The most distinctive and implausible feature of Stoic natural theologyis the attribution of reason to immanent material arche of the universe.The criticism featured most prominently by Plotinus concernsthe identification of being with matter and thus this kind of conceptualisationof arche. In Stoicism the organising principle is depicted asGod, soul, fire or pneuma and all physical events including the continuousstability of bodies through time are explained by the logos operatingthrough the dynamic character of pneuma.5 According to Plotinus,this identification of intellect or reason with matter is a major flaw inthe argument. Indeed he goes further and also rejects the descriptionof divine rationality as that which functions to match means and ends.This it would seem places Deleuze in an awkward position. Elsewhere,Deleuze, along with Guattari, comments approvingly on the Stoicinsight into the spermatikos logos or generative principle, the immanentprinciple of cosmic organisation.6 Such positive commentary tends tosuggest that Deleuze believes Spinoza is able to offer a way to thinkabout reasons and causes, first principles and immanent principles orlaws of organisation, that would satisfy even the Plotinian reader.Conversely, the Stoic philosophical themes must be thrown into theboiling pot for some reason. I suggest that they are leant on to give(undue) weight to the linguistic theory and later to the particular formof ethical naturalism Deleuze finds inspiring.Deleuzes insistence on systematic enquiry into being explains whyhis natural theology occupies a curious position between the Stoics andPlotinus. The arguments for a necessary, singular existent God, theidentification of God with nature but the insistence on a non-reductivematerialism bring us to Deleuzes critical appraisal of being and theidentification of being with God. In various places in Deleuzes work,God 13the terms immanence and univocality are bandied about and aresupposed to describe both God and the principles of being. Deleuze,and later Guattari, assume that the fully worked out system deliversnot just the arche or principle(s) of being but also the concept of immanentsubstance which later became the body without organs.7We expect, then, that Spinozas Ethics will offer an alternative to theCartesianKantian concept of the subject and the CategoricalImperative, a way of responding to the terrible spectacle of the modernlegitimation crisis by rethinking the grounds of ethical theory. We willthus expect Deleuzes interpretation of Spinozas Ethics to concentrate onits pantheism and to focus our attention on the ways in which we cantransvalue our traditional moral notions. As importantly for Deleuze,Spinozas arguments for pantheism are based on a theory of parallelism,a controversial theory we will look at in some depth later but nonethelessa theory which Deleuze takes to support a thesis distinct from thedialectical method and an alternative to Hegels Infinity or Absolute.With this chapter I intend two things. Firstly, I wish to reconstructthe arguments so that we may be clear as to the system that underliesoft-quoted Deleuzian phrases. Secondly, I hope to prove that it isimpossible to cherry pick the ethical naturalism from this system andthis means the inevitable inheritance of certain problems; the consequencesof the flows and gaps, the rather woolly references and potboiling characteristic of Deleuzes arguments even at this first stage.The pantheismThe relationship between pantheism and monism is not strict. Onecould be a monist and not a pantheist; a materialist might take thisposition. One could argue that God is in everything but that there aremany sorts of things. Or, one could argue that God is everything. Forthe sake of this argument I shall distinguish between monism wherethere is only one kind of thing and monism where there is only oneindividual. The former is the position of a normal materialist; however,it is this last position that will occupy us throughout this chapter,where monism and pantheism coincide.Part one of Expressionism presents three sets of arguments intendedto prove the necessary existence of God and to identify God withnature. Each argument is named a triad which is a reference to a formof argument named a syllogism. According to Deleuze each triadbrings together three different things or concepts through the middleterm; the middle term alters throughout the syllogisms. The first triad14 Deleuze and Spinozabrings together the concepts of attribute, essence and substance. Thesecond the concepts of perfection, infinity and the absolute. The finaltriad draws together the ideas of essence, with the thing of which it isthe essence and the capacity of that thing to be affected. It is surprisingto find the appearance of a dialectical argument but Deleuze does quiteplainly state that each term, substance, attribute and essence, is amiddle term relating the two others, in three syllogisms (28). Followingthe structure of his argument we shall begin with the first triad andconcentrate on the relationship of attribute to essence.8Before proceeding it may be worth clarifying the principal concepts:substance, attribute and mode. Substance, according to Spinoza, is thatwhich is in itself and is conceived through itself. It is the source thatrequires no further ground. The concept of substance must not postulateanything outside of itself. The being of Being or of substance asSpinoza calls it is for him not a mere idea; it is the overwhelming, allencompassing,infinitely rich intuition of God, which findsconfirmation through thought and experience, whenever we look intotheir ground.9 An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of substanceconstituting its essence. What we know of substance we knowthrough the attributes of Thought and Extension. An attribute explainsor expresses the essence of substance. Each attribute is infinite in kindbut not absolutely infinite. Modes are individual things; they are temporaland finite. A mode is an affection of substance, is in another thingthrough which it is also conceived. The meanings of these terms will beexemplified as we continue with Deleuzes argument. The mainproblem concerning Deleuze is the apparent incompatibility betweenthree propositions stating the relationship between these three terms.The monistic argument depends on the claim that there is a substancewhich has every attribute as well as the proposition that twosubstances cannot share any attribute and the assertion that no substancehas more than one attribute. Deleuze intends to show howthese three propositions can work together. Indeed, he submits thatthe first nine propositions of the Ethics lead to the tenth; the assertion