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The paradox of civiceducation in non-liberaldemocracies: the case ofIsraelAmi PedahzurPublished online: 10 Nov 2010.

To cite this article: Ami Pedahzur (2001) The paradox of civic education in non-liberal democracies: the case of Israel, Journal of Education Policy, 16:5, 413-430,DOI: 10.1080/02680930110071020

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The paradox of civic education in non-liberaldemocracies: the case of Israel

Ami Pedahzur

Israeli society has a long reputation of being intolerant and violent. In this study we chose to look into the role of theeducation policy in Israel and to ask why do civic education programmes fail in implanting more seeds of toleranceand democratic values within the society. The first part of the study presents the subordination of the civic educationprogrammes to the needs of the ethno-national agenda in the early years of the state of Israel, accomplished mainlyby marginalizing the field of civics both in terms of contents and instruction hours. Then, we argue that since the1980s, after the Israeli leadership was exposed to the problematic consequences of the lack of education to demo-cratic values, all the initiatives to promote such agenda collided with the strong non-liberal character of the statewhich prevented any progress toward a more democratic orientation. We present the nature of this collision byusing three levels of analysis: structural, policy making and policy implementation. We conclude by arguing thatonly a process of real liberalization of the state of Israel has the potential to liberate the education system from theparadoxes inherent to it.

Introduction

Over the course of the last 20 years, unprecedented extremism and violencehave char-acterized Israeli politics. Externally, Israeli society has always lived under the threatof the broader Israeli± Arab conflict, and internally, it has been marked by highly vola-tile relations between Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs, however, the Jewish communityin Israel has also gradually become a society polarized along numerous axes orcleavages’ . The religious cleavage between orthodox and secular Jews, the ethniccleavage between Jews of Ashkenazi (European) and Mizrachi (Arab) origin, and thepolitical cleavage between the dovish left and hawkish right are a few key examplesof the rifts dividing Israeli society.

Research conducted from the 1980s indicates that extremism, ethnocentrism andviolence are deep-seat ed among Israeli youth and adults (Shamir and Sullivan 1985,Benyamini 1986, Smooha 1986). Most of these studies reveal significant support forcertain attitudes, such as curtailing the freedom of speech, exclusion of ethnic minori-ties from society and Israeli politics, a call for a strong leadership and an increase in reli-

Journal of Educational Pol icy ISSN 0268± 0939 print/ISSN 1464± 5106 online # 2001 Taylor & Francis Ltd

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DOI: 10.1080/0268093011007102 0

Ami Pedahzur is a lecturer at the Department of Political Science, University of Haifa, Israel.

J. EDUCATION POLICY, 2001, VOL. 16, NO. 5, 413 ± 430

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gious legislation. Comparative research accentuates the extremist profile of certainsectors of Israeli society, and reveals that Israeli pupils tend to score very highly onmeasures of ethnocentrism and authoritarianism in comparison to pupils abroad(Toreny et al. 1975: 225, Neuberger 2000: 8).

Indeed, over the years, violence and extremism have increased. Findings from asurvey administered to a student population three years after Prime Minister Rabin’sassassination show that one-third of respondents, if and when the issue conflicts withtheir personal convictions, were not committed toward accepting decisions made bya democratically elected government: 11% responded that they would in fact `beunderstanding’ in the event of another political assassination under similar circum-stances (Hasisi et al. 2000).

In view of the polarized and extremist social reality depicted above and which,according to some (Cohen and Susser 1999), may lead the political system to an all-out crisis, one would assume that state leaders would take deterrent and preventiveaction against extremism and violence (Sprinzak 1999), such as recruiting supportfor the government by promoting the trust of Israelis in democratic values. The state’ sprincipal tool in promoting paramount values is the education system, or morespecifically, the civic studies programme. However, unexpectedly, this programmesuffers from a marginal status in Israeli schools, confirmed by figures indicating thatin the late 1990s, for five consecutive years, civic studies was placed lowest in Israelistudent matriculation results. According to Ministry of Education statistics, 25% ofpupils failed this exam or did not even attempt it (Ha’aret13 June 2000).

In this study, we will attempt to identify the main reasons why, despite a lowcommitment to basic democratic values and the subsequent threat posed to the stabi-lity of the political system, the pedagogy of democratic values has been renderednearly insignificant in Israeli curricula for many years. In fact, civic studies has under-gone marginalization both in course content and in its relation to other subjects. Anattempt will be made here to assess whether the new millennium can usher in signifi-cant change in the civic studies curriculum and reinforce democratic ideals. Also, wewill ask what forces both drive and restrain this process.

Civic education and the non-liberal dem ocracy

Any governing polity aspires to impress its values upon its citizens. Political socializa-tion of the regime’s values is intended to unite citizens around national symbols andkey values of the state. This is a necessary condition for guaranteeing the legitimacyof the regime and its stability (Walzer 1997). For example, through political indoctri-nation, totalitarian forms of government succeed in reducing, somewhat, the needfor the coercive-violent element at their disposal. Democracies, too, are interested ininculcating and sustaining, by means of both formal and informal socialisation, thepolitical conceptions basic to the ruling polity (Slomczynski and Shabad 1998: 753).

The discourse regarding civic education, particularly that of a liberal orientation,is fundamentally a volatile one and has been subject to much criticism. Some criticalscholars disapprove of the state’s involvement in the individual’s privacy and criticizea political sovereign body’s attempt to shape its citizens in a process of repressive edu-cation. Yet, Levinson (1999) observes that in the 1990s ± years rife with ethnic conflict± violence and political extremism have resurfaced globally and therefore liberalscholars’ interest has increased after years of avoidance. Many in this field now regard

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a state-regulated yet constrained civic education programme as a highly importantfactor contributing to the development of civil society and the preservation of the sta-bility of the liberal state (Macedo 1995, Galston 1995, Callan 1997).

