The Problem of Pseudoscience in Science Educationand Implications of Constructivist Pedagogy

Ebru Z. Mugaloglu

Published online: 31 December 2013� Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Abstract The intrusion of pseudoscience into science classrooms is a problem in science

education today. This paper discusses the implications of constructivist pedagogy, which

relies on the notions of viability and inter-subjectivity, in a context favourable to the

acceptance of pseudoscience. Examples from written statements illustrate how prospective

science teachers in Turkey readily accept pseudoscientific explanations of the origin of

species. Constructivist pedagogy underestimates, if not ignores, the difficulty of holding

rational discussions in the presence of pseudoscientific or absolute beliefs. Moreover, it

gives a higher priority to learners’ exposure to alternative constructions through social

negotiation than to furthering their appreciation of science. Under these circumstances,

self-confirmation and social pressure to accept existing pseudoscientific beliefs may be

unanticipated consequences of social negotiation. Considering the aim of science education

to foster an appreciation of science, the implications of constructivist pedagogy are, or

should be, of great concern to science educators.

1 Introduction

The intrusion of pseudoscience into science education is a problem, perhaps a crisis. This

paper is about the pitfalls facing constructivist pedagogy when dealing with the problem.

The main focus of the paper is twofold. First, it critically discusses the implications of a

constructivist pedagogy that relies on notions of viability and inter-subjectivity in a context

where there is strong acceptance of pseudoscience. Specifically, the paper argues that

implications of constructivist pedagogy based on its debatable epistemology do not fit the

aims of science education, which encompass both an understanding and an appreciation of

science (National Research Council 2012). Thus, from the perspective of science educa-

tion, the paper contributes to the critical literature about constructivism (e.g., Irzik 2001;

Matthews 1993, 1994, 1998, 1999; Scerri 2003; Suchting 1992). The opinions of pro-

spective science teachers at a university in Turkey about the teaching of evolution theory

E. Z. Mugaloglu (&)Department of Primary Education, Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkeye-mail: akturkeb@boun.edu.tr

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Sci & Educ (2014) 23:829–842DOI 10.1007/s11191-013-9670-x

as opposed to intelligent design (ID) exemplify one context in the realm of science edu-

cation and are used to show how constructivist pedagogy can allow pseudoscience into a

science class. The paper does not claim that a constructivist who recognizes the value of

empirical evidence and scientific methodology would necessarily accept ID as science. The

written statements of prospective science teachers serve to illustrate the drawbacks of

constructivist pedagogy in a context where pseudoscientific explanations are widely

accepted by society. Turkey provides an appropriate example for two reasons: in Turkey,

constructivism has become the dominant paradigm in the teaching and learning of science,

and here also the teaching of evolution has become controversial in response to growing

social pressure stoked by propaganda supporting ID (Cornish-Bowden and Cardenaz 2007;

Peker et al. 2010).

The paper is organized as follows. The first section describes the problem that pseu-

doscience brings to science education. Focusing on the issue of evolution and ID, it

describes the characteristics of pseudoscientific explanations and offers some reasons for

their popularity. The second section elaborates on constructivism and its inherent weakness

as an antidote to pseudoscience. Specifically, the section unpacks some basic notions about

constructivism, i.e., viability and inter-subjectivity, and summarizes the ongoing debate

about its philosophical underpinnings. The third section examines the context of science

education in Turkey and provides examples of statements written by prospective teachers

who foresee themselves teaching ID in their science classes.

2 A Crisis in Science Education: Teaching Intelligent Design as Science

Science and Education’s special issue on the problem of pseudoscience in education raises

the question ‘What is pseudoscience?’(Good and Slezak 2011). The definition of pseu-

doscience naturally brings to mind the problem of demarcation between science and

pseudoscience, which has been a traditional issue in philosophy (Laudan 1983). In line

with Bunge (2011), ‘pseudoscience’ in this paper refers to a belief or a practice which is

not scientific but which is claimed to be science by its followers. Bunge states that

‘pseudoscience is error, substantive or methodological, parading as science’ (p. 411). He

offers parapsychology and ID as examples of pseudoscience. He also explains the dis-

tinguishing characteristics of pseudoscience. For example, a pseudoscientific explanation

violates basic limiting principles of science. It may be inconsistent, may involve unclear

ideas, may perform deeply flawed empirical operations, or may fail to build on earlier

scientific findings. Lindeman (1998) states, ‘A typical pseudoscience includes hypotheses

that cannot be proven false, it is not based on controlled empirical studies, it has not been

refined over time in the light of new scientific evidence, it has not contributed research to

new areas, and/or it is not compatible with well-supported theories in related domains’ (p.

