Improving Emergency and Disaster Management in Papua New Guinea: Revisiting the Rationalisation of PNG Emergency Services Policy

Patrick Russell

Flinders University

Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences

School of Social and Policy Studies

Honours Program in Public Policy

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements

for the Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in Public Policy

23 November 2015

i

Abstract

Papua New Guinea, in recent years, has experienced a number of disasters and

emergencies that have contributed to loss of lives and property. In 2007, the

government commissioned a team comprising heads of the various emergency

services in PNG to find ways of addressing these issues. To improve the emergency

and disaster management issues, the team developed a policy known as the

Rationalisation of PNG Emergency Services (RPNGES). This policy proposed an

amalgamation of the PNG Fire Service with the Disaster Service, and the St. John’s

Ambulance Service. The policy was well-intended and had promise to solve many of

PNG’s emergency and disaster management challenges, yet consecutive

governments have ignored it. This thesis aims to discuss the reasons behind the

policy’s stalling and suggest alternative ways in which the intentions of the RPNGES

policy can be progressed. The author applies a post-positivist approach, countering

the positivist method only, which was the main approach applied in the design of the

RPNGES policy. Part of the discussion focuses on policy and political values, and

the concepts, emergency and disaster.

ii

Acknowledgement

I would like to first of all give thanks to God for giving me the extra strength to finish this degree.

For this honours thesis, I would like to thank most of all my supervisor, Professor George Crowder. Without his help this would have been impossible task for me to complete. I am proud to have had an excellent supervisor whose wisdom and guidance made this task look easy. Thanks to Dr. Rob Manwaring for being my initial supervisor.

I also would like to thank my colleagues and friends in particular Ryan Karl, Billy Neely, Jo Schofield, and Mr. Bevin Wilson. Thank you for your feedback and encouragement through this course. Your comments gave me other ideas and ways of seeing the same thing in different lights.

A big thanks to Elaine Kane, Jane Hogan, Klaus Koefer and the International Student Service Unit. You were all fantastic and your support meant so much to me. Not forgetting Claire Mueller from the Special PNG support team.

Thank you to Australian Awards for giving me the opportunity to study in Australia.

To my mate, Graham Crocker, although not a student helped me take those most needed breaks, a beer or two and some good music kept me sane. To the PNG community, both students and those living in South Australia, I say thank you all.

Thank you to PNG Fire Service. Special thanks goes to Chief Fire Officer Isaac Silas and his deputies Bill Ro’o & Lua Roa, and the late officers Timothy Eu and Sam Keri Tiale for being my mentors through all my years of service. Thank you also to Gilbert Hickie. You kept me linked to the organisation, and PNG for the last 4 years.

Finally, to my wife Janet, children Myrenda & Patrick Russell Jr., I say thank you for standing with me all the way and putting up with my moods. Love you all.

iii

Table of contents

Page No:

Introduction How can emergency management be improved in 1 Papua New Guinea? Revisiting the Rationalisation of

PNG emergency services policy

Chapter One Service context 10

Chapter Two History and critique of the Rationalisation of the PNG 23 Emergency Service policy

Chapter Three Distinguishing emergency from disaster – the way forward 53

Conclusion 67

Bibliography 69

1

Introduction

How can emergency management be improved in Papua New Guinea? Revisiting the Rationalisation of PNG emergency services policy Emergency and disaster management has become an important field of work for

governments globally. Climate change related issues such as rising sea levels, and

global warming are often part of the conversations that are giving prominence to

emergency and disaster management.1 Large bushfires, volcanic eruptions,

landslides, building collapse, floods, tsunamis, and biological and chemical threats

also feature as some of the subjects of discussion in emergency and disaster

management.2 Many countries have experienced devastating effects of some of

these calamities. In 2013 more than 500 disasters occurred in various parts of the

world.3 Between 2004 and 2013 over 1 million people were killed by a disaster event

in one part of the globe or another.4 In 2014 over 300 disasters eventuated,

affecting more than 90 countries.5 Costs of damage to economies in 2014 were in

the tens of US billion dollars.6 Effective and efficient emergency and disaster

management systems or policies are in demand as countries look for ways to

minimise the impact of disasters and emergencies on societies and economies.

1 G. O’Brien, P. O’Keefe, J. Rose & B. Wisner, , ‘Climate change and disaster management’, Disasters, Vol. 06, No. 30, 2006, pp.64−80, Overseas Development Institute, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, USA http://www.glerl.noaa.gov/seagrant/ClimateChangeWhiteboard/Resources/Uncertainty/climatech/obrien06PR.pdf viewed 19 October 2015. 2 I. M. Shaluf, , ‘An overview on disasters’, Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal, Vol. 16, No.5, 2007, pp. 687 – 703< http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/09653560710837000> viewed 19 October 2015. 3 International Federation for Red Cross and Red Cross Society, n.d., ‘World Disasters Report 2014 – Data’, < https://www.ifrc.org/world-disasters-report-2014/data> viewed 19 October 2015. 4 International Federation for Red Cross and Red Cross Society, n.d., World Disasters Report 2014 – Data. 5 International Federation for Red Cross and Red Cross Society, ‘New IFRC Report calls for greater recognition and support for local humanitarian actors’, 15 September 2015, < https://www.ifrc.org/en/news-and-media/press-releases/general/wdr-press-release/> viewed 19 October 2014. 6 International Federation for Red Cross and Red Cross Society, New IFRC Report calls for greater recognition and support for local humanitarian actors.

2

World conferences are held to discuss and share ideas about how disaster and

emergency management can be improved.7

The need for effective and efficient emergency and disaster management has also

captured the attention of global organisations such as the United Nations, Asian

Development Bank, and the World Bank. The United Nations has set up two special

establishments, the Office of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the United Nations

International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), for the purposes of assisting

countries that maybe or are affected by disaster and emergency events. OCHA was

established to respond to disasters or large scale emergencies that occur in any part

of the world within a maximum of 48 hours.8 UNISDR’s role is primarily ‘to promote a

culture of prevention’.’9 Both OCHA and UNISDR’s roles are complementary. OCHA

responds to disasters and emergencies after they occur. UNISDR, on the other

hand, advocates that countries should be proactive in preventing disasters and

preparing for potential disasters and emergencies before they occur. The United

Nations is indicating through these two establishments that effective and efficient

emergency and disaster management is a global concern.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is another institution that is concerned with the

effects of disasters on communities. Its concerns about disasters saw ADB publish a

book on how to manage disasters in 2008.10 ADB hopes that this book would assist

disaster managers to help their communities to be better prepared for potential

disaster events. The World Bank, on the other hand, offers courses in emergency

and disaster management.11 It too has recognised the need for countries to develop

7Copernicus, ‘Conference on disaster management -2015’, 2015, http://www.copernicus.eu/events/wcdm-2015-world-conference-disaster-management viewed 20 October 2015 8 United Nations Office for coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), ‘What is UNDAC?’, n.d. <http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/undac/overview> viewed 18 October 2015. 9 9 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, ‘What is the International Strategy?’, n.d. http://www.unisdr.org/who-we-are/international-strategy-for-disaster-reduction viewed 18 October 2015. 10 W.N. Carter, A disaster manager’s handbook, Asian Development Bank, 2008, https://openaccess.adb.org/bitstream/handle/11540/5035/disaster-management-handbook.pdf?sequence=1 Viewed 20 October 2015. 11The World Bank, ‘Introduction to disaster risk management’, The World Bank website, 2015, http://einstitute.worldbank.org/ei/course/introduction-disaster-risk-management-0 viewed 20 October 2015.

3

knowledge and skills so that they can be better prepared for disasters and

emergencies. The World Bank, UN, and ADB, which traditionally focused mainly on

development, have come to accept that disasters and emergencies pose serious

threat to the social and economic health of countries.12 These institutions are

encouraging developing countries to develop effective and efficient policies and

capacity to mitigate the effects of disasters and emergency events on their

communities.13

Papua New Guinea is amongst many of the developing countries that needs to

prepare itself and heed the advice of such global development partners as the

United Nations14, the World Bank,15 and the ADB16 as these institutions have at

various times assisted PNG with its development projects including disaster

management and adaptation to climate change programs. PNG needs to promote a

culture of disaster and emergency prevention and preparedness. The Provincial and

Local Level Government Affairs Department acting Secretary, Dickson Guina,

recently warned PNG that the country is predicted to experience El Nino drought

every five years.17 PNG urgently needs an effective and efficient emergency and

disaster management policy to prepare itself for these events. Effectiveness and

efficacy of disaster and emergency management, this paper posits, depends on

PNG optimising its limited resources and efforts to improve prevention and

12 The World Bank, ‘Managing disaster risks for resilient development’, The World Bank website,10 April 2014, http://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2013/04/12/managing-disaster-risks-resilient-development viewed 20 October 2015. 13 The World Bank, ‘Building resilient communities: Risk management and response to natural disasters through social funds and community – driven development operations’, The World Bank website, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSF/Resources/Building_Resilient_Communities_Complete.pdf viewed 20 October 2015. 14 United Nations, ‘Papua New Guinea: Annual progress report’, United Nations website, 2011, https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Papua-New-Guinea-UNCP-Annual-Progress-Report-2011_Final-high-res-2.pdf viewed 1 November 2015. 15 The World Bank, ‘Papua New Guinea: Second Gazelle restoration project’, The World Bank website, 11 April 2011 < http://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2011/04/11/papua-new-guinea-second-gazelle-restoration-project> viewed 31 October 2015. 16 Asian Development Bank, ‘ADB $24.2 million grant to help build PNG’s resilience to climate change’, Asian Development Bank website, 23 October 2015, http://www.adb.org/news/adb-242-million-grant-help-build-png-s-resilience-climate-change> viewed 1 November 2015. 17 EM TV online, ‘Guina: El Nino situation in PNG critical’, EMTV website, 12 November 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_LAcd48zzLQ Viewed 15 November 2015.

4

preparedness. Much of this work of emergency and disaster preparedness and

prevention, however, rests on the shoulders of PNG’s emergency services.

This paper focuses on emergency and disaster management and Emergency

Services–Fire Service, Ambulance Service, and the Disaster Service-in Papua New

Guinea (PNG) and what should be done to help the country to be better prepared for

disasters and emergencies from a policy point of view. The question, ‘how can

emergency management be improved in PNG? Revisiting the Rationalisation of PNG

Emergency Services,’ is an important one for a number of reasons. Firstly, the

question implies that managing emergencies is problematic in PNG and that the

country does not have adequate emergency management resources to manage

emergencies when they arise. Secondly, the question provokes the thought that

there is the possibility that obstacles or challenges exist outside of the control of

Emergency Services that make managing emergencies and disasters very difficult.

Thirdly, the second part to the question, ‘revisiting the Rationalisation of PNG

Emergency Services (RPNGES) policy’ implies that PNG has an emergency

management policy. The status of that policy is however, unclear. The government

of Papua New Guinea (GoPNG) did not implement this policy despite receiving wide

support for it from many sectors of PNG. The GoPNG did not state that it rejected

the policy either. It would be unwarranted for this paper to assume that the

government completely rejected the policy as there is no explicit evidence to suggest

that this is the case. The paper however suggests that the RPNGES policy has been

superseded for now by other issues. Currently, one such issue that has grabbed the

government’s attention is the El Nino drought period that PNG is experiencing which

is also predicted to continue into 2016. The GoPNG has already spent millions of

Kina to help Provinces affected by this disaster, and is likely to continue with this

level of spending for some time yet.18 Ironically, it was a similar El Nino event in the

late 1990s in PNG that was the impetus to the RPNGES policy.

18 G. Kenneth, ‘K30m needed for Highlands provinces’, Post Courier website, 21 September 2015,

http://www.postcourier.com.pg/Stories/k30m-needed-for-highlands-provinces/#.Vf-pxk3ou70 viewed 21 September 2015.

5

This is the first paper to provide a response to the Rationalisation of PNG

Emergency Services policy. It is hoped that a response or responses would ensue

from this paper to provide useful discussions and debates, with the aim of

contributing to the improvement of emergency management in PNG. The paper

recognises that the Rationalisation of Papua New Guinea Emergency Services

(RPNGES) policy was the first-ever attempt to bring about reform for the emergency

services and emergency management in PNG. The efforts of the team that put this

policy together are to be applauded. However, this paper argues that the RPNGES

policy is proving to be elusive and may take a very long time to implement. The lack

of interest or attention given to the policy by recent consecutive governments is

testament to this claim.

The RPNGES policy’s aim is to merge the three emergency services: Disaster

Service, Fire Service, and St. John’s Ambulance Service under one department. The

ultimate goal of the RPNGES policy is to improve the provision of emergency

management services in PNG. If this goal of the RPNGES policy is to have any

chance of being implemented then there will need to be ‘a recombination of familiar

elements into a new structure or a new proposal.’19 There will need to be a

recombining of, and even separation of some of the member elements of the

emergency services. This paper argues that the RPNGES policy’s strength is based

in the fact that it was almost entirely grounded in evidence-based policy making and

cost-benefit rationale. The focus of the working party or research team was to design

a best practice, apolitical emergency and disaster management policy that would

meet the safety needs of PNG. On the other hand, the same strength on which the

policy is founded is argued in this paper to be the obstacle to the policy becoming a

reality.

* The ‘Kina’ is Papua New Guinea’s currency.

19 J. W. Kingdon, Agendas, alternatives, and public policies, 2nd ed, Addison – Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 2003, p.124

6

Taking a post-positivist approach, this paper argues that policies are not always

value-free. The presence of values is just as important to recognise when designing

policy as they can be influential impediments to well-intentioned policies. The

RPNGES policy may have been advocating an important value, safety from

emergencies and disasters. This paper, however, posits that the RPNGES policy

was not adopted and implemented by the PNG Government because of a conflict

between values. Unless, this conflict of values is recognised and changes to the

policy are made the RPNGES may continue to lack the attention it needs, and the

people of PNG will continue to remain at greater risk to disasters and emergency

events then should be the case. The paper further argues that there is an alternative

approach to achieving the main purpose of the RPNGES policy.

The purpose of the RPNGES is to improve emergency management service delivery

in PNG and to make PNG safer from the effects of emergencies and disasters.

Applying Quarantelli’s distinction between emergencies and disasters reveals this

alternative. Quarantelli states that emergencies and disasters are related; but they

do not necessarily mean the same thing. He points out that ‘this is more than just

mere semantics.’20 This is because the distinction between the two concepts has

wider implications for emergency services. Each concept has its own particular

nuances, in turn influencing particular approaches to management and operations at

disaster and emergency events. Recognising the distinction between emergency and

disaster may lead to a potential solution to the problem of how to negotiate various

conflicts of values that have impeded the progress of the RPNGES policy. This

distinction plays a crucial part in progressing many of the aims and outcome of the

RPNGES policy.

Other emergency and disaster management models Apart from the RPNGES policy three other models of emergency and disaster

management were investigated during the process of research for this paper. These

models are: the Incident Command System (ICS), Australasian Inter-Service Incident

Management System (AIIMS), and the Integrated Approach. Some of the ideas

20 Quarantelli,E. L., ‘Catastrophes are Different from disasters: Some implications for crisis planning and managing drawn from Katrina’, Social Science Research Council, 2006, http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Quarantelli/ viewed 10th September 2015.

7

captured in the RPNGES policy are similar to these models. Adopting any of these

other models completely, however, would prove problematic for PNG. There are

many variables, but only a few more pertinent ones relative to PNG’s conditions are

briefly discussed here. The main strength of ICS, for example, is that as a command

system it can be applied effectively within one organisation at routine emergencies.21

It is, however, difficult to apply at complex disaster incidents across multiple

agencies where resources are varied and multiple agencies are involved.22 It has

proved challenging to implement in the USA between civilian organisations and

agencies such as the police or the fire service where command and control is a

culture in these latter agencies.23 Some of PNG’s emergency services are, however,

still exploring this system for their own organisation’s use.

The second model that was investigated is the Australasian Inter-Service Incident

Management System (AIIMS). AIIMS is an emergency management system that is

used in Australia and New Zealand.24 It is a system that was adopted from the USA’s

emergency management system, National Incident Management System (NIMS).25

The main advantage of the AIIMS is that it can be applied across all response

agencies, especially at large scale events such as disasters.26 The system is,

however, quite complex and if not used by trained personnel can hinder flow of

information that is vital to effective decision-making or implementation of emergency

21 D. A. Buck, J. E. Trainor, & B. E. Aguirre, ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Incident Command System and NIMS’, Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management: Vol. 3: No.3, Article 1, 2006. 22 D. A. Buck, J. E. Trainor, & B. E. Aguirre, Vol. 3: No.3, Article 1, 2006. 23 D. A. Buck, J. E. Trainor, & B. E. Aguirre, Vol. 3: No.3, Article 1, 2006. 24 G. Conway, ‘AIIMS doctrine: have we got the fundamentals right?’, The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2012, pp.54-57 < https://ajem.infoservices.com.au/items/AJEM-27-02-12> viewed 21 November 2015. 25 G. Conway, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2012, pp.54-57. 26 G. Conway, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2012, pp.54-57.

8

plans at incidents.27 Such hindrance to information flow can exacerbate emergency

or disaster situations. Furthermore, the application of AIIMS would be limited in PNG

because not all the emergency services are available in most provinces. The only

place in PNG in which all the services have a presence and which could potentially

apply AIIMS successfully is Port Moresby. PNG needs a system of emergency and

disaster management that can be applied in all the provinces. The RPNGES policy

has this advantage over AIIMS because it was designed for PNG’s situation.

