The Negotiator’s Desk Reference Volume 2 · pushes back, and the harder you push, the more it rallies against you. This is why most attempts at intervention fail in these con-flicts

The Negotiator’s Desk Reference

Volume 2

Published by DRI Press, an imprint of the Dispute Resolution Institute at Mitchell Hamline School of Law

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Understanding Intractable Conflicts

Peter T. Coleman, Nicholas Redding & Joshua Fisher*

Editors’ Note: In the second chapter of our complex-case trilogy, theauthors summarize recent findings from complexity science and dy-namical systems theory, showing how the new insights provide thepossibility of innovative levers for change. Their key findings are pre-sented as a set of five guidelines. This follows the more general explana-tion in Coleman and Ricigliano on Getting in Sync and is also closelyrelated to the next chapter, Influencing Intractable Conflicts, which alsopresents a set of five guidelines: this time, for actually working on aconflict which, on the surface, appears impossible to influence.

Scholars report that between five and eight percent of contentious rela-tionships between nations become intractable: they intensify, becomelocked-in, and persist for an average of thirty-six years (Diehl and Goertz2001). Similar patterns of entrenched conflict are found in families,organizations and communities. These destructive dynamics wreak

Peter T. Coleman is Professor of Psychology and Education at Columbia University, wherehe holds a joint appointment at Teachers College and The Earth Institute. Dr. Colemandirects the Morton Deutsch International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution(MD-ICCCR) and the Institute on Psychological Science and Practice (IPSP) at TeachersCollege, and is Executive Director of Columbia University’s Advanced Consortium onCooperation, Conflict, and Complexity (AC4). He currently conducts research onoptimality, adaptivity, and complexity dynamics in conflict contexts. Nicholas Redding is a research psychologist with the Ulupono Initiative of The OmidyarGroup, a social impact investment firm focused on encouraging sustainable energy, foodand waste practices in Hawai’i. Prior to joining Ulupono, he was a research programcoordinator with the Advanced Consortium on Cooperation, Conflict, and Complexity (AC4)at the Earth Institute, Columbia University. He holds a Ph.D. in Social-OrganizationalPsychology from Columbia University. Josh Fisher is the Director of the AC4 consortium at Columbia University. He is also anAdjunct Faculty member in the School of Professional Studies, and an Associate ResearchScientist at the Earth Institute, studying conflict management, natural resources, andextractive industry. His current work focuses on natural resource management as a toolfor conflict prevention. He works with government, civil society, internationalorganizations, and nonprofit partners to design strategies to constructively manageenvironmental conflicts. Dr. Fisher received his PhD in Conflict Analysis and Resolutionfrom George Mason University.

UNDERSTANDING INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS490

havoc and bring considerable suffering, cost and instability to the fami-lies, communities, nations and regions involved. For negotiators andconflict resolution practitioners working with parties to resolve thesetypes of conflicts, traditional negotiation tactics are at best insufficient,and at worst can serve to perpetuate or exacerbate existing tensions. Thischapter and the next one illustrate how recent findings from complexityscience and dynamical systems theory can be applied to these seeminglyintractable conflicts, offering new insights into innovative levers forchange. The key findings are summarized as a set of guidelines, five ineach chapter.

Conflict is about change. It revolves around disputants’ needs ordesires to address tension from incompatible activities (contrastinginterests, beliefs, values or desires) by changing situations, relationships,the balance of power, the other disputants’ actions, values, beliefs orbargaining position, or a third party’s wish to change a conflict fromlow-intensity to high (as with some activists), or from high-intensity tolow (as with negotiators and mediators). Conflicts often emerge fromchanging circumstances and relationships and, in turn, change thosecircumstances and relationships. Therefore, how we think about andapproach change—or in the case of intractable conflicts, how we under-stand social systems that appear to doggedly resist change—is para-mount.

There are many theories of change, and disputants as well as conflictresolution practitioners all operate within one or more of these theories,whether implicit or explicit, simple or complex, formal or informal(Coleman 2004). Four hundred years of mostly atomistic, linear, causeand effect approaches to science have left our understanding of conflictand change dynamics largely decontextualized, short term and piecemeal(Coleman 2011). Although many research findings from this paradigmhave proven fruitful, and the practices informed by these findings areeffective in some contexts, they have infused our theorizing, research andpractice with a set of assumptions that severely limit theirgeneralizability and practical utility in our increasingly complex, dy-namic world. These include:

# Relating fluid things (conflict dynamics) to fixed things (staticattitudes or beliefs).

# Thinking about change only in linear, cause-and-effect terms.# Privileging effects on short-term outcomes over long-term pat-

terns in research and practice.# Framing complex conflicts in narrow, disciplinary or sectoral

ways.# Focusing primarily on problems and pathologies (violence and

war) in lieu of solutions and healthy states (cooperation andpeace).