257).

Pseudoscience must be dealt with in science teaching and learning because one of the

aims of science education is to enhance scientific literacy. ‘Can people be considered

scientifically literate if they are unable to recognize common forms of pseudoscience?’

Good and Slezak ask (2011, p. 401). A scientifically literate person must be able to

distinguish science from pseudoscience and, where appropriate, to rely on scientific

knowledge while making decisions, forming judgments, resolving problems, and taking

action (Hurd 1998). However, according to Lindeman, ‘the last decades’ explosive

increase of scientific information has not decreased popular belief in the pseudo sciences’

(1998, p. 257). In a study conducted in Vienna, 2,129 secondary school students were

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given three statements about evolution, creationism, and ID (Eder et al. 2011). Twenty-

eight percent agreed with creationist ideas, and more than a third agreed with ID. In

another study conducted in New York, Nehm and Schonfeld (2007) found that after a

14-week intervention about evolution and the nature of science, a majority of science

teachers continued to teach anti-evolutionary ideas even though the intervention had sig-

nificantly increased their knowledge of evolution.

Reasons for the popularity and durability of pseudoscience are numerous. Lindeman

(1998) explains that people believe in various forms of pseudoscience because the need to

comprehend themselves and the world is more easily and quickly satisfied by simple

pseudoscientific explanations than by scientific explanations that are harder to understand.

Lindeman (1998) argues that ‘experiential thinking,’ the automatic or default way of

interpreting, encoding, and organizing everyday information is evolutionarily older and

more commonly practiced than rational thinking based on complex rules of operation

requiring logic and evidence (Also see Beike and Sherman 1994; Epstein 1990). As such,

pseudoscience is compatible with facile experiential thinking, which seems to be correct

because it provides easy solutions to everyday problems. Nobel prize-winner Kahneman

(2011) states that fast thinking with some experiential support trumps slow, rational

thinking based on evidence and deduction. In addition, pseudoscience appeals to common

sense. For example, pseudoscientific ID says that species are perfectly designed for the

environment they live in and do not evolve over time, an easier concept to grasp than the

counterintuitive notion that terrestrial animals evolved into marine animals. Social influ-

ences exerted by proponents of pseudoscience also contribute to the popularity of pseu-

doscience. The entire scientific method is eradicated by the‘(quite illogical) postmodern

mantra that science subjugates personal meaning’ (Devilly 2005, p. 44).

The radical postmodern view holds that ‘knowledge can never be more than just a story’

(Pennock 2010, p. 762). Feyerabend (1975) highlights the limits and irrationalities in

science and discusses that ‘anything goes’. Knowledge claims are socially embedded and

depend on culture. Accordingly, scientific knowledge is a narrative constructed by the

scientific community. The radical postmodern view holds that ‘all narratives are equal and

allows no special privilege to any truth claim over any other’ (Pennock 2010, p .773).

Within this framework, philosophically, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to argue in

favour of science as a way of understanding and predicting nature. For instance, from a

radical postmodern view, favouring evolutionary theory in a science class is subject to

criticism based on ‘viewpoint discrimination’ against ID (Pennock 1999, 2002). Pennock

explains how the pseudoscientific ID movement strategically makes use of postmodern

arguments to attack the objectivity of science and deconstruct philosophical barriers to

pseudoscientific ID. As a result, science educators in many countries are faced with a

public demand to teach pseudoscientific ID in the context of science education (Lebo

2008). One manifestation of the pseudoscience problem in science education is the practice

of teaching ID, a fraudulent version of creationism dressed in scientific terminology, as an

alternative to evolution.

The Edwards v. Aguillard case (1987) in the United States ruled out the teaching of

creationism in science classes in public schools while allowing the teaching of alternative

scientific theories. Following this ruling, the words ‘creation’ and ‘creationists’ were

changed to ‘intelligent design’ and ‘design proponents’ in the textbook Of Pandas and

People. Although ID is an offshoot of creationism and therefore a religious belief, as

decided in Kitzmiller v. Dover (2005), it claims to be a scientific explanation of the origins

of species.