The last model that was considered is the Integrated Approach (IA) for disaster

management – a model that originates from Thailand.28 The main strength of the (IA)

is its emphasis on ‘both proactive and reactive strategies aimed for disaster

management before, during and after periods.’29 This is the kind of model that PNG’s

emergency and disaster services need. The RPNGES policy has similar ideas to the

IA system. This paper argues, however, that IA’s main weakness is that it views

emergency management and disaster management as the same. A key argument of

the paper, following the work of Quarantelli, is that emergencies and disasters are

distinct. By extension, therefore, managing a disaster may be different from

managing emergencies. The rest of this paper focuses on the RPNGES policy. It is

not only a policy, but an emergency and disaster management model that PNG

developed to meet its unique safety needs.

A brief plan of this thesis is as follows: Chapter One provides some background facts

about PNG’s population, geography, political system, economy, and legislations.

These factors are important to acknowledge. They pose some of the many

challenges to the effective and efficient provision of emergency services in PNG.

Chapter Two discusses the formulation of the RPNGES policy. The chapter applies a

27 C. Owen & I. Dwyer, ‘Review of incident management teamwork and multi-agency collaboration’, AIIMS national report, Bush fire CRC, 2009 <http://www.bushfirecrc.com/sites/default/files/downloads/aiims_national_report_bcrc_utas_v2.pdf> viewed 21 November 2015. 28 T. L. Moe & P. Pathranarakul, ‘An integrated approach to natural disaster management: Public project management and its critical success factors’, Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal, Vol. 15 No. 3, 2006, pp. 396-413 < http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/09653560610669882> viewed 7 April 2015. 29 T. L. Moe & P. Pathranarakul, Vol. 15 No. 3, 2006, pp. 396-413.

9

post-positivist approach to critique the RPNGES policy and goes on to introduce the

concepts of policy and political values, and how some of the values that are in

conflict with others have caused the RPNGES policy to be stalled. Finally, Chapter

Three distinguishes and discusses disaster and emergency. The distinction between

the two concepts is argued to be the key to solving the values conflict posited in the

previous chapter. A way forward is suggested based on this distinction.

10

Chapter One

Service Context

This chapter describes the context in which emergency services in PNG operate.

Emergency services such as the Fire Service, Disaster Service, and St. John’s

Ambulance Services exist in PNG to provide the emergency and disaster

management services that the community needs. The services respond to

emergencies and disasters when the need arises. At other times they deliver

prevention and preparedness programs to the community. The work of these

services, however, is not carried out in a vacuum. PNG’s growing population,

geography, political system, and economy are some of the factors that affect the

work that the emergency services do. These factors create challenges not only for

the emergency services but also for those people that cannot gain access to their

services. In other instances, these factors create opportunities for the emergency

services to improve service delivery and for more people to be able to receive

services.

The chapter also provides brief outlines of the various items of legislation under

which the different emergency services are established. Such legislation determines

what the emergency services can and cannot do, but sometimes this is not clear.

Such undefined areas in the legislation governing the emergency services has

implications for communities since these communities may need the assistance of

emergency services, but such assistance may not always be forthcoming because

the emergency services’ legislation is not explicit. Emergency services also lack

appropriate equipment, trained personnel in certain areas of emergency

management, and other resources that they need to enable them to carry out their

duties. These are the kinds of challenges PNG and its emergency services face.

Papua New Guinea (PNG) is located in the South Pacific Region to the north of

Australia, and shares land borders with Indonesia. The tiny country of nearly 7

million people sits on what is often referred to as the ‘Ring of Fire’30, the volcanic

30 A. Tupper, S. Carn., J. Davey., Y. Kamada., R. Potts, F. Prata & M. Tokuno, ‘An evaluation of volcanic cloud detection techniques during recent significant eruptions in the western Ring of Fire’, Remote Sensing of Environment, Vol. 91, 2004,pp. 27 – 46.

11

region that surrounds the Pacific.31 The population is scattered on the mainland of

the country, and the larger islands of New Britain, Bougainville, and New Ireland, and

on many of the 600 smaller islands.32 Of the 7 million people nearly 90 per cent of

them live in rural areas.33 Much of the rural area is only accessible by walking or air

transport.34 Helicopter and small single or twin engine aeroplane are often the only

means of transport in or out of most of the rural areas. Roads from the urban areas

have not reached many of the rural areas because of the rugged mountainous

terrains. The country’s rugged mountain terrains, thick forests, rivers, and sea make

it very difficult for government services to be delivered in most rural areas of PNG.

The challenge of delivering services in PNG is a task that the country’s three layers

of government carry out. The three layers of government are: the National,

Provincial, and Local Level governments. The National Government is responsible

for setting goals and providing directions for the country. Provincial and Local Level

Governments are responsible for implementing the National government’s policies.

There are 20 provinces, 1 capital city, and an autonomous region. 111 members of

Parliament represent 89 single–member electorates, and 22 regional seats. Election

of political leaders occurs every 5 years. Leaders are voted through a universal

suffrage by eligible voters. A Party or coalition with highest number of winning

members is generally invited by the Governor-General to form government.

Government is led by a Prime Minister and his cabinet. The cabinet is also known as

the National Executive Council. Currently, the Deputy Prime Minister, who is a

member of the National Executive Council, is responsible for all policy and political

31 National Geographic, ‘Ring of Fire’, National Geographic website, n.d.< http://education.nationalgeographic.com.au/encyclopedia/ring-fire/> viewed 3 November 2015. 32 C. Rogers, R. Bleakley, W. Ola & CARE Integrated Development Project Team, ‘Rural poverty in remote Papua new Guinea,; Case study of Obura –Wonenara District’, Development Policy Centre in the Crawford School of Economics and Government and CARE Australia, Australian National University website, n.d. https://devpolicy.anu.edu.au/pdf/2011/Rural_Poverty_Remote_PNG_Report.pdf viewed 7th September 2015. 33 J. Haywood – Jones, Papua New Guinea 2015: At a crossroads and beyond, Lowy Institute website, May 2015, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/papua-new-guinea-in-2015-at-a-crossroads-and-beyond.pdf viewed 7th September 2015. 34 J. Barr, ‘Drought assessment: the 1997–98 El Niño drought in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands’, Conference paper, James Cook University, Cairns, Australian Journal of Emergency Management , 1999, <https://ajem.infoservices.com.au/downloads/AJEM-14-02-08> viewed 3 November 2015.

12

matters relating to emergency services, i.e. Papua New Guinea Fire Service

(PNGFS), and the National and Provincial Disaster Service.

PNGFS and the Disaster Service are housed under the Department of Provincial &

Local Level Government Affairs. The other emergency service, the St. John’s

Ambulance Service, is a non–government organisation, but receives funding from

the National Government. It is housed under the Department of Health. PNGFS was

established by an Act of Parliament in 1962. Initially, the PNGFS was a part of the

Royal Constabulary of Papua New Guinea. The PNG government, in its wisdom, felt

that the functions of fire service needed to be separated from the Police Force’s core

responsibility of law enforcement. PNGFS was therefore separated and established

to provide firefighting services, leaving the Police Force to focus on law and order

matters. The PNGFS is mandated by the fire service Act to respond to fires and to

conduct fire prevention activities primarily in urban areas. It does not have any

jurisdiction to respond to the rural areas. The Act, however, empowers the Chief Fire

Officer in some circumstances to use his judgement about responding to some rural

fire incidents. This depends on availability of resources and other practical

considerations such as distance to the incident site and accessibility. Not all rural

areas have proper road networks. Occurrences of response to rural areas are,

however, rare.

Furthermore, PNGFS has no jurisdiction for airport-related incidents. Airports are the

responsibility of the Airport Fire Service, which comes under the Civil Aviation

Authority. In most cases however, PNGFS only plays a supporting role to the Airport

Fire Service when the latter requests the PNGFS’s assistance. While PNGFS’s

response to emergencies is limited to urban areas and non–airport responses, it is at

times caught in dilemmas. PNGFS provides informal cover to airports that do not

have the presence of the Airport Fire Service in some Provinces. For example,

PNGFS provides fire cover to Kavieng Airport in New Ireland Province, and Gurney

Airport in Milne Bay Province. These airports do not have the presence of the Civil

Aviation Airport Fire Service. PNGFS has felt a sense of duty to provide cover to

these places, even though its personnel are not appropriately trained and equipped

to deal with any aircraft incidents that may eventuate at these airports. The kinds of

13

training and equipment needed to manage aircraft accidents are generally different

to the ones needed for fire-fighters whose specialty involves controlling building

fires.35 PNGFS’s personnel and equipment are purposed for building fires, and road

vehicle accidents. By responding to aircraft incidents PNGFS may be seen to be

assisting, but it risks putting the lives of its personnel and the possibility of

exacerbating incident situations.

The PNGFS also responds to road accident incidents that require rescue services in

some of the provincial urban centres. PNGFS provides this vital life-saving service

even though it does not have the legal mandate to carry out this task. PNGFS carries

out this work because it has the equipment. There are no other agencies providing

this service. In most cases, however, provinces and places without the presence of

the fire service are left to fend themselves. The current PNGFS Act while enabling

the fire service to conduct its legislated functions also limits the organisation in other

areas where services are needed.

The Disaster Service was established by an Act of Parliament known as the Disaster

Management Act of 1984. The purpose of the Disaster Service is to act as a channel

through which ‘forward planning … efficient, prompt and effective management and

control of natural disasters in the country’36 takes place. According to this Act

disaster means an earthquake, volcanic eruption, storm …flood, fire… pestilence or

infectious disease…’37 This definition is taken directly word-for-word from the PNG

Constitution. However, in the PNG Constitution the definition makes reference to the

term emergency, not disaster.38 Nevertheless, it can be assumed here that the terms

emergency and disaster, at least in PNG’s legal context, are implied to mean the

same thing and so are used interchangeably. From its own admission the Disaster

35 Aviation safety advisory group, ‘Resource guide to aircraft fire fighting & rescue’, Aviation safety advisory group website, < http://aviationsafetyadvisorygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/pdfguide.pdf> viewed 11 October 2015. 36 Independent State of Papua New Guinea, ‘Disaster Management Act 1984’, Papua New Guinea Government website, https://www.ifrc.org/docs/idrl/323EN.pdf viewed 10 October 2015. 37 Independent State of Papua New Guinea, ‘Disaster Management Act 1984’. 38 Papua New Guinea, ‘Part X – Emergency powers, in The constitution of Papua New Guinea’, World Intellectual Property Organisation website, n.d. < http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=199188#LinkTarget_1948> viewed 11 October 2015.

14

Act limits the Disaster Service to planning for possible natural events that threaten to

disrupt the normal life of communities. By implication of its Act the Disaster Service

is not responsible for planning for any events of disruption or destruction that are

human induced, or those related to technological mishaps such as an oil spill, or a

gas pipe explosion, for instance. While the PNG Constitution makes a reference to

human induced emergencies, the Disaster Management Act does not. It is possible,

however, that the government can apply provisions from the PNG Constitution to

enable the Disaster Service or other agencies to carry out disaster management

tasks relating to human induced activities that pose a threat to the community.

The execution of the Disaster Management Act is carried out through the National

and Provincial Disaster Committees, and the Disaster Centre. The National and

Provincial Disaster Committees function in very similar ways, but with some

exceptional differences. Both committees plan preparedness and awareness

activities for potential disaster events and report on such plans to their respective

governments. The advice of the National Disaster Committee to the national

government may however include a need to declare a State of Emergency for a

disaster affected area. This means a State of Emergency Controller would be

appointed to take full control of all decisions and have unlimited access to resources

in the affected area, for example, in a province. The provincial governments often in

such instances do not have any control or power over the State of Emergency

Controller. During the aftermath of Cyclone Guba in Oro Province in 2007 the Oro

provincial government requested for a State of Emergency to the National

Government. By requesting for the national government’s intervention the Oro

provincial governor had foregone all his powers. The national government took

control of Oro Province and carried out disaster responsibilities through a State of

Emergency Controller that it appointed.39 The National Disaster Service in this light

is, therefore, a very powerful institution of the government.

39 ABC, ‘Funding not yet released for flood relief in PNG’, ABC website, 11 December 2011, < http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/2007-12-05/funding-not-yet-released-for-flood-relief-in-png/46036> viewed 11 October 2015.

15

The Disaster Management Act specifies the members required of the National

Disaster Committee. These are the Heads of the PNG Defence Force, Police,

Finance or Treasury, the Departmental Head of Defence (a civilian position), the

Heads of the Works Department, Department of Health, Department of Foreign

Affairs and Trade matters, Department of Provincial and Local Level government

Affairs, and the Departmental Head of the Prime Minister’s Department. The Prime

Minister has the prerogative of appointing a chairman, and deputy chairman to lead

the committee. The Heads of the Fire Service and the St. John Ambulance can be

appointed by the National Disaster Committee to become co – opted members, if the

National Disaster Committee deems that their role or advice is required for particular

disaster matters. The National Disaster Committee is therefore a committee that

potentially has influence over provincial governments and other agencies. The

Heads of the Disaster Committee represent key agencies of the state of PNG. These

state agencies are responsible for nearly all aspects of PNG’s social, economic, and

political affairs. One could further infer from this arrangement that co–opted

members such as the PNGFS and the St. John’s Ambulance Service, according to

the Disaster Management Act, are relatively minor players. They have very limited

influence on matters relating to disaster.

Further to this discussion, the Disaster Management Act has established national

and provincial disaster centres. These centres act as secretariats and conduct

routine administrative tasks and advice the respective committees about hazards,

risks, and potential sources of disaster events. As the roles of the disaster centres

are confined to administration their personnel are not equipped to respond to

disaster or emergency events. In Australia the State Emergency Service (SES)

officers respond to emergencies such as floods, fallen trees, and fallen power poles.

In South Australia, for example, the SES40 responds to the kinds of incidents just

cited. In Western Australia the SES also does similar kind of work through its

volunteers.41 In PNG most of the responsibility of responding to flood affected

40 South Australia State Emergency Services, ‘About the SES’, South Australian government website, ,n.d. http://www.ses.sa.gov.au/site/about_us/about_the_ses.jsp viewed 15 October 2015. 41 Department of Fire & Emergency Services, ‘State Emergency Services’, Department of Fire & Emergency Services website, n.d.http://www.dfes.wa.gov.au/aboutus/operationalinformation/Pages/stateemergencyservice.aspx viewed 15 October 2015.

16

victims, removal of fallen trees, and the likes is left to the PNGFS, even though the

fire service is not legally mandated to respond to such incidents.

The St. John’s Ambulance Service was established in PNG under the St. John’s

Council’s Incorporation Act of 1976. It’s presence in the country was however before

1976. St. John Ambulance currently has a presence in Port Moresby, the country’s

capital city, parts of Central Province, and Wewak town in East Sepik Province.42

The other 19 provinces do not have access to ambulance services. People needing

emergency medical attention in the provinces and districts without ambulance

services have to use other means of transport to assist them to seek medical

attention. Sea transports such as engine powered dinghies, dugout outrigger

canoes, and sometimes boats are the only means by which coastal villagers in the

outlying islands travel to access medical attention when they are sick or have been

involved in accident. In-frequent air services to rural areas sometimes provide

medivac services. However, for many other isolated rural places walking is the only

way that people can get to the nearest urban clinic. Such a walk to the nearest clinic

can take many days or weeks. The rugged mountainous terrains, rivers, and sea

make delivering emergency services such as ambulance services to most rural

areas difficult. Availability of ambulance services such as that of St. John’s is mostly

limited to urban areas. The same is true for the PNGFS, and Disaster Service.

The St. John’s Ambulance, Disaster Service, and the PNGFS have been providing

much needed emergency services only in some other parts of PNG. Despite the

country’s endowment with natural resources and its growing economy43 provision of

ambulance services, fire-fighting services, and disasters services is limited to some

of the country’s 22 provincial urban centres. The government has not been able to

provide emergency services in all the provinces and districts in PNG. Recent fires to

42 St. John’s Ambulance Papua New Guinea, ‘Emergency Ambulance’, St. John’s Ambulance Papua New Guinea website, http://www.stjohn.org.pg/#!emergency/i7afs viewed 8 September 2015. 43 World Bank, Papua New Guinea Overview, World Bank website, last updated 8 April 2015 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/png/overview viewed 8 September 2015.

17

houses and gardens in rural villages in the Southern Highlands44 and Morobe45

Provinces were unquenchable as such places do not have access to fire services.

The Disaster Service is now responding to provinces in the Highlands region of PNG

to provide needed rations to more than 1 million people that have been affected by

the effects of frost and drought.46

Such devastating events of frost, drought, and fire in the rural areas are not new.

Similar events had occurred in 1997 and 1998.47 These past events of destruction

however, did not motivate the GoPNG to provide emergency service cover to the

rural areas. The GoPNG did learn from the 1997 and 1998 disaster experience so

that it could prepare itself for future disaster events such as those that are taking

place in the Highlands Provinces in 2015. Ironically, the Prime Minister of PNG

recently stated that the country would need to brace itself for disasters48 and that

communities, all levels of government, and businesses would need to work together

to minimise the impact of the disaster events as such events were likely to continue

into the year 2016.49 The government of PNG is realising that the impact of the

disaster events in 2015 is worse than those that took place in the past50, and that it

44 J. Elapa, ‘Bush fire damages homes in Ialibu District’, Post Courier online, 24 August 2015, http://www.postcourier.com.pg/Stories/bush-fire-damages-homes-in-ialibu-district/#.VdquXE3ou70,viewed 24th August 2015.

