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2000 5: 169Science Technology SocietyDominique Pestre

KnowledgeHistorical Reading of the Book The New Production of The Production of Knowledge between Academies and Markets: A

  

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DEBATE: NEW MODE OF KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTIONOR NEW NETWORKS?

The Production of Knowledge betweenAcademies and Markets: A Historical

Reading of the Book The New Productionof Knowledge

DOMINIQUE PESTRE

Domnique Pestre is Director, Centre Alexandre Koyre, EHESS-CNRS (UMR 8560),MNHN, Pavillion Chevreul, 57 rue Cuvier, 75231 Paris Cedex 05; e-mail:

dardenne@mnhn.fr.

WHAT I PROPOSE to do here is to revisit the highly interesting bookpublished few years ago by M. Gibbons, C. Limoges, H. Nowotny,S. Schwartzman, P Scott and M. Trow entitled The New Production ofKnowledge: The Dynamics of Science and Research in ContemporarySocieties (Gibbons et al. 1994). The book advances the thesis that anew regime of knowledge production is in the process of emergingalongside a ’more traditional and familiar one that prevailed before’in which ’problems were set and solved in a context governed bylargely academic interests of a specific community’. The regimeestablishing itself today is called Mode 2. It is different from the pre-vious Mode 1. The new mode operates within a context of applica-tion (the multiplicity of places of contemporary techno-scientificinnovation) in that problems are not set within a disciplinary frame-work. It is transdisciplinary rather than mono- or multidisciplinary. Itis carried out in non-hierarchical, heterogeneously organised groupsthat are essentially transient (for example, through joint work

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bringing together various specialists attached to different types ofinstitutions). It is not being institutionalised primarily within univer-sity structures. Mode 2 involves the close interaction of various actorsthroughout the process of knowledge production and this means thatknowledge production is becoming more socially accountable. Oneconsequence of this is that Mode 2 makes use of a wider range of cri-teria in judging quality control. Overall, the process of knowledgeproduction is more reflexive and affects at the deepest levels whatcounts as ’good science’. -

Without a shadow of a doubt, this is a stimulating thesis for anyoneseeking to describe the multiple facets of contemporary techno-science and for those who seek to trace the redefinitions at work in

today’s techno-scientific-industrial networks. The book is highlypertinent as an analytical summary aiming to expose the nature ofthe transformations under way. In particular, it shows effectivelyhow the quantitative extension of certain practices seems to lead to aqualitative change in the overall system. Nevertheless, the way inwhich this transformation is ’assessed’ and placed in a historical per-spective does pose some problems. It is these two aspects that I

would like to look at more closely (Pestre 1995).My first cause for unease is a quasi-political one and concerns the

value judgements that can be associated with defining the knowledgeproduction Modes 1 and 2. The book certainly intends to be a de-scription, by which I mean that it aims to build the most ’objective’picture possible of what is happening, but I tend to believe that it alsoconveys (or lets through) a general appraisal of the respective meritsof Modes 1 and 2. I would say that Mode 2 is manifest here as thebetter one-more adapted, more relevant and more efficient thanMode 1 (for, who wants to win the currently raging global economicbattle?)-and that it would be good therefore to champion this if onehad to define a policy. Mode 2 perhaps truly has the advantage ofbeing ’transdisciplinary’, ’broad and transient’, ’heterogeneous’,’multicentred’, ’accountable’ and ’reflexive’-terms with strong posi-tive connotations in the Anglo-American world. However, it couldalso be a sign of the generalisation and increasingly widespread ac-ceptance of a new social and political order, that of economicneoliberalism. If we simply changed the vocabulary, Mode 2 could besaid to be a ’deregulated and untamed’ means of knowledge produc-tion, a regime which militates in favour of a ’flexibility’ deemed nec-essary (for example, of paid work) which struggles against the

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’rigidity’ of hierarchies and ’the corporatist vested interests’ of theworkforce. This entails ’disengagement of the protector state’, andso on. This would then lead to an image bearing very different con-notations. My remarks are not intended to say or let believe that Gib-bons and his colleagues are economic neoliberals. I know many ofthem well enough to assert the opposite. But rather that Mode 2 isnot independent of wider social and political redefinition and

choices, redefinition that affects us all in the way we perceive anddeal with social issues. I will return to these points in my conclusion(Beroud and Capdevieille 1997). Based on my ideas of the mostrecent work in the social history of science and technology, I wouldlike, above all, to suggest another way of putting Modes 1 and 2 intohistorical perspective. In outline, my thesis consists of three comple-mentary arguments:

1. In the West (that is, industrially advanced countries) two modesof knowledge production have been at work for several centur-ies. They describe different approaches to the practice of (whatis now called) ’the sciences’ and these systems of practice wereembedded in social contexts within which such practices emer-ged (that is, social contexts within which such practices emerged).