However, in line with a traditional liberal stance, the writings of most of thesescholars evince a rather limited approach regarding the potential for inculcatingdemocratic principles. The core concept conveyed by this education process, accord-ing to the majority of the liberalist school, is the assimilation of the basic ideal of toler-ance (Gutmann 1987, Galston 1995, Kymlicka 1995). Others extend the notion toinclude the education of mutual respect (Gutmann 1995, Macedo 1995). Departingfrom this approach, Levinson (1999) proposes teaching a more comprehensive profileof civic qualities yet still faithful to the narrow boundaries of liberal tradition. In herview, the core concept is a cardinal series of fundamental democratic rights, such asfreedom of speech, assembly, religious expression, property, the right to privacy andthe right to engage in political action. However, students must also be taught civilduties and therefore be exposed to the formal aspect of governmental processes, thatis, the constitution and constitutional proceedings which form the basis of the liberalstate. Furthermore, Levinson proposes teaching the ways and means of political exer-cise. To achieve this, certain skills must be cultivated which will help pupils becomemore aware of political issues, including voting and even taking action if necessary.The final subject to be registered in the school civics curriculum, with this approach,is the critical assessment of political alternatives (pp. 43± 44).

Ichilov (1990, 1993) has shown that some of Levinson’s ideas have already beenincluded in many curricula in liberal democracies. Several countries, such asDenmark and Germany (Hahn 1999) and, earlier, the US (Farnen 1990), haveexpanded the role of civic studies. In these countries, civic studies was formerly taughtfrom a reduced procedural perspective (i.e. structures and functions of governmentalinstitutions), while consciously avoiding more controversial issues.

It should therefore be stressed that the ascending interest in civic education inrecent years can be described as an international phenomenon. In addition to theaforementioned global ethnic conflict and violence, according to Frazer (1999), thereare other forces at work which are responsible for the growing interest in the field.One of these is the democratization processes that have taken place in Central andEastern Europe as well as in Latin American and even some African countries. Inorder to promote the transition to democracy, profound institutional change, accom-panied by a new-fashioned political culture are both necessary, and the role of civiceducation’ in such a transition was found to be central.

Yet, not only non-Western countries undergoing processes of democratizationhave turned to an espousal of civic education programmes. Political apathy, lowelectoral turnouts and declining levels of social and political participation and, atthe same time, an increase in manifestations of racist, sectarian, authoritarian andanti-humanitarian values have alarmed many countries in Western Europeand North America (Frazer 1999: 5± 6), thus sparking a renewed interest in civiceducation.

While some liberal democracies continue to debate the acceptable degree of stateintervention in the education process, as well as the nature of the ideas taught and themethods of conveying them, there exists another sort of governing system goingthrough a different type of process. This form of polity has been classified as the`non-liberal democracy’. In such countries, many with either newly found indepen-

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dence or going through processes of democratization, the dilemmas regarding thecomposition and nature of civic studies are much deeper.

The liberal democracy’ is a form of government distinguished not only by freeelections, but also by its adherence to the rule of law’, the separation of authorities,and the protection of basic rights such as freedom of speech, peaceful assembly, reli-gion and property (Zakaria 1997: 22). The non-liberal democracy is a narrow form ofdemocracy limited to the more procedural and formal meaning of the democraticidea. In other words, democratic rules of the game are maintained, including free elec-tions and multi-party competition yet, at the same time, this form of government isnot quite liberal because it suffers from the neglect of certain liberties. A non-liberaldemocracy’ stresses uniformity at the expense of diversity and unity over pluralism.This reflects a collectivistic regime, where the principles of equality and harmony arefound among those belonging to a certain group and aspiring to common goals.State offices do not exist in order to form an institutional safeguard of the individual’ sprivacy, but rather as a means for furthering the `general good’ of the people. Thegeneral good, instead of the constitution, defines the ethical boundaries of an indivi-dual’s sense of citizenship. In non-liberal democracies, not all voices have an equal op-portunity to be heard and not everybody is equally encouraged to enter the politicalarena. Participation is more a privilege than a basic right and is therefore reserved forthose who act in the collective interest. This type of participation is not a potentialvehicle for challenging authority but rather a means of processing and enforcing thegeneral will of the country (Peled 1992, Yishai 1998: 155).

Therefore, the `non-liberal democracy’ is a type of intermediate model fallingsomewhere in between the continuum of authoritarian regimes and liberal democra-cies. Its status as an intermediate model also implies certain inherent failings. The`non-liberal democracy’ is fraught with inner contradictions that are evident in thevery words that comprise its name. On one hand, democratic, and, on the other, notliberal. These incongruities are apparent in many aspects of life in these countries,including the education system.

Nearly all of Levinson’s proposals regarding civic education, as well as those ofmany other liberalist scholars, provide a genuine challenge to the non-liberal democ-racy’. Liberal tradition places a strong emphasis on the individual and his libertiesand this emphasis conflicts with the collective, and often ethnic, interest of the `non-liberal democracy’. Consequently, the paradox or inherent failing of the `non-liberaldemocracy’ acquires added meaning when applied to citizenship instruction.Incapable of reconciling the contradiction between the polity’s democratic and non-liberal principles, such a regime will attempt to navigate between the two conflictingpaths in a constant search to conceal these inconsistencies. The most convenient wayto do this is by completely removing civic studies from the school programme, or atleast relegating the course to a lower status. Another somewhat more sophisticatedoption is by thinning out subject matter or by teaching the formal, constitutionalaspect of civics. In this case, the formal aspect is placed foremost on the agenda ± con-trary to its relatively peripheral status in Levinson’s proposals ± at the expense of acomplete elimination of the more essential principles of liberal democratic rights. Bypromoting the formal version of governmental procedures and without dealing inmore substantial principles and their inherent ambiguities, the non-liberal democ-racy’ strives to obfuscate its students’ sense of critique, trying to persuade them thattheir state is 100% democratic.

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The non-liberal character of Israel ’ s dem ocracy

The majority of scholars of Israeli politics tend to agree that Israel is still far from theWestern liberal democratic model. However, there is a lack of consensus regardingthe precise nature of this country’s form of government. Neuberger (1998), forexample, argues that Israel is a blemished’ liberal democracy, citing the followingexplanations: the lack of a constitution (to this day, the state continues to employadministrative regulations and emergency legislation), the lack of a division betweenreligion and state, the institutionalized discrimination against Israeli Arabs, andthe occupation of Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Others, going one step further,argue that by virtue of the asymmetrical relations between the Jewish majority(82% of the population) and the Arab minority, Israel should be classified as a(Jewish) ethnocracy’ (Yiftachel 1997) or in fact a `non-democratic ethnic state’(Ghanem 1998).