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In contrast, since the theory of evolution was expounded by Darwin in 1859, most sci-

entists have accepted its validity and accumulated a growing body of supporting evidence

drawn from fossil records, comparative anatomy, geographical distribution, artificial selec-

tion, and genetics. Chronological sequencing of fossil records allows scientists to see how a

particular group of organisms evolved, from terrestrial ancestors to whales, for example, or

from fish to amphibians (Daeschler et al. 2006; Niedzwiedzki et al. 2010; Shubin et al. 2006;

Thewissen et al. 2007). Especially after the discovery of a common genetic code in living

beings, no reputable biologist denies the theory. For example, by inserting a human gene to

repair a defective gene in yeast, Nurse (2001) demonstrated that humans not only share

common genetic codes, but also share specific genes with other organisms, evidence of a

common ancestry. Gee et al. (2009) cite fifteen articles laying out evidence from fossil

records, habitats, and molecular processes, all published in Nature Magazine. Today, modern

biology makes sense only if the theory of evolution is accepted as basic (Dobzhansky 1973).

From the scientists’ perspective it is essential to include the theory of evolution in the body of

scientific knowledge and to teach it in science classes. Mugaloglu and Erduran (2012) use the

term ‘appreciation of science’ to mean an understanding of the nature of science and a

recognition of its contribution to civilization. They state:

We expect appreciation of science to be inclusive of favouring scientific explanations, for example,choosing the scientific explanation when presented with clashing worldviews about a critical issue. Inorder to promote appreciation of science in science classrooms, then, teachers would be expected toplace a higher status to the theory of evolution as a scientific theory than to intelligent design.(Mugaloglu and Erduran 2012, p. 101)

Unfortunately, in various cultural contexts, things are not so cut-and-dried. Teaching

evolution has often been controversial, not only in developing countries like Turkey but

also in developed ones like the United States (Miller et al. 2006; Smith 2013). The

positions of science educators about the teaching of evolution or ID vary considerably. For

example, in a recent study including 926 public high school biology teachers in the USA, it

was noted that 13 % of the teachers advocated the teaching of creationism or ID, whereas

24 % advocated the teaching of evolution as the prevalent scientific theory (Berkman and

Plutzer 2011). More importantly, in the same study, 60 % of the teachers did not state a

preference one way or the other. Peker et al. (2010) revealed that only 20.5 % of

participating preservice science teachers, who would be expected to teach evolution in

Turkish schools, accepted evolution as the prevalent scientific theory. Moreover, among

those who did accept evolution as a scientific theory, there might have been some who

accepted ID as an equally scientific theory. Mugaloglu and Erduran (2012) found in a study

conducted at a state university in Turkey that 10 of 31 participating preservice teachers,

who had completed required physics, chemistry, and biology courses, were advocates of

teaching both evolution and ID as scientific theories. These teachers equated the theory of

evolution with ID and argued that students had the right to learn all relevant ‘theories’ in a

science class. It seems that many prospective teachers intend to teach both evolution and

ID without reference to scientific validity.

3 Potential Roles of Constructivism in the Science Education Crisis

Taking into account the ongoing debates about the basic principles of constructivism

(Bernal 2006; Herron 2008; Irzik 2001; Matthews 1993, 1994; Scerri 2003, 2010; Taber

2006, 2010) this section examines the epistemic commitments upon which constructivist

pedagogy is built. It is crucial to note that there is no single form of constructivism, and

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therefore it usually carries a modifier such as ‘cognitive’, ‘radical’, or ‘social’ (Mugaloglu

2001). Quale (2008) lists up to twenty such modifiers in the literature. The many faces of

constructivism and the elusiveness of its basic principles (Suchting 1992) make it difficult

to understand and to argue against it. This paper relies on explanations originally provided

by von Glassersfeld (1991, 1993, 1995a, b, 1998), a leading figure of radical construc-

tivism, and then adopted by constructivists while explaining, defending, and interpreting

their philosophical underpinnings, such as relativism (Quale 2008) and instrumentalism

(Taber 2010).