2. What is described as Mode 2 of knowledge production has cer-tainly been predominant since the eighteenth century. If thecriterion adopted is what was effectively produced in terms oftheory and practice, then those who claim to work along the linescharacterised by Mode 1 were often submerged in much largernetworks effectively similar to what is proposed by Mode 2.This comment does not, however, imply that nothing has everchanged and, for a historian, that would be the last resort. Ithink on the contrary that periodisation can feasibly be recon-structed. Since such a periodisation does not exist insofar asmost of the great historical portraits of the sciences were at firsthistories of ideas and concepts, the work of Gibbons et al.

(1994) could be considered as an invitation to reconsider thisquestion. Neither does this comment imply that Modes 1 and 2are the representations of the only two ’realities’ that exist. Wewill take them rather as two end cases, as two analytical modelsamong others that the historical examination will uncover.

3. Modes 1 and 2, as proposed by Gibbons and his colleagues, arealso systems of argument associated with the practice of elite

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scientists in our society during the past few centuries. Theseleaders during the practice of science build up certain norma-tive systems. The discourse which erects Mode 1 as a reliabledescription of how science is practised in particular certainlytook on its final form in the nineteenth century. Since then, ithas often played a hegemonic role culturally. Elaborated in theframework of academic and university institutions, it hasallowed West to uphold its intellectual ideas and moral values.Successful in overshadowing any other descriptions of knowl-edge production, this argumentation has put the West on ahigher plane. Our epistemology guaranteed our ability to sepa-rate fact from fiction, reality from chimeral imaginings-allthings that other cultures were incapable of doing. It has alsoallowed Western producers of knowledge, and in particularnatural philosophers and scientists, to be politically non-responsible in that the science they were producing was inde-pendent of any ’interest’ (it was a pure knowledge in a spaceapart that was intellectually neutral) and its creators could notbe held responsible if their ’discoveries’ were put to bad uses (inother spaces of society, notably industrial or military). Recently,with the surge of neoliberalism, this discourse has lost some ofits meaning.

Therefore if the practise of science in previous centuries must notbe identified with mode 1 of knowledge production, what kind of pic-ture could be proposed? I would readily accept, as a starting point,the idea that there exists an approach inherited from the philosophi-cal tradition, or at least described as such by the actors, and wouldfind its principal place in academies and the universities. Subject tothe rules of a relatively unified social world, it would have as its intel-lectual objective the construction of systems of proposals logically

_ linked and consistent in terms of hierarchy. As Mode 1 would have it,this practice would be regulated by a stratified system of control,notably through the intermediary of publications. It would operatefirst in a disciplinary way, as an activity geared to solving a successionof puzzles and it would not have as its ’context’ the same as that of’applications’ (to use Gibbons et al.’s vocabulary) but a framework ofcultural excellence and distinction. As Robert Fox (1990) wrote onthe subject of the predominant practice of sciences in the Universityof Paris of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, it

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would be deployed first and foremost in a context whose goals andsocial norms were no different qualitatively from those of the worksundertaken in the arts faculties.

It may also be mentioned that this description represents only asmall part of history, however misleading it may sound. In fact it

omits, for a variety of political and cultural reasons, a range of activi-ties where the same people are involved (which makes the assumedself-sufficiency of the preceding description an illusion), who mobi-lise many others which in a first approximation resembles what isdescribed by Mode 2. For the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,this practice cuts across, for example, the so-called ’mixed mathe-matics’ which concern instrument constructors, artillery experts,fortification engineers, surveyors, navigators, cartographers, astron-omers and so on. Also included is the ’Baconian’ science and thesciences of many administrators. These ’practical sciences’ weredeveloped as much at the Academie Royale as in the workshops ofembryonic industries, at the Royal Society as well as in the regionaround London; and the standards of ’good practice’, like the crite-ria for success, vary from one place to another. The context can beviewed to be one of ’application’ insofar as it revolves round the

practical command of things (through state bodies or the market)and in that it involves the design, construction and distribution ofmachines and instruments whose relevance and suitability is assessedlocally (a prince’s court in Germany would have judged the interestof a pump on different criteria than a mine owner or a designer ofroyal gardens, and what constitutes a demonstration or a successfulproof will vary from place to place) (see, for example, Bennett andJohnston 1996; Schaffer 1994; Stewart 1992).Appeals to the state, the market or to those in commercial finance

are common currency here. The question of perpetual motion ma-chines and steam engines are canonical as examples for the first halfof the eighteenth century. The involvement of Boyle and Newton inthe East India Company, that of Desaguliers and Hooke with themarket for instruments, and again the association of Newton withthe Royal Mint are just three examples showing the variety of net-works set up in England, the multiplicity of social spaces in which the’applications’ are central to the production of knowledge (of course,the term ’application’ raises a problem since it presupposes that adistinction from purity is relevant as it carries the presumption thatseparation between Modes 1 and 2 is obvious). These networks can