In between these polarities of ethnocracy and the blemished liberal democracy’,there lies an intermediate position maintaining that the Israeli case fills the require-ments of the `non-liberal democracy’ (Peled 1992, Ben-Eliezer 1993, Yishai 1998).According to this view, the state was founded on a strong Jewish, ethnic-collectivistbase which closed its ranks in face of its encounter with the country’s Arab residents(Ben-Eliezer 1999). Following the declaration of Israel’ s independence and its defini-tion as a Jewish and democratic state’, relations between the two major ethnic com-munities of this country consolidated along the lines of a sweeping preference for theJewish majority, an outcome that would prove to be the crucial pitfall in the country’spath towards definition as a Western liberal democracy.

The theoretical model that best suits the analysis of the Israeli `non-liberal democ-racy’, with all its contradictions, is Sammy Smooha’s concept of ethnic democracy’.According to Smooha, the ethnic democracy is a democratic system of governmentwherein rights are granted to all citizens while, at the same time, a favoured status isconferred upon the majority. It is predicated on two conflicting principles: democ-racy for all and the majority’s structural subordination of the minority. The foundingof the state on these two opposing principles occasions conflicts and dilemmas.The state belongs to the majority and this by inference does not include all of itscitizens. For the (in the case of Israel, Jewish) majority, the state is a means forfurthering its interests and national goals while the (in Israel, Arab) minority isfaced with the predicament of being disloyal to the country because it cannotattain full equality and identification with the state. At the same time, the democraticsystem allows the minority to ardently campaign and struggle to better its conditionswithout fear of governmental crackdown or oppression by the majority.Furthermore, the state imposes a variety of restrictions and a general regulation ofthe minority in order to prevent disorder, instability and subversion (Smooha 1999:24).

Despite these complexities, the political procedure in Israel is based on free elec-tions and the separation of governmental authorities, two conditions that unquestion-ably fill the minimum requirements of a democratic polity as presented by Zakaria(1997). These postulates make it easier to reject the argument that the state of Israelhas nothing in common with democracy and also paves the way for the adoption ofthe ethnic democracy’ model for the present analysis.

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Civic education in Israel

The education system in Israel has been subordinated to the state’ s Jewish ethnic char-acter since its establishment. Pupils have been exposed to beliefs which served thegoals of the Jewish State, mainly to organize and coalesce members of the dominantethnicity and cultivate their national identity. The intention was to gain their full sup-port, agreement, identification, participation and willingness to make sacrifices fornational projects, while the grand design was to build a nation, a nation-state, ordefend the ethnic nation from real or imaginary threats (Smooha 1999: 26± 27).

In her comprehensive review of the evolution and formation of citizenship edu-cation in Israel, Ichilov (1993) distinguishes between two major periods: the years pre-ceding the state’s establishment (pre-1948) and those after. In the pre-state period,dominant ethnic influences and an almost complete absence of democratic tendencieswere both prominent. However, this can be attributed to non-democratic traditionsamong the majority of the Jewish public in Israel at that time, who largely immi-grated from Arabian, North African and Eastern European countries lacking demo-cratic distinctions (Sprinzak 1986). It can also be attributed to the Zionist ideology,revolutionary processes and massive construction enterprises in Israel, all of whichdemanded a general consolidation around collective myths and national ideals(Horowitz and Lissak 1989).

1

The concrete result of the subordination of civic studies to ethno-national dictateswas evident in the education of Zionist citizenship’, which formed an integral partof Hebrew pedagogy prior to the state’ s establishment. The essentials of educationof Zionist citizenship’ well represented ethno-national aims. They encompassed theentire fabric of the Jewish pupil’s life at school and were integrated into all class courses± particularly those subjects where it was easy to instil ideological strains, such as mole-det (geography of Israel, literally, `homeland’) and Bible classes ± but could even befound in mathematics studies. The subject matter of these citizenship studies under-scored the absolute right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel, while disregardinglocal Arab residents, or at the most revealing a patronizing attitude towards themand depicting them as backward natives (Ichilov 1993).

The insemination of ethno-national principles by means of the education systemdid not end with the declaration of independence in 1948. Approximately four yearsafter the state’s establishment, the ethnic component attained formal status in the edu-cational system. As part of the first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion’s vision ofMamlachtiut (Statehood),

2education in Israel was nationalized, a process that led to

the elimination of most of themore distinct educational orientations instituted duringthe pre-state era. In paragraph 2 of the Statehood Education Act of 1953, the inten-tions of the nascent state to incorporate the ethnic component into the national educa-tion system were transparent. `The goal of Statehood education is to establish anbasic education in this State upon the values of Israeli culture and scientific achieve-ments, on the love of the homeland and loyalty to the State and Nation of Israel’(Statehood Education Act 1953, paragraph 2).

This policy was put into practice by a twofold weeding-out process in civiccourses; a reduction of civic studies in general to the procedural formal aspect of gov-ernmental institutions and a marginalization of the programme in relation to othercourses, the latter whose objective was to emphasize the ethnic spirit of the Israelinational ideal.