45 The National, ‘Fire leaves families homeless’, The National online, 9 September, http://www.thenational.com.pg/?q=node/94444, viewed 9th September 2015.

46 AFP, ‘Drought in Papua New Guinea could be worst in decades: PM’, Seychelles News Agency, 24 August 2015 < http://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/3576/Drought+in+Papua+New+Guinea+could+be+worst+in+decades+PM%20-%20sthash.4qXYsV4I.dpuf>, viewed 24th August 2015. 47 J. Barr, ‘Drought assessment: the 1997–98 El Niño drought in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands’, James Cook University, Cairns, Conference paper, 1998 <https://ajem.infoservices.com.au/downloads/AJEM-14-02-08> viewed 10 September 2015. 48 AFP, 2015, ‘Drought in Papua New Guinea could be worst in decades: PM’, Seychelles News Agency, 24 August< http://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/3576/Drought+in+Papua+New+Guinea+could+be+worst+in+decades+PM%20-%20sthash.4qXYsV4I.dpuf>, viewed 24th August 2015. 49 N. Choi, ‘PM calls for unity against disasters’, EM TV online, 24 August 2015, <http://www.emtv.com.pg/article.aspx?slug=PM-Calls-For-Unity-Against-Disasters&> viewed 24th August 2015 50 The Conversation, ‘As Papua New Guinea faces worsening drought, a past disaster could save lives’, 26 August 2015, http://theconversation.com/as-papua-new-guinea-faces-worsening-drought-a-past-disaster-could-save-lives-46390 viewed 16 September 2015.

18

will have to call on assistance from Australia and other countries to help alleviate the

effects of the disaster situation.51

This will not be the first time that PNG has sought relief assistance from other

countries and non–government organisations (NGOs). In 1998 Australia and other

countries stepped in to assist PNG with relief supplies when the country experienced

events of drought and frost that affected food gardens, water supply, and the lives of

thousands of people.52 In 2007 Australia provided relief supplies and logistical

support to Papua New Guinea during Cyclone Guba in Oro Province.53 While

Australia and other countries’ support to PNG during disaster events is appreciated

in PNG, the GoPNG on the hand, has not been able to adequately deal with

disasters and emergencies, despite the country experiencing growth in its economy

in recent years. In 1998 when PNG experienced drought the country’s economy had

been in decline. The PNG currency’s purchasing power fell from US $0.70 to US

$0.48, and later to US $0.30.54 The drop in the purchasing power of the PNG

currency, Kina, in 1998 limited the government’s ability to improve or provide

adequate disaster and emergency services to some of the affected provinces.

People in some of the Highlands Provinces such as Enga, and Southern Highlands

Provinces where the drought had occurred were denied the services of Fire

Services, Ambulance, and Disaster Service. Houses, livestock, and food gardens

burnt by fire could not be saved. Many people in drought affected areas could only

watch helplessly as flames engulfed their livelihoods.55 Ambulance Service is not

51 The Conversation, ‘As Papua New Guinea faces worsening drought, a past disaster could save lives’, viewed 16 September 2015. 52 P. Barter, ‘Responses to the 1997–98 drought in PNG’, in R.M. Bourke, M.G. Allen & J.G. Salisbury (eds), in food security for Papua New Guinea, Conference paper, Lae, PNG, 2000. 53 S. Marshall, ‘Aussie aid workers rush to help after PNG cyclone’, ABC website, 2 December 2007 < http://www.abc.net.au/news/2007-12-02/aussie-aid-workers-rush-to-help-after-png-cyclone/974830 > viewed 22 September 2015. 54 B. J., Allen, & R. M. Bourke, ‘The 1997-98 Drought in Papua New Guinea: Failure of Policy or Triumph of the Citizenry?’, in R. M. James (ed), Policy making and implementation: Studies from Papua New Guinea, Australian National University Press, pp. 325 – 399, 2009. <http://press.anu.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/ch179.pdf> viewed 27th September 2015. 55 B. Allen, Food risks in PNG: lessons from 1997, Development Policy Centre, 26 August 2015, http://devpolicy.org/food-risks-in-png-lessons-from-1997-20150826/ viewed 27 September 2015.

19

established in the Highlands Provinces so it is unlikely that people who needed

emergency evacuation in the remote villages had access to such service. Disaster

Service during 1997– 998 drought period in PNG lacked qualified personnel and

resources to respond effectively to assist populations that were affected.56 In 1997

and 1998 all the Emergency Services in PNG because of the failing economy were

very dysfunctional. By the ‘mid and the late 2000s PNG’s GDP had improved

slightly’.57 The improvement of the country’s economy saw the government make

some commitment to improve response to disasters and emergencies. This was

demonstrated in the last major cyclone event that affected much of Oro Province.

In 2007 when Cyclone Guba struck Oro Province PNG’s Gross Domestic Product

(GDP) was 7.2 percent, and the purchasing power of the Kina had increased.58 Even

though International Donors assisted PNG by responding to Oro Province with relief

supplies the GoPNG was able to provide funding to the Disaster Service of up to US

$2.6 million, and nearly US $19 million to affected communities within the first few

days of the disaster event.59 This was a very significant difference to the PNG

government’s response ability to the drought events of 1997–1998. The

government’s 1997–1998 response to the disaster event was very dependent on

external assistance. Even though the GoPNG’s response to cyclone Guba in 2007

was supported by other countries and donors, the government still played an active

part in bringing about relief and normalcy to Oro Province through its agencies such

as the Disaster Service, Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary, and the PNG

56 B. J., Allen, & R. M. Bourke, pp. 325 – 399, 2009. 57 P. Barker, ‘Research of economic growth in Papua New Guinea’, Institute of National Affairs, Working paper, No. 17, 2007. < http://www.inapng.com/pdf_files/Research%20of%20Economic%20Growth%20in%20Papua%20New%20Guinea.pdf> viewed 27 September 2015. 58 R. J. May, R. Anere, N. Haley & C. Wheen, ‘Election 2007: The shift to limited preferential voting in Papua New Guinea’, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 2013 < https://books.google.com.au/books?id=GapBAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA21&lpg=PA21&dq=papua+new+guinea+2007+economy+US+$&source=bl&ots=7wmqcZMCMB&sig=qqBXLGxNeCRElICe3mmwwa1zGok&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CFUQ6AEwCWoVChMIsKS5j4qXyAIVhyiUCh335QW5#v=onepage&q=Economypapua%20new%20guinea%202007%20economy%20US%20%24&f=false> viewed 27 September 2015. 59UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Papua New Guinea: Cyclone Guba OCHA Situation Report No. 2’, United Nations website, 26 August 2007. <http://reliefweb.int/report/papua-new-guinea/papua-new-guinea-cyclone-guba-ocha-situation-report-no-2> viewed 27 September 2015.

20

Defence Force.60 This emphasis is made not to with the intention of undermining the

important contributions of other countries, donor agencies, NGOs, and other partners

during the aftermath of Cyclone Guba. This point is made to bring to attention that

the role a government of a country can play in assisting itself during disaster events

is very much dependent on the size of its economy. Allen and Bourke argue this

point well. They argue that views such as the ‘establishment view of natural

disasters’61 is applicable to developed countries with larger economies and

resources, but not necessarily applicable to lesser developed economies or

countries.

According to the establishment view disasters, although often caused by forces of

nature, can be managed adequately with adequate public policy.62 Allen and Bourke

cite the experiences of Australia’s large bushfire fire fighting operations in which hi –

tech technology and resources of magnitudes are applied to combat such large fires

in military–like fashion as example of the establishment view and contrast this with

PNG’s experience with the 1997 drought event. Australian Fire Services have very

large control centres with sophisticated intelligence systems to locate fire sites and

determine the allocation of resources to bring such fires under control. In contrast,

PNG simply did not have the capability or the economy, let alone an effective policy

to respond to the droughts of the late 1990s. In 2007 PNG still did not have a strong

economy like its developed neighbour countries, Australia and New Zealand, but its

economy had improved exceptionally well. This enabled the GoPNG to respond with

a greater level of funding allocation through the Disaster Service to assist victims of

Cyclone Guba. The GoPNG also employed some of its military resources such as

the PNG navy boats, and soldiers. However, the role of the military was confined to

providing security and support in the provision of relief supplies. PNG’s economy in

2007 was not able to afford sophisticated technology or equipment for disaster

management. The cyclone disaster of 2007 however taught PNG an important

60 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Papua New Guinea: Cyclone Guba OCHA Situation Report No. 2’, 26 August 2007. 61 B. J., Allen, & R. M. Bourke, 2009, pp. 325 – 399. 62 Hewitt, K. ‘The idea of calamity in a technocratic age’, In Interpretations of Calamity from the Viewpoint of Human Ecology, ed. K. Hewitt, London: Allen and Unwin, pp. 3–31, 1983.

21

lesson–the country’s emergency and disaster services could be better prepared for

destructive events if agencies such as the National and Provincial Disaster Service,

St. John’s Ambulance Service, and the PNG Fire Services worked collectively to

maximise the benefits of their limited resources. This rationale was the basis of the

proposed Rationalisation of PNG Emergency Services policy. Further discussions on

the Rationalisation of PNG Emergency Services will be provided in chapter two of

this paper.

To summarise, this chapter discussed the challenges that the emergency and

disaster services experience in PNG. The country’s natural geography of many

mountains, seas and rivers create challenges for these Services. Not every island

and remote village in all the provinces of PNG can be serviced. Only about 10 per

cent of PNG’s 7 million people are able to have access to the Disaster Service.

These are people living in the urban centres of PNG. Fire Service is present only in

10 provinces outside of Port Moresby. St. John’s Ambulance Service is established

in two or three urban areas. Two of the services, Disaster Service and PNGFS, are

housed under the same Department, but operate under separate items of the PNG

legislation. The St. John’s Ambulance Service is a non–government organisation that

receives funding support from the government to provide its services. Such

arrangements make it difficult for resources to be optimised between the agencies.

The 1997-1998 droughts showed how weak PNG’s disaster and emergency

preparedness was. PNG’s weak economy at that time played a big part in rendering

PNG unable to cope with disasters. Australia’s relief assistance to PNG saved the

latter from further disaster. Without donor partners and NGOs PNG would not have

been able to deal with disasters in the late 1990s. 2007 was however an

improvement. The GoPNG played a significant role in the 2007 Cyclone Guba

disaster. This was due to a much improved PNG economy. In 2015 droughts, frost

and bush fires have seen the government respond with relief supply with assistance

from donor partners. However, the lessons of 1997-1998, and 2007 disasters did not

see the PNG government extend services such as the fire services and ambulance

services to some of the provinces that are currently affected by the drought

disasters. PNG’s improving economy can allow the country to improve disaster and

emergency management for the country. The Rationalisation of PNG Emergency

22

Service is an important policy that if implemented has the potential to address the

emergency and disaster management needs of the country. Resources shared

between the Fire Service, St. John’s Ambulance, and Disaster Services can achieve

better safety outcomes for the 7 million people of PNG.

23

Chapter Two History and critique of the Rationalisation of the PNG Emergency Service policy Chapter One described the context in which Emergency and Disaster Services

operate in PNG. National and Provincial Disaster Services, Fire Services, and

Ambulance Services are in some cases able to work together because they are

present in one provincial location. In other cases one or two of the Services are

present in a province, but not all. In some cases not all the Services are

available. All these emergency services have similar, but also different

challenges as well. Their challenges come from the geographical and natural

environment, the location of the large population in the isolated rural areas, the

often uncertain economy of PNG, various items of legislation, and the confines of

their resources. The current chapter does three things. Firstly, it focuses on the

Rationalisation of PNG Emergency Services (RPNGES) policy and its origin.

Secondly, the chapter provides a comparative analysis to refute the argument

raised by the chairman of the working group that preservation of authority was

the main barrier to the RPNGES policy not being progressed. This discussion

includes an analysis of recent amalgamation attempts of the South Australia and

Victorian states’ emergency services. Finally, the chapter provides an alternative

view of why the RPNGES policy is not put into effect. The paper is of the view

that RPNGES policy is stalled because of conflicts between some policy and

political values. A post-positivist approach is applied to this part of the

discussions.

The genesis of the RPNGES policy The need to improve delivery of emergency services got onto the government’s

agenda in 2005. This was the result of, arguably, one person’s personal experience

with the 1997-1998 droughts that had affected parts of PNG.63 Sir Peter Barter was

chairman of the National Drought Relief Committee during this drought period and

witnessed the challenges that were involved with relief efforts.64 He saw how foreign

63 P. Barter, ‘Responses to the 1997–98 Drought in PNG’, in R.M. Bourke, M.G. Allen and J.G. Salisbury (eds). 64P. Barter, ‘Responses to the 1997–98 Drought in PNG’, in R.M. Bourke, M.G. Allen and J.G. Salisbury (eds).

24

relief assistance to the drought-affected areas was delivered through non–

government organisations because of differences of political opinions between the

foreign governments and the PNG government.65 Barter observed that, while

Australia as a long-time partner of PNG was responsive and helpful during the

drought crisis, Australia was also ‘forceful.’66 Australia did not appreciate the PNG

government’s lack of experience with disaster management and provide support on

this basis. Instead it dictated where and when its aid should go. Australia’s dictatorial

attitude was perhaps more so because the government of PNG and the

administration were disorganised and did not prepare well for the 1997–1998

drought disaster event. About 1.26 million people had experienced extreme cases of

food shortage during this disaster.67

In his conference paper Barter says that part of his frustration during the drought

relief program was that he had also witnessed how some politicians’ ill–defined

political motivations directed relief supply away from the most needed places to

people in parts of provinces that did not really need the relief.68 He makes a

concluding remark about this experience ‘I now feel that we have a lot to learn from

… the drought of 1997–1998, and that we should be able to use these lessons to

prevent similar crises in the future.’69 For Barter this was initially a private concern

about the government and the public services’ inability to provide emergency relief

efficiently and effectively. The issue in Barter’s mind had to become a government

agenda for it to receive the attention and resources it needed. As Althaus and others

have stated, ‘there is a crucial moment in the policy cycle, a point at which a private

concern is transformed into a policy issue.’70 Barter believed that with good

65P. Barter, ‘Responses to the 1997–98 Drought in PNG’, in R.M. Bourke, M.G. Allen and J.G. Salisbury (eds). 66 P. Barter, ’Responses to the 1997–98 Drought in PNG’, in R.M. Bourke, M.G. Allen and J.G. Salisbury (eds). 67 M. Wela, B. Kanua & S. Bang, ‘Postdrought agricultural rehabilitation: the 1997–98 El Niño Drought in PNG’, in R.M. Bourke, M.G. Allen and J.G. Salisbury (eds), Food security for Papua New Guinea, conference paper, Lae, 2000 < http://aciar.gov.au/files/node/306/pr99_pdf_10703.pdf> viewed 15 October 2015. 68 P. Barter, ’Responses to the 1997–98 Drought in PNG’, in R.M. Bourke, M.G. Allen and J.G. Salisbury (eds). 69 P. Barter, ’Responses to the 1997–98 Drought in PNG’, in R.M. Bourke, M.G. Allen and J.G. Salisbury (eds). 70 C. Althaus, P. Bridgman, & G. Davis, ‘Identifying issues’, in C. Althaus, P. Bridgman, & G. Davis, The Australian policy handbook, 4th ed, p.43, Allen & Unwin, NSW, 2013.

25

emergency and disaster management similar droughts that occur in the future would

be better managed, and people’s suffering resulting from such events could be

alleviated in a more timely fashion. In his mind a good public policy on emergency

and disaster management would prepare the country to mitigate the effects of

disasters. Such a public policy, he assumed, should be value-free and not easily

subjected to political influences or manipulation. He was resolved in his thinking to

bring such an improvement to emergency management at some opportune time. His

opportunity to address this concern came when he was appointed Minister for the

Local Level Government Affairs Department. PNGFS and the Disaster Service were

under this Ministry.

In 2005, as Minister responsible for Emergency Services, Barter commissioned a

team comprising the various Heads of the Emergency Service agencies, Disaster

Service, PNGFS, and St. John’s Ambulance Service, to research ways of improving

the delivery of emergency and disaster services in the country.71 Barter was of the

opinion that emergency management needed to be improved as a sector, instead of

just focusing on individual agencies. PNG had by then experienced a number of

disasters. Besides the 1997–1998 droughts the country saw in 1994 a twin volcanic

eruption in Rabaul, East New Britain Province.72 This disaster event destroyed

Rabaul Town and the villages neighbouring the Town.73 Estimated damage was

about PNG K200 million (A$ 90 million).74 One observer commented that ‘the

rehabilitation and reconstruction of facilities in the Rabaul region will take many

years. Restoration of government services alone is estimated to cost K100 million’

(A$ 30 million).75 This estimated cost for rehabilitation and restoration of Rabaul

71 Department of Provincial Affairs, ‘Rationalisation of Emergency Services PNG’, Final Report, Government Printer, Port Moresby, 2007. 72 K. Neumann, ‘The 1994 volcanic disaster and its aftermath in East New Britain: comments and observations’, Australian International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction Committee, Emergency Management Australia, 1996 < http://www.pacificdisaster.net/pdnadmin/data/original/JB_DM167_PNG_1994_comments_and_observations.pdf> viewed 12 October 2015. 73 K. Neumann, ‘The 1994 volcanic disaster and its aftermath in East New Britain: comments and observations’, Australian International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction Committee, Emergency Management Australia, 1996. 74K. Neumann, ‘The 1994 volcanic disaster and its aftermath in East New Britain: comments and observations’, Australian International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction Committee, Emergency Management Australia, 1996. 75 75K. Neumann, ‘The 1994 volcanic disaster and its aftermath in East New Britain: comments and observations’, Australian International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction Committee, Emergency Management Australia, 1996.