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also be called ’heterogeneous’ ’transdisciplinary’, described as show-ing a great ’organisational diversity’ and as turning on ’multiple crite-ria for quality’ (this vocabulary is of course historically inappropriate).In England (and especially in London) such ways of practising ’sci-ence’ are quite common. In France, where academicians are part ofthe machinery of the state (if I am authorised to use another anach-ronism), such activities took on different forms. Here, then, Buffon,

. Reamur and many others could think up schemes for reorganisingthe social or economic order, they could claim to have the scientificmeans to explain and formalise artisan and popular knowledge, andthey could suggest ways of rationalising all production processes forthe good of the kingdom as a whole, as against narrow corporateinterests. Proposing a new social order, that of the atomised world ofthe Enlightenment, they could put forward technical solutions thatwould be implemented under their supervision. With those whopractised mixed mathematics, they could also work directly in con-junction with military engineers in non-academic contexts (unless ofcourse they themselves were in the army) and draw up maps of thekingdom, improve waterways and other means of travelling―work-ing in the same movement on the ’frontiers of knowledge’ (anotheranachronism borrowed from the repertoire used by proponents ofMode 1) and on technical developments. They could, furthermore,contribute to practical fabrication processes, for example, concern-ing the interchangeability of parts in arms manufacturing (see, forexample, Hilaire-Perez 1990; Licoppe 1996; and Minard 1994).During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the discipline-

bound knowledge produced in universities became more relevant forpractical types of knowledge (but also abstract and theoretical) pro-duced in other social spaces like instrument construction workshops,laboratories of industrial companies, consulting engineers’ officesand in the arsenals. For the second half of the ninteenth centurytelegraphy, chemistry, electricity or radio are textbook cases. Certainpoints concerning the transatlantic telegraph can be recalled as anillustration. Lord Kelvin, the great natural philosopher in the UnitedKingdom, was at the centre of these practical sciences-a feature ofwhich was a multitude of traditional and new places. Further, Max-well himself, through the British Association for the Advancement ofSciences, contributed directly, both technically and theoretically, tothe imperial project for a cable network. These two men wereinvolved certainly with the political milieu, but above all with the

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business world, with finance and the newly developed industry. Kel-vin was an immediate liaison with the companies that laid the cablesand his objectives formed part of the same movement. No distinctionwas really possible. The aim was to advance knowledge and makemoney, to promote science and develop the power of the companiesand the empire. Similar comments can be made on the question oftechnical and industrial standards and norms, essential for economic

expansion and the desires for dominance which illustrate how widein scope the networks in which scientists worked were (Smith andWise 1989).Other sectors, less central and not so ’glorious’, could of course be

considered, for example, that of canned foods. Food producers, candesigners and manufacturers, metallurgists, welding experts, navalofficers and scientists (chemists and biologists alike) were part andparcel of this new industry throughout the century. Scientists, how-ever, were not all involved in the same way, as could be expected.Guy-Lussac, for example, did not venture from his laboratory anddealt very little with ’practical’ problems. When consulted, he con-sidered his role to give the theory of preservation and he providedonly theoretical models of the chemical processes that occurredinside the tins. He had no contact with manufacturers and did notwork actively with them, except as member of official committees toevaluate product quality. These firms, however, did sometimes usehis name to add credibility to the techniques that were developing.Pasteur, in contrast, went about things very differently-which willbe no surprise to those who know his works. Liebig in Germany wascommitted even more directly in the development of these high-technology products. The latter case displays all the characteristicsof Mode 2. This is necessarily so because practical efficiency is at theheart of the matter, because the objective was to succeed in produc-ing long-life preserved foods in a context of commercial competition.And in order to do this, it was essential to mobilise the widest rangeof allies, each contributing complementary knowledge and know-how. In this kind of situation the ’context’ is one of technical andcommercial competition.