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Course subject matter

A review of thewritings of liberal scholars in a wide rangeof disciplines reveals severalsubject categories. The leading category is the liberties espoused by democracy. The for-mal aspect of governmental or political proceedings and institutions only comeslater. The state of Israel, by its very nature an ethnic democracy’ and therefore unableto guarantee the same liberties for all of its citizens, has consciously elected to avoidany debate regarding these rights or any other sensitive issue distinguishing the non-liberal regime (from an interview with Itzhak Levi, former Minister of Education,13 August 2000). As a result, pupils are almost exclusively presented with the narrowprocedural perspective of this subject (Ichilov 1993: 108). The primary goal was toestablish the subject, `The Polity of the State of Israel’ as the core field of the schoolcurriculum. The subject matter that constituted this predominant educational chapterin effect merely displayed the formal appearance’ of Israeli democracy: declarationof independence, legislative and judiciary proceedings, elections procedures, theKnesset (Israeli parliament) and the government. Even when attempts were made tobroach more substantial questions, such as the nature of Israeli citizenship, the (non-existent) constitution and the status of religion in relation to the state, then, curriculaand matriculation exams in citizenship courses chose to focus upon the legislative pro-cedural perspective (evidence of this can be found in the following school textbooks:Shachar 1986, Yedidyah 1989). In a content analysis of textbooks, empirical corrobor-ation of the preferred status of the formal element in school curricula was indicatedby a significant disparity in favour of the procedural component over any other com-ponent (Ichilov 1993: 129).

The precedence of particularistic fields and the tendency of civic studies to avoidin-depth discussion on substantive issues were significantly sustained by the ongoingArab± Israeli conflict. The conflict was taught as an optional subject in civic studiesbut often from the narrow perspective of the national narrative. Bar-Tal (1999) sug-gests that societies involved in ongoing contention develop adaptable psychologicalconditions which enable them to cope with life’ s demands. Among these, the follow-ing beliefs were detected: the rightness of goals, the security situation, delegitimacyof the opponent, positive self-image, self-perception as a victim, patriotism and socialcohesion. In a content analysis of school textbooks on different subjects ± includingcivic studies ± Bar-Tal found that social belief s associated with Israel’ s security weregiven the highest emphasis, next, belief s regarding positive self-image and the self-perception of Jews as victims. With respect to Arabs, delegitimacy was indeed rarebut textbooks mostly presented them in terms of negative stereotypes.

The reduction of civic studies to formal rudiments, as well as their detachmentfrom social and political reality, served the state considerably in its attempts to instilthe feeling among future citizens that Israel is, for all means and purposes, a demo-cratic state. However, this tendency also obscured the embedded contradictions inthe political system and repressed the critical capacities of these citizens. It is not poss-ible to claim a causal relationship between the two, but a 1999 study conducted inIsrael evaluating attitudes of Israeli citizens regarding the quality of its democraticgovernmental system, confirms the assumption that Israelis consider their state in allrespects to be democratic and they tend not to assume political self-critical attitudes.

3

Findings show that while subjects born and educated in Israel expressed high levelsof satisfaction with the degree of democracy of the state, immigrants’ levels of satis-faction (particularly those from the West), were much lower. In response to more

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specific questions, e.g. regarding the protection of civil rights in Israel, native-bornIsraelis expressed very high levels of satisfaction in comparison with immigrants(75% of the Israelis strongly agreed with the statement that individual rights arerespected in Israel in contrast to 50% of immigrants). These findings were strikinglyduplicated and underscored in relation to the issue of equal rights in Israel (61% ofIsraelis claimed there were full equal rights in Israel in comparison to 22% of immi-grants).

Nonetheless, the state of Israel did not settle for the simple contraction of the sub-ject matter of citizenship lessons. Another tactic was employed in the restriction anddilution of civic studies. As the next chapter demonstrates, a marginal status was con-ferred upon the course in comparison to other subjects, in particular those that rein-forced the unity of the national identity.

The status of civic studies

Together with formal civic education, the Israeli education system made an effort towidely inculcate Zionist± Jewish education by means of subjects such as Bible studies,geography, Jewish history and Tushba (Oral Law).

4The first sign of the subjection

of citizenship courses to national orientations was evident in the fact that the academictraining of civics teachers was relegated to the field of general history or the historyof the people of Israel. This was because, unlike most other subjects, citizenship wasnot considered a discipline requiring any special training (interview with Mr. DoronShochat, formerly head of the Division for Democracy and Coexistence in theMinistry of Education 20 August 2000). Therefore, a single teacher became responsi-ble for subjects such as Jewish history or the history of Eretz Yisrael (`Land of Israel’ ),the intensive instruction of which reflected the ethno-national aspects of the stateand served the notion of constructing a common history and cultural consolidationaround the nation’s symbols and myths. This same teacher also taught subject mattersupposed to be of a more liberal and universalistic nature. In fact, findings from a sur-vey administered to civic studies teachers indicated that despite their general willing-ness to teach more diverse subject matter, there was a tendency not to preferuniversal values in face of national values (Ichilov 1993). In the education system oftechnical schools, the marginality of civic studies was even more pronounced. Civicswas taught under the heading of the `Study of Nation and State’ , or, in other words,a section of the curricula that dealt in Jewish History (from an interview withHannah Shafir, the nationwide supervisor of civic studies in the Ministry ofEducation 20 August 2000).

An additional indication of the marginality of civic studies is evident in the num-ber of school hours accorded to this subject. Citizenship courses in Israel were com-pletely absent in primary school (first to sixth grades), a schoolchild’s first contactwith the formal state education system. In secondary school (seventh to ninth grades),as well, few schools listed the subject on their course programme despite the fact thata special curriculum was designed for students of this age. The reason for the omissionof this subject in secondary school is rooted in the lack of enforcement by theMinistry of Education, as well as in the personal preferences of school principals.This reflected Ministry of Education policy, according to which pupil exposure topotentially provocative and disputable issues was not recommended. Therefore, thefirst genuine contact of schoolchildren with civic studies course matter was only in

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their last year of secondary school, the twelfth grade. In that year, teachers were obli-gated to teach compulsory subjects for the matriculation exams (from an interviewwith Mr Doron Shochat 20 August 2000, Kremnitzer 1996: 13± 14), and, in conse-quence, devoted all their time and energy to the instruction of the procedural aspectsof the subject on which the exam focused (from an interview with Hannah Shafir 20August 2000).