26

Town does not include non – government services. Rebuilding Rabaul from the

aftermath of the twin volcanic eruption continues to be a challenge to the PNG

government twenty years on. Fortunately, not many lives were lost from that event;

only 10 or so people were killed by the effects of the volcanic eruption.76 The lower

number of lives lost is attributed to the Provincial Disaster Service’s efforts in making

the population of Rabaul aware through campaign messages about the imminent

dangers of the activities of the volcanoes over a long period.77 Such a long

awareness program helped the people and the province prepare to relocate away

from harm’s way before the volcanoes erupted. This can be well regarded as a

success story for the Disaster Service.

Such a success story did not however happen for the people of Aitape and Sisano in

the Sandaun Province in 1998. Villages were destroyed and many lives were taken,

some never to be found, when a tsunami struck suddenly and intensely. More than

1000 lives were lost, over 2000 people seriously injured, and some 10, 000 were left

without homes.78 These villages did not have access to emergency services such as

the Disaster Service, PNGFS or the ambulance service. Unlike the people of Rabaul,

the villages of Aitape and Sisano did not receive any preparation message from

emergency services to evacuate their villages before the tsunami struck. The

tsunami caught them totally unaware.

Disasters such as the displacement of people and loss of lives from the impact of

volcanic eruptions, and tsunami were not the only issues for emergency services that

Minister Barter was concerned about. He was also concerned that many of the

provinces were without fire service and ambulance cover. Barter was adamant about

changing the already declining situation of emergency management and

76 A. W. Dent, G. Davies, P. Barrett, & P. J. de Saint, ‘The 1994 eruption of the Rabaul volcano, Papua New Guinea: injuries sustained and medical response’, The Medical journal of Australia, No. 163, Vol. 11-12, 1995, pp. 635-9 77 H. Davies, ‘The 1994 eruption of Rabaul volcano – A case study in disaster management’, University of Papua New Guinea, 1995 < http://www.pacificdisaster.net/pdnadmin/data/original/JB_DM311_PNG_1994_disaster_management.pdf > viewed 12 October 2015. 78 H.L. Davies, J.M. Davies, R.C.B. Perembo & and W.Y. Lus, ‘The Aitape 1998 tsunami: Reconstructing the event from interviews and field mapping’, University of PNG website, n.d. < http://nctr.pmel.noaa.gov/PNG/Upng/Davies020411/> viewed 12 October 2015.

27

commissioned a task force or team to research solutions to improve this situation.

The Heads of the PNGFS, National Disaster Service, and St. John’s Ambulance

Service were issued this task. Barter outlined to the Heads of the emergency service

agencies that they were to find ways to improve emergency service delivery and to

improve standards of safety for the country’s residents.79

Through Barter’s advocacy to improve emergency and disaster management, the

government of PNG recognised that disasters and emergencies in the country were

not being managed effectively and efficiently. The GoPNG accepted his views that

the existing emergency service delivery arrangements were inadequate. Each of the

services operated mostly in isolation from the other. Emergency services were also

not present in every provinces of PNG. Only Port Moresby had the presence of all

three emergency agencies. This issue of poor organisation of emergency services

had proved to be costly. Many lives and property had been lost not only as direct

results of events such as road accidents, fires, volcanic eruptions, floods, landslides,

and other life threatening incidents, but also because of a lack of emergency

services in many parts of PNG. Even when emergency services were present in

some provinces they lacked the resources and skills to be of any effective use at

many incidents.

The team of researchers consulted with many stakeholders. Various government

departments, civil society organisations, faith-based organisations, private sector,

professional groups, think tanks, academics, and employees within the three

agencies were some of the many parties that the team consulted during the policy

research process. Most of the stakeholders consulted agreed that PNG had an

ineffective emergency service model and that a new model was needed to improve

emergency response and safety for the country. The research team finally proposed

an amalgamation of services as a solution to the issues of poor emergency and

disaster management the country had been experiencing for many years.

79 Department of Provincial Affairs, Rationalisation of Emergency Services PNG, Final Report, 2007.

28

The solution came in the form of the Rationalisation of PNG Emergency Service

(RPNGES) policy in 2007.80 The RPNGES policy recommended that the Disaster

Service, PNGFS, and the St. John’s Ambulance Services should merge and be

located under the Department of Defence.81 This would allow interoperability at

incidents as the services would be able to apply common standard operating

procedures, and share training facilities. The aim of this arrangement was to improve

command and coordination between the services during emergencies and disasters.

Sharing resources is important because this would reduce duplication in roles and

responsibilities and minimise wastage. The policy recommended that in each of the

provinces emergency units comprising of fire fighters, ambulance officers, and

disaster service personnel, were to be established. Some of the personnel were to

be fulltime employees, others would be volunteers, and retained members.

Personnel would be trained to carry out more than one emergency task. Fire fighters

would be trained in life saving first aid applications, work that ambulance officers are

familiar with. Likewise, ambulance officers would learn basic fire-fighting skills so that

they could respond in the event of fire incidents. The emergency service units would

be overseen by a single headquarters, and have one control centre to monitor

emergency and disaster incidents.82 Furthermore, under this policy arrangements

with the PNG Defence Force would be easy to activate when assistance of the

soldiers was needed.83 The policy reflected inclusiveness and a whole-of-

government approach. Resources from all levels of government could be accessed

through this policy if and when such need arose. NGOs, International partners and

donors, and specialists like scientists who monitored seismic activities and many

other specialists also had roles in this policy.

The RPNGES policy makes a lot of sense in so far as its recommended solutions to

emergency management issues are concerned. The proposed solutions articulate

80Department of Provincial Affairs, Rationalisation of Emergency Services PNG, Final Report, 2007. 81 Department of Provincial Affairs, Rationalisation of Emergency Services PNG, Final Report, 2007. 82Department of Provincial Affairs, Rationalisation of Emergency Services PNG, Final Report, 2007. 83 Department of Provincial Affairs, Rationalisation of Emergency Services PNG, Final Report, 2007.

29

with the key issues identified by the research task team. The bulk of the policy is also

grounded on the economic rationale of cost–benefit assumptions. This is implied by

one of the aims of the policy, ‘to ensure the government is cost effective in delivering

emergency services’,84 that Sir Peter Barter instructed the research team to consider

when designing the RPNGES policy.

Why has RPNGES policy stalled?

The question this chapter asks is why has the RPNGES policy not been effected

even though it was designed to be cost-effective. Furthermore, most, if not all, of the

stakeholders that were consulted indicated support for the policy, yet the RPNGES

policy to date has not been put into effect. The government did not approve the

policy or reject it. The status of the policy remains unclear. The chairman of the team

that put this policy together in a presentation in 2013 stated that the policy had been

accepted by the national executive council, or government.85 The government then

directed the team to prepare legislative drafting instructions and have this submitted

to the Minister responsible for Emergency Services. The team complied with that

instruction. They had the drafting instruction prepared and forwarded it to the new

Minister for Emergency Services. However, the Minister, the chairman stated ‘did not

run with it’.’86 The new Minister did not provide further instructions to the working

group about his plans for the RPNGES policy until he vacated the office in 2007,

after losing his seat in the national elections. The new government that took office

after that election also did not revisit this policy. Two elections have gone by since

the RPNGES policy was proposed in 2007, but none of the governments have taken

any initiative to re-examine the policy.

The chairman highlighted three important areas in which lessons were learnt during

the RPNGES policy formulation. These were that: ‘preservation of authority was a

barrier, ownership (buy in is important), and [the need to work] with other options to

84 Department of Provincial Affairs, Rationalisation of Emergency Services PNG, Final Report, 2007. 85 I. K. Silas, 2013, ‘Rationalization of Emergency Services in Papua New Guinea’, http://www.pacificdisaster.net/pdnadmin/data/original/JM2013_SAM_S5_P_PNG_RationalisationExperience_SilasIsaac_20130704.pdf viewed 12 October 2015. 86 I. K. Silas, 2013, Rationalization of Emergency Services in Papua New Guinea.

30

arrive at the same outcomes.’87 He stated that one of the options or ways of reaching

the same emergency and disaster management safety outcomes ‘is to work with the

Disaster Service’88 The real barrier to the RPNGES policy being put into effect,

according to the chairman, was ‘preservation of authority.’89 By preservation of

authority’90, the chairman was implying that the three emergency services were not

prepared to relinquish the powers they currently had. The RPNGES policy, the

emergency services felt, could remove such authority if realised. Which particular

Service was not in full agreement with the RPNGES policy is not explicitly clear, but

an inference can be drawn from the chairman’s statement for at least one of the

Services that may have been dissatisfied with the RPNGES policy.

The inference made from the chairman’s views is that the Disaster Service was not

in full agreement with the Fire Service and the St. John’s Ambulance to merge. In the

dissatisfied Disaster Service’s leader’s mind was the conviction that the proposed

amalgamation of the three Services would diminish the authority that he and his

agency enjoyed. A further inference drawn from the comments of the chairman is

that each of the Services would retain their own authority over the needs of the

country for an effective emergency and disaster management if the current status

quo remained and amalgamation of the Services did not take place.

Such conclusions suggested by the chairman may be valid to a point, but may not be

sufficient to explain the RPNGES policy’s demise. The government could have over-

ridden any decisions by the Services that did not support the RPNGES policy and

amalgamated the emergency services to serve the national interest of the country,

but the government has not. The government probably had other plans. A recent

public undertaking by the current government to improve the Fire Service91, Disaster

87 I. K. Silas, 2013, Rationalization of Emergency Services in Papua New Guinea. 88 I. K. Silas, 2013, Rationalization of Emergency Services in Papua New Guinea. 89I. K. Silas, 2013, Rationalization of Emergency Services in Papua New Guinea. 90I. K. Silas, 2013, Rationalization of Emergency Services in Papua New Guinea. 91G. A. Salmang, ‘NEC approves fire safety steps: Dion’, Post Courier online, August 25 2015. < http://www.postcourier.com.pg/Stories/nec-approves-fire-safety-steps-dion/#.VjHHWU3ouUk >

31

Service,92 and a promise to assist St. John’s Ambulance93 could lead to the

government revisiting the RPNGES policy, but again this would be a premature

assumption to make. Furthermore, unlike the 1997-1998 El Nino drought that PNG

experienced and which motivated Peter Barter to consider initiating an emergency

and disaster management policy, the current El Nino drought has not done the same

to the sitting government. The current government has not yet considered another

emergency or disaster management policy. It is reasonable to suppose that there

must be another reason that exists that the past and the current government share

that has seen the RPNGES policy ignored.

Emergency Service mergers in Australia The paper now focuses attention on proposing an alternative reason or reasons that

successive governments may have had to decide against employing the RPNGES

policy and argues that preservation of authority as a barrier, as suggested by the

chairman of the working team, is only one of the possible reasons the RPNGES

policy is not effected. It is not the only reason or primary reason. If anything, the

paper argues that it is a secondary reason to why the RPNGES policy is still not

adopted. For now, however, the paper examines two Australian states’ most recent

merger of emergency services efforts to show the challenges they experienced in the

process and point out why preservation of authority as a barrier is not always the

main reason for failed merger attempts. More importantly, PNG can learn some

lessons from Australia’s merger of emergency services experiences. Such lessons

could provide PNG with ideas to consider in its own efforts to find ways of improving

the delivery of emergency services and safety. Mentioning Australia’s experience

here is necessary because in 2006 during the process of research and formulation

Viewed 25 August 2015 92 A. Alphonse, ‘Leaders not attending to natural disasters have a problem’, Post Courier online, 28 October 2015,

<http://www.postcourier.com.pg/News/mps-and-governors-have-problem-if-they-fail-to-address-disasters-

dion/#.VjBbEk3ouUk viewed 28 October 2015.

93 M. Cannon, ‘New service agreement with National Department of Health signed’, Media release, 1 October 2015, http://www.stjohn.org.pg/#!New-service-agreement-with-National-Department-of-Health-signed/clfr/560ea7730cf25fa7fe22e324 viewed 29 October 2015.

32

for the RPNGES policy the working party visited the Queensland Ministry of

Emergency Services.94 The Queensland Ministry of Emergency Services shared its

ideas to the PNG working party about its emergency management structure and how

it delivered emergency management and safety services in Queensland.

In the Queensland Ministry of Emergency Services structure the Fire Service,

Ambulance Service, and the Emergency Management Queensland Service are

housed under one Minister.95 The Fire Service’s focus is on fighting fires, and the

Ambulance Service deals with transportation of persons with life threatening issues

to the hospital. The Emergency Management Queensland Service is tasked with

responding to disasters. The Heads of each of the Services reports to the Director

General of the Queensland Emergency Services. The Director General then reports

to the Minister.96 This was possibly the similar kind of emergency management

structure that the PNG working party had in mind when it proposed the RPNGES

policy. It is not known if Queensland experienced any opposition to this emergency

management structural arrangement when it was first proposed. What is known

though is that the government of Queensland succeeded in amalgamating all its

state’s emergency services. Preservation of authority as a barrier from any of the

Services to the merger, if it was an issue, was not a strong enough reason to

dissuade the government. A contrast to Queensland’s success of merging

emergency services to that of other Australian states’ recent experiences is,

therefore, in order.

South Australia and Victoria’s emergency services merger experiences

Proposed amalgamations of Emergency Services are not always easy to achieve. In

2014, the South Australian government announced that it would merge the South

Australian Metropolitan Fire Service, Country Fire Service, and the State Emergency

94 Department of Provincial Affairs, ‘Rationalisation of Emergency Services PNG’, Final Report, 2007. 95Queensland Government, ‘Annual report: 2006-2007’, Department of Emergency Services, n.d.< https://ambulance.qld.gov.au/docs/Annual%20Report%202006-07.pdf> viewed 31 October 2015. 96 Queensland Government, Annual report: 2006-2007, Department of Emergency Services.

33

Services under one Department.97 According to the South Australian State

government the merger was aimed at ‘reducing duplication in the bureaucracy and

cutting the number of executives.’98 One executive, the Chief Officer of the South

Australian Metropolitan Fire Service, resigned because he was dissatisfied with the

state government’s plan to merge the South Australian Emergency Services.99 The

Chief Officer of the South Australian Metropolitan Fire Service told the media that he

would not be happy working with less authority. His powers as head of operations

would remain, but financial and corporate powers would be vested with the new

Commissioner of the Emergency Services under the new department.100

The planned merger of the South Australian Emergency Services, however, was

opposed and set aside. Country Fire Service volunteers had been the most vocal

opposition to the planned merger, voicing that they had not been properly informed

or consulted about the merger plan.101 The South Australian state government

eventually succumbed to the protestation of the Country Fire Service volunteers, and

did not implement the amalgamation plan. The emergency services in South

Australia still operate separately as they had been doing before the planned

merger.102 It was, therefore, not the emergency services’ executives’ fears about

losing power or authority that halted the South Australian Emergency Services

97 S. Holderhead, ‘South Australia’s emergency services will be merged into one department’, The Advertiser online, 15 September 2014. http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/south-australia/south-australias-emergency-services-will-be-merged-into-one-department/story-fni6uo1m-1227059510556?sv=414ef907a4e16cfdf59e2445ba6f6c1f viewed 15 October 2015. 98 S. Holderhead, ‘South Australia’s emergency services will be merged into one department’, The Advertiser online, 15 September 2014. 99 M. Simos, 2015, ‘MFS chief quits fire service ahead of emergency services merger’, The Advertiser online, 1 March http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/south-australia/mfs-chief-quits-fire-service-ahead-of-emergency-services-merger/story-fni6uo1m-1227243713677?sv=5bab73e428aaee6aff8baf32ee1ccdcd viewed 15 October 2015. 100 M. Simos, ‘MFS chief quits fire service ahead of emergency services merger’, The Advertiser, 1 March 2015. 101 ABC, ‘Back down on emergency services merger in SA as Minister laments hindsight', 16 May 2015 < http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-16/sa-government-backs-down-on-emergency-services-merger/6474818> viewed 15 October 2015. 102 ABC, 2015, ‘Back down on emergency services merger in SA as Minister laments hindsight', 16 May 2015.