For the twentieth century I will only elaborate upon the exampleof Marie Curie, the ’officially’ paradigmatic example of ’pure sci-ence’. The Curie case is interesting because it shows how far the his-torian’s work can be misleading when they spontaneously identify’science’ with Mode 1 of knowledge production, when these historians

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believe too firmly in the autonomy of the world of science. MarieCurie is often described as a scientist dedicated to pure science. This

image was built up starting from the form that her scientific worktook on, but also in phase with her way of defining ’physics’ and per-ceiving its social role (as everyone knows, Marie Curie refused totake out patents and offered her discoveries to humanity). This is ofcourse not incorrect and we must not lose sight of this, but MarieCurie is also originator of the radioactivity industry in France. Infact, she was the first active leader it had. It was she who conceivedthe industrialisation of the processes of fabrication and purificationof radioactive materials. The people who worked with her foundedcompanies or became consulting engineers of firms which manufac-tured the products and instruments developed in the laboratory.Marie Curie played a personal role in the metereology of radioactiv-ity (for medicine as well as for industry) and took charge of the stan-dards that were essential for the socialisation of radium. It is truethat she showed a preference (more general perhaps in French scien-tific circles) for semi-public solutions or those involving some formof state involvement, but she did choose to help with the construc-tion of private-based industry, which in the society she lived in was anecessary condition for national economic development and thesocial progress that she advocated (History and Technology 1997).

I will summarise my first proposal by saying that, although over thepast few centuries scientists and other natural philosophers practisedscience as a cultural activity reserved for a world which interactedonly very weakly with the rest of society, especially with the economicsphere, there have also been many actors in science who wereimmersed in a multitude of practically-oriented networks. The firstcategory of scientists (the distinction here is an analytical one andnot primarily descriptive) produces science as knowledge and under-standing of the reality of things, the other type as an action in thephysical and social worlds. The former presumes there is a favoured,strongly structured space of legitimisation, a space founded on a sys-tem of moral values and behavioural rules whose governing wordsare objectivity, purity, free from bias, and which help maintain a cer-tain social order against others.The latter type moves around and is active in spaces where the

exercise of practical domination over things and men is central. Cer-tainly, this control is transformation of productive processes. Thesemeans of producing knowledge are effectively the best ways to make

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money, control the market, impose an economic standard, getaround legislation, beat competitors, justify a new way of organisingwork in the workshops, or to dominate a territory and win a war. Theknowledge they produce is authenticated in parallel spaces by manydifferent actor-users and involve images, ideals and social standardsthat are different from the first kind.There is therefore little doubt for me that if the recent historiogra-

phy of science and technology is taken into account, the issue ofModes 1 and 2 of knowledge production takes on another signifi-cance. Both can be described as characterising practices and argu-ments that have been around of long time, whose respective weightsvary with the course of time and whose merits are assessed differ-

ently depending on what they could potentially bring to the diverseactors in terms of economic efficiency or social and political values.In fact Modes 1 and 2 are only extreme and highly simplified modelsfor analysis. A more finely tuned historical typology could present awhole range of modes of saying and doing to fit each era and eachgroup. For example, Galambos and Sturchio, regarding the Ameri-can pharmaceutical industry in the twentieth century, proposedthree successive modes operating in networks. The last, set in placein the 1970s and 1980s, around genetic engineering technology, wasthe most like Mode 2 defined by Gibbons et al. (Galambos andSturchio 1997).Long-term historical vistas are therefore needed that have these

assumptions as starting points. Such accounts would lead to chronol-ogies very different from those produced on the basis of the classical’intemalist’ postulate of the history of sciences, which is that of Mode1. They would emphasise, for example, the new equilibrium in forceat the beginning and at the end of the eighteenth century, they wouldinclude strong correlation with the first and second industrial revolu-tions, and they would stress the new place of the sciences in theindustrial world between 1870 and 1914. They would also acknowl-edge their full role in the two World Wars and the Cold War. It wouldfinally entail a geography of scientific, technological and industrialpowers insofar as these chronologies cannot be differentiated otherthan local situations and the great equilibrium at work across theglobe.As already mentioned, to say that the core of knowledge has his-

torically been produced along the lines of Mode 1 is not only wrongin straight factual terms. The assertion (and repeated statements)

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that Mode 1 corresponds to ’what really happens in science’ fulfilsanother function, a political one, a more essential function in ’ideo-logical’ terms-which consists of marking a kind of Western super-iority, the clear superiority of our (scientific) modes of thinking andof being.