In consequence, there is no single, simple definition of constructivist pedagogy (Mayer-

Smith and Mitchell 1997).Generally speaking, though, pedagogical constructivism is taken

to be student-centred, promoting discussion, knowledge sharing, exploratory questioning,

reflection, self-monitoring, and self-direction (Mayer-Smith and Mitchell 1997). This

much is consistent with the epistemologically based pedagogy explained by von Glas-

sersfeld (1995a).

In spite of the diversity, most constructivists hold that knowledge is a sort of active

‘construction’ performed by individuals or society (von Glasersfeld 1995a; Longino 1990;

1993; Harding 1993; Grandy 1998). Moreover, constructivist epistemology rejects the

notion that truth corresponds to an observer-independent reality (Irzik 2001). In con-

structivist epistemology the notion of truth as correspondence is replaced with the notion of

‘viability within the subjects’ experiential world’ (von Glasersfeld 1995a, p. 22), where

‘viability’ refers to the fitness of the construction to experience when human experience is

the only input. The value of scientific knowledge, thus, is not dependent on truth but on

viability, i.e. on individual experiences and ‘inter-subjectivity’ as the most reliable level of

‘experiential reality’ (von Glasersfeld 1995a). So, according to constructivism, all kinds of

knowledge, including scientific knowledge and learning about scientific knowledge, are

inherently subjective. One’s knowledge, in other words, depends on one’s cultural back-

ground, religiosity, personality, and previous experiences. This subjective nature of

knowledge becomes problematic during the formation of scientific knowledge and the

process of learning about scientific knowledge, when individual constructions are socially

negotiated for inter-subjectivity. In the absence of mind-independent reality, whose

experiential reality is the most reliable?

To deal with this problem of separating scientific knowledge from personal opinions,

constructivists claim that inter-subjectivity through social negotiation as the most reliable

level of experiential reality.

As the term [intersubjective] implies, the uppermost level arises the corroboration of other thinkingand knowing subjects. The introduction of ‘others’ might seem to be in flat contradiction with theconstructivist principle that all knowledge is subjective. However, the apparent contradiction willdisappear if I am able to show that, although the others are the individual subject’s construction, theycan nevertheless provide a corroboration of the subject’s experiential reality. (von Glasersfeld 1995a,p. 119)

Here, von Glasersfeld defines social corroboration in such a way that others’ acts are also

consistent with the viable conceptual schemes of the observer. He calls the viability of this

kind of conceptual scheme ‘a second order viability’. The second order viability determines

the more solid or stable conceptual schema in the observer’s experiential schema. So, if we

differentiate scientific knowledge as the more solid conceptual schema then it means that

scientific knowledge is the viable conceptual schema shared by more than one individual

(von Glasersfeld 1995a). Thus, science can be defined as ‘a set of socially negotiated

understandings of the events and phenomena that comprise the experienced universe’

(Tobin and Tippins 1993, p. 4).

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To define scientific knowledge in terms of active construction, viability, and social

negotiations is to raise issues in the philosophy of science, such as the positioning of

constructivism in an anti-realist, relativist, and/or instrumentalist camp. For instance,

regarding the anti-realism versus realism discussion, Nola (1997) states ‘The contrast

between realism and anti-realism, of which constructivism is a variety, is an old one in the

theory of scientific knowledge’ (p. 55). The realists contend that science uncovers a mind-

independent world whereas anti-realists deny the existence of a mind-independent world.

From a realist perspective, for example, the Sun and the Earth both exist and the Earth

would orbit around the Sun even if there were no human mind on Earth to experience that

reality. Moreover, scientific realism considers scientific knowledge as an approximation of

the mind-independent world, in the absence of which, any accurate explanation or pre-

diction related to that world would be highly unlikely or, alternatively, purely coincidental.

Taber (2010) argues that many constructivists do not deny the existence of mind-inde-

pendent reality. In defending this interpretation of constructivism, Taber cites von Glas-

serfeld, the instrumental constructivist, who did not deny the existence of external reality

but argued that we can never have certain knowledge of it.