34

amalgamation proposal; it was the protest of the frontline emergency service

operators. The frontline emergency service responders opposed the amalgamation

of the services because they felt left out from the process of consultation.103 They

were also concerned that the proposed changes would affect the way they operated,

and therefore lose volunteers.104

In Victoria some Fire Services gave conditional support for the amalgamation of Fire

Services. In 2010, as a result of a Royal commission into the 2009 Victoria bushfires,

the state government proposed to amalgamate the state’s Fire Services. Members of

the Volunteers Fire Brigades Victoria (VFBV), during a consultation process, stated

that they supported the amalgamation of Victoria’s Fire Services if the new

arrangement enabled interoperability to be more effective and efficient.105 VFBV

would not, however, support the proposal if the amalgamation of the Emergency

Services resulted in resources being reduced in one area of the Emergency Service

to benefit another.106 The Victorian state government did not implement this planned

merger. The state government felt that merging the emergency service agencies was

complicated and could not be achieved fully. The Minister for Emergency Services

pointed out that

each of the entities has its own ethos, has developed through the years its

own particular place in things and we need to make sure that we respect

that…I think people join those organisations because they want to join that

specific organisation.107

103 ABC, 2015, ‘Back down on emergency services merger in SA as Minister laments hindsight', 16 May 2015. 104 S. Rice, ‘CFS volunteers threaten to quit over SA Government’s emergency services merger plan’, The Advertiser online, 8 February 2015. < http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/south-australia/cfs-volunteers-threaten-to-quit-over-sa-governments-emergency-services-merger-plan/story-fni6uo1m-1227212303130> viewed 18 October 2015. 105 Volunteer Fire Brigade Victoria, ‘VFBV response to counsel assisting’s submissions on amalgamation of Victoria’s fire services’, 2009 Bushfires Royal Commission Submission, 17 May 2010, <013_Amalgamation.pdf> viewed 18 October 2015. 106 Volunteer Fire Brigade Victoria, ‘VFBV response to counsel assisting’s submissions on amalgamation of Victoria’s fire services’. 107 A. Savage, ‘Sweeping changes to Victoria's emergency services’, ABC online, 10 December 2012, < http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-12-10/sweeping-changes-to-victoria27s-emergency-services/4419434> viewed 18 October 2015

35

A new agency known as Emergency Management Victoria was established instead

to oversee all the Emergency Services and to provide overall strategic leadership to

them.108 This materialised with the appointment of the first Commissioner of

Emergency Management Victoria taking place in 2014.109 Victoria’s Emergency

Services amalgamation plans did not take place, but a different policy strategy, the

establishment of an Emergency Management Commission, was employed to

improve the Emergency Services’ effectiveness and efficiency.

In both the Victorian and the South Australian cases preservation of power was not

the main issue preventing amalgamation. Both states saw frontline operators protest

for other reasons. Volunteerism was the most important value the South Australian

emergency service responders believed needed to be protected. They feared that

they would lose their valuable volunteers if the merger of the services went ahead.

The Victorian volunteer fire fighters also expressed similar sentiments of opposition

to their state government’s plans to amalgamate emergency services. They did not

want to lose their volunteers if the amalgamation resulted in some emergency

service agencies missing out in resource allocation. The states of Victoria and South

Australia’s emergency services share a common value: volunteerism. Volunteerism

rather than loss of authority is a fundamental value that organisations such as the

Country Fire Service in South Australia, and the Volunteer Fire Brigade Victoria

share.

Lessons for PNG from Australia

It will not be totally denied that loss of authority is a barrier to amalgamations of

organisations. However, as shown in South Australia and Victoria other reasons for

opposing amalgamations are just as true. There are other values besides

preservation of authority that can also be obstacles to mergers. Such values can be

even more influential reasons of opposition to amalgamations than preservation of

108 A. Savage, ‘Sweeping changes to Victoria's emergency services’, ABC online, 10 December 2012. 109 Victorian State Government, ‘The Commissioner’, Emergency Management Victoria, Victorian State Government website, n..d. < https://www.emv.vic.gov.au/about-us/the-commissioner/> viewed 18 October 2015.

36

authority. The sources of the oppositions to mergers are also varied. In South

Australia at least one executive felt opposed to the states intended emergency

services merger, but most of the opposition was from the frontline volunteers. In

Victoria opposition to the merger of emergency services came from the volunteers.

These Australian experiences with their volunteer emergency service responders do

not mean that PNG’s emergency should not have volunteers. The lesson that should

be learnt from these experiences is that every organisation has its own values and

that these need to be identified and managed properly when considering

amalgamations. Furthermore, barriers to mergers may not always be put up by the

leaders of the different organisations. Such barriers can also originate from

employees in the lower levels of organisations with their own reasons or values.

These reasons may not always be related to the preservation of authority.

Another lesson that lesson that PNG can learn is that the state governments of

South Australia and Victoria managed their challenges of mergers in different ways.

The South Australian state government backed down and continued with its current

emergency management arrangement. No changes were made. On the other hand,

the Victorian state achieved a different form of amalgamation of its emergency

services. It created a commission that has oversight of all the emergency services.

Victoria chose a different approach to that of South Australia to achieve an

amalgamation of emergency services. This is perhaps a valuable lesson that PNG

should learn from this experience – that there are other ways of achieving the

outcomes of the RPNGES policy. If merging all the three Services in PNG is difficult,

then other approaches should be considered. Preservation of authority or any other

reason as barrier or barriers to amalgamations can be managed through the

application of different approaches. Amalgamation is only a means to an end. That

end is delivering an effective and efficient emergency management service delivery.

If such an end is difficult to accomplish through the RPNGES policy, then surely

there must be other options that are available that can be explored. Exploring any

other possible options may also mean redefining how the concepts of emergency

and disaster. Further elaboration of these concepts is given in this and the next

chapter.

37

Another lesson that PNG should draw from the Australian states is that the

government, especially the Ministers responsible for the respective states’

emergency services were involved right throughout the process of policy formulation.

Each of the states’ emergency services ministers were clearly in support of

improving delivery of emergency services for their communities. They believed in the

value of their states developing independent capability for the effective and efficient

management of emergencies and disasters. This is not to say that each of the states

would not need assistance from neighbouring states or from other countries. Such

assistance would probably be welcomed, but perhaps only if their own states’

resources were in danger of running out. PNG, on the other hand, has other ideas

about how it wants to improve emergency and disaster management. This is

discussed below from a post–positivist perspective.

Post-positivist approach, values and the RPNGES policy The value of safety from emergencies and disasters is not disputed. It is not

assumed here that the government of PNG does not care about emergency

management. On the contrary, it does care. The GoPNG allocates funding to the

Fire Service and Disaster Service annually to deliver emergency services in the

country. In the case of St. John Ambulance Service a memorandum of agreement

ensures that the government provides some level of funding support to the non–

government entity. The government does value the safety of its people. It does not

want to see the people of PNG suffer from the effects of emergencies and disasters.

What is argued here however, is that there are possible value conflicts about how

the government believes emergency and disaster management should be delivered

in PNG. Taking a post–positivist approach, this paper argues that the proposers of

the RPNGES policy as means of delivering effective and efficient emergency

management may have not adequately recognised the differing values of the

government, or policy decision-makers. These conflicting values will be clarified later

in the chapter. For now, a brief explanation of what a post–positivist approach is

necessary. To do this however, a basic understanding of a positivist approach is

needed first.

A positivist approach is one that emphasizes that policy making should be based on

empirical evidence that is derived from scientific methods of research and statistics,

38

not intuition or unsubstantiated personal beliefs.110 Positivists therefore often argue

that decision-makers should only pursue policies that are based on sound research.

This argument does seem to have some merit as the risk of errors can be reduced.

Gary Banks recognises this strength of the positivist or evidence-based decision-

making approach. Banks points out that the evidence-based approach is a useful

tool to apply ‘at each stage of policy development ’as it can help determine the

effectiveness of the policy ‘right from when an issue is first identified, to the

development of the most appropriate response.’111 Other endorsers of this approach

go further and argue that decision making should be value free and apolitical and

based on rationality.112 Decisions based on emotions and anything else outside of

research is substandard and would most probably produce poor outcomes of policy.

In other words, positivists argue that policy decision-makers should be influenced by

evidence rather than influence evidence to favour their own political ends.113

Guess and other researchers cite some examples from two countries where the

positivist approach to decision making proved valuable, and give other examples of

poor decision-making where sound evidence was absent. In the USA, for instance,

positivist approach brought about successful results in the health, defence and

education sectors.114 In Great Britain the application of evidence-based decision

making resulted in health costs being reduced and improvements in the health

sector.115 Application of the method assisted policy makers to respond to issues

110 Howlett, Michael, Ramesh, M & Perl, Anthony 'Understanding public policy: theoretical approaches', in Howlett, Michael, Ramesh, M & Perl, Anthony, Studying public policy: policy cycles & policy subsystems, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press, Don Mills, Ont., 2009, pp. 17-49. 111 G. Banks, ‘Challenges of evidence-based policy-making, Australian government website, 2009,, < http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications-and-media/archive/publications-archive/evidence-based-policy> viewed 1 November 2015. 112 Guess, George M & Farnham, Paul G, 'The policymaking process: between technical rationality and politics', in Guess, George M & Farnham, Paul G, Cases in public policy analysis, 3rd edn, Georgetown University Press, Washington, 2011, pp. 1-22.

113 Guess, George M & Farnham, Paul G, 'The policymaking process: between technical rationality and politics’, 2011.

114 Guess, George M & Farnham, Paul G, 'The policymaking process: between technical rationality and politics’, 2011.

115 Guess, George M & Farnham, Paul G, 'The policymaking process: between technical rationality and politics’, 2011.

39

systematically in these various sectors, thus producing successful results and

perhaps saving resources from unwise spending.116

Despite proving to be a useful tool, the positivist analytical approach has not always

been embraced by some policy makers. For example, some decisions that the USA

made were not based on evidence. Such lack of evidence grounded decision-making

has proved disastrous. The decision for USA to go to war with Iraq, for instance, was

not based on evidence, but rather on other political reasons.117 Another poor

decision that lacked evidence was the management of air quality in USA.118 USA

apparently, has poor air quality because decisions that were made to improve quality

were not based on sound research information. Policy makers responsible for air

quality based their decisions on other criteria, not scientific evidence. The positivist

approach based decision making is therefore, an important tool that policy makers

should give serious consideration to before finalising policy decisions. Positivist

approaches such as evidence based, and cost-benefit analysis to policy making

have undeniable merits. Their importance in policy making should not be overlooked.

A post-positivist approach on the other hand, is one that emphasizes the recognition

of values. Post-positivists ‘… generally argue that mainstream policy … analysts…

are misguided in their obsession with quantitative analysis, objective separation of

facts and values, and generalizable findings independent of particular social contexts

– all hallmarks of positivist thinking.’119 Post-positivists are not saying that

quantitative analysis and related tools of policy research such as evidence-based

approach should not be adopted in policy making. They argue, instead, that

positivists should use these tools, but also recognise that there is a place for values

in policy making. One approach should not exclude the other. Post-positivists point

116 Guess, George M & Farnham, Paul G, 'The policymaking process: between technical rationality and politics’, 2011.

117 Guess, George M & Farnham, Paul G, 'The policymaking process: between technical rationality and politics’, 2011.

118 Guess, George M & Farnham, Paul G, 'The policymaking process: between technical rationality and politics’, 2011.

119 Howlett, Michael, Ramesh, M & Perl, Anthony 2009, 'Understanding public policy: theoretical approaches.'

40

out correctly that evidence-based policy making has its draw-backs too.120 One its

main set-back is that it is based on the notion of being value-free and this is an

unrealistic view of policy making. ‘Policy decisions emerge from politics, judgement

and debate, rather than being deduced from empirical analysis. Policy debate and

analysis involves interplay between facts, norms and desired actions, in which

‘evidence’ is diverse and contestable.’121 In other words, evidence is subject to

multiple interpretations. Climate change and its effects, for example, is one issue that

is still being debated globally despite being, supposedly, based on evidence-based

research. Some scientists and people believe climate change is a real phenomenon,

others do not.122 Each group has their own ideas about what the evidence says

about climate change. It is a contestable issue. In Australia, for instance, politicians

are divided about the evidence of climate change.123 Scientific evidence has not

been able to convince some of the politicians to take measures to reduce its

effects.124 Taking steps to reduce carbon emissions that contribute to global warming

also has implications for the Australian economy.125

Two values are at stake here, but one of them is favoured over the other, despite

what the evidence suggests. Some politicians believe that if they respond to the

measures to reduce carbon emission drastically as suggested by some scientists

businesses would suffer and people may lose their jobs. An economic rationale or

value is therefore given priority over the reduction of carbon emissions.126 Other

120 G. Banks, ‘Challenges of evidence-based policy-making’, Australian government website, 2009. 121 B. W. Head, ‘Three lenses of evidence-based policy’, The Australian Journal of Public Administration, vol. 67, no. 1, 2008, pp. 1–11. 122 L. C. Hamilton, ‘Education, politics, and opinions about climate change evidence for interaction effects’, Springer, 2009, < http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Lawrence_Hamilton/publication/226722589_Education_politics_and_opinions_about_climate_change_evidence_for_interaction_effects/links/00b49516bf5e5109af000000.pdf> viewed 1 November 2015 (Published online 14 December 2010). 123 M. Steketee, ‘Politics trumps physics in climate change frenzy’, ABC website, 12 September 2014 < http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-12/steketee-politics-trumps-physics-in-climate-change-frenzy/5738548> viewed 1 November 2015. 124 M. Steketee, ‘Politics trumps physics in climate change frenzy’, ABC website, 12 September 2014. 125M. Steketee, ‘Politics trumps physics in climate change frenzy’, ABC website, 12 September 2014. 126 Hamilton, Running from the storm: the development of climate change policy in Australia, UNSW Press Ltd, Australia, 2001, pp.1-178.

41

politicians have a different opinion. They believe that if carbon emissions are not

reduced many people will suffer and the natural environment in which breathable air

is produced will also be destroyed. These politicians place more emphasis on the

value of an unpolluted environment over that of the activities that contribute to

economic growth. In the context of the RPNGES policy, this paper posits that the

policy was framed predominantly along the lines of positivists’ thinking or

approaches of evidence–based and cost-benefit analysis.

The aim of the positivist approach that was applied in developing the RPNGES

policy was to ensure that an apolitical, value-free, and objective policy would be

produced. Part of the RPNGES policy research team’s task involved learning from

what other countries did to improve emergency management in their jurisdictions.

The research team searched for evidence of good emergency and disaster

management practices that worked in other parts of the world. This is implied from

their research methodology which included web searches of emergency

management practices from other countries, and also from their visit to the

Queensland Emergency Services. The research team was indeed, genuinely

searching for solutions to PNG’s emergency and disaster management problem.

However, attempts to adopt an emergency and disaster management application

that would be value-free is proving to be challenging and difficult to achieve. The

reason once again, there are conflicting values at play. Unless this is adequately

recognised, emergency and disaster management practice in PNG will not be

improved.

‘Values are what we think good and bad, important and trivial, right and wrong, noble

and contemptible.’127 Values guide our choices in everyday life. By extension, ‘policy

values are the valued ends embodied in, and implemented through, the collective

choices we make through policy choices.’128 Whatever a government chooses to do

is a reflection of what is deemed to be important. For example, if a government

decides that building more schools is a priority than it will probably allocate more

resources to the building of schools. In taking such action for the building of schools,

127Berlin. I., The proper study of mankind: An anthology of essays, Hardy, H and Hausheer, R. (ed.).,Pimlico, London,1998. 128 J. Stewart, Public policy values, Palgrave MacMillan Publishers limited, 2009, p.14

42

however, other programs such as the need to train more teachers could miss out or

receive less funding as there is often limited availability of economic resources. The

government believes that its people need more school buildings, instead of more

trained teachers, that is, the government has allocated more value to the building of

schools over teacher training programs.

Jenny Stewart, following Rezohazy’s views about values, posits that ‘values are

functional.’129 ‘They can be thought of as priorities, internal compasses or

springboards for action.’130 Stewart deduces from this values discussion that ‘public

policy value can therefore be defined as the informing principle of collective action: it

is both motivator and object.’131 Values as motivators drive government action in

certain directions to bring about certain outcomes or changes that a society may

need. In PNG, for instance, the country’s recent economic boom, resulting from the

sale of its liquefied natural gas and other resources, has been translated into

infrastructure development in many parts of the country.132 PNG’s infrastructure is

still underdeveloped. In many parts of the country communications and

transportation difficulties are some of the reasons investors hesitate to invest. The

government of PNG recognises these challenges and has therefore placed

infrastructure development at the top of its many development priorities.133 As an

object values act as goals or outcomes. In placing infrastructure development as a

priority the PNG government is aiming to improve investor confidence in the country.

The object or outcome that the government is motivated to achieve through

infrastructure development is to attract more investors to come to PNG and develop

the country’s vast resources. This would encourage further economic development

and improve living standards of the people.134

129 J. Stewart, Public policy values, p.14 130 R. Rezohazy, 2001, Values: psychological perspectives’ in N. Smelser and P. Baltes (eds), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Amsterdam and New York: Elsevier. 131 J. Stewart, Public policy values, p.14. 132 Papua New Guinea government, n.d. ‘High Commission of the independent state of PNG’, Canberra, Government of Australia < http://www.pngcanberra.org/trade/infrastructure.htm> viewed 19 October 2015. 133 Papua New Guinea government, n.d. ‘High Commission of the independent state of PNG’, Canberra, Government of Australia. 134 Papua New Guinea government, n.d. ‘High Commission of the independent state of PNG’, Canberra, Government of Australia.

43

Stewart then distinguishes policy values from political values. They are related, but

do not necessarily mean the same.135 This is an important distinction as conflicts can

sometimes arise between the two values. An example of such a conflict between the

two values relating to choices on how emergency and disaster management in PNG

should be improved is discussed later in the chapter. Political values, which have a

broader and longer life span do not change much. They are generally enduring.

