The influence of cultural selection on strategic communication · organisation‟s culture on the formulation of strategic communication is a fundamental conceptual challenge for

The influence of cultural selection on strategic

communication

A thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

at the

Queensland University of Technology

by

Kim Amanda Johnston

Master of Business (Communication) (Queensland University of Technology)

Bachelor of Nursing (Northern Territory University)

Certificate General Nursing (Royal Prince Alfred Hospital, Sydney)

Agents Representative Certificate (Darwin Institute of Technology)

School of Advertising, Marketing and Public Relations

QUT Business School

Queensland University of Technology

Brisbane, Australia

II

Keywords

Public relations, strategic communication, organizing, organizational culture,

cultural selection, organizational ethnography, organizational communication

progressive contextualisation.

III

Abstract

Strategic communication is held to be a key process by which organisations

respond to environmental uncertainty. In the received view articulated in the

literatures of organisational communication and public relations, strategic

communication results from collaborative efforts by organisational members to

create shared understanding about environmental uncertainty and, as a result of this

collective understanding, formulate appropriate communication responses.

In this study, I explore how such collaborative efforts towards the

development of strategic communication are derived from, and bounded by,

culturally shared values and assumptions. Study of the influences of an

organisation‟s culture on the formulation of strategic communication is a

fundamental conceptual challenge for public relations and, to date, a largely

unaddressed area of research.

This thesis responds to this challenge by describing a key property of

organisational culture – the action of cultural selection (Durham, 1992). I integrate

this property of cultural selection to extend and refine the descriptive range of

Weick‟s (1969, 1979) classic sociocultural model of organizing. From this

integration I propose a new model, the Cultural Selection of Strategic

Communication (CSSC). Underpinning the CSSC model is the central proposition

that because of the action of cultural selection during organizing processes, the

inherently conservative properties of an organisation‟s culture constrain development

of effective strategic communication in ways that may be unrelated to the outcomes

of “environmental scanning” and other monitoring functions heralded by the public

relations literature as central to organisational adaptation. Thus, by examining the

development of strategic communication, I describe a central conservative influence

on the social ecology of organisations. This research also responds to Butschi and

Steyn‟s (2006) call for the development of theory focusing on strategic

communication as well as Grunig (2006) and Sriramesh‟s (2007) call for research to

further understand the role of culture in public relations practice.

In keeping with the explorative and descriptive goals of this study, I employ

organisational ethnography to examine the influence of cultural selection on the

IV

development of strategic communication. In this methodological approach, I use the

technique of progressive contextualisation to compare data from two related but

distinct cultural settings. This approach provides a range of descriptive opportunities

to permit a deeper understanding of the work of cultural selection.

Findings of this study propose that culture, operating as a system of shared

and socially transmitted social knowledge, acts through the property of cultural

selection to influence decision making, and decrease conceptual variation within a

group. The findings support the view that strategic communication, as a cultural

product derived from the influence of cultural selection, is an essential feature to

understand the social ecology of an organisation.

V

Contents Keywords ..................................................................................................................... 2

Abstract ........................................................................................................................ 3

List of Figures ........................................................................................................ 10

List of Tables.......................................................................................................... 11

List of Abbreviations.............................................................................................. 12

Statement of original authorship ............................................................................ 13

Chapter 1 .................................................................................................................... 15

Focus of Thesis and Theoretical Framework ......................................................... 15

Social Ecology and Systems theory ................................................................... 16

The Culture Concept .......................................................................................... 17

Public Relations and Organisational Communication ....................................... 17

Justification and contributions ........................................................................... 18

Research Problem and Questions ........................................................................... 20

The Research Setting: Red Cross Queensland ....................................................... 21

Methodology .......................................................................................................... 22

Outline of the Thesis .............................................................................................. 23

Summary ................................................................................................................ 25

Chapter 2 .................................................................................................................... 26

Review of the Literature............................................................................................. 26

Organisations: Responsive to Social Environments .............................................. 27

Cultural Ecology ................................................................................................ 29

The Culture Concept .............................................................................................. 31

Ideational Theory of Culture .............................................................................. 32

Organisational Culture as a System of Social Knowledge................................. 34

Cultural Knowledge Structures and Schema...................................................... 36

Cultural Selection ............................................................................................... 37

Sociocultural Model of Organizing ........................................................................ 43

Ecological Change ............................................................................................. 46

Enactment ........................................................................................................... 46

Selection ............................................................................................................. 47

Retention ............................................................................................................ 48

Public Relations Theory: Adaptation and Adjustment........................................... 49

Strategic Communication ....................................................................................... 51

Defining Strategic Communication.................................................................... 52

VI

Formulation of Strategic Communication ......................................................... 53

Importance of Organisational Culture in Strategic Communication ................. 54

Research Problem and Research Questions ........................................................... 56

Cultural Selection of Strategic Communication Model ......................................... 57

Research Propositions ........................................................................................ 58

Propositions........................................................................................................ 59

Summary ................................................................................................................ 60

Chapter 3 .................................................................................................................... 61

Methodology .............................................................................................................. 61

Theoretical Perspective and Ontological Considerations ...................................... 62

Research Design: An Ethnography ........................................................................ 64

Organisational Ethnography .............................................................................. 65

The Research Setting: Red Cross Queensland ................................................... 66

Boundaries of Progressive Contextualisation .................................................... 68

Presentation of the Ethnographic Account ........................................................ 72

Researcher Perspective ...................................................................................... 73

Relationship Building ........................................................................................ 76

Access to Red Cross Queensland ....................................................................... 77

Sampling ............................................................................................................ 78

Data Sources ...................................................................................................... 80

Ethnoecology: Data Analysis ................................................................................. 88

Reducing Data: Memoing and Coding .............................................................. 90

Quality of the Approach......................................................................................... 94

Ethical Considerations ....................................................................................... 97

Limitations and Key Assumptions ..................................................................... 98

Summary ................................................................................................................ 98

Chapter 4 .................................................................................................................. 100

Description of Setting .............................................................................................. 100

Red Cross Overview ............................................................................................ 102

Historical Foundations ..................................................................................... 102

Service Profile .................................................................................................. 103

Funding ............................................................................................................ 104

Mission, Vision, Values and Principles ........................................................... 105

Red Cross Structure and Governance .................................................................. 106

The Council ...................................................................................................... 106

VII

The Board ......................................................................................................... 107

Leadership ........................................................................................................ 107

National Office and States ............................................................................... 108

Red Cross Reform ................................................................................................ 109

Marketing, Fundraising and Communication Reform ..................................... 110

Rebranding of Red Cross ................................................................................. 111

National Communication Directorate .................................................................. 112

Policy and Procedures ...................................................................................... 115

The Social Environment of Red Cross ................................................................. 116

Regulatory Environment .................................................................................. 117

Stakeholders of Red Cross ............................................................................... 117

Partnering with Red Cross ............................................................................... 118

The Opinion Environment of Red Cross .......................................................... 120

The Bali Incident .............................................................................................. 121

Red Cross State Divisions .................................................................................... 122

Red Cross Queensland ......................................................................................... 122

Marketing, Fundraising and Communication .................................................. 128

Strategic Communication and Planning ........................................................... 134

Red Cross South Australia ................................................................................... 139

Marketing, Fundraising and Communication .................................................. 141

Strategic Communication and Planning ........................................................... 145

Summary .............................................................................................................. 146

Chapter 5 .................................................................................................................. 148

Ethnography ............................................................................................................. 148

Researcher Perspective......................................................................................... 150

Establishing trust and gaining entry ................................................................. 156

Red Cross Queensland ......................................................................................... 157

Encounter with the setting ................................................................................ 158

The Marketing, Fundraising, and Communication Unit .................................. 160

Strategic Communication ................................................................................. 190

Moving out from the MFC unit ........................................................................ 195

Executive team in Red Cross Queensland ....................................................... 196

Decision Making and Power in Red Cross Queensland .................................. 205

Knowledge Structures in Red Cross Queensland................................................. 216

Schema: Conceptualisations of Red Cross ....................................................... 219

VIII

Schema: Red Cross is a crisis organisation...................................................... 220

Schema: Working in Red Cross Queensland ................................................... 221

Summary: Contextualising Red Cross Queensland knowledge structures ...... 221

Contextualising Case: National Communication Directorate .............................. 222

Ways of Working ............................................................................................. 230

Change in Red Cross ........................................................................................ 241

Contextualising Case: Red Cross South Australia ............................................... 246

Entry to Red Cross South Australia ................................................................. 247

Strategic Communication in Red Cross South Australia ................................. 265

Summary .............................................................................................................. 268

Chapter 6 .................................................................................................................. 270

Cultural Selection and Strategic Communication .................................................... 270

Research Question 1: Cultural Systems and Cultural Selection .......................... 272

Research Question 2: Cultural Selection in Organizing ...................................... 275

Research question 3: Cultural Selection Criteria Operating in Red Cross

Queensland ........................................................................................................... 278

Cultural Criteria: “Avoid blame” ..................................................................... 279

Cultural Criteria: “Tolerance” .......................................................................... 282

Cultural Criteria: “Internal is More Important” ............................................... 284

Cultural Criteria: “We are Red Cross”............................................................. 286

Cultural Criteria: “Flexible and Fluid” ............................................................ 289

Research question 4: Cultural Selection and Strategic Communication ............. 291

The Influence of Cultural Selection Criteria “Avoiding Blame” on Strategic

Communication ................................................................................................ 292

The Influence of Cultural Selection Criteria “Tolerance” on Strategic

Communication ................................................................................................ 294

The Influence of Cultural Selection Criteria “Internal Focus” on Strategic

Communication ................................................................................................ 295

The Influence of Cultural Selection Criteria “We Are Red Cross” on Strategic

Communication ................................................................................................ 296

The Influence of Cultural Selection Criteria “Flexible and Fluid” on Strategic

Communication ................................................................................................ 298

Research question 5: Culturally Derived Strategic Communication ................... 299

Summary .............................................................................................................. 302

Chapter 7 .................................................................................................................. 304

Discussion and Implications .................................................................................... 304

Overview of the Study ......................................................................................... 304

IX

Contributions and Implications ............................................................................ 307

Understanding Influences on Strategic Communication.................................. 307

The Role of Public Relations in the Social Ecology of an Organisation ......... 308

Significance of Organisational Culture to Public Relations ............................ 311

The Use of Progressive Contextualisation and Organisational Ethnography in

Public Relations Research ................................................................................ 313

Philosophical Bearings: Reflections on Doing Ethnography ............................... 313

Limitations of the Research ................................................................................. 317

Opportunities for Future Research ....................................................................... 318

Summary .............................................................................................................. 319

Postscript .............................................................................................................. 321

References ................................................................................................................ 322

Appendices ........................................................................................................... 339

Appendix A – Domestic Activations of RC ..................................................... 339

Appendix B – Fieldwork protocol, Interview and observation guide .............. 340

Appendix C – Red Cross Organisational Chart ............................................... 345

Appendix D – Fundamental Principles ........................................................... 346

Appendix E – Coding nodes (NVivo 7/8/9) ..................................................... 348

Appendix F – Participant information and consent form ................................. 369

X

List of Figures

Figure 1: Theoretical map of major concepts that organise the study ....................... 16

Figure 2: Organisation of Chapter 2 .......................................................................... 27 Figure 3: Cultural Selection (Durham, 1991) ............................................................ 42 Figure 4: Weick‟s (1969, 1979) sociocultural model of organizing .......................... 44 Figure 5: Cultural selection of strategic communication (CSSC) model .................. 58 Figure 6: Organisation of Chapter 3 .......................................................................... 62

Figure 7: Progressive contextualisation of strategic communication in RCQ ........... 70 Figure 8: Overview of analysis showing linkages to display .................................... 91 Figure 9: Organisation of Chapter 4 ........................................................................ 101

Figure 10: NCD - MFC organisational structure (February, 2008) ......................... 114 Figure 11: Excerpt from email update reporting on national MFC activities .......... 115 Figure 12: Red Cross Stakeholder map ................................................................... 118 Figure 13: Logos of 2009 sponsors featured on the Red Cross website .................. 119

Figure 14: Australian media reporting on Red Cross 1 Jan 2003 to 30 Dec 2009 .. 120 Figure 15: Red Cross Queensland headquarters in Park Road, Milton ................... 123 Figure 16: Employment and training services in Bowen Hills ................................ 124 Figure 17: Organisational chart of Red Cross Queensland ...................................... 127

Figure 18: Office layout MFC area Red Cross Queensland .................................... 128 Figure 19: Seating plan on entry to Red Cross Queensland, Jan 2008 .................... 129 Figure 20: Organisational chart of the MFC unit - Red Cross Queensland ............. 130

Figure 21: Red Cross South Australia Headquarters in Wakefield St, Adelaide ..... 139

Figure 22: Organisational chart of Red Cross South Australia‟s MFC unit ............ 142 Figure 23: Collateral produced by MFC unit in Red Cross South Australia ........... 144 Figure 24: Organisation of Chapter 5 ...................................................................... 149

Figure 25: Progressive contextualisation of Red Cross Queensland: Stage 1 of

analysis ..................................................................................................................... 150

Figure 26: Red Cross Queensland web of knowledge structures ............................ 217 Figure 27: Stage 2 level of analysis in the context of the study in Red Cross ......... 222 Figure 28: Stage 3 level of analysis in the context of the study in Red Cross ......... 246

Figure 29: Organisation of Chapter 6 ...................................................................... 271 Figure 30: The action of cultural selection operating in Weick‟s (1969, 1979)

sociocultural model of organizing ........................................................................... 277

Figure 31: Cultural schemas operating at Red Cross Queensland ........................... 279

Figure 32: Avoid Blame Schema ............................................................................. 280 Figure 33: Tolerance Schema .................................................................................. 282 Figure 34: Internal Focus Schema ........................................................................... 285 Figure 35: We are Red Cross Schema ..................................................................... 287 Figure 36: Flexible and Fluid Schema ..................................................................... 289

Figure 37: Ecological relationships: Culturally derived strategic communication .. 301 Figure 38: Key contributions and implications presented in Chapter 7 ................... 307

XI

List of Tables

Table 1: Summary of access timeline ........................................................................ 77

Table 2: Entry periods and summary of activities in settings .................................... 79 Table 3: Case Construct and Data Sources ................................................................ 81 Table 4: Summary of settings for observation and data collection ............................ 84 Table 5: Field notes – observation framework (Sanday, 1979) ................................. 85 Table 6: Examples of topic codes relating to key research questions ........................ 93

Table 7: RCQ‟s Retail Operations ........................................................................... 124 Table 8: Example of output reporting for media releases in March and April 2008137 Table 9: Time periods .............................................................................................. 151

Table 10: Emergent schemas operating in Red Cross Queensland .......................... 218 Table 11: Seniority of staff accessed in the national office ..................................... 224

XII

List of Abbreviations

ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics

CEO Chief Executive Officer

CSSC Cultural Selection of Strategic Communication

ED Executive director

EMT Executive Management Team

FHS First aid, health and safety

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

IHL International Humanitarian Law

MFC Marketing, fundraising and communication (unit)

NCD National Communication Directorate

NMT National Management Team

Organizing Refers to Weick‟s (1969, 1979) sociocultural model of organizing

RC Australian Red Cross

RCQ Red Cross Queensland

RCSA Red Cross South Australia

SAM Save-a-Mate

XIII

Statement of original authorship

The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted to meet

requirements for an award at this or any other higher education institution.

To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously

published or written by another person except where due reference is made.

Signature

Date

XIV

Acknowledgements

This thesis represents a seven-year journey. Like many journeys, there have been

people who have inspired me, supported me, and sustained me during this time. I would

like to acknowledge just some of those people (because there have been many)...

First, this journey would never have started, and certainly would not have

finished if it weren‟t for my patient and inspiring supervisor Professor James Everett.

His constructive and considered feedback, his faith in my ability, and his tolerance of

„my way‟ of working, were the foundations of this effort. My respect for your amazing

mind and kindness will stay with me forever.

To my associate supervisors, Professor Lisa Bradley and Dr Karen Becker - your

guidance, unwavering support and feedback was very much appreciated. You are both

inspirational role models and I am grateful for the opportunity to learn from you.

To my loving husband David and my two beautiful children, Taylah and Thomas

- you sustained me and I recognise you sacrificed part of your life experience because of

my journey. I am sorry that you had to experience this with me – I promise I will make it

up to you.

To my Head of School, Associate Professor Robina Xavier - your generosity and

consideration was integral to me being able to complete my thesis. I sincerely thank you.

To my wonderful PR colleagues – Anne, Ingrid, Elizabeth, Amisha and Jennifer

and other AMPR staff, including Dr Amanda Beatson, Ass Prof Gayle Kerr, Dr Steve

Pike, Dr Kerrie-Anne Kuhn, Professor Judy Drennan, Dr Connie Bianchi, and Dr Maria

van Dessel. You all contributed in different ways and your ongoing interest and support

was always comforting.

To my dear friends- Kerrie Mackey Smith, Lynda Ugarte, and Julie Rannard;

Thank you for listening and being interested.

Finally, my thanks and appreciation to the people (past and present) at Red Cross

Queensland and South Australia for your generosity in sharing your world with me.

I have found this journey a tough one but I am so very grateful for the

opportunity to do something I never thought achievable. My mother, Judith Sarah,

always said I could do anything if I put the work in. She was right!

Chapter 1 15

Chapter 1

Strategic communication is a central device used by organisations to respond

to environmental uncertainty. The inherent nature of the strategic response is

premised on two key internal activities. The first requires management to monitor

and interpret environmental conditions. The second requires the formulation of an

appropriate response to that interpretation. Both are open to influences from features

operating within the internal organisational environment.

Strategy development scholars have recognised the need to take a cultural

school of thought (Volberda & Elfring, 2001) and understand the internal

organisational processes and influences on decision making (Craig-Lees, 2001;

Weick, 2001). Little progress has been made to explore these both from a strategic

management (George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, & Barden, 2006) and a public relations

perspective (Sriramesh, 2007).

A cultural perspective on strategy formulation incorporates a view of an

organisation‟s culture as a system of social knowledge that is shared among

organisational members and transmitted by members across time (Durham, 1991;

Everett, 1985, 1990; Schein, 1984). In these terms, strategy formulation requires a

collaborative effort by organisational members to identify, interpret, interact and

subsequently make a decision that builds shared meaning about a complex situation

in the effort to reduce uncertainty (Selsky, Goes, & Baburoglu, 2007). Unpacking

this collaborative effort to explore how frames of reference derived from culturally

shared values and assumptions influence that process, is a central conceptual

challenge in strategy formulation (Bailey & Johnson, 2001). The focus of this thesis,

therefore, is to explore how organisational culture influences the development of

strategic communication as an organisational response to environmental uncertainty.

Focus of Thesis and Theoretical Framework

To explore and understand cultural influences on the development of

strategic communication, this research draws on three key bodies of theory (see

Figure 1). The first draws on the literatures of social ecology and systems theory to

understand the nature of, and imperatives for, organisational adaptive responses to

environments. The second draws on the concept of culture in the literatures of

Chapter 1 16

anthropology and management to construct a defensible concept of organisational

culture. Finally, the literatures of public relations and organisational communication

are used to identify cultural influences on strategic communication in the shaping of

adaptive environmental responses by organisations. The following section introduces

these bodies of theory.

Figure 1: Theoretical map of major concepts that organise the study

Social Ecology and Systems theory

Successful organisations are responsive to their environments (Hambrick,

1981; Scott, 2003). The increasing complexity and uncertainty of organisational

environments highlights the importance of understanding organisational approaches

to respond to these changing demands (Scott, 2003). An ecological perspective

integrated with a concept of culture provides a framework to describe adaptive

efforts (Everett, 1994, 1996; Steward, 1977).

Viewing organisations from a systems perspective highlights the causal

relationships between the parts of a system as resulting from the selective exchange

of energy and matter to maintain or attain stability (Scott, 2003; von Bertalanffy,

1969). Social ecology provides a conceptual foundation for identifying relationships

between the social rather than physical parts of a system and reflects the needs of

organisations in their efforts to develop viable and sustainable adaptive responses to

a changing social environment (Emery & Trist, 1973). This may include shifts in

public opinion about organisational issues, media treatment of organisational

Chapter 1 17

policies and special interest groups‟ efforts to influence organisational policies and

imperatives of shareholder preferences. The need to be responsive to the

organisation‟s social environment is therefore central to understanding and

describing essential adaptive imperatives that exist for organisations over time

(Everett, 2001). Situating strategic communication in an ecological theoretical

framework allows development of a perspective on strategic communication as a

function that can influence the state of adaptation to a social environment (Hallahan,

Holtshausen, van Ruler, Vercic, & Sriramesh, 2007; Steyn, 2003b).

The Culture Concept

This study argues that the development of strategic communication results

from collective efforts by organisational members to attend to their environment and

interpret environmental information. Therefore, the second body of theory drawn on

for this study is anthropological theoretical traditions of culture, variously

incorporated in management and organisational behaviour literature.

Anthropological theory traditionally conceptualises culture as a system of

social knowledge learned through human interaction (Goodenough, 2003). Operating

as a resource of information and prescriptive of behaviour, culture acts to influence

decision and prescribe behaviour (Durham, 1991). The action of culture acting as a

pool of information to influence decisions is addressed by Durham‟s (1991) theory

of cultural selection. Cultural selection describes how cultural units of information

are selectively transmitted by members through comparative evaluation (Durham,

1990). In this study, I examine the proposition that culture acts as a mediating force

to influence organisational responses to its social environment, conceptualised

through strategic communication. Mediation in this sense is an influence of strategy

development in the form of cognitive criteria to constrain or endorse behaviours

related to environmental variables (Dil, 1980; Durham, 1991; Everett, 1990; Milton,

1996).

Public Relations and Organisational Communication

The perspective of strategic communication as an organisational response to

reduce environmental uncertainty justifies the incorporation of the third cluster of

research traditions including public relations, corporate and organisational

Chapter 1 18

communication literature to this study (Botan, 2006; Cornelissen, 2008; Cutlip,

Center, & Broom, 2006; Everett, 2001; J. E. Grunig, 1992a; Heath & Vasquez, 2001;

Kreps, 2006; Lattimore, Baskin, Heiman, Toth, & Van Leuven, 2004; Newsom,

Turk, & Kruckeberg, 2004; Steyn, 2007; Tench & Yeomans, 2006; Toth, 2007).

These literatures situate organisational adjustment and adaptation as core

responsibilities of strategic communication (Cutlip, et al., 2006; Steyn & Puth,

2000). Strategic communication emerges from identifying key strategic issues to

facilitate adaptation to environmental change or uncertainty (Cutlip, et al., 2006;

Everett, 2001).

Weick‟s (1969, 1979) concept of organizing as an adaptive response to

environmental equivocality frames the basic terms of this study. It is premised on the

concept that organisations seek to reduce environmental equivocality by acting on an

implicit or explicit consensus of environmental meanings (Kreps, 1990; Littlejohn,

1999; Weick, 1969). Weick (1969, 1979) contends managerial worldviews influence

how managers interpret the environmental equivocality and subsequent

organisational responses to manage their relationship with the environment. This

perspective places the formulation of strategic communication in a cultural

framework and focuses the need to understand how a group‟s shared and socially

transmitted beliefs and values (i.e. its culture) shape understanding and actions

toward their environment (Dil, 1980; Milton, 1996). As a relational model, Weick‟s

model provides a foundation from which to explore these processes as they interact

to produce organisational strategic communication.

Based on synthesis of these bodies of work a new model, the Cultural

Selection of Strategic Communication (CSSC) model, is proposed as a framework

for this study and a foundation for future research. The CSSC model provides a

unique way of exploring interlocked influences within the organizing processes on

outcomes to the interaction of environmental equivocality, organisational adaptation,

and the development of strategic communication. This model will be detailed in

Chapter 2.

Justification and contributions

This research responds to Butschi and Steyn‟s (2006) call for the

development of theory on the development of strategic corporate communication and

Chapter 1 19

Grunig (2006) and Sriramesh‟s (2007) call for research to further understand the role

of culture in public relations practice. Scant empirical information exists about how

the public relations function (in concert with organisational management system)

actually attends to the environment and how that attention results in strategic

communication responses. Understanding the influence of organisational culture on

the development of strategic communication remains an unaddressed area of

research in public relations and organisational communications (Everett, 2002;

Sriramesh, 2007).

Gower (2006) calls for research to explore how public relations is really

practised and to incorporate new theories from other disciplines to understand

influences on practice. Over two decades ago, Everett (1985) articulated the need

and value of exploring anthropological traditions in ecology and ethnography to

develop public relations theory. More recently this call is repeated by key discipline

literature (Daymon & Holloway, 2011; L'Etang, Hodges, & Pieczka, 2010). Everett

(1990) argues that both public relations theory and practice will be enriched through

deeper understanding of the interplay between organisational ecology and

organisational culture. The implications of such a framework for the practice of

public relations centre on the need to systematically describe and manage the

relationship between organisational culture and organisational ecology.

An ecological approach to public relations describes how public relations

facilitates organisational environment adaptation (Cutlip et al., 2006). The

assumptions that drive public relations practice commonly relate to how

organisations respond to their environments. This view positions organisations as

reactive receptors (Weick, 1979) and gives internal influences little consideration.

The proposed Cultural Selection of Strategic Communication (CSSC) model

utilises Weick‟s foundational sociocultural model of organizing (Weick, 1969, 1979)

in the discipline of organisational communication and extends its descriptive power

within strategic communication theory with the incorporation of the concept of

cultural selection. By exploring the role of cultural selection in the development of

strategic communication through the application of Weick‟s (1969, 1979)

sociocultural model of organizing, this study addresses that gap specifically by

examining the relationships between organisational culture and strategic

communication. More specifically, by building a case study to examine how a key

Chapter 1 20

attribute of organisational culture, the property of cultural selection, operates in the

selection process of Weick‟s model, this study contributes to the key problem arena

of public relations theory and practice. This is achieved by building an understanding

of how strategic communication results from the dynamic interplay of the organizing

processes and the influence of cultural selection on that interplay.

Research Problem and Questions

The central focus of this study is to describe how organisational culture

influences the formulation of strategic communication. Informed by the contexts

introduced above, the central research problem of this study is:

to explore how culture, acting through the property of cultural selection

in the selection process of organizing identified by Weick’s sociocultural

model of organizing (1969, 1979), influences a key feature of the social

ecology of organisations – organisational strategic communication.

This research problem reflects a core theoretical proposition that strategic

communication emerges not as a direct, rational response by organisational members

to objectively given environmental factors, but as an outcome of the influence of

cultural selection on not only what organisational members‟ view as challenges in

their social environment, but also in their decision making about what to do about

those challenges. The following research questions guide the work of this study:

RQ 1: When culture is a system of social knowledge, what is the role of

cultural selection in the development and maintenance of that system?

RQ 2: How does cultural selection operate in organizing?

RQ 3: How does cultural selection operate in Red Cross Queensland?

RQ 4: How does cultural selection operate in the development of strategic

communication in RCQ?

RQ 5: What is the role of culturally derived strategic communication in the

social ecology of organisations?

Chapter 1 21

The Research Setting: Red Cross Queensland

The setting for this study is Red Cross Queensland (RCQ), a division of

Australian Red Cross (RC). Two other Red Cross organisation cases are also built to

provide greater depth through progressive contextualisation (Vayda, 1983) of the

data at RCQ. The two contextualising cases are Red Cross South Australia (RCSA),

and the National Communication Directorate (NCD). RCQ has a statewide

responsibility to meet national organisational goals, budgets and geographically

defined obligations. RC and its divisions were established in Australia in 1914. The

organisation has a clearly articulated mission, vision, principles, and goals, and is

challenged to respond to a complex social and regulatory environment featuring

changing demographics, increasing rates of disaster, an increasing complexity of

humanitarian aid and challenges for funding (Tickner, 2007a).

The study accommodates the complexity of the internal organisational

environment of RC including strength of the fundamental principles guiding the

organisation, the history, and the requirements for transparency and accountability to

manage social expectation and organisational reputation. The criteria for selecting

these organisations include their potential to replicate or extend the emergent

theoretical apparatus (Eisenhardt, 1989) of the proposed CSSC model through

analytical inference (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). In addition, they possess a common

organisational form (Scott, 2003). Each organisation has similar organisational

structures, staff with similar roles and responsibilities, and operating environments

that provide suitable settings to study strategic communication as an empirical entity.

The appropriateness of the cases to provide a rich source of data to respond to the

research problem to explore the action of cultural selection on the formulation of

strategic communication is based on three key assumptions:

1) The national office is responsible for setting communication policy,

making organisational strategy decisions, and interpreting key

environmental events. The national office also identifies key events

deemed worthy of state-based responses;

2) The organisation has clear and distinct operations of a national and state

structure, which provides an opportunity to observe distinct cultural

influences;

Chapter 1 22

3) The state divisions have local autonomy to interpret and respond uniquely

through communication actions to national policy and local

environmental events.

The case organisations provide a suitable setting to explore cultural

influences on strategic communication. The following section outlines the

methodology used to explore the case organisations.

Methodology

The aim of organisational research is to “speculate, discover, and document,

as well as to provisionally order, explain, and predict, (presumably) observable

social processes and structures that characterise behaviour in and of organisations”

(van Maanen, Sorensen, & Mitchell, 2007, p. 1145). The central research question

guiding this study is to explore and describe the role of organisational culture in the

formulation of strategic communication as a response to environmental uncertainty.

An interpretivist epistemology informs this thesis acknowledging the broad

traditions of anthropological ethnographic studies and approaches to social science

exploring the social influences of how people construct meaning in natural settings

(Hammersley, 1990; Neuman, 2003).

Ethnographic enquiry seeks to discover meanings and perceptions of people

in a social collective and interpret their understandings in the context of their

worldview (Crotty, 1998). The term ethnography encompasses a set of methods that

involve a researcher (ethnographer) participating in people‟s lives for an extended

period with the aim to make sense of their world (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007).

According to Rabinow (1977) exploring culture is an interpretive act. As this study

is attentive to issues of interpretation, ethnography is well suited to efforts to

understand the process by which actors construct meaning out of collective

experiences (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007).

An organisational ethnography is a participant focused study of organisations

and their organising processes built from perceptions of organisational members

(Ybema, Yanow, Wels, & Kamsteeg, 2009). Organisational ethnography is an

appropriate methodology for this study as it captures organisational reality from the

perspective of the organisational members and provides contextual insights to social

and collective processes (Glaser, 1998). The identification and description of culture

Chapter 1 23

is a primary goal to allow its role in the development of strategic communication to

be explored and understood (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995; Mitchell, 2007). As a

basic form of social research, ethnography offers social researchers the opportunity

to study small scale settings focusing on participants in everyday contexts and

involves data from a range of sources (Hammersley, 1990).

The organisational ethnography of RCQ was undertaken with a comparative

study of RCSA and data collected from the NCD for policy and triangulation

(Richards, 2005). Data from 51 individual depth interviews, 18 months of

intermittent observation and field notes, and supplementary organisational

documents allow the exploration of the role of culture in the development of

strategic communication.

The exploratory nature of this study offered flexibility to move beyond

research questions and extant literature to discover new ideas and issues and provide

direction, ideas or techniques for future research (Neuman, 2003). Exploratory

research is suited to the need to understand the internal and cultural processes

undertaken by organisations in their effort to respond to environmental equivocality

through the development of strategic communication. An essential quality for an

exploratory study is to understand the complex and unique influence of

organisational culture and search for dimensions of experience not identified by

existing theory (Ezzy, 2002).

Outline of the Thesis

This chapter introduces the thesis and establishes the background to the development

of the central research question to explore the organisational cultural influences on

the development of strategic communication. It introduces the core requirements of

strategic communication as an organisational response to environmental uncertainty

and the role of organisational culture as social knowledge. Using Weick‟s

sociocultural model of organizing (1969, 1979), this study applies what Everett

(2002) identified as being a core component to ecological public relations and seeks

to understand how culture influences the development of organisational strategic

communication.

Chapter 2 presents the literature that encompasses the bodies of research

surrounding the research question. The chapter starts with key literature on the

Chapter 1 24

nature of strategic communication and the collective nature of input into the process

and introduces the context for examining cultural structures as social knowledge and

cognition, establishing the nature of these influences on the interaction between

enactment and the cultural elements operating on the selection process. The review

documents the thesis of Weick‟s sociocultural model of organizing (1969, 1979) as a

key theoretical apparatus for organisational communication. The review then builds

a more detailed description of the relationship of environmental enactment to critical

subsystems of organisational culture acting in the selection process of organizing. A

new model, the CSSC model, is proposed that captures the assumptions of Weick‟s

sociocultural model of organizing (1969, 1979). The model responds to the need to

understand the origins and nature of cultural influences on the formulation of

strategic communication, by building on the action of selection in Weick‟s

sociocultural model of organizing by incorporating Durham‟s (1991) theory of

cultural selection.

Chapter 3 details organisational ethnography as the methodological approach

undertaken to investigate the key research questions and subsequent propositions. A

justification for the exploratory and inductive approach of ethnographic study is

provided and identification of the stages of data reduction and data analysis within

and across cases. A review of methodological issues associated with previous studies

is detailed. The quality of the data analysis is established.

Chapter 4 details the description of the setting of RCQ and introduces RCSA

and NCD as comparative sites to contextualise and deepen understanding of the

primary site. Chapter 5 details the ethnography of RCQ and describes participants‟

views gained during observation and interviews. To contextualise these views,

participants from the other study sites of the NCD and then RCSA are detailed, to

provide deeper understanding of the participant‟s views in RCQ. Chapter 6 presents

the interpretation of the ethnography and addresses the study‟s five research

questions. Chapter 7 presents contributions to theory, with implications for

continuing inquiry, theory, policy, and practice. By returning to the core problem, I

discuss the relevance of the new model and conclude with outlining the limitations

of the study and propose a number of areas of future research.

Chapter 1 25

Summary

This chapter has introduced the key research problem and questions this

thesis seeks to address. The chapter first identified the influence of organisational

culture on the key social ecology of organisation as the key problem then described a

broad outline of the key theoretical areas on which it draws including organisational

culture, cultural ecology, Weick‟s (1969, 1979) sociocultural model of organizing,

and strategic communication as a key domain of public relations. This chapter also

outlined the key areas of knowledge that this study will contribute. The key

contributions of this study to the literature of organisational communication and

public relations are: (1) to build a greater understanding of the action of cultural

selection on the development of organisational strategic communication, and (2) as a

consequence of this influence, to understand the role of cultural selection on the

social ecology of an organisation.

Chapter 2 reviews the core theoretical domains informing this study

including strategic communication, ecological public relations, culture and cultural

selection and organizing. Within these contexts, research gaps are identified as they

relate to the theoretical arena that circumscribes this study- the role of culture in the

development of strategic communication.

Chapter 2: Literature Review 26

Chapter 2

Review of the Literature

Chapter 2 introduces the literature that informs this study with the aim to

document influences on the development of strategic communication as a response

to change in environmental features of organisations. Chapter 1 outlined the

background to the development of this study‟s core research problem.

This chapter draws on three key theoretical domains to extend understanding

of the processes acting on the development of strategic communication. The first

domain is founded on anthropological approaches to the concepts of culture,

ecology, and cultural selection. The second domain draws on the key theoretical

apparatus for organisational communication; Weick‟s (1969, 1979) sociocultural

model of organizing. The third domain draws on strategic management and strategic

communication literature. This chapter is structured to respond to and integrate these

conceptual precedents.

To achieve this goal, first, I establish the context for organisations being

responsive to the social environment. I then establish the rationale for examining

cultural structures as systems of social knowledge and cognition. Weick‟s

sociocultural model of organizing (1969, 1979) is then introduced as a theoretical

apparatus to explore organisational responses to environmental change. Following

this, and based on Weick‟s model as the precedent, I build a more detailed

description of the relationship of the subsystems of organisational culture acting in

the selection process of organizing.

Finally a new model is introduced that builds on Weick‟s (1969, 1979)

sociocultural model of organizing, and is informed by Durham‟s (1992) cultural

selection theory. The Cultural Selection of Strategic Communication (CSSC) model

is proposed to respond to the research problem and the need to build an

understanding of the origins and nature of cultural influences on the development of

organisational strategic communication. The chapter concludes by summarising the

key points and establishing the context for the methodology to respond to the key

research problem in Chapter 3. The major sections presented in this chapter are

illustrated in Figure 2.


Figure 2: Organisation of Chapter 2

Organisations: Responsive to Social Environments

The role of strategic communication as an adaptive response to assist in

managing organisational-environment relationships reflects an ecological framework

(Cutlip, et al., 2006; Everett, 2001). The development of strategic communication

emerges from identifying key strategic issues internally and externally to facilitate

adaptation to environmental or ecological change (Cutlip, et al., 2006; Everett,

2001). The ability to identify and differentiate key strategic issues in the

organisation's environment is one of the key contributing abilities in the effort to

develop organisational strategic communication (Steyn, 2003a).

Organisational environments are defined as everything outside the

organisation‟s boundaries. Organisation-environment boundaries can be fluid, as

boundaries can shift, disappear or can be “arbitrarily drawn” (Weick, 1979, p. 132).

Organisational members‟ ability to identify, differentiate, interpret, and prioritise


environmental issues is a critical skill in the development of organisational strategic

communication (Clampitt, DeKoch, & Cashman, 2000; Cummings & Wilson, 2003;

Murphy, 2007; Porter, 1996; Steyn, 2003b; Whittington, 1993). Bourgeois (1980)

argues the perception of environmental uncertainty is conceptually and empirically

more relevant to studies of strategy making than studies of an organisation‟s external

environment.

Scott (2003) argues that while a number of flows may connect a system, the

flow of information is one of the most important as it places demands on

organisational participants to process information. How information is gleaned from

the environment can potentially influence an organisation‟s success (Daft & Weick,

1984). The purpose of environmental scanning in public relations is to guide

organisational decision making for organisational-environment adaptation (Cutlip, et

al., 2006), providing the “first link in the chain of perceptions and actions that permit

adaptation to the environment” (Saxby, Parker, Nitse, & Dishman, 2002, p. 29).

Environmental understanding underpins the creation of strategic

communication as a response by management to meet organisational goals

(Clampitt, et al., 2000; Cutlip, et al., 2006; Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 1993). As

Emery and Trist (1973) suggest “the future will be largely shaped by the choices

men [sic] make, or fail to make, and it will not be moulded simply by technical

forces…” (p. 38). Daft and Weick (1984) describe organisational efforts for

gathering environmental information as a filtering and interpretive process to

facilitate decision making. While interpretation is often used as a synonym for

understanding, Weick (1995) differentiates interpretation as a component of

sensemaking and suggests “sensemaking is about the ways people generate what

they interpret” (p. 13).

Robbins and Barnwell (2006) note variations of an organisation‟s

environment may exist reflecting management‟s understanding of the “actual”

environment and the “perceived” environment. The creation of the environment by

management highlights the difference between observable and perceived

environments (Doty, Bhattacharya, Wheatley, & Sutcliffe, 2006). This

differentiation is addressed by Lenz and Engledow (1986) who argue the

organisation‟s actual definition of an environment can be constrained by their own

perception of its environmental reality. Berger and Luckman (2004) suggest reality is


relative. From an interpretive perspective, Aldrich (1999) argues environmental

understanding occurs as organisational members socially construct and negotiate

meanings about the organisational reality rather than accept it as given. The

negotiated interpretation of the organisational environment is therefore taken for

granted as the reality of the organisation.

Weick (1969, 1979) argues that the organisation creates (enacts) the

environment that in turn exists for the organisation. He contends “environments are

created by organisations out of puzzling surrounds and that these meaningful

environments emerge quite late in organizing processes” (Weick, 1979, p. 132). The

organisational environment is therefore “selectively perceived, rearranged

cognitively, and negotiated interpersonally” (Weick, 1979, p. 164). Organisational

members‟ assumptions of environmental reality shape what they value “through the

processes of proactive manifestation through which assumptions provide

expectations that influence perceptions, thoughts, and feelings, are then experienced

as reflecting the world and the organisation” (p. 662). Shaping, interpretation, and

environmental understanding, all occur through internal processes to refine

environmental information. The environmental “reality as perceived by the members

becomes more the source of selection within the organisation” (Weick, 1979, p.

125).

This section established the importance of understanding environmental

information as the basis of the strategic response. The next section addresses the

concept of cultural ecology as a context for exploring the role of culture in shaping

organisational responses to the environment, and ultimately, the significance for


Cultural Ecology

Cultural ecology describes adaptation through cultural means (Steward,

1977; Sutton & Anderson, 2010). More specifically, cultural ecology studies the

ways people use culture to adapt to their environment (Frake, 1962; Sutton &

Anderson, 2010), or how culture mediates how a group experiences its environment

(Winthrop, 1991).

Situating the study of strategic communication specifically in a cultural

ecology framework recognises the potential for culture to mediate or play a key role


in the development of strategic communication as the organisational adaptive

response to its environment. This perspective places strategic communication in a

cultural framework and focuses the need to understand the role of culture in shaping

understanding and actions toward their environment (Dil, 1980; Milton, 1996).

The central role of strategic communication places it within the ecological

context of an organisation managing its relationship with its social environment

(Cutlip, et al., 2006; Everett, 2001). Everett (1996) identifies strategic

communication as “the device that couples the cultural and the social in

organisations, mediates the effects of the organisational environment on the

organisations as well as organisational action toward the environment” (p. 182).

Culture operates as a complex and continuous process through which organisational

members create, maintain, and change the organisation in response to these effects

(Keyton, 2005).

Everett (1990) links an ecological model of public relations with a

sociocultural perspective arguing that taking a cultural perspective transcends the

importance of individual perceptions as secondary “to understanding and describing

how these perceptions are linked into collective representations and action” (Everett,

1990, p. 249). The linking, he argues, takes place over time through the

organisation‟s socially transmitted cultural framework.

Organisations exist as social collectives responsive to an environment

through exchanges of information and energy (Everett, 1994). Organisations can be

defined as “a dynamic system of organisational members, influenced by external

stakeholders, who communicate within and across organizational structures in a

purposeful and ordered way to achieve a superordinate goal” (Keyton, 2005, p. 11).

This dynamic system is best understood as a sociocultural system (Everett, 1990).

Organisations operate as a system of shared beliefs and knowledge structures

that collectively work to direct managers‟ attention to salient aspects of the

environment (Aldrich, 1999). The following section explores the culture concept as a

foundational framework for its potential to influence the formulation of strategic

communication in organisations.


The Culture Concept

This section introduces the culture concept by first offering a definition based

on culture as a set of control mechanisms or recipes, rules and instructions (Geertz,

1973). Building on this definition, an ideational theory of culture is introduced as a

way of organising and understanding the nature of culture employed in this study

and how this concept of culture accounts for the transmission of cultural units of

information. Given this foundation, culture as a system of social knowledge is

introduced, recognising an ideational view of culture focuses on socially transmitted

social knowledge over time. This social knowledge manifests as knowledge

structures or schemas of cultural knowledge, which is discussed in the final part of

this section.

Keesing (1981) considers the concept of culture as “one of the most

important and influential ideas in twentieth century thought” (p. 67). This may be

attributed to culture‟s potential to explain the nature of human societies (Steward,

1977). As Durham (1991) argues:

the idea that much of the patterned variation in human behaviour can be

explained by variation in the ideas and beliefs in people‟s minds, that is, from

component elements of their culture. In such arguments, culture is viewed as

a source of information that gives specific form to human action and renders

it both meaningful to the actors and intelligible to outside observers. (p. 74)

Culture is defined as a system of shared meaning, values or beliefs, socially

transmitted over time among a particular social group (Bates, 2001; Durham, 1991;

Geertz, 1973; Keesing, 1981; Keyton, 2005). While many definitions of culture have

been offered (Chick, 1997) and applications of central concepts differ (Sackmann,

1992), a general consensus by anthropologists views culture as a mental

phenomenon (D'Andrade, 2001). As Geertz (1973) suggests:

Culture is best seen not as complexes of concrete behaviour patterns –

customs, usages, traditions, habit clusters – as has, by and large, been the

case up to now, but as a set of control mechanisms – plans, recipes, rules,


instructions (what computer engineers call programs) for the governing of

behaviour. (p. 44)

The historical and socially transmitted nature of cultural knowledge is

highlighted by Geertz (1973) arguing the pattern of meanings, symbols and inherited

conceptions is a means by which members “communicate, perpetuate, and develop

their knowledge about and attitudes towards life” (p. 89). Anthropological theory

has traditionally viewed culture as a mediating influence on human action and an

information source that shapes action and meaning for members of a specific group

and gives direction to organising their lives (Dil, 1980; Durham, 1991; Milton, 1996;

Norlin, Chess, Dale, & Smith, 2003). Culture acts as a grounding and orientating

force for interpretation that underpins human understanding, definitions, and actions

towards the environment (Hatch, 1993; Milton, 1996). Culture therefore functions to

give meaning and influence how events are viewed and interpreted (Bates, 2001).

Geertz (1973) compares culture to Weber‟s reference to man suspended in webs of

significance he himself has spun. Geertz views “culture to be those webs, and the

analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an

interpretive one in search of meaning” (p. 5).

Key challenges remain in using culture as an organising concept. First, the

elusive nature of culture in practise is difficult to distinguish (Bates, 2001). Second,

the existing conceptual diversity surrounding the concept of culture makes it difficult

to operationalise (Sackmann, 1992). Adopting an ideational approach focuses the

anthropological treatment of culture and offers “a more explicit and more analytic

conceptualisation of culture” (Durham, 1991, p. 3). This approach will be discussed

in the next section.

Ideational Theory of Culture

An ideational view of culture focuses on socially transmitted social

knowledge, over time, where learning occurs in a distinctly social way (Durham,

1991). An ideational conceptualisation of culture is defined as “information acquired

by imitating or learning from other individual‟s phenotype, usually behaviour”

(Boyd & Richerson, 1985, p. 430). Durham (1991) argues that applying a cultural

ideational theory allows cultural units of transmission to be operationalised, in that


“culture is handed down through time and space in units that are conceptual, socially

conveyed, symbolically coded, parts of a system, and so on” (p. 9).

Placing an ideational theory of culture into an organisational context

recognises organisations as communication collectives (Weick, 1979) or as a

“system for facilitating human interaction” (Tourish & Hargie, 2004, p. 142).

Durham (1991) identifies the five key cultural properties of an ideational theory of

culture that represent a consensus in the literature and are important to the study of

human diversity. The five cultural properties are:

1. Conceptual reality - Geertz (1973) argues culture should be viewed as a

set of control mechanisms to govern behaviour. He cautions against

considering culture as an outcome of human thought and action rather than its

source. Durham (1991) argues for culture to not be equated with behaviour.

As the first property of culture, Durham (1991) states:

.. it is misleading to say that culture is behaviour transmitted from one

individual to another by learning and teaching. Behaviours may

certainly be culturally variable in the sense that if the guiding ideas,

values or beliefs of a population change, then associated behaviours

will also change. But to include the behaviours as culture imposes a

futile nature/nurture categorisation…. In short, culture should be

thought of not as behaviours but as part of the information that

specifies its form. (p. 4)

2. The social transmission or sharing of cultural units of information is the

next key property identified by Durham (1991). He argues this information

must be learned through learning or teaching. Culture in this frame refers to

what humans learn (Keesing, 1981). A key distinction Durham (1991) makes

is that this learning process is uniquely social; “the point is not simply that

culture is learned information but that it is learned in a distinctive social way

through modelling” (Durham, 1991, p. 5).

3. Symbolic encoding of information increases accuracy and the

effectiveness of transmission (Durham, 1991). As the third key property of

culture, Durham (1991) argues there is added significance of the symbols to


the cultural systems making the information more meaningful. Geertz (1973)

states “to aid us in gaining access to the conceptual world in which our

subjects live so that we can, in some extended sense of the term, converse

with them” (p. 24).

4. Systemic organisation as a property of culture relates to the structuring

and organisation of culture within a system of knowledge. Geertz (1973)

notes “cultural systems must have a minimal degree of coherence, else we

would not call them systems” (p. 17). Durham (1991) reflects both its

hierarchy (noting a prioritisation of importance of information) and

coherency (noting linkages within a whole) as a system.

5. Durham (1991) argues that the historical nature of the shared ideas,

values, and beliefs have been handed down over time.

As an ideational theory, culture comprises “systems of shared ideas, systems

of concepts and rules and meanings that underlie and are „expressed‟ in the ways that

humans live” (Keesing, 1981, p. 69). In the following section, I explore culture as a

system of social knowledge as a foundational framework for its potential to influence

the formulation of organisational strategic communication.

Organisational Culture as a System of Social Knowledge

The view of culture as a system of social knowledge captures the role of

culture in relating communities to their ecological settings (Keesing, 1974). Durham

(1991) views culture as “systems of symbolically encoded conceptual phenomena

that are socially and historically transmitted within and between populations” (p. 9).

Culture operating as a learned system of shared knowledge assists members of a

society to relate and cope with their environment (Bates, 2001). As a sociocultural

system, it represents the “social realizations or enactments of ideational designs-for-

living in particular environments” (Keesing, 1974, p. 82).

Culture operates as a system to provide coherency and guide, or rationalise,

behaviour (Hahn, 1995). A cultural system is defined as “a coherent set of

interdependent values related together as a way of evaluation and choice, including


the means of their expression and communication, and possibly including a means

for the challenge, the establishment and the disestablishment of values” (Soho, 2000,

p. 362). In an organisational context, culture manifests as social knowledge learned

through human interaction over time (Durham, 1991; Everett, 1990; Keesing, 1974;

Rambo & Gillogly, 1991). In a social setting, people learn how to respond

appropriately through the social transmission of culture (Goodenough, 2003).

While a lack of definitional consensus about organisational culture is noted in

the literature (Ashkanasy, 2003; van Maanen, 1987), there is some coherence around

the concept of culture being a pattern. Schein (2009) defines organisational culture in

terms of a pattern of assumptions developed by a group as a way of coping with

adaptation and integration. Zammuto and Krakower (1991) define organisational

culture as “patterns of values and ideas in organisations that shape human behaviour

and its artifacts” (p. 85) while Gordon and Di Tomaso (1992) share this definition of

patterns highlighting its development over time. A holistic perspective is taken by

Ashkanasy and Jackson (2001) who define organisational culture as “a consistent set

of attitudes and values held by organizational members, and the practices that result

from these attitudes and values” (p. 398). This approach is shared by Grunig, Grunig,

and Dozier (2002) who define organisational culture as the “sum total of shared

values, symbols, meanings, beliefs, assumptions, and expectations that organize and

integrate a group of people who work together” (p. 591). Based on this synthesis,

organisational culture is conceptualised as an organisation‟s system of social

knowledge that is shared among organisational members and transmitted by

members across time.

Organisational culture acts to both confine and facilitate what organisational

members see, how they interpret their world, and manifests itself as a social reality

tied to organisational traditions (Keyton, 2005). Weick and Quinn (1999) refer to this

as a recipe for handling situations that often become routine or embedded in

organisational assumptions and form schemas which drive action. In this way,

organisational culture acts to mediate the organisation-environment relationship

(Everett, 1990). Organisational culture is manifested and maintained by individual

sensemaking efforts facilitated through the development of “dynamic cognitive

knowledge structures” or schemas (Harris, 1994, p. 310). The cognitive properties or

ways of thinking provides schemas so organisational members can make sense of


events and know how to respond (Bates, 2001). Cognitive properties of knowledge

structures and schemas will be addressed in the following section.

Cultural Knowledge Structures and Schema

Culture is conceived as the outcome of the interaction of collective

knowledge and judgement (Sackmann, 1991). Cultural knowledge focuses on the

“organised knowledge” of sensemaking such as “ideas, concepts, blue prints beliefs,

values or norms” as the core of culture (Sackmann, 1991, p. 21). Knowledge is

conceptualised as “a progressive, hierarchical construction of models of reality

where, step by step, the furniture of experience is moulded inside knowledge

structures by the ordering activity carried out by the knowing subject" (Guidano &

Liotti, 1985, p. 102). Shared knowledge operates “as general expectations that

provide possible responses to a situation, responses that reflect and embody cultural

values” (Hatch, 1993, p. 664). Shared knowledge structures are used by

organisational members to understand and attribute meaning to events (Sackmann,

1991).

Collective knowledge structures differ from personal knowledge structures

because they are socially constructed and rely on consensus (Lyles & Schwenk,

1992). A number of cultural knowledge structure typologies are offered in the

literature. Sackmann‟s (1991) structures of cultural knowledge include dictionary,

directory, recipe, and axiomatic, reflecting the “what”, “how”, “should” and “why”

of cultural cognition. Everett (1990) offers three types of cultural knowledge

structures described as cognitive premises, cultural propositions and cultural frames.

Cognitive premises are individual knowledge structures, while cultural propositions

and cultural frames are the collective cultural structures that build understanding of

how individual knowledge is transformed by cultural structures or criteria (Everett,

2003). Cultural frames give “meaning and coherence to all the cultural propositions

which collectively operate as a selection system within the selection process of

organizing” (Everett, 2003, p. 10). As Everett (1994) concludes, cultural frames give

structure to other cultural propositions and are conceptually equivalent to cultural

schema. In this study, the concept of cultural schema is applied to capture the actions

of collective knowledge structures.


Cultural Schema

Schemes of interpretation operate as frameworks for people to make sense

and understand events, actions and situations in unique ways allowing meaning or a

reality to be constructed (Chan, 2003). Weick (1979) argues schema direct action

and have an effect of mediating or “bracketing portions of experience” (p. 154).

Schema operate at an individual level as a framework for understanding the

organisation way of life, or put more simply, “schemas influence individual

interpretations, assumptions and expectations regarding organisational events

(Scroggins, 2006, p. 86). This follows Pace (1988) who argues schemas “consist of

hypotheses or expectations about incoming information, which then provide plans

for gathering, interpreting, and using this information” (p. 149). Lyles and Schwenk

(1992) suggest schema held by organisational decision makers have an important

influence on how environmental information is interpreted, framed and processed.

This perspective is summarised by Chan (2003):

The structures of action, as systems with emergent patterns or “culture”

become codified into a shared social system of understandings and rules that

become accessible to and understood by actors of a social collective. The

membership of a collectivity is determined through a shared culture, and the

actors display their possession of such a common culture. In turn, this culture

is itself the defining characteristic of the system as a whole. (p. 361)

Schemas for interpretation aligns with Geertz‟s (1973) view that culture acts

as a set of control mechanisms “plans, recipes, rules, instructions – for the governing

of behaviour” (Geertz, 1973, p. 44).Weick (1979) describes a schema as “an

abridged, generalised, corrigible organisation of experience that serves as an initial

frame of reference for action and perception” (p. 154). For organisational members,

schemas act to simplify cognition and act as “mechanisms by which culture shapes

and biases thought” (Di Maggio, 1997, p. 269).

Cultural Selection

Cultural selection describes the capacity of the organisation‟s cultural system

to influence the nature of its own evolution (Durham, 1991). Cultural selection is


defined as “the differential social transmission of cultural variants through human

decision making” or simply as “preservation by preference” (Durham, 1991, p.199).

Cultural selection preserves cultural variation between different groups by

reinforcing the differences over time. Cultural selection predicts that human decision

making systems promote general patterns of fitness (i.e. desirability) and sustains

many of the differences in that group (Durham, 1992). It is during the social process

where cultural material is influential in the selection process (Everett, 2002),

supporting Weick‟s (1979) notion that selection pressures in organisations are the

outcome of “schemes of interpretation and specific interpretations” (p. 131).

To facilitate the functional transmission of culture among members, Durham

(1991) refers to cultural units of information as “memes” to represent actual units of

socially transmitted information, which are symbolically coded and transmitted over

space and time. Cultural units of information are socially learned from other people

in the group (Durham, 1991). Durham believes this information is not simply

“learned”, but is “socially learned” through modelling. Units of culture, he argues:

1) consist of information that actually or potentially guides behaviour

2) accommodate highly variable kinds, quantities, and ways of organizing

information (that is, with variable amounts of hierarchy and integration) and

3) demarcate bodies of information that are, in fact, differentially transmitted

as coherent, functional units. (p. 188)

Durham (1991) argues the transmission of cultural units among members

involves “comparative evaluation of variants according to their consequences” (p.

199). Members select for both the potential, and actual, consequence. This highlights

the role of human decision making in the transmission of cultural information

(Durham, 1991).

The instructional role of culture acts as criteria to categorise and assist in

decision making and action (Goodenough, 2003). The social nature of culture as an

information resource indicates it is both public and prescriptive of actual or potential

behaviour (Durham, 1991). Cultural values can be expected to bias decisions to

ensure that those decisions are congruent with the existing organisational values and

belief systems (Durham, 1991). The mediating action of culture on environmental


information acts as a force or criteria to constrain or endorse behaviours related to

environmental variables (Dil, 1980; Durham, 1991; Everett, 1996; Milton, 1996).

Culture acting as criteria provides insight into diversity of human behavioural

customs (Durham, 1991). This is clearly articulated by Goodenough (1963, cited in

2003). He states:

Culture consists of i) criteria for categorizing phenomena as meaningful

stimuli, ii) criteria for deciding what can be, iii) criteria for deciding how one

feels about things (preferences and values), iv) criteria for deciding what to

do about things, v) criteria for deciding how to go about doing things, and iv)

the skills needed to perform acceptably. (p. 6)

Cultural selection offers a way for the cultural knowledge system of a group

or organisation to maintain and sustain itself. While cultural systems are created,

shaped and constrained by individual minds, it is the shared, collective knowledge

system and the resulting partially contingent behaviours of the group that dictate the

sustainability of that system in its social environment (Keesing, 1974). Variations in

information are filtered through members‟ perceptions and incorporated into their

interpretations and understandings of their world (Aldrich, 1999). Cultural variants

act to bias change toward their environment so that the change “fits” within the

“existing web of local meanings” (Durham, 1992, p. 204). It is through cultural

selection that members can be “situated in” and interact with their environment

through negotiated meanings (Milton, 1996). It is this key theoretical claim that sets

the foundation for the exploration of this study. Understanding how people

conceptualise, interpret, and perceive their world is foundational to understanding

the decision-making process (Milton, 1997).

Variations in environmental information are filtered by member‟s perceptions

and then changed through selection processes before being incorporated into

organisational belief systems (Aldrich, 1999). Filtering implicates the action of

culture to mediate the relationship between humans and their environment (Milton,

1996). In an organisational setting, “selection processes operate by affecting the

information and resources available to people, workgroups, organisations, and

populations” (Aldrich, 1999, p. 29). The need to understand managerial mindsets is a


core requirement for understanding strategic thinking (Lundberg, 2005). The

knowledge required to make decisions as the organisational response to key

environmental change suggests organisational members have interdependent

relationships sharing knowledge, beliefs, and values; learning occurs during

communication processes; and subsequent institutionalisation of the new knowledge

(Aldrich, 1999). Exploring how “frames of reference” derived from shared values

and assumptions influence organisational action remains a key focus in management

literature (Bailey & Johnson, 2001). This is a central question for this study.

Self-selection in cultural selection reflects the capability of the cultural

system to influence the nature of its own evolution through decision making

(Durham, 1991) specifically involving making a choice between various options

(Adair, 2010).

Decision making or human action that results from choice is generally

characterised as a rule-following behaviour (March, 2002; Zhou, 2002), however

more recent literatures question the rationality of this as a process (March, 2002).

Strategic decision making in an organisation is better placed as social practice as it

represents the outcome of interaction between organisational members (Nutt &

Wilson, 2010a). The interaction occurs in the recognised steps followed in decision

making including problem definition, decision objectives, alternative generation,

anticipated outcomes, tradeoffs between alternatives and outcomes, assessment of

uncertainty, risk tolerance and impact on related decision (Hammond, 1999, cited in

Franz & Kramer, 2010). The influence of organisational culture on this decision

making process is described more generally as „organisational characteristics‟ (Franz

& Kramer, 2010) and influential in the context of local preferences and accepted

social rules (March, 1994).

While organisational culture has been shown in studies to influence decision

making style (Carr, 2005), implementation of strategic decisions (Miller, Weilson, &

Hickson, 2004), specific research to understand how the internal organisational

environment influences decision making has been overlooked (Nutt & Wilson, 2010;

Papadakis, Thanos, & Barwise, 2010). The concept of cultural selection fills this

gap.


In self-selection, a group‟s belief systems are preserved through the action of

cultural selection (Durham, 1992). Selection acts directly on “observable

manifestations of culture, as represented by traits, local communities, or whole

cultures” (Rambo, 1991, p. 82). Durham (1991) uses the term self-selection to

describe the selective influence of cultural elements on the human decision-making

system. This selective transmission indicates that members actively select

information by choice or imposition (Durham, 1991).

Choice and imposition

Durham (1991) identifies two modes of cultural selection decision making

that accommodate power structures and suggests these “...can be thought of as the

idealized poles of a decision continuum” (p. 198). He states:

At the relatively less constrained end is “selection by choice” or simply

“choice”, the preservation of allomemes through election or free decision

making by individuals or groups (free that is within the cultural constraints of

mental habit and existing technology). At the other end is “selection by

imposition” or simple “imposition”; the preservation of allomemes by

compliance with the decisions of others. (p. 198)

Imposition compliance is enforced by four forms of power structures

described as coercion, force, manipulation or authority (Durham, 1991). These align

with hierarchical structures and power forms commonly found in organisations

(Robbins & Barnwell, 2006).

Durham (1991) notes that regardless of choice or imposition, a comparative

evaluation by members of possible variants is undertaken as part of cultural selection

during a social process. Cultural units of information, or memes, are selected by

carriers based on their assessment of perceived or actual consequences, based on

actual experience or experimentation (Durham, 1991). The opportunity to make

decisions based on actual experience offers an assessment of consequences from the

different options. This allows a cross matrix of association with consequences from

similar types of decisions. The second way is experimentation or pretesting of


anticipated consequences. Cultural selection therefore is a response to consequences

as an outcome of the decision (See Figure 3):

In both cases, the system assesses consequences – those expected or those

actually experienced, according to one or more decision criteria, and then

searches for the optimal decision, that is for the alternatives within the best

overall evaluation (Durham, 1991, p. 200).

Figure 3: Cultural Selection (Durham, 1991)

Transmission or communication of a meme may be continuous and from

many sources (Durham, 1991). A meme that is considered disadvantageous or

undesirable has the potential to be eliminated through judgement about its effects

(Durham, 1991). Cultural selection can also operate at both a conscious and

subconscious level, according to how individuals recognise these effects. Durham

argues cultural selection occurs more rapidly at a conscious level, while at a

subconscious level it is slowed due to reinforcement being unrecognised or not

causally associated. Cultural selection influences the capacity for change within the

cultural system through self-selection (Durham, 1991).

In summary, the role of cultural selection in the development and

maintenance of a cultural system of social knowledge can be understood through

identifying the instructional role of cultural selection in shaping the cultural system.


Cultural selection is premised on people within a group making decisions based on

comparing and choosing among options and basing their evaluations on estimates of

the consequences and alternatives of those decisions. Within a group, decision

making governed by cultural values – or the relative appeal to persons in a position

to choose or impose these – should be considered as a prime (but not exclusive)

means of evolutionary change among groups in a population. It is during this social

or collective process where cultural material is influential in the selection process

(Everett, 2002) supporting Weick‟s (1979) notion that selection pressures in

organisations are the outcome of “schemes of interpretation and specific

interpretations” (Weick, 1979, p. 131). That is, given what is postulated about the

influence of cultural selection on the cultural knowledge system of groups, we

expect to see greater variation between groups in a population over time as a result

of the action of cultural selection within groups. The influence of culture acting on

selection in a system of social knowledge frames the first research question and leads

discussion into exploring further the nature of cultural criteria acting in this process:

RQ1: When culture is a system of social knowledge, what is the role of cultural

selection in the development and maintenance of that system?

The significance of the cultural units that informants create through social

interaction is an important part of understanding organisational members lived

experiences (Schwartzman, 1993). The next section will introduce Weick‟s (1969,

1979) sociocultural model of organizing as a framework to explore this interaction,

or the processes undertaken by organisational members to reduce environmental

equivocality. I will then focus on exploring the process of selection and the potential

to identify cultural units acting in the selection processes in organizing.

Sociocultural Model of Organizing

Weick‟s (1969, 1979) sociocultural model of organizing is a relational model

premised on the concept that organisational members seek to reduce environmental

equivocality and achieve a consensus of environmental meaning (Kreps, 1990;

Littlejohn, 1999; Weick, 1969). Equivocality is defined as the choice by

organisational members of more than one possible meaning from the environmental

information presented (Bantz, 1989; Weick, 1979). Weick (1979) defines organizing


as “a consensually validated grammar for reducing equivocality by means of sensible

interlocked behaviours” (Weick, 1979, p. 3). Figure 4 represents Weick‟s model.

Figure 4: Weick’s (1969, 1979) sociocultural model of organizing

The aim of organizing is to have action in a sequence in order to have a

sensible outcome (Weick, 1979). The shared nature of building these recipes for

action (about agreement of what is out there) has implications for the role of cultural

selection i.e. Organizing provides order to social behaviours and actions of members

through rules, processes, and procedures (Weick, 1979).

Organizing has more recently been discussed in the context of sensemaking

(Weick, 2001). While Weick identifies the close relationship between sensemaking

and organizing, he notes sensemaking “remains a subtle, elusive phenomenon” (p.

95).

Weick frames the organisational environment as a communication construct

or information source to which members encounter and react (Kreps, 1990).

Organizing (Weick, 1969, 1979) represents the communication processes used by

organisational members to respond to equivocality in environmental information.

Communication is central to sense making and organizing processes (Kreps, 2006;

Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). When applied to organisations, the focus is on

human interaction and communication as the key phenomenon of organizing (Kreps,

1990; Littlejohn, 1999).

Organizing is theoretically important as a framework to this study because it

represents a set of collective activities that act as recipes for action. This is

significant for the development of strategic communication as it is through these

collective processes that communication responses are defined and developed.

Organizing has a foundation of agreement “concerning what is real and illusory” that

is built upon by the social process of organizing (Weick, 1979, p. 3). Organizing also


responds to Keesing‟s (1974) view of ideational cultural systems as a system of

knowledge “shaped and constrained by the way the human brain acquires, organizes

and processes information and creates “internal models of reality” (1974, p. 89,

citing Gregory, 1969). These processes, he argues, closely resemble those associated

with natural selection.

Weick‟s (1969, 1979) sociocultural model of organizing has a prominent

theoretical presence in the organisational communication literature and has been

used extensively to explore a variety of contexts and organisational levels in

organisational studies (Bantz, 1989; Everett, 1996, 2002; Kreps, 1990; Littlejohn,

1999). The central rationale for the incorporation of Weick‟s sociocultural model of

organizing in this study is the significance of reduction of environmental

equivocality and the organizing processes organisational members undertake to

transform equivocal environmental information into organisational action and

communication messages (Kreps, 2006). Weick‟s model is built from the perspective

that the core of organizing is the problem of adapting to environments enacted by

organisational members (Everett, 2002). Under the terms of this model,

organisations create, construct, or invent their environments and then select those

aspects of the environment to respond. The model represents how organisational

members enact environmental information and the communication processes used to

develop meaning and reduce environmental uncertainty (Kreps, 1990).

A context for exploring the role of culture as a key influence in shaping the

collective processes of selecting environmental information is also informed by other

perspectives on how organisations seek to develop knowledge in response to their

environment. The interpretive approach emphasises a socially constructed

organisational reality achieved through the negotiation of actions and meanings and

on how individuals, groups and organisations notice and interpret information and

use it to alter their fit with their environments (Aldrich 1999). The adaptive learning

perspective suggests organisations learn from experience by repeating successful

behaviours and discarding unsuccessful ones (Aldrich, 1999). The knowledge

development perspective suggests organisational members have interdependent

relationships sharing knowledge, beliefs, and values; learning occurs during

communication processes and subsequent institutionalisation of the new knowledge

(Aldrich 1999). These models and perspectives highlight the role organisational


culture has in influencing the collective processes described in Weick‟s sociocultural

model of organizing. Weick identifies that a “scheme of interpretation” is important

in these processes, identifying a proposition of this study that this is actually set by

cultural elements within the organisation acting during the selection process. The

interlocking processes represented in Weick‟s model are described in the following

section.

Ecological Change

Ecological change reflects Weick‟s (1979) view that organisational members

do not actively notice environmental monotony or regularity. He argues members

only become aware of their environment when a change or irregularity occurs.

Change, according to Weick, can create uncertainty or equivocality. These changes

provide the raw materials for members to enact in their effort to reduce the

environmental equivocality (Weick, 1979). Reducing environmental equivocality is a

central premise of Weick‟s sociocultural model of organizing (Kreps, 2006).

Exploring equivocality within a framework of strategic communication addresses the

challenges faced by organisational members in the formulation of an appropriate

communication response.

Enactment

Weick (1969, 1979) conceives environmental enactment as a cognitive

process where organisational members actively attend to and construct their

environment to reduce equivocality. Enactment allows organisational members to

constitute their own environment (Everett, 2002; Kreps, 1990; Weick, 1969, 1979).

Members selectively perceive “their reality” of the organisational environment, then

rearrange and negotiate it; it is the action of the individuals that ultimately defines

the meaning of what they see (Weick 1979). The distinction of an enacted, rather

than an external, environment preserves the process of the environment being created

by organisational members, which then in turn imposes on the organisation (Weick,

1969, 1979).

Organisational members act to understand what they have done and the

creation of meaning for organisational members is retrospective, influenced by both

the past and the present (Weick, 1969, 1979). It is the conceptual clarity or


understanding that Scott (2003) equates enactment with an “active process by which

individuals, in interaction, construct a picture of their world, their environment, their

situation (Scott, 2003, p. 98). Members, through social interaction, transform

equivocal information into unequivocal and familiar information to allow acceptance

of the version of change or event (Weick, 1979). Organisational members‟ own

perceptual constructs direct their interpretations and understanding of information

taken in from the organisational environment (Aldrich, 1999).

From a communication management perspective, enactment characterises

environmental interaction at the boundary of the organisation shaping the

organisational reality of what constitutes what is “out there” (Everett, 1985). As a

bracketing activity, managers actively “construct, rearrange, single out, and demolish

many „objective‟ features of their surroundings” (Weick, 1979, p. 164). This activity

highlights the active role organisational members‟ play in creating their reality of the

organisational environment (Weick, 1969).

The decoding effect of enactment produces unique “displays” (Weick, 1979)

and allows managers to construct a mental picture of their environment in the

context of their organisation. Therefore enactment is influenced by what members

already know and have already experienced, signifying the potential role of

organisational culture within this process. Weick‟s model stipulates through its

“sociocultural” nature during selection, processes of social cognition operates on the

output of environmental enactment.

Selection

Selection is the most significant process at the organisational level of analysis

in Weick‟s sociocultural model of organizing (Everett, 2002; Weick, 1979). During

selection, organisational members actively select or dismiss equivocal raw material

(data) and impose meaning on the selected data to produce a meaningful

(unequivocal) enacted environment (Kreps, 2006; Weick, 1969). The selection

activity accounts for how the collective experience of the organisation shapes the

display from enactment through processes of selection. The individual statements in

the enactment pool are translated by passing through a filtering of the selection

criteria.


During the process of selection, criteria are developed and sustained

collectively by organisational members (Weick 1969). Meaning for the group is

negotiated and subsequently “reinforced, refined or replaced through the continuing

interaction of group members” and contingent on the development of consensus or

rules that guide behaviour and group norms (Everett, 1985, p. 75). Once these have

been sorted for acceptability by the selection criteria, they then constitute an

important set of criteria that drive the selection process in organizing.

Weick (1979) refers to the creation of causal maps from past organisational

experiences that act as templates to guide interpretations of equivocal information.

The action of selection processes filter information through members‟ perceptions

that alter information that people act on (Aldrich, 1999). Organisational members

collectively apply rules and cycles as schemas of interpretation to attempt to reduce

equivocality (Kreps, 1990; Weick, 1979). Weick (1979) recognises schema‟s direct

action and effect of mediating or “bracketing portions of experience” (p. 154).

Weick (1969) argues that the most stubborn problem with selection criteria is

that social systems use two types of criteria: “Criteria relevant to the internal

functioning of the system, and criteria relevant to the external functioning of the

system; and it is entirely possible that internal criteria are applied more frequently

than are external criteria” (p. 58). Criteria evolve out of cultural knowledge

structures active in the selection process that act to produce enacted environments

(Everett, 2003). The focus of this study considers the context of organisational

culture as criteria acting on the process of selection (Everett, 2001, 2002; Schein,

1984). Cultural frames or schema operate to organise other cultural propositions into

a coherent selection system, and therefore are fundamental to identifying a cultural

selection system operating in the selection process (Everett, 2003).

Retention

The outcome of selection processes results in the retention of sense making

of enacted environments that is a version of a previously equivocal display of

meaning (Weick, 1979). At this stage of Weick‟s model, the organisation retains the

products of enacted or meaningful interpretations in forms suitable for future

reference (Choo, 2001; Weick, 1979). The products of retention “affect subsequent


actions; they are frequently edited; they are protected in elaborate ways that may

conflict with variation and selection” (Weick, 1979, p. 126).

As retention results in products that are continually referenced and act to

perpetuate retained enactments, strategic communication is conceptualised to

represent the outcome of enactment and selection processes in Weick‟s (1969, 1979)

sociocultural model of organizing. Orton (1996) notes the importance of the

feedback loop from retention to enactment in the organizing model and emphasises

the influence of past structures on constraining action, particularly for current

enactment. Retention is conceptualised in this study as the output of strategic

communication in the forms of actions and messages both observed and recorded in

documents and artifacts relating to communication activity.

This section outlined Weick‟s (1969, 1979) sociocultural model of

organizing and detailed Durham‟s (1991) theory of cultural selection. Most

importantly, these two key concepts in the literature lead to the second and third

research questions in this study:

RQ2: How does cultural selection operate in organizing?, and more specifically

in an organisational setting


In the next section, I further refine the focus of this study to explore how

organisations respond to environmental change or uncertainty through strategic

communication within the theoretical domain of adaptation and adjustment in public

relations theory.

Public Relations Theory: Adaptation and Adjustment

The foundations of public relations theory are drawn from systems theory,

rhetorical theory and critical studies (Heath, 2009). While many influences on

public relations theory are noted, systems theory remains the dominant contributing

framework to public relations theory (Chia & Synnott, 2009).

Systems theory provides a coherent set of explanations of how systems

operate (Miller & Miller, 1991). Von Bertalanffy (1969) first observed that the

nature of the system and its relationship to the environment was open for the

selective exchange of energy and matter in order to maintain or achieve stability.

While Heath (2009) criticizes systems theory for its inability to detect the role of


meaning in the process of adjusting through communication, other scholars suggest a

systems approach to public relations offers researchers a way to explore not only

relationships with external stakeholders but also insights into understanding internal

public relations functions of an organization (Cutlip, et al., 2006; Lattimore, et al.,

2004; Mackey, 2004). Therefore taking a systems or ecological approach in public

relations emphasizes the interdependence of organisations with their social

environments (Grunig, Grunig & Dozier, Broom, 2009; 2002; Treadwell &

Treadwell, 2005).

An open system model of public relations is described by the theory of

adaptation and adjustment where public relations takes a role to support the

organisation to adjust and adapt to changes in their environment (Broom, 2009).

Everett (1993) argues the imperatives of public relations as a management function

responsible for relationships between an organisation and the publics of its social

environment constitute an ecological paradigm based on a model of organisational

adaptation:

... this model and its derivatives are ecological in that they posit public

relations as a boundary function that mediates the organization/environment

relationships. In this approach, organizations are held to adapt to

environmental requirements through the establishment and management of

mutually beneficial relationships. (p. 180)

An ecological approach describes the interdependence of organisations with

social actors in their environment (Broom, 2009). Environmental uncertainty

provides the context for public relations practice (Okura, Dozier, Sha, & Hofstetter,

2009).

Public relations is described as paradigmatic example of strategic

communication (Botan, 1997) as in practice, public relations plays an important role

in helping organisations adjust and adapt to change in their social environment

through strategic communication (Broom, 2009; Everett, 1993). The social

environment is conceptualised as the social, relational and opinion systems operating

in an organisation‟s environment, or what Broom (2009) describes as the social

setting. In this context, public relations is recognised as a mediator of the

organisational-environment relationship (Lauzen & Dozier, 1992), and it is in this


boundary spanning role that public relations contributes to strategically managing

organisation-environment responsibilities (Chia & Synnott, 2009).

The contribution of public relations to organisational responses is through

devising action and communication strategies to manage relationships with key

publics and around issues (Dutton, 1993). Environmental scanning and interpretation

are key strategic activities enabling the organisation to anticipate and identify issues

(Grunig, 2000). Analysis and associated communication responses result from

efforts by organisational members to formulate strategic communication in response

to environmental change (Cutlip, et al., 2006; Everett, 2001).

Strategic Communication

Strategic communication is a central organising concept for this study as it

describes the organisation‟s efforts, through communication, to adapt and respond to

its social ecology (Everett, 2001). Weick (1987) emphasises the idea of strategy as a

means by which organisations seek to manage their relationship with the

environment. The reduction of environmental uncertainty and the collective

processing of information by organisational members to produce organisational

responses provide the context on which this study is founded. Weick (1987)

describes it as a cognitive map held by managers that provides a worldview to colour

how they interpret the changes an organisation faces and the responses they adopt.

Zerfass (2009) acknowledges the embedded nature of strategic

communication function within organisational social structures acquired through

shared interpretations and routines. Manifestation processes and their associated

expectations play a significant role in strategy formulation and analysis undertaken

by organisational members (Weick, 1987). Organisational decision makers therefore

intervene between the environment, moderating environmental effects inside the

organisation (Weick, 1979). The role of strategic communication in helping the

organisation respond to environmental uncertainty is well established in the literature

(Argenti, 2007; Cornelissen, 2008; Grunig, 1992a; Murphy, 2007; Steyn, 2007).

While strategic communication is recognised as a multidisciplinary endeavour,

(Sandhu, 2009), it remains central to the practice of public relations (Chia & Synnott,

2009) and aligns with the management of communication on behalf of an

organisation (Heath, 2005).


Defining Strategic Communication

Strategic communication is operationalised in this study as deliberate

communication practices on behalf of the organisation and encapsulates the

intentional activities of its leaders, staff, and communication practitioners to respond

to environmental change. This conceptualisation is founded on descriptions of

strategic communication as a goal focused or purposeful communication effort

combining knowledge based decision making and action. Hallahan et al. (2007)

define strategic communication as “the purposeful use of communication by an

organization to fulfil its mission” (Hallahan et al., 2007, p. 3). As an organisational

effort, strategic communication is an outcome of transactional social activity within

the organisation (Shockley-Zalabak, 2002). Argenti et al. (2005) argue strategic

communication is “communication aligned with the company‟s overall strategy to

enhance its strategic positioning” (p. 83). Murphy (2009) describes strategic

communication in behavioural terms, or “the orchestration of actions, words and

images to create cognitive information effects” (p. 105). Clampitt et al. (2000)

describe strategic communication as “the macro-level choices and tradeoffs

executives make, based on their organizational goals and judgements about others‟

reactions, which serve as a basis for action” (p. 41), while Vasquez and Taylor

(2000) describe it as communication between an organisation and its publics.

More generally, strategic communication is viewed as a deliberate

communication effort to achieve an organisational goal and respond to a broader

social environment. Steyn‟s (2003b) aligns strategic communication with

management decision making to highlight organisational adaptation to its social

environment as a key focus of communication strategy. She states:

Corporate communication strategy is based on a definition of corporate

communication/public relations as a strategic management function. It assists

the organisation to adapt to its environment by achieving a balance between

commercial imperatives and socially acceptable behaviour; identifying and

managing stakeholders and issues, as well as the publics/activists that emerge

around issues; and building relationships through communication with those


on whom the organisation depends to meet its economic and socio-political

goals. (p. 178)

The terms „strategic communication‟ and „communication strategy‟ are also

commonly interchanged in the literature (see for example, Argenti, 1998; Botan,

1997; Clampitt, et al., 2000; Cornelissen, 2008; Cutlip, et al., 2006; Moss &

Warnaby, 1998; Steyn, 2007; Steyn & Puth, 2000; Tibble, 1997). These terms

generally reflect decision making in communication activities driven by corporate

strategy (Argenti, et al., 2005). A key function of strategic communication therefore

is to inform or achieve mutual understanding with stakeholder groups (Argenti,

1998; Calantone & Schatzel, 2000). The next section addresses the focal context of

this study; the formulation of strategic communication in an organisational setting.

Formulation of Strategic Communication

Strategy formulation concerns the relationship of an organisation to its

environment and is a critical component in the strategic management process (David,

2007; Hunger & Wheelen, 2007; Steyn & Puth, 2000). Bourgeois (1980) describes

the strategy formulation process as “how managers engage in the intellectual and

political processes of determining the basic character of a firm and what business it

is” (p. 26). Johnson, Scholes and Whittington (2008) identify two approaches to

strategy development; intended and emergent. Rational choice theory suggests

people make decisions and decide how to achieve their goals based on consideration

of all available information concluding that behaviour is rationally chosen (Sutton &

Anderson, 2010). If this were the case, much less variation would be evident,

particularly in the context of how organisations respond to environments.

The formulation of strategic communication is viewed as a core skill public

relations contributes to organisations (Broom, 2009; Grunig, 1992a). Strategic

communication results from both planned and emergent processes (Cornelissen,

2004). The interpretive approach to strategy formulation is based on a social contract

view of strategy, portraying the organisation as “a collection of cooperative

agreements entered into by individuals with free will” (Chaffee, 1985, p. 93). While

other perspectives of strategic communication formulation are offered, the dominant


paradigm is a rational, functional efficiency-oriented perspective (Sandhu, 2009).

Similarly public relations and organisational communication literature often describe

the formulation of strategic communication as a rational, linear and traditional

process with a focus on the planning and tactical implementation of communication

campaigns (Chia & Synnott, 2009; Seitel, 2007; Shockley-Zalabak, 2002; Steyn,

2003a; Stroh, 2007).

A cultural perspective of strategy formulation requires organisational

members to interpret environmental information and respond appropriately (Ansoff

& Sullivan, 1993; Bourgeois, 1980; Hambrick, 1981; Mintzberg & Quinn, 2003).

The effectiveness of the response relies on the ability of organisational members to

interpret, understand, or translate equivocal environmental information (Beer,

Voelpel, Leibold, & Tekie, 2005; Everett, 1993; O'Shannassy, 2003; Weick, 1988,

2001). The next section further explores the importance of collective influence,

conceptualised as organisational culture, towards this effort.

Importance of Organisational Culture in Strategic Communication

Organisational culture is an important influence in strategy formulation

(Alvesson, 2002; Haeckel, 1999; Johnson, et al., 2008; Mintzberg & Quinn, 2003;

Rughase, 2006; Strickland & Thompson, 1998). The theoretical importance of

organisational culture in public relations theory and communication management has

been articulated for nearly two decades with little advancement (Sriramesh, 2007).

While the need to conceptually link corporate culture with public relations has been

cited by leading public relations scholars including Sriramesh (2007), Grunig (2006)

and Everett (1990, 1993, 1996, 2001), empirical research on organisational culture

and public relations has primarily focused on establishing its influence on

practitioner roles and practice contexts. For example, Rhee and Moon (2009) found

organisational culture alters public relations practice in Korea and called for further

research in this area. Bowen (2004) found aspects of an organisational culture

supported ethical decision making and noted a consistency or fit between personal

and organisational values related to ethics. Diaz, Abratt, Clarke and Bendixen (2009)

found a correlation of the influence of a specific type of organisational culture

(organic) on the public relations practitioners‟ role, level of preparedness and success

with international assignments. Kerston (2005) explored the role organisational


culture played in producing crisis and argued to challenge assumed singular

rationalities that exist in organisations. Frohlich and Peters (2007) explored gender

stereotypes in a German public relations consultancy and found organisational

culture was a key influencer. Sriramesh, Grunig, and Buffington (1992) hypothesised

that public relations practice both influences and is influenced by organisational

culture and external culture, while Grunig (1992a, 1992b) identified authoritarian

and participative culture as the two key influencing concepts in organisational

culture and power important for public relations practice. Grunig argued these

variables directly affected both the communication function of the organisation and

the success in achieving organisational outcomes. The consensus from these studies

is that organisational culture is important and has the potential to promote greater

understanding of public relations activities in organisations (Sriramesh, Grunig, &

Dozier, 1996).

Ristino (2008) more recently proposed a sociocultural model of public

relations based on a Vygotskian model from a critical cultural perspective, arguing

that public relations‟ primary role is as an active agent and mediator of an

organisation‟s culture. Cameron and McCollum‟s (1993) study of the relationship

between organisational culture and the producers of communication (public relations

staff) highlighted the importance of alignment of beliefs (shared reality) about the

organisation by all levels of staff. Vasquez and Taylor (1999) extended Hofstede‟s

cultural dimensions to Grunig‟s models of public relations to explore the links of

societal to organisational culture in the setting of US public relations practice. The

study found that while two-way models emerged as being most valued, the actual

practice was dominated by one-way models. Overall, research exploring

organisational culture in public relations practice has recognised that meaning and

interpretation are central processes of public relations activities (Leichty & Warner,

2001, p. 61). These activities are conditioned by a cultural discourse and are not fully

understood (Leichty & Warner, 2001).

Public relations activities occur primarily in culturally bound organisations

(Grunig, 2006). Everett (1996) rejects the notion that organisations can be viewed as

cultures and notes an ecological view differentiates culture as social knowledge.

Everett (1990) argues:


the organization/environment relationship focus of public relations is, in part,

a culturally constructed system. A view of organizations as sociocultural

systems necessarily shifts descriptive and explanatory efforts from the

individual to the cultural level of analysis. (p. 244)

Understanding the relationship between organisational ecology and

organisational culture is crucial to the development of public relations theory and

practice (Everett, 1990), as the concept of adaptation “sets the central task for public

relations management as the effort to maximise the degree of adaptation between the

organisation and its social environment” (Everett, 2001, p. 313). Within the

ecological perspective on public relations, strategic communication is used to

respond to equivocality present in the organisational environment (Everett, 2001).

This perspective places organisational strategic communication in a cultural

framework. This framework focuses the need to understand the role of culture as part

of an ecosystem and how a group‟s shared and socially transmitted beliefs and

values (i.e. its culture) shape understanding of, and actions toward, their environment

(Dil, 1980; Milton, 1996). This leads to the final two research questions for this

study:

RQ4: How does cultural selection operate in the development of strategic

communication in RCQ? and

RQ5: What is the role of culturally derived strategic communication in the social

ecology of organisations?

Research Problem and Research Questions

Informed by these contexts, the central research problem of this study is to

explore how culture, operating as a system of social knowledge, influences the

development of organisational strategic communication. This central research

problem reflects a core proposition that strategic communication emerges not as a

direct, rational response by organisational members to objectively given

environmental factors but as an outcome of the influence of cultural criteria (cultural

selection) acting on the enacted environment. To summarise, based on the literature

reviewed, the research questions guiding this study are:


RQ 1: When culture is a system of social knowledge, what is the role of cultural

selection in the development and maintenance of that system?




communication in Red Cross Queensland?

RQ 5: What is the role of culturally derived strategic communication in the social

ecology of organisations?

The next section proposes a model that builds on the ontological categories

of organizing and represent the influences on the process of the development of

strategic communication, specifically the action of cultural criteria (cultural

selection) acting on selection processes in Weick‟s sociocultural model of organizing

(1969, 1979). In order to study the conceptual apparatus and processual elements

these propositions are described below and illustrated in Figure 5 in the CSSC

model.

Cultural Selection of Strategic Communication Model

The effort to integrate Weick‟s sociocultural model of organizing and

culture‟s role in the development of strategic communication, specifically the action

of self-selection as a central property of cultural systems (cultural selection), can be

explored within the terms of the proposed model of Cultural Selection of Strategic

Communication (CSSC model - see Figure 5). This model provides the foundation

for the central claim of this study – that strategic communication should be expected

to be as much as a result of the action of cultural selection within an organisation,

than as a reflection of variation in the conditions of the social environment.


Figure 5: Cultural selection of strategic communication (CSSC) model

Research Propositions

The research questions provoke a set of broad propositions that emerge from

employing Weick‟s sociocultural model of organizing as a conceptual framework

with the integration of an explicit concept of culture. While the research questions

establish the need and rationale to develop the CSSC model, propositions establish

claims that can be derived from the model. The propositions thus serve as

checkpoints for qualitative data. These checkpoints help to examine the descriptive

adequacy of the model not as deductive tests but as interpretive understandings that

would be expected when model and data interact. So for example, the propositions

help guide examination of the CSSC model to focus on the biased transformation of

cognitive material as it moves through selection in the formation of strategic

communication and offer interpretations of relationships and conditional statements

of analysis implications. In keeping with ethnographic traditions of participant focus,

the propositions build an understanding of the research participants‟ actions and

setting.


Propositions

P1 – Organisational culture acting as a system of social knowledge is a key

influence in the selection process of organizing.

P2 – The property of “self selection” within the cultural system acts to form a

key set of selection criteria in the selection process of organizing.

P3- Cultural criteria acting as a subsystem in the selection process of organizing

will mediate the nature of strategic communication and are key influences in the

development of strategic communication.

The key contribution to the literature of organisational communication and

public relations is a greater understanding of the action of cultural selection in the

selection process of organizing and its consequent impact on strategic

communication. The relevance of this work relates to development of strategic

communication as an interaction among key organisational members during

sensemaking to reduce environmental equivocality. Specifically the study proposes

that a significant aspect of what is created as the organisation‟s strategic

communication results from the interaction of the two processes of enactment and

selection in Weick‟s sociocultural model of organizing. The development of strategic

communication is proposed as an outcome to this interaction as much as it is a

response to variation in environmental conditions. The CSSC model is situated at

exactly this intersection of:

1) Individual interpretations of environmental factors described by the process

of enactment;

2) Culturally organised social knowledge present in the selection process of the

model;

3) Collective organisational action in the form of strategic communication.

The CSSC model proposes the relationships around which the study is

organised and which drive the ethnographic component of this work. The basic

premise of the model is that the origins and nature of strategic communication, as an

organisational response to environmental variation, can be understood by examining

cultural selection and its influence on what Weick (1969, 1979) identifies as


environmental enactment. Strategic communication therefore emerges as an outcome

of the action of cultural selection acting on variation present in the enactment

process.

The ontological categories of organizing proposed in Weick‟s model - i.e.

enactment, selection, and retention – are used as a theoretical backdrop to this effort

to understand the sources of strategic communication. The role of culture in

organizing, specifically the action of cultural criteria acting within selection

processes under the terms of Weick‟s model, can be explored in the context of

strategic communication development. In this context, values and assumptions are an

integral part of organizing and are a key to understanding their role in shaping

criteria in the selection process specified by Weick‟s model. The model provides a

means to describe how strategic communication develops as a collective response to

environmental equivocality and identifies the role of cultural selection in providing

criteria to shape selection processes.

Summary

This chapter reviewed the body of literature on the concepts of culture,

ecology, and cultural selection, strategic communication, to establish the context for

examining cultural structures as systems of social knowledge and cognition on the

formulation of strategic communication and the collective nature of internal

organisational influences on this process. Weick‟s sociocultural model of organizing

was introduced as the foundational framework of communication theory to explore

the role of cultural selection in the formulation of strategic communication.

The review established that culture acting as a system of social knowledge

provides a foundation for the exploration of cultural criteria in the formulation of

strategic communication. A new model was proposed – the Cultural Selection of

Strategic Communication (CSSC) model – to respond to the research problem and

the need to build an understanding of the origins and nature of cultural influences on

the development of organisational strategic communication. Chapter 3 will employ

organisational ethnography as a method to explore the adequacy of the CSSC model

to investigate this cultural phenomenon.

Chapter 4: Setting 61

Chapter 3

Methodology

This chapter describes the methodology underpinning this study and provides

a rationale for employing the method of ethnography to explore and analyse the role

of organisational culture in the development of strategic communication.

Ethnographic research traditionally attempts to understand the lived worlds of

participants and the context of their views and actions (Snape & Spencer, 2003).

Because of this over-arching rationale, ethnography was adopted to build an in-depth

case study of the primary site of RCQ, with two comparative studies to contextualise

data and deepen understanding (Platt, 2007).

The central research goal organising this study is to explore and describe the

role of organisational culture in the development of strategic communication. Using

a seminal model in organisational communication, Weick‟s sociocultural model of

organizing (1969, 1979), this study explores and describes the interaction of two

central features of that model- enactment and selection to understand how cultural

elements influence selection of enacted environments. This interaction of the two

central features of the organizing model represents a phenomenon where little

previous knowledge exists (Babbie, 2001; Marshall & Rossman, 1999) and therefore

an exploratory study is suited to this phenomena (Cavana, Delahaye, & Sekaran,

2000).

This chapter is structured following Crotty‟s (1998) four key elements of a

research study. First, epistemological foundations and theoretical perspectives are

presented. Second, the research design of organisational ethnography employing

progressive contextualisation is presented as a suitable design for this study. Third,

the research setting and approaches to data sources are detailed, identifying

analytical processes and contextualisation of data. Finally, the quality of the

approach is outlined including ethical considerations and limitations of the method.

Figure 6 outlines the organisation of Chapter 3.



Theoretical Perspective and Ontological Considerations

An interpretive perspective provides context for the research design of this

study and the use of ethnography as its central method (Crotty, 1998). An

interpretive approach to understanding and investigating the social world provides a

conceptual framework in which reality is known to the researcher through socially

constructed meanings (Snape & Spencer, 2003). In interpretive research, meaning is

disclosed, discovered, and experienced (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998). The meanings are

grounded in subjective, socially constructed contexts informed by the social world of

the participant. An interpretivist orientation acknowledges the traditions of


anthropological studies and approaches common to exploring the social influences of

how people construct meaning in natural settings (Neuman, 2003). The task for an

ethnographer then “is not to determine the truth but to reveal the multiple truths

apparent in others lives” (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995, p. 3).

Epistemology is concerned with ways of knowing and learning about social

worlds and the basis of truth in those worlds (Grbich, 2007; Willis, 2007) . The

relation between epistemology and philosophy is that epistemology concerns the

“general conditions under which it is possible to speak of understanding” while

philosophy is concerned more with forms and context in which this occurs (Winch,

1990, p. 41). The epistemological perspective taken in this study recognises the

socially constructed nature of the “reality” of data and influence of the researcher‟s

worldviews and known pre-existing theories.

The context of this research is set within the social world of RCQ. This social

world is studied through immersion in their organisation with the aim to produce a

detailed description of how a system of shared knowledge, expressed as

organisational culture, influences the processes undertaken by organisational

members to formulate strategic communication.

Acknowledging methodological assumptions is an important aspect of a

social science research process to maximise learning (Crotty, 1998; Grbich, 2007;

Hammersley, 1990). This study follows the tenants of realism whereby reality exists

independent of our beliefs and understanding (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003).

Consequently, ontological assumptions underpinning this study are common to many

qualitative research projects and include naturalism, understanding, and discovery

(Hammersley, 1990).

Naturalism aims to capture natural behaviours in natural settings through

direct contact with participants and contextualises data to its natural setting

(Hammersley, 1990). In this study the aim to describe the cultural units impacting on

the development of strategic communication emphasises the importance of context as

a core part of the research narrative (Hammersley, 1990). Understanding is the

second assumption as the researcher seeks to genuinely understand human responses

and the underlying cultural perspectives on which they are based (Hammersley,

1990). Discovery is the third assumption as qualitative data are concerned with

process induction (Snape & Spencer, 2003). Using an inductive method provides for


theory to be built from data and allows researchers to conceptualise and

operationalise concepts simultaneously (Johnson, 2003; Neuman, 2003).

Research Design: An Ethnography

Ethnographic enquiry seeks to discover meanings and perceptions of people

in a social collective and interpret their understandings in the context of their world

view (Crotty, 1998). An ethnographic account details selected aspects of a culture in

written form (van Maanen, 1978). As a basic form of social research, ethnography

offers social researchers the opportunity to study small-scale settings focusing on

participants in everyday contexts and involves data from a range of sources

(Hammersley, 1990). Mitchell (2007) highlights the importance of context in

ethnography:

A major part of the legitimacy for this induction process is careful attention

within ethnographic work to the context of events, since it is assumed that

events seen out of context might be misunderstood. Indeed so central is

context that it is not merely a precondition for the development of general

theory out of a particular event; rather, context when well described is the

development of theory. (p. 55)

Ethnography features “up-close involvement of the researcher in some form

of participative role in the natural everyday setting to be studied” (Stewart, 1998, p.

6). The researcher is the instrument, who, coupled with the experiences of

participants, seeks to synthesise “disparate observations to create a holistic construct

of „culture‟ or „society‟” (Stewart, 1998, p. 6). This is an appropriate approach for

this study as identification and description of culture is a primary goal (Hammersley

& Atkinson, 1995; Mitchell, 2007) and will allow its role in the development of

strategic communication to be explored and understood.

An “ethnography” encompasses a set of methods that involve a researcher

(ethnographer) participating in people‟s lives for an extended period with the aim to

make sense of their world (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995). This interpretive study

follows what Geertz (1973) describes as a semiotic or meaning approach, as the aim

is thick description providing context to observed processes. Geertz (1973) notes


description needs to move beyond attribution to culture as the cause, and he argues,

“culture is not a power, something to which social events, behaviours, institutions, or

processes can be causally attributed: it is a context, something within which they can

be intelligibly – that is thickly – described (Geertz, 1973, p. 14).

Organisational Ethnography

An organisational ethnography is employed in this study to allow for deeper

understanding and accommodate multiple perspectives of organisational processes

(Fine, Morrill, & Surianarain, 2009). An organisational ethnography is defined as an

ethnographic study of an organisation and their organising processes (Ybema, et al.,

2009). It differs from traditional ethnography as people in a setting are organised

around prescriptive goals and formalised rules governing status, relationships and

behaviours within the context of the setting (Rosen, 1991).

Organisations can be conceptualised as “hermetically sealed worlds” (Rosen,

1991, p. 4) in terms of being a specific group or social setting. The organisational

space demands that members suspend their social awareness and adopt

organisational relatedness (Rosen, 1991 citing Spooner, 1983). This differs from a

normal “social community” as organisations have formalised roles defined by the

organisation – member roles, functions, and status that act independently of the

social environment. Relationships within an organisation are therefore somewhat

artificial, organised around the purpose of the firm (Rosen, 1991).

Organisational ethnographies are designed to discover, explain, and give

some order to observable phenomena and social processes that characterise

organisational behaviours (van Maanen, et al., 2007). An ethnography requires a

researcher to account for patterns of organisational member activities through

knowledge of the organisational culture (van Maanen, 2002). Ybema et al (2009)

identified seven distinguishing properties of interpretive organisational ethnography.

These are firsthand accounts using combined fieldwork methods, the uncovering of

complex dimensions of power and emotion, context sensitive actor centred analysis,

meaning making, multivocality and reflexivity and positionality.

Organisational ethnographies have been used in researching a variety of

organisational settings and contexts including development of programs (Bartle,

Couchonnal, Canda, & Staker, 2002) accessing health services (Bruni, 2006),


doctors without borders in the Congo (Cooren, Brummans, & Charrieras, 2008) and

shadowing non humans (Bruni, 2005). Within the strategy literature, ethnographies

are more commonly employed as an approach for researching strategists-at-work

(Samra-Fredericks, 2003). However there is continuing scholarly support for

organisational ethnographies as a suitable methodology to explore organisational

contexts (see for example, Cunliffe, 2010), and this call is echoed more recently in

the public relations literature (L'Etang, et al., 2010).

The value of ethnography as a method in public relations centres on the

ability to gain critical insights into the value of practice and discourse surrounding

public relations practice and its contribution to new theoretical directions (Daymon

& Hodges, 2009; Sriramesh, 1992b). Everett (1990) argues that organisational

ethnography is suitable for theory building in public relations “given models of

reciprocal change and effects in organization-environment relationships” (p. 242).

L‟Etang (2006) furthers the call for public relations researchers to engage with

ethnography to deepen understanding of practice.

Acknowledging ethnography has not been widely embraced in public

relations, public relations studies using ethnography has been tentative (Daymon &

Holloway, 2011). Studies have employed ethnographic approaches to explore

different contexts, practices and concepts. These include Daymon and Hodges

(2009) who explored public relations practice in Mexico City, while Sriramesh

(1992a, 1992b, 1996) explored and analysed public relations activities in Indian

organisations. Palenchar, Heath, and Dunn (2005) undertook an ethnography to

investigate risk communication while Moffitt (1992) used ethnography to

conceptualise a public and challenge the institutional paradigm of public relations to

gain insights into notions of meaning and audience. Everett (1990) integrated

organisational ethnography with ecological public relations with a study of a non

profit organisation. The need for public relations to embrace ethnography as a

research tool to understand public relations practice

The Research Setting: Red Cross Queensland

The primary setting for this research is RCQ. To contextualise this setting of

RCQ, the national organisation of RC and the divisional operating structure within

which RCQ sits is first introduced. Following this, progressive contextualisation will


be detailed as an appropriate technique to capture and build knowledge of the

cultural meanings within the setting.

RC has a long tradition in Australia. Established in 1914 as part of the First

World War effort, RC has evolved to become one of Australia‟s leading

humanitarian and disaster response organisations. Employing 1862 staff nationally

(Australian Red Cross, 2008a), the organisation commenced a major rebranding

project in October 2007 with the goal to nationalise RC and integrate corporate

communications under a single positioning statement and simplified messaging. In

concert with these changes, reviews of program viability, reporting and structural

responsibilities commenced with the aim to provide efficiencies across the

organisation and refine the focus of program service delivery.

Structurally, RC has a national policy directorate leadership function

designated by a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) located in Sydney, with the national

office headquarters located in Melbourne. The national office coordinates national

programs, represents the organisation nationally and internationally, and provides a

policy and procedure service as specified by the organisation (Scott, 2003). The

structure of RC consists of three levels: the Council, the Board and the CEO.

The RC Board delegates day-to-day management of the affairs of RC to the

Divisions and the CEO (Robert Tickner). The RC Board delegates the CEO a broad

range of society-wide and international responsibilities. The CEO manages these

delegations through his senior managers consisting of the Director of Operations,

Chief Financial Officer and Director of Marketing Fundraising and Communication,

and through the National Management Team. The CEO is accountable to the Board

for implementation of the Strategic Plan and for oversight of operational

management according to the policy and systems. In addition to the national office,

RC has nine operating divisions that comprise the Red Cross Blood Service and

eight state and territory divisions.

The selection of RCQ as the primary case site and RCSA and NCD as

contextualising case sites reflected the structure of the organisation. NCD was

selected as a case site as it is responsible for organisational strategy decisions and

interpreting key environmental events. The national office also identifies key events

deemed worthy of state-based responses.


RCQ and RCSA possess a common organisational form (Scott, 2003) and

each state division has complex organisational structures, staff, and operating

environments that provide suitable comparative settings to study strategic

communication as an empirical entity. These provide the adequate similarities in

process and structure that Vogt (2002) considers are crucial for multicase or

comparative studies. Each state division has an Executive Director (ED) and a local

management team responsible for responding to national policy and establishing

local initiatives to meet operational budgets and goals. The state divisions are

responsible for service delivery, membership, and fundraising (including funding of

programs through state grants) within their own geographical boundaries. Their

structures are generally mirrored across each division, with some differences in

position titles and program delivery responding to local geographical demand.

Boundaries of Progressive Contextualisation

Traditionally ethnography is confined to a single-site for an extended period

of 12 months or more (Fetterman, 1998; Platt, 2007). However, contemporary

ethnographic practice reflects technological and globalization influences that blur

traditional boundaries and territories and require the need to consider broader

influences on a local geographical unit (Mitchell, 2007; Platt, 2007; van Maanen,

2006). While defining the specific nature and boundary of the organisational

environment is required for research and analysis (Hall, 1992; Scott, 2003),

Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) argue a case may go outside its natural boundaries

of the setting to allow information to be collected to inform a deeper understanding

or perspective of the case. Like many contemporary organisations, the natural

boundaries of RCQ were not clearly defined. As the corporate structure of RC

reflected a hierarchical, bureaucratic organisation with a decentralised structure

(Robbins & Barnwell, 2006), a multi-sited research design was conceptualised to

respond to this structure and what Marcus (1995) articulates as the “argument of

ethnography” (p. 105); that is a multi-sited study logically designed around paths,

processes and physical locations of associations. Vayda (1983) cautions researchers

not to make assumptions about the stability and boundaries of the unit of study, or

“components or expressions of some previously defined system” (p. 267), and as


such, this study is bound by the role of activity rather than a defined geographical

setting.

Falzone (2009) describes the essence of multi sited ethnographies as

following “people, connections, associations, and relationships across space” (p. 2).

Mitchell (2007) describes this as a shift in ethnographic research, as multisite

ethnographies follow “processes in motion” (p. 64), and this depends on the creative

ability of the ethnographer to establish links and commonalities of a phenomenon

(Marcus, 1998). Marcus (1998) supports ethnographic research designs examining

“the circulation of cultural meanings, objects and identities in diffuse time-space” (p.

80). Vayda‟s (1983) progressive contextualisation provides a similar holistic

approach by focusing on people performing activities and following the relationships

of interaction rather than being bounded by a previously defined system. Vayda

(1983) provides this rational for progressive contextualisation:

They started by focusing on specific activities... performed by specific

people in specific places at specific times. Then they traced the causes and

effects of these activities outwards. In doing so, they remained committed to

the holistic premise that adequate understanding of problems can be gained

only if they are seen as part of a complex of interacting causes and effects.

But the investigators avoided a priori definitions to the boundaries of such

complexes... (p. 266)

As represented in Figure 7, data collected followed the emergent themes first

introduced in RCQ then contextualised out to the NCD and RCSA. As a researcher

and instrument, I identified cultural influences in the processes undertaken to

respond to environmental or ecological change and formulate strategic

communication as a response to that change. Vayda (1983) argues progressively

contextualising the knowledge of the data observed provides the researcher with a

deeper understanding of situations and allows for surprise and unexpected results to

emerge rather than relying on fitting with preconceived notions of the setting or

disciplinary norms.


Figure 7: Progressive contextualisation of strategic communication in RCQ

One critical and foundational consideration in this study is the argument

presented by Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) that ethnographic research design is

a continuous process requiring constant monitoring of the alignment of research

problem and case selection. The achievement of methodological fit defined by the

elements of a research project‟s internal consistency is a learning process that can

require modification during the course of the research (Edmondson & McManus,

2007). While the design of this study originally proposed three RC divisions for a

multisite ethnography (New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland), approval was

only granted for RCSA and RCQ, with interviews only in the NCD. As the focus of

the study was on exploring cultural influences on strategic communication combined

with the logistical reality that the researcher could spend much more time in RCQ,

and less time in RCSA, the research design had to be revised. While the RCQ and

RCSA cases were similar in structure, strategy and environment, if claims by

Durham (1991) were correct, then they would be two different organisations.

Therefore, the research design was revised to allow the comparative sites to inform

and strengthen understanding of the primary setting.

The design of this research identifies RCQ as the primary site and RCSA as

the secondary site within contributing data from the NCD to contextualise RCQ


knowledge. The use of primary and secondary sites provides context within the

system and opportunity to uncover systematic relationships among the phenomena

observed (Wolcott, 1994). The sites of RCSA and the NCD provide a depth of

knowledge of the strategy making influences and processes in the primary site of

RCQ. The focus on policy and the broad national responsibility and reach of national

office authority dictates an “imposition” role as a cultural influence on local decision

making (Durham, 1991, p. 192). In this context, it imposes authority and limits

“unbridled local discretion” (Durham, 1991, p. 192) of the state office staff. The

three cases chosen provide a rich source of data to respond to the research questions.

This is based on three key assumptions:

Red Cross has a clear and distinct operation of a national and state

structure which provides an opportunity to observe distinct cultural

influences;

The state divisions have local autonomy to interpret and respond uniquely

through communication actions to national policy and local

environmental events;

National office is responsible for organisational strategy decisions and

interpreting key environmental events and identifies (selects) key events

deemed worthy of state-based responses.

The progressive contextualisation design of this study is supported by Platt

(2007) who argues the multi-site ethnography is not a comparative method. This

approach fits with Vayda‟s (1983) conceptualisation of progressive

contextualisation. Progressive contextualisation places the case studied in a wider

context to thereby, also understand the wider context, not simply to compare (Platt,

2007).

The notion of within case comparison has been raised by Vogt (2002) who

alerts researchers to the criticisms of case comparison in ethnographic studies with

the inability to compare the same datasets. While concerns have been raised that

multisite approaches have a potential to present a fragmented and plural approach to

ethnography (Mitchell, 2007), leading to potential loss of quality (Marcus, 1998),

support for multisite ethnographies continues to be evidenced in research across a

wide variety of contexts and settings (Bettany & Daly, 2008; Bletzer & Weatherby,


2009; Calaff, 2007; DeBerry-Spence, 2008; see for example, Formoso, 2009; Hall,

2004; Johnson, 2007; Molina, 2008; O'Connor, 2002; Roth, 2009; Smyth, 2003;

Sorensen, 2008; Vallas, 2003; Warner, 2000; Weine, Bahromov, & Mirzoev, 2008;

Weis & Dimitriadis, 2008; Wood, 2000).

Presentation of the Ethnographic Account

This study will adopt a commonly used approach in ethnographic account

presentation that includes naturalistic and legitimatory writing (Hammersley, 1990).

Realism or naturalism seeks to achieve a level of description that allows the reader to

be immersed in the scene, while legitimatory writing responds to the needs of more

formalised research reporting such as found in dissertations and has a framework

with headings and conclusions designed to reassure the reader of its importance and

objectivity (Hammersley, 1990). Van Maanen (2006) refers to this as “a

predicament” that dissertation students face when having to construct what he calls a

career making project. This construction or selective description varies and

negotiates through a number of genres of ethnographic accounts to achieve this (van

Maanen, 2006).

The central goal of ethnography is to provide “analytic, thick or theoretical

description” (Hammersley, 1990, p. 19). The account therefore will aim to move

beyond the reality of RCQ in an interpretive act. This act of interpretation results

from a complex process of interpretation, social interaction, and immersion.

Hammersley (1990) notes, “it is never a simple reflection of what exists” (p. 23).

The account will focus on rescuing the flow of social discourse to inscribe or secure

the moment in perusable form (Geertz, 1973). Hammersley (1990) cautions writers

to be aware of the assumptions informing the claims of the account and the

plausibility of the arguments. He signals the need for an explicit “indication of how

the description was produced, for what purpose, and what alternative descriptions

have been or could reasonably have been considered” (Hammersley, 1990, p. 22). In

response, this research attempts to portray multiple accounts of phenomena with

accompanying criteria for identifying these accounts. Van Maanen (2002) argues

that there needs to be a separation between first and second order concepts. To

facilitate this approach, Chapter 4 describes the setting and Chapter 5 describes what

van Maanen refers to as first order concepts; that is, participants‟ views of


phenomenon to produce emergent concepts. Second order concepts follow in

Chapter 6. Second order concepts are “those notions used by the fieldworker to

explain the patterning of the first order data” (p. 104) and presents the researcher‟s

interpretation organised by the key research questions. The next section details my

role as researcher in undertaking the research.

Researcher Perspective

Entry to the field in RCQ commenced with my introduction to staff as „a

university researcher who was interested in how RC‟s marketing and communication

area worked‟. The framing of my research role as a known investigator followed

what Lofland, Snow, Anderson, and Lofland (2006) term an “outsider” participant

researcher. The explicit nature of my role as a researcher allowed staff to

simultaneously know of my presence and thus allowed me to be a “neutral” observer.

The role as known investigator also facilitated the researcher as the instrument,

where “fieldworkers learn to use themselves as the principal and most reliable

instrument of observation, selection, coordination and interpretation” (Sanday, 1979,

p. 528).

Reflexivity and context remain central to the researcher‟s perspective. The

researcher being able to understand, interpret and describe organisational situations

are founded in both the researcher‟s perspective existing with the multiple realities

that exist in any research project. As Rabinow (1977) states:

Culture is interpretation. The “facts” of anthropology, the material which the

anthropologist has gone to the field to find, are already themselves

interpretations. The baseline data is already culturally mediated by the people

whose culture, we, as anthropologists, have come to explore. (p. 150)

An emic or insider‟s perspective to reality gives insight into behaviours and

attitudes of people and helps understand maladaptive behaviours (Fetterman, 1998).

An etic or outsider‟s perspective provides a scientific framework around the account

to facilitate description and analysis (Fetterman, 1998). These perspectives are

applied in this research in a continuum and shift from an emic to an etic perspective

through the description and analysis phases. While a non-judgemental, non-


evaluative orientation was adopted, I would like to acknowledge this was a challenge

at times due to scenes witnessed and actions taken.

Reflexivity encroaches on the research design at every stage (Hammersley,

1995). The nature of ethnographic research suggests a flexible interplay of

knowledge and research response that is not linear. Van Maanen et al., (2007)

acknowledge, “practicing organisational researchers know both from experience and

readily available collegial critique that any narrative suggesting an orderly, standard

model of the research process is rather misleading” (p. 1146). In a sense the

researcher was entering a corporate environment familiar yet new. It is familiar in

the sense that it was located in a metropolitan office block that had familiar

partitioned desks with computers – an environment familiar to the author from 20

years‟ work experience in a corporate world. Yet it was new in the fact that the

researcher had never stepped inside this building or had any contact previously with

RC (except to negotiate entry to the organisation for the purpose of this study).

Schwartzman (1993) argues it can be a significant phase for a researcher working

within one‟s own society.

The whole purpose of an ethnography is to capture culture or what

Hammersley (1990) describes as a native view of reality, “…we have no access to an

independent reality: all we have are interpretations, and the ethnographers account is

just as much an interpretation as are those of the people that he or she is studying”

(p. 14). Geertz (1973) identifies this as anthropological absorption to capture

meaning, hence “the degree to which its meaning varies according to the pattern of

life by which it is informed” (p. 14). Geertz (1973) articulates this process of

capturing social discourses:

The ethnographer “inscribes” social discourse; he [sic] writes it down. In

doing so, he [sic] turns it from a passing event, which exists only in its own

moment of occurrence, into an account, which exists in its inscriptions and

can be consulted. (p. 19)

Rabinow (1977) suggests that because both the researcher and the informants

live in a culturally mediated world, they are both immersed in self created “webs of

signification” (citing Jameson, 1972) they themselves have spun (p. 151). He argues,


“there is no privileged position, no absolute perspective, and no valid way to

eliminate consciousness from our activities or those of others” (Rabinow, 1977, p.

151). As a researcher I was mindful that a non-judgmental orientation assists

researchers to explore new directions, increase data validity and avoids data

contamination (Fetterman, 1998). Acknowledging personal beliefs and being explicit

in noting these in field notes identified personal biases. This follows Fetterman

(1998) who suggests, “making them explicit and ...trying to view another culture‟s

practices impartially” (p. 23). Rabinow (1977) puts this more succinctly, when he

reflects on the experiences shared in the field:

As time wears on, anthropologist and informant share a stock of experiences

upon which they hope to rely with less self-reflection in the future. The

common understanding they construct is fragile and thin, but it is upon this

shaky ground that anthropological inquiry proceeds. (p. 39)

The concept of reflexivity acknowledges the influence backgrounds,

orientations and interests play in shaping the research output from the study and the

researcher‟s awareness of her role in the study (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995). It is

an awareness and acknowledgement of self as researcher and the influence of the

social context of the position of the researcher in the setting. This position rejects the

claim that social research can be carried out in isolation of both researcher biography

and society, acknowledging instead the influences these characteristics have on the

findings (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995).

The acknowledgement of my previous roles (as a communication consultant

with 14 years‟ experience and as a public relations teacher), my motivations to

conduct the study in RC (to undertake the study in an interesting and legitimate

organisation) and the effect of this on the social phenomena being witnessed,

required constant reflection and awareness. My natural instinct was to be reactive

and solve problems quickly rather than describe and not participate in what I was

observing.


Relationship Building

In many ethnographic studies, the researcher develops special types of

relationships with the group being studied as part of the ongoing negotiations of

access (Fetterman, 1998). It is also not uncommon to find organisational

ethnographies studying people similar to the researcher that presents challenges for

the researcher (Rosen, 1991). In familiar situations Hammersley (1990) argues that

the risk of misunderstanding increases due to assumptions made based on pre-

existing ideas, as “we cannot assume that we already know others perspectives even

in our worn society because particular groups and individuals develop distinctive

world views” (p.8). A number of underlying assumptions were made by the

researcher subconsciously prior to going into the organisation. For example, that the

organisation was appropriately structured in terms of reporting lines and divisional

structures, line managers were rightfully empowered to make decisions, and staff

were suitably selected, qualified and experienced. Acknowledging these phenomena

explicitly allowed me to be alert to the influence of these assumptions (Hammersley

& Atkinson, 1995).

Entry to RCQ was facilitated through an existing relationship. This person

became the first of two key informants in my study. The key informants acted as

individuals who could “open doors otherwise locked to outsiders” (Fetterman, 2010,

p. 36). The key informants facilitated my introductions with senior people in the

RCQ and the NCD, and confirmed my role and research purpose as both credible

and legitimate. While both key informants came from different backgrounds and had

different roles in RCQ, common interests and outcomes were shared. These included

university linkages and familiarity with academic processes providing an important

endorsement and gateway into the organisation.

I also had another pre-existing relationship with a member in RCQ‟s

marketing, fundraising and communication (MFC) unit. I had previously undertaken

some consulting work for this member and a professional relationship was formed.

While contact had not been maintained since completing this work, the previous

relationship removed the need to establish trust in the formation of the relationship.

This person already knew who I was, where I worked, and the general purpose of my

study. This relationship was important because it provided access to organisational


documents. While access was sanctioned by senior management, identifying and

finding the documentation was made a lot easier by a facilitated approach.

Fetterman (2010) cautions researchers of the need to establish independence

in the field. Mindful of this need, I kept key informants and pre-existing

relationships within the context of my role as a researcher and worked to maintain

this distance during the study.

Access to Red Cross Queensland

Access to RC was negotiated over a 12-month period. Initial contact was

made via email in December 2006 to the RCQ MFC manager to investigate the

„research culture‟ that existed at RC. The email was forwarded to the RCQ group

manager of research and policy who requested a meeting on 25 January 2007 where I

verbally outlined my research proposal as background to the study. The director,

who was also undertaking a PhD, became the sponsor of the research and assisted in

negotiating formal access through the organisation. Table 1 summarises the access

timeline and associated activities undertaken to gain entry into the organisation:

Table 1: Summary of access timeline

Period Activity

18 December

2006

Expression of interest to key contact

25 January 2007 Meeting with group manager Research and Policy

20 April 2007 Presentation to ED RCQ – Access granted pending

approval National Director Communication

9 July 2007 Meeting with RC National Director of

Communication – Access granted pending approval

of individual state EDs

9 August 2007 Approval from ED RCSA

19 September

2007

Ethics approval received (researcher institution)

8 January 2008

30 June 2009

Data collection (ethnography) formally commenced

Data collection formally concluded


Sampling

According to Hammersley and Atkinson (1995), sampling within cases

occurs along the major dimensions of time, people and context. This responds to the

need to understand the complexities of the empirical social world (Jeffrey &

Troman, 2004). Each of these areas will be addressed in the following sections.

Time

While an ideal time to spend in the field has not been clearly established

(Jeffrey & Troman, 2004), many authors describe a period from three months to two

years depending on the research design (Fetterman, 1998; Hammersley & Atkinson,

2007; Wolcott, 1994).The time mode undertaken in this study is characterised as a

selective intermittent time mode where a flexible approach to site visit frequency

(Jeffrey & Troman, 2004) in RCQ was taken over an 18-month period from 8

January 2008 to 30 June 2009. This approach allowed for a progressive narrowing of

phenomena and opportunity to increase the depth and richness of data by capturing

both the routine of daily organisational life and periods of intense organisational

activity, and special events and rituals (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995; Jeffrey &

Troman, 2004). In this context, time spent in the field was intensive from January

2008 to July 2008 followed by intermittent periods from July 2008 to June 2009,

undertaken until theoretical saturation was achieved (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

Member checking continued until February 2010. This more selective approach also

allowed for periods of recording and reflection to improve quality of data

(Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995). It also reflected the realities of the researcher

balancing family, work and study commitments (Fetterman, 1998).

The time spent in RC required the witnessing of processes undertaken to

interpret and respond to environmental change. By their very nature, these processes

are iterative and require negotiated meanings that range from a brief question and

answer interaction between two organisational members, to a meeting where

meanings are negotiated or imposed. Therefore the researcher spent the first month

in observation-familiarisation mode. In this period, observations were made of

meetings of the team and the management group and incidental meetings between

team members and dialogue capturing events. Table 2 summarises periods of entry,

time calculated by hours, and associated data collection activities.


Table 2: Entry periods and summary of activities in settings

Period Time spent Activity

Jan – Oct 2007 Negotiating access

Jan – March 2008 296 hrs Observation and interviews - RCQ

April 2008 96 hrs Observation and interviews - RCSA

May –July 7 2008 278 hrs Observation and interviews - RCQ

July 7-9 2008 25 hrs Interviews - NCD (Sydney and Melbourne)

10 July – Dec 2008 63 hrs Observation (intermittent) and interviews

(checking and confirming) RCQ

Jan – June 2009 20 Intermittent observation (event based) and

interviews RCQ

Oct 2009 4 Member checking RCQ/ RCSA

May and July 2010 5 Member checking RCQ

People

The selection of people reflected their contribution in the development of

strategic communication. Organisations by nature are formalised in terms of role,

position, power and authority (Robbins & Barnwell, 2006). Organisational members

who were delegated by formalised role or position or by membership of a key

department were sought. Categories related directly to formal positions and included

senior management roles including EDs, group managers (sometimes referred to as

general managers), team leaders, and general members of a department deemed

responsible for communication functions in the organisation (such as the marketing,

fundraising and communication unit) as identified on published organisational charts

(see Appendix C). This follows what Hammersley and Atkinson (1998) identify as

demographic criteria where persons were sampled by categories or judgement

sampling (Fetterman, 1998) where researchers rely on their knowledge of the

organisation and positions to select the most appropriate people.

People were also member-identified (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1998) where

people in senior management positions would say, for example, “Oh, you need to

speak with (this person)” (Exec 4, Qld). Finally, people were selected by opportunity

(Fetterman, 1998) where the researcher was in a setting and discovered a person in a


role contributing to the formation of strategic communication that was not

immediately obvious from organisational documents.

Context

An organisational ethnography provides for specific events, encounters,

meanings and experiences to be contextualised within the specific social

environment of RC (Tedlock, 2003). Theory emerges out of descriptions of events in

a context bound by the setting (Mitchell, 2007). Sampling context in this study

reflected settings where communication planning and decision making related to

strategic communication naturally occurred. Setting awareness related to identifying

meetings, groupings and being present for discussions where this would occur.

Contextualising events also required looking backwards into background

information or previous discussions that took place prior to the meetings to allow the

researcher to interpret the construction of the complex processes shaped by systems

of meaning, and gain a holistic picture of the group.

Data Sources

The prime sources of data focussed on the words, paragraphs and actions of

the members of RC organised around direct experience, social action, talk and

supplementary data (Lofland, et al., 2006). To achieve this, qualitative tradition

offers three major approaches for data collection: “participant observation

(experiencing), interviewing (enquiring) and studying materials prepared by others

(examining)” (Wolcott, 1994, p.10). Table 3 summarises key data sources identified

in RC to enable the research questions to be answered.


Table 3: Case Construct and Data Sources

Construct Data Sources Participant group

Enactment

(individual level)

Depth interviews (individual)

Observation of interactions, tasks, settings,

timing, outputs, anything unique

Organisational documents (annual reports,

corporate plan, communication plans, media

releases etc.)

Memoing (comparison)

Key state-based

management team

Marketing and

communication staff

Culture Observation of rituals, symbols, group

interactions, tasks, settings, timing, outputs,

anything unique

Memoing



releases)

Observation

management

meetings

communication

meetings

Operation of cultural

self-selection in

Selection process

(organisational level)

Observation of group: their interactions, tasks,

settings, timing, outputs, unique events or actions



releases)

State-based

management team

group interview

Observation

State-based

communication

meetings

Strategic

communication

Interviews, field notes and observation.

Organisational documents (including

communication planning materials; meeting

minutes or reports; Strategy 2010 documents;

humanitarian magazine; Annual Reports and Year

in Reviews 2006-2009; brochures; internal

newsletters; media releases; speeches; campaign

materials; internal staff broadcast emails)

Interpretation of data

case

Memoing, constant comparison

Interpretation of data case


Fieldwork Protocol

A fieldwork protocol developed prior to entry was revised after entry to the

setting to accommodate and reflect the reality of the setting. The protocol (see

Appendix B) guided ongoing data collection in the primary site around established

conceptual domains in the comparative sites in RCSA and the national office.

Following data collection in the comparative sites, the protocol was again revised for

re-entry into RCQ to allow the researcher to be alert to missing data and look for

disconfirming evidence and to deepen emerging conceptual understanding.

Participant observation – experiencing the group setting

Observation as a source of data assumed the observed were an expression of

cultural systems within the organisation (Fetterman, 1998; Schein, 1984). Social

actions and flows of behaviour were attended to as articulations of cultural forms

(Geertz, 1973). Capturing social action requires researchers to immerse in a setting

to facilitate understanding of culture (Lofland, et al., 2006; Sanday, 1979). Ybema et

al. (2009) note successful observation requires close attention to detail at events and

interactions, and provides contextualisation (Elliott & Jankel-Elliott, 2003).

Observation provides a detailed, non-judgemental and concrete description of

observed organisational actions, events, objects and phenomenon (Marshall &

Rossman, 1999). In seeking cultural information within organisations, “observations

of manifestations such as artifacts and behaviours can therefore be used as sources of

data to „triangulate‟ with information obtained about cognitive components”

(Sackmann, 1992, p. 140).

In this study the researcher took an “outsider” participant role to conduct the

observation (Lofland et al, 2006). While Rabinow (1977) argues thematic

observation is difficult due to the ubiquitous nature of phenomena and the lack of

clear boundaries to limit and define a cultural performance, the observation strategy

in this study was to initially try to capture everything, with a view that over time

observation would become more focused. This approach is supported by Fetterman

(1998) who suggests observation, incidental, opportunistic or routine, “begins with a

panoramic view of the community, closes in to a microscopic focus on details, and

then pans out to the larger picture again – but this time with new insight into minute


details (Fetterman, 1998, p. 37). Using this approach, I maintained a passive

presence, being unobtrusive and generally non-interacting with actors in the setting

during an observed activity (Marshall & Rossman, 1999).

Settings selected for observation were guided by the research question and

evolved through theoretical sampling (Glaser, 1998). Settings included scenes where

the researcher anticipated that decision and sense-making would occur (Hammersley

& Atkinson, 1995). These settings included unit and senior management meetings,

team leader and staff meetings, and workshops or meetings attended by external

staff. When in the presence of new people, the researcher revealed her identity and

purpose of her being present at a meeting or setting. The open plan office spaces also

allowed opportunistic observations of informal staff interactions and conversations.

Data collection could be undertaken while being unobtrusive within the setting.

Meetings

Strategising is often undertaken in group settings or communities of practice

(Balogun, Huff, & Johnson, 2003). In this study, meetings were conceptualised as

this community. The frequency, ritualisation and consistency of meetings held as a

communicative event at RC provided a rich source of data to observe collective

strategic communication development and sensemaking processes. Schwartzman

(1993) conceptualises meetings as “communication events that must be examined

because they are embedded within a sociocultural setting (an organisation, a

community, a society) as a constitutive social form” (p. 39). She acknowledges that

meetings appear as routines and gathering of actors however argues meetings

contribute to the production and reproduction of organising structures. “Meetings are

responsible for the construction of both order and disorder in social systems, and so

they must be conceptualised as occasions with both conservative (as sense makers

and social and cultural validators) and transformative capacities” (Schwartzman,

1993, p. 40).

Shadowing

Shadowing (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007) of key positions was undertaken

in both RCQ and RCSA. The timing of observation occurred within the first three-

month period in the organisation period in RCQ (five work days) and two work days


in RCSA. Table 4 provides a summary of observational settings and Table 5

summarises observation framework (Cunningham, 1993).

Table 4: Summary of settings for observation and data collection

Activity Setting

Familiarisation / Discussion/

interaction – individual and

group

Individual offices and open plan

office spaces or cubicles

Group meetings – formal and

informal

Board rooms and meeting rooms

Interviews and member

checking

Offices/ meeting room/ local coffee

shops

Events

Key events were sought as a way to provide insight into a culture or offer a

lens to view a culture (Fetterman, 1998, p. 99). Events also bound the context of

participation, observation and analysis in fieldwork. In RC, key events were used as

a way to gain an understanding of the social group in different contexts. Key events

included activation (during times of a crisis), project special events and meetings

(such as Red Cross Calling launch and meetings, youth centre meetings), and unique

activities in the office environment including reprimands.

Field notes and concept maps

Lofland et al., (2006) insightfully notes humans tend to forget much of what

has occurred quite quickly. Therefore field notes formed a major part of this study

and explicitly recorded references to participant roles, interactions, routines,

temporal elements, interpretations and the social organisation in the settings, from

broad to specific observation (Adler & Adler, 1998). These adopt categories of

behaviours and action (Sanday, 1979) and are summarised in Table 5.


Table 5: Field notes – observation framework (Sanday, 1979)

Observational data Settings observed

Tasks Functions of individuals

Functions of key groups

Relationships of members in different settings

Actions/ behaviours of key members in different settings

Evidence of legitimate and illegitimate roles

Settings Descriptions of settings (evidence of cultural artifacts –

power, roles)

Behaviours and

consequences

Behaviours and rituals during meetings

Behaviours relating to subculture vs. corporate culture

Behaviours relating to cultural beliefs

Timing and

sequencing

Frequencies of actions and events

Identifying time patterns of behaviours

Unique events,

actions, outcomes

Any item that is unique, out of the ordinary as identified by

actors or researcher

Field notes of observations and memos to assist in analysis and theory

building (Glaser, 1992) played an important role in writing the ethnographic account.

A series of concept maps was developed as I identified associative and co-relational

relationships. The concept maps were initially drawn roughly by hand and then more

formally drawn using NVivo 7/8. As the depth and complexity of my interaction

with the organisation increased, the concept maps assisted in providing context and

tracking concepts to reflect the growing depth of understanding of the setting and

how it was shifting. During the course of the research, formal concept maps were

developed for the following themes:

Key initial concepts about the setting;

How RC sat in its social environment (conceptualisations of how

actors saw RC in its social environment;

Conceptualisations of relationships of National office to RCQ and

RCSA


Extensive field notes ranged from documenting what people said during a

meeting (noting that I was observing everything from where people sat to how it

progressed, topics and how people said things) to interactions. After three months in

the setting, observing interactions and movements during normal office hours,

observations shifted to selecting events such as meetings and undertaking interviews

with key identified personnel in the organisation whose role was involved in

strategic communication formulation. Participant familiarisation with my role and

purpose afforded me greater flexibility to attend, select and identify occasions for

observation. This follows Jeffrey and Troman (2004) who argue intermittent access

requires both compliance and trust of the members.

Recorded observations and field notes were entered in a hard copy journal.

As the researcher was known in the organisation and the nature of working in an

office meant that having a notebook and taking notes was not foreign to workers, the

researcher managed to capture most instances immediately – making dot points and

fully expanding these as a reflection of the culminated experience within 12 hours of

the observed activity. In addition, notes were made as jotted entries (Lofland, et al.,

2006) following a period of reflection or consideration. I also used a notepad to

capture these mental notes and these were added to the hardcopy journal at various

times during the research process (Lofland, et al., 2006).

Attention was given to components of observed scenes including concrete

sensory details of talk and action; general impressions and feelings; memories; and

objective, not evaluative assertions (Lofland, et al., 2006). Sanday (1979) notes that

participant observation is often supplemented by other data collection tools such as

depth interviews to enable cross checking of data.

Depth interviews

Interviews were gained with all personnel identified and approached by the

researcher to interview. It was interesting to note no member of staff declined to be

interviewed even though one of the key themes to emerge later in analysis was a

declared shortage of time and a sense of an overwhelming amount of work. However

two members failed to confirm an interview time (or changed the time set a number

of times) resulting in two staff not being interviewed.


A total of 51 interviews were conducted during the study. Interviews

commenced after four weeks in the setting. This allowed a relationship of trust to be

built and allowed time for participants to understand the nature of the researcher‟s

presence in the organisation. Interview situations followed what Neuman (2003)

describes as a form of social relationship between the interviewee and interviewer in

the context of a short term interaction to get accurate information in a context. The

aim of the interviews was to produce rich and complex data, suited for exploratory

and descriptive research (Cavana, et al., 2000). An ethnographic approach using non-

directive questions or semi structured questions was used to stimulate the

interviewee talking about a particular area (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995). This

approach can be classified as an informal interview (Bouchard, 1983) and aims to

uncover the participant‟s perspectives and understand their meanings of their daily

activities (Marshall & Rossman, 1999). A semi-structured framework in the form of

an interview guide provided for an orderly approach but with flexibility to probe

beyond standardised answers (Berg, 2004). The interview guide (see Appendix B)

consisted of key areas and was developed as dot points relating to the key construct

areas of enactment and selection. This was to ensure key areas were covered,

particularly in the initial interviews (King, 2004). The interview guide went through

a number of iterations as the researcher became more familiar in the setting and

incorporated new understandings and provided for emergent dialogue to arise

(Patton, 1990). A hermeneutic approach was also adopted to allow questions to be

added as the researcher‟s knowledge increased with each interview (Nichter et al.,

2004). Although this type of interview yielded much irrelevant extraneous data,

Cavana et al., (2000) suggests this approach is advantaged by its lack of bias and true

reflection of the situation of study.

A range of questioning techniques was applied in the interviews included

funnelling, paraphrasing, probing (Cavana, et al., 2000) and informal talk

(Fetterman, 1998). Interview questions followed an informal format with key

constructs informing the questions, but as opportunities arose, questions were asked

in context of the interviewee. Ybema et al. (2009) suggest this is a more appropriate

approach to allow for the researcher‟s knowledge of the organisation to be applied.

Interviews commenced with the outlining of information and consent as

required by the ethics committee. Interviews participants were provided with a


participant information sheet and signed a consent form prior to the formal interview

being conducted (see Appendix F). Participants were also advised that the interview

was being taped. One participant expressed nervousness in being interviewed and

was offered the opportunity to withdraw. She declined and said she was happy to

continue. Several participants made a comment following the interviews that they

felt that they had just had a counselling session and felt better for it.

Interviews were generally conducted on site in private meeting rooms or

respondent‟s offices (when available). Four interviews were conducted at local

coffee shops at the request of the participants. Most interviews were between one

hour and 1.5 hours. All interviews were digitally recorded except for one researcher-

caused failure of the recording device. In this case, extensive notes were made

immediately after the interview and checked by the participant for accuracy. Digital

voice files were downloaded on to the researcher‟s computer and transcribed

focusing on words, sentences and paragraphs. Although Lofland et al (2006) argue

that no standard convention exists for transcription, interviews were transcribed in

their entirety ignoring “filler” type expressions such as “ums and ahs”. After

interviews, field notes were made noting any unusual body language or mannerisms.

Fifteen interviews were transcribed by the researcher and 36 were transcribed

by an independent transcription organisation. These were checked for accuracy by

the researcher on coding through listening to the taped interview again and

comparing against the record.

Ethnoecology: Data Analysis

Ethnoecology is the study of what local people know, classify, and how they

use the knowledge of their environment (Sutton & Anderson, 2010). Everett (1990)

argues that when organisations are viewed as sociocultural systems, the discipline of

public relations focuses on the relationship of an organisation‟s culture to its social

ecology, then this relationship is best explored by using the theoretical features and

methodological tools of ethnoecology” (p. 248). Focusing on relationships between

an organisation and its environment, ethnoecology “seeks to provide an

understanding of the systems of knowledge that local people have” (Gragson &

Blount, 1999, p. ix). Ethnoecology is therefore concerned with understanding the

conceptual worlds of participants. Milton (1997) states ethnoecology is about:


understanding people‟s own perceptions and interpretations of the world,

partly in their own right, as diverse cultures, and partly because they form the

appropriate context in which to analyse people‟s actions and decision making

processes.... the focus on people‟s own conceptual models of the world. (p.

484)

Frake (1962) notes the aim of ethnoecological research is to understand how

people perceive their environment and how they organise these perceptions.

Understanding local or Indigenous knowledge structures is theoretically crucial to

understanding ecological relations (Ellen, 1982). The analytical approach of the

study is based on the concept of ethnoecology as a means of identifying cultural

units operating in the selection process.

The central focus of an ethnoecological perspective can be conceived as

understanding the relationship of decision making and a cognitive process involving

the employment of schemas, models, and contingencies (Gragson & Blount, 1999)

by culture members. Ethnoecological research seeks to uncover this process,

specifically what a culture knows and how it classifies this knowledge (Sutton &

Anderson, 2010; Toledo, 1992).

Ethnographic data analysis provides meaning and context to organisational

action (Rosen, 1991). Analysis following an interpretive approach aims to sort out

the structures of signification and build relationships between the data (Geertz, 1973,

p. 9). Wolcott (1994) argues analysis requires a “careful, systematic way to identify

key factors and relationships among them” (p.10). Description identifies actions

through observation. Interpretation follows analysis to make sense of the setting and

actions, to reach understanding, and address questions of meaning and context

(Wolcott, 1994).

Iterative coupling of data collection, analysis and theory generation was

applied to an inductive analysis of the data to generate an exploratory theory and

explore the origins and nature of strategic communication as an organisational

response to Enacted environments (Marshall & Rossman, 1999; Patton, 1990;

Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Examining the property of cultural selection in this

process, the researcher aimed for „theoretical sensitivity‟ in analysis and coding


(Glaser, 1992). Theoretical sensitivity refers to the researcher‟s insight and their

ability to give meaning, understand and prioritise relevant data (Strauss & Corbin,

1990). The fieldworker must be able to discern phenomena by identifying patterns,

ranges and variation in data (Geertz, 1973). The progressive contextualisation of the

case setting of RCQ and the comparative site of RCSA and the NCD are designed to

shed light on phenomenon and to “look for systematic relationships among diverse

phenomena, not for substantive identities among similar ones (Geertz, 1973, p. 9).

Data reduction is not a linear process in ethnographic enquiry but rather it follows

the iterative stages of transforming data through description, analysis and

interpretation (Wolcott, 1994, 2009). These processes will be detailed in the

following sections.

Reducing Data: Memoing and Coding

In the first stage of description, fieldwork observations data were

documented in journals and all recorded interviews were transcribed. Observations

were further reduced by memo writing, in the field after directly witnessing an event,

after a series of observations, and at the end of each observation day. Concept maps

were also developed and refined as themes emerged and shifted with more data. The

process of data reduction, analysis and display is illustrated in Figure 8.


Figure 8: Overview of analysis showing linkages to display

Memo writing

Memo writing is a crucial step between coding and brings analytic focus to

data collection and researchers‟ ideas (Charmaz & Mitchell, 2002). Memos were

used as a theorising write-up of ideas about emergent ideas or codes generated from

interviewing, observing, and reviewing organisational documents and the theoretical

relationships that emerged during this process (Glaser, 1998).Writing memos

allowed the conceptualisation of data so I could critically reflect to explore process,

assumptions and actions (Charmaz, 2000) and as a core device to bridge the scope

from collecting, coding, analysing, and sampling of data (Glaser, 1998). Memos

were in the form of written documents and graphical illustrations or conceptual

maps.

Memoing can be a source of idea generation while at the same time acting as

a device to manage and respond to the theory development process (Glaser, 1998). I

used memos to respond to the nature of the data rather than forcing a structure on the


memo (Glaser 1998). Memoing also assisted when grappling with ideas, refining

categories and exploring data relationships within the setting (Charmaz, 2002).

Memo and data sorting (reducing) were guided by the data‟s key emergent

properties (Glaser, 1998), with an analytical goal to allow the unique patterns of the

case to emerge (Denzin, 2002). The first stage of enactment occurred at the

individual level, therefore categories, themes and patterns were identified to describe

enacted events at the individual level and presented as cultural knowledge structures

in Chapter 5. The individual Enacted environment represented what was going on

that impacted on the organisation and capturing this variation through analysis.

The role of culture at the collective group level was described as memes that

represented patterns in the selection (i.e. cultural data). Schemas representing

collective cultural material or patterns of how collective beliefs of organisational

members operated as cultural criteria. The analytical goal for this stage was to

identify concepts that represent the cultural subsystems acting as collective selection

biases on enacted materials.

Data coding

Coding began analysis (Charmaz & Mitchell, 2002) and transformed data in

ways to guide evolving concepts (van Maanen, et al., 2007). Analysis began by

reading and categorising into codes suggested by the data, rather than being imposed

from the literature (Lansisalmi, Peiro, & Kivimake, 2004). Coding was applied at

three levels – line by line, sentences or paragraphs and entire documents (Charmaz,

2000; Glaser, 1992). Coding was operationalised as nodes, managed and stored by

computed assisted qualitative data analysis software NVivo 7/8/9. I started coding by

creating free and tree nodes to map relationships that emerged from the data

(Bryman, 2004). (A full list of nodes identified is available in Appendix E).

Richards‟ (2005) three stage coding process aligns with Wolcott‟s (1994)

three stages of transforming data (description, analysis and interpretation). Richards

(2005) argues coding by description, topic and analytical coding assists researchers

differentiate the purposes of each coding stage.

Descriptive coding was the first level of analysis that identified the cases and

attributes of the data including position, department, location, gender, age,

qualifications, and length of time working at RC . Dil (1980) notes codes “must also


describe the environment as the people themselves construe it according to the

categories of their ethno science” (p. 20).

Topic coding initially labelled expressions, sentences, and paragraphs into

topics. This approach allowed the identification of topics that were being discussed

or themes and categories that emerged from the data (Richards, 2002). Topic coding

aligns with Glaser‟s (1998) substantive codes that were generated to build

conceptual theory and clarify relationships. These relationships were driven by the

research questions. Examples are provided in Table 6.

Table 6: Examples of topic codes relating to key research questions

Social Ecology and

environment

What‟s „out there‟ – who and what /How does it all

work out there/What all the major elements are out

there/Who‟s important in the environment/How

does the organisation perform in this environment?

Culture and Organisational

Culture

Values and beliefs in the organisation/What‟s

important here/What's acceptable behaviour/How

does it work here/How does the ED fit/Decision

making/What's the culture/What happens to

people‟s ideas about (enactment) things in the

organisation and pressures from the operating

environment?

Strategic communication Communication programs and practices/ research/

action/ programming/ communication/ evaluation

Reputation/ mission/ vision/ strategic goals of

organisation

Stakeholder conceptualisations and prioritisation.

Pratt (1994) identifies the importance of classificatory schemas derived from

observations rather than preordained models. The use of knowledge structures and

schemas representing participants‟ shared cultural knowledge in RCQ provided a

conceptual foundation to explore the role of the cultural subsystem in the selection

process on the development of strategic communication. This was achieved by


examining participant‟s cultural knowledge structures through contextualising

comparative data from RCSA and NCD.

Quality of the Approach

Marshall and Rossman (1999) contend qualitative researchers face

challenges concerning clarity, consistency, and coherence when conducting research.

Denzin (2009) notes constructivism as an interpretive style founded on trustworthy

triangulated empirical data. Trustworthiness of the account is judged based on the

criteria of credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability, which are

equivalents of validity, reliability and objectivity (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

The quality of this study‟s approach responded to these concerns through the

research design aiming for a trustworthy account highlighting validity and reliability

within the context of an ethnographic method.

Ethnographic research claims validity as a major strength due to the

researcher being in the setting, informant interviewing and participant observations

offering a closeness to setting, categories and participants‟ empirical reality

(LeCompte & Goetz, 1982). Maxwell (2002) refers to validity as not inherent to a

particular method, but to the data, accounts and conclusions reached by using the

method. Naturalism assumes validity can be ensured by close contact.

Hammersley (1990) relates credibility to establishing legitimatory writing,

and argues the general practise in ethnographic studies “is concerned with

establishing that the ethnographer has been to the place and seen what is described

which is dependent on their ability to convince us they have penetrated another

community” (p. 23). However Lofland et al. (2006) argues while the naturalistic

investigation has fewer problems with validity than studies that rely on indirect

observation, “the naturalistic researcher must critically assess the truth and meaning

of every piece of information collected” (p. 90). They note truth corresponds to “an

accurate, factual depiction of the observed events and behaviours, both verbal and

nonverbal” (Lofland et al, 2006, p. 90). Trustworthiness was managed in this

research by using multiple sources of evidence to address discover and confirm

constructs as they emerged from the setting.

Internal validity is concerned with the sharing of conceptual categories for

mutual meaning among observer and participants and is challenged by history and


maturation, observer effects, selection and regression, mortality and spurious

conclusions (LeCompte & Goetz, 1982). These were addressed through identifying

the influence of time on the stability of concepts by maintaining contact with the

setting over an 18 month period. I was mindful of observer effects and potential

symbiotic relationships from being an observer in the organisation and was alert to

problems of entanglement, distortions from participant mistruths and credibility

(Lofland, et al., 2006; Walford, 2002). Independent sources and triangulation of data

were sought to clarify data and emergent themes to control these distortions

(LeCompte & Goetz, 1982). Triangulation involved the use of different methods and

sources to check the integrity of, or extend, inferences drawn from the data (Snape &

Spencer, 2003). Declaring my perspectives as a researcher was also used as a

technique to manage potential effects of researcher bias, claims of morality and

conclusions. Maxwell (2002) also delineates between descriptive validity (accuracy

of account in records, and secondary descriptive validity, being accuracy of

inference). These were addressed by having interview transcripts professionally

transcribed and case reports having a clear chain of evidence and detailed record

keeping. Member checking of accounts was undertaken with two key participants in

the study – one from RCQ and one from RCSA. The participants read the descriptive

accounts of their areas to check for accuracy of description.

Threats to external validity include those that reduce a study‟s “comparability

and translatability” (LeCompte & Goetz, 1982, p. 51). External validity relies on

sound description of the characteristics of salient phenomena. While qualitative

studies are not designed to allow systematic generalization to some wider population,

concerns have been raised by leading authors about the substitution of the traditional

observation based single site ethnographic study with a fragmented multisite study as

this has the potential to dilute the quality of the ethnography ( see for example,

Mitchell, 2007; Marcus, 1998). LeCompte and Goetz (1982) suggest a multisite

ethnography contributes to strengthening external validity through comparison with

other sites. While Wolcott‟s (1994) concern about multiple sites is related to the

superficial understanding gained of many sites and a lack of depth of any one site,

Marcus (1998) argues a multisite study nurtures the translation of meaning. While

Mitchell (2007) argues that holism is lost, Marcus (1995) concludes:


Although multi-sited ethnography is an exercise in mapping terrain; its goal

is not holistic representation, an ethnographic portrayal of the world system

as a totality. Rather, it claims that any ethnography of a cultural formation in

the world system is also an ethnography of the system, and therefore cannot

be understood only in terms of the conventional single-site mise-en-scene of

ethnographic research, assuming indeed it is the cultural formation, produced

in several different locales, rather than the conditions of a particular set of

subjects that is the object of study. (p. 99)

Reliability requires resolution of internal and external research design

problems to provide for external reliability (other researchers discovering the same

phenomena) and internal reliability (other researchers matching generated constructs

in the same way) (LeCompte & Goetz, 1982). While a general definition of

reliability is the quality of the study that allows it to be repeated with the same

results (Yin, 2003), ethnographic research is complicated by a lack of standardised

controls common to other types of research as it focuses on participant observation

in natural settings with the purpose of exploring unique phenomena that may not be

able to be replicated (LeCompte & Goetz, 1982). Constraints relating to external

reliability were addressed following Le Compte and Goetz (1982) through

responding explicitly to the five major problems of reliability: Recognising research

status, informant choices, social situations and conditions, analytic constructs and

premises and methods of data collection and analysis. Five strategies are offered to

address internal reliability: low-inference descriptors, multiple researchers,

participant researchers, peer examination and mechanically recorded data. While

only one researcher was involved in this study, the researcher was alert to description

versus interpretation and separation of chapters four, five and six reflect this

distinction.

Jeffery and Troman (2004) note two methodological issues that arise in

ethnographic modalities where time is an issue. These include compensating for a

lack of extensive time in the field and how to resist familiarity in intermittent modes

characterising this research. They argue the reduction of time can lead to a reduction

in ethnographic principles and a focus on the micro level of interactions. This was

addressed by focusing on broader theories and other influencing factors such as


relevant political, institutional, structural and cultural discourses in analysis to

sensitise the data (Jeffrey & Troman, 2004).

Ethical Considerations

Ethical issues in ethnographic research extend to every stage of the research

program (Fetterman, 1998). Fetterman (1998) argues that because ethnographers

delve into participants‟ secrets, rituals, and frustrations, ethics to an ethnographer

must preserve “the participants‟ rights, facilitates communication in the field and

leaves the door open for further research” (p. 129). Ethics approval was received at

the level one, low risk category and conducted to meet ethical guidelines set by the

researcher‟s University Human Research Ethics Committee (UHREC).

In conducting the research, I was aware that full participant consent was

required implicating voluntary involvement with withdrawal at any time by

participants. Full consent was obtained from all participants, and permission for

organisational access and use of organisational documents. Data collected from

interviews and observations required confidentiality based on non-identifying

individual and observational notes accessible only by the researcher. Specific content

and individual sources of organisational information and documents were not

disclosed, with group reporting at the organisational level.

Lofland et al. (2006) argue researchers are challenged by feelings of

deception and disclosure. These challenges are essentially ethical ones as they relate

to managing the relationship of observer-participant. Making explicit my researcher

role was one step to address this, however being witness to very personal situations

in the workplace continued to prove challenging when writing the account and

needing to balance the truthfulness of the observation with the researcher‟s

commitment to privacy of participants as such descriptions “can jeopardise

individuals” (Fetterman, 1998, p. 142). Fetterman also highlights feelings of

discomfort that arise from issues of disclosure. He states, “ethnographic descriptions

are usually detailed and revealing. They probe beyond the façade of normal human

interaction” (p. 142). This was encountered in this study, however data not relevant

to the study was not used.


Limitations and Key Assumptions

A number of key assumptions underpinned this research design. A challenge

on entering the field was the inconsistency of data sets afforded by the three sites.

The research design made assumptions that divisional sites would afford equal

access to data and opportunities to observe. However limitations relating to

geographical distance affected the nature and quality of the data collected and the

closeness of relationships with participants in RCSA and NCD.

The second assumption related to accessing events, meetings and documents.

RCQ was amenable to this and the more time I spent in the organisation correlated

with increasing invitations and opportunities to attend meetings. The situation

experienced in RCSA was more limiting due to lack of researcher familiarity to

identify meetings, events and documents. The consequence was far more data was

gathered in the primary site. While this was acceptable within the terms of the

research design, it provided a limitation on the scope of contextualising knowledge

in the primary site.

A third and important assumption was made that an appropriate structure and

function existed in RC divisions (RCQ and RCSA). This included reporting lines and

divisional structures. This assumption was found to be weak when confronted with

the reality of the settings. Ezzy (2002) suggests researchers should not deny or hide

the influence of preconceptions generated by reviewing existing literature but

formally state them and embrace an iterative process of simultaneous deduction and

induction of theory building, testing and rebuilding.

Summary

This chapter outlined the ethnographic method and research design

appropriate for this exploratory study. Through undertaking an ethnography and

employing progressive contextualisation, the research design placed the setting of

RCQ in its wider context (Platt, 2007) to build a depth of understanding of the

discovered phenomena. More specifically, the research design responds to the core

research problem of understanding the influence of organisational culture in the

development of strategic communication through building a depth case study of

RCQ with comparative sites of RCSA and the NCD. This chapter also described the


study design‟s adaptation that followed a continuous process of monitoring to align

the research problem and case selection (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995).

This chapter addressed the epistemological foundations and theoretical

perspectives and presented the rationale for selection of the research setting. Data

sources and analytical processes were also detailed.

Chapter 4 details the setting of the study sites to provide context and to

familiarise the reader with the cast of characters and their lived world. Chapter 5

then presents the ethnographic account of these settings and Chapter 6 presents the

analysis of cultural units.


Chapter 4

Description of Setting

Chapter 3 detailed the methodology of organisational ethnography and the

suitability of this method to examine the influence of cultural selection on the

formulation of strategic communication in RCQ. This chapter aims to provide the

context of the setting as sites of interaction, causes and effects of RCQ members as

they connect through the organisation (Vayda, 1983) and respond to environmental

change. Thick or detailed descriptions of settings, events, activities, interactions,

persons and language allow readers of ethnographies to understand the lived

experiences of the people studied (Geertz, 1973; Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2009),

and the wider world system that the participants experience (Platt, 2007).

To achieve this outcome, this chapter is structured in the following way.

First, RC and the NCD are introduced as this provides the policy, structure,

governance and social ecology that influence the operation of RCQ. Next, the focal

organisation of RCQ is introduced as the setting of the study, with a focus on the

marketing, fundraising and communication (MFC) unit as this site exists to

formulate the organisation‟s strategic communication. Finally, RCSA is described as

the setting used to contextualise knowledge of the strategy making influences and

processes in the primary site of RCQ. Figure 9 illustrates this approach.




Red Cross Overview

RC is part of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent

Societies (IFRC). Globally this is the largest humanitarian network in the world with

186 member national societies (www.ifrc.com) which RC claims is close to

universal representation (Tickner, 2007a). Globally this network includes the

national RC and Red Crescent Societies, the International Federation and the

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). ICRC humanitarian work has

increased both in scope and complexity as the organisation responds to an increase in

natural disasters and conflict and the need to work collaboratively with other national

RC Societies to deploy services. Worldwide, the movement has approximately 71.9

million members and 11.5 million volunteers – although the movement recognises

that a lack of formal recording among societies makes it difficult to have an accurate

picture of this (IFRC, 2007). RC employs nearly 2000 staff nationally and provides

over 70 community services delivered by over 30,000 volunteers and 35,000

members1 across 863 branches (as at April 2008).

Historical Foundations

Red Cross International and Red Crescent societies began late in the 19th

century as a response to the human casualties of war. The movement was founded in

1863 by Swiss banker Henry Dunant in response to his experiences witnessing the

aftermath of the 1859 Battle of Solferino. Dunant established a committee that

became the first international relief effort for the wounded of war, and began what is

now known as the International Federation of Red Cross (Australian Red Cross,

2009b).

RC was established in Australia in August 1914 as a branch of the British RC

at the outbreak of the First World War with the primary aim of supporting sick and

wounded soldiers. While never legally a federation, RC adopted a federated model of

practice giving autonomy to state and territory based RC organisations and was

incorporated by the Royal Charter in 1941 to become the RC Society. This

autonomy provided power to EDs of state-based RC organisations to develop and

1 Volunteers and members are listed separately in figures published by RC . The distinction of a

financial member who is a volunteer is not made.


deliver programs, manage finances and administrative resources, generate revenue

and managed governance (Australian Red Cross, 2007d).

This model remains unchanged today2 with each state having an ED, a

divisional council or board, and a management team. The divisional state

management has power to make decisions about programs, resources, revenue

generation, and governance for their RC division. Each state has programs and

service models that reflect national RC policy, however state management teams

interpret local and policy requirements and makes local decisions to reflect local

interpretations (Tickner, 2007a).

Service Profile

RC delivers a range of health and social welfare services both domestically

and internationally. The services undertaken by the organisation are described

generally as blood services, community services, disaster and emergency services,

first aid, international humanitarian law (IHL), and programs supporting Indigenous

communities, and migrant support services (Australian Red Cross, 2008a, 2009a).

Overall the society delivers more than 70 community services including

transport and accommodation cosmetics and hands on care, telecross, holiday

programs, personal support services and several other unique state-based services,

for example the night cafe (RCQ), and cosmetic care (RCSA). While some services

are long-standing, nationally managed and coordinated programs, including IHL,

tracing and asylum seekers services, RC management is actively trying to centralise

other services including good start breakfast club, save-a-mate (SAMS) and telecross

(Australian Red Cross, 2007d).

Recipients or „clients‟ of RC services are described as Indigenous people,

young people, families, aged people, people with disabilities or mental health issues,

asylum seekers and refugees, disadvantaged people and victims of natural disasters,

including communities located in the Australasia region (Australian Red Cross,

2007d).

RC identifies three goals for their services:

2 Upon entering the organisation, RC was undergoing a review of services with the aim to move to a

national management structure


1. Champion humanitarian values for the protection of life, health and human

dignity through promotion, education and advocacy;

2. Assist and empower vulnerable people, especially those most in need in

Australia and in Asia-Pacific region, in their everyday lives and in times of

crisis;

3. Forge a unified, inclusive and sustainable movement, soundly managed and

financially secure, which reflects our country‟s diversity (Australian Red

Cross, 2006a, p. 4).

Funding

As a not-for-profit organisation, RC relies on income from external donors,

government grants and commercial activities. In the period from 2007 to 2009, RC

has experienced an increase in revenue. For example in 2009 RC reported a record

income of $1.027 billion (Australian Red Cross, 2009a) attributed to an increase

from local donations to the Victorian bushfire appeal (a crisis event) and increase in

government funding for blood services (note the RC Blood Service is now fully

funded by the Australian government). This increase in revenue follows an $11

million increase in funds from 2007 to 2008. In public financial reports RC indicates

that the society has experienced an increase in costs, consistent with increased

demands on services i.e.: an increase of $29.5 million from 2007 to 2008 (Australian

Red Cross, 2008b)

RC states 91% of funding is spent on helping to support vulnerable people.

This includes 55% spent on programs and most recently in 2008, the Victorian

bushfire relief effort. Nine percent of funding is spent on administration, fundraising

and retail activities. Services (excluding blood) distributed in the Australia-Pacific

region include 74% spent on Australian programs, 8% on Asian programs and 18%

on other international programs (Australian Red Cross, 2008b).

There is a high level of scrutiny on spending of donated funds by not for

profits in Australia, particularly RC, instigated from media reporting by 60 Minutes

(Channel 9) in 2003 questioning the distribution of fundraising money for the

victims of the 2001 Bali bombing. This is addressed in more detail later in this

chapter in the public opinion environment section. Governance and transparency of

administrative reporting remains an important concern for RC as represented by the


focus and highlighting of governance structures and accountability in a number of

documents and public speeches (Tickner, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a). The organisation

also produces annual and financial reports, describing services and achievements,

and a separate full financial report detailing revenue and expenditure.

Mission, Vision, Values and Principles

Hallahan, et al., (2007) define strategic communication as “the purposeful

use of communication by an organisation to fulfil its mission” (p.3). RC publicly

notes seven fundamental principles of the RC and Red Crescent Movement underpin

all the activities of the organisation (see for example, Year in Review 2008-2009,

The Humanitarian). Exploring the nature of the principles, the mission, and values

statements of RC are important for this study given the significance and influence of

these on organisational members‟ values and belief systems (Alvesson, 2002).

The seven fundamental principles are humanity, impartiality, neutrality,

independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality (see Appendix D for

definitions of the key principles). These are espoused as guiding organisational

behaviours and decision making. The induction manual for employees states the

following about the principles:

In order to carry out its unique mission and to foster consistent and effective

action across a complex organisation such as ours, seven Fundamental

Principles provide a universal standard of reference, a set of guidelines and a

common goal for all members… As a Red Cross employee, you (and Red

Cross members and volunteers) are the embodiment of the organisation and

represent the Fundamental Principles in action. No matter what position you

hold, these Principles should be respected, adhered to and used to guide your

work. (Australian Red Cross, 2007a, p. 3)

The CEO of RC in his inaugural speech (2005) referred to these as “non-

negotiable core principles” and hallmarks of the global RC organisation and noted

“fundamentally RC is about 'people' and the alleviation of human suffering”

(Tickner, 2005, p. 1). In addition to the seven fundamental principles, mission,


vision and goal statements are published in the 2007 Red Cross Induction Manual

for Employees. The RC vision, mission and goal statements are as follows:

Our Vision: To improve the lives of vulnerable people in Australia and

internationally by mobilising the power of humanity

Our Mission: To be a leading humanitarian organisation in Australia,

improving the lives of vulnerable people through services delivered and

promotion of humanitarian laws and values

Our Goals:

Champion humanitarian values for the protection of life, health and

human dignity through promotion, education and advocacy

Assist and empower vulnerable people, especially those in most need

in Australia, and in the Asia Pacific region, in their everyday lives and

in times of crisis

Forge a unified, inclusive and sustainable movement soundly

managed and financially secure, which reflects our country‟s diversity

(Australian Red Cross, 2007a, p. 7).

Additional behaviours including compliance, understanding, personal

growth, effective communication and contribution and support of volunteers are also

listed as generic statements in position descriptions for advertised positions vacant in

the organisation (see for example, Australian Red Cross, 2006b, 2006c, 2007c).

Red Cross Structure and Governance

RC governance operates at three structural levels: The Council, the Board

and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). National, state and territory functions are

principally governed by the Board under delegations of the Council of the Society

(see Appendix C for RC organisational chart). The RC Board delegates day-to-day

management of the affairs of RC to the state and operational divisions and the CEO.

The Council

Membership of the council of the society comprises up to 35 members

elected from the society. This includes the president of the society and 28 voting

members comprising the chairman; the vice chairman; the chairman of the audit and

risk management committee; the chairman of each of the eight state and territory


divisional boards; 16 representatives taken from the states and territories, and a

youth representative; up to seven non-voting members - the president and up to six

vice presidents. (www.arc.org.au accessed 16 March 2010).

The responsibilities of the Council are limited to the appointment of members

and auditors, receiving corporate documents and financial reports, and power to

amend the Royal Charter and rules (equivalent to a Constitution). The Council of the

society meets once per year.

The Board

The RC Board consists of 12 people including four elected office bearers and

a representative appointed from each of the divisions and two additional board only

members. This comprises the chairman, vice-chairman, chairman of the Audit and

Risk Management Committee (ARMC), eight divisional chairmen (sic), a youth

representative and up to two additional RC board members (RC organisational chart,

January, 2007). All board and council members are volunteers selected for their

professional or personal experience and standing in the community. The Board meets

between four and ten times a year.

The board delegates a broad range of society-wide and international

responsibilities to the CEO i.e. national functions with all other domestic services

and operations not within the national function being the responsibility of the state

and territory divisions of the society. The CEO manages these delegations through

his senior managers consisting of the director of operations, chief financial officer,

and director of marketing fundraising and communications, and through the national

management team.

Leadership

The CEO of RC was appointed in February 2005 to the position of the

Secretary General, more commonly referred to as the CEO. Prior to this role,

positions held include the CEO of an employment company. In previous roles, the

CEO was a Labor Government Federal Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait

Islander Affairs from 1990-1996 and also served as a law and business lecturer at an

Australian university, and as a local Councillor at Sydney City Council from 1977 to

1984. Academically the CEO holds a Bachelor of Laws, Master of Laws (Hons) and


Bachelor of Economics degrees, and is currently undertaking an Executive MBA

(http://www.redcross.org.au/aboutus_keypeople_default.htm#RTickner).

The CEO is accountable to the Board for implementation of the strategic plan

and for oversight of operational management according to the policy and systems,

which it establishes. The national management team (NMT) is chosen by the CEO to

provide high-level advice on operational matters and implementation of decisions

(www.redcross.org.au). The NMT comprises the CEO and EDs from each state and

territory (ACT, NSW, NT, QLD, SA, TAS, VIC, WA), and functional roles such as

the national directors of MFC, operations, finance, information, human resources,

legal, domestic operations, international operations, and business strategy. At the

time of the researcher entering the organisation, the NMT consisted of 18 people in

key roles, however during the course of the study, the NMT changed due to changes

in strategic direction (Menon, 2008). Changes to this team included the inclusion of

new roles including a head of Indigenous strategy, and a director of information

technology. The positions of general manager legal and chief information officer

were removed.

The backgrounds and qualifications of the NMT are listed on the RC website

that includes information about their experience and working backgrounds,

qualifications, area of responsibility and length of time with Australian RC. The

NMT consisted of seven females and 10 males. Four had been with the organisation

for approximately one year or less, nine had been in the organisation for up to five

years and four had been in the organisation between five and nine years.

Academically, one holds a PhD, five hold Masters Degrees, three hold postgraduate

qualifications not specified, and two hold bachelor degrees. Six staff had no stated

qualifications. The NMT were geographically based in their states with a

concentration of other senior positions in Sydney and Melbourne.

National Office and States

The national office of RC is in Melbourne and oversees national programs

and represents the organisation nationally and internationally. RC employs

approximately 1862 staff nationally (Australian Red Cross, 2008b). In addition to the

national office, RC has nine operating divisions that comprise the RC Blood Service

and eight state and territory divisions – New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia,


RCQ, Western Australia, Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory and

Tasmania. While the CEO is responsible for the management of RC nationally, local

services and operations are the responsibility of state divisions.

Each state division has an ED and a local senior management team

responsible for responding to national policy and establishing local initiatives to

meet operational budgets and goals. The state divisions are responsible for service

delivery, membership, fundraising, and policy formulation and delivery within their

own geographical boundaries.

Volunteers

Volunteers play an important part in the delivery of RC services and

programs (Australian Red Cross, 2007a). In 2008, RC had approximately 30,258

volunteers engaged in programs and activities across the organisation. Only 16% of

RC volunteers are aged between 18-45, and only 1% are aged below18 (Menon,

2008). The CEO has publicly noted the aging volunteer base and announced that

strategies to focus on improving retention and attracting younger volunteers to the

organisation would be introduced (Australian Red Cross, 2007e; Tickner, 2007b).

These reforms are part of an organisation wide reform process, which is discussed in

the following section.

Red Cross Reform

At the time of entering the organisation in January 2008, RC was embarking

on a series of reviews of its strategic direction, service profile, and brand positioning.

The reviews included administrative, operational and services, which incorporated

marketing, fundraising, and communication functions. The need for change was first

noted by the board in 2005 and formalised in the RC strategy document RC 2010

published on 26 May 2005. RC 2010 identified the strategic directions of RC and

noted “we will be Australia‟s most effective community-based, humanitarian

movement known for our compassion, our action and the impact of our work with

vulnerable people” (Australian Red Cross, 2005, p. 3). A strategic implementation

plan was also developed to “identify the steps or actions that will be taken to achieve

the strategies identified in the Strategy 2010 document” (Australian Red Cross,


2007e, p. ii). This operationalised the strategic document for the business units in

Australian RC.

In July 2006 the board approved a recommendation of the audit and risk

management committee (ARMC) to establish terms of reference of a review of

services effectively narrowing the strategic focus for RC activities to emergency

services, international aid and development, International humanitarian law,

migration impacts and work in Indigenous communities, addressing disadvantage

and programs to connect marginalised people back to their communities. These

changes required that some services currently provided by RC would be transitioned

out, and some would be significantly changed.

The terms of reference of the service review recognised the profile of

services in each state division developed as a result of varying influences. This

included factors such as local orientation and perception of emerging needs to

varying government responses at a state and federal level. The terms of reference

also recognised that states often responded to local opportunities for service delivery,

and this included resource availability such as expertise and volunteers, funding, the

presence of other community service providers, and logistical elements such as

geography. Finally the review noted the influence of individuals and lobby groups as

a key influence in developing services.

In his 2008 annual address to the board, the CEO noted reform was a key

priority as the organisation had become a “Jack of all trades and a master of none”

(Tickner, 2008a, p. 2). He recognised the organisation “had allowed a proliferation

of diverse services (totalling over 130) to spread ourselves too thinly and we were

failing to give priority to some of our core areas” (Tickner, 2008a, p. 2).The review

of administrative operational and service activities of the RC aimed to assist in a

change program that would provide a major driver of change to the next stage of the

society-wide reform process review aimed to address what was identified as “a

significant tension between a number of the wider aims and objectives contained

within the strategy” (Australian Red Cross, 2007d, p. 2).

Marketing, Fundraising and Communication Reform

In addition to the organisational reviews discussed above, a full review was

being planned for all national and state MFC functions at RC with the aim to review


current practices and capacity for communicating. The review commenced in late

2008 and was positioned as a key step to nationalise all communication activities,

standardise communication staff skill sets and integrate its brand communications. In

a staff-wide email broadcast on 9 April 2009, the CEO highlighted the MFC function

to be restructured to a national reporting framework as providing a number of

benefits. These included a way to improve costs of fundraising; gain a better focus

on income generation and reduction of associated costs; greater alignment of MFC

with the changes being implemented as a result of the services review; and a more

integrated, consistent and coordinated approach to communication and reputational

support in RC. The effect of this change saw all state-based communication

functions nationalised on 1 July 2009 and centralised under the leadership of the

national director of communication. As part of this change, all positions in MFC

were made redundant, with state staff encouraged to apply for the national positions.

The geographic location of some national MFC positions was not fixed, allowing

QLD or SA staff to apply and remain in their state. In addition, the CEO highlighted

more clarity in roles and accountability, and a greater shift to focus on online and

new media tools for RC.

When the change was finally implemented on 1 July, 2009, the national

director of communication highlighted the shift from state focused activities to

national based activities to be delivered through five key areas titled marketing,

fundraising, communication and brand, media and projects, business improvement

and benchmarking. This event signalled the close of the cases in terms of this

research study.

Rebranding of Red Cross

In addition to the organisational, administrative and service reviews, the

Board approved a rebranding exercise for RC in October 2007, which introduced a

number of changes to how the organisation was presented. The rebranding aimed to

present a more holistic brand (logo, images, look and feel) style across all

communication materials, and adopt a single positioning statement “the power of

humanity”. Changes also incorporated the application of a clustering to services

under the titles of “Crisis”, “Care”, and “Commitment”. In this context crisis

equalled responsiveness in emergencies and disasters, care equalled connections with


local community work, and commitment equalled long term, humanitarian values. In

addition, photographs used in promotional materials such as brochures and

advertising were changed to a more beneficiary focus and incorporated both local

and international images. The language choice used by RC also changed to more

plain English language. Finally, there was a directive to remove state or national

based titles for the organisation, with reference to Red Cross, rather than

“Australian” Red Cross, or divisionally for example, as Red Cross “Queensland”. A

style guide was also produced to provide regulations around the use of the logo,

corporate colours and messaging.

The rationale behind the re-branding was stated as a response to

inconsistencies in the brand and message when being compared to local and

international competitors in Australia. The aim of the rebranding was stated as

“creating a stronger, more relevant and successful communication platform”

(Campbell, 2007, p. 1). The internal focus of historical communication was also

given as a rationale as noted in an all staff email broadcast on 20 December 2007:

Without realising it, we often focus on ourselves rather than our beneficiaries

and our communication lacks the urgency needed to convert people‟s

considerable respect for our brand into action. This affects our ability to

attract support from the community and ultimately, our ability to help the

many people that rely on our service every day (Campbell, 2007, p. 1).

The rebranding was “soft launched” to internal staff on 26 February 2008

followed by a public “soft launch” on 17 May 2008 which included television and

radio commercials, online and media publicity. There was no public launch

ceremony or event conducted.

National Communication Directorate

The communication function in RC was state-based with direct line reporting

to the EDs of each state. While the policy and direction was overseen by the NCD,

interpretation, implementation and accountability of the enactment of these was held

at the state level. The NCD had 37 staff of which 16 had the title “manager” or

“director”, and seven had the term “national” in their title. The organisational chart


detailed in Figure 10, shows the structure of the unit was organised as silos of

disciplines divided into donor relations, business partnerships, media, and

communications. Donor relations incorporated marketing fundraising, campaigns,

and regular. Business partnerships incorporated account and project management,

while communication activities were divided into domestic, incorporated the

intranet, and international, incorporated major disasters responses (such as the 2004

tsunami). The national media advisor reported directly to the CEO.

The staff employed in the national directorate were generally more qualified

and had greater experience than those employed in the states. They were also on

much higher incomes when compared to their state counterparts (National 2). The

national director of MFC had been with the RC since 2004. Previous roles included

senior corporate communication management positions in national and international

corporations in the legal, finance and insurance industries. The national director of

MFC also held Masters qualifications in commerce and communication. The

national media advisor joined RC in May 2007 and has more than 25 years of

experience as a journalist. Roles prior to this (2003 – 2004), included director of

media and communications for leaders of the federal opposition, hosting Insight, a

current affairs program on multicultural television station SBS for six years, and

hosting the breakfast program on ABC radio national.


Figure 10: NCD - MFC organisational structure (February, 2008)

The positions were not all centrally located (see Figure 10). Staff were

located across Sydney (17) and Melbourne (19), with one in Perth and one in

Brisbane. The NCD was based in Melbourne with the national director of MFC,

national media advisor, and general manager of donor relations based in Sydney

(where the CEO is primarily based).

Reporting on national MFC activities was facilitated formally through the

national director of MFC direct to the CEO and the board. MFC activities were also

reported in financial and annual reports organised by detailing income generated and

expenses of fundraising activities. At the time of the research, there was no other

evidence of formal evaluation being undertaken at other MFC programming levels.


Communication with states and territories was facilitated through a monthly

national teleconference chaired by the national director of communication. All state

MFC managers would dial in to discuss MFC state-based activities and campaigns.

Communication of MFC national activities to key internal stakeholders was

facilitated through a monthly email update issued by the national director of MFC.

This email distribution noted highlights, updates and achievements of the unit. The

following (Figure 11) is an excerpt of topics covered in the January 2008

distribution:

Figure 11: Excerpt from email update reporting on national MFC activities

Policy and Procedures

At the time of entering the organisation, the RC NCD was reviewing and

developing a number of policies and procedures relating to marketing, fundraising

and communication that State RC divisions were required to follow. These included

national media protocols (April 2008), and business partnership policy providing

guidelines for client approaches by states for fundraising. This reflects the pending

changes that the organisation was undertaking to shift from a decentralised, federated

model of management to a centralised model, particularly for the MFC function. The

aim for the protocols and guidelines reflected common approaches to managing

media contact and client contact in nationally structured organisations. National

media protocols are aimed to enable effective cooperative and appropriate media

management, and formalise delegated authorities of staff authorised to speak with

the media and lines of contact to be followed when the media called.


The national corporate relations policy aimed to coordinate organisational

contacts. Under this policy, organisational contact points for nationally defined

organisations fall under the responsibility or delegation of the national corporate

relations manager. The goal of this policy was to reduce multiple contacts from RC

personnel and to provide a more coordinated and consistent approach to managing

corporate-client relationships. For example, national organisations were only allowed

to be contacted by national corporate relations staff, while RCQ based organisations

were allowed to be contacted by RCQ corporate relations staff.

This section established the setting of NCD as a policy setting authority in

the environment of RCQ. This is important as it provides both the policy frameworks

and procedural hierarchies that RCQ members need to respond. The next section

introduces the external environment of RC.

The Social Environment of Red Cross

Social ecology highlights the interdependent relationship of the social

environment and the organisation as it plays out in the organisation‟s efforts to be

responsive to its environment (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000). Social ecology

recognises the reciprocal influences among people, social organisations and physical

environments (Abu-Lughod, 1966). By exploring the social environment within

which RC operates, an ecological perspective is gained as a framework to describe

organisational adaptive efforts in response to environmental demands (Steward,

1977). Building on the conceptualisation of an organisational environment by Scott

(2003), the social environment recognises the extent that relational, public opinion,

and institutional frameworks converge from the standpoint of the focal organisation.

It is this environment that members of RC enact (Weick, 1979).

RC is one of many not-for-profits operating in Australia. The Australian

Bureau of Statistics (ABS) notes in June 2007 there were 41,008 registered not-for-

profit organisations in Australia attracting more than $76b in income. The industry

employs nearly 890,000 people and attracts more than 2 million volunteers.

According to the ABS (2007) the main sources of income for Australian not-for-

profit organisations were funding from federal, state and local government (33.5%).

Over two-thirds (69.2%) of total government funding to not-for-profit organisations

was volume based funding (for example, granted on a per-student or a per-client


basis). Income from services accounted for 29.9%. Donations, sponsorship and

fundraising accounted for 9.5% of total income and sales of goods 8.9% (ABS,

2007).

RC is one of the largest not-for-profit organisations in Australia. Its direct

competitors are World Vision, Mission Australia, the Salvation Army, St Vincent de

Paul and The Smith Family. The CEO in his 2008 annual report to the board noted

RC faced significant challenges to improve efficiency and effectiveness in their

MFC efforts, and that reputationally, the organisation was at risk:

We need to face the fact that organisations like the Salvation Army, World

Vision and Oxfam are far more effective in their fundraising than we are

because they focus on such strategies and regular giving, bequests and

corporate partnerships, which deliver far more revenue at much reduced costs

than many of our traditional methods of fundraising. There is a reputational

risk here unless I ensure our Fundraising Marketing and Communications

team have the authority and resources they need to improve our fundraising. I

will be addressing this issue in the immediate period ahead. (Tickner, 2008a,

p. 18)

Regulatory Environment

The regulatory environment of RC includes approximately 15

Commonwealth and 163 State and Territory Acts which guide the practice as a not-

for-profit entity or charitable body (Tickner, 2008b). In a report to the Senate

committee investigating disclosure for not-for-profit organisations regulations

around not-for-profit organisations, seven disparate sets of federal fundraising

legislation that govern or affect RC activities were identified. (Tickner, 2008b).

These were noted as being additional to the current state-based legislation.

Stakeholders of Red Cross

RC‟s stakeholder map is intricate due to the complexity of their services,

propriety areas, unit performance indicators, and the funding model under which

they operate. Stakeholders are defined as “any group or individual who can affect or

are affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p.


46). While there were no documents identifying and prioritising stakeholders and

publics, internal business plans drafted by RCQ MFC unit generally identified

external stakeholders as clients, service partners, government (local, state and

federal) both in terms of service partnership and funding sources, corporate partners

(funding) and sponsors, volunteers and members, media groups, and youth. Internal

stakeholders include board members, RC service or program areas, employees and

“permanent” volunteers. A stakeholder map developed by the researcher is

represented by Figure 12.

Figure 12: Red Cross Stakeholder map

Partnering with Red Cross

RC actively seeks to partner with organisations, corporations, trusts and

foundations to increase fundraising opportunities. Publically RC describes these as

long-term, strategic and mutually beneficial relationships (www.redcross.org.au).

Describing approaches RC takes to partner with external groups is important

to this study as it gives insights into how the organisation identifies and prioritises

these relationships. There are two types of partnerships described by RC. The first is

a corporate relationship where RC offers a variety of ways for organisations to be


involved including financial contributions, provision of pro bono professional

services, staff volunteering, information dissemination and fundraising activities. RC

offers four levels of corporate partnerships that govern how the partnership is

publicised by each partner. The levels are titled: humanity, community, loyalty, and

major sponsor. Figure 13 is an excerpt from the RC website in 2009 showing logos

of sponsors partnering with RC.

RC positions their approach in corporate partnering as one that does not

adopt “an „open-palm‟ philosophy” but rather one that focuses on involvement and

commitment, and one that does not compromise their fundamental principles

(Tickner, 2007b). RC has been successful in partnering with a number of large high-

profile Australian organisations and recognizes these organisations on their web site.

The second type of partnership is one that the CEO describes as having an

effect on increasing RC ‟s sphere of influence, potential capacity and effectiveness

(Tickner, 2008b). Delivering on this intent, RC has partnered with leading

psychological associations such as the Australian Psychological Society, mental

health organisations such as Beyond Blue, and civic institutions and authorities such

as the UN High Commissioner, to develop or raise awareness of issues and services

(Tickner, 2007b).

Figure 13: Logos of 2009 sponsors featured on the Red Cross website


The Opinion Environment of Red Cross

RC features significantly in Australian print media coverage across a number

of areas. To gain a clearer understanding of the nature, tone and topics of reporting, a

content analysis of articles mentioning RC (excluding articles mentioning blood

collection points and local community fundraising efforts) was undertaken by the

researcher as shown in Figure 14. This graph illustrates reporting on RC by major

Australian news publications (Factiva) produced a total of 8996 articles in the period

1 Jan 2003 to 30 Dec 2009

The sampling included all Australian newspapers from 1 January 2003 to 31

December 2009 on media database Factiva. The results produced 8,996 articles

mentioning RC in this period. A thematic analysis of 210 articles selected from this

sample was undertaken to establish the key themes and opinions expressed in the

coverage. The major themes determined by their frequency in the reporting are

summarised as follows:

Transparency of donated funds/ governance – key claims were raised in the

media questioning the management of the Bali appeal funds that questioned

RC‟s management and distribution of these funds;

Reputation as a charity, blood, volunteer, fundraising and aid agency;

Competitors include World Vision, The Smith Family, Doctors without

Borders, Salvation Army and St Vincent de Paul;

International relief and disaster work;

Falling donations/ increasing demand with the Global Financial Crisis;

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Figure 14: Australian media reporting on Red Cross 1 Jan 2003 to 30 Dec 2009


Falling volunteers/ aging volunteers;

Resources – including need for information technology to manage donations

etc;

Corporate partners.

Topics and themes in media reporting are important to understand as they

reflect the current tone and nature of public opinions (Ferguson, 2000) that exist in

the social environment of RC. Two dominant public opinion themes were present to

exert pressure on RC; accountability and transparency. These themes are key

challenges in the opinion environment as they converge on RC to deliver services to

a diverse range of stakeholders affected by disasters. RC identify these as people,

governments, international community, public and private donors (Tickner, 2007).

Themes of accountability and transparency also played a key feature in a

reputational crisis event that affected RC in 2003. Narratives recounting past events

and legends play an important role in ethnography as they deepen researcher

understanding of how members make sense of events in their world (Cortazzi, 2007).

Within RC, an event singled out as being a “watershed” moment or catalyst of

transformational organisational change was the Bali crisis. While this crisis was an

historical event, for current RC members, this was a major event raised by

participants as being relevant to the current setting and an important part of RC

legends and stories. The following section summarises this event.

The Bali Incident

Following the 2001 Bali bombing, RC was the lead not-for-profit agency

responsible for collecting and distributing the $14 million funds raised in Australia.

Mr Richard Carlton, a reporter from the current affair television show 60 Minutes

(www.sixtyminutes.ninemsn.com.au), interviewed the then Secretary General of RC,

Ms Martine Letts, and made allegations of misuse or misappropriation of donations

for the Bali tragedy. On Sunday 1 June, 2003, a story called “Double Cross” was

aired on 60 Minutes. The story was promoted as follows:

In the days immediately after the Bali bombing, Australians, as you would

expect, opened their hearts and their wallets. They donated more than $14

million to the victims and their families. The world‟s most high profile


charity, the Red Cross, offered to collect donations and promised the money

would go directly to the victims of the terror attack. But that's not what

happened. That‟s not where all your millions went. Instead, much of that

money has been channelled into other projects that have little to do with the

Bali victims. The good reputation of the Red Cross has been tarnished. And

they should have known better, because they've been caught out before.

(http://sixtyminutes.ninemsn.com.au/article/259042/double-cross)

This was considered a watershed for the organisation as for many staff that

were present at this time (or retelling the legend of this event) recount it was

shocking for RC as it was the first time in their history that their intentions or

motives were challenged. The media reporting and subsequent impact on RC‟s

reputation in Australia caused the resignation of the Secretary General and the

creation of a senior communication role, a national director of communication, in the

organisation and a focus on transparency of administrative cost reporting and

reporting of tied program funding.

Red Cross State Divisions

At the time of this study, the state divisions of RC operated as independent

organisations. Each state‟s executive management team had responsibility to

interpret national policy requirements and make local decisions to reflect the

requirements of that state. The state divisions of the society are; New South Wales,

Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, Australian Capital Territory, Northern

Territory, Tasmania and Queensland. The EDs of each state operated with two

reporting lines. They reported directly to the CEO of RC on national functions and to

the divisional council or boards on other local matters. The next section will describe

the settings of the key study site, RCQ and the comparative site of RCSA.

Red Cross Queensland

The primary site of this organisational ethnography is RCQ. RCQ is a

regional division of RC and operates as an incorporated authority. It has a chair, an

executive management team, and a board, who have delegated authority for local

income generation, finance and administration, membership, volunteers and services


across the state of Queensland. RCQ manages regional services through a regional

management structure, including far north Queensland, North Queensland, central

Queensland, and southern Queensland. Each region has a regional manager and they

report directly to the ED of RCQ.

Describing the physical office environment of RCQ contributes to building a

deep understanding of the working world of participants, specifically the physical

symbols and resources that help to facilitate their ways of working (Fine, et al.,

2009). This next section describes the location, internal office layout, management

and reporting in RCQ.

Figure 15: Red Cross Queensland headquarters in Park Road, Milton

The headquarters of RCQ is in Park Road, Milton; a popular inner-city fringe

business district located close to public transport and well serviced by a local cafe

precinct (see Figure 15). RCQ occupies level 1, 3 and an annex of a three level,

highly visible 2550m2 building with a lift and undercover parking for 57 cars. The

building has views of the Brisbane River from some offices. RCQ subleases office

space on the ground level and level 2 to professional businesses such as AECOM, a

provider of professional and technical support services, and an accounting software

firm. RC purchased the Park Road, Milton site for $6.8 million and moved in on 3

October 2005 after previously occupying a prime inner-city Adelaide Street location

for 58 years.


In addition to the headquarters, RC operates its employment and training

services from 16 Hamilton Place, Bowen Hills (see Figure 16). The staff here are

dedicated to employment and training, a specialised division of RCQ‟s services.

RCQ‟s regional offices are located in Cairns, Townsville, Rockhampton, and the

Gold Coast. RCQ operates 48 retail stores across Queensland as shown in Table 7:

Table 7: RCQ‟s Retail Operations

Region Stores

Southern Beaudesert, Gatton, Ipswich, Toowoomba, Warwick.

Central Alderley, Fortitude Valley, Geebung, Kallangur, Logan

Central, Redcliffe, Runcorn, Sherwood, Sunnybank,

Surfers Paradise, Wynnum.

North Blackbutt, Caloundra, Capricorn Coast, Dalby,

Deception Bay, Gympie, Hervey Bay, Imbil,

Kilcoy, Kingaroy, Nerang, Pomona, Roma, Richmond,

St George, Toogoolawah, Yarraman.

Far North Atherton, Bowen, Bundaberg, Cairns,

Mackay, Marlin Coast, Raintree,

Rockhampton, Rockhampton Central,

Sunlands (Thuringowa Central),

Townsville, Treetops.

Figure 16: Employment and training services in Bowen Hills


The internal office organisation of RCQ headquarters is open plan with

senior manager offices scattered around the windows of the building. The mid level

petitioning divides the space into individual computer cubicles. The colour scheme

reflects the corporate colours i.e. red colour coordinated chairs and coloured feature

walls with messages that reflect inspirational messages such as respect.

Each desk was furnished as expected with a computer, telephone, lockable

drawers, and a small bookshelf area for storage. Each computer was networked to

the intranet and Internet, e-mail and printing networks. Individual technology offered

for each employee could be considered inferior to contemporary organisations. For

example RCQ employees do not have individual hard drives and therefore cannot

access external files without going to a dedicated computer elsewhere on the floor.

There was one computer located in the marketing fundraising and communication

area in RCQ that has its own hard drive, allowing staff to read CDs and USB sticks.

Management

Governance and management in RCQ exists at three levels: The divisional

council, the executive management advisory committee, and the executive

management team. The state and territory divisional councils and board, along with

the EDs of each state and territory, jointly report to the CEO (Australian Red Cross,

2007b).

The divisional council of RCQ is led by a chair and a deputy chair, and has

12 elected members and co-opted members (6 females, 2 males elected/ 2m, 2f co-

opted). The council meets 10-12 times a year. Traditionally the RCQ council has

been responsible for the strategic alignment of RCQ activities with the national and

international effort. However with the increasing focus on nationalisation and

centralised management of strategy and programs for RC, divisional council powers

were in the process of being limited to an advisory role.

The executive management advisory committee includes the chair and deputy

chair of the divisional council, the ED (and his assistant) and all group managers and

directors. The advisory committee meets once a month and acts as a key

communication tool of operational issues between the divisional council and the

management team.


The executive management team consists of the eight general and business

unit managers in RCQ, each responsible for a core area of service delivery. This

includes the ED and group managers of community services, business training and

employment services, regional and corporate services, Indigenous strategy and

programs, people and learning, and emergency services.

The background of the senior management team in RCQ varies as they have

a range of qualifications and experiences relevant to their roles. The ED of RCQ

joined RC in 2000, and had worked for 15 years in leadership roles in government

and the private sector. The ED maintains strong connections and relationships with

key political figures and business leaders and said he was highly skilled in

understanding and responding to the needs of the media having had significant

experience with key local Queensland media groups.

The group manager of business operations joined RCQ in 2006, coming from

senior consulting and project management roles in a number of large organisations.

The marketing, fundraising and communication unit fell under the responsibility of

business operations. The group manager of community services joined RCQ in 2005

from a senior local government role, also having worked as a policy adviser to a

previous Lord Mayor of Brisbane. This manager also had experience in business,

public relations and marketing and has worked in Brisbane, Melbourne and London.

The group manager - business, training and employment services joined RCQ three

years ago, from a policy development background in Canberra. The group manager -

regional and corporate services has been with RCQ since 2000, holds a Bachelor of

Business (Accounting) and is a Certified Practising Accountant and has corporate

experience in transport, retail, and manufacturing sectors. Head of Indigenous

strategy and programs joined RCQ in 2007 coming from similar leadership roles in

high profile Indigenous organisations. The director of emergency services joined

RCQ in 1989 and has an MBA. The people and learning manager joined RCQ in

March 2008, coming from a background of consulting to the not-for-profit sector and

generalist human resource management within the banking and hospitality sector,

and the recruitment industry.

The titles of RCQ senior managers were “group managers” with the

exception of the head of policy and research who is called “Director”. These titles

were not consistent with titles in national office or other states. The title of the ED


was consistent with other state-based executives. The title of manager was found to

be consistent with the NCD, however team leader was more common in other states.

The structural organisation relating to program delivery was consistent with other

states, with the ED being the most senior authority in the state organisation.

Group managers are responsible for day-to-day operations of their business

units. Group managers meet as an executive team generally once a fortnight to

discuss issues relating to services, human resources, policy, and to gain feedback on

matters of concern. This meeting is led by the ED, who states the aim is to openly

discuss and give feedback. These meetings were not recorded formally with minutes,

but the executive assistant to the ED takes notes. Staff meetings are held every

Monday in the board room, where items of interest are discussed and staff are given

an opportunity to raise matters or, on occasions, share an achievement or some other

event that is happening in their private life. Figure 17 details the organisational

structure in RCQ:

Figure 17: Organisational chart of Red Cross Queensland

Staff, Retention and Volunteers

The staff profile of RCQ is predominately female and totals approximately

420 staff, or 319.31 full time equivalent positions in RCQ. The staff profile includes


full time, part time and casual position. These are detailed as 147 female and 53 male

full time staff, 103 female and 91 male part time staff, and 44 female and 41 male

casual staff. Turnover of staff was noted in the ED‟s reports to Divisional Council

and ranged from 2.7 to 2.92% equating to approximately 14 staff leaving RCQ each

month (Goebel, 2008a, 2008b). There are nearly 3,900 active volunteers in RCQ

providing services in community services, emergency services, First Aid and retail

services.

Marketing, Fundraising and Communication

The MFC unit in RCQ is the focal setting of this study. The goal of this

section is to build on the knowledge of the parent organisation, RC, and its social

environment and provide a detailed description of the RCQ unit as a context for this

study. This section is structured in the following way. Firstly a description of the unit

structure is provided, detailing authority, position and reporting. Next, profiles of

MFC staff are outlined, giving insights into background influences, qualifications

and motivations for working at RC. Then, focusing on the marketing, public

relations and communication functions, there is a description of key responsibilities,

activities and processes. Ways of working and meetings in the unit are described,

followed by planning components of environmental scanning, planning and approval

processes and reporting of MFC activities.

The unit was the responsibility of the group manager of business operations

(responsible for MFC, first aid and retail operations). The manager of the MFC unit

Figure 18: Office layout MFC area Red Cross

Queensland


directly reports to this position. MFC staff were located in the headquarters offices in

Milton with the exception of two planned giving coordinators located on the Gold

Coast. Ten staff occupied floor space and offices in the south-western corner of the

building. The ED‟s office was located in the north-eastern corner of the building.

MFC shared the floor with finance and corporate services. All MFC middle and

lower level staff had cubicle desks, while the group manager and the manager of

MFC had an office with half-glass partitioned walls and a lockable door (see Figure

18). The group manager‟s office was in close proximity to the MFC unit (see Figure

19).

The group manager of business operations was supported by a personal

assistant who also undertook various other roles within the office, but offered little

administrative support to the MFC manager unless directed by the group manager.

The administrative assistant (titled MFC assistant on organisational charts) acted as

the gatekeeper for information also undertaking marketing and communication

activities when required. The following organisational chart (Figure 20) illustrates

the reporting relationships:

Assistant Marketing

PR/ Com Jnr and **

PR/ Com Snr (** No allocated space until March 2008)

Corporate Relations Mgr

RCC coord

FR coord

Mgr Planned Giving *

MFC Mgr

Grp Mgr Bus Ops

Finance position

* Planned Giving coords x 2 off site in Gold Coast but under line management of Planned Giving Manager

National position

Figure 19: Seating plan on entry to Red Cross Queensland, Jan 2008


RCQ MFC staff held varying levels of qualifications in marketing

communication and had varying levels of relevant experience prior to working with

RC. While the group manager of business operations had no formal qualifications,

their background and experience was significant due to their having held similar

senior roles and consulted to a number of large organisations. While all the middle

level managers within the unit held tertiary qualifications (with the exception of the

planned giving manager), not all qualifications were directly relevant. For example,

the senior marketing officer held a diploma of music and was formerly a lead

violinist in a youth orchestra. While formally undertaking a Masters of Management

degree this person had no qualifications in marketing or communications. There

were claims by this role that a number of marketing units were included in the

Masters course. The newly appointed fundraising coordinator had a degree from

Oxford University in music history, while the manager of corporate relations had an

arts degree in arts history and politics.

The manager of the MFC unit held a Masters in Public Relations and had

previously held senior consulting and middle level management roles in the

corporate, arts and not-for-profit sectors. The senior public relations and

Executive Director

QLD

Group Manager Business Operations

MFC Assistant

Manager MFC

Manager Planned Giving

RCC Coordinato

r

Coordinator Planned

Giving

Coordinator Planned

Giving

Corporate Relations Manager

Fundraising Coord

Snr M&C Officer

Snr PR & C officer

Pr &C officer

Figure 20: Organisational chart of the MFC unit - Red Cross Queensland


communication officer held a Bachelor of Journalism and had relocated from

Canberra in November 2007 after working in another RC division for a year and

previously working in recruitment roles. The marketing communications officer held

a Bachelor of Arts in public relations, but was a recent graduate.

The fundraising staff did not hold relevant tertiary qualifications however had

demonstrated relevant working experience. The manager of planned giving had

previously held a senior role in hospital administration of a small regional hospital.

The responsibilities and activities of each member fell within their discipline silo

with some blurring of roles and responsibility between the senior marketing

communication and the senior public relations and communication officers.

Responsibilities

The MFC unit was described as providing expertise spanning the media,

marketing communication, advertising, corporate relationships, fundraising and

donor management, and all aspects of corporate communication. A key aspect was

stakeholder relationship management facilitating a liaison role with RC volunteers

and members, government agencies, corporate sponsors and programs for various

projects, events and campaigns.

Specifically the responsibilities of the unit were described as:

Media – generating publicity through researching, writing media releases,

creating media opportunities and responding to media enquiries for all

aspects of RC programs, fundraising and community events (MFC, 2008b);

Marketing communication / advertising – researching and writing / design

and produce (place) collateral and advertising relating to programs and

campaigns including corporate brochures, magazines, newsletters, direct

mail, advertising and other promotional materials;

Corporate communication – researching, writing and editing copy for

corporate materials including annual reports and year in reviews, contribute

to reporting to national board and divisional councils, managing content in

relevant parts of national website, volunteer and member newsletters, staff

communication.

While the unit‟s title reflected marketing, fundraising and communication,

the roles more accurately reflected marketing, fundraising and public relations. The


manager of the MFC unit reported to the group manager of business operations and

was the central coordinating point for all tasks. The MFC manager had responsibility

for project prioritisation and delegation and sign off on project outputs by staff.

Formally, the responsibilities of the manager of the MFC unit were described in the

role‟s position description as actively contributing to, and value-adding to the

broader strategic planning process; taking a lead role in the design, development,

implementation and evaluation of an integrated strategic marketing and fundraising

plans; actively contributing to the design and planning of marketing and fundraising

strategies, programs (corporate sponsorship, bequests etc.), appeals and activities at

the national, state, regional, branch and local level; developing effective

organisational performance measurements in consultation with the group manager

business operations; monitoring and reporting on performance against organisational

goals; and finally taking a leadership role in the development of the MFC budget

(Australian Red Cross, 2006b).

Communication within and between the silo disciplines in the MFC unit was

done both formally and informally. Formally, regular staff meetings in the unit were

held to discuss workloads, issues and any information relayed from senior

management, including the group manager. While meetings were diarised to be held

every week, meetings were generally held every fortnight. Informally, staff would

discuss projects and workloads within the staff area. However it should be noted that

staff relations in the unit were strained. While the exact nature of these strained

relations was confidential, an external facilitator had been engaged in the period

prior to site entry to resolve the internal conflicts.

Work delegation in the unit was facilitated through the MFC manager. A

process had been implemented four months earlier by the MFC manager to curb the

volume and nature of ad hoc requests coming into the unit. The manager developed a

formal request brief system that requested program and service managers to detail

the nature, timing and budget allocation for the requested job. The form was then

submitted to the MFC manager for delegation and prioritisation. A description of the

roles and responsibilities of each discipline silo follows:


Public Relations

Key responsibilities of the senior public relations officer role noted in the

position description (Australian Red Cross, 2007c) included: contributing to strategic

planning processes and the design; development and implementation of strategic

media communication; and public relations plans and strategies at a national, state,

regional, branch and local level. Accountability, evaluation, issues management and

contribution to performance and budgets were also listed as key areas of

responsibility. However in practice, media and the role of the media in the

organisation were clearly the highest priority as observed in the unit, with daily

actions attributed to publicity, events, and stakeholder relationships activities.

Key activities listed in the business plan for the role focused on media

outputs including relationships, processes and protocols, and identifying proactive

media opportunities including engaging with local celebrities; monitoring media

coverage; developing project plans; and working collaboratively with the RC Blood

Service.

Marketing

While the public relations role focused on media, in practice the marketing

role focused on the production of collateral. Key responsibilities of the senior

marketing and communication role noted in the incumbent‟s position description

(Australian Red Cross, 2006c) highlighted the strategic nature of the role.

Specifically this was described as contributing to the broader strategic planning

process, and to the design, development, implementation and evaluation of strategic

marketing, media and communication strategies, programs, activities and plans at all

levels of the organisation. This responsibility also included contributing to the design

and planning of business plans and budgets.

Key activities listed in the business plan for the marketing role (MFC, 2008a)

focused on developing and managing collateral including the development of a job

request system, maintenance of a marketing database and an events calendar,

production of materials to support program activities. For example, volunteer or

donor recruitment, development and contribution to corporate publications including

The Humanitarian and Year in Reviews, and a focus on youth targeted programming

including researching current levels of youth engagement, drafting of “test options”


for marketing youth involvement and implementing youth campaigns, and

development of key messages for youth.

Fundraising

Fundraising staff worked across marketing and public relations area with a

focus on raising funds for the work of RC. Positions in the area included a

fundraising coordinator, a planned giving manager, a planned giving coordinator,

and manager of corporate relations. Key responsibilities for fundraising staff noted in

the various position descriptions ranged from responsibility for identifying and

developing planned giving initiatives and opportunities in RCQ, cultivating

relationships with prospective and current donors. The roles also included a focus on

identifying and securing corporate sponsorships, and to manage various donor or

fundraising activities such as Wills Days, art unions, direct mail, and regular giving.

The team were also responsible for liaising with national counterparts for national

fundraising campaigns such as Red Cross Calling and World Red Cross Day.

Strategic Communication and Planning

The focus of the study is on the influence of organisational culture on the

development of strategic communication. The MFC unit was a natural locus to

explore specialised communication activities to support strategic goals (Argenti, et

al., 2005) articulated through environmental scanning, research and communication

planning (Cutlip, et al., 2006; Ferguson, 1999; Steyn, 2003b, 2007).

MFC member efforts to understand their organisational environment was

undertaken in a number of ways. Environmental scanning was undertaken informally

in the MFC unit. This included staff reading and listening to daily news and

reviewing the daily media clipping services. A media report clipping service was

undertaken commercially by a national clipping service organisation (Media

Monitors) that provided clippings of all mentions of RC and issues identified as

important by the organisation that appeared in local and national media. The

monitoring was limited to a clipping service only and no trend analysis was

undertaken. At the senior executive level, environmental scanning was undertaken as

a personal function and there was no formal process to capture or document this

intelligence as a process or trending forecast to incorporate it into planning.


There was no formal research undertaken by the unit relating to

communication activities. As previously noted, the NCD provided research data to

state divisions relating to specific areas such as donor activities and funds raised.

MFC members relied on information provided by program area to formulate

communication activities.

Two levels of planning occurred in RCQ MFC. The first aligned with the

broader business planning cycles of RC requiring communication functions to

respond to the corporate goals articulated as a series of actions. The second appeared

to be more ad hoc and less formalised responding to projects and communication

campaigns. For example, in some projects, the strategic communication activities

would simply be a one-page list of tactics, actions and milestones to be achieved. For

other projects, there would be an attempt to do more formalised planning, but in

most cases, these were not formally documented or implemented and did not appear

to incorporate or align with other functions (such as marketing or fundraising)

present in the unit.

According to the business plan (2007/2008), the MFC unit goal included

“actively managing the marketing, communications and media relations across the

full spectrum of RC activities to lift the impact of our fundraising, recruitment,

public profile, reputation and authenticity” (Australian Red Cross / PR Business plan

2007/2008). This goal was designed to align with Goal 3 of the RC strategic plan

which was: Over the next five years RC will forge a unified, inclusive and

sustainable movement, soundly managed and financially secure, which reflects our

country‟s diversity (Australian Red Cross, 2005). To achieve this, each discipline

identified a series of actions to be undertaken to achieve this goal. For example,

public relations and media articulated four actions and 23 tactics that included

relationship management, issues management, improved internal communication,

professional development, and proactive campaign planning. Marketing articulated

six actions and 25 tactics that focused on developing current and relevant collateral,

maintenance of contact records and distribution lists, and targeting specific

demographics (youth) for a focused marketing campaign, working with the blood

service, and maintaining or policing corporate signage and presence. Fundraising and

corporate development focused on building a diverse and sustainable financial base

articulating six actions and 44 tactics. These included identifying external funding


opportunities, relationship building in key areas, ensuring fundraising activities have

high net returns, contributing to national fundraising efforts, and focusing on issue-

based events.

Approval processes

Approval processes for media and marketing communication collateral

requests were facilitated through request forms and approval sheets but there was a

lack of consistency in how these were used or applied as criteria to manage work

quality or workflow. The official approval process required all requests for media

releases, community service announcements, and media photo opportunities and

marketing collateral, such as brochures or posters, was to be given to the manager of

the MFC unit. A marketing request form was to be completed with as much

information as possible. If the job was accepted a job envelope was raised with the

marketing request form attached to the front of it – in effect creating a job bag.

However informal requests were created, typically generated by phone contact by

service areas, or via direct requests from the ED or group manager. The ED of RCQ

had given a directive that the MFC unit had no authority to refuse a program or

service. This meant that if a program had the funds to spend on a piece of collateral

such as a brochure, then MFC staff were not authorised to refuse the brochure as it

was considered the program responsibility to determine the need for the brochure.

MFC staff were permitted to counsel or advise (but not refuse) program staff if they

believed the collateral piece was not appropriate or required.

The policy of work approvals followed a hierarchical line of authority. For

example, media releases would be approved by the MFC manager who would

forward them to the group manager for approval, who would forward to the ED for

final approval. The NCD approval was not required for local issues. National media

personnel were advised of the release for information only. For approvals of

marketing and other types of collateral, a similar approval process was undertaken.

In practice however, work approvals did not always follow policy. After a media

release was drafted it was forwarded straight to the ED to make changes and taken

back to the communications officer to be distributed to the media. Regional or

service managers were advised of the release if their service area was involved.


Identification and approval of events was undertaken by MFC staff in

collaboration with national or program areas. Approval for large events was

facilitated through the development of a business case for the event given to the

group manager and then to the ED. Smaller events such as Wills Days had

preapproved templates, and did not follow the same processes.

Reporting on MFC Activities

MFC activities were reported through the group manager to the RCQ

executive team meeting. MFC activities were also summarised in an outcome/

achievement form in a monthly report published by the ED to the QLD divisional

council. These reports focused on the activities or outputs of the unit rather than the

impacts or outcomes of the MFC activities. For example, the number of media

releases issued, the percentage of success reflected how many of the media releases

were picked up by the media. The percentage of “hits” reflected the publication of

the release, and number of interviews reflected a RCQ spokesperson being quoted.

This is illustrated in the following excerpt from the April 2008 report (Goebel,

2008a) (Table 8).

Table 8: Example of output reporting for media releases in March and April 2008

Press Releases 2008 March April

Releases Issued 20 12

% success 55% 92%

Hits - 57

Interviews 11 16

RCQ also noted that it was coming second in the number of hits for Red

Cross Calling (in comparison to other states). Reporting for marketing activities in

this forum included output figures, listing for example, how many publications were

produced.

The RCQ MFC manager participated once a month in a national MFC team

teleconference where activities and achievements were verbally reported from each

state and territory. The purpose of the teleconferences was information sharing

between states rather than reporting and evaluation of communication activities.


Comparison with other states in terms of impact of marketing and communication

efforts was reported in fundraising dollars.

Summary

This section concludes the description of the setting and context of the study

in RCQ. The next section will introduce the comparative site of RCSA, a comparable

site in both size and role to RCQ. This setting is important to the study as it provides

comparable insights to inform the setting of RCQ.


Red Cross South Australia

RCSA headquarters is located in Wakefield Street, Adelaide, a fringe central

business district on a major road, well serviced by public transport (see Figure 21).

The two-level building is similar in external design and appearance to the RCQ

building. RCSA moved to this site in September 2003 from a North Adelaide

location to improve accessibility, visibility and to reduce maintenance and

overheads.

Like RCQ, office space is designed so senior member offices are located

around the windows of the open plan building, while middle to lower level staff

occupied petitioned office cubicles internally. Each cubicle was furnished with an

operational computer, phone and office equipment. Also like RCQ, the standards of

technology were commensurate with a not-for-profit setting. There are also a number

of meeting rooms throughout the building as common spaces for staff to book for

meetings.

Management

Similar to RCQ, RCSA is managed by a senior management team, consisting

of an ED and four group or senior managers who are responsible for services,

corporate and business development, finance administration, and people and

learning. The management team comes to RC from a variety of backgrounds,

Figure 21: Red Cross South Australia Headquarters in Wakefield St, Adelaide


qualifications and experience. The length of time with RC also varies from recently

employed to having 15 years‟ experience. There is also an equal mix of genders on

the management team.

The ED has held the role since April 2004 and has qualifications in social

work with a strong background in human and community service, welfare and

disability background. The general manager of services has also been with RC in

2004 and has a background in psychology, following positions held in State

Government with Disability Services. The ED also has tertiary qualifications in

psychology. The general manager corporate and business development has no formal

qualifications but has been with RC for more than five years and has previously held

management roles in other not-for-profit organisations. The senior manager, finance

and administration is a chartered accountant and joined RC in 2006 after spending

over 20 years in the financial services industry including several years as financial

controller for the Australian branch of an American bank. The manager of people

and learning joined RC in early 2008 and has a Diploma of Education. Previous roles

prior to joining RC included human resource management positions in government

departments and a research institute.

The RCSA Board at the time of the study period had 11 members and,

similar to RCQ, was led by a chair and a deputy chair. The Board also featured four

high-profile patrons. Backgrounds of the Board members includes business, health,

education and finance.

Structures and reporting responsibilities were similar to RCQ. Each general

manager (known as group managers in RCQ) was responsible for a portfolio of

services and reported directly to the ED. General managers were responsible for day-

to-day operations of their business units. Like RCQ, general managers in South

Australia met as an executive team generally once a fortnight to discuss issues

relating to services, human resources, policy, and to gain feedback on matters of

concern. Unlike RCQ, executives shared the chairing role. Staff meetings were held

regularly however were not as frequent as in RCQ.


Staff, retention and volunteers

RCSA has approximately 173 staff and 4102 volunteers and members. RCSA

manages services centrally with regional areas operating as hubs. This includes Eyre

Peninsula, northern, South East, North and far West, each having managers with

geographically located offices. RCSA also operates 19 retail family stores selling

second hand goods, homewares and fashion and two super safety stores that sell and

hire infant restraints. Staff turnover figures were not acquired for RCSA, however

staff reported a sense of similar levels of turnover as experienced in other states.

Marketing, Fundraising and Communication

The MFC function in RCSA was managed by the general manager of

business and corporate development. There were 25 staff in the unit (see Figure 22

for an organisational chart) and while this appeared to be a much larger unit than

RCQ, the unit incorporated the retail and the first aid, health and safety (FHS)

functions not incorporated in the RCQ MFC unit structure. There were 15 staff

undertaking roles similar to the RCQ site and comparable in number of staff. This

included responsibility for marketing, media and publicity, advertising (local

programs and HR recruitment), retail, events, corporate partnerships and fund-raising

activities, membership and branch coordination, first aid and safety training courses.

The structure of this unit varied slightly to RCQ in that this unit also had

responsibility for branch and member communication with a dedicated, titled

position. While the MFC unit was also structured in silos, the structure was based on

area of responsibility rather than discipline.


Figure 22: Organisational chart of Red Cross South Australia’s MFC unit

Unlike RCQ, the marketing and communication function was combined,

having two staff responsible for all media including editorials in publications and the

generation of media releases and publicity, advertising, marketing communication

and collateral. The team leader of the marketing and communication function had

held the position for several years. His background included strong journalistic and

management skills, having previously supervised staff in two radio newsrooms in

Canada, later serving as Director of Communications and Creative Services for a

Canadian provincial government. The junior team member had completed tertiary

qualifications in communication but had limited working experience.

The community and corporate relations manager joined RCSA in March

2008 only weeks prior to the researcher entering the site. Prior to this role this

manager held a senior corporate account management and development roles in a


large multinational organisation. The community and corporate relations manager

was a newly created position in the team responsible for managing all fundraising

activities. The position was also responsible for liaising with the national corporate

relations manager.

When the general manager of business and corporate development went on

leave, the manager of FHS acted in this role. However there was no clear delegated

seniority shown on the organisational chart for this role. The other team leader or

manager roles (e.g.: team leader of marketing and communication, team leader of

fundraising, community and corporate relationship manager, and manager of FHS)

were all mapped on the chart as senior roles in the unit and reporting to the general

manager. This was unique to South Australia as there was a mediation role of the

manager of MFC in RCQ with a corporate relations function operating as a separate

function with no direct reports.

Responsibilities

Similar to RCQ, the MFC unit in RCSA was described as providing expertise

spanning the media, marketing communication, advertising, and for corporate

relationships within the fundraising area. No documentation was found that outlined

the key responsibilities of the unit. Unlike RCQ, the structure of the unit was focused

more on fundraising than on marketing and public relations (communication)

activities. One more senior staff member (team leader) was responsible for

outputting all communication materials (marketing and public relations) and one

junior staff member was responsible for technician based advertising roles.

Work allocation in the marketing and communication unit was generally

managed reactively. Work requests often would come via the general manager, the

ED or program area manager, requesting media publicity, a need for a brochure,

advertising for volunteers or marketing communication collateral. The team leader

would document the request, the deadline, and the resources needed to complete the

task. The team leader was responsible for prioritising workloads for marketing and

communication.


Marketing and public relations

Unlike RCQ key responsibilities of the team leader were not documented in a

formal position description. Verbally, the role reported contributing to strategic

planning processes and the design, development and implementation of strategic

media and communication at a national, state and local level. Key activities for the

role focused on media outputs including identifying proactive media opportunities

including monitoring media coverage, developing project plans, and working

collaboratively with program areas.

This role was also responsible for the production of collateral and advertising

materials (see Figure 23). Key activities included development and contribution to

corporate publications including The Humanitarian and Year in Reviews and

volunteer or recruitment advertising.

Fundraising

Fundraising staff were focused on events. With the recent addition of a

corporate relations manager, the focus of the unit was shifting to more corporate

development activities. Key responsibilities included a focus on identifying and

securing corporate sponsorships, and to manage various donor or fundraising events

such as “Boys Day Out” and other branch-based activities. The team were also

responsible for liaising with national counterparts for national fundraising campaigns

such as Red Cross Calling and World Red Cross Day.

Figure 23: Collateral produced by MFC unit in Red Cross

South Australia


Strategic Communication and Planning

Similar to RCQ, middle level management and team leader positions had the

opportunity to provide strategic input into communication decision making. The

team leader of marketing and communication and the manager of business and

corporate development had responsibility for the development and contribution of

strategic communication plans and actions in addition often providing South

Australian detail, information and perspectives to complement National Office

programs, plans and projects. Environmental scanning was undertaken informally by

the team leader reading and listening to daily news and reviewing the daily media

clipping services. The monitoring was limited to a clipping service that was often

distributed to other senior managers. A monthly marketing and communications

report was prepared for the general manager by the team leader marketing and

communications. This covered major activities, milestones, number of media

“mentions”, brand reach and frequency by particular media. A précis of this

marketing and communications report was included in the reports prepared for the

Board issued via the RCSA ED. No detailed longer-term trend analysis was

undertaken or interpretation of public opinion. At the senior management level,

environmental scanning was undertaken as a personal function and there was no

formal process to capture or document this intelligence as a process or trending

forecast.

Planning for communication in RCSA followed two streams. The first stream

responded to state-based needs using an event calendar. This planning was

undertaken by the team leader of marketing and communication who would use an

events calendar template to capture yearly milestones and opportunities in media and

marketing. Input for this calendar was solicited from the senior management team,

services program managers and line staff. The content of this tool was also then

coordinated with head office for national input and the marketing and

communications activities of the other states.

Other communication planning in RCSA was done at a program level on a

“needs” basis. Depending on the nature, complexity and goals of the project,

separate briefs, plans or key messages would be prepared and executed as required.

One example of this was for a local retail shop opening. A media plan would be

developed and implemented to generate media and publicity to support the opening.


The second stream of planning responded to the NCD needs. Planning for

major national programs such as Red Cross Calling was coordinated by the NCD

with committee membership, input and support from the states for the required

media, fundraising and corporate communications activities.

Approval processes

Approvals on marketing and communication activities were facilitated

through the general manager of the unit, and the ED depending on the nature of the

activity. Media releases were taken by the team leader for approval by the ED (after

GM and services management review) and/or to National Office depending on their

nature or content.

The standard policy for all information materials was approval and signoff by

the ED of RCSA. Compared to RCQ, the middle levels of management (group

manager and MFC manager) either passed this step of approval or a similar position

did not exist in RCSA. Similar to RCQ, the RCSA ED had responsibility to inform

the local RCSA board members about public information activities.

Reporting on MFC activities

Similar to RCQ, reporting on MFC activities in RCSA was done both

formally and informally. Formally, activities were reported to board and national

levels via reporting. Informally, activities were reported verbally at the general staff

level, middle management level, and executive level in RCSA.

Summary

The state divisions of RCQ and RCSA were similar in overall structure,

reporting, and provision of services. Both organisations were subject to the same

policy and regulatory environments imposed both by RC and the external

environment. Differences were found in approvals and reporting, delegated

authorities of MFC staff, MFC activities and staff roles in the MFC unit, with RCQ

having more MFC staff but more levels of approval to negotiate.

RCQ and RCSA were similar in their approaches to planning with both

following a more reactive, adhoc approach to prioritising communication activities.


A key difference was the focus of activities between the two settings. While both

organisations had a similar number of staff dedicated to MFC activities, RCQ was

more focused on marketing and public relations, particular regional and metropolitan

news media in Queensland. RCSA was more focused on fundraising event activities

and also producing news stories for internal and external RC publications

coordinated by NCD.

RCSA MFC unit was more autonomous in developing strategic

communication actions, while in RCQ, the locus of this activity found in the

executive member level with MFC staff playing a technician role. RCQ staff were

also required more tightly controlled in terms of approval systems, and were required

to follow several steps for approvals of materials produced. RCSA staff were

required to only follow one step. RCQ also had more staff dedicated to marketing

and public relations activities, while RCSA had more fundraising staff. The retail

management and first aid health and safety areas were also more visible in RCSA as

part of the unit which was not present in RCQ.

While both organisations did not demonstrate a planning approach to

activities, both had developed ways to identify future events. For example, RCSA

used a calendar as a way to map future events for planning. The calendar relied on

members completing the calendar both at a local and national level, however this

was not always completed. RCQ had formal business plans that identified a higher

level of planning, however, the translation to strategies and tactics was not

undertaken.

This chapter has detailed the research setting of RCQ, focusing on the

marketing, fundraising and communication unit as the locus for the development of

strategic communication in the organisation. This chapter also detailed the social

ecology of the setting, by describing the relationships within the organisations and

the relevant structure, policy and framework of RC. The comparative sites of RCSA

and the NCD were detailed to establish the context for Chapter 5 – the ethnography

exploring systems of shared knowledge expressed as organisational culture.

Chapter 5: Ethnography 148

Chapter 5

Ethnography

Chapter 5 details the ethnography of RCQ. Presented as narrative detailing

emergent themes over three studies (settings of RCQ, the NCD, and RCSA), the

ethnographic account seeks to discover and understand meanings and perceptions of

people in their social world (Crotty, 1998). Given this imperative, the aim of this

ethnography is to describe and understand the focal organisation, RCQ MFC and

executive staff perceptions, in their role as developers of strategic communication

and their views of their organisation and environment in their natural setting. The

focus is on members in RCQ MFC unit as the natural locus of communication

activity. The discussion progressively contextualises these activities, first within the

boundaries of RCQ, and then extends to the NCD . The ethnography then moves to

the divisional setting of RCSA to enrich understanding of member views in RCQ

and provide a comparative base to establish the value and beliefs systems operating

in RCQ (see Figure 24 for chapter organisation). This follows Vayda‟s (1983) and

Marcus‟s (1995) call for ethnographers identified in Chapter 3, that is not to be

constrained by predetermined boundaries but to focus on activities and trace the

causes and effects as they engage in the situation confronting them. Chapter 4

presented the setting of RCQ, the NCD as the national regulators and policy setting

authority for the national organisation and detailed the comparative setting of the

divisional state office of RCSA.

Stewart (1998) highlights the role of the researcher as the instrument in

ethnographic enquiry. This chapter therefore commences with my perspective as the

researcher and a disclosure of my consciousness of influences, assumptions, and

fears in my journey of discovery in writing the ethnographic account. Fetterman

(1998) argues that a researcher‟s effort to view another‟s culture impartially can be

enhanced by acknowledging personal beliefs and biases. The ethnographic account is

then introduced at the first stage of analysis by describing the setting of the MFC

unit in RCQ. The interactions of the MFC group with the executive team is described

to provide a more detailed context of the setting, work, and people. I then provide the

emergent knowledge structures representing shared views of their world as they


contribute to their understanding (Sackmann, 1991) as it influences the development

of strategic communication.

Next, to progressively contextualise the knowledge structures of RCQ

participants, the second stage of analysis is undertaken by exploring the views of

staff in the NCD within these structures. The chapter concludes with the third stage

of analysis, within the setting of RCSA as a comparative perspective to deepen

understanding of the primary site. Vayda (1983) suggests ethnographers explore “the

contexts in which apparently similar interactions take place elsewhere” (p. 273) to



develop deeper understanding of the interactions and concerns into context. Figure

25 represents this contextualisation of the setting of RCQ.

Figure 25: Progressive contextualisation of Red Cross Queensland: Stage 1 of analysis

Researcher Perspective

My role as researcher in RC was as a known investigator (Lofland et al.,

2006). I was visible and interactive, but not participatory. I came equipped with

connections (knowing key people in the organisation), accounts (being able to

articulate in one sentence about what and why I was researching), knowledge (being

able to position myself as a non participatory observer) and courtesy. Having spent

many years in industry, I was respectful of members‟ time and participation

(Lofland, et al., 2006). However, Fine and Shulman (2009) argue organisational

ethnographers can benefit from greater self awareness and recognise that their work

reflects a series of choices they make about how they go about their work. This claim

is further supported by Hatch (1996)who suggests ethnographers reflect on their

purpose and practice, as the ethnography really represents a researcher‟s own

cultural biases. This reflexivity “implies that the orientations of researchers will be

shaped by their socio-historical locations, including the values and interests that

these locations confer upon them (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995, p. 16). While


ontologically, I believed reality is socially constructed, epistemologically I came

with a constructionist, interpretivist view in which the researcher and the social

world influence each other (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). In this case, while objectivism

or “attaining the objective truth and meaning” (Crotty, 1998, p. 6) was my aim, I

understood that reality was subjective, or existed within the consciousness and

experience of the members of RC. As Rabinow (1977) states:

...the anthropologist and his informants live in a culturally mediated

world, caught up in “webs of signification” (citing Jameson, 1972) they

themselves have spun. This is the ground of anthropology; there is no

privileged position, no absolute perspective, and no valid way to eliminate

consciousness from our activities or those of others. (p. 151)

In this section I detail explicitly my consciousness, or as Stewart (1998)

suggests, I describe and explore the cultural biases that live within the focal research

instrument – me. It is organised according to the following time periods (see Table

9):

Table 9: Time periods

Period Date

Early days

Jan 08- June 08

Middle days June 08- Dec 08

Closing days Jan 09- June 09

Checking and confirming June 09-Dec 09

Early days

I entered RC with assumptions of which I was aware but had not specifically

documented nor clarified. I assumed that RC would have a level of sophistication in

their communication management given their size, age and history, and global status.

I also assumed that I could keep focused on my key research questions, gathering

data to inform my understanding of how cultural selection operates. Both of these

assumptions were not met. While the selection of my setting met the sampling

criteria needed to respond to my research questions, it was not until I entered the


organisation that I found I had made these assumptions based on the tangible

symbols and outputs of their communication effort. I had assumed that there would

be a structure to the processes, there would be a number of documents representing

the planning process, and that there would be a visible and planned effort in

response. What I found was quite different (which is often the purpose of doing

research), and the finding challenged me on entry as I felt, initially, that I was not

gaining access to the right people. However, after some time I realised that this

structured or “proper” process actually did not exist as I anticipated it would, and I

would have to look to alternative ways in which the organisations approached their

strategic communication activities.

While issues relating to entry were not of any note, challenges surrounding

issues of reciprocity and personal ethics arose. As Fine and Shulman (2009)suggest,

I needed to be precise, observant and passive. However my training as a

communication consultant with 15 years‟ experience challenged this frame as I was

used to solving problems quickly. The critical requirement of not trying to solve a

problem meant I exercised enormous restraint. I likened it to a similar effort of

offering a cigarette to a person trying to quit smoking. I constantly needed to remind

myself not to say anything and to ask questions about why they were taking an

action that, in my experience, I would not have taken. I found at times that I was

challenged to be a “problem solver” versus a “neutral observer”. Over the time in the

field, my instinct to “fix things” lessened and my instinct to question became innate

(which was a relief, for both me and my supervisor).

Finally, as warned by Lofland et al., (2006), I suffered from information

overload in the early days and felt frustrated that there was not an observable

proactive effort or outcome evidenced by documents relating to communication

strategy. I also experienced the dilemma of wanting to capture everything and not

having enough knowledge to determine which event would deliver the richest data.

To resolve this, I selected the scenes and events based on criteria from my

experience. For example, if there was a strategic planning meeting suggesting an

explicit voicing of concerns and solutions versus sitting with the MFC team and

watching them work on their computers, then I chose the meeting because this was

the place where group level discussion would take place – but not really knowing if I


missed something vital in the MFC area. However, I felt comfortable that members

in RCQ had accepted me on face value.

Middle days

The middle stage I describe as a period of time I felt “at ease” in the

organisation. Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) warn about feeling “at home”, as

this encourages a “too cosy a mental attitude” that affords a researcher to lose their

analytical perspective (p. 115). I was certainly “part of the furniture”, staff did not

look at me as if I was a stranger, and often I felt people spoke to me as if I was just

one of their colleagues and confidants. This identification with the organisation and

the members (Lofland et al., 2006) also produced feelings of sympathy, as I held

privileged knowledge of different levels of discourse about the unit, decisions,

personnel and views.

I still had a powerful instinct to help the organisation and step out of my

observation role to “fix” things. I also had an increasing awareness of my sense of

loathing and frustration with many aspects of the organisation, requiring at one point

that I take a leave of absence so I could overcome these and get back to a neutral

observational role. With one staff member in particular, I experienced significant

disdain, a phenomenon not uncommon in fieldwork (Lofland et al., 2006). I reflected

on why I disliked this person and concluded that I thought this person was a bit of a

“player” – I actually called this person a “snake” in my field notes. In my view, this

person was very good at talking “the talk” – using jargon – but did not deliver. I

observed inconsistencies in their professional approach to their work and how they

easily allocated blame to others for inaction or non delivery. I was frustrated because

senior management thought this person was highly capable. However I worked very

hard to ensure that my feelings were not detected by any staff member. This time

also coincided with my trip to South Australia to study the setting there, followed by

interviews in Sydney and Melbourne, allowing valuable down time from the

intensity of the RCQ setting and allowing for the comparative insights from both

RCSA and the NCD to take shape.

In all settings, staff were generally very likable and required little effort to

establish relationships. I incorporated many of the relationship maintenance

strategies that Lofland et al. (2006) identify including establishing a non-threatening


demeanour. I anticipated that many staff would experience discomfort because I was

a PhD researcher and had worked in strategic communication roles in a number of

large organisations. It was not appropriate that I present myself as strategic or

selectively incompetent (see Lofland et al., 2006, p. 68) as this would not fit with my

background nor was necessary given the purpose of the research.

Legitimacy or credibility of perceived role is critical in organisational

ethnographies (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995). I perceived members in RCQ saw

me as a valuable resource, while members in RCSA saw me simply as a university

student with some research to do. NCD staff viewed me as someone who had been

given permission to interview them and spend some time in their office. These three

interpreted perspectives really reflect the role and time spent in the organisations,

and it did not impact on my ability to move or have access to information.

I adopted exchange strategies as a way to maintain the trust and value of my

presence in their world (Lofland et al., 2006). Given the lack of resources available

to staff, I provided books and resources in the form of providing current or relevant

research articles for them to draw on. I also offered future training, once my PhD

was finished. Later this proved to be a futile offer as the organisational restructure

effected in July 2009 to nationalise the MFC function relocated most communication

roles to other states in Australia.

One core yet not unexpected concern was about confidentiality. A number of

members asked who was going to have access to my notes and interviews, and

viewed me cautiously. In my responses to these questions, I reaffirmed that only I

(and my supervisor) would have access to the notes and any records I collected

would not be identifiable. RC would not have access to my data and I would only

give them a summary report of my findings. This seemed to satisfy all members,

assisted by the fact that the Group Manager of Policy and Research was also doing a

PhD at my institution, and that the parents of another manager were both academics.

A variation on this occurred in RCSA, where one of the staff there asked “Do you

think Red Cross really knows what you are going to do with the data in terms of

publishing?” (Member MFC, SA). This question came out of this member‟s

knowledge of the academic profession, as their partner is an accomplished scholar. I

also didn‟t expect that quite so many staff in the organisation would have left by the

time I exited the setting. Had I asked the staff turnover rate in RCQ MFC before I


started, I would have discovered that the average time in the unit was a year (with

two exceptions). However I knew where many of the staff had gone, so this allowed

me to gain valuable member checks of my interpretations.

As a researcher, I had not really reflected on the moral dilemma of “what if”

what I needed to report was not complimentary (Fine & Shulman, 2009). These

concerns crystallised more as a challenge as I spent more time in the organisation.

Closing days – exiting the setting

As I became more familiar with the setting, and experiencing little in the way

of “new” discoveries, I had an increasing awareness and anxiety about presenting my

ethnographic account. Researchers are warned to avoid addressing partial truths and

self deceptions of the account in the struggle to be respectful to the organisation and

to protect formed relationships (Fine & Shulman, 2009; Lofland, et al., 2006). Fine‟s

ten lies of ethnography (1993, cited in Fine & Shulman, 2009) highlight these

challenges. The struggle was indeed about providing an honest account, but being

respectful to the organisation whose members showed enormous generosity both in

letting me into part of their world and the organisation whose mandate is to help

vulnerable people. While I had fully disclosed my research purpose and intent to

gain access, I questioned if what I was writing would be harmful to the organisation.

Fine and Shulman (2009) warn of the ethical and practical dilemmas involved with

conducting an organisational ethnography, highlighting the challenges and

opportunities for deception in disclosure and reporting. My approach was to write a

truthful account and then reread, being alert to any information that could be

harmful. Two choices were available at this time. The first would be to embargo the

thesis; the second would be to remove those parts that I, and my supervisors,

considered harmful. As I concluded the account, I reviewed it in the light of it having

the potential to cause harm. I excluded parts of four narratives as a result of this

review. These did not weaken the account, but did lessen the intensity. However this

was a compromise I needed to make.

Checking and confirming

Checking and confirming were undertaken formally and informally in three

ways. The first was seeking confirmation through discussion. For example, two of


the RCQ executives attended a function where I broadly identified some of the key

concepts found in the early stages of analysis. The second was through re-entering

the organisation on a number of occasions during write up and discussing some of

the core concepts with key informants. A key obstacle to this approach was that

many of the members of the organisation had left the organisation. So the final

approach was through the maintaining contact with some of the participants who had

formally left the organisation. I informally presented an abridged version of the first

stage of analysis for reflection. I also emailed the setting description to two key

informants, one from RCQ and one from RCSA, for accuracy checking.

My experience during this process echoes warnings made by Lofland et al.

(2006). That is, for some members the initial reaction was, “well, no, that is not my

experience”. When this was the case, I clarified the concept, cited some examples

and my interpretation. In all but one case, the member agreed that my interpretation

was actually accurate or stated, “yes, I can see why you see that” and it was more a

realisation of insight rather than a statement of something new. As Hammersley

(1990) suggests “we have no access to an independent reality: all we have are

interpretations, and the ethnographer‟s account is just as much an interpretation as

are those of the people that he or she is studying” (p. 14). And this is the case here.

What follows is my interpretation presented as an ethnography of RCQ MFC unit in

an effort to understand their views of what they see, do and how they work in their

effort to contribute to strategic communication.

Establishing trust and gaining entry

Stewart (1998) and Ybema et al. (2009) emphasise the importance of

relational ties between the researcher and people in the setting and how the nature of

these relationships contribute to the ethnographic account. Relationships were central

to the knowledge-creation process in this study (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995).

From the very beginning, access was gained to the setting through a personal

relationship.

My relationship with the MFC manager in RCQ began several years earlier

in 2003 when I was working as a consultant to an organisation she worked for. Over

the next few years I remained in contact with her as she moved to different

organisations and continued to have a professional consultant based relationship. The


first meeting was on 25 January 2007 and was attended by both the MFC manager

and the senior manager for research and policy. The senior manager was also a PhD

student at the same institution as me and we quickly established commonalities in

both approach and methodology.

The senior manager noted one of her key performance indicators was to

enhance links with local universities for research so this helped facilitate the

approval processes within the organisation for access. Subsequent meetings included

presenting to the ED of RCQ, followed by a meeting with the director of the NCD in

Sydney. While the ED of RCQ was supportive of my study, I was advised that I

needed to individually approach the other state‟s EDs to gain access.

Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) suggest a key challenge for researchers is

in managing the expectations of people and their varying levels of knowledge of

research methodology. Given the supportive response to my study received from the

ED of RCQ and the director of NCD, I was surprised when it was reported back to

me that the ED of Tasmania, who was PhD qualified, made a derogatory comment at

a national management team meeting and declared that my methodology was

inappropriate and not suitable. I had previously sent a letter outlining my request

accompanied by two page project brief, written in non-technical language, with very

little information about the epistemology and methodology. Either by coincidence or

influence, RCSA was the only other state apart from RCQ that granted access, with

the NCD granting interviews of only key staff. This follows what Lofland et al.

(2006) suggest in that purposeful sampling in qualitative studies is common,

however Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2009) warn that choice of setting is often

constrained by availability of access to the site.


The following ethnographic account is presented to reflect the themes as

encountered as the account moves from the focal setting of the MFC unit to the

executive level in RCQ.

The first part of the ethnography details the physical entry to RCQ and then

moves to the MFC unit to describe the participant‟s world and their approaches to

working in RCQ uncovering themes of business, authority, work allocation and

feeling overworked. This includes member perceptions of MFC work in RCQ, and


motivations for working at RC. The account then moves to member views of RC as a

brand, and explores accepted ways of working at RCQ. The account then describes

member perceptions of environment before moving to themes related to strategic

communication. These sections conclude with the presentation of the knowledge

structures and core schema‟s operating in RCQ.

Encounter with the setting

I stepped into RCQ officially as a PhD researcher on 8 January 2008

following the traditional Christmas and New Year holiday break. I entered the

building via the Park Road entrance, an area well known for its coffee shops and

restaurants. The building was contemporary but tired-looking. To enter the building

referred to as Humanity Place, a visitor would need to go up several flights of stairs

to reach the reception of RCQ – passing by glass doors of other businesses on the

ground level in the same building. The tiled stairs were chipped but clean. There was

a lift, but it was only accessible from the security car park on the lower ground

(parking) floor.

The reception area overlooked Park Road. Three people were waiting while

the receptionist was trying to manage a wave of calls beeping on the switchboard.

She ignored people in the reception and gave priority to the calls (I concluded this

was an accepted practice after being in the organisation for some time). After asking

for my appointment, I was signed in with an official visitor‟s pass. In a week, this

would be replaced with an official security tag with a photograph and title of QUT

researcher. A swipe card was needed to be able to move through the three security

doors on the floor.

The open plan office setting did not appear to be fully staffed as there were a

number of computer cubicles with spare seats. At this point, the office appeared to be

quiet – with little chatter or “noise” from people talking. The cubicles were well lit,

modern in design in terms of colours and style, but overall the office spaces appeared

cluttered and messy. While some were tidy, there appeared to be little policing of

boxes and general office mess, and this was particularly a feature in the MFC unit.

I was met in reception and made to feel very welcome by the senior manager

I had met previously in the coffee shop. There was almost an atmosphere of


excitement generated. This person was to become one of two key informants in my

study, reinforced by her comment “let me know what you need”. Fetterman (2010)

argues selecting an intermediary is valuable, but cautions researchers to establish

independence in the field. While my relationship with my key informant proved to

be a valuable resource during the time spent in the organisation, I was mindful of the

need to establish myself as a trusted and independent researcher seeking knowledge

for my PhD and not for any organisational mandate. As I later learned, the

organisation was undergoing a number of reviews to inform organisational change,

so the need to be seen as independent from these reviews, and trusted, remained an

important concern for me.

My key informant sat across the desk from me in her office and commenced

her briefing on life in RCQ. This included an overview detailing the structure,

history and the way things generally worked. Some time was spent to identify roles,

positions and personalities. She actively tried to anticipate my future needs as a PhD

researcher by suggesting that I obtain copies of various documents and meet with

various people. Her detailed discussion with me was held in her office with a closed

door. She kept getting up and opening and then later closing the door during certain

points in our conversation. She said it was just “in case she said anything politically

incorrect”, although the information she was disclosing appeared quite pedestrian

and I wondered what part of it would be considered sensitive.

Door closing and sensitivity about voicing a view that may not be the

dominant view later emerged as something that was done frequently in this office. I

initially believed the trust of disclosure of sensitive information (her view) early in

our relationship was because she was also doing a PhD in another area at the same

institution so we shared common knowledge of key university personnel and

departments. Her knowledge of what a PhD entailed was helpful as she conveyed

this knowledge as both trust in the process and my institution to other members

across the organisation.

Her role as a senior manager in the RCQ office incorporated responsibility

for advising the executive team on policy, undertaking research, and most

importantly, led the grant application process for the organisation. RCQ was

considered successful in its grant application efforts, and later I found that this model

was going to be replicated at a national level.


My key informant was a respected and trusted member of the senior team,

having the confidence of the ED. She had also been with RC for more than a decade

in a number of roles so her organisational knowledge was very high. Her role in my

research was also important because, although she was not connected with the MFC

function, she would provide an “executive team” interpretation as an alternative way

of looking at things and give me insight from her perspective of why things

happened as they did based on her deep organisational knowledge.

My intention to focus on the MFC unit as the site or setting of strategic

communication was informed both theoretically and organisationally. Theoretically,

Hallahan et al.(2007) argue the development of strategic communication involves

several disciplines including management, marketing, advertising and public

relations. Cornelissen (2008) and Argenti (2007) identify the role of corporate

communication as a strategic management function coordinating the organisation‟s

marketing communications and public relations functions. Organisationally, RCQ

had an established, independent, well-staffed marketing and communication unit

who undertook sophisticated marketing and communication programs and

campaigns. The RCQ marketing, communication and public relations position

descriptions and business plans also documented core activities of developing and

contributing to strategic communication in RC.

The Marketing, Fundraising, and Communication Unit

My introduction to staff in the MFC unit was done opportunistically as they

wandered into the office. The unit was located in the back south-west corner of the

Park Road building. It was diametrically opposite to the ED‟s office – meaning it

was the furthest point away of all offices in the building. For the MFC manager to

see the ED, she had to go through two swipe security doors.

My key informant, who did not belong to the MFC unit, stated she had

organised an office desk for me to work at. She quickly discovered that her previous

effort to organise this had failed. I was told this was because the organisation had

grown so quickly and they were waiting for office space in the annex next door to

become available so they had enough space for their growing staff. Until this

happened, there was no desk available. While my key informant apologised, I was


actually happy with this because it meant that I could pull up a chair at strategic

locations within the office to observe and not be seen to be out of place.

I was shown to the office of the MFC manager who welcomed me to the

organisation and ushered me into her office. She appeared very busy working on

editing a media release in front of her, yet appeared comfortable with my presence in

her office. She was slightly distracted and was complaining about the poor IT

resources, and how something about her computer was not working properly. After

finishing the task, she focused her attention on me and proceeded to outline the unit,

staff and their roles, after which she got up to introduce me to her MFC members

that were in the office. As a group, they all appeared quite young.

I was first introduced to the marketing officer, a man in his late 20s who was

dishevelled in appearance. He greeted me cautiously but was keen to tell me that he

used to be a marketing manager in a high profile arts organisation. His chatter

stopped when he returned to his workspace and he did not appear to engage much

with the other staff in the unit. I was informed by another staff member about the

way he came to be employed by RC. In his previous role, he and the MFC manager

worked in the same organisation but he was her supervisor. Now in RC, the authority

was reversed and she was his supervisor. He had left the arts organisation and was

unemployed doing volunteer work at RC. When the marketing officer position

became available at RC, the MFC manager contacted him to see if he would be

interested because she was aware that he did not have a job. He was also already

working in RC as a volunteer so he came to the unit with some organisational

knowledge. The power relationship between him and the MFC manager was now

reversed and there appeared to be underlying tension in this relationship. Other staff

in the unit later acknowledged this tension.

The two public relations staff were both females in their 20s. The more

senior person held a degree in journalism. She was corporately casual in appearance,

which fitted with the mostly casual standard of dressing by all staff in the office. She

had previously joined the RCQ office from a similar role in another state‟s RC office

for a year. She said she moved to RCQ recently to specifically work with the

manager of MFC because she had great respect for her experience and wanted to

learn from her. The junior public relations person had recently completed her degree

in journalism but had limited experience in public relations or communication roles.


She had worked in RC in employment services before “getting in” to the MFC area –

something she described being reliant more on who you knew rather than what you

knew:

Before, in my old area, we had little to do with MFC. Both of the areas I

worked in (Red Cross) prior was government contract and you don‟t really

have much connection to the rest of Red Cross. Especially MFC – I didn‟t

even know what they did. But I wanted to go into that area because it is my

area of study. People told me the MFC team were very cliquey so there is no

chance of getting into the team unless you know someone. (Member 4,

MFC, Qld)

The fundraising staff appeared to work independently from the other two

areas (marketing and public relations /communication). The corporate relations

manager was from the UK and had been in Australia for two years, travelling here to

be with her boyfriend. She was in her mid 20s, well groomed and held a Bachelor of

Arts in American history and politics. She had work experience in public relations

events and administration in a press office at MG Rover Car Company and at global

corporate Unilever in the UK. Her responsibilities at RC included identifying,

liaising and securing corporate relationships, in the form of short or long term

funding and sponsorships, for the organisation. More recently her role also included

liaising with national office to jointly approach national corporate and also

contributing to the development of national guidelines for management of the

corporate relations effort.

The corporate relations manager had one direct report, a fundraising

coordinator, occupied by a young man in his 20s.. He joined RC when I started my

fieldwork. He had come from working in recruitment in London to work for RCQ,

drawn by the appeal of working for the largest humanitarian organisation in the

world and the fact that he had met the finance manager in Manchester who told him

if he ever came to Australia, she could get a job for him. He had worked for several

weeks at RC with no pay because he was waiting for RC to organise his work visa.

He did not seem concerned about not being paid though. He held a Bachelor of Arts

in music history from Oxford University UK.


The planned-giving manager was a much older man, aged in his mid 60s,

previously retired from an executive administration role in a regional health board

and hospital. He had been with RC since March 2006, joining the organisation in a

volunteer capacity and then moving into a paid position as a planned-giving

coordinator, being titled as manager sometime after that. His view of planned-giving

was that it was part of fundraising and involved “corporate, third parties and art

unions”, including Wills Days3. He viewed planned-giving as being very different to

marketing and communication functions, and actively sought to keep it that way. He

boasted, “we‟ve cocooned the plan-giving area away from the hurly-burly of MF and

C”.

The planned-giving manager had three direct reports, the Red Cross Calling4

coordinator and two planned-giving coordinators that were rarely seen because they

were located on the Gold Coast. The Red Cross Calling Coordinator was a woman in

her late 20s from the UK who had a national diploma in hotel catering and

institutional management. This was her first job in Australia after moving here in

April 2007. She started working for RC 10 months ago as a casual temporary worker

(temp) to provide data entry and administration support to the corporate relations

manager. She had been told RC was going to create a more permanent role for her

and she said she was promised that it was going to be formalised a few months ago.

In the meantime she said she was optimistic that it was just how things happened at

RC – they were very slow on anything to do with paperwork, and it would come

through. She continued to focus on her job responsibility of coordinating Red Cross

Calling – RC‟s major door knock appeal held nationally in March.

A woman, who stood out from the others, was bustling around the office and

moving between the group manager‟s office and her cubicle. She was making more

noise than any of the other staff. The MFC manager identified her as the MFC

assistant, an 18-year-old female who had been with RC for 2.5 years, which made

her the longest serving employee in the MFC unit. I was also told if I needed

anything, she would be the person to ask. The MFC assistant briefly said hello and

3 Wills Days are planned events where members of the public attend an advertised location and have their will and estate

document drawn up by a qualified solicitor for a small fee. The aim of Wills Day is to encourage people to leave a donation from their estate to RC. 4 Red Cross Calling is the annual doorknock fundraising appeal conducted nationally in March. The dates are not consistent

across the country due to differences in state government requirements for fundraising “weeks”.


kept walking. Later the MFC assistant described her role to me as an executive

assistant to the group manager of business operations whose main role (informally)

was as a gatekeeper and central keeper of office gossip. Her responsibilities included

being the group manager‟s personal assistant, assisting the MFC unit, and “doing my

own little events”. This included managing the annual Christmas gift wrap appeal in

shopping centres. She had a close personal relationship with the group manager and

was well liked by executive staff in the organisation. She was well regarded for her

energetic working style and her ability to meet requests quickly. She held no formal

qualifications but was a central figure in the unit and gatekeeper to the group

manager. This included reading (and deleting if she felt it was warranted) all the

group manager‟s emails, managing her diary, and acting to “push back” on people

wanting access to the group manager. Staff in the unit appeared wary of her as one

team member commented, “she has a big influence on the team. When she‟s in a

good mood, it is fantastic... when she‟s having a bad day, it is not so great in here”

(Member MFC, Qld). The MFC assistant was also due to leave the organisation to

go overseas in five weeks time, so her main focus was getting ready for the “new

girl” to take over from her. She said she doubted that a new person could do

everything she did though “because she wouldn‟t cope” (MFC assistant). While

some of her tasks would be delegated to other team members, generally staff were

not concerned she was leaving. There was one more staff member who had MFC

responsibilities, but she was attached to the national office team. She was introduced

to me as we passed her desk, but she did not attempt to engage in any small talk and

declined to be interviewed.

For the first few weeks of my fieldwork, I found that I was doing most of the

talking, responding to questions such as “who are you”, “where are you from”, “what

do you do” “where do you live”, “what are you doing here/ what is your research

about”, “does national office know you are here”, and “why would you want to study

RC?”. These questions were usually embedded in more informal discussions,

involving social activities or general questions about how I was going, how I was

finding RC and if I had “worked out what was wrong with the place yet”. This was

really a “tongue- in-cheek” comment. This time was not wasted as Hammersley and

Atkinson (1995) remind us that “the value of pure sociability should not be

underestimated as a means of building trust” (p. 89).


From these early conversations it was also made clear that I was viewed as an

expert and a “valuable resource” and someone that could help, but at this early stage,

I was not clear on what this actually meant. However some members were quizzical

on the benefits of my research in terms of “what will Red Cross get out of this?”

(Member 3, MFC Qld), but this passed quite quickly. As one member in the unit

expressed:

All of us want to do the most with the least. All of us want the best for the

organisation and the outcomes. Which is why we see you as an additional

resource to help us do that. (Member 10, MFC Qld)

The office setup replicated a typical office setting and featured the expected

symbols reflecting hierarchies of power and position. The MFC manager and the

group manager had a lockable office (an office with a door) while all other MFC

members were spread over two partitioned sections. Each section had four office

cubicles, with staff clustered by discipline, where possible. The senior public

relations person, the most recent recruit did not have a dedicated space and had to

“hot desk” on a daily basis. This was in spite of her being one of the more senior

members of team. She continued to hot desk for two months, until mid-March, when

she was allocated a space due to a resignation of another staff member.

The physical proximity of the group manager‟s office provided opportunities

for team members to bypass formal reporting lines. At times this was an encouraged

practice. The thinness of the wall partitioning the MFC manager and group

manager‟s office also meant discussions and issues in the MFC unit were

inadvertently picked up by the group manager because a conversation or issue was

overheard, thereby bypassing and making redundant the hierarchical authority

identified in the MFC manager‟s position description to manage the unit.

The next section explores ways of working which describes members‟ views

about what they need to do and what is important about working in RCQ. This is

important as it provides the basis of identifying shared knowledge and cultural units.


Ways of working

As I settled in over the following weeks, I observed the organisation and

prioritisation of marketing and communication projects and work was done at a

number of levels. Fundraising was not part of strategic communication prioritisation

as they worked on project-based campaigns including Red Cross Calling.

For the most part, people in the unit seemed very busy – at times almost

frantic. There seemed to be no centralised place to see what people were working on,

or deadlines for what was pending. In terms of marketing and communication work,

there appeared to be little consistency in how work was prioritised. For some

projects, a more senior directive was given. For example, the ED or group manager

gave a directive, and MFC members would say, “[name] wants it done today”. Any

other high priority jobs would be pushed aside. For other cases, prioritisation of

workload followed a less formal approach. The MFC manager had recently

introduced a workload prioritisation system where service staff in the regions could

complete a brief and this document would be forwarded to the MFC manager to

prioritise and allocate it to staff, with the aim of managing workloads:

We have made a lot of progress to rein expectations in and get people to log

jobs. The issue is that I have yet to see a job that has been rejected. It‟s very

hard. How do you reject them? (Member 3, MFC Qld)

There was also a verbal directive given by the group manager that MFC

members do not have the authority to refuse a job, only she did (field notes 11 Feb

2008). However, the group manager expressed she did not want to be involved in the

daily prioritising of allocated work and did not want to be bothered with micro level

detail.

And it doesn‟t help that (name of group manager) is so busy doing her things.

So we are always told, leave (her) alone – ok great – but… (Member 4, MFC

Qld)

Work for the marketing and communication staff was allocated by discipline,

however there was some sharing of tasks. The marketing communication staff


worked primarily on the development of collateral materials and advertising. This

included brochures, posters and information materials required by services, and

advertising for key type events such as volunteer recruitment, and Wills Days. The

marketing team leader stated that the main short and medium term goals of the role

were “to develop a consistent set of collateral pieces”. The marketing business plan

noted other activities identified included the development of RCQ year in reviews,

production (writing) of the chair‟s bulletins, writing and production of newsletters,

maintaining the RCQ website and administrative tasks such as maintaining a

marketing database.

The public relations communication staff worked primarily on media and

publicity activities including drafting media releases for corporate or service needs

(identified as both proactive and reactive) and responding to media enquiries. They

also drafted editorial copy for corporate publications and newsletters. As noted in

their business plans, public relations work also included developing and maintaining

media relationships with local media, maintaining an accurate media distribution list,

monitoring the local media for issues of high priority, identifying and promoting

opportunities across the organisation, and engaging local celebrities for promotional

opportunities. So while a silo approach to the unit work was taken, team members

expressed concern about a lack of communication between the silos. Staff in the unit

felt they worked in isolation or just within their discipline. While relations in the unit

were described as social and chatty (Members 1, 2, 7) with some underlying

competitiveness (Members 2, 6, 9), sharing of tasks and projects was not really done:

Nobody really knows what anybody else does...Well, we just, it is not

encouraged. .... I don‟t really understand. (Member 6, MFC Qld)

The isolation of members in the unit was compounded with the MFC

manager of the unit going on maternity leave, and a decision made in late March by

the group manager not to replace her. The MFC manager was the central

communication point for all disciplines. With the position removed for the period of

leave, the proposed management structure would now be reconfigured with each

discipline reporting directly to the group manager. In a meeting with MFC members

on 8 February 2008 in the Solferino Room, the new team leadership structure was


outlined, but members expressed concern because there was a lack of clarity

operationally about how the unit would actually function, and if this new structure

would compound existing problems in the unit such as having too much to do:

[it is] hit and miss really. It kind of goes through phases where everything‟s

really good and we always know what‟s going on and then... whatever. And

now it‟s potentially going to be more difficult with this new structure... we‟re

going to have to work very hard on it. (Member 7, MFC Qld)

people just feel that a lot is expected and there is confusion over things and

miscommunication – and the teams. And all of this stuff around the structure

of the teams – it has never been right. (Member 4, MFC Qld)

The expression of overwork, or too much work and being busy, emerged

early in the fieldwork, and it was shared across all levels in the MFC team. Often on

entering the setting in the morning, I would ask different members what sort of day

they had planned – this also assisted me in planning my day. Most common

responses included adjectives such as “busy”, “slammed” or simply, “I have sooo

much on today”. The reasons behind shared views of the workload appeared to be

attributed to three key claims: a lack of resources (human and pay related), poor

capacity, and poor management, depending on who you spoke to. The MFC

members viewed the workload problem as being caused by having not enough staff

and the organisation having unrealistic expectations that they can service all of the

program‟s marketing and communication needs:

we‟re slammed. I can vouch for my last year and I can tell you I‟d be lucky to

finish work by 11 or 12 at night. We are busy people, sincerely. We‟ve come

here and taken a pay cut generally. We come here because we believe in what

the organisation does. And generally we leave disenchanted, overworked,

buggered, going to higher paying jobs in the private sector, exhausted by the

organisation and its bureaucracy. (Member 10, MFC Qld)


because we‟re quite under resourced for the amount of work we have to do

and it‟s generally expected that we won‟t perform that well, and we get quite

a few complaints as well as we do because… we don‟t necessarily do it on

time or when it‟s needed. ...Well we are just too frantic – our resources are

too small. (Member 6, MFC Qld)

MFC members knew senior management held a view that the MFC team had

poor capacity and skill to service the needs of the organisation. I was alerted to this

early in my fieldwork when attending a group managers‟ meeting. The executive

team were discussing an impending organisational change program and the need to

have a supporting communication program. One senior manager voiced her concerns

about not having a plan that focused on key messages surrounding the changes. The

ED‟s response was that he didn‟t want “another plan” (field notes, 16 January 2008).

The executive team discussion confirmed executive members generally expressed no

confidence in involving the MFC team in the change process. This extended to an

expressed general lack of confidence in the capacity of the communication staff to

produce quality work (Memo, 16 January 2008, 3.05pm). On exploring this

sentiment with the team at a later time, one member expressed “we're not really seen,

perceived by senior management to be achieving our goals” (Member 3). However

for MFC staff, the perception was not about their skill level, rather it related to a lack

of resources and also a perception by RC staff that MFC members are not working

“hard” enough:

It‟s the perception more than anything. It might give the impression that

we‟re not working very hard or we‟re just messing around or being silly, but

it‟s actually just a part of the way that we work. (Member 7, MFC Qld)

.. they [other RCQ staff] think we are noisy and always on the go. .... I am

not sure they understand how much goes through there or what we really do

in terms of everyday stuff. I am sure they think it is all kind of glossy. I guess

we are quite vocal and we kind of chat... I‟ve never known a team to have so

much focus in an office as our team has. (Member 4, MFC Qld)


While MFC members recognised senior management had no confidence in

their team, they also quietly shared some of these views, and exhibited behaviours

revealing a lack of confidence in other team member‟s capacity and a reluctance to

rely on other members to undertake work to an acceptable standard. Staff would

keep private files limiting access to information by other staff, or hoard information

about projects or work from other members in the unit. This would have a

cumulative effect of increasing individual workloads which, given their concerns

about overwork, was interesting:

.. because you‟ve been let down, you keep the file, you keep the information,

so that you think you‟re on top of it all but you can‟t do everything. And

that‟s when – it‟s only when the shit hits the fan that then you open it up and

say, “I‟ve got the information here,” and then the person says, “Well, I‟ve

never seen that”... (Member 5, MFC Qld)

Other members felt that many of their capacity perception problems stemmed

from the high staff turnover in the unit. While the group manager responsible for the

MFC unit indicated staff turnover in RCQ was similar to other states, a head count

taken from the time I entered RCQ to the conclusion of the study indicated an

exodus of staff. My emerging awareness of the high staff turnover in the MFC unit

had implications for my study as culture requires that people pass on their

knowledge to subsequent “generations”. However I was increasingly aware that

many of the decisions made about strategic communication, campaigns, stakeholder

relations and issues were directed from a more senior level. While staff turnover in

the unit had been an ongoing issue for the organisation for some time, there was no

consensus on specific causes of people leaving. Generally members suggested

people left because of fatigue and frustration, disillusionment or simply that RC was

being used as a stepping stone for inexperienced staff. The appeal of gaining “street

credibility” and experience by working for such a large and global organisation (and

having it on their CV) was also valuable to members as they thought it would give

them a competitive advantage to get a better job in a different organisation:


It is an easy org to get into so they can career build …it is a stepping-stone

for a lot of people; that is a major factor. There is a lot of conflicting

personalities in that team – that play a major part into people trying to get

ahead and pushing other people out of the way in trying to do that. (Member

8, MFC Qld)

All team members expressed frustration at the high level of work and equally

about the poor rates of pay5 offered in RC. These and other elements were used to

explain the high turnover:

... we can‟t seem to keep staff. The reason is that they just get exhausted...we

do have this exceptionally high turnover, we are lucky to keep staff for a year

in this department, exceptionally high turnover. In the year that I have been

here we have lost three. Q:Why?... Burnout, remuneration, frustration with

the lack of structure, frustration with the change of structure… it‟s ...

exceptionally bureaucratic and rigid too… (Member 10, MFC Qld)

The effects from the high staff turnover included loss of intellectual property

from the lack of appropriate documentation and private filing systems or knowledge

systems. This meant that generally staff had to recreate everything from the

beginning, with RC having very limited organisational knowledge or intellectual

property from evaluation of previous communication programs. The recreation of

documentation was done on an “as needed basis”, and was usually done with

whatever resources most closely fitted with the need:

I don‟t know how they‟ve been managing to operate… or the retention meant

that these things have existed, but they‟re gone and they‟ve been reinvented

yearly. That‟s been one of the biggest issues faced by the organisation is the

5 Pay rates in the not-for-profit industry were traditionally below market rates. This was the same for RCQ, with

the MFC positions salaries officially listed as: Manager MFC - $77,000pa (incl. super) ; Senior PR and

communications officer - $53,867 -$56,416pa (incl. super); Senior Marketing and communication officer -

$53,867 -$56,416pa (incl. super); Media and communications officer –$42,321 - $45,767pa (incl. super). (source:

Position Descriptions 12 October 2007)


staff retention impacting on the holding of the knowledge. (Member 10, MFC

Qld)

So when someone leaves the organisation there‟s nothing in place – so the

intellectual property‟s just gone. There‟s no system – we don‟t have a

corporate database. (Member 6, MFC Qld)

The profile of the MFC team could be described as (predominantly) young,

inexperienced and altruistic individuals that expressed fulfilment by working for an

organisation like RC. For many of them, this was their first job, or it was the only

job they could get (because they were new to Australia), or they had retired and

wanted to re-enter the workforce. However they all framed their decision to work at

RC as an altruistic one, transcending any potential financial rewards. Expressions of

goodwill and giving back featured heavily in member‟s expressed motivations for

working for RC. Members felt that the organisation‟s work was very meaningful and

that they play a role in that. They also shared a sense of personal compromise in

terms of pay and expectation because they were working for one of the largest

humanitarian organisations in the world:

It‟s kind of nice to know I‟m doing my bit. (Member 7, MFC Qld)

it really does help to work for an organisation that you can feel proud of

working... that does good stuff. So that‟s probably one of the saving graces of

Red Cross...This is an amazing place. (Member 3, MFC Qld)

the position did not interest me – it was the organisation. (Member 6, MFC

Qld)

The focus on the humanitarian work of RC featured strongly in member

views. Members expressed the motivation for working at RC generally around the

principles. While they all knew what the role of the principles was, when questioned

about the effect on their role in communication, most members simply repeated the

corporate line confirming “RC has seven fundamental principles that represent how

the organisation is supposed to go about its work”. As one of the newer members


said “There‟s seven of them – impartiality, neutrality, empowerment, community,

something else...The one I have an issue with at the moment is the empowerment

one... (Member 6, MFC Qld). I did not correct the member that there was no

empowerment one.

In the next section, member views of RC as an organisation, its history and

values will be discussed. MFC member views of what RC is as an organisation are

important because of the role that mission, vision and value statements play in

building understanding of what the organisation needs strategically for

communication (Argenti, 2007; Cornelissen, 2004; Hatch & Schultz, 1997; Stanley

& Michael, 2002).

MFC member views of Red Cross

The historical foundations of RC were important to MFC members. Members

cited the organisation‟s traditions as strongly contributing to the high reputation that

RC enjoyed. The fact that RC had been established in Australia for nearly 100 years

reassured staff that there was a widespread knowledge and understanding in the

external community about RC as an organisation and about the types of work it

undertook. I overheard several times the comment “everyone knows who RC is”.

There was an expectation that accompanying this familiarity was trust. With this

came a feeling of dependability and a level of prestige because of the nature of

humanitarian work. However the age and history of RC were also viewed as

constraints because staff felt the organisation was stuck in the past, and implied that

RC could not operate in new ways, or respond to a modern environment. Staff felt

that because it was so steeped in traditions, it could not adapt to what contemporary

society needed the organisation to be:

just the way the organisation is … because Red Cross is an organisation that

is so old – it was founded many, many years ago – so the culture is hundreds

and hundreds of years old. Communication strategy, marketing strategy is a

relatively new thing. It wasn‟t around when the RC was established. It is sort

of balancing the originations and trying to adapt the modern themes...

(Member 2, MFC Qld)


The balancing of modern versus traditional RC can be seen in the role that

volunteers and members play in RCQ, and how this is conceptualised by MFC

members. The State divisions of RC were established in 1915 as a result of

governor- general‟s wives wanting to support the soldiers in the war. For the older

staff members, these traditional ties were highly valued and need to be protected. But

the combination of the aging volunteer base and the image that this projects about

the organisation makes this an unsettled and unresolved issue for staff to deal with:

Our volunteer base is dying off, and shrinking... There is starting to be some

bad blood with the organisation as well – the structure of how Red Cross has

related to volunteers... By having to move to a new structure – there‟s some

resentment around and confusion around how to keep and maintain that old

branch structure and transition [away from it] ... basically how to

communicate with those people. (Member 10, MFC Qld)

We don‟t have any young volunteers; all we have are people above 65...

because it‟s such an old organisation... we were predominantly set up for the

war... and people just stick with it and go along with it now… (Member 2 ,

MFC Qld)

The role of the branches in the daily functioning of the changing RC was

challenging for MFC members as they recognised them as necessary and valuable,

but they struggled with how to incorporate them in the new corporate movement of

RC. Branch members were viewed as difficult and time consuming and their

reluctance to shift or change to new ways of doing things caused problems for RC.

MFC members in RCQ had very little contact with volunteers as this was managed

by another department in the organisation. Their only contact was communication

based, for example advertising for more volunteers for a regional area, or following

up on a news story or media release in a region:

You go to the branches, the branches are floundering. Floundering, saying,

“What use are we? No-one needs us anymore. You‟ve taken blood services,

you‟ve taken Red Cross calling, you‟ve taken all these things off us, what


role do we have”... You‟ve got difficult and time-consuming situations in

branches. You can get all consumed by their little problems. (Member 5

MFC, Qld)

We don‟t really have a good relationship with the branches at this stage...

(Member 1, MFC Qld)

RC was viewed by staff as iconic and very important. A well-cited mantra

by staff was about RC being one of the world‟s most recognisable, trusted brands.

“We are up there with McDonalds and Coca Cola” (Member 1, MFC Qld). Staff also

recognised that the RC brand was “worth millions” and this is something that needs

to be cared for and nurtured:

Red Cross is one of those very few iconic, high quality brands in the world...

So it‟s trusted, it‟s recognised and galvanises people into action. (Member 8,

MFC Qld)

you can fall back on the line that we‟ve always been there and we always will

be there. It has cut through... people do know and trust Red Cross. Comments

I get, even just wearing a Red Cross T-shirt, “oh, well done”… “you do a

good job”… “I haven‟t donated blood this…. but I intend to” … (Member 1,

MFC Qld)

MFC members reported RC was viewed by stakeholders as being associated

with three core streams of business: crisis or disasters, blood and international work.

RC being associated with disasters built on member‟s sense of being altruistic,

helping people and being in the “thick” of the action. RC‟s involvement in

international work was regarded as exciting and received most of the public

notoriety. The association with Red Cross Blood Services did not excite MFC

members as they saw this as a different organisation doing different work with a


different funding model6. There was a shared view that RC did so much more that

was not recognised:

public doesn‟t know what we do so they don‟t get that need to be involved.

(Member 4, MFC Qld)

Some people know, lots of people might think they do... the blood thing.

We‟re often confused with blood services. (Member 3, MFC Qld)

The idea that RC for many audiences meant blood was acceptable. There was

a frustration that external audiences did not fully understand the scope and

complexity of what RC really does, and this was a failing of RC in Australia. The

fact that RC‟s work could not be neatly packaged into clear, distinct areas like their

competitors such as World Vision and the Salvation Army meant that there was a

high level of complexity and challenges around communicating for RC:

we‟ve got competition like Starlight Make A Wish and the Cancer

Foundation. They‟ve [Cancer Foundation] got quite sexy...they‟ve got a

cause to attach it to. To a certain extent people already know what they do.

But Red Cross have such diffuse goals under one banner. People might know

about one particular stream but there‟s about 50 other things we do that they

don‟t know about. (Member 6, MFC Qld)

.. people don‟t really understand what we do… and it is an increasingly

complex message to communicate in an increasingly complex not-for-profit

environment. It is an exceptionally complex organisation. (Member 10, MFC

Qld)

With this sentiment came an underlying concern that there is a lack of

maintenance or effort to maintain this positioning, and almost a sense of resting on

their laurels from just being called “Red Cross”:

6 At the time of the research RC Blood Services was a separate organisation. However following the review in July 2009 , the Blood Services were integrated into the main RC organisation


it‟s internationally recognised and people don‟t really ask a lot of questions

when the Red Cross is calling, that they [Red Cross] are riding on that for a

while... they think it is so good that they don‟t need to fix their image.

(Member 2, MFC Qld)

MFC members were aware that RCQ was viewed by national office and other

states as being “different” to other the states. Internally RCQ MFC members viewed

themselves and RCQ as progressive, proactive and generally achieving more which

contrasted to their views of what the rest of the organisation was not doing enough:

I‟d say [we are] progressive, forward thinking, pretty “gung-ho”. [name ] has

a reputation of being a bit of a cowboy. (Member 3, MFC Qld)

.. because it‟s Queensland... “they are cowboys up there. They can handle it

on their own”. ... I just think we are more active in Queensland. (Member 8,

MFC Qld)

there‟s a real underlying creative brilliant team here. It‟s the volume of what

we‟re trying to do with limited resources and Queensland is at the forefront

of a lot of great stuff for Red Cross. (Member 5, MFC Qld)

Many of these views were directly attributed to the influence of the ED. The

influence of leaders and leadership in organisations is well documented in the

literature. Leadership involves contact and interaction between the leader and the

followers (Mumford, Hunter, Freiedrich, & Caughron, 2009). Personal

characteristics of a leader are influenced by their behavioural disposition, personality

and shared vision (Yammarino & Danserau, 2009). Staff in the unit respected the

knowledge and skills of the RCQ ED and viewed their relationship as an opportunity

to learn from the ED‟s experience and skills. However paradoxically, they feared

they would not meet the ED‟s high expectations and felt they were not in a position

to advise or counsel the ED or the executive team on matters of strategic

communication:


He (ED) understands how it works, so it is a bit more ED-led for us as a state

than other states that we‟ve got a very 'hands on' ED. But it‟s actually quite

good that we‟ve got a more hands on ED because it means we do some really

interesting work.... (Member 10, MFC Qld)

The view that the organisation was “personality-based” was shared among

MFC members, as this concept referred to some dominant personalities in the

organisation that needed to be accommodated. For ways of working, this meant their

individual needs were met, rather than needs based on strategic goals, research or

data:

I don‟t think it is clear reporting ... they just base things on personal

relationships as opposed to professional relationships. (Member 2, MFC Qld)

Because it is a personality driven organisation – rather than allowing efficient

people or efficiencies – it is the dominant personality – it doesn‟t run like

other organisations I‟ve been in. It is highly dysfunctional organisationally ...

(Member 10, MFC Qld)

While the MFC team thought they were progressive, and recognised the

strong influence the ED had on the way things were done in RCQ, there was also a

shared view of complacency, or resigned tolerance that emerged from the team in

response to general frustrations from trying to work in RC. These frustrations came

from a number of sources including levels of bureaucracy, slowness of getting things

done or lack of response, and generally poor levels of resources offered by the

organisation:

We have got departments denying responsibility for base functions. It‟s like

working in a third world country... The organisation just doesn‟t care .

(Member 10, MFC Qld)

The framing of the situation was expressed by members as a “Red Cross

way” of doing things (acceptance of a way of working or just how it is) or simply as


a lack of action, focus or strategic intent, founded on a values based rational; that is

being humane and tolerant of poor performance (“because we are Red Cross”), and

not necessarily putting the right effort in the right places. As highlighted by one

member (who asked and answered their own question):

there have been occasions where I‟ve kind of said, “Why did we do that?”...

[the answer is] It is just the way that we do it. (Member 7, MFC Qld)

The “Red Cross way” or “not-for-profit way” included a tolerance for poor

performance, lethargy for action, and a fatigue of trying to respond to a high level of

work with poor infrastructure, poor resources and poor systems. There was a view

that this “way” was the “humanity” part of working at RC. This concept as a whole

emerged quite late in fieldwork, it was articulated by MFC members in RCQ earlier

as an attitude or a way of working:

The Red Cross attitude is a not-for-profit psyche that a lot of people

have...We almost think that we only engage staff that can‟t – more or less,

people that can‟t get a job anywhere else and they used to finish up with not-

for-profits. (Member 5, MFC Qld)

While tolerance and “humanity” were part of the Red Cross mantra, members

reported an underlying intolerance where they felt they had to protect themselves and

reduce personal risk. This required steps to “protect your back” and “not make

waves”. The protection appeared to be in both how they worked, and what they

produced. How they worked meant that they were reluctant to document and avoided

making decisions or taking risks. Team members avoided the production of any

evidence that they could be directly held accountable for. This was expressed as a

way of “covering your back”:

there‟s a culture of ...a lot of people will say “cover your arse” culture.

Everyone is very protective of your own behind – everyone is afraid of

looking bad to the wrong people. ... Covering your arse is similar to nobody

wanting to admit when they‟ve made a mistake. (Member 6, MFC Qld)


An accepted way of working by MFC members was to share the risk of the

pending decision, or the sensemaking leading to the decision through dialogue and

conversations across the organisation – consulting widely to incorporate a diversity

of views in decision making. The need to collaborate, or have a conversation, was a

way of sharing information and communicating in the organisation. This may be an

accepted human services framework of working, or “the Red Cross way”. It is also a

way of legitimately sharing the load or blame. For example, if a lot of people are

involved in the framing of the situation it will be hard for senior management to

pinpoint exactly who is accountable as the outcomes of the dialogue are not

attributed:

there is a need for collaboration to get a decision made here. ... There is also a

slight culture for covering our own back, so making sure that you have done

everything and you have got an email trail of everything you‟ve done so you

can defend yourself. (Member 6, MFC Qld)

It‟ll [the decision will be made on] be a mixture of instinct and input from all

involved, and in particular from the experiences so far of (names) and

whatever as to how people have reacted and what sort of messaging.

(Member 7, MFC Qld)

The reliance on conversations combined with the lack of documentation and

real planning revealed a flexibility and fluidity as a way of working in the MFC

team. For some members this meant it allowed them to work on the priorities of the

day as determined by them, but for others it created a sense of lack of structure and

direction. Some functions at RC had a national structure or framework surrounding it

– for example, Red Cross Calling and corporate relations. Members working in those

areas said they benefited from having a clear structure and direction for their daily

work.

I am not used to this loose end stuff – everyone‟s just flying out doing their

own thing... I am not used to that kind of outer rim – where sometimes you


do what is going on there and sometimes you do your own thing. Some

people like that – some people are for national and some people against. I

find that whole thing very strange... (Member 4, MFC Qld)

For other members, having no overarching structure or framework meant

they could work on their own determined priorities for the day:

It's exceedingly hard to set priorities because anything can become a priority

at any time. So if you have, let's say, 27 tasks... So how do you do that? I

haven't actually got an answer from anyone, so I work on what I think needs

to be done. (Member 8, MFC Qld)

Feelings about national office were expressed in the context of pending

change and review. As identified in Chapter 4, RC had embarked on a series of

organisational reviews, including MFC, in an effort to find efficiencies in

management, structure and reporting. So while some elements of the change and

review process had already commenced, such as the rebranding strategy, other

elements were unknown so MFC staff expressed uncertainty about what the future

might bring. This uncertainly was framed as an excitement and anticipation that the

change will resolve many of their frustrations, and also a fear of what may actually

change. MFC members had viewed the gradual loss of power of their ED as a power

struggle between state and national needs:

Because there‟s been a change of structure ... because of the nationalisation

the EDs have lost quite a bit of power comparatively to how it used to work.

So there‟s still state need versus national need – there‟s still a bit of “us and

them” happening organisationally. (Member 10, MFC Qld)

The balancing of national versus state needs was expressed as a division of

loyalty and sometimes this complexity caused anxiety for MFC members:

Sometimes it is quite complex. Recently we had a situation where we had a

state program ...so on that state level (ED name) should be able to sign up on


that stuff. But I identified (detail of an issue) – so according to my national

policy, the procedure is that if I identify (detail of an issue), it has to go to

(name of senior executive) to sign off on ...Meanwhile we‟ve already

(actioned it locally) … but I kind of felt that I was the one then getting stuck

in it. (Member 4, MFC Qld)

However given the state-based reporting, the local ED authority took

precedent over any national directive and the consequences would then be played out

at executive level not at the local practitioner level:

If the ED wants something done, it‟s done regardless of whatever national

has set as the direction – this is what needs to be done. (Member 10, MFC

Qld)

A fear of getting into trouble and taking steps to protect themselves emerged

as a strong theme for many MFC staff. Rather than thinking about this as a

reluctance to accept responsibility, they framed it as a need to avoid being “blamed”

because they anticipated a consequence and needed to take steps to cover up or

protect themselves in various ways:

We joke about there being a blame mentality, but that‟s not isolated to our

organisation. It‟s just people, human nature, to protect yourself. (Member 1,

MFC Qld)

Every tenth comment was, “It'll be my arse that‟s on the line if it doesn‟t

happen”. Like, everything. This sort of “watch your arses” fear thing... quite

extraordinary. (Member 7, MFC Qld)

When individual team members were asked what they thought they needed to

protect themselves from, in terms of consequences, they were not really sure.

Durham (1991) suggests criteria for decision making is based on members‟

comparative evaluation of the consequences, guided by the actual or perceived

experience with the consequences of different options. While they had no examples


of where people had suffered consequences, some cited the “possibility” of job loss

while others simply said they didn‟t want to experience the wrath of the ED:

The ED likes to stamp his authority by making people jump “now”... he

expects people to be able to read his mind. (Member 3, MFC Qld)

If something goes wrong I don‟t think it is very transparent. For instance,

someone might disappear because they were asked to go on extended leave

and then they don‟t come back. So it‟s not necessarily transparent to

everyone else in the team as to why they are leaving. There might be gossip

on the grapevine to say someone has been put on performance probation.

(Member 5, MFC Qld)

MFC members actively took steps to reduce the possibility of being seen as

not fully competent. MFC members knew not to go to the group manager, or anyone

in national office, until they were sure they had all the facts and “knew what they

were talking about”:

(name) is scared still and said “don‟t, we can‟t go to (group manager) until

we all know what we are doing...” I just find it really strange and it‟s kind of

this feeling that (name of group manager) might see that we are not

prepared… (Member 4 MFC, Qld)

...you don‟t really speak to national unless what you are speaking about.... it

is almost fear of getting into trouble – into trouble of what I don‟t really

know – but because it is “national”. (Member 9, MFC Qld)

Signoff and approval processes by delegated authorities are common

organisational practices to manage risk and control (Robbins & Barnwell, 2006).

Approval systems in the MFC team were by line management. For example,

approval processes for a media release, piece of collateral or business case for a new

project would first be submitted to the MFC manager, then it would go to the group

manager and then it would go to the executive director. Changes would be made at


each level and, depending on the nature of the change (major or minor), the piece

may be sent back at any stage and the process would start again. In addition, on some

matters that involved or affected national policy, the national director of

communication or a delegate would also be involved. MFC members viewed this

process as overly bureaucratic and burdensome. While some members equated this

to the poor efficiency and structure, others attributed it to simply a reluctance to

make a decision:

The efficiency of the place impacts on how you do your job a lot – all the red

tape. It‟s just the organisational structure and how it is built. The chain of

command and things like that. (Member 2, MFC Qld)

At the moment there‟s so many levels of signoffs, approvals, people are

scared of making decisions… there‟s a culture of reluctance to make a

decision or pass a decision. Don‟t sign your name... (Member 10, MFC Qld)

Other members recognised that they needed to be more visible in the

approval process as this was one way for them to build credibility. Bypassing the

approval system was also a way of speeding up the process, with the decision to send

work for approval, or not, left up to the MFC member:

In the approval process here, I go straight to (ED name). I‟m building my

relationship with him and I need to know him, especially if his name‟s on

everything. (Member 1, MFC, Qld)

If I write a letter to a corporate I don‟t get it signed off. I bypass a lot of that.

But I know if we‟ve got an invite to send out, first it would go to (MFC

manager name), then to (group manager name), and then to (ED name). And

you have to manage that. You can‟t give it to (MFC manger name), and say

pass it to (group manager name), or (group manager name) you pass it to (ED

name)… (Member 4, MFC Qld)


This approach by individual members to make decisions about when to

follow formal organisational procedures reflected the claim that there were few

consequences. Also there was a view that senior managers did not enforce following

organisational procedures or processes.

Communication and group sensemaking about strategic issues and concerns

occurred primarily within the senior management team, for example at senior

management meetings. The MFC unit was represented in the senior meetings by

their group manager. Following the executive meeting, there was no observed

reporting back or summarising of key issues or directives by the group manager to

the MFC manager. MFC members knew they were not gaining access to the “right”

information, and had to rely on secondary information to do their job. MFC members

generally received information about work projects from program or service area

briefings provided over the phone or via senior staff. There was a reliance on

program staff by MFC staff to ensure the strategic fit of their communication

request. Once a MFC member created information about a project, they filed the

information under their personal drive in the system. This filing system for

documents had the effect of limiting access by other unit members. While a shared

file system was available for staff to use, it was not used. If a staff member was away

or left RC (as previously discussed), the intellectual property and history about that

project, and the work undertaken was lost. Overall there was no formal system for

managing documentation as a group:

For the next year, we don‟t have this calendar of what is going to happen in

the year. Even that hasn‟t changed very much in the two years I‟ve been here

– we have got better ways of doing things, and we look forward a bit more –

but we still don‟t have that systems stuff. (Member 4, MFC Qld)

Our documentation system has not been that great ... I keep them in my files

that are saved, because now I am used to this. (Member 10, MFC Qld).

One example of this was with a recent youth project. This was a high profile

and important project of RCQ to provide housing, education and training, and

support services for homeless youth. While I had been at other executive meetings


discussing the project in more depth, this was only the second meeting attended by

the MFC team member and she was required to present a publicity strategy (plan)

that was supposed to contain information about stakeholders, timing, deliverables

and key messages. There was no other documentation available on any shared drives

about the project, so she had to rely on the information discussed at the first meeting.

Following this meeting she expressed the following view:

I felt very disadvantaged doing that from one meeting... from not having a

central location of information and not having the Centre even [built] –

there‟s nothing – they are just all ideas at the moment – also being new to

having do a publicity strategy – so I put together this document, which is

kind of gone nowhere and done nothing... (Member 1, MFC Qld)

While this member recognised they did not have adequate information, there

were no steps taken to get this information from other sources. This appeared to be

an accepted way of working in the unit. The lack of documentation and planning

artifacts contributed to the lack of knowledge held by MFC members of previous

communication efforts and evaluation. As previously discussed, this is also linked to

a reluctance to be held accountable for work due to perceived consequences, and a

fear of decision making based on lack of access to the “right” information:

Fear of not having the – what I reckon a lot of people don‟t have the right

information fed through to them, they make decisions which are not based on

all of the facts and then when they do make decisions, they can be criticised

and I‟ve seen it time and time and time again. (Member 5, MFC Qld)

The lack of documentation was a challenge for me as I was actively seeking to

collect evidence (artifacts) of strategic communication for analysis. I widely

communicated to MFC staff that I was looking to collect plans, briefs, working

papers, business plans, or any documents produced by the marketing communication

or public relations staff for my study, however these were either not produced,

hidden in personal files or just not readily available. When I became aware that a

plan existed, I would request a copy or ask if I could see it. Some staff were very


willing to “share” with me their working papers, but these were often work in

progress or incomplete. Other staff indicated they would email me a copy, but it did

not arrive. After a few requests in passing, I stopped asking. Given the lack of

documentation meant that my research design had to change to not focus on the

actual documents as evidence of retention (Weick, 1969).

With the exception of the published business plans, there was no

documentation or evaluation of previous campaigns or projects undertaken in RCQ.

Even the group manager could not locate a previous plan drafted for the Centre for

Young People project done by a staff member who had left the organisation and

emailed me to see if I had been given a copy (Field notes 7 April 2008).

The need to plan, or to be “strategic” appeared to not be purposeful in MFC

RCQ. Strategic communication processes incorporate environmental scanning and

issues management to allow the organisation to be both responsive and proactive in

management of issues (Ferguson, 1999). While Steyn (2003b) highlights

organisational adaptation as a key outcome of strategic communication, Grunig and

Grunig (2000) argue this enables the organisation to identify and anticipate issues,

allowing analysis and response (Cutlip et al., 2006). In RCQ‟s MFC unit,

environmental scanning was inconsistent across the team, and limited externally to

monitoring the media and internally to attending staff meetings, keeping in touch

fortnightly with regional area managers. There did not appear to be any formal

criteria for issues, documentation of findings, or tracking systems in place in the

unit. The monitoring was ad hoc:

We monitor the media to see if our press releases are getting picked up,

what‟s getting picked up, what isn‟t getting picked up... what issues are in the

media. So what‟s being presented in The Courier-Mail, what‟s online...

what‟s in The Australian ...7and what other organisations are saying.

Internally, we have Monday morning meetings where we look around and

share stories or information... we contact the regional managers on the

fortnightly basis. (Member 1, MFC Qld)

7 The Courier-Mail is the state of Queensland‟s daily metropolitan newspaper. The Australian is a

national news broadsheet.


While some members in the unit did not consider environmental scanning as

relevant to their role, others viewed the activity purely as a proactive one, meaning it

is undertaken to identify opportunities that could be used as a media or publicity

opportunity for RC.

It is probably not a scanning role – it is more getting out there and trying to

find the information as well.... (Member 2, MFC Qld)

MFC member perceptions of their environment

MFC member conceptualisations of RC‟s environment is important to

explore given this study is an ecological one focusing on the role of strategic

communication as an adaptive response, and the influence of cultural criteria on

mediating that response. The social environment of RC is conceptualised as the

reputational, relational and public opinions systems operating in the organisation‟s

environment. For MFC members, RC‟s social environment was recognised as

shifting and changing:

[Red Cross] is not current – it‟s got an ageing volunteer base – so our

volunteers are dying off ... we need to focus on getting those bequests in ...

we also need to be focusing on building our support with young generations

and their interests in volunteering. Support or fundraising is completely

different – episodic volunteering… and they don‟t give to the same place

they volunteer... (Member 10, MFC Qld)

There was an increasing awareness expressed by members of the need to be

accountable and transparent in processes required by government and the corporate

sector. This was not fully developed in terms of knowledge in MFC members:

The government is pretty important considering that a lot of our stuff is based

on government funding. Government contacts. .. The corporate sector are

relatively important – gaining their support is important....you want them to

have a favourable impression of you. (Member 2, MFC Qld)


Stakeholders were descriptively identified simply as recipients (users) or

facilitators (helpers/ collaborators) of RC services (Member 8). For example, blood

donors, corporate donors and volunteers. Due to budget constraints limited audience

research was conducted by MFC members. MFC members recognised that national

office conducted market research, but these results were not made available to the

individual MFC staff members. For them, core sources for intelligence included

liaison with service area managers, reading or listening to the daily mass media and

Google. For example, in preparation for a meeting about a major youth project, one

member described her approach for research:

...we monitor the media for homelessness. I was collecting for information

from there in regards to our risk management, who the bigger players are

already in the space, what are they doing …the statistics as well. Did other

research but not actually commissioned anyone – it was more Google to

verify that. Checking out information... (Member 1, MFC Qld)

Formal research was not widely used to clarify external audiences. However

national office purchased corporate lists from Dun and Bradstreet8 that identify

business characteristics and provided these to each state for their corporate relations

activities. National office also commissioned national market research on donor

profiles twice a year. Both of these sources were relied on by MFC members to

profile and target their stakeholders and publics.

An emerging theme shared by all members in the MFC unit was the internal

focus and acknowledgement of senior management or national office as the key

player in their social environment. While other stakeholders, audiences and publics

were identified, observations of work practices revealed that members were more

concerned about meeting the needs of internal audiences more so than external

audiences, specifically senior management:

is it [the communication message or piece] what (ED name) would want you

to say... (Member 1, MFC Qld)

8 Dun and Bradstreet are a company that provide sales and marketing data: see www.dnb.com.au


I have to be aware of what my manager‟s thoughts are on it really. (Member

6, MFC Qld)

This internal focus was recognised by MFC members as not being specific to

their activities, but as an organisational characteristic that suggested RC was not alert

to what was happening outside the organisation. Members related this to a number of

areas such as information technology and office resources, awareness of other ways

of working, or just an acknowledgement that RC was in a place on its own:

.. people don‟t see that. They are in a cocoon... they have never worked

anywhere –they‟ve worked here for 10 years or maybe. (Member 4, MFC

Qld)

...a vacuum and people [here] are unaware of it. (Member 5, MFC Qld)

This section focused on RCQ members‟ perceptions and views about RC,

RCQ and the social environment surrounding the organisation. The next section now

focuses on strategic communication in RCQ, specifically asking members to express

their views on what it is, how it is developed in the organisation, and their role in

contributing to the formulation of strategic communication.


Hallahan et al. (2007) define strategic communication as using

communication purposefully to achieve organisational goals. MFC members were

observed to conceptualise strategic communication through both the activities of the

unit and within the key messages they developed. The process undertaken to achieve

this was viewed by members as both ad hoc and a missed opportunity:

...the tail‟s wagging the dog. There‟s no respect of the skill set the marketing

dept might have to offer – you don‟t know the rationale around creating it.

(Member 7, MFC Qld)


By this, members acknowledged they were not playing a credible part in the

strategic side as lack of access to high level information, lack of resources and

volume of work prevented them from “being strategic” (Member 1, 3, 5, 10). Instead

they viewed the work they did as reactive, and that the need to produce quantities

(i.e. 15 media releases a month) was compromising their ability to be effective in

that role:

The organisation should be communicating about less for starters. Rather

than all of its services, choosing the key cause services that we communicate

about – and priorities – and that might only be a few things – and really

pushing those...(Member 10, MFC Qld)

Communicating about the complexity of services and programs offered by

RC was identified as a major challenge by members, both in terms of simplifying the

message for audiences and managing their workloads. MFC members felt there

needed to be a more coherent approach to achieve this simplification but did not feel

they were in a position to do this:

... because there is no consistent communication strategy for all of the service

areas ... because there is such a wide variety of services, there is no clear

distinction. People can‟t tie in with it...we are just all over the place.

(Member 2, MFC Qld)

While analysis of what competitors were doing was rare in the MFC team,

the team acknowledged many of their competitors had an advantage by having just

one core idea or theme to communicate about:

...single purpose organisations obviously have a way easier time

communicating. (Member 6, MFC Qld)

The randomness and lack of consistency of communication activities in RC

was viewed as being solved by the launch of the new brand strategy (rebranding) in

February 2008 (nearly two months after I entered the setting). The new brand

strategy was viewed as a way of providing cohesion and structure to communication


activities that were previously recognised as being without consistency or quality:

.. beforehand the brand was controlled by sausage sizzles, the branches, a

myriad of different collateral, which every time was different ...it‟s a dog‟s

breakfast. What they‟ve [national office] done is got a consistent look and

feel.. having messaging that‟s consistent. What‟s happened [previously] is an

enormous waste of time across the country. (Member 3, MFC Qld)

MFC members also felt the clustering of services around three key areas of

Crisis, Care and Commitment simplified the challenges around packaging the

information, messaging and simplifying from a communication perspective the

complexity of what RC does:

So whenever we communicate we want to tie it back to this message of Red

Cross is Crisis, Care, Commitment. Images should reflect that, it will have a

basic look and feel and there‟ll be specific type of wording that should go and

there is a style guide to go with it. (Member 10, MFC Qld)

There was one communication event, Red Cross Calling, where MFC

members felt that they were part of a national effort. RCQ MFC employed a part

time dedicated Red Cross Calling Coordinator whose responsibility was to

coordinate the resources and development of the campaign at a local level, including

placement of advertising banners, dealing with branches and traditional or non call

centre recruited volunteer collectors. Red Cross Calling was viewed by MFC

members as the major fundraising event in the RC annual calendar with a single

purpose to raise money. More specifically, it was seen as an opportunity to show

other states that RCQ were high performers:

It‟s just our chance to really shine and stand out from the rest. .. it just

reinvigorates – people like I said, they see your T-shirt and pat you on the

back. They know you‟re there, but sometimes they needed a shakeup.

(Member 1, MFC Qld)


There was a lack of agreement by MFC members about the purpose of Red

Cross Calling. While some members felt the campaign promoted local fundraising

for local services, other members expressed concern that there was actually audience

confusion about what they were actually donating for:

...half of them do not know what services Red Cross does so ... they‟re

probably thinking that Red Cross Calling goes to disaster relief, because

that‟s what we are known for but when disaster comes around, you see so

many other appeals that people going to think hold on wait, there‟s an appeal

for this so ... So it comes down to how hard it is to really communicate like if

you give to 40 hour famine, you're going to be feeding starving kids.

(Member 2, MFC Qld)

There was a level of observed fatigue in the unit when discussing Red Cross

Calling. On exploring this with one MFC member, they declared quietly they would

like RC to cancel Red Cross Calling:

We‟d all love to ditch Red Cross Calling. Because it costs a lot of money to

do. It‟s an enormous headache. Getting a collector for every street, we got the

telemarketing which charges the earth, but then what do we replace it with?

(Member 3, MFC Qld)

MFC members questioned the level of resources and effort required to raise

on average $4 million dollars, and the organisational resistance to question the

traditional door knocking appeal:

It‟s worked in the past and so we‟re sticking to something that we know is

working or it‟s just the way it‟s always been done. (Member 7, MFC Qld)

The role of Red Cross Calling as a central campaign strategically was

overshadowed when the topic of crisis and being “activated” in response to the crisis

was raised. The next section explores the central role RC being activated played in

strategic communication efforts in RCQ.


Red Cross is Activated

During the first few weeks of being at RCQ, and then during two other

periods9, RC was activated in response to flooding in Northern Queensland. When a

disaster is declared under The Disaster Management Act 2003 (the Act), a significant

coordinated response by the State or other entities is required to help the community

recover from the disruption. Activation occurs when they are notified of this status

by a delegated authority. RC is part of the non legislated support group and has

agreed responsibilities to provide personnel and administer first aid during

emergencies, for example establishing and operating evacuation centres. Activation

is communicated formally throughout the organisation by phone and email, and a

response team is formed to organise logistics, such as goods and equipment,

transport, personnel and volunteers. During the activation response, volunteers or

nominated marketing and communication staff attend the disaster area to act as

media liaison for the organisation. Normal roles, tasks and duties of the MFC

members change for the duration of the activation. When the response from RC is no

longer required, staff return to their normal work responsibilities. During this time,

there is no back filling of work; staff remaining in the office are expected to do

urgent tasks, and staff across the organisation have an understanding that during

activation, normal requests will not be on hold. Staff viewed responding to

emergencies as RC‟s raison d‟être, “we are a disaster organisation” (Member 10,

MFC Qld).

I came in to the office on 15 February 2008 and noticed there was a sense of

excitement in the office. There was a greater level of activity and almost an energy

being shown by staff. “we have been activated. (Name) has been sent to North

Queensland to manage the media” (Member 2, MFC Qld). Formally, RC had been

advised they were activated and the MFC manager showed me a copy of the media

release issued by the Minister for Emergency Services (Roberts, 2008).

Over the next few days I observed what seemed to be a different MFC unit.

There was vibrancy and a sense of purpose observed in activities as MFC members

went about drafting media materials and information for the victims of the crisis.

9 RCQ was activated for floods in January and February 2008 for Mackay, Nth RCQ and in May 2009 for

flooding in North RCQ. A full list of domestic activations for RC is listed in Appendix A.


Internal communications increased too. Internal email in RCQ was typically

cluttered with requests for car parks, moving cars, recruitment information (positions

vacant in RCQ this week), and notices about people leaving or moving to different

positions or simply going on leave. During activation, emails updating staff on the

current status of the crisis and RC‟s response were more purposeful. Information was

actually informative and interesting. For example, status updates were given on the

crisis and the nature of the RC response. MFC staff also drafted and issued questions

and answers (Q&As) for management and staff on the ground to answer, or if any

staff were asked about what RC was doing. When an appeal was launched, there was

detailed and specific information relating to how to donate, and how the money

would be distributed. There was also information relating to RC administrative costs

(if any were being claimed) to manage the program. It was also during this time that

MFC staff were invited to response meetings and were included in more of the

strategic response formulation. There was more collaboration between the

emergency and disaster staff, the executive team and the MFC unit.

Observing activation in RCQ was important for the study because it revealed

a very different way of working at this time. The changes observed, and the sense of

energy created by the activation juxtaposed the lack of energy or fatigue in previous

periods. It also highlighted that staff could articulate a focus for their activities

previously missing. In terms of strategic communication, MFC staff were cohesive

in both focus and effort towards a single intent – responding to the crisis. This was a

very different organisation to the non activation one previously observed.

Moving out from the MFC unit

A growing realisation from exploring the unit was the sense that decisions

made about strategic communication were not being made in this unit. Moreso, it

was a realisation that environmental scanning, interpretation, analysis and decisions

about responses were being undertaken at a much higher level in the organisation.

The aim of this ethnography is to explore and follow processes in motion (Mitchell,

2007), to gain understanding and insight of the MFC member views of their world as

they see it in influencing strategic communication in RCQ. Observation found that

there were significant differences in information access, demonstrated skill level,

information sharing and communication decision making in the more senior level to


what was discussed or shared at MFC unit level. Following Vayda‟s (1983)

progressive contextualisation, the setting of this study now extends to the next level

in RCQ, the executive team, and follows relationships of interaction, influences, and

effects of strategic communication in RCQ.

Executive team in Red Cross Queensland

The executive team or “group managers” were the senior leadership team at

RCQ responsible for the strategy development, policy implementation and day to

day business decision making. The team of eight was responsible for interpreting and

developing RC policies and programs in RCQ. The ED had been with the

organisation for eight years and came from a strong political background. This meant

he was well connected and was very comfortable, knowledgeable and experienced at

government and stakeholder relations, media relations and communications.

He presented as a confident, assertive leader that appeared to engender both

respect and fear by staff. Staff and colleagues from across the organisation expressed

great respect for his knowledge and skills, his capacity to deliver, and his passion

and commitment to the RC fundamental principles. However he appeared to be

feared in terms of his direct, challenging and impatient style of leadership. He would

challenge staff, sometimes openly encouraging debate. He also responded better, or

appeared to respect more, articulate staff who were able to clarify their point on

demand and defend their positions. Staff considered his motivations pure, although

other executives recognised not all staff responded well to his management style.

The group manager of business operations was the direct line manager for the

MFC unit. She was an articulate woman and appeared confident and assertive in

meetings. She had a reputation for working long hours and managing multiple

projects. She was obviously well regarded by RC national office as she had been

recently selected to be part of the national retail review team. This meant that she

had the additional responsibility of reviewing all national retail outlets and services

in addition to her responsibilities as group manager of retail operations in RCQ. Staff

in the MFC unit said that she was hard to get access to.

The other group managers were of a similar profile; a mix of genders, but all

were confident, articulate and able to communicate their point. One exception was

the group manager of business, training and employment services, who was the


quietest, seemingly reflective one in group management meetings, but this was not a

distraction from his capabilities.

The executive team was an important and powerful influence on strategic

communication as a group because when compared to the MFC unit, their tenure was

between three and 20+ years. The MFC unit members‟ average time at RC was only

a year. The executives as a group therefore provided the historical context and

guidance for decision making about strategic issues.

Communication about strategic issues and concerns occurred primarily at

senior management meetings. These were generally held weekly (but often

rescheduled) following the staff meeting where group managers “can raise issues,

anything from staff problems, to service or program issues, in a confidential and

collegial way” (Exec 6, Qld). These meetings were chaired and led by the ED and

topics were raised by other group managers for discussions:

we have got a senior group that meet regularly – not so much regularly lately

because we are all so busy that everybody‟s so busy we have almost got no

time for meeting – but when we‟re meeting we used to discussing things –

and it would go around the table and everyone would have a view. And

everybody would share their view ... maybe we ought to be doing this, or

why not do that, or have we thought of this. (Exec 7, Qld)

The meetings occurred in the same room as the staff meetings, around a large

board table. Talk here was quite candid, and the members spoke freely about a range

of concerns, however some members of the executive team were more dominant

than others.

The first meeting I attended was on 14 January 2008 in the boardroom,

following the general staff meeting. The topics discussed at this meeting ranged

across all areas of responsibility, including board applications, cultural surveys, key

performance indicators, the retail review and the increasing demands on the team for

project work driven by national office. However there was also a large portion of the

meeting dedicated to communication issues. The discussion moved to the role of

media releases in nurturing relationships with agencies, and the differentiation of

targeted releases to increase efficiency and effectiveness in using the media. This


meeting also raised the need for a crisis plan as a way of refining the recognition of

audiences and key messages in a crisis, and that RCQ didn‟t have one. While the ED

raised concerns about having “too many plans”, he led the discussion and there was

agreement about the need to have consistent and accurate key messages.

The pending organisational restructure for the branch renewal program was

raised as a concern, with a proposal put forward and supported by a number of the

executives about needing a change communication plan. It was generally agreed that

internal communication was poor in RC and staff needed to have a program of

information professionally delivered. The ED expressed his concern that the MFC

team did not have those skills, and it would need to be sourced elsewhere. One of the

team suggested that a change manager was needed. The website section for RCQ

was also identified as needing to be updated, with a comment from the group

manager from business operations that this role was not resourced. And so the

discussion continued.

At this meeting, a strategy meeting was also called for Wednesday (in two

days‟ time) by the ED, and he requested his team “come to this meeting with a series

of issues to deal with this year”. As requested, two days later the executive team

turned up with a range of issues, although there was no clear structure to how these

were to be presented. One executive started with a PowerPoint presentation titled

“the total future of everything”, revisiting the 2006 report score card, and then linked

key issues of quality, change, staff capability and stakeholders to current (2008) and

future planning. This member of the team obviously had access to significant

historical, reporting, and planning information and research. This presentation then

kick started discussion on a range of topics including a recognition of managing

community expectations and managing self expectations (towards staff), and the

need to evaluate “what doesn‟t get measured, doesn‟t get done” (Exec 3, Qld). There

was also a reflection by the ED of the core mission of RC to “improving the lives of

vulnerable people” and the role of “us” (as in the executive team) to “identify who

we need to talk to ... to deliver... we are all translators”. One member of the team

particularly was “pivotal in the translation and summarising of environmental

conditions and then articulated strategic and business planning implications” (Field

notes, 16 Jan 2008) for the executive team. However as one executive quipped, “Red


Cross is exceptional at conceptualising and producing frameworks, but not good at

implementation” (Exec 4, Qld).

The absence of the MFC manager from strategic level meetings was

understandable given only the executive team attended meetings, however the lack

of access to this information meant the MFC unit were not operating with the same

level of information about the organisation, decisions and the environment that the

executive team had access to. This was acknowledged by members of the executive

team but there were no steps to rectify this:

I don‟t think they [MFC staff] get the information because they‟re not at

those strategic level meetings so you can‟t be proactive. You‟ve got to be

reactive. You only get half the story. Sometimes, even when you go to the

head of the organisation for a particular piece of information, it‟s not quite

right. (Exec 3, Qld)

The executive team did recognise, however, that there needed to be the

appropriate level (seniority) of staff attending strategic management meetings as the

“right people need to go to the right meetings” (Exec 7, Qld). This concern related to

the senior managements‟ perceptions of staff capacity, particularly relevant for the

MFC area.

Some executives believed these problems were driven by the salaries offered by RC

for these positions as it did not attract the right calibre (in terms of skill and

experience) of staff. “If you pay peanuts, you get monkeys”, (Exec 7, Qld). This was

also expressed as being a compromise, that if you wanted to work at RC, you were

prepared to accept a lower salary:

it‟s not [the] sort of place that someone who is really pursuing the material

rewards would stay long at. That‟s not criticising people who are pursuing a

material career path; it‟s just that they may choose to limit the time they

spend here because of that. You are not going to get rich working at Red

Cross. (Exec 2, Qld)

There were a number of situations observed where the professional

(technical) response by MFC members did not meet expectations of senior staff. One


example was during a meeting with an executive team member, a media release was

shown and I saw the words “this is crap” written across the top of the release by an

executive (Field notes, 13 June 2008). The poor capacity in the unit became a

reputational issue for the MFC unit generally:

I don‟t think they are skilled at developing a communication strategy – and it

is really a sad admission to say that – but I just don‟t see the current group of

people there having that ability... it is built on a bit of a track record with

their stuff (Exec 7, Qld).

A scene further clarified the perception of MFC staff capacity held by senior

management a month later, (8 February 2008) when during a flood crisis in North

RCQ, a media report in a North RCQ paper stated “the Red Cross has so far

managed to ship 4000 crates of bourbon and coke and cans of paint to the area to

help stricken locals” (Daily Mercury, 7 February 2008). While this story started as a

humorous email rumour, it was picked up as a legitimate story and published in the

local paper in Mackay, the day prior. The MFC manager, the public relations staff,

and media officers in the national office were aware it had been published. I was

sitting in the MFC manager‟s office when the ED came in, obviously angry, and

wanted to know why he wasn‟t made aware of it the day before. He had just been

notified by staff in North RCQ about the media report, and it had obviously taken

him by surprise. There was a heated discussion with some swearing and he left with

a comment “this is totally unacceptable”. These views were elaborated on by another

group manager when relating to skills and knowledge:

Unfortunately they [MFC staff] make the same mistake with [name of the

senior executive] who has a Bachelor in Arts – Journalism. He has the

expectation – he can write a media release – I can write a media release....In

the absence of you doing the job, then he‟s going to do it and get really

shitty. So does he have confidence [in the MFC unit]? No! (Exec 5, Qld)

The acknowledgement and tolerance of poor performance and the lack of

performance management by senior managers was confusing to observe, only


because they had the legitimate power to do something about it, but no actions were

taken. While senior managers expressed frustration with other managers, there was

an acceptance of lower standards of work with no apparent accountability for the

impact of this. The lack of accountability was internalised as tolerance or a “go

softly” on poor performance and this was seen as an acceptable work ethic, because

RC is a charity organisation that does not have a performance culture:

this is endemic through the organisation. People do not have good

performance management coaching/leadership abilities. (Exec 6, Qld)

the accountability stuff is inconsistent ... part of it is an aversion to conflict

within the organisation. And a kind of cultural expectation that you have to

go softly on some people... it is part of organisational culture or has been and

that‟s a leftover from that. (Exec 7, Qld)

The term “Red Cross way” was also used in the executive team, and captured

similar descriptions of ways of working in RC. For one executive member “The Red

Cross way is having long meeting with lots of time wasted. In future I will not

provide feedback because it is not included” (Field notes, 5 August 2008). So for

some executives, the RC way was accepted as a way of working; for others it was

viewed as a way of avoiding accountability or as an excuse just because they worked

at RC:

I don‟t believe in statements like “the Red Cross way”... people push it and

make it what suits them. So the Red Cross way for people who are conflict

adverse, is doing everything you can to avoid any kind of discomfort. Or the

Red Cross way for some people is just to be lazy or not want any

accountability or whatever. (Exec 3, Qld)

The cultural expectation to go softly and views about the organisation being

adverse to conflict and accountability characterised a way of working at RC. Overall

there was a belief, similar to the motivations found in the MFC unit, that people who


came to RC were motivated by an overwhelming desire to make a difference. In a

way, other things are not viewed as important:

People are here to make a difference in the world, and that they prioritise

effective action in the community above most other things. They are

intrinsically motivated and they are not heavily extrinsically rewarded, nor do

they look for it. That‟s overwhelmingly a key driver of the culture. (Exec 4,

Qld)

The executive team encouraged flexibility as a way of working at RC as this

characteristic allowed the organisation to respond to what was most important – that

is respond to disasters as they happened. The response is encapsulated under the

event of being activated. A strong and shared view of RC was that it was a crisis and

disaster organisation. For the executive team, flexibility allowed them to fulfil this

role:

...there is a fluidity and a flexibility about the organisation which has its pros

and cons, but certainly in terms of responsiveness, our ability to respond to

disasters is a good one. There‟s a nice dovetailing between people who are

intrinsically motivated to make a difference and an organisation that‟s not

very rigid, so you can – if there‟s a difference to be made, you can act on it

very quickly. (Exec 4, Qld)

the organisation code switches its culture depending on the situation. It is a

crisis response organisation when there is a crisis at hand and the

organisation very quickly changes... So we‟ve got to live up to that

expectation that in a crisis we will actually be there and we will be making a

difference. The organisation actually plateaus until there is a crisis and then it

code switches quickly and goes into that more. (Exec 7, Qld)

The code switching had been observed earlier in the MFC unit, but now it

was articulated by this executive. To observe this was actually like viewing two

different ways of working. One way existed when RC was activated, staff had a


purpose, direction and nothing else took priority. The other way described as a

plateau was where staff had too many priorities and the flexibility as a way of

working where staff appear to become lost:

people get lost and people who don‟t deal with ambiguity well find it hard.

(Exec 4, Qld)

when the Emerald [crisis] occurred ... everything else was not that important

– they were the most vulnerable group at the time. The rest of the place will

just function. (Exec 7, Qld)

The lack of firm systems, processes and approaches in RC was evidenced

through a lack of planning previously identified in the MFC unit. While this was

specific to communication planning, executives confirmed that this was also relevant

to other areas:

the organisation is not a strong planning organisation – we are getting better

at it, but from an outsider‟s perspective you‟d go, “come on guys”... (Exec 5,

Qld)

The flexibility proved challenging for staff, particularly those more familiar

with working in organisations that provided more structure, more direction and more

controls.

Flexibility also allowed executive members to be creative in their conceptualisation

of solutions (to meet the needs of vulnerable people). There was recognition though

that RC was poor at implementation of solutions:

how they [Red Cross] do things is expectation versus reality. The big gap is

pure frustration. Everything is left to the last minute and therefore the quality

is not good. (Conversation exec and national exec – Field notes, 5 August

2008)


Flexibility accommodated or encouraged a reliance on internal relationships

as a way of working at RC. The absence of firm organisational processes and

systems meant that executives and their staff needed to negotiate or manage

relationships in the workplace as a way of working:

... they spend a lot of time managing the internal relationships rather than the

external relationships....it‟s not what, but who to a great extent. There is a lot

of that here. (Exec 6, Qld)

Some people coming from large institutions, particularly government

institutions, find the place too organic, very organic, it‟s heavily relationship

based. People who have got low ambiguity tolerance... find it difficult

sometimes and complain that you have got to know the right people to get

something done. (Exec 4, Qld).

Relationships in the executive team depended on individual ability to

vocalise their point of view, or essentially debate a position. This meant they needed

to be able to confidently debate and support their position in group manager

meetings or when interacting with the ED. This was the way they communicated and

interacted as a group and was a valued behaviour. The “debate” also allowed

decisions to be flexible enough to benefit from other perspectives:

people who are able to analyse information and stay ahead of the wave...

People who are articulate.....People who are quieter and more thoughtful have

to work harder to get recognised by [name of ED] ...Someone who doesn‟t

speak up or interrupt as much as the others, is going to be at a disadvantage

in his rating of the world. (Exec 2, Qld)

If you can‟t express yourself in 30 seconds and get the point across in 30

seconds, you‟re dead in the water. (Exec 3, Qld)


Given the centrality of decision making in cultural selection (Durham, 1991)

the next section will explore the nature of decision making and power in RCQ,

focusing on decisions made in the context of strategic communication.

Decision Making and Power in Red Cross Queensland

Given that cultural selection is an outcome of human decision making,

Durham (1991) notes that regardless of the decision being of free will or imposed,

members will evaluate the possible variants according to their consequences.

Strategic communication is also an outcome of decisions made by organisational

members in response to environmental change. It is important to explore the

dynamics of decision making in RCQ to understand these influences.

Decisions made by the executive team that contributed to strategic

communication were both at an individual level and by group consensus. The ED

viewed himself as a mentor and wanted to assist his leadership team to develop skills

in visioning and management. Other executives viewed that they had power to make

a decision and there was an expectation that they deliver on the decision. The

concept of group consensus emerged, with group meetings being the forum for the

group to voice concerns and move towards a shared view on important items. This is

why the ability to speak out as a personal characteristic of the team was so critical to

the group. While some members were vocal in expressing their concerns at the lack

of research or data-based decisions, others seemed less concerned and expressed they

were comfortable in this approach:

...it‟s an organisation that is largely built on subjective decisions making....

it‟s a cultural thing... come from the top down. We‟ve made some investment

decisions without a level of analysis... (Exec 5, Qld)

Decision making here is characterised as “pushing the envelope” meaning

that there was support for risk taking in RCQ in the context of a risk adverse view by

RC nationally:


[we]...ride the edge of the envelope – that close that the envelope doesn‟t

exist... we are going to go into a 15 million dollar project – yeah, why not...

(Exec 7, Qld)

The view that national office were risk adverse meant that decisions were

made to provide minimal risk to the organisation:

we are at a scale now and a level of sophistication now that we are (a) able to

expose ourselves to risks if we can‟t cover off some of those things in a more

deliberate way and (b) people are getting lost. It‟s getting too big and the

decision making is too fast and there‟s too many communication channels so

people are getting a bit lost. (Exec 4, Qld)

For longer standing executives, the rationale behind this approach was

understandable given this was a legacy of the “Bali incident” 10

that happened in

2002:

Bali was a “watershed” for Red Cross as it was an event that raised the most

amount of money, but also the media turned hostile against Red Cross – this

had not happened before (Exec 2 Field notes, 8 January 2008)

When we went through the Bali crisis, the organisation has had some pivotal

moments and has had the glare of the spotlights... they have not got rid of

that. Senior people in the organisation still suffer the crisis of the Bali 60

Minutes interview...the organisation is driven by crisis and it is become very

risk adverse – this is the dilemma that we will face. (Exec 7, Qld)

There was mindfulness in the executive team of a power struggle between

state and national office. This mindfulness was often expressed during executive

10

The Bali incident or “Bali” was the term used to describe the interview by Australian current affair

program reporter Richard Carlton that aired on Channel 9 on 1 June 2003. After the Bali bombings in

2002, RC was responsible for collecting and distributing funds to the victims of the bombing. More

than $14 million was raised. In the interview, RC was accused of using the money for other purposes

see: http://sixtyminutes.ninemsn.com.au/article/259042/double-cross

http://sixtyminutes.ninemsn.com.au/article/259042/double-cross


team meetings when discussing items where national office had a “reach” or impact.

For example, for media (of national significance) one senior member recounted to

the team how he put a call into one of the senior national members for a media story,

only to be told “we are busy today” (Field notes, 14 January 2008). Another senior

member recounted how “national office simply do not understand our funding

model” (Field notes, 31 March 2008).

The team was also operating under a shadow of reviews; organisational

change that aimed to shift the power and control back to a centralised, national

model. This provided a shared sense of insecurity about the consequences of the

changes as other levels of staff in RCQ. Historically, the state EDs enjoyed

enormous power in the organisation, as reflected by one senior manager:

[in the past] there was a lot of talk about devolving all of the programs to the

states and reducing the central budget and national staff ... the EDs in the

states held a lot of power and the national management team was the “be-all-

and-end-all” for decision making and the board was a rubber stamp operation

... (Exec 3, Qld).

While the need to change was recognised by executive as a way to move

forward, it was not shared widely in the MFC unit. The executive members

recognised the challenges and questioned if it was possible given the current ways of

working in RCQ:

... They are effectively separate organisations coming together as one, so

eight different cultures, and moving to a scale where ... there is an absolute

imperative for a structuring process. It‟s going to be fascinating to see how

our local flexibility and responsiveness and a high pulse rate and dynamism

responds. (Exec 4, Qld)

Maybe the national changes and the perceived distance between the division

and the national office – difference in understanding of our realities creates

an area – a degree of difficulty that didn‟t previously exist when the change


might have just been in the department or at the divisional level. (Exec 2,

Qld)

The understanding of the realities of executive members, in terms of their

views of RC, its history, reputation and social environment will be explored in the

next section.

Executive member views of Red Cross

Conceptualisations of the organisation, including its brand or reputation

influence group behaviours. Capturing these conceptualisations deepens

understanding of their realities of their environment (Hatch & Schultz, 1997). Like

the MFC staff, executive members viewed RC as iconic and it gave them an

opportunity to do something meaningful with their careers by giving back to society

and making a difference. “There are not many jobs in the world where you actually

get to make a difference,” (Exec 7, Qld). The history of RC was also viewed as

impacting on their beliefs about the organisation, both in terms of the work done and

the symbolism generated by one of the largest and oldest humanity organisations in

the world:

... that history is significant. [Red Cross is] a universal sign of care and

comfort that you‟re wearing on your chest and you don‟t know where else the

person you‟re talking to has encountered that or what their expectations are

going to be of that emblem and the people working for it. ... you have to live

up to the responsibility of wearing that emblem. You‟ve got all of that history

standing behind you and all of the expectations that come with that. (Exec 3

Qld)

Many of the responsibilities of RC were underpinned by the seven

fundamental principles that were published as guides to activities of volunteers and

staff working in RC.

the organisational principles, those fundamental principles, are the most

effective organisational mission statement principles that I have ever seen.


People really do refer to them. They are internalised. People are here because

of them. People think about their behaviour in relation to them and it‟s just

something that I have never seen in another organisation of any description,

that those sorts of things are so impactful. (Exec 4, Qld)

They‟re [the principles] great tools to be able to say – in an environment

where you‟re being asked to do something by your family network or by your

elders and the organisation seem so to be telling you to do something else –

rather than just saying “We‟ll just bend the rules and we will do it this way

because that‟s how that community works” you actually use the principles as

your tool. (Exec, 3, Qld)

While some viewed the principles as powerful and instructive, others did not:

No, they don‟t play a role. People are cynical about them. That‟s the other

thing... huge amount of cynicism. (Exec 6, Qld)

The differing views on how these principles informed the work or mindset of

staff in RC came from a view that the principles were misunderstood or

misinterpreted because the language used was misleading, no longer relevant or that

people who worked at RC did not know how to operationalise them:

I don‟t think people understand them. From induction down, we‟re too soft

on the principles. Some people in the organisation wouldn‟t even be able to

tell you what the principles are. The principles are bent out of shape to do

things “the Red Cross way”. (Exec 3, Qld)

There was a cultural expectation that staff knew about the fundamental

principles, but a much weaker expectation on how they were applied. There was

wide consensus that the principles were not appropriately applied (emerged early in

the study), or later, that the principles were often used by others in the organisation

as a way out, an excuse, or simply misinterpreted to suit a situation. One example


given was that neutrality was applied as a way of excusing inaction or not speaking

out. Some members were very frustrated by this:

One of the spin-offs from that is the impartiality and neutrality which are

such important values to doing the sort of work we do. They‟re interpreted as

meaning, you can‟t speak out. If you are going to be neutral, you can‟t take a

political stand, which is wrong. You can‟t take a party political stand; you

can‟t take a short-sighted partisan view on anything, but if there‟s a public

policy issue, you should argue the public policy issue. (Exec 4, Qld)

Overwhelmingly, RC was considered to be known for disaster, blood and

international work and they had a strong reputation for performance in these areas.

This was a common platform not only among executive members, but for most staff

at RC:

Disaster and blood is usually what they say about what we do, but people‟s

perceptions are of a very capable, large global organisation that can turn up in

the worst circumstances. (Exec 4, Qld)

The lack of clarity around what RC actually did first revealed in MFC was

also shared in the executive team:

Whether you put 20 cents in a tin or you leave us your house, you do it on the

– usually poorly informed understanding of what we actually do and it‟s a

pretty important thing to be explicit about what we do. (Exec 4, Qld)

We have such a strong level of infiltration about the brand recognition, but

we have a low level of recognition about what we actually do. Our challenge

is that everyone knows about us but doesn‟t have a clue what we do. (Exec 5,

Qld)

The lack of knowledge of external audiences was also not concerning to RCQ

executives who were reassured by the very strong reputation and powerful brand of


RC. There were some concerns though that RC did not leverage the opportunities

offered by the strong brand recognition:

The brand is quite helpful because people who don‟t know anything else are

likely to see Red Cross as a reputable, credible humanitarian organisation

with history. That‟s quite powerful for us. We don‟t have to work on creating

that perception. It‟s out there. We have to make sure we don‟t do anything to

destroy that perception. What we do do needs to enhance that perception.

(Exec 2, Qld)

The discrepancy in the strengths of the RC brand and its direct effect on

fundraising efforts was of some concern to executive members, but this was

expressed more as bewilderment and an outcome of the capacity of the MFC area at

a national level:

If you look at the brand recognition, we are in the 90s. The next best brand in

our sector is the Salvos and they are in the 40s ... So organisations that no-

one has ever heard of out-fundraise us. We are almost twice as recognised as

anyone else in the sector and you look at our fundraising, we come in at

about 30th. So there‟s a huge mismatch between people‟s identification and

recognition and high, it‟s an incredibly prestigious brand and we just do an

epically shit job of asking people for money. (Exec 4 Qld)

The lack of capitalisation on being one of the world‟s most recognisable

brands, yet only being very mediocre in raising money was a consistent view held by

members in RCQ. Equally, the reaction ranged from bewilderment to sheer

frustration. However there was no evidence among the executive group that any

response was needed to investigate or correct this. It appeared that this was accepted

as the current positioning in the not-for-profit landscape.

Hatch and Ruben (2006) highlight the role of organisational brand as social

texts, and the centrality of corporate branding in management decision making. They

suggest “brand communication will increasingly be seen as a primary representation

of corporate values in the context of the ever expanding availability of information”


(p. 57). Given the importance and recognition of strength of the brand, one of the

biggest risks articulated for RC was anything that impacted or damaged the brand.

RC did not have a dedicated issues management function as described by Heath

(1997). There was a shared view that community expectation played a role in this but

there was little analysis of public opinion sentiment about RC or understanding of

the public expectations. There was a view that RC will be visible and active in any

disaster situation:

the main risk for the organisation and with the sort of public claim and the

public esteem that an organisation like RC has, is that we have to be there

amidst the central challenges in the community. If you have got a brand

profile, like we do ... “Wherever you are, whoever you are, we‟re there to

help. We‟re there to help people with the greatest needs. No matter what the

circumstances, what the barriers are, we will get through. We will help you,”

that sort of brand profile. (Exec 4, Qld)

Other RC executives expressed concern that internal management‟s view of

RC as a brand verged on being elitist and arrogant. But the expression of this was

found to reflect more of an internal or insular perspective rather than being elitist.

For example, the member here was concerned that RC does not look beyond its own

organisation, and this belief was also shared in the MFC unit:

We are very arrogant when we look outside, too. (named people) ... went to a

not-for-profit forum (and) basically said, “We have got some great people

here and we do some great things when you look at who else is out there in

the not-for-profit sector”... I was embarrassed.. there is no humility... We are

elitist. (Exec 6, Qld).

The focus on internal understandings of RC was also raised as a reputational

risk, effectively ignoring key publics in the environment. There were growing

concerns that RC was not aware of its social environment:


Red Cross needs to pay more attention to its reputation with particular groups

of people. We‟re really arrogant about it. We‟re in for a major kicking. It

might not happen tomorrow or in the next five years but it‟s going to happen

because we‟re fundamentally paying no attention to some people who we

really ought to be and have been for the last five to ten years. We‟ve dropped

the ball. (Exec 3 Qld)

The importance of exploring executive member views of the external social

environment and their perceptions of what exists and its influence on the need to

respond is explored in the next section.

Executive member perceptions of their environment

The RCQ executive team characterised their social environment as being

occupied by clients, corporate, other agencies, government, and regulatory bodies.

Their mindfulness of their presence was observed in meetings and discussions as

they were concerned about the impacts on their social environment and relationships,

consequences and antecedents to policy and decision making. However this was not

a formal process. The scanning, interpretation and prioritising of this information

was done at the individual level, and this ability was perceived by members as

variable in the team, lacking in process and structure:

.. you rely on key people to give you your environmental scans. The ED

actually does a lot of that work ... keeps up with people in government …but

it is kept up there (points to head). There‟s no process for actually sharing

some of that stuff and even the strategic meetings that we‟re supposed to

have to kick around that information are always kicked back off the agenda

so it doesn‟t necessarily happen … so what‟s happening inside is here (points

to head) … there‟s this information coming in and some of it‟s immediately

being thrown out the door ... (Exec 3, Qld).

The competitive landscape of not-for-profits has previously been identified as

being cluttered. Some members expressed a frustration that RC was playing by, or

competing with different rules. In their view, some of their competitors were not


doing the “right thing” in terms of marketing communications, and that they, for

example, were capitalising on misery. RC uses empowering and respectful images.

Views were shared amongst the executive team that RC, given its reputation and

brand recognition, was not as sophisticated as their competitors in their strategic

communication activities. They considered their competitors use advertising and

other promotions a lot more effectively:

Flashy is not the way that we want to do it. We don‟t want to grandstand. I do

have some discomfort with Oxfam‟s “Close the Gap” campaign. Wonderful

targeting of a key issue, wonderful beating the drum ... I can almost hear

Oxfam headquarters in Sydney rubbing their hands together thinking all the

money they are going to get because it‟s a fashionable issue and I am pretty

certain there is a bit of that dynamic in our future in the community, “Well,

here‟s the biggest one. If we position ourselves as doing something about it,

we will be right?” (Exec 4, Qld)

World Vision raised $50 million, we got $150 million. I saw that as a real

warning shock across our bow. Here‟s an organisation [World Vision] that‟s

come from nowhere and doing one thing in particular to raise $50 million and

being high profile in the public. We should have raised three times the

amount this time [that we actually did]... (Exec 3, Qld)

There was no clear agreement about how RC should be presenting itself in

terms of a view about how it needed to improve. There was a shared recognition they

were competing with other not-for-profits for the same fundraising dollar and many

of them had an advantage either because they had a more simplified product or they

used advertising techniques that, in the executive team‟s view, were not appropriate

for RC to use. The restraint driven by the values is interesting as there was clearly an

emerging tension between a product driven organisation versus a human services or

social values model driven by collaboration and conversations. The tension is that

some members felt RC was becoming product driven and losing the ability to

collaboratively work with a group to provide a service. Other members viewed it as


losing the visioning or creative process needed to meet the changing needs of its

social environment:

we‟re product driven – rather than being like Oxfam or whatever, who

generally market – what you get the sense of is an approach and a really

respectful approach of people and their issues, you don‟t get that here ... Even

the Red Cross‟s care commitment stuff is really not about an approach. It‟s

about our products. (Exec 3, Qld)

.. in any organisation you have got to have people who are visionary – it is

my role. We have too many product management people – who are wedded

to a product. (Exec 7, Qld).

The tension that was emerging characterised a competing view of a creative

versus a marketing, or product-driven way of working. While these views were

expressed as a concern broadly, views were particularly strong around strategic

communication activities, specifically about RC‟s brand and how it should maintain

its reputation and prioritise its relationships with stakeholders. In this case, it was a

belief that RC does need to get more organised, but there is a fear that it might be

unable to maintain that balance of creative and more formalised ways of working.

This was expressed as one of RC‟s greatest challenges:

That‟s one of the key challenges for an organisation growing, growing

geographically in a dispersed way ... Any national organisation which

operates across the states has got the same challenge. How do you get the

balance right between having likely responsive things plugged into the local

community and do things right on the ground and have some coherence as an

overall agency? That's the balance. (Exec 4, Qld)

This section presented participant views of RCQ. It documents that the locus

of strategic communication in the organisation sits with the executive unit as it

interacts with the MFC unit, then follows processes in motion (Mitchell, 2007)

through exploring cognitive knowledge structures held by members of RCQ with the


aim of exploring meaning and understanding of their world. The next section

summarises these knowledge structures.

Knowledge Structures in Red Cross Queensland

Knowledge structures are cognitive schemas that act to instruct or bias

individual‟s interpretation and understanding of environmental information (Harris,

1994). The knowledge structures summarised below represent shared knowledge or

classificatory schemas that are derived from observations and interviews (Platt,

2007). Harris (1994) suggests sense making is facilitated through knowledge

structures of schemas. Schemas provide sense making templates for management

that assist to give meaning to environmental information (Walsh, 1995). Schemas are

organised expressions of experience that serve as a frame of reference for action

(Weick, 1979) or act as mechanism to shape and simplify cognition (Di Maggio,

1997). As cognitive structures, Sackmann (1991) suggests people use schemas to

both understand and attribute meaning to events. In RCQ, the emergent knowledge

structures existed in five key areas as illustrated in Table 10 and Figure 26.


Figure 26: Red Cross Queensland web of knowledge structures

The figure illustrates the cultural propositions as a web of knowledge

structures and their relationships that have emerged from the cognitive premises of

individual members. This represents the collective level representations generated

during enactment (Weick, 1969) about RC, what they believe the organisation to be

and what it is like working there. The red schema relates to belief systems operating

to organise RCQ members‟ views about what RC is, and needs to be, to respond to

the environment that it is operating in. The purple schema exists around how

members perceive they need to operate as a crisis organisation and their beliefs about

being flexible and fluid. The yellow schema relates to how RCQ members operate as

a way of working at RC. The green schema reflects views about stakeholders and


their relationship with power and structure. The blue schema describes beliefs about

how RC is perceived by external audiences. The schema is shared across the five key

areas as they contribute to building understanding of participant views in RCQ.

Table 10: Emergent schemas operating in Red Cross Queensland

Schema characterised Emergent knowledge structures

Views of RC trying to meet the

needs of outside world (red)

Old and traditional, iconic and respected

7 Principles both enhance and constrain our work

Valuable and recognised brand – I am proud to

work at RC – RC or not-for-profit way

We are a humanitarian organisation (tolerance) and

a volunteer organisation

Helping vulnerable people important

Old ways of working –Tolerance of poor

performance

Complex and not understood –Need to maintain

relevance

Corporate way versus a social values way

Views about being a crisis

organisation (purple)

A crisis organisation – need to be flexible and fluid

Flexible

Reactive, ad hoc and inconsistent

Busy (out of control)

No planning

Decision making based on intuition

Views about how we work at

RCQ (yellow)

Avoid being blamed

Not performance based, poor accountability, Power

and power struggles , need to share risk –

Conversations, we have an internal focus, we don‟t

document, we need to be articulate

Views about stakeholders and Power struggle, nationalisation (support or


their relationship with power

and structure (green)

challenge), need to be articulate, EDs are important

Views about external

perceptions of RC (blue)

Humanitarian organisation, old, volunteer based,

helping people, traditional, recognised and valuable,

complex

Schema: Conceptualisations of Red Cross

The red and blue schema (Figure 26) organise members‟ views of what RC

is, what they think external audiences think about RC, and what it means to work at

RC. This reflects their shared knowledge about what RC needs to strategically

communicate to meet the needs of its social environment.

They view the brand as being highly respected and very valuable, and there is

recognition that they are custodians of the brand. There is some concern that there is

not enough being done to maintain the brand, however it is generally felt the brand is

strong enough to cope with this.

The age and traditions of RC are very important to members as they feel they

contribute to an iconic and respected organisation that is doing amazing and

meaningful work. Traditions were viewed as constraining for RC, as they were being

held back by what was the history of the organisation and by the profile of the

members, volunteers and board members being stuck in the glory of the past and not

keeping pace with current ways. This also included maintaining relevance for the

current society and what that means.

Current ways also encapsulated RC not providing staff with resources and

technology and investing in the organisation to be able to maximise their potential.

Age and tradition were also viewed as benefits. Many staff were frustrated that RC

was not more successful, given their understanding of what the organisation was,

how well known it was, and the remarkable work that it did.

The complexity of services and work RC undertook also provided a source

of frustration for members. This was because it was not simply defined, or simply

communicated to diverse audiences that were targeted by RC. Even with the new

branding, members felt it was still difficult to package.


While acknowledging the seven fundamental principles are meaningful for

many staff, there was a consensus held by the executive team that they were not fully

understood. There was also a shared view that while the principles were present, they

did little to actually contribute to the work done at RC on a daily basis.

Staff feel exceptionally proud to be associated with working at RC. They

like to tell their friends and colleagues they work for RC and put RC on their work

history. This is also linked to the humanitarian work that RC undertakes and the

public image held about RC work. They view helping vulnerable people to be

extremely important and this overrides some of the other frustrations they experience

at RC.

Working at RC also means staff need to accept the not-for-profit framework

that is associated with being tolerant, or what is often interpreted as being

humanitarian. For staff this means that there is latitude in work standards – or a

tolerance of poor performance. There was also a tension in RCQ as staff recognise

two competing ways of working. One is a creative way that relies on conversations

and collaboration. The other is a marketing driven way, being directed by the

product... this remains unresolved for members.

Schema: Red Cross is a crisis organisation

The purple schema (Figure 26) organise RCQ participant views that RC is a

crisis organisation working in flexible ways to allow them to be responsive to the

sudden nature of a crisis. Flexible and fluid ways are accommodated through

conversations as a way of working in the organisation; recognising relationships with

key staff are a way of getting work outcomes rather than formal processes of

documentation. The ability to converse or debate is highly valued in RCQ.

Documentation is avoided as this would solidify an approach, removing the ability to

be flexible. Therefore, planning is undertaken verbally with feedback given as part of

a conversation. Decisions are achieved through discussion and ultimately consensus.

If agreement cannot be reached, decisions are not made.

Organisational knowledge is reduced because of lack of documentation, so

decisions are made based on the current understanding of a situation. Work therefore

is prioritised by deadline, not necessarily by importance, so staff often have a sense

of being out of control or having no direction. When a crisis does occur, staff have a


sense of relief as a focus for work is delivered within the scope of the crisis, rather

than the complexity of work that comes with normal operations at RC.

Schema: Working in Red Cross Queensland

The green and yellow schemas (Figure 26) organise member‟s views about

working at RCQ. There is a shared view that the organisation operates in a way that

distributes accountability. This includes having conversations to share risk, a lack of

documentation and lack of evaluation or accountability. Staff feel that they will be

blamed and fear consequences, leading them to avoid situations where they perceive

this may occur.

Staff know there is little accountability for outcomes of “other” staff and this

is a source of frustration and confusion. The lack of performance management

nurtures an individualistic way of working that includes a lack of sharing

information and a need to protect individual output.

Power and relationships are important in RCQ, with this sometimes

obscuring external perspectives and audiences, leaving staff more focused on

internal stakeholders. Power resided in key areas and staff needed to make sure those

with power were satisfied. In most cases the power is legitimate, however power

struggles exist for members resulting in the need to identify, manage or “play the

game” to have a better outcome. The need to be able to debate and be articulate is

also a highly valued quality in working at RCQ.

Summary: Contextualising Red Cross Queensland knowledge

structures

The first stage of analysis focused on the MFC unit in RCQ as the setting to

explore the cultural influences on the development of strategic communication. The

setting of the study now shifts out to give context to these knowledge structures. This

knowledge web will now be explored in the context of the national office (analysis

stage two) and then compared with the knowledge structures present in RCSA

(analysis stage three).


Contextualising Case: National Communication Directorate

Stage two of the analysis now shifts to the next level of influence in the

National Communication Directorate (NCD). The following ethnography aims to

further explore the processes, persons and actions relating to the development of

strategic communication in RCQ and give context and meaning to these findings (see

Figure 27) (Vayda, 1983; Marcus, 1995). The first part of the ethnography details the

physical setting then moves to explore the knowledge structures identified within

RCQ, including motivations for working at RC, member conceptualisations RC‟s

reputation, traditions, services and environment. The account then describes member

perceptions of environment before moving to themes related to strategic

communication.

These views are important as Lundberg (2005) argues “it is the mindset of

the dominant coalition which enables executives to notice, bundle, and give meaning

to solicited as well as available information” (p. 299). It was the role of the NCD to

set strategic direction of RC and policy relating to the organisation‟s strategic

communication. While the regulatory and normative powers of the NCD were

limited due to the federated model that allocated absolute power to the state-based

divisions, it was viewed that the NCD was in a position of authority to influence and

direct interpretations and actions by members in RCQ.

Figure 27: Stage 2 level of analysis in the context of the study in Red Cross


The NCD in RC was responsible for setting policy and direction for the

national organisation of RC. The director of the unit articulated the purpose of the

unit as being for “reputational defence”. Staff in the unit have a perceived senior role

in the organisation and are in a position of authority, however do not have any direct

line reporting between the state-based MFC staff and the national office staff.

Access to RC needed to be endorsed by the national director of

communication. By the time I came to interview the key staff they had moved into a

new building in York Street in Sydney – although not all national office staff were

located there. Of the 37 staff in the NCD, 16 were in Sydney, 19 were in Melbourne,

one was in Brisbane, and one in Perth. There was no clear rationale for this

distribution except for staff preference.

The Sydney office of the NCD was located on level 9 of an eleven storey

office block in the heart of the CBD in Sydney. Offices were secured by glass doors

that could only be entered by swiping a security pass or by buzzing the security

intercom. The internal fit out of the Sydney office was similar to the RCQ and

RCSA premises. Senior staff occupied offices while less senior staff were in open

plan partitioned offices in the centre.

The Melbourne office of the NCD was located in a city fringe in a non

identifiable, two level building in a location behind the Victoria state office building.

There was no RC signage on the external building. The entrance was through a

discrete frosted glass door only accessible by being buzzed in. Inside there was no

reception area. Visitors to the building confronted a small corridor with a stairway

with the national office staff located through another door to the left. Stairs led up to

more offices and a large meeting room with a board type table. The Melbourne

office area appeared cramped and not like the modern Sydney premises or other state

offices. There was little to offer staff working there in terms of outlook. Like the

other locations though, senior staff had offices and junior staff were accommodated

in cubicle partitioned areas.

On entry to the Sydney office, the executive assistant to the director of

communication appeared organised and professional, and presented a diary schedule

of appointments for my interviews. I had not been given permission to observe or

attend meetings, so my time in the office was dedicated only to gaining a one hour


interview with nominated people identified responsible for developing or

contributing to strategic communication in RC. Most interviews extended more than

an hour. While these covered everyone in the unit, I was given access to the most

senior communication roles responsible for marketing and communication activities,

including media, internal communication, international communication, research,

strategy, and donor relations. The level of the staff interviewed (managerial or

operational) is summarised in Table 11.

Entry to the Melbourne office was less formal. While senior staff knew that I

was arriving, there was less formality, acknowledgement or organisation. I was

introduced around to staff sitting at their desks and shown to a desk left vacant for

the day due to someone being on sick leave. There was little opportunity to interact

with the staff. Similar to RCQ, staff were busy in their cubicles with little office

banter witnessed. In both Sydney and Melbourne, interviews were undertaken in

personal offices or in onsite meeting rooms.

Table 11: Seniority of staff accessed in the national office

Seniority level National MFC unit National other

Senior manager 6 2

Operational 5

The age and experience pool of staff in the NCD was older and more

experienced than staff in the MFC state offices. Staff in the more senior roles had

significant working experience in relevant organisations prior to coming to work at

RC. The views expressed by national members about their motivation for working at

RC were similar to RCQ. The length of time that national staff had been with RC

was also significantly longer, ranging from six years to newly appointed, with a

median time of three years. The motivation for working at RC was shared and

expressed as sentiments of doing something they believed was worthwhile and

contributed to society in some way:


if I am going to be promoting something, it has to be something that I

passionately believe in and not something that‟s just really about putting

dividends back in shareholders‟ pockets. (National 3)

it‟s personally nice to do something that feels right. (National 9)

The uniqueness of RC being in a position “to influence” was also important

to staff in national office, and this was bundled with RC‟s foundation of being a

humanitarian organisation:

when you have worked for the organisation for a while, you come to realise

that there are constraints, but that they are also enormous opportunities. Our

organisation can do stuff simply ... that other organisation‟s don‟t get a

chance to do. (National 3)

There was shared consensus that RC was known for blood, international

work and disasters:

Red Cross is widely known among the public and very highly respected. So

when people think of Red Cross , they think very highly of us. However, they

don‟t really know what we do; certainly within Australia. So the main things

they associate Red Cross with is blood, international work and to a lesser

extent our response to emergencies and disasters. They don‟t really have a

good sense across the board about our various programs for disadvantaged

people in Australia and that‟s something that we want to address... (National

7)

While there was recognition that the complexity and scope of RC services

hindered their ability to let audiences know what they did, there was also a view that

what had been done to date was confusing and led to a view of RC being

misunderstood by the lack of consistency across Australia about what is was doing:


[Red Cross ] has been fairly remedial in terms of communications over the

years.... We‟ve been projecting all these confusing messages about what we

are doing and who we are inappropriately and that‟s what‟s really fractured

our brand generally ... We are actually the one organisation ... trying to be all

things to all people is just information overload. (National 2)

With the recognition that what RC does is complex, also came a shared view

that audiences and stakeholders did not have to know about everything the

organisation did; a view equally held in RCQ:

I don‟t think everybody has to know everything we do. That to a certain

extent we can trade off our reputation for... safety, reliability, trustworthiness,

size, scope in the areas that people already recognise and we can target our

information to people who need to know about certain services...(National 3)

what people understand Red Cross to be is this big, sexy, global, international

brand and that they – it is top of mind for them, number one in respect, and

they don‟t know all the intricacies of what it does. They don‟t need to. They

trust it. (National 2)

There was also awareness that although RC enjoyed a high brand profile,

there was a sense of there being unrealised potential, also expressed as missed

opportunity for the organisation:

It‟s both an awareness of missed opportunity and unrealised potential. It‟s

probably a factor of increased competitiveness within ... and we see a number

of not-for-profits doing those things better than we are doing and we have

said, “Well, if we have got such a fabulous brand, such great recognition,

why aren‟t we matching some of those other organisations?” (National 7)

RC‟s reputation was viewed as being an organisation that was safe,

trustworthy, reliable, and built on tradition. Nurturing, protecting and maintaining

the reputation of RC was very important to national staff and many identified it as


one of their key roles. However for many members, the concept of being safe was

tied to symbols of age and tradition in RC. For many, traditional ways of working

and governance structures were viewed as a constraint for progress and impinged on

their ability to adapt to a more contemporary social environment. The age and

traditions of RC were viewed as something that could constrain the organisation

moving forward. The lack of appeal and loss of relevance to younger audiences was

a priority for many staff who were concerned that RC was so bound up by tradition,

engaging with the older generation in both leadership and policy, that it was

neglecting other audiences or mindsets:

We don‟t need to remind people about how old we are. That‟s what we are

trying to reverse; is look contemporary, not the reverse. (National 2)

It does reflect an old style governance structure that had people who really

weren‟t looking at strategic but they‟re, very much, looking at small details...

(National 5)

Views of roles that traditional members and volunteers played in the

organisation created a tension in terms of recognising that RC needed to do things

differently. While there was a high level of respect for what the ageing volunteers

and members contributed to RC, there was a floundering in terms of what to do with

a group that cannot change. The need to rebrand RC to corporatise it was also seen in

a way as rebranding the types of volunteers they attract. Recognising that RC is not

appealing to the youth was a concern for national staff:

We can‟t have, with the greatest respect in the world, octogenarians running

chook raffles at (name of a town) at a loss, using public relations materials

that are completely off-brand and not synergised because when those people

die nobody is going to do anything because there‟s a perception that we are

old. ....I don‟t think that that, and updating our image, is mutually exclusive.

(National 12)


These sentiments were reflective of tensions also found in RCQ. In RCQ this

was more about a tension between a product driven versus a social service model,

but here this view was refined to being more about trying to shift the organisation

from a non corporate to a corporate mindset. While national staff were not wedded to

sentimentality or a specific state-based alliance, they argued for recognising that

while values-based decisions have a role, the organisation needs to be far more

accountable for the delivery of corporate outcomes and donor value. This was really

described as a way of working mindset, where decisions were the outcome of

position not impact:

We have shareholders who are the governors and the members, but they‟re

not really. You could be an old lady of 80 who‟s baking lamingtons and you

feel that you‟re a senior member of the society. Well they‟re not. They‟re not

business. I‟m very aware that I can‟t be too value focused ... we don‟t exist

simply to give volunteers something to do... (National 9)

We turn ourselves inside out and become something we are not just to get a

bit of funding. Then we have got traditional boards and Mable comes on

board and her mother was incontinent, so she thinks it would be really good

to set up a linen hire service for people and that happens. So that‟s what‟s

happened over the years. (National 2)

The “bounded by tradition” sentiment was also applied to how the

organisation responded to its competitive environment. Members in national office

felt that they were doing enough. Members at this level revealed they had greater

insights and perspectives into the strategic vision of the organisation, specifically the

diversity and scope of work being undertaken both nationally and internationally by

RC, and this perspective enriched their view of what RC needed to be doing at a

local or state-based level:

It‟s not that those concerns aren‟t getting to the streets. They are, via other

organisations. But we have opportunities to work with people who are the

most vulnerable people in the community, partly because we say, okay, we


will air those concerns privately, not publicly. I am happy knowing that there

are other people that are doing that publicly. But it‟s not as if we are not

doing anything, we are doing lots, arguably more, than making ourselves feel

warm and fuzzy. (National 3)

While acknowledging RC‟s role to help vulnerable people emerged strongly

at the national level, the role of the seven fundamental principles was not so clear.

RC publicly states the seven fundamental principles guide or influence work

undertaken by RC. National members viewed these as a philosophy but not

instrumental in guiding the work done by the NCD. The principles were recognised

as having organisational value as a platform, or as being inherent in brand strategy,

but are ultimately confusing and hard to interpret:

[The use of the principles] Yes it‟s a key positioning platform when you‟re

talking to outside business partners and you can position yourself as a non-

religious organisation that is independent ... Most people don‟t understand

the wordings around the core principles. Some of them are quite

contradictory... People don‟t know what they mean. People look at

universality and you think, so what does that mean? (National 5)

we certainly don‟t live and breathe them. ... they are harder to conceptualise.

I mean, something “neutrality, impartiality, universality”; people probably

don‟t get that bit. (National 7)

Seven fundamental principles written in Old English which they are, in stuffy

sector speak that you never heard ...it‟s ridiculous. ... The language is too

irrelevant. (National 2)

The principles were also recognised as having the potential to be used as an

excuse for inaction or inactivity. While no clear examples were given, these

comments were made being mindful that it could happen and RC needed to take care

that the principles were not applied in this way:


... you can go too far one way and use neutrality, impartiality, independence,

all of those sorts of things as an excuse for not speaking out... It is crucial too

that we are not seen as politically active .. not only about what we do with

our own government, not only politically sensitive within our own country

but with the knowledge about what we do here has a bearing on what

happens internationally as well. (National 3)

We wanted to do much more advocacy to influence public policy and to get

some public recognition for what we stand for and believe in but a lot of

people say, “Oh, you can‟t possibly have a public view about Indigenous

issues or whatever, immigration issues, because of that neutrality.” So, yeah,

they have certainly hid behind that. (National 7)

While the principles were not viewed as a strong influence on action or ways

of working, other influences were evident. These will now be explored in the next

section.

Ways of Working

National staff views about ways of working at RC shared many similarities

with RCQ. There was a palpable fatigue and frustration in staff that was similar to

the RCQ view, but national office staff felt they had more ability to influence

outcomes. While feelings of overwork and exploitation emerged, there was

awareness that for some staff, they were actively trying to make that a condition for

their subordinates:

staff here are exploited. There is a culture of “you work for a humanitarian

organisation. Therefore, it should have your life”. That‟s unfair and

unrealistic. I try really hard not to do that with the staff that work for me.

(National 3)

(name) expects it all. That‟s part of his culture. Negotiating never happens

successfully. The same thing happens at divisional level where

communications people go, “but I‟ve been asked to take the lead on this


volunteer and membership communication review that‟s due, and you want

me to organise this ball for the ED.” “Do both.” And one of them inevitably

falls in a heap or the person works 24 hours a day for six months and leaves.

That‟s basically what happens all the time. (National 2)

The concept of surviving a bullish way of working emerged, but not in the

same way as in RCQ. In NCD, it was described more as a survival mechanism,

where people who were not strong, articulate and assertive may have a hard time in

RC:

There‟s a bullying culture slightly at the top, too. ... It‟s the louder, the

biggest wheels, the people that talk the loudest...[that get their own way]

(National 3)

The identification of relationships as being central to ways of working was

also shared at the national level, with this theme being articulated as both relational

and also involving power or operating in a political way. The influence of the

relational way of working was acknowledged as being too informal or fluid, and

there was a need to shift this practice:

It‟s an organisation that also needs to formalise things. The relationships and

the ways of working that drove it rather than the structure. (National 5)

Like RCQ, national office recognised a reliance on consultation or having a

conversation as an accepted way of working. However inaction resulted from this

activity with a recognition that consultation was aiming for decision by consensus,

which leads to no decisions being made:

we confuse consultation with consensus. We come from a background of “we

can only make a decision when we have got consensus on something.” So we

get those nine people in the room and very rarely do we get consensus. So we

get really constrained by that. (National 7)


The expectation that staff consulted to get to a decision was viewed as disruptive,

and stifled NCD‟s staff ability to achieve outcomes. This was also attributed to the

influence of other parties to try to achieve a sense of power or control over the

situation. While power is not explicitly articulated here, it is reflected in the ongoing

battle by states to maintain a level of power:

there‟s just constant interjection. There are people that do step in and micro-

manage and it becomes very interruptive... it creates a completely different

set of circumstances. (National 6)

There was a shared view that some states were out of alignment with the

national direction. This was recognised by national staff as more of a reflection that

state staff did not have access to the visioning and national priorities discussed at the

very senior level:

They are part of Red Cross. Some of the internal stakeholders in states,

particularly who are very state focused, and tend to not always see the whole.

(National 5)

This misalignment also had consequences for the strategic communication

output in RC. National staff viewed the states as having different priorities, but few

national staff made the links to the lack of access to key information. It was just

viewed as a lack of perspective, or an internal focus. A recognition by members that

RC has an inward or internal focus emerged as a very strong theme. This lack of

perspective was viewed as a lack of vision of RC being one organisation instead of

the federated model of nine separate operating divisions:

a lot of the sentiment that comes through of “my state is different” is based

on a very traditional, rural opinion. Which is where their traditional

membership came from. It‟s not necessarily where the other supporters or

where blood donors and even volunteers, increasingly, are actually coming

from. (National 5)


people are just so caught up in their own internal divisions and that happens

with the organisation globally as well. We are just a microcosm of the

movement, really. (National 2)

NCD staff also expressed a view they felt they did not have access to

information needed for them to make the right decisions in their work:

I‟ve said over and over and over, I‟d really love to come to the more senior

meetings and hear what their priorities are, because it really influences what I

do. I‟ve been told it‟s inappropriate [to go to those meetings]. (National 10)

A number of staff highlighted the political nature of RC confirming its internal

nature as just a political organisation with an internal focus:

it is a battle. This is a really political organisation. Not political in a bitchy

sense at all; just everything‟s complicated. Red Cross is its own worst enemy.

Everything is inward focussed. (National 4)

...we are a really long way behind lots of other not-for-profits strategically,

hugely, because of the undue amount of influence of board members and

people like your senior managers are able to inflict on your day-to-day....

micro-management indicates how out of touch we are. (National 2)

For most, the internal focus was directed at things like the principles, where it

was attributed that the “organisation” didn‟t see the folly in their ways – but no

analysis was undertaken that maybe this internal focus was having an impact:

we tend to talk in Red Cross lingo. Forget sector lingo. We have got lingo all

of our own... the principles have organisational value in communicating them

– they are inherent in brand, inherent in imagery... And that is part of Red

Cross wanting to talk its own language all the time and not communicate

with people in a compelling way. (National 2)


The view of national staff that the organisation tended to have an inward

focus aligned with the emergence of personality being an important or contributing

characteristic in staff and recognition that power and politicking was part of a way of

working at RC. For some members this was described as game playing, for others it

was simply an exercise of power:

... people have been quite shocked by some of the game playing and

machinations and lack of sympathy and empathy internally, that have been in

some cases fairly dirty politics. It takes people by surprise... (National 2)

There‟s varying degrees to which people play the game and RCQ is notorious

for not playing the game compared to South Australia, which is very much

on board and does play the game... (National 7)

The internal focus was held by national members to be particularly applicable

to RCQ. RCQ was noted as being parochial as RCQ staff thought their state was

special and had unique needs and needed unique programs:

The CEO of Queensland Red Cross, CEO of WA Red Cross, and all those

people, are different. That‟s why we have got those different cultures. The

Queensland culture is regarded as a bit of a cowboy; it does its own thing; it

doesn‟t want to be constrained in any way. That‟s been very problematic to

manage... On the other hand, Queensland has also driven performance

improvement and business process improvement... more than some of the

other states. (National 7)

The power structures in the NCD and their relationships with state-based

MFC unit managers and staff were viewed as challenging by most of the national

staff. For some national staff, there was recognition that the current federated model

was not effective and they took personal steps to modify their work practices and

expectations. For other staff, they had alternative views to how the state staff viewed

their practices. For example, RCQ MFC staff viewed they worked well although

their performance was constrained by lack of resources. Alternatively, some national

managers viewed the RCQ MFC unit as “dysfunctional” (National 4) or lacking


perspective (National 5). For many staff, there was a shared view that the current

system needed to change to alleviate duplication of services and structures regarded

as dysfunctional and inefficient:

change ... it‟s just about being more effective as an organisation, relevant as

an organisation and really effective for our beneficiaries; effective for the

people we serve, effective in terms of responding to disadvantaged. (National

7)

it‟s an absurdity to think of us as eight separate organisations. We have to

work as one organisation. We use donors‟ money so duplicating services and

duplicating functions simply to keep little ... happy. I would get rid of every

single State board. That‟s a complete waste of time. I would get rid of the

EDs, they should be State managers. That‟s an absurdity we have kept the

structure. .... we are over-managed on a senior management level. (National

3)

The view that there needed to be transformational change in the

communication function of the society was very strong. There was a shared

frustration due to national viewing they had the skills and perspective, but no power

to direct change because the EDs held power. The patriarchal internal focus of the

states meant they were viewed as not having the bigger picture. For example, when

talking about a specific state:

They have had their own little fiefdoms... it‟s just incredible. It‟s just

ridiculous. But again it‟s a product of the history. It‟s what has been

inherited. (National 2)

It‟s really tried to keep doing its own thing. So it‟s a state [Queensland] that

tends to operate the most autonomously.... But I do think it‟s a problem for

the Society because it under represents some of the key things that the society

wants to do going forward. (National 5)


The responsibility for prioritising and deciding action for the society

generally was held with national office. However views about tensions between state

and national power to make these decisions also emerged as a key tension in the unit.

The concept of having a fight or having a battle was common among national staff

when discussing areas where there may not be consensus in the states:

the power that still resides out in the divisions. ... it is a fight. .... it‟s not

going to happen. It‟s always a fight. The whole time I have been here. ...was

prepared to have the fight... (National 4)

if it was easier and you could push it through quicker, you would. But if

you‟re in for a fight... We really had to fight. (National 5)

Planning, or rather a lack of it, was acknowledged by national staff as

something that happens but may not be recognised. There was some attempt at

developing communication plans, but for a number of reasons they did not come to

fruition. A number of examples were given by staff where they attempted to

facilitate a plan through appropriate approval processes only to be told at one point

in that chain of command that it was not approved or acceptable for some reason. For

most of the national staff, reference was made to the strategic plan as being an

artifact of a plan, and their response in terms of actions and tactics was open for

interpretation:

We don‟t have a plan for MFC .. even basically, like a Gantt chart... because

other priorities get injected ... but they are not priorities for us. (National 6)

there‟s no real strategic planning process. Although it‟d be argued there is.

(National 5)

The lack of planning combined with the organisation defining itself as a

crisis organisation meant that being reactive was viewed as a way of working,

primarily attributed to senior level interference inhibiting staff ability to be

proactive:


in terms of communicating our priorities, I am led by the theme of the day.

The CEO will decide in the middle of the night that we don‟t have enough

information out there about what we are doing with...(shows an example)

...this is a 20-year-old concept that is not relevant anymore and you have to

stop interfering with this kind of strategy ...it makes it very hard to be

proactive and plan. (National 2)

The inability to plan was also found to be associated with a mindset of

having the ability to drop everything when a disaster hits. The role of the RC as a

disaster response organisation is an important part of working at RC and very much

part of its reputation. A very different type of organisation emerged in RCQ during

activation for a disaster (crisis), and this was reflected at the national level. Some

members believe that the conflation of the two roles of RC, one being a disaster

response organisation and the other dealing with the mundane but increasingly

growing needs of the vulnerable has created two distinct or different organisations:

It‟s [crisis response] core business and it gives a sense of urgency that often

people don‟t have at other times. It takes over from all other things. It gives

people [staff] a purpose, a reason for being. (National 5)

It‟s almost like there are two Red Crosses and the Red Cross that works at

disaster level – and I‟ve seen it – it started with tsunami and it‟s been honed

with each disaster. That‟s how our organisation should work. We have an

agreed way to do things. We have people who sit within their appropriate

roles. A set of information and it‟s common information for everybody. And

it works. Step outside of that scenario, it is completely different. And it is – it

can range from at one end, a complete shambles, to the other end where

we‟ve got some very good, very efficient programs out. (National 6)

When the chips down and everybody shoulders to the grindstone ...There‟s a

sense of purpose that is perhaps missing the rest of the time because that‟s


what we‟re there – everybody has a feeling that that‟s what we are there to

do. (National 3)

The crisis also brought relief to the overwhelming complexity of what RC

does. This was viewed as another reason why staff looked forward to another

disaster:

it‟s more that they are over-worked and in time of crisis people put that

aside.... you have more permission to not get something else done. “It‟s okay

to not get it done now because we all know you‟re working on this thing.”

(National 10)

This difference created demands in both role and approaches to prioritising or

managing work which created tension in terms of focusing on just “one thing” and

also grieving for the excitement and freedom that normally comes with a crisis. The

freedom means that staff need to be fluid and flexible, even in non activation (non

crisis response) times:

When we go away to disaster, there‟s an adrenaline rush associated with it as

well but you are focussed. Whereas the rest of the time it‟s like oh, for God‟s

sake we are doing what? Hiring out car seats in WA .... We are way too

unfocussed and diverse. (National 2)

regrettable in some ways... to a certain extent unavoidable. You don‟t want

[Red Cross] to be drifting and purposeless in the in between times. You don‟t

want to see the extremes... (National 3).

The extremes referred to meant work undertaken during non activation.

During non activation or non crisis times, national staff found ways to approach

daily, non-crisis work with the fluid and unstructured environment. For some this

meant simply doing your own thing; for others, it meant finding support from what

already exists to cope with the lack of structure around daily work:


I pretty much do my own thing now. I have learnt how the place works. I just

get on and done it. Fortunately, I have got really good relationships with all

the program managers and so I work closely with them. (National 4)

in terms of priorities (work), they are pretty fluid. I mean, honestly, it

depends on what‟s happening. (National 2)

NCD staff recognised that the lack of structure in MFC activities was

exacerbated by low skill levels of MFC members in the divisions. NCD staff shared

a view that capacity of MFC staff generally in the states was a concern, and that the

influence of being state-based was a big part of this:

As a society we‟re probably adequately resourced but it‟s, it sounds arrogant

to say incompetence, but there‟s a lot of stuff I do because I don‟t believe that

other people will do it. (National 9)

There‟s junior people in positions that don‟t have the basic skills to do the

job that‟s required. No implications when they don‟t. No guidance, no

direction and yet when you issue a direction at a national level, it dissipates

as they move back into the State. ... it‟s been a hard slog because all of them

have been delivered through that little [state based] team I have spoken

about. (National 4)

Similar to RCQ, national office staff viewed research as important. The lack

of funding meant staff undertook secondary and desk research to inform action in the

marketing and communication areas. Evaluation was rarely done but was generally

viewed as important. Research was funded for youth programs, and this was viewed

as an emerging market by the board:

Desk stuff and secondary stuff...we rarely have budget to look at it directly.

(National 2)


...we need to be very clear on what we want and how it‟s going to be

measured and evaluated and all that and we don‟t have that... (National 4)

Accountability, or rather lack of it, was also expressed as a concern by staff

in national office, also being attributed to poor skills levels by MFC staff in the

divisions. The recognition of the underperformance and the poor skills set was

particularly frustrating for national staff as staff in the divisions were employed by

their state EDs, and they had little influence on who was employed:

I‟m feeling quite disillusioned with lack of accountability at the moment. It‟s

been three years. The reporting lines haven‟t changed. The skills levels are

grossly... very, very, very junior; like, very junior. The capacity of the team is

not where it should be. From an accountability perspective... there are no

implications... I just look at things that happen and you just think I can‟t

believe people get away with that. I can‟t believe there‟s no clear decision

making process where things are documented. (National 4)

Similar to RCQ, there is a view held by national that there is no effort by

senior staff in the organisation to manage poor or non performance.

It‟s the governance structure and that people aren‟t accountable as much as

they should be accountable. (National 5)

We don‟t have a performance culture and we don‟t performance manage

people effectively. We have got both some under-achievers and just some

people doing naughty things... (National 7)

While some consider there is a tendance to avoid confrontation, others view

the avoidance of performance management as a consequence of the power battle that

resides in the divisions. The concept of “a battle” between national and the divisions,

and also between different levels of management in the organisation, emerged and

the context of these “battles”, or fights as previously identified, spanned a number of

different types of issues:


There are no consequences....But for me the bigger problem is that staff here

have never had to conform to guidelines. They have again no consequences

for changing things, creating their own materials in the face of guidelines,

ignoring guidelines and editing their own material. So they just continue to

do it....there aren‟t any consequences. (National 2)

...partly gutlessness. Partly unwillingness to ... I can understand why you

don‟t want to take people on... but everybody is too scared ...You pick your

battles ... (National 3)

The tensions revealed firstly in RCQ and confirmed by NCD staff were

underpinned under an umbrella of pending change of the MFC function in the

organisation. The next section explores their views of change.

Change in Red Cross

The review of the MFC function was being undertaken at the same time as

the other reviews and the shift to nationalisation. Many of the national staff

recognised that this change represented a shift in authority and challenged the

traditional authority of the state EDs. They were comfortable with this challenge and

for many it was something that simply had to happen:

the organisation has been going through a difficult structural time and I don‟t

think all of that is totally bedded down yet... I can understand the difficulties

of people who have had power and have had it taken away. It‟s hard.

(National 3)

the States have run in past years with great autonomy, that shift is very, very

difficult for some. (National 6)

The review of the MFC function in RC was generally supported by national

staff. For some, the challenge was that change was being made in the middle of their

current workload so it was just another thing to do. However there was a shared view


that change is a slow process and has not been well supported in terms of

communication as well as it should have been:

If you actually look down at grassroots level, this [change] is actually

paralysing, disempowering and disruptive to the organisation... You are still

working with the old systems and working with the new systems. So it‟s not

even a case of working with one ... it‟s like working with eight state systems.

And the scope of the task is enormous. Absolutely enormous. (National 6)

We‟re trying to bring the two organisations together and ... it‟s very slow.

We‟ve had a lot of external reviews and work done. We know that the

government wants to see us as one organisation and so really, you‟ve got an

organisation who‟s still coming to grips with that. (National 5)

Most national staff discussed the changes generally in terms of gaining

control, and giving structure and quality to the marketing and communication area.

Given national staff generally felt that the divisions had different priorities, the

reform for them meant they would all have the same priorities. It was a way for them

to bring the states into line with national ways of working. In one example, a

national manager was reflecting on working with a group of communication staff

from a state to resolve an issue, only to find that when they returned to the state, they

did something completely different to what they agreed on:

They go back at a state level, they end up with their parochial hats back on,

not necessarily that‟s because they how they want to proceed but that‟s the

pressure that‟s being exerted from their managers. (National 4)

Change was viewed as a way to address poor skills level, poor capacity, lack

of accountability and poor planning discussed above:

The biggest part of that review really focuses on realigning the whole who

reports to who, who does what, getting consistency of job function. In all

honesty, it will focus on drastically reducing the head count and changing ...


not reducing the net but the current head count because what we‟ve got is a

mismatch of skill sets and heads as opposed to where we need them. So it‟s

really focused on: what are the needs of the business, where is the business

currently focused, where are the gaps, what do we need? And in that, getting

change. (National 5)

National staff recognised that many staff in the organisation felt RC Australia

did not do enough to promote itself, when compared to their competitors who were

doing much more:

every one of them wants to see us more out there because they peg us against

World Visions and Oxfams [competitors] and people like that. In fact World

Vision spend $40 million a year on advertising and we spend nothing...

(National 2)

The lack of spending on campaigns was viewed as a budget resource issue.

For most staff in national office they did not have a role in the interaction between

the board and management on budgets negotiation. One example cited included the

board giving an instruction for better promotion of the brand and for a campaign to

be presented, only to have it not approved with no reason given:

So the Board is saying we want to see you out there. We want you to be

pushing the brand out there. Okay, they have said, “Come back to us. In your

budget, put in campaigns.” We have done that. We developed a campaign.

We have got it there. (discussion here outlining details of campaign –

components of campaign provided here removed for confidentiality)... So this

is pretty contemporary and “out there”. There‟s some really great ideas. The

total budget was $250,000.... we put that to the Board. A quarter of a mil

($250,000) for the whole thing and I just heard yesterday it got cut out of the

budget. So this happens all the time. (National 2)

From a strategic communication perspective, national staff viewed the

changes to MFC structures and the rebranding as a way of refining the brand and the

message. The inward focus previously identified was part of the existing approach to


communication in RC, and this was recognised as needing to be changed to respond

to both the stakeholder and competitive environments:

Our objectives of the day were, and still remain, to be more outward looking

Red Cross, focussing on beneficiaries, people we help, rather than ourselves,

or even volunteers; moving from – we had this really static look and feel, to

something that‟s more dynamic and creating a sense of urgency across our

local brand; contemporising. (National 2)

Views about how RC fits in the competitive landscape were not strongly

expressed. There were shared views reflecting on RC messages, most expressing

concern that they are internal focused and vague or not competing on the same

beneficiary led platforms:

when you have got your competitors, very beneficiary focussed, there‟s

consistency to it, the message is strong; whereas our messages tended to be

about our internal program names and these messages are very strong.

(National 2)

They also shared recognition that the role of the mass media in RC is highly

valued. This is also reflected structurally in the unique position of the national media

director (directly reporting to the CEO and having few direct reports). There was

also recognition that very senior staff and the board measured the effectiveness of

the marketing and communication role based on media success.

like a lot of CEOs, like a lot of senior management, the CEO is very

interested in media and communications and very aware of it. ... it‟s an area

of the organisation that he focuses quite strongly on and he often has very

strong views about stuff... that‟s what most of senior management really

focus on and how they judge you. (National 3)

The only thing that it (senior management) has understood about

communications is media and that‟s the only thing that it typically values....


although all of them [reference to board and senior management] are fairly

hung up on media as the only kind of form of communication that matters.

(National 2)

For current national staff, the Bali crisis was one media event that not only

gave a warning, but it represented a trigger for major organisational change. The Bali

event was part of the folklore of RC and most staff could retell the story of Richard

Carlton from the 60 Minutes program damaging RC‟s reputation and the residual

effects that were felt by all RC staff, donations and the public – both then and

continuing. Staff viewed this as being the moment when RC realised that it needed to

work as one organisation – not six states and two territories (Member 6, Qld). The

trigger of the Bali event translated into the organisation needing to be “different”.

For RC, this was reported as a need to work differently, be more transparent and to

understand why donations were falling and respond. Members viewed this as the

moment when the organisation reflected on itself and learnt that they needed to be

transparent in how funds are distributed and how administration costs are reported.

The Bali event also represented something that they needed to be forever mindful of:

Bali gave the need for the organisation to work differently because of the

reputational damage and the financial damage. Even up to three years ago,

[and] for a period of three years after it, it was still dropping 30 per cent

every time it did any fundraising activity. (National 5)

... two years after Bali – the negativity was still there. That takes a long time

to wash away. (National 6)

...it also took a great deal of my time on the first day after the tsunami

operation appeal was launched to convince journalists that we were a

trustworthy organisation... (National 12)

In summary this section presented stage two of the analysis which presented

the NCD views on the persons, actions and processes relating to the development of

strategic communication in RCQ. The national office set the policy and regulatory


environment around RC and this section explored that dominant coalition mindset.

The next section looks at RCSA as a comparative site for the exploration of these

themes to gain greater understanding of the context of strategic communication in

RC.

Contextualising Case: Red Cross South Australia

The following section presents the final case and ethnography of RCSA.

Presented as Stage 3 of the analysis, the ethnography aims to provide a comparative

site for understanding the knowledge structures that emerged in RCQ and give

context and meaning to these findings. The ethnography further explore the

processes, persons and actions relating to the development of strategic

communication in RCQ (see Figure 28) (Vayda, 1983; Marcus, 1995).

The first part of the ethnography details the entry to RCSA, then moves to

exploring the knowledge structures first introduced in RCQ and themes specific to

the participant‟s world of RCSA and their accepted ways to working. Similar to the

other cases, the account then moves to member views of RC as a brand, then

describes member perceptions of environment before moving to themes related to


Figure 28: Stage 3 level of analysis in the context of the study in Red Cross


Entry to Red Cross South Australia

My encounter with RCSA commenced with an initial email and follow up

phone call with the ED. While very easy to talk with, relevant questions were asked

and answered, with an outcome of being granted access. Further emails negotiated

dates, duration of stay, and an outline of the types of people and activities I wanted

access to. No other communication prior to entry was undertaken.

I entered RCSA on 14 April 2008. I was surprised how similar the building

looked to the RCQ building. It was also a white, low set (two storey) building with

closed in windows and featured the familiar RC signage on the outside. Also like

RCQ, the building was located on the fringe of the central business district, well

serviced by public transport, and very visible on a main transit strip.

The facade of the building featured glass doors, and if you were peeking

inside, the reception desk was visible from the street. It looked modern, clean and

welcoming. On entering the foyer, the receptionist looked quite calm compared to

the RCQ receptionist. Although she was on the phone, she had background music

playing and the reception area featured a large bowl of fruit. I was greeted with a

smile and waited for her to ask who I was seeking. The phones were quieter than in

RCQ. After a few minutes I was warmly greeted by a woman who introduced herself

as the personal assistant to the ED. She advised me that the ED was away but the

general manager of services would see me. She led me through a security door and

upstairs to the EDs‟ office where I was seated in a comfortable chair by a low level

coffee table.

The general manager of services confidently walked into the office and

welcomed me to the organisation. After some informal chatter, she outlined the

profile of the state division and key staff, wanting to know who I wanted to meet

with and speak to so the executive assistant to the ED could organise appointments.

She also suggested I attend a number of key meetings that were coming up in the

next few days. The general manager of services then led me to the MFC area and

introduced me to the manager of the first aid, health and safety department who was

acting general manager of business and corporate development.

The office layout seemed remarkably similar to RCQ. Open plan office


cubicles featured in the middle of the floor space, with glass portioned offices for

senior staff scattered near the windows. RCSA occupied the two floors of the

branded building. Upstairs were finance, emergency, the ED, human resources, MFC

and international humanitarian law (IHL). Downstairs were community services,

Telecross, transport, and Save-A-Mate (SAM). The staff tea room was also

downstairs.

The acting manager of business and corporate development was a corporately

dressed woman in her mid 30s. She was acting in the role because the normal

manager was on holidays. This surprised me because I had negotiated with key staff

dates to travel to South Australia to interview and observe the unit and this was the

first time I was made aware he was taking leave during this time. If I had known this

I would have rescheduled. However, the general manager business and corporate

development agreed to be interviewed off site during his holidays.

The acting manger was sitting in the manager‟s office and appeared quite

busy. She had made a diary note of my arrival. She wanted to know what I was

doing and why I wanted to study RC. In response she told me that she was relatively

new to the organisation and normally sits off site in another building away from the

headquarters. Her work history was both corporate and non profit, as she had

previously held senior corporate roles in both the education sector and for another

first aid training organisation. She then introduced me to individual staff in the unit

as a university researcher doing her PhD on RC. As we walked through the office

area, staff appeared cautious and polite. They were not as openly welcoming as RCQ

staff and few tried to engage in additional conversation.

The individual staff included the two marketing communication staff, the

corporate relations manager and fundraising staff, an international humanitarian law

officer and the retail manager. Unlike RCQ, there was no MFC administration

assistant position. I was then shown a desk space that I could occupy. However, this

was located over the other side of the office, quite a distance from the MFC unit.

This was problematic as I could not hear or see what was going on and there was

little space in the unit to sit without staff feeling I was imposing on their personal

space. Later that afternoon, I requested permission to shadow key staff in the unit,

such as the corporate relations manager and the team leader for marketing and

communication. This positioned me in the middle of the unit, and I assumed that


other staff didn‟t feel like they were being watched.

Ways of working

The structure and responsibility of staff in the MFC unit was configured in a

slightly different way to RCQ. Only the general manager of the unit had an office –

all other staff were accommodated in partitioned cubicles.

The two marketing and communication staff were responsible for all public

relations, media and marketing communications. The senior role was occupied by a

male in his early 50s who had previously held a number of senior journalism based

positions overseas. He viewed himself as “self taught” in the discipline of marketing

communication, as his academic qualifications were in arts-history.

All requests for work came directly to him and he had his own system for

prioritising and pushing back on requests. He also directly liaised with the ED and

other senior managers in the organisation. There were less levels of hierarchy to

negotiate for approvals, and he appeared to have more power and control over his

work. On being introduced I detected from his questions about what I was doing and

needed to achieve during my time in RCSA, that he was familiar with academic

processes and this was later confirmed when I learnt his partner was a highly

accomplished academic in another discipline.

His offsider was a younger female who was a recent graduate. She sat

diagonally opposite him separated by a partition and small walkway. She reported

directly to him and all work was delegated by the team leader. Her main work tasks

were advertising related (mainly HR) with less time spent on marketing

communication collateral.

The corporate relations manager had only recently joined RC. She was

appointed to a newly created position with all of the fundraising team as direct

reports. Her responsibility was to build corporate relationships in RCSA and manage

the fundraising area. A woman in her early 30s, she had come from account

management type roles in a corporate environment. She had a higher tempo of pace

when compared to other staff in the office. She was moving quickly, making phone

calls and shuffling files when I was introduced to her. She welcomed me and said

she was looking forward to speaking with me, and then went back to what she was

doing.


The fundraising area had a team leader, a coordinator, an officer, and donor

development roles. The fundraising staff primarily worked on events such as “Boys

day out” and “Race Day”. The donor development staff worked on nurturing

relationships for bequests. This included public speaking events about RC for

organisations like the Rotary Club and the Lions Club. Most of the fundraising staff

had been with the RC for a number of years. The creation of a new corporate

relations manager position meant that the fundraising team leader now had another

level of management and was no longer “in charge” of the fundraising area.

There were similar themes of views about motivations for working at RC to

RCQ. These included being value driven to help and make a difference. It was also

expressed as a way of having a unique opportunity to do the type of work that only

RC can provide:

Most people would say it makes them feel good [working here]. They are

giving back to the community, while being paid at the same time. A lot of

people believe in what they do. They enjoy that particular job and in some

ways there‟s not – for some of the jobs that they do here, they are quite

unique; that you can‟t go out and do those in an outside world. (MFC 1, SA)

...definitely it‟s the people who want more than just a job because it kind of –

if you take on not-for-profit, it‟s a bit of a lifestyle as well. Especially in the

areas of marketing and fundraising because it‟s different. (MFC 14, SA)

There was less intensity of activity observed in the MFC unit in RCSA. Staff

were chatting among themselves and there appeared to be a level of camaraderie

among the MFC staff. While public and explicit comments of overwork were not as

common as in RCQ, there was a shared view among the team that they were trying

to respond to high workloads with varying levels of perceived support:

We‟ve have had a huge amount brought on us. They [national] are not giving

us the support that we need so it‟s reached to the point where something has

got to give somewhere. ... we just can‟t continue doing what we are doing.

(Exec 3, SA)


The run up...nothing else stops ...there‟s only one person here so the wear and

tear on people.... You don‟t do “that” because you‟re so tired, you can‟t.

(MFC 2, SA)

We are spread very thin and it‟s through no fault of ours. We‟ve been

allowed to take on a lot of stuff... to pull them back and say, okay, this is

what we need to do is very difficult, because we‟re just are run off our feet.

(MFC 10, SA)

The marketing communication team leader appeared autonomous and

empowered to move among the executive team responding to their communication

needs. For example, the team leader interacted directly with the ED developing

messaging and drafting media releases and facilitating sign off. The team leader also

met with other senior managers about a variety of communication needs including

developing news stories for internal RC publications, drafting volunteer profiles, and

drafting service area media releases. MFC staff were also included in strategic level

meetings, their counsel was sought for advice on messaging and media management

(Field notes, 15 April 2008).

There were shared views that in the past, RCSA did not necessarily employ

the right people, however members felt this was changing. While there was some

recognition that the poor pay rates offered by RC attract a lower quality of skills,

there were no shared views specifically about the poor capacity of staff in the MFC

unit. There was a shared view however that staff in RCSA take a lot of care in

employing the right people for the right job, and this was a recent shift in

employment practices. For some this was a shift to a more corporate and accountable

way of working:

It‟s been a culture of just employing – shifting people around; not getting the

right person for the right job necessarily. There‟s a shift now. It still happens,

definitely, but there‟s a stronger shift towards getting the right person for the

right job; possibly paying these people more for their job, too, so you are

getting people with more expertise. (MFC 14, SA)


Staff perceived staff turnover was unusually high in RC. Like RCQ, this

equated to additional stress due to poor systems and process of documentation. The

lack of documentation was recognised as being unusual, however like RCQ, lack of

time was attributed as the main cause. Staff also reflected on the lack of consistency

of processes and procedures in RC:

There is very little written down. I have tried to get procedures and things

started. Everything is in people‟s heads. It‟s something that none of us have

done and I never implemented because there‟s never been the time to sit

there, one, to format the templates and, two, when I started here we had – I

had 16 staff and now I have got five. (MFC 1, SA)

When I first came here years ago I used to drive my boss nuts because there

was absolutely nothing [referring to documentation] and it depended upon

people knowing all the stuff that happened 20 years ago to be able to fit it in.

(MFC 2, SA)

Similar to RCQ views, poor pay, general frustration and disillusionment

were attributed as reasons for staff leaving the organisation. This was seen as an

organisation-wide problem, rather than being specific to one particular state:

Turnover is incredible. Every week there‟s at least somebody‟s job at least

advertised here, Melbourne, Sydney or wherever. I noticed last year every

second email you got was, “Oh, we are saying goodbye to Elizabeth. Mary is

leaving next.” (MFC 3, SA)

Staff recognise that there were two different types of people attracted to

working at RC. Those motivated by the brand and using it as a way to get ahead in

terms of experience. The other type were those who were motivated by the work that

RC did. These people were described as values based and worked for RC even

though they were financially compromised in terms of financial reward. Accepting


lower pay was viewed as a personality type that is attracted to working for a not-for-

profit like RC:

The pays not very good but you don‟t come here for the pay, you come here

for the greater good. (MFC 9, SA)

The organisation has a very high turnover rate probably due to relatively low

rates of pay. People just using it as a stepping stone. Looks good on a CV...

(MFC 6, SA)

... heart driven because at the end of the day we know that we are not

particularly well remunerated. We know that people are here to a great extent

because they choose to be, they want to be, because of the values. (Exec 4,

SA)

RC don‟t provide high salaries. The reason you have got people here is

because of what they know about the organisation. They are prepared to take

that drop in salary. (MFC 11, SA)

Views about capacity of staff and managing performance in RCSA were

similar to RCQ in terms of accountability, however there were no clear views about

performance management. Executive staff felt they responded effectively to poor

performance, although they recognised it was challenging, but they felt supported in

this role:

most of the executive team are not afraid to performance manage. To sit

down and talk about how they‟re seeing it and how a person‟s seeing it, how

can we help. And setting some performance management goals if you like.

...And if we‟re working around bad behaviour and accepting it, the morale of

the place just drops. And it‟s tough to have the hard conversations but it‟s a

sign of a good leader. ... [there is] support [for] the executive members and

the team leaders to have those conversations. (Exec 2, SA)


Less senior staff however did not share this view and expressed concern that

staff were allowed to get away with poor performance. Like RCQ they viewed

accountability in the organisation as lacking:

I don‟t think anyone has been held accountable in the past. That‟ what my

team is struggling with because it‟s going to be accountability at all levels...I

feel people are reluctant to being accountable. (MFC 14, SA)

I would say at the present time it‟s [accountability] probably a little lacking

but that‟s about to change because of the national focus that the organisation

has. I believe that there‟s going to be a lot more accountability in the future.

(MFC 6, SA)

Tolerance of errors and concerns about consequences were not viewed by

staff as a concern. Senior staff who had been in the organisation for some time

reflected on what happened in the past, but current practice was described more as

using tolerance and a focus on learning when dealing with staff mistake making.

Less senior staff shared this view as simply a learning opportunity:

In the past, if something had gone wrong, they would have been absolutely

come down on like a tonne of bricks. Whereas my approach is, “what was it

that we tried to achieve?” At the end the day if you make the mistake for the

right reasons or something doesn't work – as long as there‟s nothing

malicious about it. It would be a problem if the same thing happened next

year, but I‟m not going to batter you around. (Exec 3, SA)

There was also a view that RC was an organisation in which it was easy to

get a job. The consequences of this mindset translated to a perception that MFC staff

were of a lower capacity that industry standards. However while there was little

foundation to this in reality, staff who demonstrated high capacity were reported to

get frustrated and leave. It was also suggested that people left RC because their

expectations of what it was like to work there were not met:


But then we don‟t deliver necessarily what they [young people] expect and

that‟s part of that disconnect brand thing. And then there are those that we

inherit and couldn‟t get a job anywhere else. There are the good people that

come, they are frustrated guys. So what you tend to get left with is the ones

that are quite happy with the status quo and all the rest of it. (Exec 3, SA)

Similar to RCQ and views in national office, lack of planning was

acknowledged as a way of working, and this was attributed to fundamentally a lack

of time and poor skill sets. There was also a view expressed that this was not a

sustainable way of working and needed to change:

I am the first to put my hand up to say, “Yes, it [planning] should have been

done,” but we just didn‟t have the people or the skill set necessarily to be

doing it [planning] ... (Exec 3, SA)

they‟ve got it this far and maybe this is the part of the change.... It‟s like

being in a wind tunnel. You come in some mornings and you feel like you‟ve

been, by two hours later, you‟ve been flattened. Just by sheer volume. By no

planning. By everybody wanting everything. By nobody being able to

prioritise. (MFC 2, SA)

While documentation and planning in RCSA was not highly prioritised, staff

recognised the importance of these types of activities, workloads and other more

immediate priorities were claimed to prevent staff from this:

because people get busy, people get distracted doing other things, people‟s

priorities change, which all relates back to we need to get our strategic intent

right. (Exec 7, SA)

The lack of opportunities to plan meant that staff relied on what was familiar

in their need to be strategic in communication and actions. Views of being strategic

in RC reflected an organisation doing things the same way. Similar to RCQ there

was a shared view that RC tended to be set in its ways, following what was familiar.


we‟ve done it this way for so long ... (MFC 2, SA)

For some members, this was due to the organisation lacking direction, for

others it was because they knew no other way. The way of working was used to

describe many areas in the organisation, for example, going for grants and changing

services to fit the need of the funding, to changing work priorities to meet the needs

of a branch:

It‟s an embedded practice. It‟s a cultural thing, which has been there for a

while. It‟s just always been there, perhaps we have never been clear on where

we want to put our dollars. So when something goes up, we go for it, grab it,

because our strategic intent hasn‟t been right, haven‟t been clear on that.

(Exec 7, SA)

Evaluation of communication programs in RCSA was viewed as ad hoc and

informally judged. While evaluation was not a strong topic generally discussed or

observed, views that were expressed acknowledged that evaluation needed to

respond to the fluidity or lack of structure of programs and performance:

Success is judged on how many boxes we tick and what was in the plan, not

necessarily whether they are working, and do we need to adjust it, do we

need to change it? (Exec 3, SA)

While collaboration and conversations were identified as a decision-making

process in RCSA, unlike RCQ it was not framed as a way of sharing risk. It was

viewed as a way of being inclusive and following a social services framework. While

this was recognised as a way of working in RCSA, staff also expressed concern that

this may not be the most efficient or effective way of working:

it‟s like the United Nations... See that‟s the problem is that there‟s too much

consultation so nothing gets done. (MFC 2, SA)


It‟s probably not a culture of quick change. Very much a discuss/debate.

(MFC 13, SA)

Decisions have become more of a consultative process. .... There are times

when there‟s probably too much consultation on some issues before they

reach a decision. (Exec 7, SA)

The need to consult and discuss was also reflected in a need to be flexible

and fluid. Like RCQ, RCSA expressed similar views about fluid or ad hoc ways of

working and a connection to being a crisis organisation:

A lot of the ad hoc nature is because of the heart decision thing, the values

based decision making .... People like crisis. When things settle and become

easier, they need a new crisis. (Exec 4, SA)

The fundamental principles were highly regarded in RCSA, which was a

contrast to shared views about the principles in RCQ and National office. The

principles were viewed as valuable, empowering and instructive for daily work

practices:

They [the principles] are very important. The organisation couldn‟t operate

without them. They help the organisation to do its job, absolutely, otherwise

the organisation wouldn‟t still be here after 140-odd years, if they hadn‟t

been important. (MFC 6, SA)

The seven principles allow me to make a decision, an honest decision, an

unbiased decision and it keeps me out of the community politics. (Exec 6,

SA)

It‟s not how you or I may handle things in our personal life, but when you

represent the organisation ... you have to stick within the fundamental

principles of what‟s right and what‟s wrong. It doesn‟t mean you agree with

everything all the time. (MFC 4, SA)


While staff viewed the principles as being highly instructive and a valuable

resource when responding to external audiences, they also expressed a view that

other staff in RC use them as an excuse for inaction:

Some can use them as an excuse for not acting. And they hide behind them ...

In some other states at times, “We don‟t go for government money because

of our independence”. Well, that‟s not what independence means. (Exec 2,

SA)

Staff viewed RCSA as a value driven organisation which was unique or

different to other states, particularly RCQ. There was a view that RCQ was laissez-

faire in its management approach, meaning they viewed RCQ as greater risk takers

and more corporate in their approach. RCSA, on the other hand, was primarily

driven by a values framework. They viewed themselves as being more concerned

with the needs of their stakeholders and clients. They viewed their decisions as being

more considerate of their needs, rather than the organisation‟s needs:

the organisation understands that it needs to get more efficient and all of

those sorts of things but it‟s still value driven. It is a heart driven

organisation. So it will always have that interesting tension. (Exec 4, SA)

Views about becoming more corporate as a way of working emerged when

staff reflected on what the organisation “used to be like” or what it was changing to

become. For newer staff it was expressed as a tension over values-based thinking and

decision making versus business like thinking or decision making. In RCQ this was

expressed as a creative versus a product-driven way of working. In national it was

also found as a way of needing to shift or change for more accountability and

efficiency. What is being described here is expressed as the challenge of corporate

versus non corporate as a way of working:

there‟s a mindset, coming from a commercial world into not-for-profit ... It‟s

just a different mindset. (MFC 13, SA)


Seeing it more as a business, not the fluffy, soft, charity. The savvier ones are

employing the right people, possibly from corporate background, which I

had. You are bringing the contacts and the business sense and understanding

the fundamentals, the sponsorship, marketing and media. (MFC 14, SA)

Similar to RCQ, the role and influence of the ED was observable. The

executive team in RCSA described themselves with teams such as a “cohesive

group” (Exec 7), and having “trusting” relationships (Exec 6). Staff also viewed the

leadership team as approachable, supportive and willing to tolerate risk or error:

what I like... is (they‟ll) listen, and say “Oh, yeah, okay, that‟s good. What do

you think about this?” ... So you get an audience. You get listened to ... so it‟s

that kind of leadership, that‟s what keeps people here. (MFC 2, SA)

I‟ve had a lot of support particularly from the ED (name). Having the support

at that level and having trust of what you‟re doing and being allowed to take

positive risks and know that we‟ll get it wrong from time to time but it‟s

about taking those risks to try and develop a service delivery that‟s going to

meet the needs of the community. (Exec 6, SA)

RCSA viewed the national change as something that was happening and staff

shared a view they were working hard to be compliant to respond to the

nationalisation effort. They acknowledged that change was needed as the changes

aimed to bring much needed efficiencies to RC needed. However like RCQ, RCSA

staff considered South Australia as having unique or special needs:

What we have seen in some areas is very much a one size fits all approach,

which doesn‟t work. It‟s peculiar here. It‟s a very peculiar sort of market. The

areas where we have been given flexibility, that‟s fine. ...When it gets to us,

it‟s very much the square peg trying to fit in a round hole ... (Exec 3, SA)


The change was heralded as the shift from the old RC to the new RC. For

some this was comforting, knowing the organisation was becoming more

contemporary and more equipped to survive in the modern world:

there‟s change on the way ... huge amount of change. Culturally it‟s not the

same old Red Cross which, frankly, if they‟re going to survive needs to be

...For me it would be remaining relevant because the base is changing. We‟re

not knitting socks for people all the time. We‟re not selling lamingtons.

We‟re not supporting the boys in the war. We‟re trying to find where we‟re

relevant. (MFC 2, SA)

It‟s [change] got to happen because if we are going to focus on what we are

here for we‟ve got to drop the clutter. Give it back to where it belongs. And

that, I have a sense, will give Red Cross a stronger profile. (Exec 2, SA)

How external audiences perceive RC emerged as consistent around themes of

traditional, respected and trusted. Tradition was viewed as an important part of

informing ways of working “.. there‟s an amazing culture of that. Like, “This is the

way it's always been done.” (MFC 14, SA). While used to describe ways of working,

it was also used to describe the climate of RC as being an old fashioned place:

in lots of ways a lot of the people here are kind of old-fashioned. You don‟t

know how to put that another way. I haven‟t really thought it through, I

suppose. Maybe it‟s because we have quite a large core of volunteers and a

lot of our volunteers are older; that they have some old-fashioned notions.

(Exec 4, SA)

There were tensions observed as staff tried to express their views of

balancing the modern new RC that needed to emerge with the old ways of RC, those

ways that represent what RC used to be like. Branches and members were viewed as

being an integral part of the traditions of RC. This was viewed as a way of working

and was also viewed as something that strongly influenced public perceptions of RC.


However staff also recognised the model that RC has traditionally operated under

has changed, due to changing social environment:

Our membership ... They are a very ageing base of support. Quite

opinionated. They are very much of the old Red Cross. ...They engaged with

the organisation predominantly through times of war. ... The organisation

itself is essentially the same organisation. It‟s just the vulnerable groups that

we are working with has changed... It is a model that worked 50, 40, 30 years

ago when people had more time. (Exec 3 SA)

Staff viewed the brand of RC as being highly respected and trusted, built on

RC being born out of the war and being associated with relief efforts, disasters, and

just simply being in places where people need help:

Respected... a respected organisation, what we do is relevant and done well.

(MFC 11, SA)

There was a level of frustration expressed by staff about the loss of

opportunity for RC. The recognition that RC brand was one of the most recognised,

trusted brands, but RC failed to capitalise on that position. This was viewed as being

an outcome of the age of the organisation as it was constrained by its traditions,

blinded by its age:

We have got one of the most exciting brands in the world, we could do so

much with and I can do nothing, nothing, because I am so restricted with

what I can and can‟t do. (MFC 10, SA)

It‟s supposed to be one of the biggest in the world. People who work within

are not looking to the future. We have this ageing population, as far as our

branches, for a long, long time. A lot of our branch ladies are [in their] 70s

and 80s. (MFC 3, SA)


A very strong view shared by staff was that RC does valuable work and more

people should know about it. RC was recognised as being known for its blood

services work, and similar to RCQ, staff expressed very strong levels of frustration

that people did not know about the scope and types of other services the organisation

provided. In addition, the association of RC with elderly volunteers and second hand

retail stores was concerning as they felt it undermined the public‟s perceptions of the

nature and scope of work actually done by RC:

The profile of the Red Cross is pretty appalling. We don‟t have, other than

bad media, I don‟t see us being very proactive in getting our messages out

there to highlight to people in South Australia what the Red Cross does

because I don‟t think people know, other than the blood bank and

emergencies internationally. (MFC 10, SA)

We have got a lot of work to do communicating what we do and what are our

core functions. What we do isn‟t well-known. (Exec 7, SA)

Everybody knows about the blood service... the perception would be that we

are an employer that is a pseudo-health medical realm, instead of being a

whole raft of community services... the quality of the information is good.

It‟s just not out there, wide enough. Why not? I don‟t know. (Exec 4, SA)

The lack of capitalisation on the brand was equated to lost opportunities to

leverage fundraising and corporate support:

... when you are up against big charities, who spend millions on corporate, on

advertising and things, and then get the corporates behind them, we are never

going to get that until you spend. To me, you have got to spend a dollar to

make a dollar. Initially, we need to get our message out there and we just

don‟t. (MFC 1, SA)


the way that Red Cross advertises... it doesn‟t, basically. That was the one

thing that surprised me coming to Red Cross; that it does so many things for

so many people. (MFC 2, SA)

The rationale behind the lack of promotion of RC‟s achievements was

strongly held to be due to views that the organisation was “Red Cross”; that it didn‟t

need to promote what it did as people instinctively knew. This was described as just

the way RC is, attributed to age, arrogance and being out of touch:

We are inclined to pat ourselves on the back, get involved in, slapping

ourselves on the back. But we are not really getting the message out there to

the right sort of people. (Exec 5, SA)

We need to move into the 21st century. We‟re behind the eight ball. .. We

don‟t utilise it. We don‟t shake our own flag. We don‟t promote ourselves.

We don‟t have an advertising campaign.... we don‟t promote ourselves and

when you look at Red Cross‟s history, it‟s about the war. The war was 50

years ago. Those people are old.... I‟ve been told it is the Geneva way. ... it‟s

being humble. But, you see, unfortunately humble doesn‟t cut it these days.

(MFC 3, SA)

Some staff also viewed the principles as being a constraint on strategic

communication opportunities, as a further reinforcement of a way of working at RC.

This meant that relying on the principles and the RC way of doing things meant they

missed opportunities to show external audiences the types of work being undertaken

by RC:

That‟s the culture of just being neutral, staying in the background, not

making a big song and dance. That‟s just an organisational thing. We are

probably not the first to step up onto the stage and wave the flag and say,

“Aren't we fantastic?” ... We are probably not big at letting the world know

what we do. (MFC 13, SA)


One of the core concerns expressed by staff was about communicating the

level and complexity of the services that are provided. This was balanced with

concerns that it might actually create greater demands on the services and staff.

There was also a shared view that RC was trying to do too much, trying to provide

too many services to too many people, resulting in an organisation that had left itself

spread far too thin:

Unfortunately, we have a plethora of services and it‟s very difficult to go out

to the public, telling them about all of these multitude of services that we

have got, because people can usually only absorb two/three messages at one

time. (MFC 6, SA)

We‟re trying to do too much. We‟re spread so thin and that‟s not just in

South Australia ... You name it, we‟re doing it. That‟s ridiculous. You cannot

spread yourself that thin and do anything particularly well. (Exec 2, SA)

There was also a shared view that RC tends to focus much more on internal

audiences rather than external audiences. While the same power relationships were

not found to exist in RCSA as they did in RCQ, staff found the internal focus

reflected in ways of working and influenced a lack of responsiveness to external

audience needs:

[Red Cross is] absolutely obsessed with itself. I mean that in the nicest

possible way. I love the organisation but if it spent more time looking

outwards. The brand is a classic example of that. ... What we often end up

having to do is make whatever it is we are doing, keep what we have got

rather than say, “What do we need? Let‟s actually develop something.” ....

It‟s internal, purely internal. (Exec 3, SA)

The internal focus also translated to a lack of environmental scanning.

Similar to RCQ, more senior staff facilitated environmental scanning through

memberships to networking groups and participation in government working parties.

Individual staff read newspapers and internalised environmental information.


Discussion of themes relevant to RCSA was presented informally at senior staff

meetings, but like RCQ, there was no observable systems or tracking of stakeholder

sentiments or concerns:

It‟s very, very difficult to keep looking outside what‟s going on with the day-

to-day. A lot of us try to get out and about as much as we have, but our

ability to actually respond to anything we are seeing is severely limited.

(Exec 3, SA)

Overall there was a reflection by staff that although environmental scanning

was recognised as important, due to the nature of the workload, the lack of resources,

and a lack of value placed on systematising, it was not formally done. The next

section will now explore member views about strategic communication in RCSA,

focusing on their role and contribution to the function.

Strategic Communication in Red Cross South Australia

Views about strategic communication in RCSA varied among members with

shared views expressing concern about the impact of the internal focus of the

organisation on communicating with audiences and the new branding:

The downfall is that we don‟t communicate. We don‟t communicate well

externally. We communicate really well internally. For example, when the

new branding was launched ... We‟re hearing about all this. What about

everybody out there? They don‟t get to see this. We need to communicate

that out there. (Exec 8, SA)

Some staff viewed the organisation as not using communication channels,

like the media, correctly while others viewed the organisation as following an old

way of doing things – or doing marketing and communication the same way as it has

always done:


the profile of the Red Cross here is pretty appalling. Other than bad media,

we are not in it [the media]. I don't see us being very proactive in getting our

messages out there... and everyone here thinks that is okay. (MFC 6, SA)

Competitors were often held to be doing it better, smarter or with more

effectiveness. Members felt RC was not sophisticated in their communication efforts

and were constantly being compared to organisations that members felt were getting

it right, like World Vision, and the Salvation Army:

Red Cross target seniors and young people, don‟t do a heck of a lot in

between...Salvation Army have got a far longer tradition of giving in that

regard than we have. But they are clever in the fact that they have four core

areas which they ask people for money for and that‟s basically the homeless,

people who are affected by alcohol or drugs and generally the disadvantaged

and the wayward. Most people would think, well, charity begins at home and

they have the same message and that‟s been pumped out since 1932, when

they first started down that path. Whereas Red Cross really haven‟t. (MFC 6,

SA)

RC‟s purposeful communication with its key audiences was viewed as

selective. While most staff recognised two key audiences of youth and seniors as

general demographic groups, there was a shared view that other audiences were not

attended to. Campaigns were viewed as not only a way to reach key audiences, but

as a way to reinvigorate the ageing membership and volunteers, and reposition the

organisation away from being known as an old organisation:

in terms of attracting young people is that we [Red Cross] are not seen to be

... we don‟t engage actively in campaign work. We don‟t join campaigns,

because of our mandate. It‟s a double-edged sword. (MFC 11, SA)

While views were shared around traditions, views expressed about a different

type of tradition, the Bali crisis, were shared in RCSA as a watershed event in RC‟s


history. Staff in RCSA viewed the Bali crisis as one that significantly damaged RC‟s

reputation and it continues to influence organisational behaviours:

we got really, really damaged through the Bali stuff. Really. And we still hear

about that and we still, we still wear that. We learnt so much from that and,

I‟ve got to say now, that our expertise and capability nationally, that we are

able to draw on, is absolutely sensational. (Exec 2, SA)

For some members, the Bali crisis continues to be used to explain

organisational behaviours, particularly in terms of decision making by national

management:

(name) is frightened of the Martine Letts and Richard Carlton‟s (60 Minutes)

episode [Bali incident] and everybody has been told that there‟s only three

people that can make any communication to the media. .... that‟s fair enough,

but none of them are what I would call charismatic people, who have the

ability to get out there and grab people, in an emotive way. (MFC 6, SA)

Bali was viewed as the cause of organisational change. It remains as a legend

within RC, a moment recalled through storytelling where RC realised it needed to

get serious about managing its reputation and its responses in the media. As a result

of Bali, RC employed more skilled communicators and introduced policy to prevent

the causes of the Bali crisis from happening again. However for MFC members, they

do not wish for another Bali crisis, but they hold a view that approaches to managing

strategic communication does need to change. Familiar ways of working and a

reluctance to do it differently emerged as a shared view of strategic communication

in RC:

We‟ve done [communication] this way for so long. We could achieve so

much more. Things are not linked. The sponsorship is not linked in. the

marketing, the fundraising is not linked. I don‟t know if it‟s inexperience or

just the sheer effort of trying to do everything or not knowing where you‟re

going. Wandering in the desert. Doing what people come in and say “This is


a good idea. Today‟s good idea is that blah blah.” I would just like to see

[communication as ] strategically driven so that you can say “Do this one, do

that one ... And do that one next year”. (MFC 2, SA)

There was no clear way forward expressed by members to overcome this, just

an acknowledgement that this is what happens.

Summary

The ethnography of RCQ commenced in the focal site of the MFC unit in

RCQ and moved to the executive team to discover their views of the organisation

displayed through the displayed emergent knowledge structures. These structures

worked to influence meaning and understanding in the group.

To deepen understanding of the RCQ site, the analysis then shifted to the

policy framework of the NCD and provided context of the regulatory environment

and the organisational frameworks that RCQ members were required to operate

within. In a final step of analysis, the focus shifted again to a comparative divisional

setting, RCSA, and participants‟ views were provided for both comparative and

contextual understanding of the social ecology of RCQ participants.

Analysis revealed that while common cognitive knowledge structures were

present across the three settings as would be expected in organisational culture, RCQ

presented variation from the other two sites. These three cases and levels of analysis

contribute to building an understanding of their world from which to build an

interpretation for the role of cultural criteria presented in Chapter 6.

Chapter 5 has presented the ethnographic account of RCQ. Following the

tenets of Vayda (1983) and Marcus (1995), the account has followed and explored

the shared cognitive knowledge structures as they have emerged from the group in

RCQ. The narrative has moved through three stages of analysis to follow emergent

member views of their world as it related to strategic communication, and gain

deeper contextual understanding in their role as influencing strategic communication

in the organisation.

The following chapter will identify cultural criteria as in operates in the

selection process and identify the influence of cultural selection on strategic

communication that is the purposeful use of communication by an organisation to


fulfil its mission (Hallahan et al., 2007) in RCQ. I return to the main research

questions driving this study to explore the major processes of developing strategic

communication and identify cultural process that lead to how significant cultural

selection criteria are in influencing the development of strategic communication.

Chapter 6: Cultural Selection 270

Chapter 6

Cultural Selection and Strategic Communication

In this chapter, I systematically link the ethnographic details of Chapter 5

with the primary research problem of this study- to explore the role of cultural

selection in the development of strategic communication. The imperative of this

problem area is driven by the perspective that an organisation‟s strategic

communication is crucial to efforts to adapt to its social environment, including

public and stakeholder opinion systems. These factors situate this study in the social

ecology domain of organisations and will be discussed in relation to the

ethnographic details.

Through using the technique of progressive contextualisation, Chapter 5

presented three cases to build an understanding of basic cultural features of RCQ. In

this chapter, I build on the description of cultural knowledge structures to identify

cultural criteria as they operate in the selection process of organizing (as

characterised by Weick (1969, 1979)) at RCQ. Specifically, this chapter aims to

explore the action of the identified cultural selection criteria in the development of

strategic communication at RCQ.

The goal of this chapter is to provide analysis that moves from the cultural

knowledge structures operating within RCQ set out in Chapter 5, to describe how

such structures eventually act as „cultural selection criteria‟ during the development

of strategic communication at RC. The analysis of the ethnography presented in this

chapter provides a foundation for conclusions about the influence of cultural

selection criteria on the social ecology of organisations presented in the final part of

the chapter.

This chapter is structured to respond to the five research questions guiding

this study:

RQ 1: When culture is a system of social knowledge, what is the role of

cultural selection in the development and maintenance of that system?



RQ 3: How does cultural selection operate in RCQ?


communication in RCQ?

RQ 5: What is the role of culturally derived strategic communication in the

social ecology of organisations?

To achieve the goals of this chapter, first the literature on cultural selection is

revisited using Durham‟s (1991) cultural properties to identify how cultural

knowledge structures can operate as a series of selection criteria. Then, I identify and

frame the action of selection criteria in RCQ. Next, the influence of individual

selection criteria in the development of aspects of strategic communication at RC is

explored. Finally, I discuss how the selection criteria collectively influence the

development of strategic communication at RCQ (see Figure 29 for overview of

chapter).



Research Question 1: Cultural Systems and Cultural

Selection

In this section of the chapter, I address the first research question; when

culture is a system of social knowledge, what is the role of cultural selection in the

development and maintenance of that cultural system? The context for this first

question is provided by revisiting the concept of culture as a system of social

knowledge as this provides a crucial context for understanding more broadly the

research problem of this study.

Culture exists as a system of shared ideas, rules, and meanings, expressed in

the way humans live and socially transmitted over time (Bates, 2001; Durham, 1991;

Geertz, 1973; Keesing, 1981; Keyton, 2005). Following anthropological traditions,

culture was found to shape RCQ group members‟ behaviour and provide direction in

their work (Durham, 1991; Milton, 1996; Norlin, et al., 2003). As a system of social

knowledge, culture offers connectedness and coherence in ideational dimensions of

how they went about doing things (LeVine, 1984). This meant culture organised

internal processes, gave direction to what the group valued, and acted as an

instructional role for the group in their effort to not only see what is in the social

environment, but also gave a rationale for what they did in terms of their behaviours

(Hahn, 1995). Overall, the RCQ cultural system represented the groups‟

conceptualisation of how to operate in their environment.

The transmission, creation and maintenance of cultural information within

RCQ‟s cultural system, emerged out of social interaction among members of the

group. Durham (1991) contends for information to be considered as cultural, it must

be socially learned. The maintenance of the cultural system is dependent on the

group‟s collective efforts to sustain it through the ongoing adoption of the cultural

information that comprised ideational cognitive, structural, and symbolic

components (Keesing, 1974).

Durham (1991) defines cultural selection as the selective social transmission

of cultural units through human decision making. Cultural selection is an outcome of

human decision making and brings the role of human beings as decision makers into

focus (Durham, 1991). Cultural selection offered a way for the cultural system

operating at RCQ to maintain and sustain itself within their overall cultural


knowledge system. The units of culture found in RCQ were displayed at the first

level of analysis as knowledge structures operating within the group (see Figure 26)

and at the second level of analysis as collective cultural schemas operating within the

organisation (see Figure 31).

The RCQ cultural system operated as connected cognitive structures or

schemas to help members understand and attribute meaning to events (Sackmann,

1991). Cultural schemas serve as frames of reference for action, understanding, and

perception (Weick, 1979) to simplify cognition (Di Maggio, 1997). Schemas respond

to the complexities of culture and are used as a foundation for identifying and

classifying cultural items (D'Andrade, 2001). The instructional role of culture as

shared knowledge structures acts as criteria for categorizing, decision making,

preferences, action and performance skills (Goodenough, 2003).

Five dominant schema were found to be operating in RCQ and represented

within the knowledge structures described in Chapter 5. Cultural selection allowed

members in RCQ to be “situated in” and interact with their environment through

negotiated meanings (Milton, 1996). It is this key theoretical claim that set the

foundation for the exploration of the interaction through strategic communication.

While cultural systems are created, shaped and constrained by individual minds, it is

the shared, collective knowledge system and the resulting behaviours of the group

that dictate how sustainable the group, and cultural system, is in its social

environment (Keesing, 1974).

Durham (1991) argues cultural selection influences the capacity for change

within the cultural system through self-selection. Self-selection of cultural units or

memes operate at this level of significance because they constrain the amount of

variation that is available to meet adaptive challenges.

Self-selection is a term used to describe the influence of cultural elements on

the human decision-making system that can occur through free choice or imposition

(Durham, 1991). Regardless of choice or imposition, members evaluate the possible

variants according to their consequences (Durham, 1991). Cultural variants act to

bias change toward their environment so that the change “fits” within the “existing

web of local meanings” (Durham, 1992, p. 204). Evaluation of consequences by

members can be based on actual experience from previously applying the criteria,

with the consequences of different options. This allows a cross matrix of association


with consequences from similar types of decisions. The second way is

experimentation or pretesting of anticipated consequences. The selection of a

cultural unit or meme, Durham (1991) argues, is dependent on cultural fitness. As

memes are selected by carriers based on their consequences, disadvantageous memes

may be eliminated through judgements about consequences (Durham, 1991).

Subsequently, memes may also be adopted and consequently reinforced at a

subconscious level, cementing their place as an accepted cultural way (Durham,

1991). This condition sets the context of cultural selection preserving the unique

features of the group of RCQ.

This study has addressed the first research question by establishing that the

role of cultural selection in a cultural system can be acknowledged, in part, by

identifying the instructional role of cultural selection on shaping the cultural system.

Given the claim by public relations that strategic communication is a core function

of their role to manage the organisation-environment relationship (i.e. its social

ecology) (Cutlip, et al., 2006; Everett, 2001), the theoretical imperative emerging

from culture as shared social knowledge recognises the centrality of organisational

culture to RCQ‟s efforts to adapt to its social environment with strategic

communication.

Cultural selection is premised on people within a group making decisions

based on comparing and choosing among options and basing their evaluations on

estimates of the consequences and alternatives (Durham, 1991). Within a group,

decision making governed by cultural values, or the relative appeal to persons in a

position to choose or impose choices, can be considered as functioning in a similar

way as forces that act on variation in any evolutionary system whether organisational

or organic (Durham, 1992). In these terms, cultural selection criteria constitute a key

(but not exclusive) means of evolutionary change (Everett, 1994, 2001).

It is during collective (or social) process where cultural material is influential

in the selection process (Everett, 2002) supporting Weick‟s (1979) notion that

selection pressures in organisations are the outcome of “schemes of interpretation

and specific interpretations” (p. 131). That is, given what is postulated about the

influence of cultural selection on the cultural knowledge system of groups, we

expect to see greater variation between groups in a population over time as a result

of the action of cultural selection within groups. Cultural selection‟s role in a system


of social knowledge is that it acts to instruct, sustain and maintain the system

through the selection of cultural information that has a tightness of fit and alignment

with the group‟s judgements. This selection is also based on an assessment of

consequences for the group.

Research Question 2: Cultural Selection in Organizing

The second research question asks how cultural selection operates in

organizing. Organizing is theoretically important to this study because it represents a

set of collective activities that act to instruct members for action. Weick (1979) states

“organizing involves shared recipes for building, and it involves arranging processes

to cope with the equivocal nature of streams of experience” (p. 47). Organizing also

responds to Keesing‟s (1974) view of ideational cultural systems as a system of

knowledge “shaped and constrained by the way the human brain acquires, organizes

and processes information and creates „internal models of reality‟” ( p. 89, citing

Gregory, 1969).

Organizing provides order to social behaviours and actions of members

through rules, processes and procedures (Weick, 1979). The aim of organizing is to

reduce equivocality through achieving consensus of meaning by organisational

members. The shared nature of building these recipes for action (about agreement of

what is out there) (Weick, 1979), has implications for the role of cultural selection.

Selection is the most significant process at the organisational level of analysis

in Weick‟s sociocultural model of organizing (Everett, 2002; Weick, 1979). The

focus of this study explored the role of cultural criteria acting on selection processes.

According to Weick (1969), organisational members actively select or dismiss

equivocal raw material (data) during selection and impose meaning on the selected

data to produce a meaningful (unequivocal) enacted environment (Kreps, 2006).

Activity during selection assembles the collective experience of the organisation to

shape the display from enactment. During the process of selection, criteria are

developed and sustained collectively by organisational members (Weick 1969). The

individual statements in the enactment pool are translated by passing through a

filtering of the selection criteria (Weick, 1969). The action of selection processes

filter information through members‟ perceptions that alter information upon which


people act (Aldrich, 1999), and collectively organisational members apply rules and

cycles as schemas of interpretation to attempt to reduce equivocality (Kreps, 1990;

Weick, 1979). Weick (1979) recognises schemas direct action and have an effect of

mediating or “bracketing portions of experience” (p. 154). Once sorted for

acceptability by the selection criteria, schemas then constitute an important set of

criteria that drive the selection process in organizing.

Everett (2003) identifies that individual knowledge structures held by

organisational members are expressed as assertions or statements about the

organisation that when joined, form causal maps or cultural schema expressed in the

form of beliefs, values and perceptions. Cultural schema act as frames to give

meaning and coherence to individual knowledge structures (Everett, 1994, 2003;

Spiro, Kilborne, & Langness, 2003), and are fundamental to identifying systems of

cultural selection operating in the selection process (Everett, 2003).

Cultural selection operates when cultural criteria are employed during the

selection process of organizing to act on the variation that is present from enactment

cycles (i.e. the work of environmental interpretation by organisational members).

Within the selection process, cultural criteria acting through shared social knowledge

structures act as cultural selection to influence the choices made by groups according

to the fitness or consequence of the cultural unit. Given that influence within the

RCQ group, over time the action of cultural selection criteria created increasing

variation when compared to other RC organisations such as RCSA. The variation

was evident in how RCQ members viewed, interpreted, understood, and reacted to

environmental equivocality or change. Given the evidence found, cultural selection,

over time, would continue to produce increasingly substantive differences between

the two groups even though they continue to face similar environmental challenges.

So this approach can refine Weick‟s (1979) notion that the creation of causal maps

from past organisational experiences create “templates” to guide interpretations of

equivocal information. In the terms of the CSSC model, the mechanism that creates

these templates is the action of cultural selection in organizing. Figure 30 illustrates

the action of cultural selection operating within the terms of Weick‟s model.


Figure 30: The action of cultural selection operating in Weick’s (1969, 1979)

sociocultural model of organizing

Following Everett‟s (2003) claim that a hierarchy of cognitive salience

establishes the significance of the selection system operating in the selection process

of organizing, the contribution of this study is that cultural selection acting in the

organizing process sustains or preserves the group (and its way of working) over

time. This means that this study, in effect, explores organisational culture as an

important inertial force (see Hannan & Freeman, 1989). Decision making based on

the recipe for responding to enacted materials will be strongly influenced by the

cultural values of that group, for example, what is appealing or how appropriate (the

fitness) of the selected values. This means that differences will emerge among

groups over time who face the same environmental challenges based on their

decision making influenced by secondary (cultural) values systems by both choice

(freedom to make a decision) or imposition (the decision is imposed by a higher

authority‟s decision).


Research question 3: Cultural Selection Criteria Operating in


Research question 3 asks how does cultural selection operate in RCQ? I

analyse the action of cultural selection to provide a foundation for understanding the

operation of cultural selection criteria operating on the knowledge structures within

RCQ. Criteria operating at RCQ are presented as cultural knowledge structures to

reflect participant hypothesis or beliefs about the information (Everett, 2003; Pace,

1988). Five schemas were identified to provide structure to the cultural propositions

operating at RCQ. The schema operate to organise criteria into a coherent cultural

system and thus represent tightly coupled knowledge structures that meet Durham‟s

(1991) classification of cultural units, being historically present over time, socially

transmitted, and used in a way to guide behaviours.

Cultural schema depicted in Figure 31 operate to organise other cultural

knowledge structures into a coherent selection system, and therefore are fundamental

to identification of a cultural selection system operating in the selection process

(Everett, 2003). The five schemas were developed to depict core themes of coherent

knowledge systems that were found to collectively act as criteria to guide selection

in the selection process. According to Durham (1991), these units are learned and

shared systems of knowledge and beliefs, and are socially transmitted over time.

These are criteria have been labelled and coloured to illustrate the five

coherent systems: criteria around avoiding blame; criteria around tolerance; criteria

around internal focus; criteria around being iconic, and finally, criteria around being

flexible and fluid. Selection criteria were identified as units that are socially

transmitted, had historical presence, and acted to inform or guide behaviour

(Durham, 1991).The colours correspond to the knowledge structures presented in

Figure 26 and detailed in Table 10.


Figure 31: Cultural schemas operating at Red Cross Queensland

Schema operating in RCQ are discussed in the next section specifically

describing how they organised the group and their world view, the relationship

between these and the knowledge structure that exists within this schema and how

these drive the selection process in organizing.

Cultural Criteria: “Avoid blame”

The first cultural criteria was organised around the schema of avoiding blame

(see Figure 32). The schema collectively operated in a way to guide avoidance

behaviours by MFC members that supported a shared belief that action needed to

protect and avoid any risk of being in a situation where they could be “blamed” for

an adverse outcome. The key cultural units acting as criteria in avoiding blame in

selection processes were centralised around reducing this risk.


These criteria operated as selection by choice or freewill (Durham, 1991)

with members actively focused on reducing individual and group risk. Risk was

evaluated by the group based on the perceived consequence of the action. Ways of

working to reduce risk included avoiding documentation or not keeping a paper trail

for attributing responsibility that linked them to an outcome. An outcome of this was

that work was stifled and claims of overwork because of low capacity and double

checking meant work was reviewed several times before being released. This was

also compounded by low expectations by self and others of work in the unit.

Paradoxically, confirming or protecting paper trails such as email documentation and

diary notes, were tightly managed just in case they were needed by the members to

defend an action or claim. This was also known as “covering your back” by

members in the organisation. Lack of documentation also translated to no

accountability.

In keeping with the basic claims of the cultural selection model in which

beliefs become more tightly integrated around “acceptable” (i.e. culturally valued)

historical precedents, reducing risk also included following historical precedents of

actions. This meant staff would take similar approaches that had worked previously

in response to an action. This meant what seemed the most appropriate response was

not necessarily taken, but one that was historically (by precedent) safe.

Reducing risk also meant that the group was not proactive in generating tasks

and most work was generated external to the group (directed). This meant they were

not proactive but reactive and doing enough to be perceived as reaching milestones

and undertaking tasks. The verbal claims of overwork were real for the group,

compounded by other cultural schema of internal focus and flexible ways resulting in

a lack of structure.

Figure 32: Avoid Blame Schema


The cultural criteria to defer or deflect a decision was also strongly applied

within the group. Strategies to reduce decision-making events included having

meetings to converse about an issue with no discernable outcome resulting from the

meeting. Engaging with dialogue or “consulting” with other parties was also used as

a way of deferring or deflecting a decision.

Conflict and power struggles within the group were also used to reduce risk.

Rambo (1991) argues that selection is often made based on individual implications

leading to selection of cultural units for personal gain. Projects were structured to

protect group members (or individuals) by offering a scapegoat, either internal or

external to the group, as someone to whom to attribute any lack of performance or

outcome.

Conflict was explicit within the group when describing lower than expected

performance with blame attributed to poor capacity rather than organisational

characteristics such as poor resources or structure. The outcome of this was

enveloped with low trust and low morale in the group with some deviant behaviour

such as gossiping, manipulation and attribution of errors to imply it was someone

else‟s fault. Members applying this criterion were making a decision about the level

of risk they would be prepared to take. Historically this criteria supported low levels

of risk taking in all situations by the group.

The action of cultural selection criteria “avoiding blame” in

organizing at Red Cross Queensland

The action of the criteria acting on selection processes in organizing

influenced members in the unit to take what they conceived to be “safe actions”.

Regardless of their actions being self initiated or following policy and procedure,

their selection of action was taken to protect themself or the group and were low risk

in terms of their assessment of being blamed. Overall the collective criteria

enveloped around avoiding blame sustained the need to keep things stable in RCQ

and avoid escalation. Specifically MFC members needed to work hard to meet the

needs and expectations of the senior staff and avoid consequences of not meeting

their individual expectations. This correlated with other cultural frames of an internal

focus with significant staff effort and focus directed to keeping internal audiences

satisfied.


The criteria of avoiding blame also resulted in stifled action. Staff worked

from a scenario base of “what if” in their decision making. This had a consequence

of little being undertaken unless it was proven or familiar. Behaviours around

response also resulted in “least action”. This meant that staff members would

provide a just adequate or just in time response to a communication need.

An outcome of this criteria operating within the group was that staff would

get frustrated and potentially the high staff turnover was an outcome of this criteria

in action. This also contributed to increasing organisational risk through the loss of

intellectual property and no evaluation embedded in strategic communication

practice.

This schema was very dominant in RCQ. While there was evidence from

RCSA that coupled with a cultural expectation to be compliant to national office

requests, this was a different set of views to what was found to operate in RCQ. In

RCQ at the MFC level, the focus was on local management and actions. At the

executive level in RCQ compliance with national office was considered with other

competing priorities and not based on avoiding blame.

Cultural Criteria: “Tolerance”

The next cultural criteria were organised around schema relating to

“tolerance” (see Figure 33). These cultural units collectively operated in a way to

guide behaviours to sustain or cope with working in an organisation where

“tolerance” underpinned members‟ world views.

Figure 33: Tolerance Schema


A primary driver of this schema was a tolerance of poor performance and a

lack of accountability (or consequence) in delivering outcomes. Also enveloped in

this schema were views that because you worked for RC you tolerated reduced

resources, inadequate technology, and poor pay.

The “tolerance” schema guided beliefs about diversity and humanity and this

was operationalised by members as a level of tolerance that was expected because it

is “Red Cross”. While tolerance of diversity was directly applied to tolerance of poor

performance, humanity was applied to the expectation that RC employed people

based on personality or circumstance, and not on skills, knowledge or experience for

the role.

The action of cultural selection criteria “tolerance” in organizing

at Red Cross Queensland

The “tolerance” criteria operated at a level that instructed, confirmed or

reinforced an accepted way of viewing their world and thinking about behaviours.

As a collective schema, these criteria led to lower standards and lower expectations

of the organisation and of individual and group performance. Capacity of staff being

below or perceived to be below the level required meant there was a belief that the

unit could not deliver on projects or work generally. This resulted in no real value of

the role, advice or relationships with communication staff in the organisation. Staff

therefore were not included in high level meetings where decisions about strategic

communication were made, contributing to conflict, poor morale and frustration. The

impact of this meant that other staff compensated (because they were personally at

risk of being blamed) so they accommodated the lower capacity by finding

alternative ways to accomplish the work, or doing the work themselves and

increasing their own workload. This could be seen to be a direct contribution to high

staff turnover in the MFC area. Staff also limited sharing certain information on

projects because of capacity concerns, and linkages to avoiding blame schema. The

lack of planning (see flexible and fluid schema) meant that outcome based evaluation

(Hendrix, 2004) of communication projects was not undertaken.

“Tolerance” was sustained by an old way of working guided by the traditions

of RC being the largest humanitarian organisation in the world. Staff beliefs about

the organisation guided the routines and process to follow the least line of least


resistance, including sticking to what was done last time. This included following

“goat tracks” or doing things the same as they had always been done. This model of

working accommodated the sense of having too much to do and fear of innovation

meant staff will not question why they could, or should, do things differently.

Finally, “tolerance” was sustained institutionally by offering substandard

levels of technology, equipment and resources. Staff members recognised poor

resources as the reality of working in a not-for-profit organisation and accepted the

associated impacts of having poor technology, resources and equipment on their

ability to do their job.

The “tolerance” criteria operated at different levels of analysis in RCQ when

compared to RCSA. In RCSA there was an organisational focus, while in RCQ there

was an individual focus. In RCSA there was less association with capacity at MFC

level primarily due to a more experienced staff member working almost

autonomously with direct reporting to the ED. In RCSA, “tolerance” was more

associated with historical precedents as the fundamental principles were a natural

foundation of tolerance of diversity and humanity as a Red Cross way. In RCQ,

“tolerance” focused more on the tolerance of individuals as this organisation

operated more on a personality or relationship basis. There were increased levels of

frustration in RCQ and increased conflict that was contributed to by “tolerance”.

Cultural Criteria: “Internal is More Important”

The third schema of cultural criteria organised knowledge to prioritise

internal stakeholders above other stakeholders (see Figure 34). This schema

conflated with the schema of avoiding blame and traditions of the Red Cross Way to

organise group views that the internal management of RC was more important as a

stakeholder than other stakeholders.

The pending nationalisation meant that members were often faced with a

choice between meeting national needs or local management needs. Based on this

criteria, and influences from imposition (power mixed), local needs were always

prioritised higher than external publics because the consequences were higher from

internal.


Durham (1991) defines four types of imposition: coercion, force,

manipulation and authority. In RCQ, the most dominant was imposition by authority.

The function of nationalisation as a change agent naturally challenged traditional

structures and positions of authority locally. The power struggle that was being

played out within the organisation meant that staff were required to draw on cultural

criteria when responding to situations, only to find senior managers defining the

situation and establishing the boundaries of response.

The action of cultural selection criteria “internal focus” in


The “internal focus” criteria drove selection by organising member

prioritisation of stakeholders with internal being the most important. There were

three hierarchies to this frame. The first was the local internal group. Reflecting the

federated model of RC, the internal focus on the local power cohort meant that only

needs of internal local power holders were considered in the allocation and work

done. The dominant role of the RCQ ED and the accompanying leadership style of

controlling or influencing communication activities at all levels also contributed to

this schema by providing an alternative source of power to the emerging struggle

with national office. The second hierarchy was the NCD, whose authority as the

source of national policy on strategic communication, was limited by local

Figure 34: Internal Focus Schema


operational reporting lines. The third hierarchy was at the CEO and Board level, with

a focus on RC strategic goals.

The “internal focus” criteria operated at different levels of analysis in RCQ

when compared to RCSA. In RCQ, it was a dominant criteria frequently applied both

by free choice and through imposition (Durham, 1991). RCQ viewed their needs as

unique and as having special needs when compared to other divisions or states.

While nationalisation was pushing for “one RC” that would bring efficiencies to the

organisation, senior management in RCQ viewed national (and nationalisation) as a

rival. RCQ MFC members acknowledged the professional knowledge and needs of

the national hierarchy however were supported to prioritise local needs over national

needs as required. RCSA also held an organisational level of internal focus, but there

was little evidence these criteria were used to influence their world view. RCSA was

more client-focused and had greater awareness of the impact of their relationship

with external publics. Therefore it was found that RCSA prioritised national needs

equally with local organisational needs, which contrasted with shared views in RCQ.

Cultural Criteria: “We are Red Cross”

The next cultural criteria were organised around schema relating to

perceptions of RC. While labelled as “We are Red Cross” (see Figure 35), this

criteria encapsulated staff‟s recognition that RC was globally respected, iconic and

one of the world‟s most well-known brands. These criteria could have also been

labelled arrogance or hubris, the label of “We are Red Cross” was more appropriate

as it encapsulated overwhelming feelings of pride, sentiments that characterised the

importance of the work RC did, and an overwhelming sense that RC was an

important part of the world‟s humanitarian effort. Therefore words such as arrogance

or hubris were not used. Instead this criteria was characterised as “We are Red

Cross” to reflect these views.

These were powerful criteria as staff felt that no matter what they did (in

terms of their communication actions/ strategy), the strength, and iconic nature of

RC would not be affected. The “We are Red Cross” schema enveloped beliefs that

external community members or audiences didn‟t require detail about the actual

services or programs delivered. Although RC delivered a range of complex programs

and services, the schema dictated that RC members evaluated audience or


stakeholder strategic communication needs as being satisfied by simply knowing that

RC was in “that space”. This was viewed as being adequate because members felt

that any assessment of quality or type of service was met by the fact that RC was

“there”.

Reflections by staff members about the Bali incident suggests these criteria

may have been influential in 2003 and played a role in influencing RC members‟

perceptions (or lack thereof) of changing expectations by its social environment.

Members recounted the Bali incident with disappointment that it occurred. Although

members revealed organisational learning from this incident since this time

evidenced by organisation-wide structural and policy change, I detected that

members had no awareness that there was any potential that this situation could

happen again.

Staff were very proud to work at RC due to the nature of the work undertaken

by the organisation. While this appeared to be a paradox with the expressed

frustrations by current staff, the overwhelming sentiment of pride remained. Staff

therefore felt other organisations or individuals should also feel very privileged to be

associated with RC.

Figure 35: We are Red Cross Schema


The “We are Red Cross” schema also created a tension with what the

organisation was, or has traditionally been known for, and what the organisation

needed to be in the modern or current environment. This tension was present as the

organisation was championing change through reviews and restructures with a shift

toward nationalisation. This tension culminated as a “corporate versus non-

corporate” tension, or what was viewed as new ways challenging the traditions and

foundations of RC. Traditions and the old way of doing things were very powerful

criteria at RC as staff took comfort from the old ways of doing things. These criteria

provided a way of holding on to the old way of working, to the iconic view of RC

and its important place in history as doing important work.

The action of cultural selection criteria “We are Red Cross” in


“We are Red Cross” criteria drove selection by creating a sense of security

around the brand and reassured staff that the brand of RC was ubiquitous and

enduring. The belief that the RC brand was iconic and powerful meant that staff

thought they had little effect on influencing stakeholder perceptions of such a strong,

global organisation. There was a sense of complacency around monitoring and

maintaining the brand, and the meaning RC had for the variety of stakeholders

present in its social environment. The criteria also positioned RC as elite in terms of

stakeholder relationships, where association with RC though corporate sponsorship

agreements, service agreements or activities, would benefit the reputation of the

partner more than it would benefit RC.

This schema operated in different ways in RCQ compared to RCSA. In RCQ,

the focus on the iconic nature of the brand meant that there was a sense that “others”

were the brand custodians translating to their views that they are just there to service

the programs rather than nurture the reputation of RC. While similar knowledge

structures were in place in RCSA, the emergence of the national office as the driver

of the MFC reform meant that RCSA also felt “someone else” was responsible for

RC brand maintenance.


Cultural Criteria: “Flexible and Fluid”

The final criteria were organised around flexible and fluid ways (see Figure

36). While RC members were united in their description of the organisation as a

crisis organisation, this schema was closely associated with their views of how they

needed to be responsive to being activated for a crisis. The need for flexibility also

presented as a strong criteria for not having what would be expected to be traditional

business structures around communication functions (plans, research, and systems).

The lack of organisational processes in place facilitated a more flexible and

responsive way of working during activation but in terms of it being a criterion it

meant that the organisation could not be proactive, but instead relied on a reactive

way of working. The lack of structure also meant a loss of control because the group

were allowed to make their own judgements about projects or responses that were

not tied to any formal reporting or agreed approaches.

The action of cultural selection criteria “flexible and fluid” in


These criteria drove selection to value flexibility and ways of working that

were not concrete. The need for flexibility correlated with the need to have a level of

responsiveness required by an organisation activated to respond to a crisis situation.

Figure 36: Flexible and Fluid Schema


Working for a “crisis organisation,” members rationalised this as needing to be able

to “drop everything” and reconfigure their work effort to respond to various types of

crisis, whatever type. The consequence of this mindset was their conceptualisation of

non-activation periods as mundane and overwhelming, primarily due to the variety

and complexity of tasks and the competing demands on their time without the

structure to support the demand. Flexibility and fluidity did not translate well in the

complex non-activation environment and resulted in an adhoc or inconsistent

approach to doing things that lacked structure and processes. For some this meant

there was no solid box around what was required, instead it meant the organisation

existed as a fluid and changing entity. The lack of consistent or enforced processes

within RC meant that staff could choose how they responded and this was an

accepted way of working.

A consequence of the fluidity and flexibility was an apparently unstructured

and reactive approach to working. The fluidity and flexibility created a seemingly

uncontrolled work environment leading to feelings of loss of control and

overwhelming work (no ability to prioritise). The lack of structure around planned

responses also resulted in a lack of evaluation. One outcome of this was no local

evaluation therefore no case for demonstrating capacity, resulting in, for example, no

case for budgets so there were no resources for new communication campaigns.

While flexible and fluid could be aligned with innovation and freedom to

think “outside the box”, the lack of innovation or a reluctance to do things differently

was caused by staff expressing comfort in keeping or doing things the same way.

Both being fluid and flexible, and keeping things the same, could be conceived as a

way of coping with the lack of structure and the flexible way.

The “flexible and fluid” schema was dominant in RCQ. Confirming evidence

came when RC was activated during a disaster or crisis (see Appendix A for

activation events). Activation brought structure and order, and members expressed a

sense of purpose normally missing. Activation also provided an opportunity for RCQ

MFC members to reinvent and reposition their role in the crisis. This meant they

were more visible and took a more leading role in strategic communications relating

to the crisis. Activation also made RC as an organisation more visible, bringing

reassurance to staff as they perceived this as an opportunity for external publics to

see and understand what RC does.


In RCSA, while a lack of planning relating to organised communication was

also found, flexible and fluid as cultural criteria were not as dominant in organizing.

Structure and processes featured in RCSA, with staff subscribing to these in a

number of ways. This was evidenced in adherence to formal meetings, requests for

information, responses to program and stakeholder communication needs, and most

importantly, prioritisation of communication actions based on local organisational

needs.

This section responded to RQ3 to explore how cultural selection operates in

RCQ. The criteria presented as five schemas of cultural knowledge working to

influence members in decision-making processes. The action of cultural selection

operating as self-selection of cultural criteria demonstrates the influence of the

cultural system in influencing the evolution of that system. In RCQ, members of the

organisation had the ability (consciously or subconsciously) to make a choice based

on an evaluation of the consequences of selecting those criteria (Durham, 1991).

This meant there were other options available in the context of the situation, but over

time, the decision reflected a pattern, and the cultural logic behind that decision was

found to be shared. While it was not surprising to find evidence of some schema

operating in a weaker, less dominant form in RCSA, the strength of the emergent

schema operating in RCQ provides the foundation to refine the application of the

criteria to the formulation of strategic communication.

Research question 4: Cultural Selection and Strategic

Communication

In this section, I address the fourth research question of this study: how does

cultural selection operate in the development of strategic communication in RCQ?

The formulation of strategic communication, as noted in Chapter 2, requires

organisational members to interpret, understand or translate equivocal environmental

information (Beer, et al., 2005; Everett, 1993; O'Shannassy, 2003; Weick, 1979,

1995) and make decisions based on information available (Johnson et al., 2008). For

strategic communication, which Hallahan et al. (2007) describe as being purposeful

communication to fulfil the organisational mission, decision making relates to

communication action, messages and channels. Strategic communication can be

further operationalised as deliberate communication practices on behalf of the


organisation and encapsulates the intentional activities of its leaders, staff and

communication practitioners. In RCQ, this was a collective act located in both the

MFC unit and the RCQ executive level.

The role of public relations contributing to the formulation of strategic

communication in response to environmental change is a fundamental historical

perspective recognised in the literature (Broom & Smith, 1979; Grunig & Grunig,

1989; Grunig,1990; Lauzen & Dozier, 1992; Okura, et al., 2009; Steyn, 2007).

Public relations contribution to strategic communication is predicated on rational

decision making and clear lines of authority and power hierarchies within the

organisation (Grunig, 1992b; L'Etang, 2005). Evidence from this study found

cultural selection operated to influence the development of strategic communication

in RCQ. Each of the cultural selection criteria was found to influence strategic

communication and characterised a way of working for the group that determined

current and future responses to the enacted environment. This finding contributes to

understanding the internal organisational environment influences strategic decision

making identified by Nutt and Wilson (2010) and Papadakis et al., 2010) and more

specifically for strategic communication. These influences are explained in the next

section.

The Influence of Cultural Selection Criteria “Avoiding Blame” on


The cultural criteria of avoiding blame and reducing risk influenced the

development of strategic communication in a number of ways. Decision making

about external events and communication responses revealed RCQ staff had a

reduced vision of the external environment and this impacted on the interpretation of

events. For example, they did not see or hear the external signals if what they saw

challenged the status quo within the organisation.

The “avoiding blame” criteria were instrumental in influencing the timing of

communication responses. The stifled nature of contemplating communication

actions and time spent on deliberating to get the response “right” to avoid being

blamed meant that work was increased and responses were slowed. Time was spent

on redefining the problem several times. Through consulting and having discussions,

the problem definition was shifting based on these discussions and their ability to


keep talking about the nature of the problem also delayed decision making on key

external issues.

Cultural selection influenced the group to work in a way that avoided

evaluation of performance and thus blame. Scanning was avoided as it challenged

status quo. Responses were slowed because of the need to ensure the artifact was

collaboratively endorsed by the group or checked by an individual (because of lack

of trust of the group). Responsiveness was reduced as RCQ struggled with high

levels of bureaucracy in signing off on MFC output. Resources and effort by MFC

members dedicated to collaborating and sharing risk also stifled responsiveness

contributing to the overwhelming sense of pressure expressed by team members and

the lethargy in meeting these created deadlines in RCQ.

Sensitivity to external environment was fractured for members by their

efforts to avoid blame. For example, if the enacted environment challenged the status

quo, members were unlikely to acknowledge the equivocality, or would actively

avoid or ignore equivocality if it conflicted with internal dynamics. The action of

cultural selection focuses on the influence of power-control and the consequences of

this relationship on any formulation or analysis of environmental information. This

is similar to what Okura et al. (2009) found when they explored the influence of

power-control perspective on environmental scanning activities and found the

internal characteristics of the organisation were far more influential on scanning

behaviours.

The criteria of avoiding blame meant that staff sought direction and followed

instructions without necessarily analysing what they were told. This meant the staff

in the MFC area would only ever be filling a technician role. Because of this, they

were not challenging the meaning (imposition) as they had a fear of consequence.

Organisational members followed precedents or scripts of action that had

been historically established as acceptable. Members opted for replicating what was

done, or what they thought was done previously and therefore avoided taking risks.

This meant if the activity was not successful, there was a precedent set by historical

communication actions that were previously recognised as reasonable or accepted by

the group.

Cultural selection influenced the endorsement of a workplace that effectively

avoided documentation of communication programs, activities or actions. This


included a lack of planning (written) and evaluation of activities. The confluence of

fluidity in these criteria rationalised the lack of documentation and planning with the

need to be flexible and open to change (because we are a “crisis” organisation). For

strategic communication this meant actions were reserved for reactive or directed

items, leaving opportunities for exploring other options or communication actions

unattended.

Avoiding blame as criteria also influenced member avoidance of challenging

power relations. For RCQ this meant that even if the group felt the interpretation or

action being taken was not correct, they avoided challenging or questioning this to

maintain the status quo. This action was also acceptable to the group being justified

as the way the organisation worked.

The Influence of Cultural Selection Criteria “Tolerance” on


The cultural criteria of “tolerance” influenced the development of strategic

communication in a number of ways. The strength of traditions and history in the

organisation combined with the traditions of the federated structure and traditional

roles of boards and community members meant RC was not inclined to embrace

opportunities. The tendency to follow established precedent influenced members to

keep to the routine, keep to the traditional ways of doing things, reduce or avoid

risks and not try anything new. This also translated to other components of strategic

communication including messaging and channel selection. In this case, messaging

and channels were identified in ways that met expectations and satisfied “old ways”

of working. “Old” conceptualisations of communication problems were accepted and

unchallenged. Power hierarchies created by ageing board members‟

conceptualisation of the environment remained unchallenged by more youthful

members as any challenge was considered by these members as both disrespectful

and “not something that was done at RC”.

“Tolerance” criteria were instructionally powerful in influencing expectations

of the group in terms of performance and acceptance. This influence spanned a

continuum meaning that for some members it meant they were willing to accept

lower standards and rationalised this as being the nature of working at RC, while for


other members it meant they could not take the opportunities they identified. The

impact of this on the development of strategic communication meant that RC was

not sensitive or responsive to the environment, but was rather risk adverse, wanting

to stay with or “tolerate” what was familiar.

While it is not unexpected to find an organisation risk adverse, collectively

cultural selection affected communicative action. Selection criteria guided actions to

avoid putting the individual or group at risk. As a way of working, this meant little

was capitalised in terms of opportunities, only reactive responses to emergent issues

and a general reluctance to embrace opportunity.

The Influence of Cultural Selection Criteria “Internal Focus” on


Cultural selection acted to influence a dominant internal focus for attention

and response. First, external environmental information, including identification,

analysis and prioritisation was not viewed as important by organisational members.

Cultural selection in the selection process acted to instruct the group to prioritise the

internal audience needs over other audiences. Rambo (1991) identifies that activities

are selected to sustain what is considered as working for the group. This is in

contrast to other more rational approaches that argue strategic communication is

formulated to respond to the external environments. This is also applied to external

publics and stakeholders who are prioritised by selection criteria that sustain or

nurture internal views, that those stakeholders deemed important by internal

members rather than by research. Instead they relied on power-holders in the

organisation to identify and interpret ecological change for meaning. The reliance on

power-holders to define the environment delegated middle and lower staff to a

technician role. This reduced risk for team members through allowing power holders

to define strategic communication problems and identify communication responses.

Second, members‟ high prioritisation of internal relationships and low

prioritization of external issues and external publics, created a lack of perspective of

any influence or consequences caused by organisational actions on external publics.

The dominance of power relationships in the organisation meant for members it was

not a safe environment to take risks to challenge the internal focus. The implications

of the internal focus meant while free choice (Durham, 1991) influenced members to


make decisions based on their cultural values, imposition (Durham, 1991) describes

the role of power or a decision imposed on a group to meet the needs of the more

powerful. For the MFC group in RCQ, this meant that there were often conflicting

directives from the different hierarchies at times.

Third, the internal focus created missed strategic communication

opportunities for the organisation. This, coupled with the avoiding blame criteria,

meant the organisation was not proactive, but remained reactive to issues. The

criteria were working to sustain the group view and this also interfaced with the role

of power in the organisation, working through imposition (Durham, 1991).

Weick (1979) argues that organisations create their own environments. In the

case of cultural selection‟s influence on strategic communication, RCQ members,

through cultural selection, sustain an environment that suits them. This may very

well mean the internal environment found in RCQ is closed to external influences. It

can also mean that members‟ views of the environment are filtered through selection

criteria. This would mean that RCQ member‟s conceptualisation of the environment

is not correct or their view is biased or tainted by the influence of cultural selection.

The Influence of Cultural Selection Criteria “We Are Red Cross”

on Strategic Communication

The cultural criteria “We are Red Cross” were influential in the development

of strategic communication at RCQ. Schultz, Hatch and Larsen (2002) argue

behaviours that support a corporate reputation need to be deeply rooted,

acknowledging that “increasingly organizations compete based on their ability to

express who they are and what they stand for” (p. 1). Conceptualisations of the

internal brand and reputation of RC by MFC staff therefore needed to be consistent

with the organisational mission vision and values statements 11

(2005, 2008a,

2009a). The influence of the “We are Red Cross” criteria on strategic

communication created the potential for haughtiness or a sense of organisational

superiority particularly when exploring potential sponsorships or corporate

partnerships. The linkages of being an iconic, large, globally important humanitarian

organisation meant potential relationships were assessed on criteria of being worthy

11 RC Vision is: To improve the lives of vulnerable people in Australia and internationally by mobilising the

power of humanity. RC Mission is: To be a leading humanitarian organisation in Australia, improving the lives

of vulnerable people through services delivered and promotion of humanitarian laws and values.


or deserved of partnering with RC rather than on other financial based criteria, such

as return on investment or tangible strategic communication outcomes.

The complexity and scope of services undertaken by RC presented challenges

for members as they felt this was difficult to translate into any strategic

communication effort. This criteria influenced strategic communication to not detail

the nature or specifics of the programs as this was beyond audience comprehension

(or also need to know) of audiences. Members viewed the brand of RC (we are Red

Cross) as being the vehicle for communication premised on audience awareness that

RC did important work.

MFC staff beliefs about RC as iconic and highly recognised influenced a

shared view that existing stakeholder perceptions of such a strong organisation could

not be affected by smaller or campaign-based communication programs. More

importantly, because MFC staff believed they had little effect on the reputation of

RC, they lacked concern about the impact or effectiveness of their groups‟ actions

locally. This was evident through the lack of planning, research, and evaluation in

programming. Their views expressed that nothing they did would affect this, so

therefore they were not too concerned about the affect of their current activity,

culminated with an overwhelming sense that RC will be okay anyway because they

are RC.

The schema was also instrumental in directing a tendency to conceptualise

communication problems historically, based on previous experiences. For example,

because there was a cultural expectation that RC was an iconic humanitarian

organisation held in high regard by stakeholders, staff viewed that local marketing,

communication or public relations efforts were ineffectual. For them this meant that

their actions had little effect on influencing the reputation of RC. In addition, old or

traditional ways of working meant existing practices were left unchallenged or were

accepted as the way of approaching stakeholder communication.

A key example of the old way being left unchecked was the Red Cross

Calling door-knock fundraising campaign conducted annually in March. Staff

recognised, when prompted, that there were alternative ways to undertake this type

of campaign. They also recognised the campaign perpetuated an outdated message

about RC and contributed to maintaining old ways of doing things within RC (both

in a positive and negative way). There remained, however, a strong cultural


expectation that this campaign was undertaken in the same way every year 12

and

benchmarked in comparison to previous years rather than other potential success

measures. This tendency to not challenge existing systems of social knowledge about

the current status and form of Red Cross Calling as a campaign, showed that

members sought comfort in what was familiar or historically acceptable. This, in

effect, sustained imposition (Durham, 1991) as a form of cultural selection decision

making. Over time, choices for operational strategic communication are limited

through decision making about strategic communication being premised on historical

activities. RCQ members recognised this as a shared or acceptable view of doing

things the same way. Durham (1991) refers to this as cultural fitness of memes.

Durham (1991) regards this as the action of cultural selection sustaining the values

and belief systems of internal members. Therefore, it is not a determined response by

members to either environmental change or externally generated demands by

audiences in the social environment.

The Influence of Cultural Selection Criteria “Flexible and Fluid” on


The cultural criteria of flexible and fluid encouraged a less structured

approach to communication in the organisation evidenced through minimal planning

and documentation. This had four key influences on strategic communication.

First, the flexible criteria influenced fluidity in decision-making processes

around strategic communication resulting in little or no formal planning processes

being developed around key programs or projects. The outcome of this meant there

was little to no resource allocation for projects, and more critically, no evaluation of

any communication outcomes. Parallel to this was lack of evidence by the marketing

communication effort of their value or contribution to the organisation. This valuing

was not simply a calculation of generated fundraising dollars by a specific

fundraising campaign, but in its contribution to the other strategic goals of the

organisation.

12 In 2009 the Red Cross Calling campaign was not undertaken. On 13 February 2009, the CEO advised staff via

email. The decision not to proceed with Red Cross Calling was “due to the unprecedented requirements of

supporting Australia‟s largest natural disaster” (the 2009 Victorian bushfires) and the associated fundraising

appeal. The February 2009 appeal raised an unprecedented $379 million. RC was the lead agency to collect and

distribute funds raised.


Second, while some members claimed they planned, they didn‟t document

the process. The “flexible and fluid” criteria encouraged members to be variable in

their approaches to communication tasks and functions. For some members this

allowed them to work with little structure, resulting in a more reactive approach to

prioritising communication actions. For example, there was little prioritisation of

stakeholder or communication needs beyond a crisis, so all demands for

communication activity, including collateral, media materials and program meetings

were viewed as being the same level of need or priority. The consequence of these

criteria on the group meant that workloads could not be managed and there was an

overwhelming sense of being overworked. The criteria of flexible and fluid also

provided little support for members to push back on projects due to a lack of

documentation of program priorities and goals.

Third, being flexible and fluid also hindered the progression of any

developing campaigns as staff felt they needed to attend to other priorities. For some

members, this meant they were just ‟treading water until the next crisis” meaning it

was acceptable for programs to be left in a state of “limbo”.

Finally, the criteria of flexible and fluid, created additional pressure or stress

as there was a lack of performance benchmarks or structures around milestones to be

achieved. In response to these criteria, members would revert to old ways of doing

things driven by a sense of security that comes from following historical precedents

and reassurance from providing something to senior management that was familiar.

This section presented an analysis of the role of cultural criteria drawn from

the five identified collective schema acting in the selection process to influence

strategic communication in RCQ. Each of the cultural selection criteria was found to

influence strategic communication and were shown to be present both during free

choice and imposition based decision making as members negotiated meanings and

actions in their efforts to respond to environmental equivocality.

Research question 5: Culturally Derived Strategic

Communication

This final section of the chapter now moves to a broader context beyond the

setting of RCQ, to address the final research question; what is the role of culturally

derived strategic communication in the social ecology of organisations? This


question responds to a higher level of analysis which this work informs and more

specifically, to understand the role of strategic communication in the social ecology

of organisations.

Social ecology describes the relationships between parts of a system and

reflects organisational needs in responding, through adaptation, to a changing social

environment (Emery & Trist, 1973). While ecology recognises the interaction of the

system, social ecology highlights the interdependent relationship of the social

environment and the organisation. Strategic communication traditionally represents

the organisational response to the social elements of an organisation‟s operating

environment (including factors such as public opinion, the actions of stakeholder and

special interest groups) (Broom, 2009; Everett, 1993). Set in this ecological context,

Everett (2001) argues that based on the discipline‟s historical claim of building and

maintaining social relationships between an organisation and its social environment,

the task of organisational adaptation to its social environment is a central organising

problem for the discipline of public relations (Everett, 2001).

A major claim by public relations is responsibility for monitoring the

environment and making decisions about programs that facilitate adaptation or

change (Everett, 2001). While environmental uncertainty provides the context for

public relations practice (Okura, et al., 2009), the central task of strategic

communication is to assist the organisation in responding to that uncertainty,

ultimately helping the organisation achieve its needs for adaptation (Argenti, et al.,

2005; Hallahan, et al., 2007; Steyn, 2003b). Clampitt et al. (2000) highlight the role

of choice by management based on judgement. Culturally derived strategic

communication reflects the influence of cultural selection on management

judgements in their effort to formulate an adaptive response to the environment as

illustrated in Figure 37. Culturally derived strategic communication, through the

action of cultural criteria and cultural selection, is centrally placed in the ecological

relationship of an organisation and its efforts to adapt to its social environment. The

centrality of cultural criteria at the collective group level is found to conservatively

influence the core roles and functions undertaken by members to formulate strategic

communication.

Environmental scanning, traditionally captured through the boundary

spanning role of public relations, and subsequent interpretation or the judgement


about environmental equivocality follows Alvesson‟s (2002) cultural view of

strategy, highlighting the reality of the external environment as a social construction

by the group. He argues, “the consequences of the environment for the organization

and the actions of organizational participants are revealed in the interpretations,

frames of reference, perceptions and forms of understanding which characterize the

strategic actors as a collective” (p. 77). He cautions the need to understand how the

group collectively attributed meaning and content to the environment. This

understanding is provided through examining knowledge structures in organisations,

and identifying cultural criteria operating in selection processes. Culturally derived

strategic communication will therefore reflect the internal imperatives of the

organisation as much as the external. Therefore the stronger the organisational

culture (Geertz, 1973), the more likely that culture, rather than environmental

variables, will be the dominant influence in the development of strategic

communication.

The outcome of this influence will eventually produce substantive differences

between organisational groups, even though they may face similar environmental

challenges. These implications are further addressed in Chapter 7.

Figure 37: Ecological relationships: Culturally derived strategic communication


In this study I have explored culture as a system of social knowledge and the

fundamentally conservative role of cultural selection within that cultural system to

maintain that system. Cultural selection acts to sustain a cultural system through a

selective bias toward information that supports or “fits” with the existing cultural

knowledge structures. The outcome of cultural selection is that given a similar start,

and in the face of similar environmental pressures acting on organisations in a

population, over time there will be an increasing divergence of the cultural

knowledge systems within a population, thereby creating substantially different

approaches to those environmental factors. In RCQ we see an organisation that has

unique sets of knowledge structures at play. Sackmann (1991) argues “cultural

beliefs influence the formulation of strategic intentions, that they shape the

realisation of strategic intentions, and that they influence the maintenance process of

realised strategic intentions as well as their reshaping” (p. 155). The findings from

this study support Durham‟s (1992) claim that cultural influences may be more

important for understanding social ecology than environmental factors.

Summary

In this chapter, I have addressed the research questions of this study. The first

research question explored the challenge set by the theoretical precedents among

cultural anthropologists who have organised their research programs around the view

of culture as a system of shared, socially transmitted knowledge (e.g. Durham, 1992;

Everett, 1996; Keesing, 1981; Rambo, 1991). When culture is held to be a system of

social knowledge, a key problem addressed by this study is to further explore in an

organisational context Durham‟s (1992) theory concerning the role of cultural

selection in the development and maintenance of that system. This study provides

evidence that when culture is operating as a system of social knowledge, cultural

selection acts to influence decision making within a group. This study suggests that

the nature of that influence is a tendency to preserve inertial forces identified by

Hannan and Freeman (1989) by limiting the amount of variation in the cultural

knowledge system. Such an effect will likely add to the amount of variation between

groups (say, RCQ versus RCSA) over time as a result of the action of cultural

selection. The group‟s cultural belief systems are sustained or preserved through the


action of cultural selection as decision-making systems (based on cultural criteria)

promote a bias for the tightness of fit between “new” ideas and existing beliefs.

The second research question explored how cultural selection operates in

organizing. The study employed the perspective proposed by Weick and others that

organizing is viewed as a set of collective processes for reducing equivocality by

increasing consensus around meaning shared among organisational members about

what is “out there” and what to do about it. Based on that theoretical apparatus, the

study suggests that culture acting through selection criteria operates to increase that

consensus within a group, and, consequently, over time creates increasing

differences between groups in how such groups look at, understand, and react to

environmental features. This effect will eventually produce substantive differences

between groups even though they face similar environmental challenges.

The third research question explored how cultural selection operated in RCQ,

and then more specifically in the fourth research question, as an influence in the

formulation of strategic communication in RCQ. The study found that cultural

selection operated by instructing or guiding group beliefs and behaviours that are

unique to the group. The action of cultural selection preserved the unique features of

the group over time. Differences emerged in RCQ because of the action of cultural

selection. And finally the fifth research question asked what is the role of culturally

derived strategic communication in the social ecology of organisations. This

highlighted that culturally derived strategic communication reflects the influence of

cultural selection and highlighted that the external reality of the group is a reflection

of the social construction rather than the imperatives of the environment the

organisation operates.

The final chapter will present the conclusion of the thesis, identifying the

overall implications and contributions to the discipline of public relations, and future

research directions.

Chapter 7: Discussion and implications 304

Chapter 7

Discussion and Implications

In this chapter, I present conclusions and the implications of the study to

respond to the central research problem: How culture, acting through cultural

selection in the selection processes of organizing, influences the development of

strategic communication in organisations. Through these implications, this central

research problem is set in the larger analytical context of the effort to build and

manage relationships within the social environment in which organisations operate.

To accomplish the goals for this chapter, I first provide a synopsis of the

major findings and conclusions about the research problem. Next I present

conclusions and implications for the CSSC model and implications for theory and

methodology in public relations and organisational communication. I then provide a

summary of the key theoretical findings and contributions of the research to the

discipline literature of public relations and the implications for practice. I conclude

the chapter with identification of limitations and future research opportunities.

Overview of the Study

The purpose of this study was to explore how culture, acting through cultural

selection in the selection process identified in Weick‟s seminal sociocultural model

of organizing (Weick, 1969, 1979), influences a key feature of the social ecology of

organisations – organisational strategic communication. I argue that this research

problem is embedded in the core theoretical proposition that strategic

communication emerges not as a direct, rational response by organisational members

to objectively given environmental factors as commonly portrayed in the public

relations textbook tradition. Instead, I argue that strategic communication emerges as

an outcome to the influence of cultural selection at work on the collective

sensemaking processes of the organisation. The consequence of this proposition is

the view that it is this work of cultural selection that influences not only what

organisational members view as challenges in their social environment, but also what

they elect to do about those challenges as they contemplate the development of


strategic communication. Such a proposition runs directly counter to much of the

prescriptive literature and textbook tradition (see Kuhn, 1996) of the discipline of

public relations. That tradition is organised around the perspective that

“environmental monitoring” and consequent decision making is the primary driver to


To organise exploration of the central research problem of this study, I

employed the CSSC model based on Weick‟s (1969, 1979) sociocultural model of

organizing. The CSSC model is used to develop a series of theoretical propositions

to guide the exploration of the study. The importance of these propositions in this

exploratory study is that they provide a basis for assessing the descriptive adequacy

of the CSSC model; that is, they are a guide to gauging the model‟s capacity to help

organise a meaningful picture of the world it seeks to explore. The propositions are

logically warranted and serially drawn claims derived from the elements of the

model. Thus, in a qualitative study, propositions act as a way to ground descriptive

detail to serve the researcher and participants‟ needs for understanding (Lofland, et

al., 2006). Unlike empirical hypotheses drawn from a theoretical model in

experimental science that seek quantifiable tests of that model, qualitative

propositions of the sort employed in this study are guides to explore the descriptive

adequacy of a model.

The first proposition (P1) and largest descriptive lens of the CSSC model is

built from culture theory in anthropology and the management disciplines. It sets the

study‟s principle perspective that culture is a system of shared and socially

transmitted ideas, concepts, rules and meanings (see for example, Keesing, 1981).

Based on such a perspective, the study explores how an organisation‟s cultural

system working as a system of social knowledge is evidenced by emergent

knowledge structures and displayed as schema which organise members‟ shared

views. The study observed that these schema offered members a coherent set of

related values in decision making about enacted environmental data.

P1 is set in the theoretical envelope of the process of selection described in

Weick‟s organizing model (Weick, 1969, 1979). As a process, selection occurs when

organisational members actively select or dismiss equivocal raw material (data) and

impose meaning on the displays of enactment (Kreps, 2006; Weick, 1969). Schema

operating during the process of selection pull together the collective experience of


the group by shaping the display presented during enactment and influencing its

“movement” through the subsequent process of selection. The recognition of

collective experience acting through a system of social knowledge recognises the

centrality of organisational culture to an organisation‟s efforts to adapt to its social

environment.

To isolate the cultural mechanism at work in the selection process of

organizing in Weick‟s model, the second proposition (P2) asserts that the property of

“self selection” (identified by Durham, 1992) within an organisation‟s cultural

system forms a key set of selection criteria that filter the variation provided by

enactment and shape the nature of what the group holds as acceptable. This

proposition of the CSSC model also allows insights into how the cultural system acts

to maintain and sustain existing knowledge structures working in the organisation.

The study identifies five core schemas acting as selection criteria in selection. Weick

(1979) recognises schema to have a mediating or bracketing effect on experience.

The schema were an outcome of the collective system of social knowledge operating

in RCQ and emerged from the knowledge structures. The schema provided structure

to organise cultural knowledge structures collectively acting as criteria to guide

selection in the selection processes as part of the decision-making process. The

schema formed criteria that acted on the display of the enacted environment, or in

other words, the work of environmental interpretation by organisational members.

Thus, “self-selection” or the property of a cultural system to assess the value of an

idea based on its proximity to existing ideas, operated when cultural criteria were

employed as decision-making criteria (labelled cultural criteria) during the selection

in organizing.

Finally, the third and most specific proposition (P3) of the CSSC model

asserts that cultural criteria, acting as a subsystem in the selection process of

organizing, mediates the nature of strategic communication for an organisation. This

proposition also was helpful in describing and understanding variation in the set of

conditions for development of strategic communication in RCQ when compared to

RCSA. Different cultural criteria acted to influence the divergent nature of the

actions and messaging of strategic communication between the organisations in spite

of the similarities in their social environments, particularly their relationship to the

national office of RC.


Contributions and Implications

Four contributions arise from the theoretical apparatus and methodological

commitments of this dissertation (Figure 38). The first is the central claim that an

organisation‟s culture is a significant feature in the development of an organisation‟s

strategic communication. As noted, this claim and its support from this study is an

important counter to the view in the discipline of public relations that systematic

monitoring of an organisation‟s external environmental is a key feature to ensure

organisational adaptation.

The second theoretical contribution of this study relates to the role of public

relations in the social ecology of an organisation. The third contribution relates to the

significance of organisational culture to public relations practice, and finally, the

contribution to public relations applying the methodology of progressive

contextualisation in organisational ethnography. In the following section, I discuss

these contributions and their implications.

Figure 38: Key contributions and implications presented in Chapter 7

Understanding Influences on Strategic Communication

Most fundamentally, this study explored the research problem of the role of

an organisation‟s culture on the formulation of strategic communication. I argue that

the action of cultural selection criteria operating on the collective knowledge system

(culture) of an organisation mediates strategic communication. I provide evidence


that when an organisation‟s culture is seen as a constellation of collective knowledge

structures including beliefs and values, the guiding influence of cultural selection

criteria on that knowledge system can create a significant influence on the

communicative actions and messages (strategic communication) developed by the

organisation. The identification of the influence of these cultural selection criteria

supports criticism of the pervasive view in public relations that holds that strategic

communication is principally driven by responses to external drivers in the social

environment of the organisation. Counter to this long-lived maxim, this study

provides a view that strategic communication may reflect outcomes to the action of

cultural selection in the culture of an organisation as much as it reflects imperatives

of the external social environment. In this study, I demonstrate that the culture of an

organisation should be recognised as a potentially significant influence on the

development of strategic communication by an organisation. Underpinning this

central claim and a key theoretical perspective in this study is Weick‟s classic

perspective that organisations are first and foremost sociocultural systems. This leads

to the second key contribution of this study: a contribution to understanding the role

of public relations in the social ecology of an organisation.

The Role of Public Relations in the Social Ecology of an

Organisation

In 1952, Cutlip and Center first articulated an ecological perspective for

building public relations theory to understand efforts by organisations to meet

adaptive requirements in their social environments (Cutlip, Center, & Broom, 2000).

An ecological perspective views public relations‟ contribution to strategic

communication as emerging from its boundary spanning function as mediator of the

organisation-environment relationship (see for example, Lauzen & Dozier, 1992; van

Woerkum & Aarts, 2008). This study contributes to understanding the significance

of the cultural ecology of organizing by its identification and description of the role

of culture and cultural selection in mediating organisation-environment relationship

and the influence of organisational culture on decision makers in their responses to

environmental change.


Astley and Fombrun (1983) emphasise the importance of “collective” forms

of organisational adaptation to the environment. Efforts towards organisational

adaptation is a key claim in the public relations literature, which is dominated by a

view that the nature of the organisational environment influences the role of public

relations in the organisation. For example, if the environment is turbulent, the role

of public relations in the organisation is more strategic or more powerful (see Lauzen

& Dozier, 1992). Traditional conceptualisations of the organisation-environment

relationship reinforce the dominant role the environment has on choices made for

organisational action (Astley & Fombrun, 1983).

Historically, public relations practitioners were trained in the task of

environmental scanning and analysis. However, a key imperative drawn from this

study is that practitioners should be trained in the analysis and description of an

organisation‟s culture to understand an essential context for the development of

strategic communication. Rational approaches to strategic communication

formulation remain a dominant approach in the literature (Steyn, 2007). In practice

this perspective reflects a technical and tactical approach (Stroh, 2007). While

Mintzberg and Lampel (1999) argue that strategy formulation is intuitive and

judgemental, this approach is not reflected in the public relations textbook tradition

(Steyn, 2007; Stroh, 2007). The work of this study suggests that a fundamental need

for the successful practice of the discipline of public relations is education and

training that is more explicit in cultural analysis for practitioners. Clearly

practitioners would be more equipped for the task of understanding and describing

how their work is influenced by an organisation‟s culture and reinforce the

significance of cultural selection to the development of strategic communication.

Senior management play a key role in providing stewardship in strategy

formulation while the leader (or in this case CEO), provides the discipline and

perspective for strategy (Porter, 1996). Lauzen and Dozier (1992) have previously

highlighted the role of power relationships and organisational hierarchy in executing

strategic communication, but this has not been explicitly described. With important

resonances to this study, these researchers observe:

Public relations programs will be driven by what was done in the past and

shaped by institutionalized commitments and budgets, rather than being


responsive to environmental demands. Under such conditions, the more

challenging the environment, the more rigid the organization, driven by its

history rather than by its anticipation of the future. (p. 216)

van Woerkum and Aarts (2008) argue it is the role of public relations to

guide interactions with the organisation and its environment. In doing so, they

highlight the role of the unconscious mind in the orientation process:

Our assumption is that the unconscious mind has a significant impact on

one‟s orientation ...and that, by accepting this phenomenon, raises serious

questions about how those in public relations deal in practice with the outside

world. (p. 182)

Initial work on the challenges of integrating the perspective of organisations

as sociocultural systems and the theoretical implications of organisational culture as

an evolving system of social knowledge were carried out by Everett (1985, 1990).

This study extends Everett‟s perspective by identifying cultural selection operating

on selection in organizing as a key driver to understanding the social ecology of

organisations. This study extends Weick‟s (1979) notion that the creation of causal

maps from past organisational experiences create “templates” to guide

interpretations of equivocal information. In the terms of the cultural selection model,

the mechanism that creates these templates is the action of cultural selection in

organizing.

One essential outcome of this study is set in the context of understanding the

role of cultural selection in organizing processes. This outcome is captured in the

notion that we should expect that over time the action of cultural selection criteria

would create increasing variation between local groups in a population in how they

look at, understand, and react to environmental features. This process will eventually

produce substantive differences between groups even though they face similar

environmental challenges. This is a key contribution to the public relations open

systems theory of adaptation and adjustment (Broom, 2009). In public relations,

organisational adaptation develops under the classic “monitoring” function of public

relations and is combined with significant factors related to collective knowledge


structures present in the cultural system of an organisation. We should expect that

the more tightly integrated the cultural system of an organisation (Geertz, 1973

refers to this concept as “strong cultures”) the more likely that culture, rather than

environmental variables, will be the dominant factor in the development of strategic

communication. This leads to the third contribution of the study discussed in the next

section.

Significance of Organisational Culture to Public Relations

The theoretical importance of organisational culture to public relations theory

broadly has been articulated for nearly two decades with little advancement

(Sriramesh, 2007). The importance of the concept of culture and its potential to

mediate strategy is commonplace among researchers (Everett, 1990, 2001; Grunig,

2006; Steyn, 2007; Stroh, 2007). However, there has been little advancement to

identify explicitly how such influence might actually take place. This arena is an

important part of the work of this thesis.

The collective nature of strategy development is well recognised (Andersen,

2000; Bonn, 2005). Dozier and Broom (2006) acknowledge the role of

understanding internal influences stating, „„environmental pressures matter to

strategic decision making only when the decision makers regard those pressures as

important‟‟ (p. 148). Grunig (2006) has argued that culture has potential to mediate

strategy while Bonn (2005) has called for research to go beyond exploration of the

individual and examine the group context and influences. In keeping with the view

that “normative theories based on functional models of practice do not capture the

dynamic characteristics of relationships and discursive nature of meaning, which

form the core of public relations practice” (Curtin & Gaither, 2005, p. 91), this

research contributes to understanding how culture mediates strategy through

exploring group influences of culturally mediated strategic communication. While

Everett (1985) identified the action of cultural selection in selection, this study

extends this understanding to operationalise units of cultural information by

employing Durham‟s theory of cultural selection. Thus, this study supports a view

postulated by Daft and Weick (1984) that a key aspect of organisational

communication is the “interpretive system” of an organisation. When the work of

public relations is a part of that interpretive system, it can be a mediating feature in


the social ecology of an organisation. To this end, this study explored significant

influences on that interpretive system and, in turn, the social ecology of an

organisation; cultural selection criteria acting in the selection process of organizing.

The contribution of this study to this domain adds the requirement for public

relations to not only understand the organisational and social issues, but to look at

the cultural criteria operating within the organisation to determine what role these are

playing in the current organisational response. More importantly, the study

contributes to understanding how organisational members are being influenced by

these criteria operating on the sociocultural knowledge structures within

organisations. Berger and Luckman (2004) contend that reality is socially

constructed so for public relations, the social construction of essential knowledge,

which is understanding the social environment so the organisation can respond and

adapt, is the cornerstone of practice. Organisations as a sociocultural system (system

of knowledge), when linked to models of public relations, inform our understanding

of the interplay between culture (Everett, 1993, 1996) and “underscores the

importance of understanding the system of meaning and values through which

people interpret the world and guide their actions” (Durham, 1991, p. 417).

As a prelude to the work of this study, Brown and Starkey (1994) argue

understanding culture enhances understanding of the management of information

and communication in organisations. They state “one needs to understand the culture

of an organization to make sense of that organization‟s way of managing its

communication and their information outcomes” (p. 807). While the extant

literatures in public relations tend to argue the organisational environment strongly

influences communication decision making as the organisation attempts to adapt to

its environment (Broom, 2009; Dozier & Broom, 2006; Grunig, 1992a; Grunig,

Grunig & Dozier, 2002; Lauzen, 1995; Lauzen & Dozier, 1992), Okura et al. (2009)

argue the internal characteristics of an organisation play a significant role in

influencing public relations practitioners processes of environmental scanning and

contribution to organisational decision making, and this study has furthered this

argument. The importance of understanding group influences on strategy

development, and group processes in public relations leads to the final

methodological contribution of this study; the use of progressive contextualisation

and organisational ethnography in public relations research.


The Use of Progressive Contextualisation and Organisational

Ethnography in Public Relations Research

This study documents that use of the technique of “progressive

contextualisation” in organisational ethnographic studies can enhance description

and understanding of the influence of knowledge systems and structures on that

social ecology. The use of multi-sited ethnographic studies is not a new phenomenon

in organisational research (see for example, Ybema, et al., 2009). While ethnography

is not widely used in public relations research (Daymon & Holloway, 2011; L'Etang,

et al., 2010; Sriramesh, 2007), there have been growing calls for differentiation in

methodology (Ihlen & van Ruler, 2009). Employing the technique of progressive

contextualisation facilitates the study of the social ecology of organisations because

it permits, in its design, the exploration of adaptive efforts across different analytical

layers – from individuals, through small groups, to the larger setting of the

organisation itself. These analytical opportunities must be aligned to the well

described problems of crossing different levels of analysis in a research study.

However, continued development of the analytical technique will contribute to

refinement of the method. This study is a contribution to those methodological

refinements.

Philosophical Bearings: Reflections on Doing Ethnography

Denzin and Lincoln (2008) refer to a qualitative researcher as a “bricoleur”

(p. 5) and provide an analogy of the researcher as quilt maker who assembles images

into montages. Like a bricoleur, I was trying to capture the complexity of social life

at RCQ to assemble, then interpret, the cultural elements influence on the

development of RCQ‟s strategic communication. To achieve this, I used an

interpretive framework to understand social reality (Bhattacharya, 2008).

I earlier stated that my challenge as an ethnographer was “not to determine

the truth but to reveal the multiple truths apparent in others lives” (Emerson, et al.,

1995, p. 3). These truths, according to Denzin and Lincoln (1998), can be displayed

in many forms. This also creates potential for tensions to be raised in the thesis about

what is known as “truths” known from a positivist perspective versus what was


“discovered and socially negotiated”. An important question to ask is if any of these

tensions existed in my bricolage.

The positivist-interpretivist debate “revolves around ways human behaviour

should be conceptualised and studied” (Prus, 1996, p. 4) . A positivist orientation

emphasises ordering observations in manners amenable to quantification and

mathematical modelling and attempts to explicate causal relations (Prus, 1996).

While positivist paradigms focus on causes and effects, constructivists focus on

emergent understandings and socially constructed reality (Denzin, 2009).

Interpretivists envision human group life as interactive and socially constituted

(Prus, 1996). So I questioned, did my mapping of knowledge structures and cultural

criteria emphasise the only truth as order and subscribe to a positivist approach?

Hammersley (2002) argues the way people in a group construct their social

world is central to an ethnographers approach. Interpretivists understand that the

human experience is rooted in people‟s meanings, interpretations, activities, and

interactions” (Prus, 1996, p. 9). So while the mapping of the knowledge structures

may be perceived as an ordered, stable and quantifiable modelling of RCQ‟s cultural

knowledge, the intention (or tension) is to represent the socially negotiated meanings

that organise group life at RCQ. Denzin (1989) notes steps to interpretation include

deconstruction, capture, bracketing, construction, contextualisation (p. 27). The

mapping represents part of this process.

One of the most singular and significant attributes of cultural knowledge is

that it operates as shared social knowledge, or knowledge that is socially negotiated

and accepted. To understand this attribute, Durham (1992) requires that the

ethnographer undertake both immersion in the organisation and a researcher‟s

perspective to be able to identify cultural knowledge when it is encountered.

I found I was questioning whether my ethnography had fallen into a category that

Denzin (1997) claims organises current ethnographic assumptions, arguing “the

modernist ethnographic text presumes a stable external social reality that can be

recorded by a stable, objective, scientific observer...(p. 31). Following this, Denzin

(2009) notes reality is only known within the context it is situated.

The writer presents a particular and unique self in the text: ... However the

rules for presenting this self are no longer clear. Krieger comments: „The

challenge lies in what each of us chooses to do when we represent our


experiences. Whose rules do we follow? Do we make our own? Do we...

have the guts to say, „You may not like it, but here I am‟(1991: 244) (p. 89).

Traditionally in interpretive research meaning is disclosed, discovered, and

experienced (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998). In my ethnographic account, I became

increasingly aware of the words I used to express what I found were aligned with my

philosophical bearings. The importance of using correct linguistic expression that is

aligned with the researcher‟s philosophical traditions is highlighted by Winch (1990)

who argues that “the elucidation of a concept, is, to a large extent, the clearing up of

linguistic confusions” (p. 11). Fine et al., (2009) recognise different traditions inform

ethnography in sociology and management, with management focused more on

explicit applied links. Recognising this difference, and my discipline‟s foundations

in business, made me more aware of my choices in language, and in some sections,

required changes with the intention to resolve these tensions.

Other challenges emerged around “doing ethnography”. The speed at which I

felt immersed in the organisation presented unanticipated challenges. The first

challenge was to overcome feelings of being overwhelmed with data (I discovered

that in an examination of culture, everything could serve as some form of cultural

data). To mitigate this problem, it was essential for me to learn to remain focused on

the core organising concepts of my research. While Hammersley (1990) encourages

this to explore areas previously unanticipated or unknown, the reality was that I

needed to maintain a focus around my central research problem and the discipline

required for this.

The second challenge was managing the varying levels of personal

relationships I had with participants. Being part of their working world challenged

the relationship roles I initially established between myself as a researcher and their

realities as employees of RC in my research. As the organisation was undergoing a

reform process, the data was sometimes weighted by these change processes.

The third challenge I had to confront was to meet the dual expectations of

generating a research report worthy of a PhD thesis and reporting truthfully without

harm to the generous and hard working people in RC. This latter imperative quickly

shaped how I thought about my ethnographic data and how I related to it.


For me as a ethnographer, the experience of “doing” ethnography highlighted

the importance of specific skills and knowledge documented in classic texts (see for

example, Fetterman, 2010; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). However these texts

rarely reported on a post ethnography period in which there were examples of the

sorts of learning that accompanied the ethnographic enterprise. My learnings from

doing ethnography included, first, the importance of strong interpersonal skills to

build trust in participant relationships. I achieved this level of success in establishing

productive, meaningful, and appropriate relationships. Second, taking a non-

participative stance was challenging initially but in the end, it was the right decision.

Non-participation allowed me to maintain perspective by not having to invest in any

outcome of the participation for the organisation. While professionally at times I

could easily see a solution, it was more important that I maintained the sanctity of

my role to move between etic and emic perspectives (Hammersley & Atkinson,

2007).

Perhaps one of the most important points of recognition about doing

organisational ethnography was understanding that observed life in an organisation

moves quickly, and by its nature, generates enormous amounts of data. The capacity

to manage and analyse this data required I develop a high level of intellectual

stamina and personal discipline to maintain records, continuously reflect and

document conceptualisations of meaning in memoing, and remain alert to something

new or different within the setting after time.

In reflection, I have found that the use of ethnography as a method to explore

cultural phenomena and the actions and beliefs of individuals who are situated in that

culture was a crucial methodological choice for me. I learned to understand both the

struggle as well as the importance of the ethnographic enterprise in organisations as

a way to understand such settings. Only after reflecting on the study as a process can

I articulate what I would do differently. First, I would interview much later in the

journey because only after time was I more deeply aware of some of the

complexities of the setting. By interviewing early, I missed the opportunity to ask all

participants about these observations. Second, I would spend more time on thinking

about my questions so I could ask better questions. In my fieldwork, opportunities to

gain deeper understanding of a situation where not fully realised because I simply

didn‟t ask the right questions. Third, I would allow more time for participant


reflections about my discoveries in their setting. While I did do this in my study with

some participants, allowing more time to this with the whole group could have

provided deeper insights.

Finally, one of the most important points of integration for my theoretical

model and the ethnographic approach I employed was the reinforcement for a central

provision of Weick‟s (1969, 1979) sociocultural model of organizing – the notion

that sense making is done retrospectively. This notion was borne out both in terms of

my participants‟ views about their organisation, but also by the extended reflections

on the ethnographic data that my analysis required. These sorts of experiences

suggest that my learnings from this experience will shadow and shape any future

ethnographic adventures.

Limitations of the Research

A number of limitations of this research are recognised. The first relates to

the constraints on the claims that can be made from the use of organisational

ethnography to explore the quality of a theory. This study‟s descriptive goals were

limited by the temporal nature of the ethnographic enterprise. An organisational

ethnography is a portrait set in a particular time with particular players. These

attributes limit the range of the epistemological claims that are possible and

meaningful across other settings no matter the similarities. However, based on the

ethnographic goal of rich description, and following the lengthy intellectual history

of the practice of ethnology, the ethnographic enterprise does serve as a means of

building foundations for comparative analysis, which can inform the quality of

thought about other settings. Thus, the power of ethnography in the exploration of

theory is not captured by its ability to falsify or verify such theory, but rather by its

ability to provide a thick description, which by itself, may help inform other, similar

descriptive enterprises.

The use of ethnography to answer the key research problem of exploring the

influence of cultural selection on strategic communication provides a limitation in

the context of established discipline approaches to exploring strategic

communication. The length of time available to the researcher accessing the

organisation were generated by the limitations of the researcher to spend unlimited

amounts of time particularly in RCSA, which is geographically remote from the


researcher‟s home (more than 2000 kilometres). The distance also meant limited

ability to revisit RCSA. This geographical constraint meant that the depth of

organisational data could only be used to enrich understanding of the RCQ setting

rather than allow it to stand alone as a site.

The third limitation relates to the researcher as an instrument and the multiple

realities that exist within a setting. While it has been well documented that

ethnography is interpretation, (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007; Rabinow, 1977; van

Maanen, 2006), the limitation of the researcher interpreting and retelling the account

presents one account of events. While ethnographers address these concerns through

making their assumptions explicit, it remains a factor that can bias data collected

(Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007; Lofland, et al., 2006).

Finally, while the selection of the three organisational settings reflected a

choice made to best meet the needs of the study, the discovery of the high turnover

in the MFC unit in RCQ had implications for the strength of the cultural units acting

in the organisation.

Opportunities for Future Research

This research offers important implications for future research. Cultural

studies of public relations practice promise to yield greater understanding of

ecological practices of public relations and offer five clear research opportunities

from this perspective. First, cultural studies exploring the role of cultural selection in

contexts of practice where external consultancies are called in to organisations to

take an expert prescriber role (Broom, 1982). The action of cultural selection would

then not be applied to enactment of environmental change, but of the display from

the consultant.

Second, further research would also afford an opportunity to explore the

interaction of organisational and the consulting organisation‟s cultural criteria in the

formulation and adoption of strategic advice. This would extend understanding of

cultural influences into processes and influences on strategic communication. In the

context of strategic communication, a core domain of public relations practice

(Vasquez & Taylor, 2000), the dominant theme of empirical research focuses on

rational, planning approaches in practice. More focus on a social systems perspective

of public relations founded on an ecological approach is needed to identify, for


example, interdependencies of organisations and others (such as consultants, other

agents, and the media) in their environments (Broom, 2009).

Third, while this research developed depth cases of autonomous divisional

settings of one organisation, further research is needed to more fully understand the

role of cultural criteria across different organisations to investigate such things as

cultural isomorphism across industry populations.

Forth, for strategy development, an ethnographic study focusing on senior

public relations practitioners in sense making of environmental conditions and

internal decision-making processes would yield greater understanding of this

dynamic and little understood phenomenon. The use of ethnography employing

progressive contextualisation, offers organisational researchers the opportunity to

follow public relations practitioners to identify and follow processes and influences

on the formulation of strategic communication, beyond the cultural influences

identified in this study.

Finally, while this study focused on RCQ from January 2008 to June 2009,

the study also documented RC‟s intention to reform. Returning to RCQ following

the establishment and embedding of these reforms to explore if the knowledge

structures uncovered in the first study remain, would provide valuable understanding

of the strength and durability of these cultural criteria operating as social knowledge

over time.

Summary

McKie (2001) lamented nearly a decade ago that public relations theory

remains isolated in its body of knowledge, networks and associations, particularly

noting a lack of contribution from social sciences, including cultural anthropology.

This study has responded to McKie‟s challenge by drawing on social science,

particularly cultural anthropology, to contribute to building discipline knowledge of

the role of cultural criteria in one of the public relations discipline‟s core domains of

practice; strategic communication.

Understanding the role of culture in the practice of public relations has been

recognised as important but scarcely studied. This study has contributed to

understanding cultural influences on the formulation of strategic communication that

result from the dynamic collective interplay of organisational members and cultural


selection in an organisational context. The guiding influence of cultural selection on

the beliefs and values that constitute an organisation‟s culture found strategic

communication reflects the action of the process of cultural selection as much as it

reflects perceived imperatives in the organisation‟s social environment

The implications of this study reinforce the value of a sociocultural

perspective in which an understanding of organisational culture generally, and the

action of related cultural selection criteria specifically, is fundamental to any effort

to describe and influence the social ecology of organisations. The study also

contributes to understanding the role of internal organisational factors that shape

communication with stakeholders (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2001).

With additional research in this area, we may well find that the historical

emphasis on scanning and monitoring of environmental factors is a less essential

task for effective public relations practice than the practitioner‟s competency in the

analysis of cultural processes within an organisation.


Postscript

In keeping with the limitations to the ethnographic enterprise I discussed, the

RC in 2010 is a very different RC to the one I entered in January 2008. Some may

say that if cultural selection was acting within the organisation, it would not be

different. However the reforms that were part of folklore when I entered the

organisation (“they want to change, but nothing will really change” Member 6, Qld),

were implemented ahead of the published schedule by the national management

team. The reform was imposed and can be classified as transformational change

(Cohen, 1999). State-based MFC roles were nationalised with reporting being

removed from the state divisional management. This occurred formally in July 2009.

The MFC function nationally was restructured and all state-based positions in MFC

were made redundant and staff were encouraged to reapply for new national defined

positions. New reporting lines, newly defined areas of responsibility and new

strategic directions were part of the new way of doing things. While I officially

ceased collecting data when the change was implemented, I continued my interest in

RC. I noted a difference in both internal communication (via email from the national

leadership team) and as a response to climate surveys. It would be interesting to re-

enter the organisation to see if change had created new cultural criteria. That,

however, is another study.

References 322

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Appendices 339

Appendices

Appendix A – Domestic Activations of RC

Activation of RC (source: CEO Report to AGM November 2008).

Domestic (Australia only) (yellow is QLD RC )

Activation 2008

January 2008

WA Bushfires

Tropical Cyclone Helen (NT): (between Port Keats and Darwin.

NSW North Coast Floods: Kyogle area / Cabbage Tree Island.

Jan/ Feb 2008

Mackay/ Emerald/ Charleville Flooding (Qld):

Flooding in Gold Coast, Beaudesert, Townsville, Mackay, Charleville,

Emerald, several small central western towns and Rockhampton.

February 2008

Tropical Cyclone Nicholas (Western Australia) (stood down)

September 2008

Woollahra Fire - Woollahra NSW - exclusion zone due to Hazardous

materials

Methane leak, Cranbourne Victoria

Brisbane Storms – November 2008

Activation 2009 - (source: CEO Report to AGM November 2009).

February

Victorian Bushfires

SA heatwave

April

Mid north coast NSW floods

May South East Qld flooding

May-June NSW Northern River Floods

April-June H1N1 Influenza coordinated response

Appendices 340

Appendix B – Fieldwork protocol, Interview and observation guide

1. Interviews

The interview guide follows King (2004) and Charmaz (2007) and will be semi

structured, facilitated by the researcher to initially focus/ prompt on key events

identified from individual interviews, or previously identified by the researcher from

population intelligence. For each event, similar questions will be probed.

1. Your role – what do you do here?

2. What are your role responsibilities?

3. Describe how you think your role impacts on the organisation?

Probe: how does your job make the organisation more or less successful?

4. In your organisation‟s external operating environment, what factors does the

organisation need to pay attention to? (note, if several factors noted by

interviewee, each will be explored separately)

5. Why is this factor important?

Probe: Important to you

Probe: Important to the organisation?

6. How does the organisation monitor this factor?

7. Did you play a role in monitoring, analysing, or responding to this?

Probe: If yes, why. If no, why?

8. Can you describe the steps you took in this?

9. Can you describe what influenced these steps

10. What is important to you (values and beliefs) about your job?

11. Can you describe the organisational culture here?

Probe: can you describe some examples of these elements

12. What are the values, beliefs or behaviours that this organisation rewards?

13. What about the ones they don‟t reward?

14. What are the hidden values that the organisation nurtures but doesn‟t

necessarily want to put out there?

15. Recently this event occurred, what actually happened here?

16. How did the organisational respond?

17. Why did/didn‟t the organisation respond – what influenced this process – do

you think the culture we spoke about before influenced this process (get

detail here)?

18. Ok, now I want you to think about this event, what happened here?

19. How did the organisational respond?

20. Why did/didn‟t the organisation respond – what influenced this process – do

you think the culture we spoke about before influenced this process (get

detail here)?

Appendices 341

2. Observation

Observation will focus on studying the process or phenomenon (Charmaz, 2007)

of meetings and interactions in situations where communication decision making and

environmental analysis is taking place. Observation records will be explicit,

containing reference to participant roles, interactions, routines, temporal elements,

interpretations and the social organisation and may shift from broad to specific or

selected observations (Adler & Adler, 1998). The observation strategy will be to

maintain a passive presence, being unobtrusive and non interacting with actors in the

setting (Marshall & Rossman, 1999) to minimise any distortion. The researcher will

reveal her identity and overall purpose of research to all participants. The researcher

acknowledges the legal and ethical responsibilities associated with observation and

recognises the confidential nature of some interactions. This will be responded to in

more detail in the ethics section of this report.

Observation settings will include scenes where decision and sense making occur,

or opportunistic settings (Adler & Adler, 1998) as the situation arises for the

researcher when present in the organisation. Observation will be conducted by

attending meetings, in situ decision making and sitting with the executive. These

have initially been identified as settings with the communication manager, meetings

such as executive, business unit and communication staff meetings, briefings and

other strategy meetings or occasions. The timing and frequency of observation will

occur over a one-month period in each organisation, however will be guided by the

data generated and theoretical sampling. For example, if new observation data

generate theoretical saturation, then observations will cease (Glaser, 1992).

A proforma or tick sheet has been developed after initial observations to facilitate

accurate capture of observational data. Adler and Adler (1998) suggest observation

produces great rigor when combined with other methods. Validity will be enhanced

through testing and triangulating data with other data collected, seeking evidence of

disconfirming cases (Adler & Adler, 1998). Table 3 provides a summary of

observational data and examples of the types of observations anticipated

(Cunningham, 1993). Table 5 provides an example of a field observation template:

Observational

data

Example

Tasks Functions of the individuals

Functions of key groups

Relationships of members in different settings

Actions/ behaviours of key members in different

settings

Evidence of legitimate and illegitimate roles

Settings Descriptions of settings (evidence of cultural

artifacts – power, roles)

Behaviours and

consequences

Behaviours and rituals during meetings

Behaviours relating to subculture vs. corporate

culture

Behaviours relating to cultural beliefs

Timing and

sequencing

Frequencies of actions and events

Identifying time patterns of behaviours

Unique events, Any item that is unique, out of the ordinary as

Appendices 342

actions, outcomes identified by actors or researcher

3. FIELD OBSERVATION PROFORMA (initial anticipated)

DATE: TIME:

SETTING:

PARTICIPANTS:

Tasks : Individual /

groups

Relationships

Actions/ behaviours

Roles

Settings

Behaviours /

consequences

Behaviours / rituals

Timing and

sequencing

Frequency

Identifying time

patterns of

behaviours

Unique

Other

Appendices 343

Appendices 344

4. FIELD OBSERVATION NOTES

DATE: TIME: SETTING:

PARTICIPANTS:

OBSERVATION / Activity/ Event Reflection/ Memo

Appendices 345

Appendix C – Red Cross Organisational Chart

Appendices 346

Appendix D – Fundamental Principles

Red Cross as a branch of the British Red Cross at the outbreak of the First World

War with the primary aim of supporting sick and wounded soldiers. It is part of the

largest humanitarian network in the world- an international network of the 186 RC

and Red Crescent societies which began in the 19th century. The National Societies

have established a federation based in Geneva and Australia is represented on its

Governing Board. Globally, national RC and Red Crescent Societies, the

International Federation and the ICRC are the most significant non-governmental

actors in the health and social welfare sector, during conflicts, disasters and at other

times.

RC provide over 70 community services ranging from blood services; school

breakfast programs; support programs for people with mental illness; and disaster

support. Voluntary service is one of the fundamental principles on which RC and the

global RC Red Crescent Movement is based. RC employs approximately 1000 staff

and services are delivered by over 30,000 volunteers. Worldwide the Movement has

in the order of 97 million volunteers (RC , 2008).

Fundamental Principles

Humanity

The International RC and Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire to bring

assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavours, in

its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering

wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and ensure respect

for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, co-operation and

lasting peace amongst all people.

Impartiality

It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or

political opinions. It endeavours to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided

solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.

Neutrality

In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not

take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial,

religious or ideological nature.

Independence

The Movement is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in

the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their

respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able

at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the Movement.

Voluntary Service

It is a voluntary relief movement not prompted in any manner by desire for

gain.

Unity

There can be only one RC or Red Crescent Society in any one country. It

must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory.

Universality

Appendices 347

The International RC and Red Crescent Movement, in which all Societies

have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other, is

worldwide. (Red Cross Strategy 2010)

Appendices 348

Appendix E – Coding nodes (NVivo 7/8/9)

Crisis

A crisis brings structure and tighter controls A crisis gives you an excuse not to get other stuff done

A crisis provides an opportunity for RC to reinvent _ reposition_

re establish itself

Crisis brings a sense of purpose and energy normally missing

In a crisis the organisation is actively involved at all levels

In a crisis the purpose of the organisation comes into focus In a crisis, it doesn‟t matter if I am exhausted

In a crisis, there is only one thing to think about

It is soulless in a crisis what happens in a crisis is different we have to protect

You need to do things differently in a crisis

Change and reviews

Bottom up change _it should come from the staff Change has been poorly managed_is a mess

get flogged if you go in to hard (change) It is too big a task

No communication about change

filter down from top

heard a rumour

Nothing will really change and nothing will

not get what they want

rushing to change

a quick fix

we are victims in major organisational turmoil Change to control or manage power

Change structure to change way of doing things New systems to cope with change

paraphrasing, disempowering and disruptive to the org

States are not really involved in the reviews States won‟t be able to do what they want anymore

change will be a challenge to implement

Change will be bad

Before we changed it was better

Confronting Derailed by those people

Fear of change

Halted _Unsure_ uncertainity resistance to change

tensions with change

Change will be good

change will improve the way we do things

Excited about change

expectations go with change It has got to happen

How long do we have to wait for it to change

slow and gentle

Still have a long way to go to change

If we don‟t get on board with new technology we are doomed Influence the outcome (of change)

is an excuse

Our original instruction for brand change People recruited to deliberately change way things are done

RC is still trying to come to grips with the change

Restructuring and reviews Take people with you on your journey

Trying to do it different or change

Appendices 349

Church_like

working in a church

Communication

and planning

Adhoc communication

Advocacy campaigns audiences need to connect with beneficiary image in collateral

based on what we did historically

Beneficiary focus of messages biggest number of hits of any charity

Board want campaigns but cut the budget

Business plan Campaign based work

campaigns not working_not reaching stakeholders

Comm strategy explicit Communication actions

Communication disciplines at RC are not the right mix

community versus product driven complexity around communication with s_holders

coms not marketing based

driven by executive team Events make no money

Information overload for people

didn‟t buy into the plan Local messages confuse people

Making website user-friendly

Red Cross doesn‟t know what it wants from the website

The web highlighted the flaws in RC states vs. national Messaging

Missed opportunity

National are not as effective as states New projects require new ways_not always easy

No budget to do things properly

Not or need to be strategic in coms People think we are quite sophisticated in comms but we are not

Red Cross Calling

A PR positioning exercise

Doesn‟t let people know what we do at RC

Is our main engagement with volunteers Makes people want to leave because they know it‟s

coming and it is too hard

Not serving its purpose_out of date as a fundraising activity

Reinforces an old, outdated image

spending too much money saving money around communication

Sponsors and partners

Talk to people about what the org does targets

seniors young people

we have improved in the quality of our coms

we need to get out there We need to package collateral to speak to donors

we need to talk about more than just crisis and international

we sort of form ourselves around the business Complexity of

organisation

Diversity of services costs too much and dilutes the brand

We don‟t really know what we are

CULTURE - expressions of

9 different cultures A blame culture

A taskforce of people without right focus

Accuracy is rewarded

Appendices 350

Ad Hoc_ fluid Organic_ inefficient

Mechanistic and not organic

ambiguity and inconsistent

Analogy - Sinking ship_ bus_ switchboard etc anchored - bedded down

Anglo Saxon white workforce - mainstream

inspirational assumption that everyone knows how it works

aversion to conflict

Avoid documenting become disengaged (working here)

Become more serious _ cannot be silly anymore

Being articulate - able to argue a point being careful because of consequences

blame and bullying culture are different

Blame mentality Bully culture

can do culture

cancel meetings cant collaborate

Can‟t speak out or make waves

closed-door Collaborative work_consultation _conversation

Competitive

Complacency complicated and difficult relationship

Confuse collaboration with consensus Covering our own back, justifying

CRAP

defend yourself detail - RC can‟t deal with detail

dirty politics

discrimination doesn‟t like people who are parochial

doesn‟t like small thinkers

Don‟t learn from our experiences_no documenting don‟t say anything strong enough or controversial enough

Don‟t talk about things publically

double standards exploits vulnerability

fast paced

Fear and conflict and bad stuff

aversion to conflict

Avoid documenting being careful because of consequences

blame and bullying culture are different

Blame mentality Bully culture

Can‟t speak out or make waves

Competitive complicated and difficult relationship

conflict and infighting

Covering our own back, justifying defend yourself

dirty politics

dislike double standards

exploits vulnerability

Fear of game playing

Getting into trouble

got away with it (performance accountability) governance

Hiding weakness

intolerance It not a comfortable place to work.

Lenient work ethics

looking bad mediocrity

Mistakes

Nasty behaviour

Appendices 351

Not happy

Poor judgement Punish you for challenging CEO

Punitive - deal with bad behaviour

Quiet people are weak routine and process_least resistant

take a stand on this fight

tension to scared to say no

Under mining authority power etc

Use it as ammunition Fear of

game playing

Gender Getting into trouble

got away with it (performance accountability)

governance growth - organic and accidental

Hiding weakness

honesty identified as a problem

Ignoring warning

Innovation - or not Internal problems our biggest hurdle

intolerance

Intuition It not a comfortable place to work.

Knowing - how to do things or what people do Knowing or not knowing where you stand

knowledge

assumption that everyone knows how it works

Knowing - how to do things or what people do

Knowing or not knowing where you stand Listen- don‟t want to

not sharing knowledge_keep it to yourself

Lenient work ethics Listen- don‟t want to

looking bad

Mechanistic and not organic mediocrity

mediocrity and concession

MFC is working ok Mistakes

Nasty behaviour

No red cross way of doing things not an INTERNAL service culture

Not happy

not sharing knowledge_keep it to yourself open, encouraging respected

passion and a belief in the organisation

People are shocked working here Personal opinions and views

Poor dress code

poor internal culture generally Poor judgement

Punish you for challenging CEO

Punitive - deal with bad behaviour putting up a smoke screen

Quiet people are weak

Risk We are very careful

routine and process_least resistant

Self-imposition~ Sophistication - low level of...

subcultures

take a stand on this fight Tall poppy syndrome of RC

tension

to scared to say no Trust or not

Under mining authority power etc

Use it as ammunition

Appendices 352

Views about culture (ways of doing things around here)

Waffly we need to modernise but keep our history

We need to work outside the square_ break the rules at times

we see ourselves a little differently Documenting gives structure and takes off pressure

efficient and well run organisation

Environment

Branches don‟t follow the 7 principles

Chaotic or changing environment Competitors are clearer in what they do

Competitors

Competitors are clearer in what they do

Don‟t take the light from other organisations

we have greater potential to achieve more we need to be out there like the competitors

We operate in a highly competitive environment

counts only from the media criteria for environmental scanning

Doesn‟t pay attention to global environment

Donors

Donors do not vary by state - they are the same

Donors have some engagement with us already Donors vary regional vs. metropolitan

don‟t really have the analytical skills Don‟t take the light from other organisations

Env scanning

counts only from the media

criteria for environmental scanning

Doesn‟t pay attention to global environment don‟t really have the analytical skills

formal process

haven‟t got one that works It is hard to get this information

It is national responsibility

Media issues Not formally

relationships with key people

secondary research of environmental information

Media issues relationships with key people

secondary research

twice a year research Fundraising

Donors





New ways of fundraising

Transactional view of stakeholders Evaluation_

Performance

A sense of relief that no one complains

EDs don‟t like being held accountable

no accountability_Evaluation_not outcomes performance or deliverable focused

Not paid to evaluate, paid to deliver

Our competitors evaluate better Poor performance is rewarded

The need for accountability and transparency with stakeholders is

scary

Appendices 353

we need to be clear and transparent and we cant

Will be doing research nationally evolved to...

Feel like one

red cross

cultural and system change for one red cross

The reality of One Red Cross is different Fragile

organisation

Fundraising

Admin cost of fundraising

cant publicise some services because people won‟t donate to them Corporate fundraising National is organised

Corporate fundraising needs to be flexible

Hard to get corporate dollars Hate Planned giving people_ Street walkers

Org twists itself to meet the funding

People don‟t want to donate to things they don‟t understand RC fundraising needs a complete overhaul

They won‟t listen_ Old ways still make money

get our house in order and then

they will come

Global organisation

_impacts on all Red Cross

brand

ICRC huge, cumbersome and not flexible In a powerful position to influence

Does too

much_ Red Cross

ambitious

Avoids associated with bad news Goal or trying to be

Govt knows we won‟t take concerns to the street

Govt wants to see us as one organisation haven‟t got one that works

How I feel about working in RC

A great organisation to work for

A lot of things we do are groovy Attractive (Red Cross is...)

Does important or amazing work

Humane organisation to work for I feel supported and protected in what I do

Love my job

Part of the team RC is a good place to work

Red Cross is solid, reliable, reputable, credible, held in

high esteem This is what I thought Red Cross was going to be like

A lot of things we do are groovy

A Negative comments_ to work for Business valued over staff

challenge working here

colleagues bitching - not a humanitarian way disorganised

Fractured and no team work

Get disillusioned I didn‟t feel supported in that situation

I feel anonymous because of the hierarchy

just want to do the job and go home Need to justify why they are here

no connection between looking after staff and what we

do NO PD or training

nobody wants to support anybody of anything_not my

job

Appendices 354

People criticise others

People desperately want to be loyal but can't personality driven organisation_who you know not

what_who you are

Poor staff morale PPR tokenistic

Working at Red Cross is a challenge_ many obstacles

You have to be patient_ tolerant_ resilient to work at RC

capacity not fixed when people leave

Easy org to get a job in Holding back_not using my skills and knowledge

No respect

People ride on my coat tails poor or negative comments about capacity

positive or good comments about capacity

While dysfunctional, there is a lot of professionalism Attractive (Red Cross is...)

Believe in what we do despite the issues we face

burnt out Business valued over staff

Cannot keep good people

capacity not fixed when people leave challenge working here

colleagues bitching - not a humanitarian way

come to get a foot in the door Cost of staff

credibility and capacity

disorganised

Does important or amazing work Don't have the right people (See capacity)

Don‟t look after staff_exploit or not value

Don‟t need so many hands on deck now Don‟t want to add extra stress

driven by...

Easy org to get a job in exhausted so let it go...

expectations of staff not met

Fractured and no team work Get disillusioned

get frustrated and leave

Get no or little rewards or recognition Get recognised at the highest level

Getting it done relies on personal motivation not

process Hard to keep good staff with poor pay

harness for good not evil_keep spirits up

high staff turnover Holding back_not using my skills and knowledge

Humane organisation to work for

I didn‟t feel supported in that situation I feel anonymous because of the hierarchy

I feel supported and protected in what I do

I need to respect other workers workload Inexperience

Internal culture doesn‟t support staff

Issues It is isolating as a role

job insecurity

join RC because you care about Social Justice issues just pile more work on top

just want to do the job and go home

Lack of confidentiality, lack of fairness and equitability. Lack re to defend ourselves

Lethargy in doing normal business

likes people who are pragmatic, resourceful and work hard

looks good on a cv that you worked at RC

Loss of intellectual property Loss of sharpness

Love BUT...

Appendices 355

Believe in what we do despite the issues we face

Not in a position to be heard Love my job

making a difference motivation for working at RC

Media team is working the best Motivated by helping people_not loyalty to Red Cross

as a brand

Motivation for working here My knowledge is claimed by someone else_I am not

visible

My longevity at RC helps me to survive My staff do not perpetuate a blame culture

My state is different

Need to do more Need to justify why they are here

Need to pull people together to make them see this is

one org New staff influence

No career path in RC

no connection between looking after staff and what we do

NO PD or training

No respect nobody wants to support anybody of anything_not my

job

Not doable Not in a position to be heard

Not investing in staff not a priority Not tapping into talent

Not upset anyone here at RC

organisational capacity Overworked slammed heavy workload

exhausted so let it go... just pile more work on top

Loss of sharpness

Not doable too much to do_I am busy

Part of the team

People criticise others People desperately want to be loyal but can't

People don‟t understand what MFC does in QLD

People in RC talk from an uninformed position People ride on my coat tails

People work here because they expect a little bit more

personality driven organisation_who you know not what_who you are

poor or negative comments about capacity

People who are needy work for red cross

Poor pay discussions

Salaries are arbitary_not skill responsibility based

Poor re limits what we can do in terms of Comms

Poor staff morale positive or good comments about capacity

PPR tokenistic

Privileged position Proud

RC are trustworthy_let us get on with our work_do

question us_we are RC RC doesn‟t care and is not concerned about people here

RC is a good place to work

RC makes it difficult to have a relationship with other staff

Really don‟t want to leave

Red Cross is solid, reliable, reputable, credible, held in high esteem

Red Cross people

Reporting and achievement Resourcing

Lack re to defend ourselves

Appendices 356

Not investing in staff not a priority

organisational capacity Poor re limits what we can do in terms of Comms

Reporting and achievement

Retention

burnt out

Cannot keep good people come to get a foot in the door

Cost of staff

Don't have the right people (See capacity) Don‟t look after staff_exploit or not value

get frustrated and leave

Hard to keep good staff with poor pay high staff turnover

Internal culture doesn‟t support staff

job insecurity looks good on a cv that you worked at RC

Loss of intellectual property

New staff influence No career path in RC

RC doesn‟t care and is not concerned about people here

Really don‟t want to leave staff are pulled in lots of different directions

Staff retention is a national issue - not a SA issue

try to keep staff works too hard

You are not important _happy to let you leave Reward and recognition

Get no or little rewards or recognition Get recognised at the highest level

Need to do more

Self esteem and praise self-preservation

You have to show success before it is supported

Role and working

driven by...

exhausted so let it go... expectations of staff not met

Inexperience

Issues join RC because you care about Social Justice issues

just pile more work on top

Loss of sharpness making a difference motivation for working at RC

Not doable

Overworked slammed heavy workload

People work here because they expect a little bit more

Privileged position Proud

Some people could not cope with the lack of...

Staff focus is too narrow Staffing

too much to do_I am busy

unique of jobs done Way to survive

we work to do the best we can

When you work at Red Cross, you need to put your own views aside

Working style

Salaries are arbitary_not skill responsibility based Self esteem and praise

self-preservation

Some people could not cope with the lack of... staff are pulled in lots of different directions

Staff focus is too narrow

Staff retention is a national issue - not a SA issue Staffing

This is what I thought Red Cross was going to be like

too much to do_I am busy

Appendices 357

try to keep staff

unique of jobs done Way to survive

we work to do the best we can

When you work at Red Cross, you need to put your own views aside

While dysfunctional, there is a lot of professionalism

Working at Red Cross is a challenge_ many obstacles Working style

works too hard

You are not important _happy to let you leave You have to be patient_ tolerant_ resilient to work at

RC

You have to show success before it is supported I need to work at keeping the AusAid relationship good

I think the competition are disingenuous and I can‟t stand them

Indigenous and mental health It is hard to get this information

It is national responsibility

Media issues New ways of fundraising

People have little understanding of RC values

People often misunderstand what RC is doing but we always have an answer

people think we are Christian charity

People think we are disorganised people think we are government

People want to bring red cross down Peoples experience of red cross varies

Public opinion

RC doesn‟t capitalise on vulnerability to sell its message RC doesn‟t get it right all the time

RC has obligations to do certain things

RC is a long way behind other NFPs RC is brave

RC is going in the right direction_impatient

RC steps in where others don‟t_ Red Cross can do things other orgs cant

Red Cross has done and should be doing

Red Cross is like working in a third world country Red Cross_NFP attitude or way

Geneva way Red Cross language or lingo

relationships with key people

Rural donors support domestic activities Sees itself as fundraisers and not in a competitive business world'

Stakeholders

academically defined

Are a risk_governance

Are not valued Are old

Blood service

Branches - a dying model Branches - A huge risk to reputation

Branches work hard

Branches don‟t understand why we changed cant _ don‟t engage with young people

change will impact on volunteers and branches

cracks starting to show_Old member base defined by age

defined by position description

defined by service user Don‟t agree or view the same way

Expectations of branches not met by RC

First for Red Cross Give us money

Government

In the past Indigenous program

First for Red Cross

Indigenous person to lead is important

Appendices 358

Indigenous person to lead is important

Interfere with RC work or direction Membership profile is changing to reflect society

Not compliant

Not paying attention to s/holders old turf wars

people who need to respect us for international work

RC attitudes to branches is changing or has changed RC changed the way they serviced branches

RC doesn‟t care about branches they want them to all

leave Some volunteers join for social not work reasons and

this is a problem

Some volunteers think we are a basket case staff

stakeholders are old, english, white Australian

traditional stakeholders are the same in all states but some react

more conservatively

treat as individuals not households unsophisticated analysis

views of s/holders based on personal experiences

Vols don‟t understand where we are going volunteer based organisation and volunteer board

Volunteers can help in daily work load

Volunteers members and Branches

Are a risk_governance Are not valued

Are old

Branches - a dying model Branches - A huge risk to reputation

Branches work hard

Branches don‟t understand why we changed change will impact on volunteers and branches

cracks starting to show_Old member base

Don‟t agree or view the same way Expectations of branches not met by RC

In the past

Interfere with RC work or direction Membership profile is changing to reflect society

Not compliant

RC attitudes to branches is changing or has changed RC changed the way they serviced branches

RC doesn‟t care about branches they want them to all

leave Some volunteers join for social not work reasons and

this is a problem

Some volunteers think we are a basket case Vols don‟t understand where we are going

volunteer based organisation and volunteer board

Volunteers can help in daily work load Volunteers translate their idea of what RC is for them

we are not here to give volunteers a place to meet

will create problems with sign off if they are not happy Won't change the way they do things

Volunteers translate their idea of what RC is for them

we are not here to give volunteers a place to meet where are the young people

who are your stakeholders

academically defined Blood service

cant _ don‟t engage with young people

defined by age defined by service user

Give us money

Government people who need to respect us for international work

will create problems with sign off if they are not happy

Won't change the way they do things

Appendices 359

Young people

cant _ don‟t engage with young people

where are the young people

Supporting Vulnerable is a bit of a cliché Things never get finished

to disrespect old members goes against what RC is

Transactional view of stakeholders twice a year research

Two red crosses

We make it difficult for people to engage with us What they think and feel about others (doing seeing)

internal

communication

Building or not building trust

Cannot be heard_dont listen communicate well internally

Disconnected _dont share

Don‟t communicate well internally hard to get people to work together and communicate

idea or aspirational

Internal expectations is different from external many kinds of walls

Osmosis

Poorly managed Up and down versus horizontal comms

What we do internally is different Media - use of

are a risk Dealing with media

Don‟t say anything strong enough or controversial enough

Huge pressure to get exposure in the old days RC was respected in the media and everything was

published

is one area in the org working the best Mass media are more interested in entertainment than humanity

stories

Media interests media is the only understood and VALUED comm channel in RC

Messages - in media

Need to bignote ourselves to try to get coverage no buy in of calendar items

Not using media

Profile in the media is poor RC needs to be more strategic in using the media

RC needs to lobby govt thru media

Role of media and publicity Snr mgmt very interested in it

some are anti red cross

Used as criteria for judgement We dilute our messages by sending out too much

We need to be different to other NFP in the media to gain respect

by journalist

Mission, vision,

values and

principles

Being Neutral

constraining action Creates a constant tension in the organisation

don‟t inform what we do really

Embody what the organisation is everybody working at RC should know

Impact enormously

lack relevance_ are from a different era MY own vision is

No one really understands our 7 principles

Not religious or political people need to be educated to see how they are used

Principles enhance our work

Principles guide what I do

Appendices 360

Principles need to be translated into modern day language

Principles take a back seat Staff are cynical about the principles

National office

A big hole

A national office decision

Bali Building an ivory tower

Can‟t wait for national

Centralised means we can evaluate disorganised

dysfunctional national arrangements

Expensive way to have a head office somewhere good great organised

Is a big flagship to lead the fleet

just another layer of bureaucracy Less democratic less tolerant

National are short sighted

National recognition of competing priorities National underestimate what is happening in the states

National way of doing things

National will do it like it or not Nationalisation

Nationalisation - the only way to get people to work together

Nationalisation is the right path Not supporting nationalisation

provide extra support and re Sending grenades over the fence

silent protests against national

Staff WILL want to work like this State attitudes are not correct

State offices

State vs. national interests States do not see the big picture

States interface with members not donors - this influences their

views

supportive of going national

trying to get all legs walking in the one direction

Used to be state... now national focus will crash _it will not work

Will deliver efficiencies

Nobody knows what we do_no

profile

Lack of promotion or support

Need to present the holistic picture of RC - local and internat

People dont need to know everything we do People know what they want to know

Sending out confusing messages

Old, tradition

Carrying baggage from the past

Dont remind people how old we are Given our age, we should be better

legacy of federation of states

Maintaining relevance Obsolescence, not relevant, not contemporary

Old means bad constrained etc

Old means good values OLD text search

Old way of thinking vs. new ways of thinking

paternalistic and militaristic Trying to reverse the old image and be more contemporary

Power,

managing and reporting

Apathetic

Autocratic or dictator autonomous

Bad or poor leadership

Being politically correct

Appendices 361

Board dont support

Board Board have an undue amount of influence

Board make decisions based on lobbying not research

Board not used to doing business this way Bureaucratic, hierarchy _heavy

Frustrations I earn more I am more senior

cannot control or not your job to control

Cannot fight or battle for it anymore Compliance is rewarded

confused

Control Controls put in place over states governance needed

Delegates or decentralised

Different styles of EDs Do all of this just for board approval

Doesn‟t support NCD D_

Done in isolation Dont get it

Dont take any actions

Dont want to upset _cause more problems ED Driven

ED is face of RC at state level get out of my way...

Pulling levers ED or executive

Get rid of EDs and State boards _ A waste of time

Huge egos inflate self importance build empires

just plain obstructive

SA Ed Not a mover_Laid back_doesnt know

supportive of Indigenous

KPIs Management are of an older generation

Open door policy

Power taken away from EDs SA - good leadership

set the tone

shiny white stallion Used to be of limited imagination

Wanted to keep things the same and not change

EDs are misled that they have power and authority EDs not involved in strategic ideas for communication

Eds now less active since disempowerment

Eds will do anything to keep control empower to do

Everything is a battle or a fight

Expects you to just do it Frustrations

Gatekeeper

Get rid of EDs and State boards _ A waste of time Qld ED

A crash through Can get away with anything

god like qualities father confessor

allowed to do whatever he wants in command of this

is different _ he does get involved in strategic coms

is strategic - others are not thinks outside the box_ strategically_ but others dont

values articulate people, not quiet people

inspirational leader Instant response to

Is difficult

Is proactive It is not his fault so many people leave

People are scared to say no to

shiny white stallion

Appendices 362

is different _ he does get involved in strategic coms

thinks outside the box_strategically_but others dont Huge egos

I earn more I am more senior

If you dont have manager in your title you are not invited illegitimate power exists to influence

inflate self importance_build empires

Is out of date or out of touch is very focused on international

It is good power is going back to national

NCD D_ is not a people manager - she does her own thing NCD D_ wont take on that fight

Just a difference in style

just plain obstructive SA Ed

Not a mover_Laid back_doesnt know supportive of Indigenous

key performance indicators dont really exist at RC

KPIs leadership

Bad or poor leadership NCD D_ is not a people manager - she does her own

thing

NCD D_ wont take on that fight Just a difference in style

Mircomanage not accessible

SA - good leadership

strong leadership linkage function

Losing their power means they are not willing to do stuff

Lost or losing power_empires Management are of an older generation

Managing poor or good performance or behaviour

People dont like others getting recognition

Managing the organisation

Control

can not control or not your job to control No sign offs_no formal policy

No structure or controls or processes

putting controls in place_going forward rules

There are procedures

we do what we want _no control We have no standardised systems across the org

Done in isolation

Dont want to upset NCD D__cause her more problems EDs not involved in strategic ideas for communication

Eds now less active since disempowerment

is different _ he does get involved in strategic coms thinks outside the box_strategically_but others dont

Managing poor or good performance or behaviour


No records are kept_no intellectual property recorded

Not the right management team Poorly managed_mismanaged_no thought goes into

mging

Silos Square peg round hole

Managing with values AND head_balance

Matrix management Micromanage

Mircomanage

National reigning in control Need to convince CEO_not clear logic

network and contacts

nine boards how ridiculous

Appendices 363

No records are kept_no intellectual property recorded

No sign offs_no formal policy No structure or controls or processes

not accessible

not sharing - protecting the patch Not the right mangement team

old style of governance reflected in RC

Open door policy Over managed


People in power manipulate others politics or tokenistic

Poorly managed_mis managed_no thought goes into mging

Power position to influence power struggle

Wont do what they are told

Power taken away from EDs

EDs are misled that they have power and authority

Lost or losing power_empires

putting controls in place_going forward RC has a complex governance structure

RC is lead by people who are out of touch

CEO is only one person and all national orgs face this CEO

Doesnt support NCD D_

Expects you to just do it

Is out of date or out of touch is very focused on international

Micromanage

CEO is only one person and all national orgs face this wont listen or take advice

rules

SA - good leadership set the tone

shiny white stallion

Silos Snr mgmt are in the Old boys club

Square peg round hole

strong leadership symbols of power ie offices

take people on (fight for it)

The board are picking at small details There are procedures

Mention

Try to get them to cooperate Used to be of limited imagination

Wanted to keep things the same and not change

we do what we want _no control We have no standardised systems across the org

Wont do what they are told

wont listen or take advice Reputation,

brand, branding

and logo

a lot invested in it - too late to change

Arrogance_ Not as good as we think we are

Complacent or Sitting on our laurels

No humility in Red Cross Australia Red Cross is different to International red Cross

Blood Service

Problems in the blood service

Brand changes the solve all for org problems

a lot invested in it - too late to change

Brand galvanises people into action

Branding to help decision making for services

Appendices 364

hasnt been rolled out externally

Militant about our brand but not about our messages New brand helps us get it together internally

New brand will get us out there

No consultation about it Poorly executed_missed opportunity

Reviews will fit into the new brand

we change it but really it should stay the same Brand galvanises people into action

Brand worth millions

Brand_reputation needs to be carefully managed_looked after Branding to help decision making for services

Clustering services and positioning

Complacent or Sitting on our laurels crisis care commitment

Clustering services and positioning Reluctant to cluster under Crisis care commitment

Used as a positioning device for services

disaster, emergency or crisis organisation Diversity of services costs too much and dilutes the brand

hasnt been rolled out externally

Humanitarian Iconic, powerful well known and high quality - trusted

Brand worth millions Most important humanitarian organisation in the world

Perceived as not a needy charity International

Just a logo

Militant about our brand but not about our messages Most important humanitarian organisation in the world

Mother nature will take care of us because we are RC

New brand helps us get it together internally New brand will get us out there

New logo aligns with Global red cross - is that a bad thing

No consultation about it No humility in Red Cross

No one service wants to be aligned to one word

Not a lot was or is going to change old, fuddy duddy

Part of the furniture, always there in disasters

Perceived as not a needy charity Poorly executed_missed opportunity

Problems in the blood service

RC is not well understood Rebranding is about showing our impact

Red Cross Day - self congratualtory

Red Cross has many symbols Reluctant to cluster under Crisis care commitment

Reputation

Reviews will fit into the new brand Sell the org around a key concept

Service club based organisation

Sexy and global Silence can damage our reputation

Used as a positioning device for services

War organisation We are elitist.

we change it but really it should stay the same

When RC speaks it should be printed RESEARCH

intuitive not

formal

Avoiding doing research...

Research into Red Cross Services - how

we develop or

do

Strategic

A closed box

Appendices 365

AAAAREstrategic

contribute to strategy formation

Keep budgets and event plans

Narrow the focus being strategic National strategy

AAARE NOT strategic themes

Can not decide on our priorities _ changes daily

Confused - from influence of national

Doesnt understand or know strategy or direction Doing their own thing

ED has to join the dots _ others should be but cant

Focus on events of dubious return Fragmented or not consistent

Holding back _fluffing aroundwhen we should be doing

something No fundraising strategy

Not a planning organisation

One size fits all states Only Qld ED is strategic

outputs not outcomes

Restrictive strategy runs on heart

short term vs long term perspective

strategically delinquent struggle between values based and corporate based

Based on area on responsibility only based on personality not policy

Because management say so

being COMPLIANT (risk compliance) Blood out of a stone

Bugger the consequences

Can not decide on our priorities _ changes daily Can not make a decision

Cant promote because we havent got enough funding

Capable competing influences in

Compromised decision because of lack of support

Concerned about public opinion Confused - from influence of national

consensus decision making

contribute to strategy formation cost of strategy

Courier Mail Test

Crisis response organisaiton Decision making

Based on area on responsibility only based on personality not policy

Because management say so

Bugger the consequences Can not make a decision

competing influences in

Concerned about public opinion consensus decision making

Courier Mail Test

Decision making - VALUES based Decision making criteria coms staff

decision making head based

Decisions not thought through properly defer to snr mgmt

I make my own mind up

Made a decision not based on research or analysis

Not empowered to make decisions Not willing to make hard decisions

There is no logic_ad hoc

too late_too much already invested Wont make a decision incase it goes wrong

Decision making - VALUES based

Decision making criteria coms staff

Appendices 366

decision making head based

Decisions not thought through properly defer to snr mgmt

Documentation of non essential stuff is a luxury

Doesnt really document_ not linked to decisions Doesnt understand or know strategy or direction

Doing their own thing

Don't care_not engaged Dont try to do things differently

ED has to join the dots _ others should be but cant

Flexibility and responsiveness Focus on events of dubious return

Fragmented or not consistent

funding gaining clarity

Getting derailed

goat tracks _ground hog day_ embedded practice Hard to be proactive when everything is just dismissed

have to do it differently

Heavy handed_personal focus on programs Holding back _fluffing aroundwhen we should be doing

something

I make my own mind up ideal or should be communicating and are not

Inaction is misinterpreted

Indecision Individual performance is not linked to strategic goals

Intuition Keep budgets and event plans

Like a corporate

looking over the horizon to the future lost or losing knowledge or Intellectual property

Made a decision not based on research or analysis

Reactive decision making

Mindset focused on internal not external_not

strategic_Cocoon_vacuum

A closed box

Moving or not moving forward Narrow the focus being strategic

National strategy

need more documentation and boundaries here Need to drive things for it to be successful

No fundraising strategy

No protocoles in place - I am astonished Not a learning organisation

Not a planning organisation

Not empowered to make decisions Not willing to make hard decisions

Octopus with legs detached

One size fits all states Only Qld ED is strategic

Org needs to get its act together before we can do things

Our business model doesnt allow us to compete out of the box strategy

outputs not outcomes

Passively... doing it passively Plan with no response

program focused.

Reactive decision making Red Cross is dysfunctional

Response - reactive or proactive

Capable

Crisis response organisaiton

Don't care_not engaged Dont try to do things differently

Flexibility and responsiveness

goat tracks _ground hog day_ embedded practice Indecision

Intuition

Passively... doing it passively

Appendices 367

Reactive decision making

Risk adverse organisaiton So busy dealing with problems, can not be proactive

Struggling or limited by...

tail wagging the dog_tactical not strategic Restrictive strategy

Risk adverse organisaiton

runs on heart setting priorities or not

short term vs long term perspective

So busy dealing with problems, can not be proactive strategically delinquent

struggle between values based and corporate based

Struggling or limited by... tail wagging the dog_tactical not strategic

There is no logic_ad hoc

too late_too much already invested Use heads not hearts

We are disorganised_we evolve to fit the situation

We have to do things differently because we dont have normal re We need to fix this before it goes wrong

We value process or following procedures

we work backwards what I do a lot is putting out fires

What we do here has the potential to impact internationally

Wont make a decision incase it goes wrong Structure

A crazy way to structure national communications

Autonomous regional team structure

Cohesive and proactive confusing

cowboys of the north

hard to manage has driven performance_set the standards

How national deals with QLD

Incorrect lines cause problems Internal division is damaging our brand

It is a fight with QLD

Lack of infrastructure hinders our performance linkage function

MFC in QLD is dysfunctional

No systems previously in place Not conducive to what we need to do

Not what I thought it was going to be

Our department is unique, special own state office staff

Personal relationships or not

Position in organisation - Actual Position in organisation - perceived

QLD doesnt get the big picture

QLD is not serving the interests of the Society QLD is unique - bigger better

Qld likes to do things differently_for themselves

Queensland is more active Queensland reluctant to come on board and needs to cover

themselves

Queensland wants to do it now but you have to think about it first RC is structured for International disasters

Reporting relationships

separate teams Silos

Silos stiffle thinking

Some states are proactive and some are not South Australia Red Cross

SA focused and proactive and client focussed

SA is compliant SA is trying to look holistically

South Australia, increasingly no. Because they actively support – because they‟ve got a new head in South Australia and because

they actively support some of the key Australia-wide service

platforms and have actually driven those for the rest of the socie

Appendices 368

spread out no consistency

State reluctant to share stories nationally cowboys of the north

hard to manage

has driven performance _set the standards How national deals with QLD

It is a fight with QLD

MFC in QLD is dysfunctional Not what I thought it was going to be

own state office staff

QLD doesn‟t get the big picture QLD is not serving the interests of the Society

QLD is unique - bigger better

Qld likes to do things differently _for themselves Queensland is more active

Queensland Red Cross

Queensland reluctant to come on board and needs to cover themselves

Queensland wants to do it now but you have to think

about it first Queensland wants to do it now but you

Some states are proactive and some are not

State reluctant to share stories nationally

States do have unique needs sometimes states doing it differently

States dont care about what national cares about States think they are different

States wont follow what we do for sharing knowledge

The argument of my state is different comes from traditional views

there are no State boundaries online

Traditional donors are different to newer donors upstairs and downstairs

we are not like that

What works for QLD doesnt work for us Systems and

processes

Systems are sub standard

The cross is

confused with Christian

symbols

Time

A lot of pressure to get things done

All talk and no action Always held up by org issues

Disorganised _meetings rescheduled

Don't even bring it up with her because she hasn't got time Things go nowhere

Time - start or taken

Time or deadlines are my criteria Time or hours spent at work culture

Vulnerability

Appendices 369

Appendix F – Participant information and consent form

Researcher Contact : Ms Kim Johnston, Phone Mobile: 0421311163; QUT Office: 3138 4089 Email: [email protected] Description Dear staff member of Red Cross You have been approached to participate in a research project being undertaken by Kim Johnston, a PhD research student at Queensland University of Technology. The working title of the project is “The Influence of Cultural Selection on Organisational Communication Strategy”. The purpose of this project is to explore the processes organisational members undertake to develop communication strategy or communication responses to events or changes in the organisation’s environment. The researcher requests your assistance because you’ve been identified as a person who assists the organisation to do this. Therefore, your assistance in this research project is both valuable and important. The benefits of the research include advancing knowledge and understanding of the internal processes undertaken in organisations to develop responses to environmental changes, specifically communication responses. For Australian Red Cross, the benefits will also include an understanding of how Red Cross identifies, prioritises and processes information about its environment. Participation Your participation in this project is voluntary. If you do agree to participate, you can withdraw from participation during the interview, or on the same working day, without comment or penalty. Your decision to participate will in no way impact upon your current or future relationship with QUT. As the data collected during interviews or observations is not personally identifiable after collection, it is not possible to withdraw after the data has been collected and analysed. Your participation will involve two parts: 1. An interview consisting of several open questions relating to the research project. The interview will take

approximately 40 minutes and will be conducted on site at RC offices in a room that provides confidentiality and is comfortable.

2. Being observed by the researcher. This involves the researcher playing a non participatory role in observing you in interaction with other RC staff members or representatives, in situations where communication responses are identified or developed.

Expected benefits It is expected that this project will not benefit you personally. However for Australian Red Cross , the benefits may include an understanding of how Red Cross identifies, prioritises and processes information about its environment. Other benefits of the research include advancing knowledge and understanding of the internal processes undertaken in organisations to develop responses to environmental changes, specifically communication responses. Risks The potential risks associated with this project may include

Discomfort – due to the potential feelings from disclosing individual work practices.

Inconvenience – due to the time requested to participate in the interview.

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION for QUT RESEARCH

PROJECT

Appendices 370

Confidentiality All comments and responses are anonymous and will be treated confidentially. The names of individual persons will not be identifiable and all data collected will be identified by a number only and will be pooled for analysis. The results will be reported at an organisational level. Interviews will be audio recorded for accuracy and data collection purposes and will be transcribed word for word by the researcher. The transcription document will be identified by a number and not a name, so the participant will not be identified. No other people will have access to the recording or the transcription. The records will be held by the researcher in a locked facility at QUT and will not be used for any other purpose. The data will be held for seven years as required by academic protocols. It is possible to participate in the interview without being recorded. Consent to Participate You are requested to sign the attached consent form as an indication of your consent to participate in this project. Questions / further information about the project Please contact the researcher named above if you have any questions or if you require further information about the project. Concerns / complaints regarding the conduct of the project QUT is committed to researcher integrity and the ethical conduct of research projects. However, if you do have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of the project you may contact the QUT Research Ethics Officer on 3138 2340 or [email protected]. The Research Ethics Officer is not connected with the research project and can facilitate a resolution to your concern in an impartial manner.

mailto:[email protected]

Appendices 371

CONSENT FORM for QUT RESEARCH PROJECT

“The Influence of Cultural Selection on Organisational Communication

Strategy”

Statement of consent

By signing below, you are indicating that you:

have read and understood the information document regarding this project

have had any questions answered to your satisfaction

understand that if you have any additional questions you can contact the researcher

understand that you are free to withdraw at any time, without comment or penalty

understand that you can contact the Research Ethics Officer on 3138 2340 or [email protected] if you have concerns about the ethical conduct of the project

agree to participate in the project

understand that the project will include audio recording

Name

Signature

Date / /

mailto:[email protected]

Documents

The influence of cultural selection on strategic communication · organisation‟s culture on the formulation of strategic communication is a fundamental conceptual challenge for