# Marginalizing the role of emotions in our science and practice.# Over-simplifying or over-complicating our models and methods.

THE NEGOTIATOR’S DESK REFERENCE 491

# Missing the invisible or currently unobservable dynamics at playin conflict systems.

# Failing to foresee the unintended consequences of our actions(Coleman 2011; Vallacher et al. 2013).

Although intractable conflicts are often multiply-determined (Coleman2003), we suggest that it is some combination of 1) their highly complexand dynamic natures, 2) our misbegotten assumptions of how theyemerge, evolve and change, and 3) the unintended consequences of ouroften well-intentioned attempts at changing them, that creates a perfectstorm of intractability. Consequently, many conflicts becomeself-perpetuating and wear on despite multiple good faith attempts attheir resolution (Kriesberg 2005: 65-98).

However, complexity science, and in particular dynamical systemstheory (DST), a school of thought coming out of applied mathematics,offers new, highly original and practical insights about how systems of alltypes—from cellular to social to planetary—change and resist change (seeColeman 2011; Vallacher et al. 2010; Vallacher et al. 2013). In this chap-ter, we outline a new theory of practice for addressing long-term con-flicts that is emerging from this paradigm.1

Guidelines for Understanding Intractable Conflict: A

“Dynamical Systems” Theory of PracticeDynamical systems theory (DST) is a relatively new and increasinglyinfluential paradigm in many areas of science, which offers an innovativeset of metaphors, models and methods for conceptualizing and address-ing conflict. A dynamical system is defined as a set of interconnectedelements (such as beliefs, feelings, and behaviors) that change and evolvein time, where a change in each element depends on influences fromother elements. Due to these interacting influences, the system as awhole evolves in time and new elements and dynamics emerge that inturn affect the system’s evolution. Thus, changes in any element of anegotiation process (such as levels of trust) depend on influences ofvarious other elements (each disputant’s motives, attitudes, actions,etc.), which evolve over time to affect the general pattern of interactions(positive or negative) in the dispute. Likewise, through the negotiationprocess new dynamics emerge in the relationships between conflictparties that can themselves become grounds for dialogue and new pointsfor negotiation. The implication of this for negotiators and mediators isthat they must simultaneously hold space for the original inputs to thenegotiation (interests, positions, needs and dynamics), identify emergentissues that occur in-process, and identify appropriate ways to incorpo-rate those into negotiations. The principles defining the evolution ofdynamical systems have wide applicability and have been employed toconceptualize and investigate a highly diverse set of conflict-related


phenomena (emotion, stereotyping, attitude change, cooperation versuscompetition in social dilemmas, etc.).

Every theory of practice is based on a particular worldview: a set ofimages, values and assumptions that are often more implicit than madeexplicit (Coleman 2004). While there are some basic tenets that under-pin most theories of practice, for example “Do No Harm” (Anderson1999), the DST theory of practice has a few basic tenets that set it apartas a unique approach to practice in complex and intractable situations(for elaboration, see Coleman 2011, 2014; Vallacher et al. 2010; Vallacheret al. 2013). The foundational assumptions of this new approach are:

# Complexity matters: intractable conflicts operatewithin a complex network of forces. This means that thereare typically multiple, interrelated causes, actors, perspectivesand narratives at play in the conflict system—although some willprove more central to intractability than others. It also meansthat there are likely multiple entry points, solutions and path-ways to peace (Burns 2007).

# Time matters: both linear and non-linear change dy-namics operate in conflict systems. Focusing on only lin-ear effects (shorter-term cause and effect relations prominent inWestern science and logic) often brings unintended conse-quences and eclipses our understanding of how these lineareffects play out over time in complex, nonlinear systems (Dörner1996). The key is to understand both linear effects and nonlineardynamics in relation to one another and in terms of differenttemporal scales.

# Inclusion matters: given the multiply-determined na-ture of these conflict systems, more inclusive practicesinvolving a broad and diverse set of stakeholders arelikely to be more effective. More inclusive approaches canprovide a more comprehensive view of a system, offer higherprobabilities of identifying critical drivers and novel insights,and, if conducted in a manner perceived as legitimate, result inmore buy-in and sustainability from a broader set of constitu-ents. However, more inclusive practices can also be more costlyand messy, and less efficient, particularly when attempts aremade to involve more militant, marginalized groups. There is athus critical tension in change processes between inclusivenessand efficiency (Coleman and Voronov 2003).