Policy values change more frequently. Examples of political values are ‘freedom,

democracy, and equality’136. Such political values provide the principles upon which

nation–states are formed.137 In PNG, for example, national sovereignty and self-

reliance, human development, equality and participation, and freedom are some of

the political values that have been captured in the country’s constitution. 138 These

political values have guided the actions of every elected government of PNG. Self-

reliance in particular is one of the political values that will be further discussed in the

context of emergency and disaster management in a later part of this chapter.

Policy values on the other hand, ‘manifest themselves in particular areas of

government action.’139 Such action can be in the form of how, for instance,

emergency management and disaster systems are designed. In PNG the emergency

and disaster management system is still evolving. Nevertheless, the GoPNG in its

wisdom decided that the country should be provided with a national firefighting

service. While this service is not present in every part of the country, it is available in

the main towns and cities of PNG. Annually the government allocates budgetary

funding to the PNGFS to carry out fire safety campaigns through the media, and

safety inspections sometimes in remote areas of Provinces where such services are

difficult to access. The Disaster Service’s presence is in almost all the Provinces of 135J. Stewart, Public policy values, p.14. 136 J. Stewart, Public policy values, p.14. 137J. Stewart, Public policy values, p.14. 138 Independent State of Papua New Guinea, n.d. Constitution of the independent State of Papua New Guinea, < http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/pg/pg011en.pdf> viewed 19 October 2015. 139 J. Stewart, Public policy values, p.14

44

PNG. The Disaster Service also relies on government funding to conduct its disaster

awareness and training programs in various communities around the country.

Although the PNGFS and the Disaster Service are housed under one department the

government feels that each of the agencies need to focus on different aspects of the

same community need – improvement of emergency and disaster safety and

management. Recognising the role that policy values play, therefore, is important.

Policy values are allocated to address policy problems as ‘…policy problems are

value based and [can be] translated into explicit government action.140 Easton points

out that ‘politics is about the authoritative allocation of value’.141 Government decides

who gets what, when and how.142 ‘Public policy is the process through which this

happens.’143 Public policy is the vehicle in which political values are carried and

implemented. ‘All policy questions are values–based.’144 Stewart cites an example

of an explicit policy value such as stopping certain groups of people from wearing

certain coverings on their bodies. The values that are in conflict are private values

versus public values, also known as policy values. Some religious beliefs and

cultures encourage their followers to fully cover their bodies. Their followers also

believe that this is their right and that such a right should not be disputed. Fear and

misunderstanding because of issues of potential terrorism practices that have

occurred in other parts of the world where such religious groups are also present

could force governments in other parts of the globe to make policies that forbid such

dressing in the interest of the public. The government in enforcing such a policy,

would be seen to be creating a conflict between values, one that is in the interest of

the public, and another that is against individual or private values. Values, when not

given fair considerations, can therefore create policy issues for the people involved

in making policies and its recipients.

140 J. Stewart, Public policy values, p.14. 141 D. Easton, A framework for political analysis, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice –Hall, 1965. 142 H. Lasswell, Politics: Who gets what when, how, Cleveland, OH, Meridian Books, 1936. 143 J. Stewart, Public policy values, p.14. 144 J. Stewart, Public policy values, p.14.

45

The question to ask at this juncture is how political values and public policy values

are relevant to the discussion about the proposed RPNGES policy. The proposed

RPNGES policy is not only about advocating the value of public safety. This policy is

also premised on at least two assumptions. The first of these assumptions is that the

RPNGES policy would entail that PNG have its own emergency and disaster

management capability to respond to emergencies and disasters before seeking any

international intervention or assistance. The second assumption of the RPNGES

policy is that it would be apolitical so that politicians would not apply it to their own

advantage. In regards to the first assumption, sometimes international help may not

be requested if adequate domestic resources were available. PNG would, through

this policy value, be seen to be acting on one of its political values, self–reliance.

Self–reliance is one of the goals stated in the PNG Constitution.145 The government

of PNG would be responsible for the allocation of most, if not all, of the resources if

the RPNGES policy is implemented.

However, this value of self-reliance is in conflict with another value, that of effective

response to disasters and emergencies through the assistance of other countries

and international organisations. It is not denied that the RPNGES policy recognised

that there was a role for donor agencies and international disaster relief agencies.

The policy indicated their role and acknowledged that they were important partners

for PNG. In practice, however, PNG expects the international community to assist

almost immediately after a disaster event occurs. Recently, a governor of one of the

provinces urged the government to ask for international assistance. Commenting on

the failure of crops the leader stated that ‘food gardens around the country and the

lack of rainfall is so serious that neighbouring countries such as Australia and New

Zealand are needed to help with logistics and transport of relief supplies to remote

areas.’146 He further admonished the government by saying ‘that pride and ego have

stopped PNG asking for help so far, but that needs to change.’147 The Prime Minister

145 Independent State of Papua New Guinea, n.d. Constitution of the independent State of Papua New Guinea, < http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/pg/pg011en.pdf> viewed 19 October 2015. 146 B. Hill, , Juffa says it's time for PNG to ask for drought help, ABC online, 2015http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-10-27/juffa-says-it's-time-for-png-to-ask-for-drought/6890022 viewed 1 November 2015. 147 B. Hill, , Juffa says it's time for PNG to ask for drought help, ABC online, 2015.

46

of PNG, Peter O’Neil, also called on ‘Australia and other development partners, non–

government organisations, and faith based organisations to be prepared to assist

PNG…as PNG is facing challenges with drought that is likely to go into 2016.’148

The irony of calling for international assistance for food and relief supplies is that

prior to the actual drought taking effect the National Agriculture Research Institute

(NARI) of PNG warned the government that the country would experience a drought

event and that drought resilient crops would need to be cultivated and distributed to

communities.149 The government ignored NARI’s warning, and instead, denied it

funding allocation.150 The government probably felt PNG lacked the necessary

resources and that the NARI proposal was too expensive to fund or that it would be

too late for the program to be implemented.151 The government decided that its next

best choice of action is to seek the assistance of other countries instead when the

need arose.

Another area in which the values of self-reliance and effective emergency and

disaster management appear to be in conflict is the PNG Disaster Management Act.

This Act explicitly states one of the functions of the Disaster Committee as ‘to advise

the National Executive Council [government] if appeal for international assistance is

required.’152 The government of PNG recognises that it has limitations in what it can

do to manage emergencies and disasters and therefore accepts that it is important to

be able to call upon international assistance whenever this need arises. The need to

148 M. Bourke, ‘As Papua New Guinea faces worsening drought, a past disaster could save lives’, Australian National University, 26 August 2015. http://www.anu.edu.au/news/all-news/as-papua-new-guinea-faces-worsening-drought-a-past-disaster-could-save-lives viewed 19 October 2015. 149 R. Ewart, ‘Drought-coping programs were denied funding by the PNG government: NARI’, ABC online, 28 August2015. < http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-28/drought-coping-programs-were-denied-funding-by-the/6731738> viewed 1 November 2015. 150 R. Ewart, ‘Drought-coping programs were denied funding by the PNG government: NARI’, ABC online, 28 August2015. 151R. Ewart, ‘Drought-coping programs were denied funding by the PNG government: NARI’, ABC online, 28 August2015. 152 Independent State of Papua New Guinea, Disaster Management Act 1984, Papua New Guinea Government, n.d. <https://www.ifrc.org/docs/idrl/323EN.pdf>viewed 10 October 2015.

47

be self–reliant in the provision of emergency and disaster Service is trumped by the

need to depend on international assistance.

This paper is not suggesting that PNG’s dependence on international assistance is a

bad thing. PNG is a member of the global community. PNG became a member of the

United Nations153 and also the Commonwealth154 in 1975, shortly after it gained

political independence from Australia. United Nations and Commonwealth are just

few of the many international communities PNG is a member of. The point being

argued here is that PNG will continue to seek the generous assistance of other

countries and international organisations. PNG values their role in the country’s

development and also their assistance when it is struck by calamities. It is therefore

safe to assume to some degree that because of this dependency on international

assistance consecutive governments have not seen a need to activate the RPNGES

policy.

Another example that attests to this claim is the recent establishment and opening of

a non-government organisation’s disaster response office in PNG, the International

Organisation for Migration (IOM). During the opening ceremony for the office the

USA ambassador to PNG said ‘that the new facility is part of the United States’

ongoing support for drought relief for Papua New Guinea’s Highlands Region.’155 He

further pledged that ‘the U.S. Government is committed to supporting the people of

[PNG] who have been affected by the El Niño … and that his ‘government continues

to work closely with the government of [PNG] and non-governmental organization

partners like IOM to deliver relief assistance and to identify the most effective ways

to help those people affected by the El Niño event.’156 With such encouraging and

supportive statements by international partners PNG is unlikely to refuse help.

153 United Nations, ‘Papua New Guinea, UN Data’, United Nations website, n.d. http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=papua%20new%20guinea viewed 19 October 2015. 154 Commonwealth, ‘Papua New Guinea, The Commonwealth year book’, 2015. http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/yb-pdfs/papua_new_guinea_country_profile.pdf viewed 19 October 2015. 155 Post Courier, ‘Opening of new IOM office in Wabag’, Post courier online, 30 October 2015.http://www.postcourier.com.pg/News/opening-of-new-iom-office-in-wabag/#.VjZsh03ou70 viewed 2 November 2015. 156 Post Courier, ‘Opening of new IOM office in Wabag’, Post courier online, 30 October 2015.

48

The government is also assured of assistance and so there is no assurance that it

will commit itself fully to putting into effect the RPNGES policy, which advocates,

generally, self-reliance as the main approach for emergency and disaster

management. The value of accepting international assistance from a very powerful

nation such as the USA which has extensive disaster and management resources in

all probability outweighs the value choice of self-reliance given that PNG does not

already have capability. The assumption that the RPNGES policy would encourage

PNG to be self-reliant in the provision of emergency and disaster management is

already proving to be a difficult task to realise.

The second assumption of the RPNGES policy is that the policy would act as a

means of dissuading politically motivated initiatives from politicians. One of the ways

in which the policy tries to do this is to limit the number of government or ministerial

portfolios, by applying a cost-benefit approach. Cost-benefit was one of the main

outcomes that was expected of the policy. This is inferred from a number of

statements in the RPNGES policy. The first statement is by the chairman of the

working party. He states ‘Sir Peter Barter instructed …our team…with the purpose of

preparing recommendations to [e]nsure the government is cost effective in delivering

emergency services.’157 Cost-effective in this sense is interpreted as having the

three Services amalgamate as one agency delivering emergency services. This is

further elaborated in another statement in the RPNGES policy which states ‘the

establishment of a new Ministry has to be within …need for economic use of

resources and costs of establishing a new Ministry.’158 Cost-benefit analysis

underpinned the RPNGES policy.

The new Ministry that the RPNGES policy proposed was to be known as the Ministry

of Defence and Emergency Services. The Emergency Services and the Defence

Force would be headed by one minister. One of the implications of this proposal,

however, is that some members of Parliament would miss out on a ministerial job.

Instead of the government establishing a department for emergency services so that

it would have its own minister, emergency services would be transferred to an

157 Department of Provincial Affairs, ‘Rationalisation of Emergency Services PNG’, Final Report, 2007. 158 Department of Provincial Affairs, ‘Rationalisation of Emergency Services PNG’, Final Report, 2007.

49

existing department, the Department of Defence. This would mean that at least one

member of the government would be denied a portfolio for emergency services.

Currently, Defence is in a separate department to the PNGFS and the Disaster

Service, who are both under the provincial and local level government affairs

department. St. John’s Ambulance is supported by the Health Department. While the

proposed changes are a cost-effective way of delivering emergency services, such

change can create dissention within government because only one Member of

Parliament would be occupying a portfolio that has several agencies under its

jurisdiction. That member is likely to be part of the executive council, where most of

the political or policy decisions are made. Other members of the government sitting

on the back-bench or without a portfolio would not necessarily be a part of the

executive council, and would feel they have lesser opportunity to influence policy.

PNG politics has a history of politicians’ changes alliances, and parties.159

Politicians often interpret being allocated a portfolio as a form of recognition or

reward. It is not only about being recognised by political peers as leaders who are

astute and can effectively deliver on policies, it is also about feeling that they have

been honoured. It is a value of prestige to them. ‘In … Papua New Guinea political

economy of identity is integral to its parliamentary conventions. Identity is, in many

instances, the critical factor in determining parliamentary representation, allocating

resources…and appointment within the state.’160 Furthermore, ‘politicians actively

seek to become distributors of development – that is the opportunity to dispense

public funds to their region for infrastructure, services and to provide income.’161

Establishing a new department for emergency services to be headed by a minister

may therefore create prospects for the potential minister to not only represent the

new establishment, but also create positive perceptions about the minister to the

159 G. Sawlani, ‘Sir Michael Somare resigns from ruling Papua New Guinea party he founded’, ABC online, 12 Oct 2015, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-10-12/michael-somare-resigns-from-papua-new-guinea-party-he-founded/6848060 viewed 3 November 2015. 160 Unknown author, in Chapter 5, ‘Identity politics and institutionalised instability: The political economy of nationalism’, http://www.polsis.uq.edu.au/OCIS/Colman.pdf viewed 1 November 2015. 161 Woolner, D., Papua New Guinea: 20 Years On, Research Paper No. 4 1995-96, 1995, Parliamentary Research Service, Parliamentary Library, Canberra, < https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/rp/1995-96/96rp04.pdf> viewed 23 November 2015.

50

electorate through his active involvement in dispensing funds or services that he is a

leader that is genuinely concerned them. Such active involvement improve the

chances for the minister to be considered favourably for future re-elections. During

disasters such as the El Nino droughts some politicians try to be directly involved in

delivering relief supplies or funds for relief supply, instead of allowing public service

agencies like the Disaster Service carry out this task. In the 1997-1998 drought this

was practised by some politicians.162 In the 2015 drought a similar practice took

place.163

Politicians sometimes accuse each other of politicising the delivery of disaster

relief.164 This is however, the reality of politics in PNG. Like it or not politics often

trump policies and the public service. The RPNGES policy, being designed to be

value-free, and cost effective probably recognised such issues. However, unless

such political realities change the RPNGES policy in its current shape may continue

to be given scant consideration. Other options for overcoming this dilemma are

necessary to progress the outcomes desired by the RPNGES policy, but this cannot

be done with the RPNGES policy in its current form. Other forms of emergency and

disaster policy or arrangement need to be considered. An alternative way to

overcome this challenge of values is to redefine or review the concepts of

emergency and disaster. Further elaboration on this is in the final chapter.

This chapter discussed the genesis of the RPNGES policy. It began as the private

concern of one concerned politician, and later became a public concern. The policy

did not make progress after he was replaced as minister responsible for emergency

services. The need for the services to preserve individual authority was blamed for

162 P. Barter, Responses to the 1997–98 drought in PNG, 2000. 163 Post Courier,’Polye cautions PM of politising drought relief efforts’, Post Courier online, 28 August 2015,<http://www.postcourier.com.pg/News/polye-cautions-pm-of-politising-drought-relief-efforts/#.VeAQME3ou70 v> viewed 3 November 2015.

164 B. Hill, ‘PNG government accused of politicising drought aid’, ABC online, 21 September 2015, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-09-21/png-government-accused-of-politicising-drought-aid/6792636 viewed 21 September 2015.

51

the stalling of the policy. This is partly true, but it is perhaps not the main reason.

Comparative analysis of recent amalgamation attempts of emergency services in

some Australian states showed that other reasons for failed merger attempts are just

as relevant. In PNG’s case a conflict of values, political and policy values, is

identified as the main cause. A post-positivist approach was applied to the critique of

the RPNGES policy to support this claim. The RPNGES policy was grounded mostly

on cost-benefit, and evidence based approaches – both positivist in nature. There

needs to be a rethink of the concepts of emergency and disaster to progress the

ideas of the RPNGES policy so that emergency and disaster safety can be improved

in PNG.

52

Chapter Three

Distinguishing emergency from disaster – the way forward

This is the final Chapter of the paper. In Chapter Two the paper discussed the

origins of the Rationalisation of PNG Emergency Services (RPNGES) policy and why

the policy has stalled. Conflict between policy and political values is argued in that

chapter to be the cause of the RPNGES policy’s failure to progress. Political values

and policy values are always present in policy making. They should not be ignored

even when positivist approaches such as cost-benefit analysis and evidence-base

methods are applied in the designing of policies. Their role in policy making can

enable policy to progress from conception to implementation. Chapter Two also

showed how some Australian states resolved conflicts in values that arose when

their governments proposed the amalgamation of emergency services. Each state

had their own unique solution to resolving these conflicts of values. Chapter Two

then suggested that other options should be considered to reach the outcomes of the

RPNGES policy. In its current form the policy has limited chances of being

progressed. The chapter recommended that one of the ways to do this is to revisit

the concepts, emergency and disaster. This chapter does that: firstly it discusses the

two concepts by looking at some of their characteristics using Quarantelli’s ideas and

integrating some from PNG’s experience; secondly, it suggests a way forward. The

paper proposes that the PNGFS and St. John’s Ambulance should merge. The

Disaster Services should be organised separately.

