukraine was

established the same year. It consisted of practical events for cooperation in international

security oriented toward concrete goals and results.

Cooperation with NATO within the Partnership for Peace Program opened a lot of

opportunities for Ukraine. It was a unique opportunity for Ukraine to develop its own

policy toward one of the most important security organizations in Europe and the world,

independently defining the goals of cooperation and implementing them. This greatly

contributed to the reaffirmation of Ukraine as an independent state capable of conducting

its own foreign policy.

With the emergence of Ukraine's clear foreign policy motivations regarding

NATO, it became possible to judge the state's behavior, which, in turn, contributed to

how Ukraine was perceived by NATO. The seriousness of Ukrainian intent was

reinforced by the state’s actual behavior. For example, in 1995, the year after Ukraine

joined the PfP program, the Ukrainian Army's 240th Special Forces Mechanized Infantry

Battalion went to Sarajevo for the peacekeeping mission. This made Ukraine a force

contributor to the NATO-led operation to carry out the UN resolution in the former

Yugoslavia (Implementation Force, IFOR, 1995-1996 in Bosnia and Herzegovina). Later,

32 Partnership for Peace: Framework Document issued by the Heads of State and Government

participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 10 January 1994, available from http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940110b.htm, accessed 15 December 2006.

15

Ukraine contributed a mechanized infantry battalion to the Stabilization Force (SFOR)

and made available a helicopter squadron. This was not Ukraine's first peacekeeping

experience since independence, but it was the first time the Ukrainian Armed Forces

performed missions within the NATO format and according to NATO operational

procedures.

The initiation of practical cooperation between NATO and Ukraine based on

clearly defined foreign policy motivations eliminated the near-degenerate image of

Ukraine held by NATO. For NATO, Ukraine became a contributor, a state which

implemented important security tasks in cooperation with the Alliance. For Ukraine,

cooperation with NATO became an important direction for foreign policy and

contributed to stability in the area, which is only 400 kilometers from the Ukrainian

border.

Ukraine’s participation in the Partnership for Peace Program and the concrete

results of its cooperation with NATO reaffirmed Ukraine as an independent international

actor with a foreign policy supported by clear motivations and appropriate international

behavior. This, in turn, contributed to the evolution of the image of Ukraine in the eyes of

NATO. An earlier image, unclear, close to degenerate, was replaced by a new image—

the image of a “partner.”

D. ROLE OF THE CHARTER ON A DISTINCTIVE PARTNERSHIP (MADRID, 1997) After the fruitful and mutually beneficial relationship that began with the PfP

program, NATO changed its perception of Ukraine. Ukraine's new image as a partner and

its appropriate international behavior pushed the Alliance to seek enhanced cooperation

with the state. Its strategic geographic location, considerable military potential and strong

political will to develop as a democratic state also played an important role in this regard.

In 1997 NATO Secretary General Xavier Solana said, in a statement preceding

the signing of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine in

Madrid on July 9, 1997,

16

The Alliance acknowledges that Ukraine has an important and even unique place in the European security order. An independent democratic and stable Ukraine is one of the key factors of stability and security in Europe. Its geographical position gives it a major role and responsibility. NATO attaches a special importance to its relationship with Ukraine.33

After the Charter was signed Ukraine entered a new era of cooperation with

NATO. This cooperation was specifically shaped for Ukraine and was influenced by the

evolution of the Ukrainian image held by NATO. Of course, the strategic geographic

location of Ukraine, its political and military potential played an important role. But

again, the status of a distinctive partner and the benefits related to this status could not

become a reality without positive changes in how Ukraine was perceived.

Two facts support this argument and thus the main hypothesis of this paper. First,

in 1992, when Ukraine joined North Atlantic Cooperation Council, it had the same

geographic location and potential for becoming an active contributor to stability in the

Euro-Atlantic security area. However, NATO did not propose any cooperation

specifically shaped for Ukraine at that time because the future of Ukraine and its foreign

policy priorities and motivations were unclear. Second, Ukraine's clear foreign policy

motivations, supported by appropriate international behavior, were recognized by NATO

and became preconditions for offering the status of Distinctive Partner in 1997. As stated

in the Charter, NATO

welcome[s] the progress achieved by Ukraine and look[s] forward to further steps to develop its democratic institutions, to implement radical economic reforms, and to deepen the process of integration with the full range of European and Euro-Atlantic structures.34

33 Xavier Solana, NATO Secretary General, Speech at the Madrid Summit, 7 May 1997, available

from http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970507a.htm, accessed 30 January 2006. 34 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine,

Madrid, 9 July 1997, available from http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/ukrchrt.htm, accessed 30 January 2006.

17

Therefore, NATO recognized Ukraine's progress. Noting in the same document

its appreciation of Ukraine's active cooperation with IFOR/SFOR and other peacekeeping

operations in the former Yugoslavia, NATO underlined the importance of the state’s

international behavior.35

To summarize, NATO’s proposal to further develop its relationship with Ukraine

based on distinctive partnership principles resulted from NATO's recognition of

Ukraine’s clear foreign policy motivations and appropriate international behavior. As

noted above, a state’s foreign policy motivations and international behavior are important

determinants of its image. Therefore, the change in the relationship between NATO and

Ukraine and the signing of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership were influenced by

the changing image of Ukraine from a near-degenerate state to a partner.

E. FROM MADRID TO PRAGUE: UKRAINE DECLARES ITS DESIRE TO JOIN NATO (2002) The next important event in NATO-Ukraine relations came on May 23, 2002,

when the Secretary of the Ukrainian National Defense and Security Council, Yevhen

Marchuk, announced Ukraine's intention to seek NATO membership. Although the

possibility of Ukrainian membership in the Alliance had already been discussed by

various interested groups, this announcement by a high Ukrainian official was

unexpected. Ukraine's ambitions were given a cautious welcome when NATO Secretary

General Lord George Robertson, head of a North Atlantic Council delegation, arrived in

Kyiv on July 9; however, Robertson warned that “membership was at least five years

away.”36 NATO-Ukraine relations in 2002 were far from those typical of potential allies,

and the image of Ukraine held by NATO was far from the image of an ally.

In fact, after the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership was signed, NATO-Ukraine

cooperation was significantly enhanced and brought even more valuable results. Sessions

of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, conducted at least twice each year in the format

“NATO plus Ukraine”, became a unique forum for consultations that greatly contributed

35 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine. 36 East European Constitutional Review, Volume 11, Number 3, Summer 2002, available

from http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol11num3/constitutionwatch/ukraine.html, accessed 20 June 2006.

18

to building confidence and increasing transparency in NATO-Ukraine relations. For

NATO, Ukraine ceased to represent an area of uncertainty, and “[s]trong, independent,

stable and democratic Ukraine became a cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security.”37 For

Ukraine, the Charter opened opportunities to get Alliance assistance in different spheres

of state development and reaffirmed Ukraine's role as a key European actor in the

security sphere. The new framework of cooperation allowed the conduct of a number of

activities in the “NATO plus Ukraine” format, including joint seminars, working groups

and meetings on topics such as civil emergency planning and disaster preparedness, civil-

military relations, democratic control of the armed forces, defense planning, budgeting,

policy, strategy, national security concepts and defense conversion. Ukrainian endeavors

to develop as a stable, independent, and democratic state were welcomed and greatly

supported by NATO.38

While Ukraine received valuable assistance from NATO, it also made active

contributions to Euro-Atlantic security. NATO benefited from Ukraine's expertise in

science and its contributions to peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans.39 Ukrainian

contributions to international peacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslavia provide a

clear example.

Period Missions Forces Contributed

1992 – 1995 UNPROFOR

240th Detached Special Battalion 60th Detached Special Battalion

40th Operative Group of staff officers Military Police Unit

Group of Military Observers since 1995 1995 – 1999 IFOR/SFOR 240th Detached Special Battalion

1996 – 1998 UN Mission to

Eastern Slavonia

17 Detached Helicopter Squadron 70 Detached Armored Company

64 Detached Special Mechanized Company 8 Detached Helicopter Squadron

15 Detached Helicopter Unit

37 NATO and Ukraine – Distinctive Partners. 38 NATO and Ukraine – Distinctive Partners. 39 NATO and Ukraine – Distinctive Partners.

19

Period Missions Forces Contributed

1999 – present KFOR

UKRPOLBAT (Ukrainian contingent within the Ukrainian-

Polish Battalion in Kosovo) Source: The History of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Participation in Peacekeeping

Operations http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=peacekeeping&sub=history

Table 1. Ukrainian Forces Contribution to International Peace-keeping Operations on the Territory of Former Yugoslavia.40

The new cooperation format created unique opportunities that Ukraine used for its

rapprochement with NATO. The Ukrainian military performed their missions in close

cooperation with their NATO colleagues. In the case of KFOR missions in Kosovo, the

Ukrainian military acquired valuable experience of interoperability with NATO forces as

a part of UKRPOLBAT. The foreign policy motivations of Ukraine, its dedication to

insuring regional peace and stability and its international behavior all contributed to its

new image of a strategic partner and potential ally.

However, Ukraine's active rapprochement with NATO lost momentum after 2000,

when it faced both internal and external obstacles. Power shifts in Russia and Vladimir

Putin’s presidency marked the beginning of considerable changes in Russian foreign

policy, including its policy toward NATO enlargement. Under the Russian presidency of

Boris Yeltsin, from 1991 to 1999, Ukraine, with its heavy economic dependence on

Russian energy resources, did not face serious obstacles in developing an independent

foreign policy towards NATO. Yeltsin did not object strongly to the first wave of NATO

enlargement at the end of the Cold War, which incorporated the Czech Republic,

Hungary and Poland, and he did not interfere in NATO-Ukraine relations. When Putin,

less tolerant of NATO, came to power, Russian energy supplies to Ukraine became a tool

to influence Ukrainian foreign policy. Therefore, starting in 2000, the rapprochement

between Ukraine and NATO faced an external obstacle, the Russians, which produced a

partial drift of Ukrainian foreign policy priorities back to the East.

40 “The History of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Participation in Peacekeeping Operations,” available

from http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=peacekeeping&sub=history, accessed 22 November 2006.

20

This Eastward drift of Ukrainian foreign policy was conditioned by the

emergence of new motivations to preserve good relations with Russia for the sake of

Ukraine's further economic development. This fact, along with Ukrainian energy

dependence, meant that Russia remained Ukraine's major trading partner and market as of

2001.41 The authorities' failure to diversify Ukraine's energy sources and markets and to

reduce its economic dependence on Russia after 1991 made it necessary to appease

Russia, which under Putin's leadership strongly opposed Ukrainian rapprochement with

NATO.