# Emotion matters: despite their relative neglect in con-flict research, emotions often play a vital role in sus-taining and transforming intractable conflicts. The pres-ence or absence of strong reservoirs for positivity and negativityin relational systems in conflict has proven to be among thecentral parameters for determining enduring conflict and sus-tainable peace. (Gottman et al. 2014)


# The system rules: intractable conflict systems havetheir own exceptionally strong internal propensities.When you push on a system mired in intractable conflict, itpushes back, and the harder you push, the more it rallies againstyou. This is why most attempts at intervention fail in these con-flicts. Therefore, instead of interjecting new ideas, goals andmethods as a means of changing a conflict system, it is best tobecome intimately familiar with the existing propensities of thesystem, and then to work with the dynamics of the system toaffect constructive and destructive probabilities (Jullien 2004;Gal 2013).

The general objectives of the DST approach differ fundamentally fromthe objectives of more standard models of conflict resolution; they do notaim to identify and satisfy disputants’ underlying grievances, interestsand needs in order to resolve the presenting conflict. Rather, the DSTapproach starts with comprehending the dynamics of the system that aremaintaining the status quo of the conflict and then exploits these in-sights by working with the flow of these dynamics to shift the probabili-ties of destructive conflict and foster sustainable peace processes. Specif-ically, the objectives are to work with stakeholders to regain a sense ofaccuracy, agency and possibility in what seems like an otherwise impos-sible conflict, and then to co-create more sustainable solutions by open-ing up the system to new information before facilitating a reconfigura-tion of the patterns of relations—over time—from destructive to con-structive. This is accomplished by employing a set of practices aimed atconstructively managing the current state of the conflict, while simulta-neously working to increase the future probabilities for constructiverelations between the parties and decreasing the probabilities for de-structive future encounters (see Nowak et al. 2010, for access to an on-line tool for working with these dynamics).

Below is a schematic and set of guidelines for a DST theory of prac-tice. Note that describing these guidelines in a linear, sequential manneronly reinforces more traditional linear thinking. Therefore, we organizetheir presentation around a basic set of change practices on systemicpreparation, comprehension, engagement, and learning and adapta-tion for working with complex, nonlinear systems (See Figure 1). Ratherthan adopting these guidelines as a step-by-step approach, readers areinstead encouraged to view the guidelines holistically, employing andmoving between processes as appropriate during the change process.The first two sets of practices (preparation and comprehension) arecovered in the current chapter, while the second two (engagement, andlearning and adaptation) will be covered in the following chapter.


Figure 1: A Dynamical Systems Theory of Practice

We have labeled the first set of guidelines in our model as systemic prep-aration. Working effectively to change complex, dynamic conflict sys-tems is demanding and unfamiliar to most, and requires a set of compe-tencies, skills and approaches to assessment rarely offered in trainingson conflict management. This is not only true for conflict practitioners,but also for leaders, managers, representatives, disputants, third partiesand other stakeholders involved in these settings. As such, it is criticalfor those consulting to parties in these systems, as well as the partiesinvolved, to gain a working familiarity with basic systems concepts.Ideally, practitioners will take this a step further, internalizing thesecompetencies and skills sufficiently to be able to encourage deeper un-derstanding within the parties they are working with. The followingguidelines outline two categories of competencies integral for systemicpreparation.

Guideline #1: Enhance Individual Competencies for

Systemic WisdomBecause complex conflicts are themselves systems of interrelated factorsand dynamics, some of which are obscured by traditional means of un-derstanding conflict, enabling stakeholders to navigate these forces andengage each other more constructively requires that they understand thesystem as a system. Gregory Bateson (1972: 440) emphasized this whenhe said, “Lack of systemic wisdom is always punished… Systems arenonetheless punishing of any species unwise enough to quarrel with itsecology. Call the systemic forces God if you will.” For Bateson, the firststep in creating social wellbeing is enhancing systemic wisdom: under-standing that we are dependent upon, and participants in, a larger livingsystem.

Previously, we identified a set of basic building blocks that could beconsidered core competencies for systemic wisdom (Coleman 2011).They include:


# Understanding that nonlinear networks of causation are distinctfrom linear, cause and effect models. Systems are composed ofmultiple elements interacting and evolving over time, requiringone to identify the multitude of factors that conspire to driveundesirable outcomes, rather than looking for one or two directcausal factors.

# Enhancing complex thinking, feeling, acting, and social identifi-cation with decision makers and other key stakeholders.