Distinguishing disaster from emergency

Emergency and disaster are two concepts that are sometimes used interchangeably

to mean the same. An example of this was discussed in Chapter One of this paper

where the PNG Constitution and Disaster Management Act gave the same

definitions, but used different terminology. The PNG Constitution makes mention of

emergency, whereas the Disaster Management Act refers to the same conditions

described for emergency as disaster. When the RPNGES policy was framed it is

more than likely that it was not only premised on cost-benefit basis, but also on the

assumption that emergency and disaster were understood to have the same

meaning. Punching in the words ‘definition of emergency’ on the google website

53

resulted in over 285, 000, 000 definitions.165 The same search idea applied to the

words ‘definition of disaster’ produced 107, 000, 000 versions or definitions of the

concept.166 It would be impractical to read every single definition of the concepts.

One of the earliest attempts for a definition of disaster was by a policy researcher

named Charles Fritz in the 1960s. Fritz defined disasters as ‘…uncontrollable events

that are concentrated in time or space, in which a society…undergoes severe danger

and incurs such losses…that the social structure is disrupted and the fulfilment of all

or some of the essential functions…is prevented.’167 According to Fritz’s definition a

disaster is only a disaster if the event that causes damage or destruction is so

intense such that returning normalcy to the community is almost impossible to do.

However, determining the degrees of severity is subject to different interpretations.

For example, in Port Moresby, PNG’s capital city, water supply is often shut off for

rationing purposes when Sirinumu dam is reaching low levels of water. At other

times it is the work of dissatisfied land owners that force the city authority to turn the

water supply off as the dam is on customary land. Businesses, government offices,

schools and other services are often forced to stop their activities because there is

no water for electricity, sanitation, and other purposes. Sometimes this occurs for a

few days or weeks. Work hours and revenue is lost, much of which takes a long time

to recoup. Households also suffer. However, residents often save water in buckets,

tanks and drums. The impact on them is often reduced, but they remain

uncomfortable. The economy is affected, but it is rarely that life is lost due to such

events. Such events fit Fritz’s definition of disaster; however, in this case the loss is

more for businesses than for ordinary members of the community.

Researchers in the field of disaster and emergency management have agreed that

even Fritz’s definition is insufficient given that how disaster events start and what

effects they produce is often unpredictable,168 as the above example illustrates. The

165 Google, n.d. ‘definition of emergency’, https://www.google.com.au/webhp?hl=en#hl=en&q=definition+of+emergency viewed 4 November 2015. 166 Google, n.d. ‘definition of disaster’, https://www.google.com.au/webhp?hl=en#hl=en-AU&q=definition+of+disaster viewed 4 November 2015. 167Handmer & S. Dovers, ‘The nature of emergencies and disaster’s in J. Handmer & S. Dovers, handbook of disaster & emergency policies & and institutions, Earthscan, UK & USA, 2007. 168 Handmer & S. Dovers,The nature of emergencies and disasters, 2007.

54

researchers have even gone further to suggest that it is the media that often define

what a disaster is and what is not.169 This has some elements of truth. The current

drought experienced in Papua New Guinea was reported almost daily in the media,

giving it so much prominence as a disaster.170 Radio as a form of media is also the

main channel through which events of disaster is channelled in PNG.171 However,

the media is not always clear with its criteria for a disaster to be defined as such.

Until the questions ‘what, exactly, constitutes a disaster’172 can be addressed

satisfactorily or ‘whose definition should be used’173 is decided, policy makers might

as well rely on the media’s changing definitions of disaster, and emergency. Such

inconsistency would have wider implications for governments and its agencies.

Deciding which agency should respond would be a problem. Which agency should

lead and which should be a support service would be difficult for policy makers to

decide if the media’s definition for disaster, and emergency, were adopted as the

standard for calling on resources. Canton points out that ‘defining what is meant by

disaster is not just an academic exercise – it is a reflection of how society deals with

the consequences of crisis.’174 The same point made about disaster could also be

said for emergency. What is important for PNG is not to just give names to these

events, disaster or emergency, but to identify practical ways in which these concepts

as destructive events can be mitigated by whom and with what resources.

169 Handmer & S. Dovers, The nature of emergencies and disasters, 2007. 170 The Conversation, ‘As Papua New Guinea faces worsening drought, a past disaster could save lives’, 28 August 2015 < http://theconversation.com/as-papua-new-guinea-faces-worsening-drought-a-past-disaster-could-save-lives-46390> viewed 5 November 2015. 171 ABC International Development, Citizen access to information in Papua New Guinea, 2014, http://www.abcinternationaldevelopment.net.au/sites/default/files/Citizen%20Access%20to%20Information%20in%20PNG_2014.pdf viewed 5 November 2015. 172 L.G. Canton, Emergencies, disasters and catastrophes in Emergency management: concepts and strategies for effective programs, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. New Jersey & Canada, 2007, p.38. 173L.G. Canton, Emergencies, disasters and catastrophes in Emergency management: concepts and strategies for effective programs, 2007. 174 L.G. Canton, Emergencies, disasters and catastrophes in Emergency management: concepts and strategies for effective programs, 2007.

55

Quarantelli’s ideas provide insights about how disasters can be distinguished from

emergencies. This paper posits that Quarantelli’s ideas are practical enough for PNG

to give serious consideration as guides to improving emergency and disaster

management services. They resemble the descriptions of how emergency and

disaster management take place in PNG. Quarantelli initially identified at least five

organisational characteristics that distinguish a disaster from an emergency. Only

four of these aspects are discussed here as they can be related to PNG’s recent

history with disasters. These are: ‘Converging organisations, loss of autonomy,

closer public-private interface, and performance standards.’175 Each of these

characteristics are however, elaborated, applying PNG’s experience. A fifth

characteristic of distinguishing emergency from disaster is added to the list based on

PNG’s experiences with managing disasters and emergencies.

Quarantelli’s distinction The first distinguishing feature Quarantelli highlights is referred to as converging

organisations.176 Quarantelli posits that ‘disasters involve multiple organisations,

public and private, that local communities may have not worked with before.’177

These organisations from the various sectors converge and apply different resources

and expertise to support the community that is affected even though the community

has not had any past experience working with them. The quiet villages of Sissano

and Aitape in Sandaun Province experienced this sort of convergence of

organisations during the aftermaths of a tsunami in 1998 where government

organisations, NGOs such as the Red Cross, Salvation Army, and Scientific and

other international organisations came together to assist in different capacities.178

Until this tsunami, the Aitape and Sissano communities did not experience such a

collaboration of organisations.

175L.G. Canton, Emergencies, disasters and catastrophes in Emergency management: concepts and strategies for effective programs, 2007. 176L.G. Canton, Emergencies, disasters and catastrophes in Emergency management: concepts and strategies for effective programs, 2007. 177 L.G. Canton, Emergencies, disasters and catastrophes in Emergency management: concepts and strategies for effective programs, 2007. 178 United Nations office for the coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,’ Papua New Guinea - Tsunami OCHA Situation Report No. 7’, 28 July1998, < http://reliefweb.int/report/papua-new-guinea/papua-new-guinea-tsunami-ocha-situation-report-no-7> viewed 6 November 2015.

56

Emergencies, on the hand, are dealt with using local community resources.179

Whenever there is a house fire incident in an urban area of PNG the fire service is

generally the responding agency, if it is available. If there are lives at risk the PNGFS

calls the St. John’s Ambulance Service, and sometimes the Police to assist. These

agencies usually bring the incident under control within a matter of hours with their

resources. The Disaster Service is not usually involved. According to Quarantelli’s

categorisation then, this level of response to the incident would be categorised as a

routine emergency. The incident does not require additional resources other than

those that are already available to the responding agencies of the community.

Furthermore, PNG is fortunate that it has not experienced the kind of protracted

bushfires like those experienced in other countries such as Canada or Australia180

This may however, change with the current drought and climate changes in the

future.181 In 2015, the state of Victoria deployed 45 specialist firefighters to assist

Canada fighting its large bushfires.182 Australia sent 102 fire fighters to Canada to

take up various specialist roles in the firefighting campaign.183 The fire had been

burning for weeks, destroying more than a million hectare, and forcing 13000 people

to flee from their homes.184 Such fires that require resources outside of the local

community are beyond the level of emergency. According to Quarantelli’s definition,

they are aptly termed, disasters. Certainly, if such large bushfires happened in PNG

179L.G. Canton, Emergencies, disasters and catastrophes in Emergency management: concepts and strategies for effective programs, 2007. 180 Victorian government, ‘2009 Victorian bushfires royal Commission’; Final report, July 2010, < http://www.royalcommission.vic.gov.au/finaldocuments/summary/PF/VBRC_Summary_PF.pdf> viewed 6 November 2015. 181G. Sawlani, ‘Drought threatens to bring major bushfires to PNG’, ABC, 23 September 2015, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-09-23/drought-threatens-to-bring-major-bushfires-to-png/6799412 viewed 6 November 2015. 182 Victorian government, ‘Victorians help Canada fight wildfires’, Premier of Victoria, 12 July 2015, http://www.premier.vic.gov.au/victorians-help-canada-fight-wildfires viewed 6 November 2015. 183 Victorian government, ‘Victorian help Canada fight wildfires’, Media release, 12 July 2015 < https://4a5b508b5f92124e39ff-ccd8d0b92a93a9c1ab1bc91ad6c9bfdb.ssl.cf4.rackcdn.com/2015/07/1107-NEVILLE-GARRETT-FIRES-HM.pdf> viewed 6 November 2015. 184 Victorian government, Victorian help Canada fight wildfires, Media release, 12 July 2015.

57

and went on for weeks they would be referred to as a disaster, especially if

resources beyond that of a local fire station were needed and many lives were at risk

or displaced. This would require not only the fire service, but possibly all levels of

government to intervene.

The second distinguishing point Quarantelli makes is that a disaster event often

results in ‘loss of autonomy’185 as a consequence of new ‘operating structures being

formed and taking over normal ones’.186 Powers to call upon resources, public and

private, come into play. Private buildings can be demolished without any fear of

being sued. Cyclone Guba, discussed in the previous chapter, is an example of this

description of loss of autonomy. Such powers of authority are not used in ‘day-to-

day’187 or routine emergencies. In PNG these special powers of authority would be

bestowed by the government through a lawful instrument such as the Constitution,

after considering the advice of the Disaster Committee. Routine emergencies do not

require this level of government authority. Whenever there is a road accident in PNG

the government does not step in with special powers. Agencies such as the police,

fire service, and the ambulance work within the guidelines of their respective policies

and procedures and deal with the accident. According to Quarantelli’s distinction, this

would be categorised as an emergency, not a disaster.

The third distinguishing note that Quarantelli makes about disasters and

emergencies is that disasters often result in closer public–private interface.188 The

Aitape and Sissano experience as discussed above is a good example of the kind of

185L.G. Canton, Emergencies, disasters and catastrophes in Emergency management: concepts and strategies for effective programs, 2007. 186 L.G. Canton, Emergencies, disasters and catastrophes in Emergency management: concepts and strategies for effective programs, 2007. 187 L.G. Canton, Emergencies, disasters and catastrophes in Emergency management: concepts and strategies for effective programs, 2007. 188L.G. Canton, Emergencies, disasters and catastrophes in Emergency management: concepts and strategies for effective programs, 2007. *The author of this paper is fire fighter with the PNG Fire Service and had turned out to many emergencies over a period of 19 years. Most of the emergencies he responded to involved either the Fire Service only or with St. John’s Ambulance Service, and the Police.

58

public–private interface that Quarantelli refers to. There are very few instances of

routine emergencies where the private or non-government sector is ever involved.

St. John’s Ambulance is perhaps the only NGO, in Port Moresby at least, that has an

interface with the fire service and police sometimes. Outside of Port Moresby it is

usually the fire service and police that provide emergency services routinely.

The final distinguishing point that Quarantelli raises about disasters and

emergencies is about ‘performance standards.’189 ‘During disasters protocols that

would normally govern response are superseded…e.g. speed of response is

altered…or limited equipment is dispatched.’190 Communications, roads and bridges

are also often affected making response to disaster more challenging than that of

responding to routine emergencies.191 During the aftermaths of Cyclone Guba in

2007 in Oro Province many people went without food for days.192 More than 140 000

people were impacted by the aftermaths of the cyclone. Roads and bridges leading

from Girua Airport to Popondetta Town were washed away making access difficult

for relief supplies to be flown in. The Australian Defence Force assisted the PNG

Defence Force with its helicopters by flying relief supplies and PNG soldiers from

Port Moresby directly into Popondetta Town. Communication between Popondetta

and other parts of PNG was cut off for some time. The PNG Defence force set up its

own communication and co-ordination centre and used this to keep the rest of the

world informed about the disaster relief efforts that took place in Popondetta.

Emergencies, on the other hand, would involve localised damage to infrastructure

and not as many lives as in the Cyclone Guba event.

189 L.G. Canton, Emergencies, disasters and catastrophes in Emergency management: concepts and strategies for effective programs, 2007. 190 L.G. Canton, Emergencies, disasters and catastrophes in Emergency management: concepts and strategies for effective programs, 2007. 191 L.G. Canton, Emergencies, disasters and catastrophes in Emergency management: concepts and strategies for effective programs, 2007. 192 C. Parker, ‘Salvation Army in Papua New Guinea responds to Cyclone Guba’, Salvation Army website, 21 November 2007, < https://www.salvationist.org/intnews.nsf/vw_web_articles/74C365A55C86DD0B8025739A003DF6E6?opendocument> viewed 6 November 2015.

59

In addition to Quarantelli’s observation of how disasters are different to emergencies

is the trend of deployment of large numbers of soldiers to such disaster events for

security duties. From the 1990s to the more recent years the PNG government has

been applying the powers of the PNG constitution to call on the PNG Defence Force

to assist with disaster response responsibilities. This paper refers to this as a

security feature. During Cyclone Guba in 2007 PNG soldiers and police personnel

based out of Popondetta were flown in to assist the local police. They were deployed

to the site to not only assist with giving out of relief supplies to the cyclone and flood

devastated communities, but also to provide security and enforce law and order.193

In 1994, PNG Defence soldiers were deployed to Rabaul after two volcanoes had

erupted. A report recommended to the government that the PNG Defence Force

soldiers and the Police should be deployed to areas where a disaster is likely to

occur to assist with law and order duties.194 In 1the 1997 drought in PNG defence

force soldiers were deployed to the affected provinces. Their role, again, was to

assist with issuing of relief supplies, and to provide security.195 PNG Defence Force

soldiers will be deployed to assist the National Disaster Service with the coordination

of relief supplies delivery in the current drought events the country is experiencing.196

Prime Minister O’Neil at a recent PNG Defence Force ceremony announced that the

force would continue to be involved with disaster relief duties as the country is likely

to experience ‘more floods…cyclones…and droughts in[ ] the future.’197 Disaster in

193 UN Office for the coordination of humanitarian Affairs, “Papua New Guinea: Cyclone Guba OCHA Situation Report No. 2’, 26 November 2007 < http://m.reliefweb.int/report/250204/png/papua-new-guinea-cyclone-guba-ocha-situation-report-no-2> viewed 6 November 2015. 194 H. Davies, ‘The 1994 eruption of Rabaul volcano – A case study in disaster management, University of Papua New Guinea’, 1995 http://www.pacificdisaster.net/pdnadmin/data/original/JB_DM311_PNG_1994_disaster_management.pdf viewed 12 October 2015. 195 No author, ‘The roles of the Defence Forces, Operation ples drai: The PNG and Australian Defence forces working together for the people of PNG during 1997-1998 drought’, 1998, http://www.global.net.pg/png_drought_relief/htmls/page3a.html viewed 6 November 2015. 196 European Commission for Humanitarian Office, ’ ECCHO crisis flash No. 1: Papua New Guinea- drought/frost’, 14 September 2015, http://reliefweb.int/report/papua-new-guinea/echo-crisis-flash-no-1-papua-new-guinea-drought-frost viewed 6 November 2015. 197 Government of PNG, Speech by Hon. Peter O’Neill CMG MP Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea at the Papua New Guinea Defence Academy 2nd Defence Force commissioning course (DFCC) graduation parade, Prime Minister of PNG’s website, 22 October 2015,http://www.pm.gov.pg/index.php/news-centre/390-speech-by-hon-peter-o-neill-cmg-mp-prime-

60

PNG is therefore a role for security forces, because of their capability to co-ordinate

and provide security. Emergency does not involve such levels of relief coordination

and security. Soldiers are not usually involved with emergencies. Emergencies

sometimes involve police personnel’s presence. Other times emergencies involve

only the presence of the fire and ambulance services.

It must be stated clearly here that this paper is not arguing that just because

disasters have distinctive features from emergencies that emergency services such

as the fire and ambulance services should not assist. Where these emergency

services are available they should help, if they have the resources and capacity to

assist at a disaster event. Otherwise, an event that is categorised as a disaster in

PNG is usually left to the Disaster Service and the PNG Defence Force to deal with,

owing to their level of resources and expertise and the legislative powers that are

needed to call on them.

Way forward for the Services Quarantelli, and PNG’s own experiences with disasters and emergencies as

discussed, have demonstrated that the two concepts have different characteristics

from each other from an organisational aspect.

Such distinctions in the features between disaster and emergency have implications

for the Disaster Service, PNGFS, and the St. John’s Ambulance Service and the

RPNGES policy. The distinctions also suggest a way to resolve the conflict between

political and policy values that have been brought to light as result of the proposed

RPNGES policy. As discussed in the previous chapter, the government is adamant

on improving disaster and emergency management for the country. However, it is

undecided on how to go about with this task.