The peripherality of civic studies is additionally underscored in the matriculationcertificate of the Israeli pupil. Despite being an apparently compulsory subject, civicstudies is worth only one academic credit on the final certificate. In comparison, sub-jects such as Bible studies, Hebrew, composition and literature ± courses that aredependable conduits for the insemination of national values ± each benefited from aminimum of two compulsory academic credits. Translated into hours of instruction,this meant that each of these subjects consisted of a minimum of 180 class hours, incontrast to 90 hours of citizenship lessons. Furthermore, the Ministry of Educationgave pupils the option of extending each of these subjects up to five academic credits(450 class hours) while civic studies was restricted to its original single credit.

Time and again, objections regarding theperipheral status of civic studies in Israelwere directed to the Ministry of Education. Professor Emanuel Gutmann, who waschiefly responsible for the design of the course programme in citizenship studies,appealed in the early 1990s to the Minister of Education arguing that:

Citizenship courses have been assigned, according to the general school curricula, no more than 90 classhours (out of all the years of secondary school education). In thepresent program, three subjects were taughtin these 90 hours, each allotted 30 hours. `The Polity of the State of Israel’ was a requisite subject and thiswas supplemented by two additional courses out of five electives, including the Israeli-Arab conflict. Forsome years now, it has becomequite clear to ministerial officials in charge of civic education that it is impos-sible to teach the course on Israeli polity in thirty hours and therefore, in reality, many more hours aredevoted well and above this quota. The inevitable consequence was that in recent years, only two subjectsin effect were taught, one requisite and one elective. (Correspondence 15 November 1990)

The test of reality proves that this complaint, like numerous others tucked away in theMinistry of Education archives, was cordially acknowledged and then discarded inits dusty files.

In summary, the above findings indicate that the Israeli pupil was exposed to thesubject of civics for a short period of time and only at a relatively later age.Moreover, out of the far-reaching and intricate fabric of political and social life inIsrael, he or she was introduced to only those aspects that were easy for the countryto deal with and which indirectly reinforced the younger generation’s legitimacyregarding nationalist ideals and the governing body. In this fashion, the educationalsystem served the state in its efforts to shape the collective consciousness of the beliefin the democracy of Israel, despite the dominance of the institutionalised Jewishmajority and without a discussion of the middle, grey areas which might evoke ques-tions with regard to the essence of a polity of this type.

The em ergence of Kahanism , the Oslo Agreem ents and theRabin assassination and their effect on the instruction of civiccourses

Three pivotal events of the 1980s and 1990s should have shaken the very foundationsof civic studies in Israel and led to their expansion and the inclusion of more liberaland humanistic principles. Foremost was thepenetration of the 1984 Israeli parliament

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by a racist party (Kach), later, the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and more recently, theassassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. In retrospect, it appears that theseevents did in fact inspire the education system to change its traditional approach andsubmit a general and new-fashioned plan of action. The blueprint was constructedon the reinforcement of democratic studies and the modification of civics coursematerial in order to introduce the pupil to liberal democratic views (principally, acomprehensive schooling of the concept of democracy with an emphasis on humanrights and liberties) as well as problematic and disputable issues (a broad and criticaldiscussion of the ethnic character of the Israeli democracy and the political expressionsof the cleavages that cut across it).

However, the inherent failing of the non-liberal democracy’ was demonstratedonce again in the paradoxical policy practised by Israel regarding civic studies in recentyears. On one hand, steps were indeed taken to bring about a broad and genuinechange in civic education with the aim of strengthening the democratic liberal aspect.On the other hand, the non-liberal constraints upon the state still prevented thesmooth transmission toward the liberalization of civic studies and instead they pro-ceeded quite unsteadily, with stops and starts and numerous diversions.

The initial efforts to liberalize civic studies can therefore be linked to the electionof Rabbi Meir Kahane to the Israeli parliament. He ran at the head of a quasi-fascistlist which openly preached the racial discrimination of Israeli Arabs and their expul-sion from the state (Sprinzak 1991). Following Kahane’s success in parliamentary elec-tions and a whole slate of studies confirming the assumption that the racist Rabbi’sviews had found a stronghold in the Israeli street, there was a growing awareness ofa deep anxiety both among policy makers and the people in regard to the future ofdemocracy in Israel, thus provoking many to act. The Israel Broadcasting Authoritydecided to boycott the Kach party and banned its leaders from appearing in themedia. Parliament adopted legislature to prevent the party from taking part in futureelections and the education system responded with a formal announcement declaringits own modifications in the emphases of school curricula. For the first time since theestablishment of the Israeli state, the Ministry of Education decided priority must begiven to thedemocratic element over theparticularist-national element in civic educa-tion. If until the 1980s, documented reference of the education of the Israeli citizento democratic values was infrequent or coincidental in the Ministry of Education’sarchives (where the process of setting goals remained abstract and recommendedsteps were predominantly the integration of the subject of democracy in the variouscourses), then, after Kahane’s election to Knesset, the tone changed and the emphasisshifted from education to Zionist citizenship’ to education toward democracy’ .The years 1986 and 1987 were even declared years of education to democracy(Ichilov 1993).

Nearly nine years after Kahane’s attainment of Knesset membership, the OsloAgreements between Israel and the PLO were signed. This second, critical turningpoint, was supposed to have led to the reform of school curricula. The OsloAgreements were to mark the passage from the belligerent past to a new era of peacebetween Israel and the Palestinians and within this framework, Israel and thePalestinian Authority were both committed to altering their school curricula andremoving all ethnocentric indications (Israeli 2000). The third, and perhaps most trau-matic event and milestone for Israeli society, was the murder of Prime MinisterYitzhak Rabin by a Jewish perpetrator. Yigal Amir, graduate of the national religiouseducation system, explained that he committed the murder out of the belief that not

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even a democratically elected government had the authority to make decisions thatstood in stark contrast to the Jewish Halacha (Jewish Law) or the will of a Jewish tradi-tional or orthodox religious part of the nation.

In spite of the significant public outcry that arose in the wake of these events andthe proclamations regarding the new direction of civic studies, a retrospective analysisof the efforts to translate words into action shows that the curricula was mostly leftuntouched and that the non-liberal component continued to overshadow the demo-cratic component. Restrictions on the liberalization of civic education due to the fail-ings of the non-liberal democracy can be examined according to three principallevels of analysis: structure, policy making and policy implementation.