As a consequence, NATO-Ukraine relations slowed considerably and in 2000

began to deteriorate due to a series of scandals involving former Ukrainian President

Leonid Kuchma. The first signs of international scandal emerged with suspicions that

Kuchma had personally authorized the sale of a Kulchuga radar system, which can track

all existing aircraft without detection, to Iraq in July 2000, only two months after U.S.

President Bill Clinton visited Kyiv to cement the U.S.-Ukrainian strategic partnership.42

The scandal, dubbed “Kolchuga-gate,” broke out when a former Ukrainian Presidential

Guard officer, Major Melnichenko, made public audio tapes of Kuchma authorizing other

state officials to sell Kulchugas to Iraq. Although the deal was never proven, Kuchma’s

reluctance to clarify the situation and his confrontational behavior considerably

complicated Ukrainian relations with the West and especially the U.S. As former deputy

Head of the Presidential Administration, Vasyl Baziv, noted, Ukraine categorically

refused to accept such a tone in its relations with the West.43

Another disturbing scandal erupted in September of the same year, with the

disappearance of Georgiy Gongadze, a Ukrainian journalist famous for investigating

41 Hutchinson Country Facts: Ukraine, available

from http://www.tiscali.co.uk/reference/encyclopaedia/countryfacts/ukraine.html, accessed 28 August 2006.

42 “Ukraine Turns Down Early Membership Prospect In NATO,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 1, Issue 43, 1 July 2004, available from http://www.jamestown.org/print_friendly.php?volume_id=401&issue_id=3005&article_id=2368187, accessed 15 November 2006.

43 “Ukraine Turns Down Early Membership Prospect in NATO.”

21

government corruption. The same audio tapes made public by Melnichenko contained a

conversation between Kuchma and former Minister of Interior General Kravchenko in

which they discussed the necessity of doing something about Gongadze.

Of course, the West could not tolerate the situation in Ukraine. It became clear

that Ukraine under Kuchma and his semi-totalitarian regime was not a candidate to join

the Western democratic regimes and NATO. Ukraine was very close to being considered

a rogue state in Kuchma's second presidential term. His strategy of blaming the West for

its unwillingness to consider Ukraine as a future ally led to so-called “Kuchma fatigue,”

the refusal of NATO and the EU to consider Ukrainian integration while Kuchma was in

office.44 For example, Kuchma was not invited to attend the 2002 Prague NATO summit

meetings. It was decided that the NATO-Ukraine Commission, traditionally held during

the summit, would be conducted by foreign ministers in order to avoid Kuchma’s

presence. Although Kuchma made a unilateral decision to go to Prague anyway, he was

not welcome and no official meetings were held with him.

Ukrainian authorities declared their aspirations to join NATO in May 2002,

knowing that NATO would not under any circumstances invite Ukraine to the

Membership Action Plan during the Prague summit. This might be considered a tricky

political move by Kuchma to maintain his legitimacy with the Ukrainian population by

blaming the West for marginalizing Ukraine.

Two weeks after Ukraine declared its intentions to join NATO, on a visit to Kyiv

on July 9, 2002, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson stated, “The task before us

now is to concentrate on building upon and enhancing our Distinctive Partnership …A lot

will depend on Ukraine's resolve to take reforms forward. But we are ready to go as far as

Ukraine can.”45 The Ukrainian declaration of its NATO membership aspirations was not

ignored by the Alliance. Both sides were waiting for the approaching NATO summit.

Ukraine was expecting the reaction of NATO, and NATO, although not planning to

44 Taras Kuzio, “EU and Ukraine: A Turning Point in 2004?” Occasional Papers, No. 47, November

2003, available from http://www.iss-eu.org/occasion/occ47.pdf, accessed 20 November 2006. 45 “Celebrating Five Years of NATO-Ukraine Partnership,” 10 July 2002, available

from http://152.152.96.1/docu/update/2002/07-july/e0709a.htm, accessed 26 November 2006.

22

invite Ukraine, had to change its strategy to develop relations with Ukraine based on new

realities. As expected, everything fell into place at the NATO summit in Prague.

F. FORGOTTEN ASPIRATIONS FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR UKRAINE'S IMAGE (2002-2004) After the summit in Prague, NATO-Ukraine relations entered a new era. As

predicted, Ukraine was not invited to the Membership Action Plan. At the same time, the

Alliance reacted to the Ukrainian declaration by signing the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan

(NUAC). The NUAC, although lacking a clear position on Ukrainian membership in

NATO, is similar in content to the NATO Membership Action Plan. It contains principles

and objectives which, if implemented by the state, prepare it to meet all the criteria of

NATO membership. Thus NATO kept the door open for Ukraine, but not with Kuchma

in the President's office.

Launching the new format for cooperation and signing NUAC tested the

seriousness of Ukrainian intentions. As the document states,

the purpose of the Action Plan is to identify clearly Ukraine’s strategic objectives and priorities in pursuit of its aspirations towards full integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures and to provide a strategic framework for existing and future NATO-Ukraine cooperation under the Charter.

After signing the Action Plan, Kyiv could no longer refer to external reasons for

its failure to integrate into NATO and the family of Western democracies. Everything

depended on Kyiv and its progress in implementing the provisions of the Plan. The

provisions included strengthening democracy and the rule of law; respect for human

rights; the principle of separation of powers and judicial independence; democratic

elections in accordance with Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

(OSCE) norms; political pluralism; freedom of speech and press; respect for the rights for

national and ethnic minorities, and non-discrimination on political, religious or ethnic

grounds as well as adoption of all relevant legislation in pursuit of these objectives.46 As

46 NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, Prague, 22 November 2002, available

from http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b021122a.htm, accessed 12 December 2006.

23

events demonstrate, Kyiv failed to implement its own ambitions. Kuchma's highly

corrupt oligarchic power regime not only doomed democratic reform, but threatened also

to turn Ukraine into a rogue state.

Having damaged Ukraine's good relationship with the West, Kuchma turned his

attention back to Russia. Official Kyiv's new foreign policy motivations and its drift to

the East were accompanied by changes in the state’s international behavior. Instead of

adapting internal economic legislation to Euro-Atlantic norms and practice, thereby

implementing its commitments under NUAP, the government became active in creating

the Common Economic Space (CES) with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia.47 However,

Kuchma’s new policy did not bring the anticipated positive results. Moreover, in

November 2003, Russia and Ukraine faced the most serious crisis in their history. The

island of Tuzla in the Black Sea became a bone of contention in Ukraine-Russia relations

after Moscow expressed doubts about Ukraine's claim to the island. In the terms of multi-

vector (East and West) foreign policy, official Kyiv failed to improve its relations with

West and did not achieve much in its relations with the East.

Overall, Ukrainian foreign policy motivations in 2000-2004 were characterized by

lack of clarity. Ukraine's international behavior under Kuchma’s multi-vector foreign

policy was characterized by a return to the practice of balancing between the West and

the East. Seeking protection under the Western “umbrella” and support in its problematic

relations with Russia, and at the same time seeking room under the Russian “umbrella” in

case of confrontation with the West, Ukraine’s government found itself in a situation

similar to 1991, aggravated by international political isolation. Its unclear foreign policy

motivations and unpredictable international behavior contributed to the reversion of

Ukraine's image to that of a near-degenerate state. Consequently, Ukraine lost a unique

opportunity for gradual integration into NATO proposed in the NATO-Ukraine Action

Plan. It was clear that NATO would not consider Ukrainian membership until the end of

Kuchma’s presidency and Kyiv's unclear policy of balancing between West and East.

47 NATO-Ukraine Action Plan.

24

G. IMPACT OF THE 2004 ORANGE REVOLUTION ON UKRAINE'S IMAGE AND THE REVIVAL OF UKRAINIAN ASPIRATIONS FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP Karl Deutsch and Richard Merritt present an argument about the significance of

events for the change of international image. They identify three types of events which

can contribute to image change: spectacular events, cumulative events and shifts in the

policy of governments or mass media.48 Spectacular events and their significance for a

state's international image change are of special interest for this thesis. Ukraine's Orange

Revolution, which ended the Kuchma regime and revitalized interest in Ukrainian

integration into NATO and Western democratic society, can be seen as a spectacular

event. Scholars disagree about the significance of image changes produced by spectacular

events. However, the Ukrainian example proves that spectacular events can have a

considerable impact on a state's image. The Orange Revolution and its aftermath

considerably altered NATO's view of Ukraine and changed NATO-Ukraine relations.

The Orange Revolution was sparked by the Kuchma regime's electoral fraud

during the presidential elections. One of the main slogans of the revolution was “Ukraine

without Kuchma!” Kuchma's failures in the international arena were accompanied by

lamentable social conditions and poor quality of life for average Ukrainians. After

democratically elected Yushchenko became President, the hopes for Ukrainian

membership in NATO moved closer to reality. On April 20, 2005, NATO Secretary

General Jaap De Hoop Scheffer stated in an interview with the Financial Times that

“membership standards can be much more easily fulfilled by the Yushchenko

government than by the former Kuchma government.”49 The change in NATO’s attitude

toward Ukraine can be explained by the change of the state’s image in the eyes of the

Alliance.

Yushchenko's arrival in the Presidential office in 2005 also marked an end to

Kuchma’s multi-vector foreign policy, which put Ukraine into limbo with no clear or

48 Karl Deutsch and Richard Merritt, “Effects of Events on National and International Images,” International Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), edited by Herbert C. Kelman, 135-184.

49 Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine moves closer to NATO Membership,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 2, issue 84, April 2005.

25

concrete foreign policy priorities or strategy. From the very first days of his Presidency,

Yushchenko repeatedly declared that the only option for Ukraine’s development was full

economic and political integration into the EU and NATO. On his visits to Western

states, he requested support for Ukrainian endeavors. Clear foreign policy motivations,

dedication to a Euro-Atlantic course for Ukraine’s development as an independent state,

and domestic reforms to fight corruption changed Ukraine's image.

According to Hermann and Fischerkeller, an ally is an actor who is “ready to

pursue mutually beneficial economic relations and cooperate in peaceful joint efforts to

protect and improve the global environment; [an ally is] motivated by altruism as much

as by self-interest.”50 Taking this into consideration, Ukraine was never so close to being

seen as an ally as in 2005. After 15 years of half-measures and false starts, Ukraine

embarked on a path of comprehensive reforms and Euro-Atlantic integration.

