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Ukraine's Orange Revolution explained from the approach of the Game Theory, in this case, applied to geopolitics
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AGT Case Study:
THE ORANGE REVOLUTION
Vaida TamelaitytėEdgaras VorobjovasJaime Mato Alonso
Ruben Rebollo Feliciano
Vilnius, 2011
Content
• Pre-elections• Elections• Protests• Outcome• The game theory
Presidential Elections First Round
CandidatesOleksandr Moroz Petro
Symonenko
Viktor Yushchenko
Opposition leader
Viktor YanukovychIncumbent,
Prime Minister
4,97% 5,82%
39,87% 39,32%
Presidential Elections Second Round
V.Yushchenko vs V.Yanukovich
Cronology of the demonstrations
• 22nd of November: THE PROTESTS BEGIN• 23rd of November: March to the Supreme Rada
THE FIRST WEEK
• Creation of the Committee of National Salvation
• Yushchenko taking Presidential Oath illegally
• The threat of the BLUES
• November 28th: The threat of the ARMY
• KGB with protesters?
• December 1st- The support of the Supreme RADA:
Non-confidence vote
• The President Leonid Kuchma's refusal
• 3rd of December: The Supreme Court acts
RE – ELECTIONS
• The DEAL:
New elections ONLY
If Constitution is reformed
December 26:
• 3rd round of electionsResults:
Viktor Yushchenko 51.99% vs 44.20% Yanukovich
January 2005 • Viktor Yushchenko swear in
as the 3rd President of the Republic of Ukraine
The conflict
• The conflict began after the declaration of the winner by the Election Authority. Was maintained over weeks due to the fact that both the incumbent (the holder of the office or the Blues) and the opposition (the Oranges) had great beliefs that had great potential to win; without forgetting the important role played by the society that, for the first time since the recent creation of the state became aware of itself to defend what was theirs.
• And at the end, as all we know, only the oranges turned out to have the best view of the situation.
The Players:
Defender of the SQ Law Enforcement
The Revolutionary Agent
Preferences
Assumption for G:
Up > U~p
Up can be achieved by:
Soft Power
Use of Force
Assumption for O:
Uo >U~o
Uo can be achieved by:
Demanding
Revolting
etc.
The Game Tree
Preferences
G: B1 > B2 > 01 > 02
O: 01 > 02 > B1 > B2
The Government vs Revolutionary AgentWho gets it all?!
G: B1 > B2 > 01 > 02
O: 01 > 02 > B1 > B2
No Revolution?
No Revolution?Not really!
=> Not Stable Preferences!
Not Stable Preferences, the proof
=> "Alliance Portfolio"
=> Multidimensional policy space
THE END