Structural level

One of the first steps taken by the Ministry of Education in 1985, immediately fol-lowing Rabbi Meir Kahane’s election to parliament, was the establishment of a specialdivision for the advancement of democracy and coexistence in Israel. Tensionbetween democratic and non-liberal components could already be felt in this decision.This new resolution was in effect a formal acknowledgement by the Israeli Ministryof Education that, contrary to other countries where the term civic education’includes concepts relating to general democratic values, formal civic education inIsrael had not fulfilled its role of strengthening democratic values.

The called-for step was a broad reform of the civic education programme, withan increase in class hours and the replacement of formal subject matter with more sub-stantive democratic notions. However, this type of reform could be tolerated onlyunder one condition ± a change in the state’s attitude. Loath to abandon the ethniccharacter of Israeli democracy, the state opted for a more contemporary agenda indemocratic studies. Together with the formal instruction citizenship course in its tra-ditional form, a complementary organizational programme was initiated for teachingdemocratic values. The formal version of civics therefore remained marginal in classhours and resources, however, in relation to democratic studies it still enjoyed a clearadvantage. Traditional civic studies remained an integral part of the official Israelischool curricula, whereas democratic studies that focussed more deeply on the rela-tions between Jews and Arabs, the idea of rule of law’ and civil rights, receivedextra-curricular status (from an interview with Mr Doron Shochat 20 August 2000),making them an optional subject for the majority of school principals. The latter pre-ferred to devote all available school hours to matriculation subjects. In addition, notonly were democratic studies assigned peripheral status, the Division for Democracyand Coexistence (DDC) itself was considered a marginal body in the Ministry ofEducation and therefore a pawn in the hands of policy makers.

Shortly after the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, elections wereheld in which the right-wing bloc, under the leadership of Benyamin Netanyahu,just barely triumphed. Zevulun Hammer, representative of the National ReligiousParty,5 was appointed to the post of Minister of Education. Hammer, in line withthe traditional position of his party, maintained there was no justification for promot-ing the democratic aspects of civic education without a similar expansion of Jewish-nationalist values. He therefore decided on the establishment of the Board for theEducation of Values (BEV) whose objective was to be an umbrella framework forthe agencies responsible for the cultivation of Jewish studies, as well as the Division

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for Democracy and Coexistence. Once again, the dilemma inherent to thenon-liberaldemocracy reared its notorious head. A single directorate of the Ministry ofEducation became responsible for both reinforcing national-Jewish identity and theassimilation of liberal values. The practical implication of this was that these two con-flicting initiatives now operated under the same organizational framework.

After Minister Hammer’s decease and the appointment of Itzhak Levi, a memberof the same party, as Minister of Education, ministerial priorities were once againrewritten. Minister Levi decided to pare down the management and budget of theBEV, established by his predecessor. Levi understood the difficulty of running twosegregated systems of instruction on similar subject matter, where only one systemwas anchored in the official course curricula. According to him, the decision to cutback on the Board’s activities was a result of two major circumstances. First, the sig-nificant financial expense of two coexisting systems, and second, the failure of theBEV to reach its projected goals. As the Minister saw it, there was no way to forceteachers and pupils disinterested in the Board’s activities at their school to make theeffort to teach or learn subject matter that was not an integral part of the formal schoolcurriculum (Ha’aretz 23 April 1998; interview with former Minister Levi). In theend, a short while after left-wing Meretz

6party member, Yossi Sarid, became

Minister of Education, a final decision was made to dismantle both the BEV and theDDC. Testimony provided by the civic education supervisor reinforces the assump-tion that their extraneous status to the education system minimized their effectiveness(from an interview with Ms Hannah Shafir 20 August 2000).

In this case, despite the official intentions of the Ministry of Education to favourthe liberal± universal aspect over the non-liberal ethnic aspect, policy makers withthe final say ensured that civic studies remained in their formal procedural form. Theattempt to elevate the standing of democratic studies appeared feasible in the forma-tion of the DDC but, in effect, failed from the moment of inception. This was aconsequence of its peripheral status, and later a result of policy makers’ objections tothe teaching of democratic values in isolation of national values.

Policy making

This level of analysis even more markedly reflects the symbiotic and inseparable con-nection between the teaching of nationalist and democratic values in Israel. In March1995, about one and a half years after the signing of the Oslo Agreements and oneyear prior to Prime Minister Rabin’s assassination, Professor Amnon Rubinstein,the Minister of Education at that time and a Meretz member, appointed a committee(Kremnizer Committee) to advance the democratic reform of formal civic education.Its aim was the development of a comprehensive initiative for the inculcation of citi-zenship in pupils as a moral and behavioural foundation shared by all citizens of theState’ (Kremnizer et al. 1996: 5). The panel primarily consisted of academics andother representatives of Israeli society. It tried to learn the nature and roots of theproblems in the civic curricula and to address the need to change the instruction ofthose political processes responsible for instilling anti-liberal attitudes among pupils:

While the widespread public belief is that democracy is the government of the majority, the more liberalconception of democracy has not been sufficiently internalised, i.e., a political system placing at its centrethe individual who has the power to shape and develop his or her personality as a human being in a societywhose ultimate purpose is the defence of individual rights, and to guarantee the protection of the rights of

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various groups in society. A marked weakness is apparent in the lack of an internalisation of universalistvalues detected, for example, in attitudes toward Arabs and ultra-Orthodox, freedom of speech and the free-dom of press. . . . There is an aspiration toward a homogenous and harmonious society, while, in actuality,it is necessary to cultivate an awareness of the diversity and pluralism of this society, the legitimacy of partak-ing in debate, the positive aspects of debate and the guidelines for settling conflicts based on a tolerantapproach and using peaceful and democratic ways. (Kremnitzer 1996: 7)

In summation, the panel presented proposals for the extensive reform of civic educa-tion while granting a clear priority to liberal perceptions, and above all, individualrights over rights of the Jewish collective.

On the face of it, it seemed that this committee and its clear-cut policies indicateda consensus among Israeli policy makers on the genuine necessity to liberalize civiceducation curricula. However, in reality, all was not as it seemed.