At a meeting in Vilnius on April 21, 2005, NATO invited Ukraine to begin

Intensified Dialogue on Ukraine’s prospects for NATO membership. According to

NATO’s official website,

the formula of Intensified Dialogue has its roots in the 1997 Madrid summit, at which NATO Heads of State and Government decided to continue the Alliance’s intensified dialogues with those nations that aspire to NATO membership or that otherwise with to pursue a dialogue with NATO on membership questions and relevant reforms.51

Previous rounds of NATO enlargement showed that Intensified Dialogue is

followed by an invitation to implement the NATO Membership Action Plan. The fact that

Ukraine was invited to enter into Intensified Dialogue with NATO only four months after

the Orange Revolution proves that changes in Ukraine were recognized by NATO, and

that NATO is ready to perceive Ukraine as a probable member—in other words, an ally.

The Orange Revolution and the victory of democracy in Ukraine are strong

empirical support for Herman and Fischekeller’s argument for the significance of events

for international image change. NATO's invitation to begin Intensified Dialogue only

50 Hermann and Fischerkeller, 428. 51 “NATO Launches 'Intensified Dialogue' with Ukraine,” available from

http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2005/04-april/e0421b.htm, accessed 17 November 2006.

26

four months after the Ukrainian revolution shows how change of image influences the

outcome of foreign policy toward the image holder. From a practical point of view, the

Ukrainian goal to integrate into NATO had clear chances for success due to the Alliance

Open Door policy. As NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told reporters in

April 2005, NATO and its member states stood ready to do what they could to help

Ukraine achieve its goals.52

H. EFFECT OF INTERNAL POLITICAL INSTABILITY ON UKRAINE'S IMAGE What took place in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution presents many lessons.

The Orange Revolution is part of the popular wave of democratization in Eastern Europe.

Political instability in Ukraine following the revolution resulted from the power struggle

between the political groups that had propagated the ideas of the Revolution and

democratic transformation. The “Orange coalition,” which came to power after the

revolution but has since collapsed, consisted of four main political groupings: “Our

Ukraine” Party (backed by Yushchenko), Block of Yulia Tymoshenko (headed by Yulia

Tymoshenko), Socialist Party (headed by Oleksandr Moroz) and Party of Industrialists

and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine (headed by Anatolii Kinakh). Right after the presidential

elections, Yushchenko formed the Orange coalition government, appointing

representatives of the four political groups. However, all four immediately expressed

discontent with the proportional importance of their ministerial mandates; their

disagreements rapidly turned into open political confrontation. The President's efforts to

mediate and reunite the coalition government were unsuccessful. The new Ukrainian

government failed the survivability and professionalism tests due to the confrontational

climate. As a consequence, the government was fired by Yushchenko after only seven

months.

Such political instability could not be ignored by NATO. Although the new

Ukrainian government insured a steady flow of reform focused on integration into

NATO, the Alliance leadership was concerned with the political instability. As a

confirmation that Ukraine's image was damaged, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop

52 “NATO Launches 'Intensified Dialogue' with Ukraine.”

27

Scheffer stated after his meeting with newly appointed Prime Minister of Ukraine Yurii

Ekhanurov in October 2005 that Ukrainian integration into NATO should be a

performance based process and not only an events-based process.53

Unfortunately, the great Orange hope became a great Orange disappointment due

to immature behavior by the political elite, who missed a chance to further democratic

development and whose legitimacy among the Ukrainian people was greatly undermined.

As a consequence, parliamentary elections in March 2006 were won by the opposition

Party of the Regions of Ukraine headed by Yushchenko’s main opponent Victor

Yanukovych. Before Yanukovych's appointment as Prime Minister on August 4, 2006,

his party openly opposed Ukraine's move to join NATO, describing the process as an

inexplicable rush.

However, after Yanukovych became Prime Minister, NATO-Ukraine relations did

not suffer complications. Moreover, the newly elected parliamentary deputies, with

majority support for Yanukovych, nonetheless ratified the Memorandum of

Understanding allowing NATO access to Ukrainian airlift capacity. The ratification of

this Memorandum had been on hold since 2004 and did not make it through the previous

parliament. NATO's use of the unique and inexpensive Ukrainian airlift capacity benefits

Ukraine, from a commercial point of view, and for NATO it is beneficial as well because

strategic airlift is a considerable capabilities gap for the European Allies (compared, for

example, with the capabilities of the U.S.). Yanukovych and his parliamentary supporters

made a positive practical contribution to mutually beneficial cooperation with NATO.

Although the Party of Regions of Ukraine had earlier opposed ratification of the

Memorandum, it was nonetheless ratified once Yanukovych took office. The new

Cabinet of Ministers and the Parliament showed an exemplary joint effort on this issue,

and Yanukovych's team demonstrated the scope of their influence over Ukrainian foreign

policy.

53 Presspoint with the Secretary General, Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and H.E. Mr. Yuriy Yekhanurov,

Prime Minister, available from http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s051007b.htm, accessed 18 November 2006.

28

Ukrainian integration into NATO before the next parliamentary elections in 2011

depends greatly on the position of Yanukovych and his supporters in Parliament. Visiting

NATO headquarters on 14 September 2006, Yanukovych said there was

no alternative today for the strategy that Ukraine has chosen in its relations with NATO… For Ukraine it is very important to participate in the creation of the new system of European security, and such an opportunity is given to us today with the Intensified Dialogue with NATO and cooperation with NATO.54

Asked if Ukraine would join NATO’s Membership Action Plan, he responded

that because of the Ukrainian political situation, “we will now have to take a pause, but

the time will come when the decision will be made.”55 He did not indicate what kind of

decision to expect.

The answer can be inferred from the draft of the Declaration on National Unity of

Ukraine and its provisions on NATO-Ukraine relations proposed by the Party of Regions

of Ukraine. Creation of the Declaration was a Yushchenko initiative. The document had

to incorporate key aspects of Ukraine's development, including its foreign policy, and had

to be supported by different political parties. Signing the Declaration was intended to end

growing political instability which endangered the integrity of the state. Yushchenko’s

initial text of the provision on NATO-Ukraine relations stated that Ukraine will “join the

NATO Membership Action Plan.”56 The Party of the Regions of Ukraine proposed

modifying it to read, “Mutually beneficial cooperation with NATO, resolution of the

question regarding NATO membership via a referendum” or, alternately, “Mutually

beneficial cooperation with NATO in accordance with the current version of the Law on

National Security of Ukraine. Question regarding NATO membership must be resolved

via a referendum. Every necessary step should be taken by Ukraine in this regard.”57 The

rhetoric of this text is open to different interpretations. The final version advocates

54 Presspoint with the Secretary General, Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and H.E. Mr. Yuriy Yekhanurov,

Prime Minister. 55 Ibid. 56 Declaration of National Unity of Ukraine (Text Signed at the Round Table), 21 August 2006,

available from http://www2.pravda.com.ua/en/news/2006/8/1/5966.htm, accessed 12 January 2006. 57 Declaration of National Unity of Ukraine.

29

[m]utually beneficial cooperation with NATO in accordance with the “Law on National Security of Ukraine” (in accordance with the version of the law that is current on the day of the signing of this Universal). To resolve the question regarding NATO membership via a referendum, which is to take place after Ukraine completes every step necessary for it.”58

The statement regarding joining the NATO Membership Action Plan was

removed from the text. Considering that the majority of the Ukrainian population opposes

NATO membership, and factoring in the low probability that Parliament would pass new

laws on this matter, it is fair to say that Party of the Regions of Ukraine achieved its short

term goal of delaying membership in MAP at least until 2011.

Signing the Declaration cooled political tension in Ukraine but did not put an end

to political instability. The President's statements of Ukrainian readiness to join MAP are

not supported by the Prime Minister, who is backed by the Parliamentary majority and

thus has considerable leverage in foreign policy.

In a politically unstable situation, Ukraine's foreign policy motivations again have

become unclear and its behavior in the international arena is unpredictable.

Consequently, Ukraine's image has suffered, and it is not perceived, as it was in 2005, as

a NATO ally. This explains why Ukraine was not invited to join the NATO Membership

Action Plan during the Riga summit. Ukraine's chance to become a NATO member is

delayed at least until the next parliamentary elections in 2011.

I. CONCLUSION Since the beginning of NATO-Ukraine relations in 1991, cooperation has been

influenced by the Alliance's image of Ukraine. Changes in foreign policy motivations and

international behavior, which are the main components of image formation, influenced

the evolution of NATO-Ukraine relations starting with the NACC and later the PfP

programs, the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan and

the invitation to join in Intensified Dialogue with NATO. The fact that Ukraine was not

invited to the MAP during the Riga summit is explained by Ukraine's current image,

58 Declaration of National Unity of Ukraine.

30

which is marred by unclear foreign policy motivations and unpredictable international

behavior. If not improved, this negative image will block the state’s integration into

NATO even if all official criteria for NATO membership are met.

31

IV. EFFECT OF NATO MEMBERS’ FOREIGN POLICY ON UKRAINE: NATO AND EU INTERDEPENDENCE

A. INTRODUCTION This chapter describes how particular NATO members’ foreign policy towards

Ukraine affects Ukraine's integration into the Alliance. NATO is an organization

comprising 26 allies. Consequently, the image of Ukraine held by NATO as an

organization and the Alliance’s policy toward Ukraine results from commonly accepted

policy, elaboration of which is based on consensus. Without minimizing the importance

of any NATO member, for all practical purposes, the foreign policy of several specific

NATO members determine NATO's general policy. The important states include the

U.S., Germany, France and Poland.

The current complex situation results from differences among these states on the

future of NATO and Ukraine’s status. These differences can be explained by divergence

in national interests and motivations. The U.S. and Poland, with a rationale for seeing

Ukraine as an ally rather than a partner, are the most active advocates for Ukraine’s

membership in NATO. The reluctance of France and Germany to perceive Ukraine as an

ally and to support Ukraine in its endeavors is also dictated by rationale, one rooted in

their respective national political and economic interests. Continued U.S. and Polish

support will be crucially important for Ukraine’s full integration into the European and

Euro-Atlantic institutions. At the same time, membership will remain blocked if France

and Germany do not change their positions.

B. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD UKRAINE American policy toward Ukraine has always been crucially important to NATO’s

cooperation with the country. The chances of Ukraine joining the Alliance depend greatly

on the position of official Washington. The history of U.S.-Ukraine relations

demonstrates variations in American interests and strategy. America's initial strategy in

establishing relations with Ukraine was characterized by active participation to support

Ukrainian development as a stable and democratic European state. Considerable financial

assistance to Kyiv during that period can be considered investments, primarily in U.S.

32

strategic security on the European continent. The history of U.S.-Ukraine relations and

the changing U.S. strategy reveal that the U.S. took a lead in shaping NATO’s approach

to Kyiv, and specifically in securing Ukraine's status as a NATO Distinctive Partner in

1997 and inviting Ukraine to join Intensified Dialogue in 2005.

Changes in U.S. foreign policy can be explained by the politico-psychological

realm of international relations theory. Additionally, considerable changes in U.S.

strategy after the Orange Revolution provide strong empirical support for the significance

of events for image change and the outcome of foreign policy.59 Recognition of

democratic changes in Ukraine by the U.S. (in contrast to key Western European NATO

members) and changes in Ukraine’s image had clear justification. America's interest in

cooperating with Ukraine was always conscious, with clear goals. At the same time, the

importance of Ukraine’s image change for the evolution of U.S. foreign policy strategy is

obvious.

1. U.S. Policy toward Ukraine, 1991-2004 Immediately following its emergence as an independent nation in 1991, Ukraine

fell into the orbit of U.S. strategic interests. As Celeste Wallander puts it,

Ukraine is a key European country with geopolitical importance in Europe, the Black Sea region, and the Caucasus. Its location makes it a vital country in geoeconomic terms, as well as a potential trade corridor between Europe and Asia. Ukraine’s economy is more diversified than many in the post-communist region, with potential in the energy, defense, scientific-technological manufacturing, and agricultural sectors … Consolidating Ukraine’s future as a democratic country is important to U.S. national interests and requires a strong and sustained strategy.60

Among the most obvious rationales for active U.S. engagement with young

Ukraine was the need for reliable mechanisms for cooperation with a strategically located

new state. Ukraine was a powder keg, having inherited almost 40 percent of the Soviet

Union's military equipment. In terms of numbers, there were 1,944 strategic nuclear

warheads and 2,500 tactical nuclear weapons, 220 strategic nuclear carriers, including

59 Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), 135. 60 Celeste Wallander, “Challenge and Opportunity: A U.S. Strategy on Ukraine,” CSIS Publications,

28 June 2006, available from http://www.ukrweekly.com/Archive/2005/270514.shtml, accessed 12 January 2007.

33

176 land based intercontinental ballistic missiles and 44 strategic bombers (Tu-160 and

Tu-95). Conventional forces comprised 6,500 battle tanks, more than 7,000 armored

combat vehicles, 1,500 combat aircraft, 270 attack helicopters, 350 combat ships and

support vessels, millions of small arms and millions of tons of ammunition. Rapidly

initiating mechanisms for cooperation and consultation created U.S. opportunities to

further Ukraine’s “safe” development as a denuclearized and partly demilitarized state.

Appropriate Ukrainian decisions in that direction were supported by large amounts of

targeted American financial assistance. This explains why, from 1991 to 1996, Ukraine

became the world's third largest recipient of U.S. assistance (after Israel and Egypt) and

the number one recipient in former Soviet territory.61

Did official Washington perceive Ukraine as a probable future member of NATO

in the early 1990s? Definitely not. Ukrainian leadership and diplomats rejected the idea

repeatedly, even opposing the first round of NATO enlargement.62 Further, the U.S. and

other Western nations indicated that Ukraine was not a candidate for NATO

membership.63 This demonstrates that at first Ukraine was not perceived as a probable

ally but rather as a partner requiring assistance with stable and safe democratic

development. The transition to democracy requires time and considerable reforms.64

Accordingly, the initial strategy of the U.S. toward Ukraine was not focused on Ukraine’s

integration into NATO.

Later, on the eve of the first round of NATO enlargement, U.S. foreign policy and

its vision of Ukraine’s place had not changed considerably. In 1998, American foreign

policy and international relations analyst Robert J. Art claimed that

61 Leonid I. Polyakov, “U.S.-Ukraine Military Relations and the Value of Interoperability,” 18,

available from http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=590, accessed 22 December 2006.

62 Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 122. 63 Basic Papers on International Security Policy, April 1996, no. 16, available from

http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP16.htm, accessed 31 January 2006. 64 Burkhard Koch, “American and German Approaches to East Central Europe: a Comparison,”

World Affairs, September 1993, available from http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-14728649.html, accessed 11 January 2007.

34

NATO can expand without alienating Russia and endangering Ukraine. The special deals cut with these two – the founding Act with Russia and the NATO-Ukraine Charter – will square the circle. Both states will be kept organically out of NATO but intimately tied to it. Moreover, NATO’s expansion must be limited and, preferably, stopped, if Russia’s cooperation is to be secured … that is exactly what the United States and its allies risk if they next induct the Baltic states or Ukraine into NATO.65

This view reflected the left wing of the U.S. Democratic Party during NATO

enlargement between the Madrid invitations of 1997 and the actual first round of

enlargement in the spring of 1999.66

At the same time, when Ukraine asked for U.S. support to strengthen NATO-

Ukraine relations and bring them to a qualitatively new level in 1996, the U.S. response

was positive. Official Washington understood that institutionalization of NATO-Ukraine

relations could help prevent Ukraine's reincorporation into a Russian-dominated security

structure—a scenario that would cast the shadow of Russian power on the Polish border

with major implications for Alliance defense planning.67 The U.S.-Ukrainian

Commission, created in 1996, worked on these ideas from Kyiv; as a result, at the 1997

Madrid summit Ukraine became a NATO Distinctive Partner. This status opened

considerable opportunities for Ukraine to conduct an independent foreign policy and

receive more benefits.

Between 1997 and 2004, U.S. policy toward Ukraine was characterized by

cautiousness. Official Washington perceived Ukraine during those years as dominated by

President Kuchma and the oligarchic “clans” supporting him. The U.S. repeatedly

expressed concern about Ukraine's fitful economic reforms, widespread corruption, and

deteriorating human rights record.68 The first Ukrainian declaration of its NATO

membership aspirations in 2002 was cautiously welcomed by the U.S. The odds of

65 Robert J. Art, “Creating a Disaster: NATO’s Open Door Policy,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 113, No. 3, Autumn 1998, 385, available from http://navynps.library.ingentaconnect.com/content/taps/psq/1998/00000113/00000003/art00002, accessed 28 August 2006.

66 Asmus, 122. 67 Asmus, 159. 68 “Ukraine: Current issues and U.S. policy,” CRS Reports for Congress, 23 August 2006, available

from http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/73991.pdf, accessed 12 January 2007.

35

America supporting Ukraine for NATO membership in 2002 were extremely low because

of a series of quarrels between national leaders in 2000-2001. The Kulchuga-gate

scandal, followed by an exchange of unpleasant “compliments” between Washington and

Kyiv, are the most obvious. At the same time, while not backing Ukraine’s NATO

aspirations, Washington continued to provide considerable economic assistance.

Therefore, U.S. foreign policy during the so-called “post-communist syndrome”

from 1991 to 2004 was based on the strategic interests of the U.S. and its European allies

in making Ukraine safer and building the foundation for a stable democracy.

Approaching U.S. foreign policy during that period from the perspective of political

psychology, one can say that American foreign policy was based on the perception of

Ukraine as a partner. Assistance was practically intended to keep Ukraine from becoming

an unpredictable or even a rogue state.

2. U.S. Policy after the 2004 Orange Revolution Significant changes in U.S. foreign policy and a switch in the American position

on Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership after the Orange Revolution are strong

empirical support for how events affect both images and foreign policy.69 Why did the

U.S. recognize and actively support democratic transformations in Ukraine? There is no

doubt that a helping hand from the U.S. demonstrated yet again America's devotion to

liberal democratic values. Even America's negative experience with Ukraine under

Kuchma did not slow efforts to consolidate democracy and improve relations with Kyiv.

Starting in 2004, U.S. interest in Ukraine grew rapidly, accompanied by

qualitatively new strategic goals reflected in increasing American scholarly publications

and Congressional Research Service reports. The new U.S. strategy advocated Ukraine’s

integration into the family of Western democracies and NATO, and called on the EU to

provide similar support and “open the door” to Ukraine.70

American scholars said that Ukraine must become a priority for the United States.

Wallander wrote,

69 Kelman, 135. 70 “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution and U.S. Policy,” CRS Reports to Congress, 1 April 2005, 7.

36

Ukraine is a priority not only for … strategic reasons, but also because U.S. credibility is at stake: if the United States cannot sustain a serious strategy for Ukrainian development and integration, it is difficult to see how it can do so for countries with less economic potential, weaker democratic institutions, and further removed from vital European allies.71

Robert Wexler, a member of U.S. House of Representatives, said in 2005, “I hope

the Administration will discuss the likelihood and timetable for Ukraine joining

NATO.”72 Although U.S. support does not guarantee success, American endorsement is

very important.

The new U.S. strategy was still based on conscious interests and clear foreign

policy objectives, with a clear rationale to see Ukraine as an ally rather than just a

partner, and to advocate Ukrainian membership in NATO. The rationale can be explained

by a rift between key Western European powers and the U.S., which began when the

Soviet threat disappeared and became clearer in recent years.

The second Iraqi campaign by a U.S.-led coalition led to open criticism of the

American foreign policy by key European allies and EU trendsetters Germany and

France. Given Germany and France's political and economic potential and importance in

shaping EU policy, when they change their view of the traditionally strong American

position, it has the potential to become reality.

Europe remains the most important and indispensable U.S. partner in all

significant global issues in the new century – the global environment, international

development policy, high technology, etc. The EU has the population base, the economic

and technological capabilities, and the cultural and political attributes of a global power.

In Joseph Nye’s terms, Europe has the “soft power” that increasingly determines

international influence in the postmodern world.73 Energizing American efforts toward

71 Wallander. 72 Comments by Representative Robert Wexler before the United States House of Representatives,

Committee on International Relations, “Ukraine: Developments in the Aftermath of the Orange Revolution,” 27 July 2005, 2, available from http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa22653.000/hfa22653_0.HTM, accessed 28 August 2006.

73 Stephen F. Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 3.

37

Central and Eastern Europe to strengthen the U.S. position on the continent is a logic step

for Washington. The case of American-Polish relations is the best of several examples of

U.S. success in this direction.

America's position on the necessity of integrating Ukraine into NATO and the EU

does not look like a request that the European powers shelter a “poor cousin” against

drifting back to authoritarianism. Ukraine's strategic location and economic, political,

scientific and military potential are strong arguments against key European powers

reluctance to accept democratic changes in the country. Concretely, Ukraine's unique

strategic airlift capabilities could resolve a major problem of European NATO members

related to the capability gap between them and the U.S. Moreover, Ukrainian military

potential and strategic airlift capabilities are far from superfluous for the EU's long term

process of creating a common European military force. Therefore, by supporting

Ukraine's membership in NATO and EU, the U.S. both supports Ukrainian strategic goals

and simultaneously strengthens its own position with a probable NATO member.

