The positive role of social identity in mass emergencies:

Survivors’ experiences of the London bombs July 2005

The positive crowd: Psychological and social dimensions June 13th 2008Chris Cocking, John Drury, & Steve Reicherc.cocking@londonmet.ac.ukFunded by ESRC grant (Ref no: RES-000-23-0446) April 2004-7

Outline of Presentation

Background and aims of researchResearch findingsImplications for emergency

planning

Development of crowd behaviour theories

19th Century- The irrationalist approach (Le Bon, 1895)

1960s - 70s more rationalist approaches Emergent Norm Theory (Turner R., 1974)

From 1980s to present- The Social Identity Model (Reicher, 2001)

The ‘Panic’ model

Part of the irrationalist tradition in crowd psychology

a) Threat causes emotion to overwhelm reason b) Collective identity breaks down c) Selfish behaviours- pushing, trampling d) Contagion-these behaviours spread to crowd as a

whole This has implications for emergency planning

Social attachment model-Mawson (2005)

In emergencies, people seek out attachment figures: social norms rarely break down

But, such ties can have fatal consequences- people escape (or die) in groups

Improves on panic model, and supported by evidence from behaviour during fatal fires, (Cornwell, 2001) but problems remain:

a) Implies that panic in a crowd of strangers is more likely b) Why do strangers co-operate in emergencies?

The self-categorisation approach (Turner J., 1987)

Disasters create a common identity or sense of ‘we-ness’- Clarke (2002)

This can result in orderly, altruistic behaviour as people escape common threat

Increased threat can enhance common identity

7/7: primary data-set

1) 12 face-to-face interviews 2) 7 e-mail responses3) 14 on-line questionnaire responses

7/7: Secondary data-set

1) ‘Contemporaneous’ interviews with survivors and witnesses, from 141 different articles in 10 different national daily newspapers.

2) 114 detailed personal accounts of survivors (web, London Assembly enquiry, books or retrospective newspaper features.

Data from at least 145 people, most of whom (90) were actually caught up in the explosions (c. 5% of those directly affected)

7th July terrorist attacks

Rough chronology of events on the tube 1) Blast followed by darkness and silence 2) Screams of fear and distress- passengers try to

find out what’s going on 3) Smoke & soot clear- attempts to help/ comfort

others, & escape- some delay because of fear that tracks are live

4) Passengers wait approx 30 mins. for rescue, and walk in orderly fashion along tracks when directed

Response to 7/7

Individual fear and distress, but no mass panic

Evacuations characterised by orderly, calm behaviour

Many reports of altruism, co-operation, and collective spirit of Londoners/ UK as a whole

Panic?

‘There was no real panic - just an overwhelming sense to get out of the station quickly’

‘Almost straight away our packed carriage started to fill with smoke, and people panicked immediately. Thankfully there were some level-headed people on the carriage who managed to calm everyone down’

Unity

‘One of the things which struck me about this experience is that one minute you are standing around strangers and the next minute they become the closest and most important people in your life. That feeling was quite extraordinary’

Implications: The myth of Panic

Many accounts of ‘panic’ in emergencies But what actually is panic, and what is logical

flight behaviour? Need to look at what people actually do, and

decide if it is indeed ‘panic’ More than just semantics, as it could affect

emergency evacuation planning

Practical implications: during incident

If ‘panic’ is wrong and crowd behaviour is social and meaningful-

More emphasis is needed on communicating with the crowd and less on the crowd as a physical entity (exit widths)

If shared social identity is the basis of much helping-

Those in authority should encourage a sense of collective identity in the public- don’t address them as atomised customers

Crowds can be part of the solution rather than part of the problem

Practical implications: post incident

If there is a potential for resilience among strangers- The authorities and emergency services need to allow and cater for people’s willingness to help each other

Survivors’ need for mutual support groups may be therapeutic and need to be researched in more detail

Although it is possible mutual support may be maladaptive for some- e.g. ‘victim’ identity

Summary

Crowds in emergencies behave in ways that are consistent with their identities and governed by the social norms of the situation

The ‘panic model’ is largely a myth Evidence supports our theories

http://www.sussex.ac.uk/affiliates/panic/applications.html

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