# Understanding how latent (implicit) processes operate and howthey manifest, and the trade-offs of working with both implicitand explicit processes.

# Effectively balancing the tensions between short-term andlong-term thinking and action.

# Exercising multilevel thinking: enhancing awareness and actingat different levels (psychological, social, structural, institutional,cultural) simultaneously.

Prior research has suggested that higher levels of five relevant individualcompetencies are associated with more constructive conflict tendencies:cognitive, behavioral, and emotional complexity, tolerance for ambiguity,and broader temporal scope (i.e. consideration for future consequences.)2

In a recent study (Redding and Coleman working paper), we investigatedthe relationships between these competencies and participants’ capaci-ties for effectively navigating a complex intractable conflict scenario.After assessing the five competencies through standardized survey mea-sures, participants played a complex computer simulation game, whichrequired them to act as the Prime Minister of Israel working to navigatethe complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to bring about a sus-tainable long-term resolution.

Preliminary results of the study suggest that these competencies areassociated with gaining a more complex understanding of the system,engaging more constructively with the other party, and taking actionsmore conducive to sustainable outcomes. Participants with higher levelsof cognitive complexity took action more quickly at the onset of the con-flict in order to begin to better understand how the system operates.They were also, at the conclusion of the simulation, better able to differ-entiate the multiple perspectives relevant to the conflict and to integratethose perspectives within a larger context. Additionally, those higher inthis trait, along with higher levels of tolerance for ambiguity and consid-eration for future consequences, were more likely to simultaneouslyemploy multiple approaches to improving the situation—a strategy asso-ciated with more efficacy in complex systems (see Dörner 1996)—ratherthan sticking to one approach. This was demonstrated, for example, byactively engaging with the conflict through political channels, whilesimultaneously reallocating security forces as needed and advancinginfrastructure and economic development projects.


Those higher in emotional complexity tended to identify more of thebroader range of actors involved in the conflict, and relied less on drasticmeasures that would result in long-term negative impacts on their rela-tionships with others in system. In other words, those who were moreemotionally complex were less likely to retaliate with violent force to asecurity violation such as suicide bombing or threats from an extremistgroup. Lastly, those higher in cognitive complexity, emotional complex-ity and tolerance for ambiguity employed more constructive actionsthroughout the simulation as compared to those lower in these compe-tencies. Overall, these individuals focused their actions more on enhanc-ing communication, building trust, coordinating effort and responding tothe other party’s (i.e. Palestinian) needs.

Research in this area is still nascent but the above findings suggestthat there are specific competencies that can be developed for increasingsystemic wisdom. In addition to advancing research in this area, ourgroup has developed a three-stage model for coaching those working toameliorate intractable conflicts (Redding and Coleman working paper),which expands beyond traditional approaches to conflict coaching (seeJones and Brinkert 2007). Essentially, our model proposes that individu-als can increase systemic wisdom by avoiding tendencies to over-simplifythe narratives they impose on the complex systems they are workingwith. Instead, it is essential to work consciously toward developing men-tal models that are sufficiently complex for identifying underlying pat-terns and dynamics that can be harnessed for positive change. This isaccomplished through building systems thinking ability as a competency,and adopting practices that emphasize the identification of all the rele-vant elements in the system—and the relations between the elementsthat give rise to the overall dynamics that are observed—before movingto implement change in the system. While engaged in this process, indi-viduals should be aware of tendencies to collapse the complexity of theirown emotional experiences when engaged in conflict: experiencing abroad range of emotions can be a valuable source of information whenfaced with a broad array of decisions. Additionally, it is essential forchange makers to build self-awareness around their general level ofcomfort with ambiguity, as well as their preferences for privileging short-term over long-term thinking. These are difficult tendencies to change.But increased self-awareness can, over time, lead to more adaptive deci-sion making that is essential for fostering long-term sustainable change.

The evidence suggests that higher levels of systemic wisdom enablestakeholders at various levels of power to navigate a conflict system moreeffectively. Not only this, but stakeholders are thus better equipped toengage the system to encourage more constructive means of action andinteraction. Therefore, building or enhancing systemic wisdom amongstakeholders is a critical step in enabling them to move from intractableconflict toward constructive engagement. At the individual level, this canbe fostered by challenging individual tendencies to oversimplify their


understanding of complex situations — including the emotional experi-ence as a participant in the system— instead working within the ambigu-ity inherent to such challenges. Individual stakeholders can also be en-couraged to identify the multiple alternative roles they can occupy aschange agents in the system, and to avoid tendencies to reduce ambigu-ity by engaging in short-term thinking and action.