Four years earlier, on October 1991, the Minister of Education at that time,Zevulun Hammer (National Religious Party), had nominated a committee with analmost identical composition. Its goal was to review the status of Jewish studies instate-run education. Even though the committee’s findings indicated a relatively plur-alistic tendency, the gist of the findings was clear ± proposals for expanding Jewishstudies and courses in the history of the Israeli people at all levels of instruction (fromprimary to secondary school). Furthermore, the committee (Shinhar Committee)secured the status of four Jewish subjects on the matriculation exams and also intro-duced new subjects (Shinhar 1994).

Once again, Ministry of Education officials were faced with the double messagedeeply rooted in Israeli political structure; on one hand, the need to bolster the state’sdemocratic foundations by introducing liberal values and, on the other, to maintainthe unity of the dominant Jewish ethnic group over its national-religious symbols.The BEV was assigned the role of applying the recommendations of both reports, afact that only exacerbated the state of paradox characteristic of this administration.After the administration was dismantled, the role of implementing proposals wastransferred to two supervisors in the Ministry of Education. Today, these twoshare a single desk in the Ministry of Education in Jerusalem, which seems to beanother symbolic illustration of the inability to distinguish between liberal andnational objectives.

Policy implementation

So far, paradoxes accompanying the efforts to promote democracy studies in Israel atthe institutional level and efforts to formulate policy have been presented. A realitycheck proves that this same paradoxical picture has repeated itself also in the attemptto bring about structural change in the formal school civic studies curriculum.

Beginning in the mid-90s and persisting with theKremnizer Report and the fail-ure of the DDC, there is evidence of revisions and modifications of the compulsorycivic study programme. The Ministry of Education team responsible for this pro-gramme worked vigorously in order to present a study curricula that would relateto the essence of social and political life in the state of Israel and would also demotethe procedural formal aspect from its dominant position. This approach reflected achallenge to the Ministry of Education’s official policy over the years, where contro-versial topics were to be kept out of school classes (Ha’aretz 29 August 2000). A pre-liminary review of, `Being Citizens in Israel’, the basis of the new curriculum andthe book certified as the core textbook for the instruction of civics beginning in

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2000, indeed demonstrates an in-depth involvement in the substantial issues of theState of Israel. These include the status of the Arab population, cleavages in Israelisociety, the status of civil law vis-a -vis religious law, the rule of law in a democraticcountry, and civil rights (Eden et al. 2000). This turnaround of ideas and, in particular,theMinistry of Education’s apparent renunciation of its commitment to national nar-ratives in favour of those liberal principles conforming with Levinson’s tenets(1999), supposedly reflect the transition toward liberalism Israeli society is under-going, as claimed by Shafir and Peled (1996: 409± 410).

However, a second, more informed scrutiny of the implementation of the curri-cula reform reveals otherwise. Civic studies, it appears, has not been able to liberateitself from its inherent failings ever since the state’s establishment and, therefore,recent declarations on the liberalization of values in Israel have turned out to be pre-mature. A methodical survey of the core issues and the degreeof significance accordedto democratic liberal values proves that the fortitude of Jewish ethno-national ten-dencies’, to use Ram’s terms (1999), are not to be made light of. Examples are foundin the chapter presenting pupils with the principles of the social contract’. In contrastto expectations from a chapter thus titled, much of it is devoted to the pact drawnbetween Israel and G-d. Moreover, this text makes it quite clear that in the time ofthe prophets Ezra and Nehemiah, the Jewish nation embraced the authority of theOral Law as the standing constitution of the state and People of Israel (Ha’aretz 30August 2000). Hence, the declared intentions of those who drafted the new programindicated that the Israeli pupil would be less exposed to ethnic, religious and nationalvalues in civic studies. He or she would encounter them in other classes ± in the frame-work of civic studies, but the role of the State in shaping the Jewish citizen who isabove all loyal to his People and the Torah,

7would not be completely abandoned.

However, there is more: apart from the obstacles created by the aforementionedvalues, reform also faced administrative obstacles. The new curriculum was supposedto include twice the number of civics class hours in order to provide enough timefor teaching all the principles from the original programme (correspondence 13March 2000). But, in fact, the number of class hours remained the same, that is, 90class hours in the last school year. The reduced number of hours required a screeningout of many anticipated subjects and most of the subject matter that was omittedjust happened to touch upon the essential concerns of the state: the cleavages ofIsraeli society including the status of the Arab minority, freedom of speech in a demo-cratic society and the elections in Israel. On the other hand, the formal aspect, that is,the chapter depicting the political system and governmental institutions, still enjoyeda central role in the new curricula (from a letter 21 May 2000, Ha’aretz 29 August2000). According to the supervisor of civic education, even after the removal ofsome course matter, the number of issues was still markedly greater than the timeallotted for teaching them. This posed a problem because civics teachers who, overthe years, became accustomed to instructing the formal aspect of the Israeli politicalsystem, preferred to stick to the course material they were familiar with. In fact, inmany cases, they felt comfortable enough to overlook the newer, thornier issuessuch as the debate regarding the extent to which the state of Israel conforms to thedefinition of a democratic polity (interview with Hannah Shafir 20 August 2000).

Still, there are further problems. A new curriculum currently under discussion bythe Ministry of Education proposes that some subjects, including civic studies, shouldno longer be included in the school curricula as required subjects for the matriculationexam. According to the Ministry of Education executive responsible for the peda-

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gogy of civics, this action would lead to a situation where school principals will preferto devote school hours to compulsory matriculation subjects, with an almost com-plete exclusion of those subjects, such as civics, which no longer require a final exam(from an interview with Hannah Shafir 20 August 2000). These new plans are in out-right contradiction to the recommendations of the Kremnizer Committee, whichasserted that citizenship studies should be enhanced and taught as early as primaryschool, throughout post-primary and secondary and eventually culminate in a matri-culation exam worth 3± 5 study credits. A concern that weakens even more the effec-tiveness of a critical, universalist study is the Ministry of Education’s decision not toinclude a single social science subject (sociology, political sciences) in the list of com-pulsory matriculation exams.