In light of Alliance difficulties reaching consensus on major decisions, Ukraine, if

accepted in NATO, might become a close supporter of NATO's main protagonist, the

U.S. In this context, it should be noted that U.S. concerns about intra-Alliance divisions,

revealed after 2003, grew to the point that the Senate asked President George Bush to

raise the issue of changing NATO's consensus rule. One possible approach to the

evolution of decision making in NATO is to empower “coalitions within NATO.” This

approach would mandate that the NATO Committee of Contributors, comprised of Allies

prepared to contribute forces to operations, carry out operations on behalf of NATO.74

Considering the U.S. support of Ukraine’s aspirations for NATO membership and the

reluctance of the European Allies to extend the same support, Ukraine would logically

become a member of a U.S.-led “coalition” within NATO.

Of course, the scenario of coalitions within NATO is not all that likely. In its

history, NATO has managed to withstand serious crises, and its “margin of safety” will

allow it to weather the current situation. At any rate, Washington and Kyiv share mutual

74 Leo G. Michel, “NATO Decision Making: Au Revoir to the Consensus Rule?” Strategic Forum, No. 202, 2003.

38

interests in Ukrainian membership in NATO, which explains why the U.S. changed its

image of Ukraine from a partner to an ally and changed its policy toward Ukraine and

Ukrainian hopes for NATO and EU membership.

3. U.S. Policy after the 2006 Parliamentary Elections Ukrainian Parliamentary elections in 2006 revealed internal political instability.

Fruitless and debilitating disputes inside the Orange coalition, in power less than 15

months, impeded progress in implementing a coherent reform program after the

revolution. As a result, voters handed pro-Western parties a defeat, giving 32 percent of

the vote to the Russia-backed Party of the Regions. This was a wake-up call for the U.S.

David Kramer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs,

said in June 2006, “The positive atmosphere [towards Ukraine] at NATO ... has

dissipated in the face of several factors.”75 Those factors include the vision of NATO-

Ukraine relations described by the head of the newly-formed government. Underlining

the necessity of developing mutually beneficial cooperation between NATO and Ukraine,

Yanukovych rejects the idea of near-term membership in NATO.76 Although

Yanukovych bases his argument on negative public opinion on the issue, and NATO

membership would probably fail to pass in a national referendum, his rhetoric is not the

sort welcomed by the U.S. or NATO. The fact that NATO and member states' leaders

always assign great importance to rhetoric also explains the reaction of Washington and

the change in atmosphere towards Ukraine. Words, like actions, have consequences, and

language becomes part of generally accepted political reality.77

However, American foreign policy has not changed in ways which could affect

the strategy and interests of U.S.-Ukraine relations. Importantly, official Washington

responded positively to the formation of the Yanukovych government in August 2006.

The new permanent government took Ukraine out of the limbo it had occupied since the

75 “NATO Gets Cold Feet on 2008 Enlargement,” Reuters, 3 July 2006, available from

http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L03599675.htm, accessed 28 August 2006. 76 Presspoint with the Secretary General, Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and the Prime Minister of

Ukraine. 77 Ian Q. R. Thomas, The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination (New York:

Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), 6.

39

March elections. A State Department spokesman said that the U.S. would work with the

new government, given that it came to power in a democratic way. Nevertheless,

American analysts believe that the U.S. will watch closely to see if the new Ukrainian

government will try to reverse progress in democratization and other areas.78 Official

Washington will keep an eye on developments within Ukraine, and what they see may

change elements of U.S. foreign policy, although not U.S. strategy in general.

Tracing the chronology of U.S.-Ukraine relations, one can see how America's

strategy and interests changed over time. Changes in U.S. policy, influenced by the

evolving Ukrainian image, greatly affected NATO's propose form of cooperation. Efforts

by Washington allowed Ukraine to become NATO Distinctive Partner and join an

Intensified Dialogue. As the main proponent of Ukrainian membership in NATO, the

U.S. will continue to play a crucial role. At the same time, the invitation for Ukraine to

join the NATO MAP will depend primarily on Ukraine’s persistent pursuit of necessary

reforms along with the position of European allies, especially Germany and France.

Without appropriate support by key European powers, Ukrainian membership in NATO

will not become a reality.

C. NATO-EU INTERDEPENDENCE AND EUROPEAN AMBIVALENCE TOWARD UKRAINE European reaction to Ukraine's aspirations provides further evidence of NATO-

EU interdependence. The ambivalence of EU and its key powers regarding exactly what

type of relationship it wants with Ukraine is a serious obstacle to Ukrainian membership

in NATO. Western European reluctance to recognize transformations in Ukraine, to

change their view of the state and to support Ukraine for NATO and EU membership

have a clear justification. The causes of ambivalence (almost antagonism) are both

political and economic. The political background is the continuous policy of key

European powers to maximize their influence and political weight in Europe and the

world. The economic background, indissolubly tied to energy security, is the close

economic connection of France and Germany with Russia. Reluctance to support

Ukraine’s rapprochement with NATO to the detriment of relations with Russia is the key

78 Steven Woehrel, “Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. policy,” CRS Reports for Congress, 23 August 2006.

40

European allies' main economic reason. However, keeping the door to NATO closed

against Ukraine, even for the long term, means the European allies indirectly create

favorable conditions for the Kremlin to regain influence over Ukraine. As a result,

reluctance to recognize democratic transformations in Ukraine and to perceive it as an

ally, which is based primarily on national interests, partly nullifies U.S. and Polish

support for Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic endeavors. The situation is a serious obstacle to

Ukrainian integration into the family of Western democracies.

1. France's Position France has never directly expressed either support or opposition to Ukrainian

membership in NATO. At the same time, the French position on the future of NATO as a

practical matter blocks Ukrainian membership. U.S. proposals for further enlargement of

the Alliance and creation of new mechanisms for cooperation with Australia and Asian

countries were blocked by Paris on the eve of NATO’s Riga summit in 2006. By

opposing further Alliance transformation in general, France makes Ukrainian

membership in NATO improbable.

At the same time, one can see France's rationale for not perceiving Ukraine as an

ally within NATO and EU. Official Paris understands that in regards to Ukrainian

membership, the U.S., as the main proponent of NATO enlargement, will strengthen its

standing in Europe. In 1996, President Chirac said, “My ambition is for the [European]

Union to assert itself as an active and powerful pole, on an equal footing with the United

States of America, in the world of the twenty first century, which … will be a multipolar

one.”79

Competition with the United States for a leading international role is rooted in the

idea of France’s grandeur, of a strong and powerful France which “must lead a global

policy in the centre of the World,” in De Gaulle's words.80 The development of European

79 Anand Menon, France, NATO and the Limits of Independence (New York: Saint Martin’s Press,

2000), 130. 80 Menon, 130.

41

Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the EU, where France has strong political

and economic standing, serves French national interests in achieving “equal footing” with

the U.S. as an influence in Europe.

French Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie explains French objections to the

U.S. proposals on the eve of the Riga summit, stating that

the development of “global partnership” would risk diluting the natural solidarity between Europeans and North Americans … and above all, send a bad political message: that of a campaign, at the initiative of the West, against those who do not share its conceptions.81

Therefore, France's reluctance to support Ukrainian membership in NATO is part

of its general obstruction of any NATO transformation which might threaten the

international standing and influence of the EU in general and of France in particular.

Another reason France does not support Ukraine's aspirations is its unwillingness

to damage its developing relations with the Russian Federation. A Polish-Lithuanian

proposal to change EU-Ukraine cooperation (from the European Union Politics of

Neighborhood policy to another, with long-term prospects for EU membership) was

cautiously supported by Germany but rejected by France. One of the French arguments

was the uncertainty of official Paris on how Russia would react.82 France assigns special

importance to its relations with Russia based on national interests, especially economic

and energy interests.

Recognizing France’s political weight in the EU and its ability to influence

NATO internal processes, Russia created considerable economic incentives to enlist

France's political support in the sphere of international relations. These economic

incentives revolve around the stability of Russian energy resource supplies to Europe and

France in particular. Specifically, two French companies, “Total” and “Elf”, have

traditionally been among the largest buyers of Russian crude oil and oil products. “Total”

81 “France Blocks NATO Bid to Create a Global Terror Force,” The Independent, 4 November 2006,

available from http://news.independent.co.uk/world/politics/article1953750.ece, accessed 26 January 2007. 82 “France Fears Putin, Obstructs Ukraine’s Association with European Union,” Maidan Inform, 7

February 2005, available from http://eng.maidanua.org/static/enews/1107727382.html, accessed 11 February 2007.

42

was one of the first to invest in the newly opened Russian oil industry, opening the

possibility for France to participate in developing the giant Russian oil fields. One of the

best examples of French involvement in the Russian oil industry is the fact that “Total”

owns half of the shares in the huge, rich Kharyaga field in Nenets territory in the Timan

Pechora basin.83 Recent rumors of the withdrawal of the company’s license for the

Kharyaga project even caused the French Foreign Ministry to intervene. Foreign Minister

Philip Douste-Blazy said in September 2006, “I really hope that the good relations

between France and Russia translate very quickly into the possibility for “Total” to

continue its whole program in Russia.”84 Putin’s statement that the rumors were

exaggerated calmed the situation.

In addition to the existing cooperation, France plans to participate in developing

another giant untapped gas field in Russia known as Shtokman field. With 300 million

cubic meters of gas located in the Barents Sea, it has the potential to become Russia’s

major gas source for both internal and export markets. France's “Total” is one of four

international companies involved in development of this challenging gas field, with

production expected to begin in 2010.85 Considering that all of Europe depends on

Russian natural gas (50 percent of imports) and oil (30 percent of imports), French efforts

to strengthen economic ties with Russia will not meet strong objections from most EU

members.86

To summarize, France's ambivalence about relations with Ukraine and Ukraine’s

future status in NATO and EU can be explained by national political and economic

interests. While it wants equal footing with the U.S. in world affairs, France is satisfied

83 “Energy Cooperation between France and Russia: A Solid Base and Bright Perspectives,” Moscow

International Petroleum Club, 4 February 2006, available from http://www.mmnk.org/journal/said.htm, accessed 30 January 2007.

84 “France Demands Total Support over Oil License,” St. Petersburg Times, 26 September 2006, available from http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=100&story_id=18945, accessed 30 January 2006.

85 “Energy Cooperation between France and Russia: A Solid Base and Bright Perspectives.” 86 “Russian Oil Cut-Off Prompts Europeans to Look for Alternatives,” CNS News, 10 January 2007,

available from http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewForeignBureaus.asp?Page=/ForeignBureaus/archive/200701/FOR20070110c.html, accessed 22 January 2007.