In another discussion of constructivist epistemology, Scerri criticizes constructivism for

defining scientific knowledge as subjective and relative. He indicates that some studies in

the literature are ‘seriously mistaken and are having a damaging influence upon scholarly

work, the public image of science, and last but not least, on science education’ (2003,

p. 472). In his opinion, constructivism is anti-science. He criticizes the notion of relativism,

which is associated with constructivist thinking:

The central idea in relativism is precisely that all knowledge is relative. This implies that the forms ofknowledge derived from chemistry, black magic, or voodoo, for example, are all equally valid. (p.471)

In his reply to Scerri’s criticisms, Taber (2010) claims that they rest upon a

misinterpretation of mainstream constructivist thinking, the underpinning of which is not

relativism as argued by Scerri, but instrumentalism. According to Taber, ‘Instrumentalism

considers the products of science (theories, models, laws, etc.) not as true descriptions of

the world, but rather as useful tools to make sense of, predict, and control the world’

(p.553). This argument stresses the limits of a mind-independent reality’s accessibility

without rejecting its existence. Taber (2010) also argues that instrumentalism is compatible

with the approach of many scientists in contrast with the antiscientific position of

relativism. However, in a recent reply to Taber, Scerri attempts to show that

‘instrumentalism is an outdated philosophical approach that has been replaced by

antirealism (2010, p. 10). Irzik (2001), a philosopher of science, emphasized that

instrumentalism has been intensely studied and that one can find ‘excellent critiques of it

(See Feyerabend 1981; Newton-Smith 1981; Salmon1984)’(p. 162).

Some theorists in the realm of science education focus on the merits of pedagogical

constructivism rather than its philosophical underpinnings (Bernal 2006; Herron 2008). ‘In

the most general sense, the contemporary view of learning is that people construct new

knowledge and understanding based on what they already know and believe’ (Bransford

et al. 1999, p. 10). Regarding the learning process, the idea that ‘mental representations are

constructed rather than passively received’ is considered as an uncontroversial issue (Irzik

2001, p. 162). Constructivist pedagogy is also useful in pointing out that learning diffi-

culties can stem from the learners’ previous conceptual schemata. It provides a method-

ology through which learners can become aware of earlier schemata and learner-centred

strategies that prompt revision of previous constructions and make way for new

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constructions. Moreover, as stated by Mugaloglu (2001), learner-centred strategies are not

unique to constructivist pedagogy. For instance, any science teacher can organize group

discussions and expose students to different points of view and can create situations in

which students discover and remediate inadequacies in earlier cognitive schemata. Issues

of mind-independent reality and truth need not prevent cognitively oriented teachers from

using learner-centred strategies, self-determined inquiries, or group discussions. Moreover,

in doing so, the cognitivist science teacher might well avoid authoritarianism. Thus it is

difficult to argue that teaching strategies employed in a constructivist context are unique or

any more useful than strategies employed in a cognitive context.

On the other hand, referring to constructivist pedagogy based on constructivist episte-

mology, Philips states, ‘A weak or at least a controversial epistemology has become the

basis for a strong pedagogic policy’ (1995, p. 11).The problems that arise from the nature

of constructivism become much more acute when pseudoscience finds its way into science

education. As stated by Matthews (2002, p. 128), constructivist epistemology, by loosening

its reference to reality ‘leaves legitimate methodological space for ideology, personal and

group self-interest, or just feel-goodness, to determine theory choice and acceptance’.

Thus, realities change as the lenses change (Matthews 2002). Constructivist epistemology

has limited means to evaluate the merit of statements like ‘I know that organisms change

over time’ and ‘I know that intelligently designed organisms do not change over time’,

provided that both statements are viable, socially negotiated, and advance the attainment of

personal goals in a social context. In such a case, some science teachers will help students

to see both points of view and determine their own preferences. In fact, for the con-

structivist teacher this is the preferred approach, because it is not authoritarian and because

it gives students space in which to make their viable constructions (Quale 2008).

4 The Case of Turkey

4.1 Historical Background of Teaching Evolution

A vast majority of Turkey’s population is Muslim. The public acceptance rate of evolution

in Turkey is around 25 %, and that is one of the highest among Muslim countries. One

reason for this comparatively high acceptance rate could be the early introduction of

evolution theory in the Turkish science curriculum. Turkey was founded in 1923, and by

1930 evolution theory was taught in the schools (Toprak 2012). On the other hand, now,

Turkey is a major source of the creationist propaganda outside the USA, and is especially

significant in relation to its influence on Muslim populations in Europe’ (Cornish-Bowden

and Cardenaz 2007, p. 113).