Another approach to building systemic wisdom among stakeholdersin a system is to bring them together. When engaging with multiplestakeholders, groups are typically challenged to consider the broaderrange of factors and perspectives that are relevant to the conflict. Em-ploying activities such as conflict mapping (see Guideline #3) challengesparticipants to see the system as a whole rather than through the lens oftheir individual experience. When these stakeholders begin to see theirrole in a larger system of influences, their perspectives on the system andunderstandings of ways to improve the system begin to change.

Guideline #2: Increase Competencies for Conflict

Intelligence: Adaptivity, Optimality and Systemic

AgencyThe capacity to effectively navigate and leverage destructive and con-structive conflict dynamics in complex systems also requires enhancingour conflict intelligence (Coleman and Ferguson 2014), which entailsdeveloping a set of three dynamic, behavioral competencies for conflictadaptivity, optimality and systemic agency.

Exercising AdaptivityConflict adaptivity is the capacity to employ different strategies in differ-ent conflicts, or as the same conflict situation evolves and changes overtime, in a manner that achieves goals effectively and is fitting with thedemands of the situation (Coleman et al. 2010). It involves a capacity toread situations accurately and then employ distinct strategies (such asBenevolence, Cooperation, Support, Dominance, Competition, Appease-ment or Autonomy; see Coleman and Ferguson 2014) where they fit, andin a manner and to a degree that allows for satisfactory progress inachieving one’s goals. More adaptive approaches to conflict resolutionhave been found to be associated with higher levels of efficacy and satis-faction with mediation processes (Beardsley 2010; Beardsley et al. 2006;Jacobs and Aakhus 2002; Kolb 1994; Picard 2004; Riskin 1997) andhigher levels of satisfaction with conflict generally. In organizations,conflict adaptivity has been associated with increased work satisfaction,better relationships with co-workers, greater emotional well-being, re-duced job stress and fewer intentions to quit (Coleman and Kugler 2014;Coleman, Mitchinson and Kugler 2009). Lastly, at the internationallevel, case-based research on interstate negotiations found parties were


more effective in negotiations to the extent that they were able to adjusttheir strategies to fit the relative (and relevant) power of the other side(Zartman and Rubin 2002).

Seeking OptimalityOptimality is the capacity to combine different approaches to conflictmanagement (such as integrative and distributive tactics withmixed-motive conflicts) optimally to achieve the best possible outcomes(Coleman, Kugler, Kim and Vallacher working paper). Research suggeststhat effective individuals rarely rely on a single conflict handling style,instead employing more blended or “conglomerated” approaches thatutilize the beneficial components of a variety of tactics (Van de Vliert,Euwema and Huismans 1995). For instance, effective attorneys use apattern of behaviors in negotiations that do not neatly fit any one of theconflict-style categories (Schneider 2012; Williams 1983; 1993). Simi-larly, recent research in our lab on optimal ratios between more individ-ualistic (self-focused) and more collectivistic (other-focused) behaviorsalso found more balanced strategies associated with more integrativestyles of conflict management, leading to higher levels of satisfactionwith conflict outcomes, processes, relationships, goal attainment and jobsatisfaction (Kim and Coleman working paper).

Fostering Systemic AgencyFinally, systemic agency is the capacity to visualize and mobilize net-works of collective influence to alter the nature of the context in which aconflict is situated. This is a collective form of efficacy and leverage typi-cally employed when the status quo is unresponsive to more traditional,unilateral methods of constructive conflict resolution. Systemic agencyrequires systemic wisdom, along with the capacity to comprehend andmap the complex networks of causation in which the problem beingaddressed is situated. But it goes beyond this to include implementingstrategies for altering systems dynamics. This perspective is being in-creasingly adopted in the development sector, with both non-governmental and governmental organizations such as The Omidyar Group,Oxfam, USAID, and the World Bank working to employ systemic map-ping and other tools in order to better identify opportunities for changeand to mobilize networks of support.

Together, enhancing our own and others’ levels of systemic wisdomand conflict intelligence helps to establish a shared language and capac-ity for working effectively with complex conflict systems. A set of prelimi-nary-assessment questions may be helpful here, especially for determin-ing what skill development and other early-assistance efforts might beneeded before any more direct form of intervention can have a chance ofsuccess. These include asking whether the stakeholders and facilitatorsare…


# …sufficiently comfortable with complexity and ambiguity?# …able to avoid reducing the complexity of a situation to simple

cause and effect relationships between issues and outcomes? # …open to scanning the environment for existing latent processes

that could be enhanced to shift the fundamental dynamics of thesystem?