43

with NATO’s current composition, tasks, roles and missions, and resists NATO

transformations that might negatively affect French international standing. Ukrainian

membership in NATO is perceived by France as strengthening the U.S. position in

Europe. Reluctance to damage relations with Russia is another explanation for France's

negative attitude towards further NATO enlargement and Ukrainian membership. These

strong reasons and French opposition make Ukrainian prospects for membership in

NATO practically unlikely.

2. Germany's Position The position of Germany on Ukrainian membership in NATO is no less important

than the position of France. Unlike France, Germany participates in NATO’s military

wing and thus is better integrated in NATO institutionally. Moreover, Germany’s active

support for the first round of NATO enlargement greatly determined the successful

integration of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into the Alliance. In regards to the

German position on Ukrainian NATO membership, official Berlin welcomed democratic

transformations in Ukraine and Euro-Atlantic orientation of its foreign policy. At the

same time, in contrast to official Washington, the German leadership did not openly

express a positive or negative view of Ukrainian membership in NATO. Nevertheless,

several factors indicate that Germany does not have adequate reason to perceive Ukraine

as a probable ally within NATO. Moreover, keeping the doors of both NATO and EU

closed would better serve German national interests and is more rational for Germany

than support for Ukraine.

The history of NATO expansion after the Cold War revived German interest in

the scope of the Alliance’s enlargement. A position paper drafted by a German inter-

ministerial working group in 1994 named the Visegrad countries (Czech Republic,

Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic) as preferred candidates for parallel enlargements

of NATO and EU and rejected collective admission of other aspiring countries.87

Germany took great interest in expanding NATO and EU to protect itself from potential

87 Frank Schimmelfennig, NATO’s Enlargement to the East: An Analysis of Collective Decision-

Making, EAPC-NATO Individual Fellowship Report, 2000, 40.

44

instability in Central and Eastern Europe. As former German Defense Minister Volker

Ruehe stated during Bundestag debates on NATO enlargement in 1994,

The opening of the Alliance to the East is in our vital interests. One does not have to be a strategic genius to understand this … A situation where we are at the border of stability and security – stable here but unstable east to us, prosperity on this side but poverty on the other side of the border – such a situation is not tenable in the long run. It is for this reason that Germany’s eastern border can not be the border of NATO and the European Union. Either we will export stability or we will end up improving instability.88

Ukraine, not a part of the Visegrad group and not a German neighbor

geographically, is one of the other aspirants whose membership in NATO does not

especially serve German national interests. It is obvious that the reason for actively

advocating Czech, Hungarian and especially Polish membership in NATO cannot be

applied to Ukraine. Moreover, Berlin understands that Ukrainian integration into NATO

will require considerable political and economic assistance for NATO membership-

oriented reforms. For the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic, such

assistance is justified by German national interest, especially in the security sphere, but

the same cannot be said of Ukraine. For these reasons, Germany is ready to perceive

Ukraine as a partner with democratic transformations and a West-oriented foreign policy

but not as a probable ally. Assistance to Ukraine is not seen as a justified burden.

Another clear rationale for not accepting Ukraine as an ally within NATO and EU

comes from Germany’s unwillingness to support Ukrainian endeavors that might harm

relations with Russia. Like France, Germany has recently been active in developing

relations with Russia to serve national interests in the economic and energy spheres.

Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who signed the initial agreement with

Putin to construct the North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP), is now chairman of the

NEGP consortium. German companies “BASF” and “E.ON” together own 49 percent of

88 Volker Ruehe, Speech during the Parliamentary Debate on NATO Enlargement, 1994, quoted in

Asmus, 30.

45

the consortium shares.89 It is intended that the pipeline cross the Baltic Sea to directly

connect Russia with Germany. The project faces strong opposition from six European

Union member states (Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovak Republic)

and is considered an economic threat to Belarus and Ukraine. If the project is

implemented, Belarus, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and Ukraine will lose their

status as transit states and the accompanying financial benefits.

For Germany, NEGP is advantageous because it would make Germany the

primary distributor of Russian gas in Europe. The pipeline will transport gas primarily to

Germany with further distribution to the rest of Western Europe, as well as to the former

transit countries. For Ukraine, which now sees 80 percent of Russian gas pass through its

territory en route to the EU, the consequences of this project are predictable: Ukraine will

lose considerable financial benefits and its strong political leverage with Russia. Given

the considerable financial and political benefits for Germany from the NEGP project, its

implementation essentially makes Germany and Ukraine serious competitors in the

energy sphere. If Ukraine joins NATO and the EU in particular, Germany risks gaining

another “dissenter” like Poland, which in 2006 vetoed the start of talks on a new

economic and energy partnership between EU and Russia.90

Germany’s reluctance to support Ukrainian integration into NATO and EU has a

clear rationale. Germany does not want to threaten its relations with Russia by supporting

Ukraine’s membership in NATO. In addition, considerable political support and

economic assistance to Ukraine would not be as well-justified by national foreign policy

motivations as were such expenditures in the first round of NATO enlargement.

Supporting Ukrainian integration into the EU, Germany also risks gaining an economic

89 Ariel Cohen, “The North European Gas Pipeline Threatens Europe’s Energy Security,”

Backgrounder, No. 1980, 26 October 2006, available from http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/upload/bg_1980.pdf, accessed 9 January 2006.

90 “Russia: Poland Holds Up EU Partnership Talks,” Radio Free Europe, 14 November 2006, available from http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/11/c5bd7c33-b982-4360-9617-62bb2ffb8ac3.html, accessed 9 January 2007.

46

competitor and a dissenter. As a result, although Germany welcomes Ukraine's

democratic reforms and pro-Western foreign policy, keeping the doors of both NATO

and EU closed better serves German national interests.

3. The Importance of Polish Support Like the U.S., Poland is an active advocate for Ukraine in NATO and EU. The

fact that Poland is a reliable American ally and supports Washington's foreign policy is

not the only explanation for Warsaw's position. Poland’s interest in Ukrainian

membership in both NATO and EU is similar to the interest of Germany in Polish

membership in these institutions in the 1990s. It is obvious that Poland would prefer as an

eastern neighbor an ally fully integrated into Europe and Euro-Atlantic institutions over

expansion of Russian influence on its border. This explains Poland’s changing perception

of Ukraine from a partner to an ally and Poland's immediate advocacy for Ukraine’s entry

into NATO. Considering the growing role of Poland in NATO and EU, Ukraine should

take advantage of Poland's support.

In 2002, when Ukrainian authorities announced their desire to join NATO,

Warsaw officials immediately expressed approval. Polish President Aleksander

Kwasniewski stated that “Poland will continue to be active in supporting the Euro-

Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine.”91 Polish support is important for Ukraine because

Poland belongs to NATO and the EU, where it managed to rapidly consolidate its

position after acquiring member status in 2004.

Poland's growing importance as a regional actor is one of the most striking

developments since the late 1990s. According to analysts, Poland has the best

performance among new NATO members.92 Historically, Poland was an influential state

in Central Europe. To play a leading role in the region today, as well as within the

Alliance over the long run, Poland has consciously sought a strategic partnership with the

United States. With U.S. political and economic support, Poland has gradually moved to

91 Aleksander Kwasniewski, Address by the President of the Republic of Poland, Mr. Aleksander

Kwasniewski,at the Welcoming Reception at the Presidential Palace, 23 September 2002, available from http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020923b.htm, accessed 7 January 2007.

92 Stephen Larrabee, NATO’s Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era (Pittsburg: RAND Publications, 2003), 42.

47

achieve its strategic goal and is the strongest U.S. ally in Central Europe today. Even

while it was acquiring the EU member status, Poland, unlike EU trendsetters Germany

and France, supported the U.S.-led second campaign in Iraq and contributed a significant

military contingent to the coalition force. Also unlike most European countries, Poland

supported Bush’s plans for missile defense and is willing to provide a radar site for a

theater missile defense system.93 The current status of U.S.-Poland relations guarantees

American support for Poland’s increasing self-confidence and status in Europe. At the

same time, the availability of a strong European ally and EU member helps Washington

preserve its strong political standing in Europe.

In February 2006, Poland’s newly elected President Lech Kaczynski expressed

his support for Ukraine’s membership in NATO, saying his country hopes to see Ukraine

join NATO in 2008. At the same time, he urged Russia to drop its ideas of a “zone of

influence.”94 It is notable that Kaczynski's statement came a month after a conflict

between Moscow and Kyiv that began when Russia stopped natural gas supplies in mid-

winter until Ukraine agreed to pay twice the price. Like other European states, Poland

reacted immediately. France, Germany and Italy encouraged Kyiv and Moscow to find a

solution quickly, but Poland raised the alarm, alleging that Moscow was using its energy

resources as a political weapon to influence “intractable” Ukraine. Poland was among the

first to point to the Russian threat to EU energy security. A recent rift in Belarus-Russia

relations, caused by a repeat of the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict the year before,

demonstrates that Polish alarm is well founded. Poland, which irritated key European

powers France and Germany with its veto of EU-Russia economic and energy talks, has a

strong argument for maintaining its position.

In addition, an overwhelming majority of Polish people would like to see Ukraine

as a NATO and EU ally. According to polls conducted by the Public Research

Laboratory of Poland in January 2007, 76 percent of respondents support Ukraine’s

93 Larrabee, 42. 94 “Poland’s Kaczynski Backs Ukraine’s NATO Bid, Seeks Better Ties with Moscow,” Moscow

News, 8 February 2006, available from http://www.mosnews.com/news/2006/02/08/kaszynsky.shtml, accessed 3 January 2007.

48

accession to NATO and EU.95 Such positive results can be explained by the fact that

Soviet domination is still fresh in the minds of Polish people. Poland's leadership has

social support for advocating Ukraine’s membership in NATO, which indicates that

Poland will continue to support Ukraine.

Polish support for Ukraine is based on a clear rationale. In addition to supporting

U.S. foreign policy on the future of NATO, Poland wants to see Ukraine as a future

member of NATO and EU based on its own national interests. Therefore, it is likely that

Poland’s support will continue to be strong. Ukraine, in aiming for NATO membership,

should take advantage of this support and study the domestic reforms that helped Poland

gain its own membership in NATO.

D. CONCLUSION NATO members' images of Ukraine, as well as their position on the potential for

Ukrainian membership, influence NATO’s common policy towards Ukraine. The

positions of the U.S., France, Germany, and Poland essentially determine the future of

Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic endeavors. The U.S. and Poland actively support Ukraine’s

acceptance into NATO because it suits their national interests and vision of the Alliance's

future. The same can be said of the ambivalence of France and Germany. U.S. and Polish

support will continue to be crucial for Ukraine’s future status in NATO and EU, but

Ukraine will remain blocked if the positions of France and Germany do not change.