Reasons for this state of affairs are various, including political and religious reasons

beyond the scope of this paper to explain. However, two fairly recent episodes serve to

illustrate how rational thinking can be side-tracked, even in a scientific community. In

2009, the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) excluded

Darwin from its official magazine cover at the very last minute. Such censorship had not

occurred since the Council’s foundation in 1963. Until this incident, the Council had

frequently published information about Darwin and evolution theory. The censorship in

2009 was a turning point, implying that the anti-evolution campaign was gaining ground,

even within the Turkish scientific community. Then in 2013 the Council declined to fund a

training programme about evolution, with an explanation in writing to the effect that

‘evolution is both nationally and universally a controversial subject’ (Bohannon 2013).

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Historically Turkey has a very centralized education system. The Ministry of Education

(MEB) is the governing body, responsible for all primary and secondary education.

According to MEB statistics, in 2012 there were 17,234,452 students in 83,835 schools,

both public and private. Without exception, all schools must follow the official MEB

curriculum, and the MEB guardedly monitors its implementation through local offices. In

2005, the MEB decided that constructivism would be the predominant pedagogy in sci-

ence, proclaiming in handbooks that learning environments, teaching strategies, and stu-

dent experiences should reflect the constructivist approach as faithfully as possible

(Ministry of Education 2005).

Text books, including biology text books, are selected and distributed by the MEB.

Today, even when evolution theory is mentioned in text books, it is not represented

scientifically.

In the 1983 edition of a standard high school textbook, evolution merits its own chapter. In the 2011edition, by contrast, evolution is part of a chapter called ‘The beginning of life and evolution’ inwhich creationism is also discussed. Another interesting difference between the two books relates tothe meaning of ‘scientific theory’; the recent version treats the concept as an open-ended, indefiniteopinion rather than a fact, reducing it to an unclear hypothesis (Sayers and Ozcan 2013, p. 3).

So, considering the aims of science education, the situation in Turkey is dire.

4.2 Positions of Prospective Science Teachers About Teaching ID

Prospective science teachers at a state university in Turkey were asked if they would teach

ID and/or evolution theory if there were no curriculum restrictions on what to teach. This

state university accepts students from all over Turkey based on results of the University

Entrance Examination, which is administered by the Student Selection and Placement

Centre every year. All high school graduates who want to be science teachers must sit for

it. Upon graduation, students participating in this study would be qualified to teach science

in primary schools at grades 5–8. All were in the third or fourth year; they had already

taken basic biology, chemistry, and physics courses. They had also taken education courses

on topics such as the psychology of learning, curriculum, and instruction.

Of the 48 prospective science teachers, 19 would teach both ID and evolution theory in

their classes. Two opted for teaching only ID. Thus, for 21 of these 48 prospective science

teachers, ID is a legitimate topic in a science class. Some examples from their written

statements are as follows:

I would like to teach both evolution and ID theories in class. … There is no debate that the bestexplanation scientist have for maintaining life is evolutionary theory. On the other hand ID isproposed by other scientists as well… Teaching only one perspective would cause students to accepteverything that they were told and soon they will stop thinking. I would like my future students togive meaning to life with science…. That’s why I will try to do my best to teach both theories so thatthey have different ideas.Both evolution and intelligent design should be included and taught equally and objectively inscience classes…. I should not say which theory I accept but I should say there are two basic theories.I would prefer to teach both evolution and ID in science lessons… They are all theories as it is saidthat they are always tentative and falsifiable.

From the constructivist perspective, social negotiation for inter-subjectivity are based

on rational thinking, and during social negotiation ID constructions may be modified so

that they become better aligned with evolution theory, if, that is, evolution theory is

compatible with the students’ experiential realities. According to constructivism, students

should be exposed to alternative views and guided by teachers to create their own expe-

riential realities. If they do not need to change their ID compatible experiential reality to

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greater compatibility with evolution theory, then the constructivist teacher will let them

rest on their experience and hope that they will modify their experiential reality in the

future. One of the prospective science teachers wrote:

As a teacher, we can introduce our class [to] all ideas, as students will be able to make up their ownminds. Hence, we cannot introduce these ideas ideologically, we only show them that these are suchissues discussing on. If they want to believe one of them, both of them or none of them, this does notbother us as a teacher.