# …comfortable with thinking about how the system will change inthe short term and in the long term (i.e. over different timescales)?

# …skilled in adaptivity, effectively employing different strategiesin different types of conflicts in a manner fitting with the de-mands of the situations?

# …comfortable with combining different strategies in complex orevolving conflicts?

# …skilled at implementing strategies that seek to mobilize net-works of individuals that are not directly linked to the conflictbut critical to the overall functioning of the system, in order toshift the nature of the context in which a conflict is situated?

Our next set of guidelines focuses on approaches for gaining systemiccomprehension. In preparation for engaging actively with systems miredin intractable conflict, it is also critical to gain a current sense of theintrinsic propensities of the system in which you are working (Gal 2013;Jullien 2004). Systems’ scholar-practitioners offer a variety of methodsfor conducting such investigations and visualizing systems (see Burns2007; Eoyang and Holladay 2013; Gal 2013; Liebovitch et al. 2014;Ricigliano 2012). Some methods have been designed for more bot-tom-up, participatory approaches to community visualization (Burns2007), others for more top-down, expert approaches (Butland et al.2007; Ricigliano 2012). While the exact approach for visualizing thecomplex network of factors and dynamics involved in an intractableconflict will vary based on the context of an intervention, three guide-lines seem central to many of these approaches.

Guideline #3: Complicate to SimplifyBecause destructive conflicts demand attention to the here and now—tothe issues, violence, hostilities, suffering and grievances evident in theimmediate context—they often draw attention away from the history,trajectory, and broader context in which the conflict is evolving. Here, wedescribe two methods for visualizing the broader historical context.

Mapping First, many peace-practitioners employ the use of complexity feed-back-loop mapping to re-contextualize their own and the stakeholders’understandings of the constellation of forces affecting particular conflicts(see Burns 2007; Coleman 2011; Körppen, Ropers and Giessmann 2011;


Ricigliano 2012). Loop analysis (see Maruyama 1963, 1982) is particu-larly useful for mapping reinforcing and inhibiting feedback processesthat escalate, de-escalate and stabilize destructive conflicts. Reinforcingfeedback occurs when one element (such as a hostile act) stimulatesanother element (such as negative out-group beliefs) along its currenttrajectory. Here, more of A means more of B, or less of A means less of B.On the other hand, inhibiting feedback occurs when one element inhibitsor reverses the direction of another element (such as when guilty orcompassionate feelings mitigate hostilities). Here, more of A means lessof B.

Feedback-loop mapping not only allows us to capture the multiplesources and temporal dynamics of complex conflicts, but can also help toidentify central nodes and patterns that are unrecognizable by othermeans. The mapping process can take different forms, but typicallybegins by identifying the nodal focus of interest—the central phenome-non we wish to comprehend (violence, stalemate, peace, etc.; seeVandenbroeck, Goossens and Clemens 2007). Next, the core dynamicsare identified, which are those elements and feedback loops most closelyassociated with the increase or decrease of the nodal variable. After this,the maps can be built out further to help visualize the broader system ofelements and feedback dynamics that are affecting the core dynamicsupstream. Maps can be generated at the individual level, at the interper-sonal level and at the broader group, communal or wider systemic levels.


Figure 2: A Visualization of the Feedback Loops Contributing to an Attractor for

Violence in Medellin, Columbia

For example, consider the map above in Figure 2. This was generated byour colleague Aldo Civico through a series of interviews he conducted inMedellín, Colombia in 2012. This map captures the dynamics of thesystem of violence in Medellín over time. It helps to visualize the dynam-ics that are constantly attracting the system into violence (solid-lineloops). But it also shows some of the inhibiting factors that help us un-derstand why the violence doesn’t get worse (dashed-line loops; a ceiling


effect). It shows hubs that work as major destructive attractors (such asthe armed conflict, the Medellín cartel, endemic corruption, the war forhegemony among and within drug cartels, etc.) and the main inhibitors(like civic participation, social and artistic processes in the peripheralareas of the city, the peace and reconciliation program up to 2007, etc.).From this analysis, we can also see that some critical events havestrengthened the patterns of violence in Medellín and weakened theeffectiveness of inhibitors.