95 “The Majority of Polish Population Support Ukraine’s Entry into the EU,” Follow News, 20

January 2007, available from http://follow.net.ua/news/stuff/232678/240, accessed 27 January 2007.

49

V. UKRAINIAN PUBLIC OPINION: THE MAJOR OBSTACLE TO NATO MEMBERSHIP

A. INTRODUCTION This chapter focuses on Ukrainian society's distorted and negative image of

NATO. Even unanimity among NATO members to accept Ukraine into the Alliance will

not guarantee success. Given negative Ukrainian public opinion, a national referendum

on joining NATO, which is a prerequisite for membership, would probably fail. Negative

public opinion undermines the sincerity of Ukraine’s leaders when they assert the

country's dedication to joining NATO.

Stereotypes and fears about NATO explain the negative perception of the

Alliance by Ukrainian society. Anti-NATO propaganda, spread within the population for

political purposes, keeps old stereotypes and fears active and creates groundless new

myths that heavily influence public opinion and can keep the average Ukrainian from

making a rational choice on the referendum on Ukraine’s bid to join NATO.

Notably, almost half of Ukrainians consider themselves poorly informed about

NATO. A clear failure by state authorities is responsible for the public's poor

understanding of NATO, its post-Cold War transformation, current tasks, roles and

missions, as well as the reasons NATO membership is the main priority of Ukrainian

foreign policy. Without a well organized and smoothly conducted information campaign,

Ukraine's main foreign policy task faces failure.96

B. POLL RESULTS Between 2002, when Ukraine first declared a desire to join NATO and 2006,

when the question of Ukrainian membership was actively discussed within NATO, public

opinion polls show that support for NATO membership has decreased while opposition

has increased.

96 Nikolai Sungurovskii, “Ukraine-NATO: Problem of Conscious Choice,” Kiev Mirror Weekly, 2

December 2006, available from http://www.zerkalo-nedeli.com/nn/show/625/55262, accessed 11 January 2007.

50

Attitude toward Ukraine's Membership in NATO

Percentage of population

Positive attitude 27 Negative attitude 38.8 Would not vote in the referendum 13.4 Difficult to say 20.2 No response 0.6 Source: Oleksander Razumkov Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies

Table 2. Public Opinion on Ukraine’s Integration into NATO (2002)97

As Table 2 shows, in 2002, a third of the population (34.2 percent) had no clear

opinion on whether to support the state’s bid for NATO membership. Ukrainian experts

believed that most of the undecided would support NATO membership if an appropriate

information campaign were conducted. To that end, they composed, coordinated and

received state approval for a “State Program on Informing the Population about Ukraine’s

Euro-Atlantic Integration” between 2004 and 2007. The program contained clear goals,

mechanisms for implementation, and expected results.

However, the program did not function as expected. More recent polls

demonstrate that it failed to increase the number of pro-NATO voters as expected. In fact,

a renewed anti-NATO propaganda campaign resulted in a decrease in support for the

policy.

Attitude toward Ukraine's Membership in NATO

Percentage of population

Positive attitude 23.5 Negative attitude 65.1 Difficult to say or no response 11.4 Source: National Academy of Science of Ukraine

Table 3. Public Opinion on Ukraine’s Integration into NATO (2006)98

97 “Public Opinion on Ukraine’s Integration into NATO,” Oleksander Razumkov Ukrainian Centre for

Economic and Political Studies, 24 December 2002, available from http://www.uceps.org/eng/opros/15/?show_q_id=13&idTema=0&m_razdel=102, accessed 29 January 2007.

98 “Sixty-five Percent of Ukrainian Population are Against Integration into NATO,” RBK Ukraine, 27 November 2006, available from http://www.rbc.ua/rus/newsline/2006/11/27/147345.shtml, accessed 22 January 2007.

51

Despite prevailing negative public opinion, the majority of Ukrainian experts

support NATO membership.99 Practically, this means that Ukraine’s entry into NATO is

supported by those who are best informed about NATO. So, what about the population?

According to the polls conducted in November 2006 by the Oleksander Razumkov

Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, 43.1 percent of the population

consider themselves poorly informed about NATO; only three percent of respondents say

they have a high level of awareness of NATO.100 Vladislav Yasniuk, director of the

Foreign Ministry's NATO-Ukraine Relations Department, reports that polls conducted by

his ministry in October 2006 show 24 percent of Ukrainians completely unaware of what

NATO is.

The urgent necessity for an effective information campaign is obvious. The

campaign should not only explain why joining NATO is the main priority of Ukrainian

foreign policy; it should also destroy old stereotypes and fears about NATO nurtured by

anti-NATO propaganda with no rational foundation.

C. MAJOR STEREOTYPES INFLUENCING PUBLIC OPINION Anti-NATO propaganda campaigns conducted for political purposes nurture old

stereotypes and fears from the Cold War years and create new ones which also affect

public opinion. There are three major stereotypes that influence public opinion on NATO

membership. In these stereotypes, NATO is seen as an enemy, NATO is seen as a block

seeking Ukrainian territory, and NATO membership is seen as a heavy burden on the

Ukrainian budget.

1. NATO Perceived as an Enemy The stereotype about the hostile face of NATO is probably the most important

and persistent. It is rooted in the Cold War and propaganda against NATO operations in

Yugoslavia which emphasized the bombardment of fellow Slav Serbians and the

expulsion of Orthodox people from their homes. Ignorance of the history of the conflict

plays a major role here. The facts that Serbian armed forces started military operations

99 Sungurovskii. 100 “Ukrainians Lack Information about NATO,” Inter News, 28 November 2006, available from

http://www.podrobnosti.ua/society/2006/11/29/372395.html, accessed 3 January 2007.

52

and that the NATO operation was a response to atrocities against the Albanian Muslim

population were surely not included in such propaganda. The same can be said about the

odds that the situation in Serbia will become a large scale uncontrolled regional conflict

with ethnic and religious overtones.

Poor awareness of NATO keeps the average Ukrainian from recognizing that

former Yugoslav republics are current or aspiring NATO members. Better information on

NATO's transformation and enlargement could help Ukrainian society to understand that

these former Yugoslav republics are not “dissatisfied” with their NATO involvement.

The fact that Serbia wants NATO membership is probably the best argument in this

regard.

2. NATO Perceived as Seeking Ukrainian Territory A second stereotype, involving NATO’s purported plans to occupy and deploy

troops in Ukraine territory, is also strong and actively exaggerated by those who spread

anti-NATO propaganda. The Block of Natalia Vitrenko, which failed to win three percent

of the vote in 2006 and thus does not qualify for a seat in Parliament, is extremely active

in diffusing these fears. Hoping to regain its lost position, the Block is especially active in

Eastern and Southern Ukraine, where ethnic Russians comprise a considerable share of

the population. The Block is even more active than the Communist Party of Ukraine,

which just barely amassed the three percent of the vote necessary for representation in the

Parliament.

In anti-NATO speeches, government opponents frequently accuse Ukrainian

leaders of trying to bring NATO troops into the state and violating provisions of the

Ukrainian Constitution that prohibit the stationing of foreign troops on Ukraine territory.

However, the authors neglect several facts. First, a foreign military base already exists in

Ukraine, belonging to the Russian Black Sea fleet. Second, people probably do not know

that NATO has no permanent military force, only one which is offered by allies and

partners and constituted specifically for the conduct of concrete military operations. Anti-

NATO propaganda neglects this information, so people hear about NATO only as a

potential occupier. Again, insufficient knowledge about NATO and active distortion of

facts play a negative role.

53

Another example of a distorted information campaign is the activity of the

Russian Nationalist Youth Organization “Proryv” in the Crimean peninsula. Two

deputies of the Russian Duma were declared persona non grata in Ukraine after they

visited the Crimean peninsula and delivered speeches in support of “Proryv.” Funding

sources for such organizations are difficult to track. However, the fact that their activities

are backed by Russian politicians speaks for itself.

3. NATO Membership Perceived as a Heavy Burden on the Budget The myth that NATO membership is a heavy economic burden also derives from

anti-NATO propaganda. Although Ukraine demonstrates relatively steady economic

development, the welfare of the average Ukrainian citizen remains poor. State social

services are also in need of improvement. That is why arguments regarding a heavy

economic burden from NATO membership, though false, catch the attention of average

Ukrainians. Supposedly well-informed pseudo-analysts even proclaim that NATO

membership will cost 92 billion hryvnias (roughly 19 billion U.S. dollars). Notably, they

do not indicate the duration and type of such expenditures.101

Again, poor awareness of NATO keeps the average Ukrainian from recognizing

that national contributions to the NATO budget are fixed on the level of one-half to one

percent of a nations’ military (but not social) expenditures. Real expenditures for the

implementation of the State Program on Euro-Atlantic Integration are 204 million

hryvnias (roughly 40 million U.S. dollars), which comes to approximately 60 kopecks

(12 U.S. cents) per adult per month. Moreover, 90 percent of this is reimbursed by the

United Nations Organization for Ukraine’s participation in international peacekeeping

operations.102 Anti-NATO propagandists’ awareness of Ukrainian society's concerns and

weak points helps them distort information to attract the attention of average citizens.

Besides these three major stereotypes, there are weaker and more irrational ones,

like the idea that neutrality is the best option for Ukraine. Only a well planned and

smoothly conducted campaign that attracts public interest can help the average Ukrainian

101 Sungurovskii. 102 Serhii Fesenko, “NATO is Not a Problem, Problem is the Ukraine’s Relations with Russia,”

Follow News, 28 November 2006, available from http://follow.net.ua/news/view/189080, accessed 9 January 2007.

54

to make a rational democratic choice. This in turn will help guarantee that anti-NATO

myths and “fairytales” will not affect Ukrainians' decisions during the national

referendum on NATO membership.

D. RUSSIAN IMPACT ON NATO-UKRAINE RELATIONS AND PUBLIC OPINION As a clear example of how concerns about Russia influence public opinion, 80

percent of Ukrainians are concerned about the possibility of worsening Russian-

Ukrainian relations if Ukraine joins NATO.103 Russia traditionally opposes any

Ukrainian rapprochement with NATO and tries to influence Ukrainian foreign policy

using leverage possible, including its natural gas supplies to Ukraine. When in April 2005

NATO invited Ukraine to begin Intensified Dialogue, there was a surge of anger from

Moscow and increased inflammatory statements by Russian politicians. The official

Russian position was announced by Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov, who said,

“We have said more than once that every country has the right to take sovereign

decisions on who will be its partner in the international arena.” At the same time, he

added that the acceptance into NATO of Ukraine would mean a colossal geopolitical

shift, and Russia would assess its options based on its own national interests.104

The official statement was followed by statements from other politicians who,

unlike Lavrov, showed a lack of ethics and diplomacy. As a consequence, ten Russian

politicians, including Vladimir Zhyrinovskii, a Vice Speaker of the Russian Duma, were

declared “persona non grata” for their interference in Ukraine’s domestic affairs. The

most staggering example of interference came with the arrival in Ukraine of another

deputy in the Russian Parliament, Konstantin Zatulin, who actively participated in a 2006

anti-NATO demonstration organized by the Block of Natalia Vitrenko. For this, he was

given the same status as his colleague Zhyrinovskii.