As mentioned earlier, two of the prospective teachers expressed the preference to teach

only ID in their science classes. They claimed that if ID’s connection to religion is taken to

be a reason for not teaching ID in a science class, then evolution theory should not be

taught either, because evolution also has a religious component. Therefore, if evolution

theory is taught in a science class then ID should also be taught. One of the two students

wrote:

If we think that we teach ID because of its religious background, we cannot teach evolution too….Evolution theory has religious background that it imposes secular humanism or atheism….We knowthat either humanism or atheism is one of religion…. Both evolution theory or ID try to develop theirhypotheses in the light of science.… However, it is obvious that there is faith at the beginning of theconstructing of theories.

The other wrote:

Science cannot explain everything…. Evolution theory implies atheism…. To answer the origin oflife, scientists try to avoid religious statements, such as supreme in order to make science objective. Iappreciate that, since we are bound to physical world we need a mechanism on how things work.However for a topic like the origins of life that bears the question ‘why am I here?’ or ‘what is thepurpose of being a being?’ Is it possible to be totally objective…

These explanations, in a sense, defend the teaching ID by claiming that evolution is

supportive of religion; it appeals to a religious explanation (secular humanism or atheism)

of the origins of life. So, according to these prospective teachers, a religious bias is not

sufficient reason to exclude ID from a science class. Their opinion of evolution is remi-

niscent of a postmodern argument that claims ‘evolution is a secular creation story’

(Pennock 2010, p. 762). While not logically valid, such arguments may be rehearsed in

social negotiations within the framework of constructivism, according to which knowledge

construction is closely related to previous experiences, cultural background, religious

beliefs, and mental states.

The constructivist position holds that constructions that are incompatible with experi-

ences will be modified or eliminated during social negotiations, when individuals tend to

align their thinking with the more persuasive arguments of others. Thus, a higher level of

knowledge, namely scientific knowledge, is achieved. Underlying assumptions within this

process is the presence of rational thinking and absence of self-interest. However, in the

presence of absolute belief, powerful group interests, or the absence of reason, social

negotiations may not proceed according to the sanguine assumptions of constructivism.

One can see how some prospective teachers defer to a religious authority rather than to

science. Here are two examples from two different participants:

Religion has not been the opposite of science until the evolution theory. Both Bible and Quran do notaccept evolution.According to my religion, the verses in the Quran directly support the science…. Moreover, wecannot think science and religion separately in my belief…

For some of the prospective teachers who favour teaching both ID and evolution, God is

the source of absolute truth. But there is a disconnect between the ‘absolute truth’ revealed

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by God and the constructivist assumption of ‘no truth’ except that which emerges from

social negotiation. Influenced by belief in absolute truth, objective social negotiation is

unlikely to take place and is more likely to serve the self- or group-interest of individuals

who adhere to unchangeable beliefs. The durability of strict beliefs is a characteristic of

pseudoscience, which does not change or correct itself over time.

Another theme in the prospective teachers’ statements is the personalization of issues.

For example, one participant expressed an emotional reaction to her concept of evolution:

I am also disturbed with the idea of being grand grandchildren of apes… But I am not angry with theDarwin’s theory.

Another wrote:

Human has a perfect design and I do not think that our ancestors are ape. This is not the humanego…. God cannot bind creation of human to this kind of humiliation.

And another, defending ID, wrote:

As I observe, all living organisms now are in the service of human kind because we are intelligentcreatures and we are the most complicated organisms in the world.

In the process of social negotiation with these prospective teachers, if someone con-

tributing to the discussion said, ‘We are not that perfect’, would the social negotiation

suggested by constructivism proceed in a rational and proper way? Or would those indi-

viduals who personalize the issues take this rebuttal as a humiliation or an offense against

their beliefs?

It is important to point out that the beliefs and opinions presented in these written

statements are neither rooted in constructivism nor the result of constructivism. The point

is that some of the statements of these prospective science teachers are based on sincere

and absolute beliefs. Moreover, other dissenting participants might have good reasons to

claim their own experiential reality as the best fit, especially in the presence of competing

self- or group-interests. In such a context, it would be extremely difficult if not impossible

to pursue a rational argument in social negotiations. Constructivist pedagogy underesti-

mates or ignores the difficulty of rational discussion in the presence of pseudoscience or

absolute certainty. Moreover, constructivism gives a higher priority to exposing learners to

alternative or competing constructions rather than the construction of scientific knowledge

by scientific methods. Hence the power of self-confirmation and the social pressure to hold

on to previously adopted pseudoscientific beliefs may be the unanticipated consequences of

social negotiation. In other words, reinforcement of pseudoscientific beliefs as opposed to

the aims of science education could be the outcomes of constructivist pedagogy.