However, feedback loop mapping often results in extremely complexvisualizations of a conflict’s dynamics, so it is critical to be able offerstrategies for subsequently focusing and simplifying. For instance, EricBerlow (2010) recommends focusing in on more local elements andloops that are actionable; in other words, those that can feasibly beaddressed. Feasible actions, informed by the complexity of events, canaffect the probabilities of constructive change in a conflict system, butthey should only be targeted after a fuller mapping of the system hasprovided a sense of the context in which these elements are operating.Another strategy is to look at each of the elements in the system, andtake stock of how many other elements are influencing the element up-stream and how many elements are influenced by the element down-stream. Elements that receive fewer inputs may be easier to change,while those that influence many other elements in this system may havemore impact on the system (Coleman 2011; Ricigliano 2012).

Conflict maps can be generated alone as a pre-negotiation exercise,with the help of facilitators or mediators, or in small groups of stake-holders. With conflict-mapping the goal is not necessarily to get it right.The goal at this stage is to get it different; to try to reintroduce a sense ofnuance and complexity into the stakeholders’ understanding of the con-flict. As described above, when individuals engage in the process ofmapping—especially in a diverse group of stakeholders—they are chal-lenged to look beyond the factors that are most relevant to them and totheir understanding of the system. A broader picture begins to emerge aseach individual contributes to a process that leads to a shared under-standing of the system, which in turn, opens up new avenues for change(Burns 2007).

InventoriesA second method for visualizing the context of disputes is through struc-tured inventories. Recently, we developed an institutional-level inventoryfor conducting complex conflict assessments in organizations (Coleman,Redding, Ng, Straw & Burke, working paper). It offers a holistic concep-tual framework for assessing the reinforcing/inhibiting conditions forconstructive and destructive conflict dynamics (and therefore increas-ing/decreasing probabilities), and provides an inventory for leaders toconduct organization-level assessments and to explore relevant out-


comes in their organizations (e.g., conflict climate, innovation, morale,organization-commitment, and procedural justice).

To develop this framework, we surveyed the conflict literature forempirical research identifying factors associated with organizationalconflict. We then identified a set of existing metrics and measurementinstruments for each of these variables, which when combined providesa systemic inventory of drivers and mitigators of conflict processes. Theresult is an inventory and a large-scale survey assessment tool. The in-ventory provides a framework for collecting data through, for example,organization records, environmental analysis, interviews and directobservations. The survey instruments can be used to assess conflictclimate perceptions of organization members across levels. Such assess-ments are useful for identifying potential conflict “hot spots” as well asmore subtle or counter-intuitive contributors to destructive conflict. Thisinformation may also prove useful in identifying positive organizationaldynamics to build on, as well as latent attractors (see below) that couldbe activated to shift destructive organizational conflict processes in amore constructive direction.

If there is sufficient time, negotiators and key stakeholders can workto develop inventories such as the one we developed for organizationalconflict, to fit the context of the conflict scenario. This can serve as aninitial step in the comprehension process, allowing for a broader under-standing of the factors that are most relevant to understanding the sys-tem, a clearer sense of the nodal focus of interest, and identification ofthe stakeholders and actors that are critical to convene for further map-ping and planning activities.

Guideline #4: Uncover Latent (Invisible) Dynamics

and AttractorsAlthough our experiences in protracted conflicts tend to be overwhelm-ingly negative in relation to the other disputants, we benefit from learn-ing to pay attention to anomalies that occur; in other words, to the ac-tions and events that surprise us. Intractable conflicts are so difficult tochange because of attractors—emergent structures that stabilize sys-tems, making them highly resistant to change—that ensure that anytendencies towards resolution are fleeting at best. However, these cracksin the foundation of our understanding of the conflict and our sense ofthe other parties are often important sources of information: evidencethat there may be alternative patterns operating below our radar. Theselatent attractors may prove to be our best avenues for escaping or other-wise addressing the conflict—if we can identify them.

For example, a surprising finding from a study we conducted withPalestinians and Israelis in 2002 was the impact on participants of early,positive, serendipitous encounters with members of their out-groups(Coleman and Lowe 2007). Just as early traumatic losses were etched


powerfully into the minds of individuals, these positive spontaneousencounters described by participants tended to have an equally powerfuleffect, long mitigating against their sense of certainty and vilification ofthe outgroup. The spontaneous nature of these encounters seemed tocapture individuals when their psychological defenses were low, therebyallowing the experiences to impact them both emotionally andcognitively.

The potential of latent attractors suggests that any actions in a con-flict can have very different effects on three distinct aspects of a conflictlandscape: on the current situation (the level of hostility in the conflictright now), on the longer-term potential for positive interactions (latentpositive attractors), and on the longer-term potential for negative inter-actions (negative attractors). For instance, sending riot police into aneighborhood in Baltimore to quell unrest from community grievancesover perceived injustices may 1) temporarily reduce violence, 2) increasecommunity resentment and alienation, and therefore the probability offuture unrest, and 3) decrease the community’s trust and respect for theauthorities, also fostering future unrest.