Discussion and conclusions

Prior to the Oslo process, there were many claims that with the end of the Israeli ±Palestinian conflict, the cleavage between doves and ± an incitement to many violentincidents in Israel during the last few decades ± would also languish. However,recently, an interesting development has unfolded. On one hand, the rift betweenhawks and doves has gradually lost its dominant status, despite the fact that the con-flict with the Palestinians has yet to reach its conclusion. On the other hand, the poli-tical radicalism marking Israeli society has not abated either. In recent years, politicalaggressiveness in Israel has assumed a new face. The deepening social cleavagesbetween secular and religious, older generations and new immigrants, Ashkenaziand Mizrahi, and especially between Jews and Arabs, are finding new and menacingpolitical expressions in the guise of xenophobic and racist expressions. Ultimately,they constitute a serious challenge from significant parts of the population to statedemocratic institutions, and the judicial system.

Regarding Jewish ethno-national distinctions, the Israeli education system can becredited with a fair number of successes. Foremost is the coalescenceof the Israeli pub-lic around national symbols and values (even at times of deep dispute among theJewish population) and, principally, a sweeping consensus crossing the lines of almostall Jewish sectors in Israel on the necessity of preserving the Jewish ethnic characterof the state and the reinforcement of its Jewish essence. However, when speaking ofthe pedagogy of democratic values and principles, the Israeli education system hasutterly failed, and not without reason. The policy makers of education in Israel sensedthe contradiction between ethnic and democratic elements, yet clearly favoured theethnic aspect. However, in order not to completely exclude the instruction of civicsfrom school curricula, they made use of various stratagems to dilute the subject (inter-view with Yitzhak Levi 13 August 2000). This dilution entailed a qualitative aspect± the reduction of the course only to the instruction of formal elements of govern-ment; and a quantitative aspect to limit classes to the minimum possible of one hourper week. Moreover, despite thedramatic events of the last decade and the resolutionsmade by policy makers to grant more substance to the instruction of democratic prin-ciples, nothing positive really happened. For every step taken in order to promotethe democratic fundamentals proffered by the education system, another, almost im-mediately subsequent step followed, offsetting it, either leading to the reinforcementof national-Jewish education, or, alternatively, to various administrative restrictions

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preventing the institutionalization of democratic values in the education system. Thesource of all these, as contested, can be found in the nature of the governing polity.

The non-liberal (Ben Eliezer 1993, 1999) and ethnic (Smooha 1999) character ofIsrael, its roots extending as far back as the declaration of its establishment as a Jewishand democratic state, engendered the inherent failing’ which accompanied everyattempt to promote democratic studies in this country. The insemination of national,ethnic and religious values remained an integral part of the education policy of allthe ruling governments of Israel. The state of Israel paid a dear price for this inherentfailing’ because the inculcation of civic qualities of a strong nationalist nature in theabsence of a moderating humanist liberal perspective did not contribute to the inter-nalization of democratic principles among future Israeli citizens. In fact, a differentpicture emerges. The state’s goal was to unite its citizens around national ideals.However, the persistent exposure of Israeli youth to nationalist messages by variousagents of socialization led to a tailspin effect leading from the commitment to thenational ethos to support for ultra-national and often racist attitudes.

In spite of the view arguing that Israel has recently undergone significant pro-cesses of liberalization, it appears that Israel’s true potential in liberating itself from itsinherent failing’ is listed in the pivotal decisions it must take regarding the nature ofits method of government, steps which must culminate in the adoption of the liberaldemocratic model. However, recent developments in Israeli society indicate other-wise. The stages of fragmentation Israeli society has gone through, and the unceasingsearch for secondary identities among various sectors (Kimmerling 1999), have leftonly a relatively small group of people to take up the task of advancing the liberaliza-tion process of Israeli society. This group faces the greater part of the Jewish publicwho, despite the many cleavages which divide it and the persistent efforts of each sec-tor to forward their particular interests, is still united around the belief that theJewish-national hegemony of this state and its institutions and the subordination ofliberal values to this hegemony must be sustained. This view implies that prospectsof an extensive reform of civic education in state-run schools are slim. Furthermore,in the last few years, there has been an increase in the number of licenses grantedtoward the establishment of independent schools and education networks, mainlyborn out of the pecuniary interests of the Ministry of Education (interview with MPZevulun Orlev, Chairman of the Knesset Education Committee 13 August 2000).The curricula of these school networks, often based on religious or other sectarianfoundations, enjoy minimal supervision by the Ministry of Education, indicatingthat even if substantial reform of the school curriculum was in fact instituted, it is rea-sonable to assume that many students would never come into contact with it. Fromall the above, it would seem that the vision of a more democratic and less violentIsraeli society is, at least for the present and with the advent of the third millennium,an unattainable goal.

Notes

1. Not surprisingly, a similar process can be detected in the construction of narratives, myths and national ideals inthe textbooks devised by the Palestinian Authority in consequence to the Oslo Agreements (Israeli 2000).

2. Statehood’ was an ethos whose intent was to grant legitimacy to the consolidation of the state’ s sovereignty after1948. The Statehood’ perspective reflected the transition from sectoral to general interests, from non-voluntar-ism to total commitment, from foreign rule to political sovereignty (Peled 1992).

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3. This study was called `Democracy in the Eyes of the Public’ and was sponsored by the Israeli DemocracyInstitute. Complete details of the research can be found on:<http//www.idi.org.il>.

4. Bar-Gal’ s (1993) research clearly shows the fashion in which geographic studies were subordinated to nationalinterests. Geography lessons at Israeli schools were largely employed as a tool whose intention was to shapeamong the pupils an orientation according to which the geographical space in Israel belongs to the JewishNation.

5. The National Religious Party (NRP) is a Zionist and Orthodox religious party. Active mainly in settlements inthe territories.

6. Meretz is a left-wing party formed by an alliance of three parties: Mapam, the Citizens’ Rights Movement, andShinui.

7. The word Torah in Hebrew can be interpreted both religiously, i.e. the Law of Moses, and literally, i.e. theory,doctrine, principles.

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