5 Conclusion

ID proponents argue that the physical universe and all living things are intelligently

designed. Although sometimes the phrase ‘intelligent designer’ is not used explicitly, the

word ‘design’ implies that living things are the products of a designer, not natural selec-

tion. Thus, ID appeals to a theistic, not scientific understanding of nature. Nevertheless,

there is widespread propaganda urging teachers to ‘teach the controversy’ (Scott and

Branch 2003), to teach students about creationism and ID in the science classroom. The

propaganda can be very effective in places where a majority of the population has strong

religious beliefs. In this context, the pitfalls of constructivist pedagogy become more

apparent. Discussion, inquiry, and collaboration are highly valued by constructivists.

838 E. Z. Mugaloglu

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Through group discussions in which students share ideas, teachers become aware of the

students’ developing schemata and honour their understandings. However, the students’

constructed schemata after group discussions and negotiations may not necessarily be

consistent with scientific explanations. Constructivist pedagogy assumes that social

negotiation will be carried out rationally, without the distortions caused by strong

pseudoscientific beliefs and social pressures. The thinking of the teachers themselves might

suffer the same distortions. If so, constructivist pedagogy may lead to confusion and

relativism among teachers, as described by Tatto (1999). Such confusion can be seen in

this statement written by a student in a method course:

I will simply allow my students to figure out things out for themselves, for I know there is no rightanswer (Richardson 1997, p. 53)

So, in such cases, as Richardson points out (1997), ‘pedagogical limitations of a

teaching practice emanating from misguided attempts to honor students’ understandings at

the expense of the right answer’ become very clear. (p. 38).Very clear, that is, to some

people; for certain constructivists, the limitations are not at all evident. For instance, Quale

(2008) interprets radical constructivism as a relativist epistemic approach and conceptu-

alizes ‘knowledge as story’:

It is a fact that there are many stories…. The crucial point to note is that science is not to beconsidered as intrinsically more true or correct than any of these alternative stories. In this light, eventhe so-called pseudo-sciences are just to be regarded as different stories.

Within this paradigm, the following ‘story telling’ scenario is presented as good

practice:

The obligation of the biology teacher is to present students the story that is offered by biological-science—in this case, the story of Darwinian evolution…. If students come to agree that evolutionoffers a better (meaning: more satisfactory, more believable, more inspiring) story than creationismdoes—the teacher will of course have reason to feel gratified (Quale 2008, p. 115).

Being open to different views is not alien to science. Also, from a pedagogical per-

spective, the sharing of knowledge in the process of construction is much appreciated.

Thus, peers and teachers make sense of others’ understanding (Richardson 1997). How-

ever, as a result of social negotiation, students may not bring their current understandings

into line with scientific explanations. In other words, if the constructions of students are in

line with pseudoscientific ID rather than the theory of evolution, what should the science

teacher do? According to Quale (2008), for whom von Glassersfeld remains a continual

inspiration, the answer is clear: the science teacher should not try to persuade students that

‘evolution is good science (and creationism is not) because the biologists agree that this is

so’ (p. 80). This is the constructivist position that most concerns science educators who

honour the goals of science education.

An overarching goal of science education is ‘to ensure that by the end of 12th grade, all

students have some appreciation of the beauty and wonder of science’ (NRC 2012, p. 1).

Appreciation of science is inclusive of appreciation of scientific knowledge, its explanatory

power, and its methodology (NRC 2012).To equate pseudoscientific explanations with

scientific knowledge is not appreciative of science. Likewise, equating ID with evolution

theory is not appreciative of science. As Scott and Branch (2003) emphasize, ‘It is sci-

entifically inappropriate and pedagogically irresponsible to teach that scientists seriously

debate the validity of evolution’ (p. 499). In honouring the goals of science education, it is

the science educators’ responsibility to employ a pedagogy that helps students to

Implications of Constructivist Pedagogy 839

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differentiate between scientific and pseudoscientific constructions. Only then can they

appreciate science.

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