Guideline #5: Identify Resonance When working with groups and communities, some peacebuilders speakof the value of identifying local areas of resonance when attempting tomobilize change (Burns 2007). We define resonance in social systems asa form of heightened, shared emotional, cognitive, physical or socialenergy that results in people feeling and finding connections withlike-minded others, and ultimately a sense of congruence and purpose(Coleman, Mazzaro, Redding and Rothman working paper). In otherwords, resonance is a form of shared energy that gives way in somegroups to a sense of unity and shared interests and, sometimes, jointaction. Directed group action results when this energy crosses somethreshold in a group (beyond their resistance to change). It can be con-structive or destructive (or both) depending on the valence and directionof the group’s shared interests (e.g., a mobilized community addressingjoblessness or sanitation problems in their community, versus an angrymob addressing grievances against members of an outgroup). Ulti-mately, resonance is the energy necessary to drive and sustain systemicchange.

Working with systemic resonance typically involves identifying,supporting and marshalling waves of motivation and energy in networksof people in service of communal change. There are a variety of ways ofidentifying resonance, beyond relying on one’s intuition. According toresearch rooted in transpersonal psychology, resonance can be fosteredby empathically attuned clinicians who are trained to better understandand intervene in the context of changing emotional landscapes, withsome advocating for trainings that strengthen somatic experiences of


empathy, including how to better communicate at the visual, auditory,interoceptive, proprioceptive, and kinesthetic levels (Lovkvist 2013). Insystemic action research, Danny Burns (2011) proposes a frameworkwhere facilitators engage through multiple streams and narratives in-formed by a basic understanding of energy patterns in a system. Burnsadvocates for an approach where action is seen as important as dialogue,and the act of doing collectively can lead to changes in the landscape andthe creation of new “entry points”.

Perhaps the most common form of assessment of group-level reso-nance is through survey administration. At the most basic level, groupmembers have been measured and compared on perceptions of cohesive-ness (Stinson and Hellebrandt 1972), coordination (Faraj and Sproull2000; Lewis 2003), and energy and pleasantness (Barsade 2002). Analy-sis involves both assessing whether group members identify similarexperiences while participating in the group, and the extent to which theexperiences are consistent across group members.

To summarize, enhancing systemic comprehension can be facilitatedby asking the following questions:

# What are the intrinsic propensities of the system in which youare working?

# Do the stakeholders and facilitator have a sufficient understand-ing of the constellation of current and historical forces affectingthe conflict?

# Have you been able to focus in on aspects of the system that maylend themselves to feasible actions?

# Are there obvious and less obvious (latent) attractor dynamics atplay in the broader system?

# Where is there currently resonant energy in the system? Can thisenergy be marshaled for constructive change?

Up to this point, our discussion has focused primarily on understandingintractable conflict. We have proposed that enhancing systemic wisdomand working to build conflict intelligence are critical activities for prepar-ing oneself and others to begin to work in these systems. Additionally, wehave described less conventional approaches for comprehending theseconflict systems through practices such as conducting feedback loopmapping, identifying latent attractors for positive change, and workingwith resonance at multiple levels. In the next chapter, we shift to a pri-mary focus on engaging with intractable conflicts, in terms of the initialsteps for encouraging positive change, and methods for learning andadapting from feedback throughout the change process.

Notes1 This chapter was derived from a more comprehensive project to develop a Field Bookon applying dynamical systems theory and methods to complex problems associatedwith conflict and sustainable peace; See Coleman, Redding, Fisher, Mazzaro, Straw andFisher Yoshida (working paper).


2 For studies on cognitive, behavioral, and emotional complexity see Bledow et al.2011; Huy 2002; Nicotera, Smilowitz and Pearson 1990; Pruitt and Lewis 1975; Suedfeldand Rank 1976; Suedfeld, Tetlock and Ramirez 1977; Wallace and Suedfeld 1988;Zaccaro 2001. For relevant findings on tolerance for ambiguity and consideration forfuture consequences see Cohen and Insko 2008; Joireman, Strathman and Balliet 2006;Nicotera, Smilowitz and Pearson 1990; Teger 1970; Van Lange, Klapwijk and Van Mun-ster 2011; Wolf et al. 2009.

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The Negotiator’s Desk Reference Volume 2 · pushes back, and the harder you push, the more it rallies against you. This is why most attempts at intervention fail in these con-flicts