103 Fesenko. 104 David McDuff, “Moscow’s NATO Line,” A Step at a Time, 8 June 2006, available from

http://halldor2.blogspot.com/2006/06/moscows-nato-line.html, accessed 8 January 2007.

55

Average Ukrainians worried about relations with Russia are not sufficiently aware

of NATO-Russia cooperation. Improved awareness of the facts about Russian

cooperation with NATO could significantly contribute to opening their eyes to the

credibility of anti-NATO propaganda disseminated by Russian-backed groups.

The facts demonstrate that Russia outdoes Ukraine in several important types of

cooperation with NATO, even considering that Ukraine is in the process of Intensified

Dialogue. So, unlike Ukraine's “26 plus 1” format of “consultations” with NATO, Russia

participates in “making decisions” with the Alliance, specifically in the area of fighting

terrorism. In contrast to five working groups functioning within the format of NATO-

Ukraine Commission (NUC), the NATO-Russia Council counts 20 working and expert

groups.105 Other facts demonstrating practical cooperation between NATO and Russia

would also surprise the poorly informed average Ukrainian. To cooperate in fighting

terrorism, Russia allowed NATO aircraft to use its airspace for operations in Afghanistan.

Within the same framework of cooperation, Russia and NATO have established

mechanisms for intelligence information exchange. Based on the provisions of an Action

Plan set up by the NATO-Russia Commission, Russia participates in the NATO

antiterrorist operation “Active Endeavor” in the Mediterranean. In September 2006, the

Russian corvette “Pytlivyi” patrolled the Mediterranean Sea jointly with the Turkish

frigate “Geksu.” A Ukrainian role in the same operation, meanwhile, is limited by the

contact point in Ukrainian Navy Headquarters in Sevastopol, and participation by the

Ukrainian corvette “Ternopil” is still in the planning stages.

It should also be mentioned that since June 2004, the Ukrainian Parliament has

failed to ratify a Memorandum of Understanding allowing NATO access to Ukrainian

airlift capacity. While the Ukrainian Parliament considered for two years whether it

should make friends with NATO and ratify the memorandum, the Russian company

105 Volodymyr Kravchenko, “Russia-NATO: Not a Love-Match but a Marriage of Convenience,”

Kyiv Mirror Weekly, 23 September 2006, available from http://www.zerkalo-nedeli.com/nn/show/615/54600, accessed 12 January 2007.

56

“Volga-Dnepr” took an interest in providing the same services for the Alliance. As a

consequence, the Russian company provides 50 percent of airlift services requested by

NATO.

Other facts about NATO-Russia cooperation—Russia’s participation in NATO

exercises, NATO’s support for the Program of Adaptation of the Russian Retired Officers

at a rate of 400,000 Euro per year,106 etc.—also exemplify how the state can pursue

national goals in cooperation with NATO. Russian cooperation with NATO might even

serve as an example for Ukraine.

Returning to how the Russian factor influences Ukrainian public opinion on

NATO, anti-NATO propaganda is reflected in another very interesting fact. According to

the polls, the share of Russian population with a negative image of NATO is 60

percent.107 Considering that Ukrainians with similar views make up 65 percent of the

population (five percent more than in Russia), the success of the anti-NATO propaganda

campaign probably was a surprise even for its organizers.

These realities point to the urgent need for an effective public information

campaign about NATO. In the future, an objective description of NATO-Russian

cooperation should probably be included in the Ukrainian State Program on Informing

the Population on Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic Integration. Depicting the benefits to Russia

from its active cooperation with NATO could show Ukrainian society why Russia so

strongly resists any Ukrainian rapprochement with the Alliance. This would greatly

contribute to the fight against anti-NATO propaganda and to reversing the NATO’s

negative image among Ukrainians.

E. CONCLUSION

The negative image of NATO held by the majority of Ukrainians will block the

main strategic goal of Ukrainian foreign policy, membership in NATO, even if all NATO

106 Kravchenko. 107 Kravchenko.

57

members unanimously support Ukraine’s bid to join Alliance. This reinforces the fact

that membership in NATO depends primarily on the state's willingness and ability to

integrate into the organization.

Negative public opinion means that a national referendum would probably fail, so

reversing the negative image of NATO should be a priority for the state leadership. The

task appears complicated because of multiple negative stereotypes of NATO. These

stereotypes, nurtured by anti-NATO propaganda in Ukraine, will prevent the average

Ukrainian from voting rationally in the referendum. A well-timed and smoothly run

information campaign can show Ukrainians the sources and goals of anti-NATO

propaganda. In response to anti-NATO propaganda, information on the scope of NATO-

Russia cooperation should be included in the information campaign. The information

campaign so far has had unexpected negative consequences, including dramatic growth in

opposition to NATO membership. Ukrainian authorities should learn a lesson from this,

as continued failure to change public opinion in the near future might create an even

greater problem: a turn back toward Russia that would preclude Ukraine's chances of

developing as an independent state.

58


59

VI. CONCLUSION

A. RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH Having begun gradual rapprochement with NATO since independence, Ukraine

today faces considerable difficulties with its bid for NATO membership. While

continuing to pursue an open door policy, NATO hesitates to invite Ukraine to the

Membership Action Plan and does not see Ukraine as a potential member despite

repeated statements by the President in favor of NATO membership and considerable

democratic advances and reforms. The fact that more than half of Ukraine's population

has a negative image of NATO aggravates the situation. If the negative perception of

NATO by Ukrainians is not reversed, a national referendum on NATO membership will

certainly fail.

The problem of images in NATO-Ukraine relations can be explained by turning to

the politico-psychological realm of international relations. The chronology of NATO-

Ukraine relations shows how the evolution of Ukrainian foreign policy motivations and

changes in its international behavior changed how the Alliance perceived Ukraine.

Changes in the image of Ukraine, from a near-degenerate to a partner and probable ally,

are reflected in changed cooperation formats proposed by NATO over the history of the

NATO-Ukraine relationship.

The fact that NATO does not see Ukraine as an ally is caused by Ukraine's

internal political instability, which is reflected in unclear foreign policy motivations and

international behavior. The legitimacy of statements by Ukraine’s President Yushchenko

asserting the high priority given to joining NATO is regularly undermined by Prime

Minister Yanukovych, who is backed by the majority of the Ukrainian Parliament.

Insofar as membership in NATO depends on the aspirant’s determination and ability to

integrate fully into the organization, this uncertainty at home will surely prevent NATO

from inviting Ukraine to NATO Membership Action Plan.

Further institutionalization of Ukraine’s relations with other Western democracies

is crucially important for the state’s self-concept and development as an independent

60

stable democracy. NATO’s Open Door policy represents a unique opportunity for

Ukraine in this regard. Unless it is integrated into NATO and the EU, Ukraine risks a

return to political, economic and military domination by Russia.

Practically speaking, Russian domination would eliminate Ukraine as an

independent state and international actor. The U.S. and Poland, the main advocates for

Ukraine’s membership in NATO, have several times expressed concerns in this regard.

Guided in relations with Kyiv by their foreign strategy and conscious interests, American

and Polish leaders continually stress their hope that Ukraine will be a strong and

independent state fully integrated into NATO and their willingness to provide

considerable support toward this goal. At the same time, they encourage the EU and its

key members to keep the European Union door open for Ukraine as well. Without

Western European support for Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic endeavors, political and economic

assistance to Kyiv from Washington and Warsaw will remain inefficient.

Major European powers' reluctance to see Ukraine as a NATO ally and EU

member derives from their resistance to NATO transformation and enlargement. France

and Germany's unwillingness to accept Ukraine in NATO and EU to the detriment to

relations with Russia is another serious obstacle. Further marginalization of Ukraine

would undermine the legitimacy of EU's support for democracy and raise the general

question of the “finalité Européenne.”108 Moreover, marginalization of Ukraine creates

favorable conditions for Russia to extend its political and economic influence to the

eastern borders of the EU. Would this be beneficial for the European Union? It is a big

question.

However, unanimity within the members of NATO would not guarantee Ukraine

NATO membership if another major problem, the distorted and negative image of NATO

held by Ukrainian society, is not resolved. Active anti-NATO propaganda, the main

cause of NATO's poor public image, nurtures stereotypes and fears about Ukraine's

108 “The EU's Human Rights and Democratization Policy: Funding Activities to Promote Human

Rights and Democratization,” available from http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/human_rights/intro/index.htm#9, accessed 14 January 2006.

61

integration into the Alliance which preclude a rational, conscious decision in the required

national referendum. Efforts by the Ukrainian government to inform the public about

Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration have obviously failed.

B. THE WAY AHEAD The future of Ukraine as an independent state is in question. That is why full

integration into NATO and the EU should remain Ukraine’s top foreign policy priority.

Resolving problems related to joining NATO is primarily Ukraine's responsibility.

However, without the support of NATO and EU members, Ukrainian intentions risk

failure.

How Ukraine is perceived by NATO will block NATO membership even if all

membership oriented reforms are successfully implemented. Overcoming Ukraine's

internal political instability and maintaining the dynamics of comprehensive internal

reform are crucially important.

Given the tension between negative public views toward NATO and Ukrainian

leaders' drive to insure NATO membership, reversing NATO's negative image must be

priority so that anti-NATO propagandists do not continue to exert a negative impact. The

importance of the “Russian factor” on public opinion suggests that Russia's active

cooperation with NATO should be a focus of the public information campaign.

Ukraine must take full advantage of strong support from the U.S. and Poland, lest

the Western countries develop “Ukraine’s fatigue” like in 2000-2001 during Kuchma's

rule. The experience of Poland and other new NATO members should be thoroughly

studied by Ukrainian authorities and experts.

Given the ambivalence of key European allies, Ukraine should reinvigorate

dialogue with the European powers. If the European door to NATO remains closed,

Ukraine's main foreign policy priority will not be achieved.

Ukraine’s path to Euro-Atlantic integration is a rocky one. The situation is

difficult but not hopeless. Of course, Western support is crucial. At the same time,

Ukraine's determination to do its homework is the key to success.

62


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