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The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread (And What Results) by Zachary S. Davis; Benjamin Frankel Review by: Eliot A. Cohen Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 1994), p. 166 Published by: Council on Foreign Relations Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20046772 . Accessed: 10/06/2014 20:37 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Council on Foreign Relations is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Foreign Affairs. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 194.29.185.203 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 20:37:46 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread (And What Results)by Zachary S. Davis; Benjamin Frankel

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The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread (And What Results) by Zachary S.Davis; Benjamin FrankelReview by: Eliot A. CohenForeign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4 (Jul. - Aug., 1994), p. 166Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20046772 .

Accessed: 10/06/2014 20:37

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Council on Foreign Relations is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to ForeignAffairs.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.203 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 20:37:46 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Recent Books

Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. V: British,

French and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, by

ROBERT S. NORRIS, ANDREW S.

BURROWS AND RICHARD W. FIELD

HOUSE. Boulder: Westview Press,

1994, 437 pp. $85.00 (paper, $34.95) The sponsors of this volume may hold

views antithetical to those who view

weapons procurement as vital to foreign and industrial policy, but if so, such opin ions are irrelevant to the quality of this

fine work. The antinuclear National

Resources Defense Council has done

researchers (if not the governments con

cerned) a service in sponsoring this series.

This latest entry is no light read, unless

one has a particular fondness for system

specifications, dates and code names of

weapons tests, and lists of nuclear war

head deployments. But the tables are

comprehensive to a fault, and the narra

tive concise and well documented. No

doubt classified information would reveal

omissions and errors, but this work, like

the volumes that preceded it, stands as a

testimony to the efficacy of patient and

comprehensive culling of unclassified

resources. An excellent reference work

that combines a great deal of information

with thoughtful analysis.

Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America,

1815-1945. BY CHRISTOPHER

bassford. New York: Oxford

University Press, 1994, 293 pp. $45.00. Bassford produces here an able, scholarly examination of someone variously

regarded as the most profound thinker on

war and as the villainous creator of a the

ory that has led to immense and unneces

sary human suffering. In the course of an

illuminating discussion (which actually goes beyond 1945), Bassford says a great deal about Anglo-American strategic

thought in the modern period. An

admirer of Clausewitz but not an uncriti

cal one, Bassford uses his subject to

explore strategic theory in general. The

result is an interesting study that has

something to say to many audiences,

including those concerned with the state

of contemporary military thought or

intellectual history.

The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear

Weapons Spread (And What Results). EDITED BY ZACHARY S. DAVIS AND

benjamin FRANKEL. London: Frank

Cass, 1993,356 pp. $37.50 (paper). An earnest and daunting collection of

essays, most of which attempt to bring

contemporary social science to bear on

weapons proliferation. Those not tem

peramentally inclined to explore the

nuances of "structural realism" and com

peting doctrines may lose patience with

some of the essays. Even readers who

believe in the utility of theory in a world

whose structure now seems quite uncertain

may shake their heads at two essays that

resort to formal modeling to explain nuclear proliferation. Still, some of the

essays are useful. Richard K. Betts, for

example, is a model of sobriety and insight in a revision of his well-known essay on

"Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and Nonpro liferation." But by and large,

one suspects that empirical research, which is repre sented but not dominant here, has more

to offer students of proliferation.

[l66] FOREIGN AFFAIRS- Volume73N0.4

This content downloaded from 194.29.185.203 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 20:37:46 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions