The impact of Science and Technology on Risk in our Society

The impact of Science and Technology on Risk in our

Society

J.P.CONTZEN

Instituto Superior Técnico

Lisbon, March 11, 2005

Introduction (1)

An evolving scene where the balance sheet of the interaction between S&T and Risk could be either negative or positive.

How to enhance the positive side? It is a matter of governance; several examples could be given in this respect

Introduction (2)

Hence, the structuring of the presentation in several parts:

The evolving nature of risk The elements of risk governance R&D and risk governance An emotional example: biotechnology and the

application of the precautionary principle An emerging issue: nanotechnology An embarrassing case: the tsunami of December

26, 2004 A new type of risk: global security, tackling

terrorism and weapons of mass destruction

Definition of Risk

“Risk should be understood as an uncertain consequence of an event or an activity with respect to something that human values”

(Kates and Kasperson 1983)

Risk is difficult to evaluate: it is the combination of two independent factors:

Risk = Severity of a dangerous event (consequence) x Probability of occurrence of this event (uncertainty)

The evolving nature of risk

Our Knowledge-Based Society of the 21st Century is experiencing increased risk caused by human activities. The reasons could be found in: Acceleration of technological innovation Greater connectiveness, globalization Increased pressure to reach markets

Additionally, human activities lead to an increase in the frequency and severity of natural disasters, e.g. impact of deforestation or greenhouse gases emission

The Impact of Globalization

(NZZ, May 3, 2003)

Risk Governance

The need for governance (1)

Risk should not considered as a fatality even if a zero-risk society does not and will never exist.

It is a matter of governance and in this exercise of governance, science and technology can contribute positively in preventing or mitigating some of the threats that they have generated themselves.

The need for governance (2)

What is Governance?

Governance is “The sum of the many ways that individuals and institutions - public or private -

manage their common affairs”

(from “The role of the World Trade Organization in Global Governance” edited by Gary P. Sampson, UNU Press, 2001)

The Framework for Risk Governance

Pre-Assessment:• Problem Framing• Early Warning• Risk Governance Process

Risk Assessment:• Hazard Identification &

Estimation• Exposure & Vulnerability

Assessment• Risk Estimation

Risk Management:• Option Generation• Option Assessment• Option Evaluation & Selection• Option Implementation• Option Monitoring

Contextual Aspects:– Risk Perception– Actor Network– Organisational Capacity– Regulatory Styles– etc

Risk Governance Framework(Components and Contextual Aspects)

Tolerabilty / Accepta-bility Judgement:• Risk Characterisation• Risk Evaluation

• Consideration of Stakeholder& Public Group Concerns

Risk Appraisal:

Developing a model for risk governance (1)

Governing all the components of the framework requires a certain institutional capacity. Does Society possess this capacity? For giving an answer to such question, one requires an analysis of the various elements constituting such capacity.

Such analysis can be performed using a model for risk governance.


Governing risk implies dealing with highly complex, adaptive systems operating under the pressure of dynamic external conditions

Risk governance can be assimilated to a process function with inputs, process parameters and outputs.


This model is not focused on the outputs such as effectiveness and efficiency, equity and fairness, transparency, accountability but on the elements of the process itself.

It concentrates on the identification of the governance components and on the possible evaluation of their respective strengths. The model could be used in this respect as a benchmarking tool for institutional risk capacity of nations, local governments, industries

Components of risk governance (1)

The model corresponds to own research but the identification of the components has been inspired by the work of Gilles Paquet, Centre on Governance, University of Ottawa (Chapter 7 « The New Governance, Subsidiarity, and the Strategic

State » of the 2001 OECD book « Governance in the 21st Century »)

Governing a complex adaptive system implies acting on a institutional process composed of Assets, Skills and Capabilities


The Assets constitute the base of the process; they are made of: Rules (explicit, tacit), Norms, Regulations

establishing rights and obligations Resources such as money, information and

infrastructures, facilities Competencies and knowledge i.e. education,

training, experience and expertise Organizational capital i.e. the capacity to make

effective use of these first three types of assets


Assets = (Rights + Resources + Competencies ) X Organizational Capital


The Skills allow the good use and the enhancement of the impact of the assets by political, economic and civic actors, when responding to external conditions.

Skills relate to: Flexibility i.e. providing new ways to make

sense of the situation, adapting to change (e.g. fight against institutional inertia)


Vision i.e. bringing new practices into a context that would not naturally generate them, anticipating change (e.g. attention devoted to foresight and to scenario planning)

Directivity i.e. reframing the whole perception of the way of life, driving change, impacting on the external environment rather than exercising prevention or mitigation of the effects of external forces (e.g. ban on CFCs or ban on WMDs)


Skills = Flexibility + Vision + Directivity


Finally, the Capabilities constitute the framework in which Assets enriched by Skills can be exploited for making risk governance successful

Capabilities are constituted of successive layers: Relations between agents and sources of

knowledge, between those carrying the authority and those bearing the risk, notably the Civil Society


Networks, a step further in organization, clan-like links between groups of actors, halfway between self-organization and hierarchy. The role of NGOs in risk governance is an issue

Regimes establishing laws of the game. The Precautionary Principle is a recent relevant example.


Capabilities = Relations² + Networks + Regimes


Putting the three components together leads to:

Governance = Assets X Skills X Capabilities


The ambition of this model is assisting in identifying the components of risk governance and singling out those components that might require special attention for achieving success. The importance of “soft elements” such as organizational capital, adaptation to change and relations has to be underlined. Science and Technology play a role; they are necessary elements but they don’t suffice for ensuring adequate governance.

Establishing a strength indicator (1)

The model when considered in the right context could yield some form of strength indicator. An example is given here.

By attributing numerical ratings to each factor within the three major components (e.g. 5 for good/strong to 1 for poor/weak), one could calculate such indicator


City planning for coping with extreme climatic events: Gonaives, Haiti vs. Tokyo, Japan

Assets: Rules: G = 1; T = 5 Resources: G = 1; T = 4 Competencies: G = 2; T = 5 Organizational capital: G = 1; T = 5

Total for Assets: G = 4; T = 70


Skills: Flexibility: G = 1; T = 3 Vision: G = 1; T = 5 Directivity: G = 1; T = 4

Total for Skills: G = 3; T = 12


Capabilities: Relations: G = 1; T = 5 Networks: G = 1; T = 4 Regimes: G = 1; T = 4

Total for Capabilities: G = 3; T = 33


Putting the three components together leads to :

Governance Strength = Assets X Skills X Capabilities

which in numerical terms yields a total of 36 for Gonaives and of 27720 for Tokyo.

If each factor would have received the maximum rating of 5, the total would have been 39375, hence a relative figure of 0.09% for Gonaives and of 70% for Tokyo

R&D and Risk Governance

A Model for Risk Governance? (1)


Why did you smile when looking at the cartoon? (if you did smile): Wrong Technological solutions? Overestimation of the risk? Personal choice of skier or public regulation?


This leads to the analysis of four discussion areas: Do we need to accelerate the development of

new technologies? How could Research better contribute to Risk

Assessment: an improved scientific approach? Public vs. Private Governance A new alliance between Regulation and

Research

New technological developments

A good S&T base exists in most areas for contributing to risk prevention and risk mitigation

Three fields require enhanced efforts: Better information gathering technologies:

early warning, faster diagnostics tools New self preventing, self mitigating

techniques: self repairing materials, machines, systems

Increased attention devoted to dual-use technologies: improve their proliferation resistance, find alternative technologies

Scientific approach to Risk Assessment (1)

Current scientific methods still suffer from Laplace’s Demon : linear, deterministic, mono-causal view of the world. A more extensive move to a complex, non-linear chaotic approach is required. Mechanistic models of Society lose individual action in statistical average whereas in a chaotic approach, individual action can have decisive consequences (A.J. Wierzbicki)


Predictions have given place to probabilities. « Hard Science does not provide definitive truth but better truth » (Oro Giarini)

Look at small variations in initial conditions and small initial fluctuations, microscopic changes in parameters, discriminate weak signals from noise (AIDS, CJD, Tuberculosis,…)


The new methods should privilege a holistic approach looking at overall systems and not just at some parts of them. Too often, the risk is shifted rather than being prevented or mitigated e.g. in sustainability issues: waste management, energy savings, air pollution, water management

The cost/benefit analysis should be refined both in economic and social terms


Examples where social costs are neglected: The irritation of Prince Charles, Duke of Wales,

when a local council cut chestnut trees arguing that falling chestnuts might hurt passers-by

Does the cost/benefit analysis of performing an Asteroid Watch justifies its development while medical research on identified threats is still under funded?


Cost/benefit analysis is often rudimentary while it is an essential element of any assessment: currently risk reduction gains are purchased at much higher costs than in earlier times, hence the importance of the economic factor. This is one of the weakest features of the recent application of the Precautionary Principle, e.g. in the BSE case. It is an area where wide differences appear in results, e.g. the difficulty for fixing the economic value of a human life (1 Swiss worth 100 Portuguese lives)


Options in resource allocation are an essential component in risk management: “Save the Planet and ruin the World”

Is it justified to spend in risk prevention 4.2 M$ for environmental remediation against 50 000$ for transport safety or 20 000$ for health improvement with the equivalent result of one year of human life saved? (Harvard study)

The decision on all these cases is clearly a political one but has the scientific, social and economic background been sufficiently detailed?

Public vs. Private Governance (1)

The role of research in risk management requires a prior analysis of the possible governance schemes including the public vs. private responsibility issue

In the industrial age, prevailed “the individualism of risk-calculating merchants [and industrialists], learning from experience, attentive to news, making decisions on a well-judged mix of trust and distrust” (Niklas Luhmann)


In the post-industrial age, with the emergence of newer risks, a more organized, more collective attitude tends to be favored

Globalization, Connexity (Geoff Mulgan) increase collective risks hard to fight on an individual basis: terrorism, infectious diseases, environmental damage, financial bubbles


A more collective management of risk implies a strong social cohesion. In certain areas, where major risks are concentrated on a minority of people, solidarity is an issue, especially when widening disparities in wealth emerge.


It may lead some categories of people to provide for their own risk management. A private approach in risk management is linked to a certain degree of affluence. The attitude of citizens of German Länder towards health insurance is representative of such correlation as shown in the coming slides

Source: STERN, 18/2004, p. 56

Public Regulation (1)

Is a greater regulatory role of the State compatible with the respect of the individual? Who governs the regulatory process: the public authority under a regime of elected democracy with a delegation of power, or direct democracy with an active participation of the civil society (citizens, pressure groups)? Will one day pilots be chosen by passengers before flight departure? (J.M. Lehn)


Four regulatory styles can be considered (Harry Otway): Adversarial style: regulations developed in open

confrontation, recourse to judicial process, transparency of information

Consensual approach: process based on views of elite groups, evolving to broader consultation


Authoritative style: government negotiates with industry (the risk creating actor) and decides

Corporatist model: involvement of different interest groups that seek to find mutual advantage in collective action

The impact of research differs largely according to the style that is prevailing

Regulation and Research (1)

What kind of relation should be established in the future between governments acting as regulatory bodies and the research community? Should they remain closely associated as they did in the past or should they in the future be kept at arms-length?

Two schools of thoughts: William Leiss (Canada) and Arie Rip (Netherlands).


Arie Rip’s approach: Scientists in advisory positions offer a unique and powerful capital of expertise. «They should provide detailed and specialized research findings but must also have the knowledge skills and understanding to relate these findings to social and political concerns even if this causes a dilemma when their loyalty to those asking advice comes into conflict with the requirements of their scientific profession»


Arie Rip makes a distinction between scientific knowledge and expert advice, the latter being primarily aimed at offering an orientation at those being advised. «Expert advice must go beyond the truths of scientific knowledge» Experts should become involved in complexities and uncertainties of the world outside their academic circle


Advisers should have a «feel» for policy issues and political flair (Harvey Brook)

Why moving towards this new practice of expert advice? The answer is the advent of “public arenas” and new political attitudes.

For Arie Rip, expectations from expert advice are based on three myths: The hard-fact myth The consensual-objectivity myth The point-source myth


When experts are employed full time as in-house advisers, the gap between expectations and actual practice can be bridged more easily thanks to the « political skill » of the adviser and to the trust placed in his or her

This leads to an approach of «pragmatic rationalism» where experts take account of the social and political impact of their advice

Is this approach a new version of Max Weber’s « Verantwortungsethik »?


William Leiss’ approach: end of old pattern of regulatory research. New Paradigm: governments manage risk, drawing upon independent scientific bodies for the risk assessment expertise. Strict institutional separation of science and policy, good for both. « Science only useful when true to itself »


This approach means the end of public regulatory research. Previous track record of regulatory research is not the reason for change. Obsolescence of the model is not the result of its failures but is driven by the evolution of the global context


Failures of regulatory research (BSE in UK, Global Change in several countries) vs. Achievements (CFC’s, toxic chemicals, nuclear safety)

A much more exacting new environment: Changing capabilities of civil society; end of

Science/ Government alliance Merging of disparate risk issues' domains,

complexity


Mounting costs - « risk reduction gains are purchased at much higher costs » - leading to competition for resources allocation

Humanity has eroded its substantial margin of error in the management of the natural environment.

Vulnerability has increased with the increase of quality and performance of modern technology that leads to a reduction of the margin of error that systems can withstand (Orio Giarini)


William Leiss’ solution for this evolution: forget about doing science in the public sector, concentrate on credible risk management, transfer science capacity to independent bodies, primarily Universities and rely on peer review for quality


The Leiss option is close to Max Weber’s « Gesinnungsethik ». It looks attractive BUT Will the needed type of expertise be available

in outside academic bodies? Will research become irrelevant to policy needs (Canadian Treasury Board, 1998)?

Will the possible advantage of organizational proximity be lost?


The debate is open: both options have their own merits. The best approach for the future should probably be a mix of these two extremes.

Some of the features of William Leiss’ option should be considered earnestly. They could help in particular to improve, within the civil society, the current low level of credibility of the scientific community perceived as too closely linked to political or economic stakeholders.


Whatever approach will be finally adopted, it is imperative to review and probably revise the link between the regulatory process and research. Such revision could impact on the existing research structures.

Conclusion

The contribution of research to the sound management of risk in our complex, chaotic Society, remains essential

A fresh look should be given to the research agenda and further targeted technological developments should be pursued

A review of the process for conducting risk-relevant research should be performed with the aim of adapting the research contribution to the evolution of policy-making.

Biotechnology and the Precautionary Principle

Biotechnology and its applications (1)

“Biotechnology is the application of Science and Technology to living organisms, as well as parts, products and models thereof, to alter living and non living materials for the production of knowledge, goods, and services including: DNA technologies such as:

Genomics Pharmacogenetics


Gene probes DNA sequencing/synthesis/amplification Genetic engineering

Protein and molecular technologies such as: Protein/peptide sequencing/synthesis Lipid/protein glycoengineering Proteomics Hormones Growth factors Cell receptors/signaling/pheromes


Cell and tissue culture and engineering such as: Cell/tissue culture Tissue engineering Hybridization Cellular fusion Vaccine/immune stimulants Embryo manipulation


Process biotechnologies such as: Bioreactors Fermentation Bioprocessing Bioleaching Biopulping Biobleaching Biodesulphurization Bioremediation Biofiltration


Subcellular organism research including: Gene therapy Viral vectors

Other biotechnology areas such as: Bioinformatics Nanobiotechnologies

Source: OECD

Impact of biotechnology (1)

Biotechnology is currently a major driving force in technological innovation. Its impact in the socio-economic world is significant and it offers the promises, if adequately managed, to lead to a win-win scenario, combining economic and social benefits and reducing the North-South divide.


It is a big source of money: global biotechnology product sales in 2003: 23

billion $, forecasted 85 billion $ in 2010 US alone: 16 billion $ divided in:

Human therapeutics/drugs: 74.0% Human diagnostics: 13.5% Agriculture: 7.0% Specialties (chemicals, etc.): 3.5% Non-medical diagnostics: 2.0%

Source: European Chemical News

January 20th, 2003


It is also a big source of hope: Immense impact on health Enhancement of food production Promising impact for the protection of the

environment: clean production of chemicals, detection of pollutants, bioremediation


The health preoccupation is reflected by the large share of the market. Human diagnostics is an area of particular growth. Agricultural products, GMO’s in particular, constitute the most publicized trade issue, while in fact they represent less than 10% of the total market.


In spite of its promises, biotechnology is the subject of heated debate and considered by several groups as a new source of risk. Some of its applications are banned in certain countries while promoted in others. GMOs are typical of this situation: Brazil and Japan have opposite views on this issue.It is a significant example of the uneasy relationship between innovation and risk.

Innovation and Risk (1)

Our World is full of uncertainties. In mathematical terms, our Society should be seen as a complex, chaotic (random events), non-linear (the Butterfly effect) system, far from the mechanistic, deterministic vision of the early 19th Century (Laplace), inherited from the Greeks.

“I have known uncertainty: a state unknown to the Greeks.”

Ficciones

Jorge Luis Borges 1899 - 1986


Additionally, there is an increased public perception of the notion of risk. The reasons could be found in: Better education Progress of Democracy, increased role of the

Civil Society and of NGO’s Growing impact of the media; the latter have

contributed to Society’s anxiety over modern science that has replaced old superstitions


“Fear has become the emotion through which public life is administered”

Joanna Bourke, A Cultural History

Innovation and Risk (4) Risk is difficult to evaluate as it is the

combination of two independent factors:

Risk = Severity of a dangerous event x Probability of occurrence of this event

Science can help in this evaluation but, with the exception of a few cases where the consequences of the event can be determined accurately and where probabilities could be based on a large statistical base, the uncertainty margin remains important.


Our political and economical decision makers must accept this situation. Risk is part of every day’s reality.

Additionally, when political decisions are taken, one should determine if they were dictated by the presence of an objective risk or by the public perception of risk (how else can be explained the public apathy towards potential brain damage due to cellular phones, towards lung cancer related to tobacco smoking?)


How to exercise good governance in such situation? Good governance requires managing change, complexity and risk, at the same time, in a democratic way. One tool that has been developed for achieving good governance has been the Precautionary Principle.


Whatever the quality of its application, the Precautionary Principle is just a tool. Eventually, managing risk relies on the political skills of decision-makers

“The intelligence of a person can be measured at the amount of uncertainty that he or she can

support”

Immanuel Kant

The Precautionary Principle (1)

Applied initially to environmental protection: “Where there are threats of serious or

irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing cost effective measures to prevent environmental degradation”

Bergen, May 1990 + Rio 1992


OECD Deputy Secretary General Pierre Vinde’s 1990 interpretation: “better to find out that we have been roughly right in time than to have been precisely right too late”


A more detailed definition:“ Preventive measures should be taken in the

specific circumstances where scientific evidence is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and that there are indications through preliminary objective scientific evaluation that there are reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially dangerous effects on the environment, human, animal or plant health may be inconsistent with the chosen level of protection”

European Commission, 2000


All texts defining the Precautionary Principle leave ample room for interpretation about the triggering factor for its application, by using such words as reasonable grounds, economically acceptable, insufficient evidence. Some texts create a confusion between the terms prevention (generally used for established dangers) and precaution (generally applied to potential risks).

This ambiguity leads to diverging views about the true motivation of such application


Is it: A measure of good household management ? A constructive partnership between social

planning and economic competitiveness ? An incentive for producers and consumers to

integrate risk management in their behaviour ? An opportunity to stimulate more regulatory

research in the environmental/health areas ? A rampart against the excesses of technology

and financial profit ?


Or An incitation to obstructionism ? An excuse for protectionism ? An obstacle to further technological

innovation? The answer lies in the form of governance

that will be adopted in the future. It is suggested, for the sake of good

governance, that a review of the current application of the principle is required. Such review could lead to a revision of the principle itself.


The review should examine three critical factors for the application of the principle: Totality: an holistic approach is necessary.

All aspects of the issue should be taken into account, e.g. cost/benefit ratio, global vs. local impact

Objectivity: the approach should be void of ideological or political bias. External pressure, e.g. from the media and lobbies should be resisted.


Adaptability: the principle should be considered as part of a dynamic, adaptive process. The danger that is under question might evolve itself as well as the knowledge about its effects. Milestones should be built in the principle for conducting periodic reviews that could lead to a revision of the decisions taken at an earlier stage.

Biotechnology and the Precautionary Principle (1)

Plato and much later (1967) Sir Karl Popper defined the three worlds that constitute the knowledge of man: The physical world The world of conscience and feelings The world of theory and abstract concepts


Decision makers privilege currently the second and third worlds when applying the Precautionary Principle, notably in the biotechnology field. They should be reminded that the first world is equally important. The first world is not only the world of recombinant DNA, enzymes and stem cells, it is also the world of hunger, illness, poverty and under-development.


The question arises in particular when dealing with new drugs. The Vioxx case is exemplary in this respect:

“Dans l’affaire Vioxx, les ayatollahs du principe de précaution ont préféré éviter trois infarctus, quitte à entraîner huit hémorragies digestives”

Jean-François Bergmann

Vice-Chairman AMM Commission


Emotion, feelings, convictions should be part of the application of the Precautionary Principle but this should not be to the detriment of the reality of this world:

“Wir müssen lernen, emotional zu sein, ohne die Sachlichkeit zu verlieren”

Dr. Arno Krotzky Metanomics

Nanotechnology

Nanotechnology: a window on the future

Nanotechnology is already with us with massive research efforts by governments, academia and industry, some products already on the market e.g. nanostructured catalysts,components in transistors, sunscreens, paints.

Applications of Nanotechnology

Source: Allianz Center for Technology, citing VDI Technology Center / German Ministry for Education and Research

Uses for Nanotechnology

0 100'000 200'000 300'000 400'000 500'000 600'000

plastics

airplane

cosmetics

photonics

packaging

telecom

life sciences

insurance

automotive

agriculture

chemicals

pharmaceutical

aerospace

information technology

communication

biotechnology

food

Internet research by Swiss Re, 2004

Products sold incorporating emerging nanotechnology, global forecast 2004 to

2014

Source: October 2004 Lux Research Report “Sizing Nanotechnology’s Value Chain”

$0

$500.000

$1.000.000

$1.500.000

$2.000.000

$2.500.000

$3.000.000

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

$ m

illio

ns

Manufacturing and materials Electronics and IT Healthcare and life sciences

Industrial prototyping and nanotechnology commercialization:

four generations

11stst:: Passive nanostructures (1st generation products) Ex: coatings, nanoparticles, nanostructured metals, polymers, ceramics

22ndnd: Active nanostructures Ex: 3D transistors, amplifiers, targeted drugs, actuators, adaptive structures

33rdrd: Systems of nanosystems Ex: guided assembling; 3D networking and new hierarchical architectures, robotics, evolutionary

44thth: Molecular nanosystems Ex: molecular devices ‘by design’, atomic design, emerging functions

~ 2010

~ 2005

~ 20002000

R&

D

~ 2015-20202015-2020

CMU

Source: AIChE Journal, 2004, Vol. 50 (5), MC Roco

Nanotechnology and risk (1)

Does the emergence of Nanotechnology generate new risks? Opinions diverge ranging from “how come?” to “risk is real”. The perception differs according to the type of nanoscale technologies: a transistor is different when considering risk from a drug delivery system.

NGO’s rather than the general public constitute the driving force in the resistance to Nanotechnology. It builds up in certain countries e.g. Canada and European Union.


NGO’s rather than the general public constitute the driving force in the resistance to Nanotechnology. It builds up in certain countries e.g. Canada and European Union.

Where lies the potential threat of Nanotechnology?: Toxicological effects: unwanted transmission in

the human body, side effects of drug delivery, insertion in the food chain

Chemical reactivity:unwanted catalytic effects


Inhalation of nanotubes, nanofibers, nanoparticles: a potential new asbestos case; some industries hesitate to be involved in a repetition of such case.

Further study and research is urgently required as current ignorance could lead to excesses in the application of the Precautionary Principle, barring the further development of this most promising technology and the strangulation of fast-expanding young industry.


The joint discussion between the European Union, Japan and the United States about a high-level Declaration on Responsible Nanotechnology could assist in developing sound international governance principles.

The Tsunami of December 26, 2004 Lessons to be learned

Introduction (1)

The major disaster generated by the tsunami of December 26, 2004 leads to a deepening of the reflection about the role of observation and alert in risk governance. Could international and national authorities have done better? The answer is certainly yes but the real issue is how to improve.

Many conferences and ministerial meetings have taken place already, displaying a lot of goodwill and of expertise but will they lead to the efficient system that is required?

Introduction (2)

The scientific and technical issues related to observation and alert are well covered but question marks remain when organizational issues are considered. Additional thinking is required before one might be assured that an efficient system has been put into place.

Good governance is at stake here.

The specificity of the December 26 disaster (1)

The magnitude of the deaths, casualties and damages that it has induced.

The geographical extent of its effects, enhancing its international character.

The relative low frequency of events of such magnitude.

The specificity of the December 26 disaster (2)

The absence of any real early warning. The lack of awareness of many people to some

threats arising from tsunamis (the lessons of November 1st, 1755 in Lisbon were not learned)

The rapidity of the propagation of the cataclysm with potential reaction times limited to tens of minutes.

The application of the concept of risk governance (1)

Did these specific characteristics create obstacles to a good governance of the risk that was present in these particular circumstances? The various components of risk governance will be briefly analyzed before concentrating on the way forward.


This analysis will reveal the main issues for any future system; some are directly related to observation and alert: The improvement of observation systems The issue of false alert The delegation of responsibility for triggering the

alert

Generic Disaster Risk Management Model

Awareness

Reduction

Relief

Assess

Reconstruction

Identify

• prevent• mitigate• prepare

EVENT

The model is well-known and understood, and frequently well-used in isolated silos using a top-down approach to a single hazard/risk.


Two others are of a more general character: The extent of the application of the Precautionary

Principle, notably for applying preventive measures and for organizing the response to any alert

The elimination of possible wasteful duplication and the reinforcement of synergies between relevant organizations through inter-linkages

The contribution of observation to risk governance (1)

Observation is a question of assets, skills and capabilities:

For the assets, resources, competencies and knowledge are obvious components. For developing countries, it means foreign assistance and capacity building. Organizational capital is equally important; observation should be organized internationally. GEOSS appears to be the adequate answer to the general problem of observation. Defense and Security considerations may create some limitations but in general the response should be adequate.


In terms of skills, flexibility and vision are essential. Current observation systems are quite suited for monitoring fairly slow evolutions of the environment but for the kind of natural phenomena that occurred on December 26, 2004, gaps do exist, hence the need to: Extent the geographical coverage of ground and sea

monitoring systems Develop new satellite systems Implement the full access to all data


In terms of capabilities, relations and networks are required for the fair and complete distribution of the results of observation. Legal regimes might come later.

The contribution of alert to risk governance (1)

Alert is certainly a question of assets (human, technical and financial resources) but for good governance, the components of skills and capabilities are essential.

In terms of skills, vision is a must in order to target the right threat and to refrain from triggering false alarms. As George PURCARU puts it, a trade-off must be established between “the false alarm and the failure of prediction” (George Purcaru, Goethe University,

Frankfurt/Main in Earthquake Hazard Assessment, Report EUR 13408)


In terms of capabilities, relations and networks constitute the cornerstone of any alert system. The crucial question in this respect is the attribution of the responsibility for triggering the alert. For threats where the reaction time after the alert is extremely short, there is no time for convening a session of the national or local government for taking decisions or a meeting of scientific experts.


Capabilities (cont.)

There must be a delegation of responsibility to somebody who, after analysis of the observation, sends the alert; the reaction must then be quasi automatic. The designation of this “somebody” is fairly straightforward at national level but more difficult at regional level. To whom a part of the sovereignty should be delegated? An international or supranational organization? Another nation?

General issues (1)

The political responsibility for dealing with threats that cannot be clearly evaluated, has led to the recent application of the Precautionary Principle that in some way has become one of the regimes within the component capabilities of risk governance.

General issues (2)

The application of the Precautionary Principle to the type of risk under discussion is clear: science can’t (currently) predict when and where and with which magnitude the next tsunami will occur. The dangerous effects are known and the level of protection is questionable in certain parts of the World.

General issues (3)

How far should one go in the application of the Precautionary Principle? The ultimate prevention would be to forbid any human settlement at sea level, a quite unrealistic proposal, but then what is “realistic”?

How far should one go in evacuation schemes? In some cases, they may cause more harm than the threat itself, or replace one threat by another (Another lesson of the Lisbon earthquake of 1755!)

General issues (4)

The last issue is the spectrum of public and private organizations that deal with risk management, risk prevention, risk mitigation, organized either on a geographical basis or on a thematic basis such as WMO, UNESCO/IOC, ICSU, UN-Habitat, UNEP, ICSU.

General issues (5)

In the tsunami field, IOC appears to have taken a strong lead but concentrates its efforts on that particular threat. Synergies with other bodies dealing with other threats appear highly desirable. Who should ensure this coordination or at least detain an overall view of the problem? A task for the World Environmental Organization currently under discussion? A role for the recently created International Risk Governance Council? Could a new UNU/IAS study on inter-linkages help?

Conclusion

Beyond the emotion stirred up by such a huge human drama, the disaster of December 26, 2004 raises a series of questions about improving risk governance. Political and public reactions after the disaster could be catalyze the drive towards such improvement but the rather narrow, excessively focused approach currently used does not go in this direction.

Science and Technology : friends or foes of Global

Security?Terrorism as a new form of

risk

The Rationale (1)

In the post World War II period, S & T have been perceived generally as a positive contribution to the Security of nations, on top of being considered as a driving force for economic growth.

The current situation might change this perception; negative aspects of the recourse to S&T are increasingly present. Can this trend be reverted?

As in the other cases, the answer lies in strong governance. How can it be achieved?

The Rationale (2)

Ensuring global Security has many facets including poverty alleviation, education promotion, fair trade, political dialogue. The discussion will concentrate on those aspects where natural sciences and their products, technologies, play the most significant role.

S&T are contributing to many forms of threats to Security, including simple forms such as hand-held guns. In terms of the impact on Society, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their proliferation constitute the main challenge.

The Rationale (3)

The dramatic events of September 11, 2001 and their follow-up have given a new dimension to WMDs but the basic issues about proliferation were already on the table for many years.

The recent events have been essentially a catalyzer for reinforcing the attention of the policy makers and of the public. They have emphasized the need for in-depth actions and have arisen a certain sense of urgency.

The Rationale (4)

"The only thing necessary for the triumph ofevil is for good men to do nothing"

(Edmund Burke, English political philosopher)

Main elements of discussion

The analysis of the evolving environment A description of the various forms of threats A possible response:

An enhancement of the role of S & T in fighting proliferation

A reinforcement of governance In the formulation and implementation of a security policy In the conduct of scientific activities

The need for a New Alliance between S & T and Democracy

An evolving Environment (1)

Factor 1: VULNERABILITY The Globalisation of the Economy, the revolution in

Information & Communication Technologies enhance the interconnectedness of our World, and lead to greater vulnerability

The growing urbanization of our Society reinforces this vulnerability. In 2015, 3.6 Billion people will live in large cities

The potential for degrading our capacity to function as a Society has never been so great


« The exorbitant costs of protecting against undeterrable terrorism [also] stem from the very makeup of post-industrial economies. They are the wealthiest in human history, offering would-be aggressors a practically infinite number of lucrative targets, from Disney World and Hoover Dam to Tokyo’s subway, and nuclear waste storage sites everywhere »

Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 11, 2002


Factor 2: LOSS OF POLITICAL CONTROL The enhanced diffusion of high tech in a globalized

world weakens the grip of democracies on the flow of arms, goods, information, finance and people; the challenge of controlling non-proliferation is stonger than ever


Factor 3: SUB-NATIONAL ACTORS Adding to an increased number of nations

accessing WMDs, the recourse to sophisticated tools of mass destruction is now accessible to sub-national actors, to terrorist groups

Legal instruments based on State-to-State relations and on deterrence through sanctions, are no longer able to respond adequately to these new unconventional, diffuse threats


Factor 3: SUB-NATIONAL ACTORS (cont.) The identification of potential perpetrators becomes

increasingly difficult, weakening the deterrence concept. As the concept of a retaliatory response is weakened, the need for prevention of attacks to the highest degree possible is reinforced. Rapid, efficient mitigation of damage when prevention has failed becomes a top priority


Factor 4: DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES The development of new technologies is no longer

driven by military programmes but by the attraction of the civilian market. The fact that they are frequently of dual-use purpose renders their control more difficult


Factor 5: IMPACT OF SCIENCE The innovation cycle, i.e. the process transforming

basic scientific knowledge into pratical applications is shorter, less arduous than a few decades ago. Science has acquired in this respect as much importance in terms of proliferation as technology, materials and equipment

Bio-threats and cyber-threats that have added new challenges to the non-proliferation issues, are science-based and reflect the actuality of this evolution


Factor 6: PUBLIC POLICY Finally, the widening gap in understanding between

S&T actors and public decision-makers renders the dialogue on S&T and Security increasingly difficult and leads in some cases to inadequate priority-setting


« The political-scientific interface has emerged as one of the key dimensions of multilateral negotiations and environmental diplomacy. For this reason, the capacity of diplomats and other actors to access, understand, and deal with increasingly complex factual and scientific data is of critical importance »

Excerpt from UNU report to 2nd preparatory session

for 2002 WSSD


In short, the ship Earth is currently sailing on uncharted waters and has lost its watertight compartments. Navigation rules and damage control procedures must be revised

Forms of threats (1)

One of the focal points of any global Security policy has been and remains the non-proliferation of WMDs

Nuclear WMDs were for a long time at the forefront of the preoccupations. This can be attributed to the early maturity of the technology but also to the status that States detaining them were gaining on the international scene.

Radiological weapons have recently emerged as a possible threat (dirty bombs)


Chemical and Biological WMDs were also developed but until the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War, they did not attract so much attention

The tremendous progress in ICTs has added the dimension of cyber-threats. Cyber-war, cyber terrorism are current realities

The use of civilian airplanes in the attack on New York has further extended the scope of the WMD concept. Vehicular terrorism is a new concept to be taken into account


In the future, we should follow the definition adopted by the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for WMDs, i.e.

« any device, material, or substance used….to cause death or serious injury to persons or significant damage to property »

and the objectives of non-proliferation should be adjusted accordingly


To assess proliferation threats, we should compare the various types of WMDs in terms of : Accessibility. This is shown in the following tables

established using a methodology developed by E. Häckel and G. Stein

Fatalities and Economic damage. Some results of relevant studies are also described


NUCLEAR

(RADIOL.)

CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL CYBER.

OBTENTION WEAPON

MATERIAL

DIFFICULT

(EASY) EASY EASY IMMATERIAL

QUANTITY WEAPON

MATERIAL

SMALL

(SMALL) LARGE SMALL IMMATERIAL

WEAPON KNOWLEDGE

BASE

FAIRLY EASY

(VERY EASY) EASY FAIRLY EASY COMPLEX

WEAPON

INDUSTRIAL PROCESSING

COMPLEX

(EASY) EASY EASY IMMEDIATE


NUCLEAR CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL CYBER.

TIME FOR OBTENTION

WEAPON

LONG

(SHORT) SHORT SHORT IMMEDIATE

TECHNOLOGYDUAL USE POTENTIAL

MODERATE

(MODERATE) HIGH HIGH HIGH

PROTECTION MILITARY

SYSTEM

HIGH/

MODERATE

(HIGH)

HIGH/ MODERATE MODERATE LOW

PROTECTION CIVILIAN

SYSTEM

LOW

(MODERATE) MODERATE VERY LOW VERY LOW


NUCLEAR CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL CYBER.

WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEM

SOPHISTI-CATED

(EASY)

SIMPLE SIMPLE VERY SIMPLE

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

NPT(1968), CTBT(1996)PROTOCOLS

CWC (1993)PROTOCOL

BWC (1975)

NO PROTOCOL

NOTHING

TECHNOLOGI-CAL

EVOLUTIONMODERATE LOW FAST FAST


Comparative effects of various types of WMDs in terms of fatalities for WMD delivery per aircraft over 10 000 km² urban area: 1 MT H bomb: up to 1.9 million deaths 1 Ton of sarin: 3000 to 8000 deaths 100 litres of anthrax: 1 to 3 million deaths

[U.S. Congress, OTA, 1993 study]


Additional data: Crude fission bomb based on 100 kg of HEU: yield

10 to 20 kT (Hiroshima equivalent) Fatalities of natural pandemics:

Smallpox 20th Century: ½ Billion fatalities Measles: some 900 000 fatalities/ year AIDS: 3 Million fatalities for 2000 only Influenza: 20 Million fatalities in 1918-1919

Global diseases are security threats!


In terms of damage to property, case of a bio terrorist attack by release of aerosols over a major city 477 million $ per 100 000 persons exposed

(brucellosis scenario) 26.2 billion $ per 100 000 persons exposed

(anthrax scenario)

[CDC, Atlanta, 1997 study]


The combined airborne assaults on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, have caused total insured damages in the bracket of 40 to 70 billion$, the single largest economic loss in US history

Cyber-attacks, notably on power production and distribution, air traffic control systems, could cause tremendous economic losses and indirectly, significant fatalities.


As an illustration of the impact of a failure of the power production and distribution, the Italian electricity black-out of September 28, 2003, triggered by a simple tree flashover, affected 58 million people, caused the death of 5 elderly people and led to financial losses amounting to hundreds of millions of Euro.


The nuclear option is probably the least accessible, the most expensive for Rogue States and terrorist groups in their efforts for securing WMDs, except when the weapon is acquired in a form ready for use or when the objective is gaining a certain international status

Furthermore, the efficacy of the nuclear option in terms of damage to life and/or property is not the highest.


Effects of radiological weapons are mostly psychological

The same consideration applies to chemical weapons

The Bio- and Cyber- options are the most preoccupying. They are those relying essentially on knowledge rather than on materials or equipment. They are also those where legal regimes are currently the weakest

The elements of a response

S&T are currently contributing to the development of new tools endangering security. How can we control or better revert this trend?

The answer could be: Develop S&T to counter those threats that they have

contributed to create Exercise Governance

In the formulation and implementation of an overall security policy

In the conduct of scientific activities

New technologies for countering threats (1)

Such technologies should aim at both damage prevention and mitigation

For prevention, several fields require increased attention: In the ITC field, the hardening of all systems against

cyber-attacks is imperative. Communication networks, notably the internet backbone networks, air traffic control systems, and power production systems are extremely vulnerable targets. Key R&D areas are quantum- or bio-encryption, networks immunization, « microscribing » of information


New recognition systems based on biometry, in particular face recognition, will contribute to the fight against terrorism (but raise the issue of the protection of human rights)

In the biological field, progress should be made on health surveillance networks, on bio-sensors, on « bio-sheathing ». Vaccination should be reintroduced, notably for smallpox, using safer vaccines, new andquicker vaccine production methods as well as faster vaccination procedures


In the nuclear field, an analysis of the current safeguards philosophy might lead to new measures favouring internal built-in barriers. The acceleration of the reduction of the current huge stock of weapon-grade materials is an element of prevention

In the chemical field, the deployement of more real-time toxicity sensors, the widespread, on-line monitoring of water and air should be implemented


In most of these fields, reliable detection systems working in quasi-real time, with adequate geographical coverage are essential. Time is a critical factor in case of attack and accelerated tests for identifying chemical, viral or bacterial agents are key elements of any preventive policy

Emerging nanotechnologies have a role to play here


For mitigation, large scale biological and chemical decontamination techniques should be developed using the most advanced technologies. Local police and paramedics should be trained to respond adequately to these new threats, in particular with regard to containment procedures. Healthcare facilities should be adapted for the potential influx of a large number of contaminated individuals


Smarter antibiotics should be developed. Advanced production methods should be used for assembling adequate stocks of pharmaceuticals capable of responding to any massive chemical or biological attack

In the nuclear field, radiological protection measures developed at the time of the Cold War should be maintained


The United States have launched massive programmes in this area: « Homeland Defense » represents 38 Billion $ in FY 2003, of which a significant part for R&D

Other countries have more modest R&D programmes but act in the same direction


Will the results of these R&D programmes be shared globally or will they be reserved to those states with weapon knowledge? The discussion is about dissemination of weapon-related knowledge

Will it lead to a situation that will increase the gap in vulnerability between those who master these new technologies or products and those who don’t?

Governance in Security Policy (1)

A renewed analysis of the role of S&T in Security is required in view of the evolution of the overall situation

What the political decision-makers do need is a recipe for sound risk management of complex crisis situations. It is a field where scientists can offer a contribution


Politicians ask for zero risk that does not exist. Scientists should help in minimizing risk. The situation is not basically different from the one arising from other global issues such as climate change or use of GMOs, with nevertheless two differences: the involvement of military actors and a lesser pressure from economic interests

Scientists should also assist in developing tools for a rapid, well-informed decision-making process in crisis situations


Additionally, a system of technological foresight should be established. A good foresight is important for the future stability of our Society. One should promote in this frame the analysis at the horizon of 10 to 20 years of the proliferation potential of new scientific developments and of their technological applications

This should lead to the identification of critical data to be monitored such as scientific knowledge with proliferation potential or as the flow of sensitive materials and equipment


Flow of materials and equipment is already regulated by several legal instruments in order to limit the risk of proliferation. As long as it was focused on nuclear weapons, such constraint did not affect significantly the industrial development of developing countries


With the advent of similar regimes aimed at other types of WMDs, the question of the possible restriction on such industrial development should be raised. Who decides that developing country X should have, or not, a factory for producing vaccines? Where is the equilibrium point between a legitimate preoccupation for global security and the individual development of nations?

Governance in Scientific Activities (1)

Science transfer has become as critical as technology transfer in terms of proliferation. So far, this factor has received less attention than other security aspects.

Security threats rely increasingly on the mastering of advanced scientific knowledge. The control of the creation and transfer of scientific knowledge constitutes a very difficult task in the current global environment


In spite of the controversy that they may raise, some measures should be implemented; for improving security, there is a price to pay.

The following measures should be considered in priority: Reinforce the stabilisation, through the conduct of

civilian activities, of those WMD scientists whose expertise is no longer required for military activities, as in the case of the ex-Soviet Union


Enhance the awareness of the Scientific Community to proliferation issues and reinforce among scientists the concept of ethics in Science. Max Weber’s distinction between the ethics of responsibility (Verantwortung) and the ethics of convinction (Gesinnung) is quite actual

Organise self control and « whistle blowing » within the Scientific Community using peer review mechanisms. Science Academies have a significant role to play in this respect


Perform, without undue hesitation, intrusive investigation of suspicious research activities

Build some filters to the flow of scientists and scientific knowledge developed in fields sensitive to proliferation

Ban the support to research projects where the danger for Security exceeds by far the potential benefit for the Society at large


The latter three measures that are justified by the need for enhancing security have clearly negative aspects. This is the price to pay. Wisdom should be exercised for limiting as much as possible their drawbacks


The issues at stake are: The freedom of scientific research. A strong scheme

of self control by the Science community should help in keeping the right balance and should be convincing enough for preventing policy makers from undue interference in scientific affairs


The protection of industrial proprietary information. This is a critical issue that has lead to the breaking down of the talks on the BWC protocol in Summer 2000. Verification procedures should take into account the industry’s legitimate interests, in particular in the biotechnology field. Cooperation of the industry is essential in establishing the ground rules


The transfer of scientific knowledge to developing countries. The guiding principle should be the relevance of a particular type of scientific knowledge to the effective needs of developing countries. To prevent a perverse application of this principle, multilateral consultation mechanisms that could arbitrate on the determination of such needs should be established.


They should be based on dialogue, information sharing, joint policy development and mutual adjustment. The setting-up of a International Panel on the Identification of Sensitive Knowledge (IPISK) following the IPCC model might be a way to assist such mechanisms

A new Alliance between Democracy and S&T (1)

In summary, the answer is: Yes, we need a new Alliance between Democracy, its elected representatives, its citizens and Science & Technology for exercising the strong Governance that is required for giving an adequate response to the new challenges of global security . S&T do not constitute the panacea when dealing with Security issues but their contribution are essential

A new Alliance between Democracy and S&T (2)

The pillars of the new Alliance are on the one hand, a well thought, balanced integration of S&T in public decision-making and on the other hand, a greater involvement of the S&T Community in public life

Twice in recent history, « institutionalizing a compact »* between Science and Government took place, after World War II and in the early 80’s. A third round is probably needed.

*(Donald E. Stokes. Pasteur’s Quadrant)

In Conclusion (1)

Achieving such New Alliance requires in-depth studies and extended discussions between the various stakeholders. Its fulfillment is crucial as it appears essential for meeting the challenge of ensuring security for the future generations.

In Conclusion (2)

“Chance favors only the prepared mind”

Louis Pasteur

As a general conclusion (1)

One cannot hide the fact that scientific and technological innovation bring new issues in terms of the emergence of new risks.

Good governance should allow reducing the negative risk aspects of S&T, leading to an overall positive balance of S&T development for our Society.

The implementation of good risk governance requires the involvement of all stakeholders, scientists, politicians and the civil society.

As a general conclusion (2)

The worst that can happen when dealing with risk is to yield to pure emotion. Rationality has still some virtue when dealing with such issue.

Documents

The impact of Science and Technology on Risk in our Society