This type of affirmation, which has been, and still is, predominantin the discourse of scientific intellectuals, keeps two large rifts aliveand reactivated. First, the division which is said to be fundamentalbetween matter and mind, between object and subject, between theworld as it is, is recognisable in itself, and ourselves who are in a posi-tion to show its truth. Second, the division between the daiiy and’routine’ laboratory or field practices, and refining reports that areproposed as a result of these. On the laboratory side they are theproducts of actions always accomplished in quite specific spaces;from the other aspect they are said only to stem from nature and con-sidered primarily as having been ’discovered’. On the one hand,meaning is given to them in social and human terms that are alwaysspecific and they contribute to redefinition of these terms intellec-tually and materially. On the other, they are declared as being un-connected with any system of values and are therefore portrayed associally neutral and ’non-responsible’ (Latour 1996).The argument that upholds mode 1 as the form of scientific knowl-

edge production par excellence thus appears as a discourse whoseaim is to help, in our intellectual economy, to forget the spaces whichdefine us, to forget that all knowledge (including ours) is deeply andirrevocably social, and to forget that any process of knowledge pro-duction is situated (this does not imply in any way, it must be

recalled, ’social relativism’, which would deny all the value of anyinteraction with the world). To my mind, it is this situation whichallows us to understand why this mode of argumentation (on thepure knowledge that the West has produced) has often been thedominant one among intellectuals, even if it has been contested hereand there by engineering circles and by those connected with ’usefulscience’.

By way of a conclusion, I would like to come back to the past fiftyyears. What World War II initiated was a profound recasting ofindustrial and military activities around sciences and the state

machinery. The practical efficiency in the production of ever-newarms passed on to the core of these activities in the United States andthe USSR, and both took responsibility for reorganising the

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production processes, including those of knowledge, in order not tolose the Cold War. This has made ’practical’ sciences more indis-pensable and urgent than ever. This has led to the definition of newlegitimate modes for practising sciences (and especially the physicalsciences), and it has led to the setting-up and massive domination ofa particular form of Mode 2 illustrated on the one hand by Route 128and Silicon Valley, on the other by the system of centralised con-tracts at the Department of Defence (to restrict myself to the UnitedStates).What is worth emphasising in this case is the capital and governing

role played by the structures of the state in forging an increasinglyorganic liaison, even if it is very variable in form, between universi-ties and financial and industrial capital, in the implementation of asystem of knowledge production both profoundly diversified in theplaces of production and highly centralised in its incitements and itscontrol. All this progressed contrary to all official discourses on afree and pure science proposed for example by Vannevar Bush inhis famous Science, the Endless Frontier (Dennis 1977; Pestre 1992a,1992b).

In the past ten or twenty years four elements have changed exten-sively. First the economic situation. Owing to the crisis and the emer-gence of new rivals, especially in Asia, the competition on the openmarkets has become a new primary criterion for political and eco-nomic action to the detriment of the criteria originating from themilitary and industrial complex dictated by the Cold War. Then therehas been the ideological revolution initiated, or anyway encouraged,by President Reagan and Mrs Thatcher. This change constituted ultra-liberalism as the only legitimate approach, as the only attitude eco-nomically (and scientifically) well founded. This belief was con-structed by many different American and British ’think tanks’ and itsubsequently spread throughout Europe, notably by way of theEuropean Commission in Brussels. The end of the Cold War rein-forced this tendency and allowed a disengagement of state from eco-nomic and techno-scientific activities. Today, the values linked to thewelfare state and to means of redistribution socially chosen ratherthan dictated by the market are considered as unfounded and irration-al, as outmoded and utopian (in the negative sense of the term), and inany case untenable-whatever might otherwise be the consequences.The last point to mention is the change of our own outlines for

’reading’ the world (and the evolution of our values), the fact that

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we, as intellectuals, are perhaps so well used to the macro-socialchange that I have just described that we have become more andmore incapable of anything other than a conformist ’conventionalwisdom’. The working hypothesis here is that social change and ourknowledge have evolved in parallel. It is one of a possible redefini-tion of the predominant social practices and values on the one hand,and of our intellectual categories and methods of apprehension onthe other. I do not think it possible to push this analysis further for-ward insofar as that would require going back to a great number ofworks published in the past two decades in history, sociology andanthropology-and in social studies on science. This work woulddemand caution and time, but I cannot get rid of a sentiment of ’dis-quieting simultaneity’ between much of our work-for example thenew insistence in France on the themes of coordination and the

negotiated agreement to the detriment of studies that bring forwardconflict and big macroeconomic issues-and the sociopoliticalchange I have briefly recalled. One of the possible indices of this’uniformisation’ (simply suggested here) could be that many of ushave felt quite at ease with the descriptions given by Gibbons and hiscolleagues, and that it appeared particularly pertinent at a time whensimilar values were becoming dominant in society as a whole, practi-cally and ideologically.

’

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