The government is uncertain if it should apply its own resources or if international

assistance is a choice it would fall back on more often to meet PNG’s emergency

and disaster safety needs. There are, however, some indications that the

government is willing to focus on improving individual disaster and emergency

minister-of-papua-new-guinea-at-the-papua-new-guinea-defence-academy-2nd-defence-force-commissioning-course-dfcc-graduation-parade viewed 6 November 2015.

61

services. The Deputy Prime Minister recently stated that the government approved

the PNG Fire Service’s submission requesting a full review of the service.198 In a

further statement the Deputy Prime Minister also stated that the government was

looking to improve the Disaster Service.199 The Opposition leader in Parliament

recently urged the government to improve funding levels to the St. John’s

Ambulance Service for it to continue delivering emergency services.200 In all these

statements both the government and the opposition are concerned about the poor

state of emergency and disaster service delivery in PNG.

The statements, however, did not make any reference to the RPNGES policy. So it

would not be unfounded to assume that the government and the opposition are

probably thinking about the same thing. They perceive that emergencies and

disasters are two distinct concepts. Distinguishing the roles of emergency and

disaster service according to Quarantelli’s categorisation therefore is relevant for

PNG’s emergency and disaster management issues. Furthermore, applying

Quarantelli’s categorisation of the concepts has the potential to resolve the conflict

between the policy value of effective emergency and disaster management and self-

reliance.

During routine emergencies the PNGFS and St. John’s Ambulance respond.

Sometimes the Police are present where they are needed for crowd and traffic

control tasks. Operating structures and procedures of the respective agencies do not

change much as there are only few organisations involved. Based on this feature, it

would not be unreasonable to suggest that the PNG Fire Service and the St. John’s

Ambulance should merge. PNGFS has 14 fire stations, 10 of which are located

198 G. A. Salmang, ‘NEC approves fire safety steps: Dion’, Post Courier Newspaper, 25 August 2015, < http://www.postcourier.com.pg/Stories/nec-approves-fire-safety-steps-dion/#.VdtqPk3ouUk> viewed 25 August,2015. 199 D.Waigeno, ‘Government to address disaster management concerns’, EMTV online, 28 October 2015 <http://www.emtv.com.pg/article.aspx?slug=Government-To-Address-Disaster-Management-Concerns&subcategory=Top-Stories viewed 31 October 2015

200 J. Lapauve Jr, ‘Polye calls on Government to save St John’s Operation in nation’s capital’, EMTV online, 6 September 2015. http://www.emtv.com.pg/article.aspx?slug=Polye-calls-on-Government-to-save-St-John-s-Operation-in-Nation-s-Capital&subcategory=Top-Stories viewed 7th September 2015

62

outside of the capital city, Port Moresby. St. John’s is based in only 2 locations in

PNG. Establishing ambulance services to share the same fire stations, as

recommended by the RPNGES policy, would make the service accessible to

provinces that do not currently have this.

It might be argued, in the manner of the previous chapter, that the fire service and

the ambulance service have different values so merging them could prove

problematic. The chances of such differences happening between the two services is

minimal. Past experience shows that the fire service, ambulance, and the police

frequently respond to emergencies together, and more often than not need each

other’s assistance to deal with some aspect of an emergency. The co-operation

between the two agencies, fire service and ambulance, at every incident has been

outstanding. Their roles complement each other. The fire service responds to

remove trapped victims involved in burning houses or crashed vehicles. It then

hands the victims over to the ambulance service. The ambulance service provides

first-aid response to the victims and hospital transportation.

The idea of merging the fire services and the ambulance service is not a new one.

Similar practices have been done in other countries. For example, in Japan the fire

service provides ambulance services.201 Before 1933, however, the provision of

ambulance service was left to the Osaka Red Cross branch. After 1933 only a few

municipalities took on board this responsibility of providing ambulance services. By

the 1960s the government of Japan took over responsibility for the provision of

ambulance services. The Japanese government decided that it was necessary for it

to take full responsibility for the ambulance service because of ‘a rapid development

of industry and expansion of the economy.’202 Economists predict that PNG’s

economy would experience more growth than other countries in the Asian region in

201 T. Ishada, M.Ohta, K. Katsurada & T. Sugimoto, ‘The emergency medical system in Japan’, The Journal of Emergency Medicine, vol.2, 1984, pp.45-55 <http://ac.els-cdn.com/0736467984900489/1-s2.0-0736467984900489-main.pdf?_tid=55c9213c-8abc-11e5-bad2-00000aab0f26&acdnat=1447497900_b40b4547c29f3c73650d74e28d26b919> viewed 14 November 2015.

202 T. Ishada, M.Ohta, K. Katsurada & T. Sugimoto, ‘The emergency medical system in Japan’, The Journal of Emergency Medicine, vol.2, 1984, pp.45-55.

63

2015.203 If this prediction is true, then it would be reasonable to further suggest that

the GoPNG should take on the responsibility of providing ambulance service. This

economic prediction has, however, been reviewed. PNG is currently experiencing a

slowing down in its economic growth.204 At this stage it would be better for the

ambulance service to be delivered by a non-government organisation.

The PNG ambulance service should, however, be merged under one department

with the fire service so that it can be partially assisted financially to meet some of its

operational needs for response to communities. Both services could be established

under a new department that is responsible for emergency services. Alternatively,

they can be relocated to be established under the Department of Police. These

services generally do not require special legislation to respond to routine

emergencies. The fire service initially evolved from the Police force. Working under

the Police department should pose very minimal issues for the fire and ambulance

services.

Another country in which the fire service provides an ambulance service is Australia,

specifically, the state of Victoria. In Victoria the Metropolitan Fire and Emergency

Services Board established a first responder ambulance service in 1994.205 The fire

service-provided ambulance service and other ambulance services have been

working well.206 Recently, however, there have been disputes between the fire

service ambulance services and the other ambulance services over turf, and

different service cultures.207 Such an experience is unlikely to happen in PNG with

203 Energy Publications, ‘PNG’s economic growth to outpace competitors’, Energy Publications website, n.d.http://www.energy-pubs.com.au/blog/pngs-economic-growth-to-outpace-competitors/ viewed 16 November 2015. 204 Asian Development Bank, ‘Papua New Guinea: Economy’, Asian Development Bank website, 2015.< http://www.adb.org/countries/papua-new-guinea/economy> viewed 16 November 2015. 205 D. Shugg,‘First responder program- a program using fire fighters and ambulance paramedics’, conference abstract, Journal of Emergency Primary Health Care (JEPHC), 2003,Vol.1, No.3-4 <http://ro.ecu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1030&context=jephc> viewed 14 November 2015

206 D. Shugg,‘First responder program- a program using fire fighters and ambulance paramedics’, conference abstract, 2003.

207 D. Shugg,‘First responder program- a program using fire fighters and ambulance paramedics’, conference abstract, 2003.

64

the PNGFS and the St. John’s Ambulance because these services would focus on

their respective core activities. If there is a need for one of the services to provide a

service in a province where the other service does not have a presence then a

memorandum of agreement (MOA) or understanding (MOU) could be negotiated

between them. Such a memorandum between the services would guide their work

relationship and reduce any potential risk of misunderstanding that may lead to

disruptions in service delivery to the community. Such co-operative relationship

would enable the services to create other needed capabilities.

PNG does not have a hazardous material and building collapse response capability.

A merged fire and ambulance services would enable both services to develop these

capabilities. Each services’ strengths in terms of expertise and skills will complement

the others weakness. They should also work on building a flood response capability.

Responding to hazardous material incidents, structural collapse accidents, and flood

events are activities that are carried out by other fire and ambulance services in

other countries. In New South Wales, Australia the fire service and the ambulance

service work with other agencies to build such capability.208 They develop standard

operating procedures to improve their collaborative response efforts to incidents.209

In 2011, Australia sent an emergency management contingent to New Zealand to

assist victims that were affected by an earthquake.210 The contingent comprising fire

fighters and ambulance personnel went to New Zealand to assist with response

activities that involved structural collapse.211 The fire and ambulance service in PNG

can aspire to build similar response capability for similar events that could occur in

the country. Possessing these capabilities would prepare them well for larger

destructive events such as floods, structural collapse, or hazardous material

incidents that often affect many lives and involving several agencies to respond.

208Government of New South Wales, ‘Publication Guide’, NSW Fire & Rescue Service, n.d., http://www.fire.nsw.gov.au/page.php?id=907 viewed 16 November 2015. 209 Government of New South Wales, ‘Publication Guide’, NSW Fire & Rescue Service. 210 N. Brooksbank, ‘TFS USAR CAT 2 deployment to Christchurch 2011: Beyond the rubble pile’, Fireround Winter, 2011, http://www.fire.tas.gov.au/userfiles/tym/file/Fireground_Winter_2011.pdf viewed 16 November 2015. 211 N. Brooksbank, ‘TFS USAR CAT 2 deployment to Christchurch 2011: Beyond the rubble pile’, Fireround Winter, 2011.

65

The Disaster Service, on the other hand, has worked well with the PNG Defence

Force, as history has shown. It is therefore perhaps reasonable that this Service is

relocated to the Defence Department. The Defence Force has many sheds to which

the Disaster Service should be given access to build stockpiling of relief supplies.

This is one of the main tasks of the Disaster Service that has been lacking.

Currently, the government is spending millions of Kina to feed a drought stricken

population.212 One of the reasons is that PNG has no food reserves or stock piled

away for such disaster events. Another reason the Disaster Service should be in the

same department with the Defence force is that military personnel often receive

disaster management training. The PNG Defence Force together with the Australian

Defence Force delivered a training session in 2007 to many organisations, including

the Disaster Service and the Fire Service.213 PNG Defence officers also receive

disaster management training from USA.214 In 2015, PNG Defence and the PNG

Disaster Service co–hosted a disaster management training program that was

delivered by the United States Army.215 Disaster Service and the Defence Force

would be able to work more cohesively because of the common disaster

management training they receive from international partners.

In summary, this chapter focused on reconceptualising the concepts, emergency and

disaster using Quarantelli’s ideas. The two concepts are related, but are not the

same. Their characteristics, five of which are described by Quarantelli, are different

from each other. An additional characteristic in PNG’s context is that disasters are

also matters that require the PNG Defence Force to assist with the provision of

security services and law and order enforcement. Emergency events do not require

212 E. Tiozek, ‘Papua New Guinea defends drought relief program amid growing frustration and desperation’, ABC, 22 October 2015, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-10-22/papua-new-guinea-drought-relief/6877370 viewed 6 November 2015. 213 L. Arnold, ‘PNG and Australia plan for disaster relief’, Australian government , Media release, 19 October 2007 http://png.embassy.gov.au/pmsb/MR071019.html viewed 6 November 2015. 214 Government of USA, ‘U.S. relations with Papua New Guinea, Fact sheet’, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 9 February 2015, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2797.htm viewed 6 November 2015. 215 Government of USA, ‘2015 Pacific resilience: PNG and U.S. Army partner for disaster response exercise in Lae’, May 11-15, Media release, 6 May < http://portmoresby.usembassy.gov/mr05062015.html> viewed 6 November 2015.

66

the presence of security forces such as the PNG Defence Force. Furthermore, the

government applies provisional powers in the Constitution to call the PNG Defence

Force to disaster events or its aftermaths. No further piece of government legislation

is needed to call on the services of emergency services such as the PNGFS and the

St. John’s Ambulance.

Emergencies are routine activities that require minimal resources from the local

community’s fire station or ambulance service. Given the five characteristics, this

chapter concluded by recommending that the PNG Fire Service and the St. John’s

Ambulance are emergency responders and should therefore merge under a new

department or with the Department of Police. The Disaster Service, on the other

hand, should be established under the Department of Defence. Its functions can be

easily complemented with the Defence Force’s growing role in disaster

management. Separating the fire service and the ambulance service from the

disaster service can and establishing them in these proposed arrangement has a

greater potential to see emergency and disaster management improve than as is

currently proposed in the RPNGES policy.

67

Conclusion

In conclusion, the findings of this thesis are based on the assumption that a conflict

of values rather than preservation of authority was the main barrier to the

Rationalisation of PNG Emergency policy being effected. The paper acknowledges

that this assumption may draw potential criticisms as it also has limitations. This is

encouraged as one of the aims this paper was to encourage discussion and debate

about how emergency and disaster management can be improved in PNG. Chapter

One described a context in which PNG emergency services operate and the

challenges they experience. The chapter did not cover all the challenges, nor the

potential opportunities that the emergency and disaster service may have had.

Nevertheless, it provided some idea of the environment in which the emergency and

disaster services operate in PNG. A few emergency management models were

considered, but the RPNGES policy was preferred.

Chapter Two focused on the genesis of the RPNGES policy. It could be disputed that

the policy began as one minister’s agenda. There may have been other individuals,

and organisations who had the same idea – to improve emergency and disaster

management. The fact that the policy was stalled after Sir Peter Barter was replaced

as the minister responsible for emergency services could be used to argue this

claim. The counter argument to this is that many stakeholders gave their support for

the RPNGES policy to be adopted. A conflict between certain policy and political

values was the cause of the RPNGES policy not being put into effect.

The final chapter conceptualised emergency and disaster differently from the PNG

legislation, the Constitution and the Disaster Management Act by applying

Quarantelli’s ideas or observations about disaster and emergency. This it may be

argued is inadequate grounds for suggesting the separation of the Services. The

question this paper would ask is whose definition of emergency and disaster should

PNG use to address its issues of inadequate emergency and disaster management

services. The media’s definition is always changing and so cannot be relied on by

policy makers as a consistent way of addressing emergency and disaster

management inadequacies in PNG. Furthermore, separating the disaster service

instead of amalgamating it with the Fire Service and the St. John’s Ambulance

68

Service would probably see many of the outcomes the RPNGES policy aspired. The

risk of the fire service and the ambulance disagreeing to merge because of

differences in value is minimal. Currently, these services are not in competition and

their past work relations at incidents indicates they have generally cooperated

incidents. Each of the services has strengths that can complement the other’s

weakness. These will become an important value when the services work together to

build response capability for hazardous material incidents, flood events, and building

collapse accidents. They can also provide services in each other’s stead through

negotiated arrangements for provinces that do not have their presence. The Disaster

Service has worked well with the PNG Defence Force. It is therefore, reasonable that

the Disaster Service be relocated to the Department of Defence.

The RPNGES policy identified key issues, but in its current shape it is unable to

achieve them. The Secretary for Provincial Affairs stated that PNG is likely to

experience droughts every five years.216 This prediction is reason enough to suggest

that PNG should promptly improve its emergency and disaster management. A new

arrangement, perhaps, can do that. The RPNGES was one means to an end –

improved emergency and disaster management for PNG. However, if it cannot be

progressed to produce this outcome now, then it is only right that a new approach is

introduced to take its ideas further.

216 EM TV online, ‘Guina: El Nino situation in PNG critical’, EMTV online, 12 November 2015 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_LAcd48zzLQ Viewed 15 November 2015.

69

Bibliography ABC, ‘Funding not yet released for flood relief in PNG’, 11 December 2011. < http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/2007-12-05/funding-not-yet-released-for-flood-relief-in-png/46036> viewed 11 October 2015. ABC International Development, ‘Citizen access to information in Papua New Guinea’, 2014. http://www.abcinternationaldevelopment.net.au/sites/default/files/Citizen%20Access%20to%20Information%20in%20PNG_2014.pdf viewed 5 November 2015. ABC, ‘Back down on emergency services merger in SA as Minister laments 'hindsight', 16 May 2015. < http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-16/sa-government-backs-down-on-emergency-services-merger/6474818> viewed 15 October 2015 AFP, ‘Drought in Papua New Guinea could be worst in decades: PM’, Seychelles News Agency, 24 August 2015. < http://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/3576/Drought+in+Papua+New+Guinea+could+be+worst+in+decades+PM%20-%20sthash.4qXYsV4I.dpuf>, viewed 24th August 2015 Allen. B., ‘Food risks in PNG: lessons from 1997’, Development Policy Centre, 26 August 2015. http://devpolicy.org/food-risks-in-png-lessons-from-1997-20150826/ viewed 27 September 2015. Allen B. J. & Bourke. R. M., ‘The 1997-98 Drought in Papua New Guinea: Failure of Policy or Triumph of the Citizenry?’, in R. M. James (editor) Policy making and implementation: Studies from Papua New Guinea, Australian National University Press, 2009, pp. 325 – 399, <http://press.anu.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/ch179.pdf> viewed 27th September 2015. Alphonse. A., Leaders not attending to natural disasters have a problem, Post Courier, 28 October 2015. <http://www.postcourier.com.pg/News/mps-and-governors-have-problem-if-they-fail-to-address-disasters-dion/#.VjBbEk3ouUk viewed 28 October 2015. Althaus. C., Bridgman. P., & Davis .G., The Australian policy handbook, 4th ed, Allen & Unwin, NSW, 2013. Arnold. L., ‘PNG and Australia plan for disaster relief, Australian government’, Media release, 19 October 2007. http://png.embassy.gov.au/pmsb/MR071019.html viewed 6 November 2015. Asian Development Bank, ‘ADB $24.2 million grant to help build PNG’s resilience to climate change’, 23 October 2015. http://www.adb.org/news/adb-242-million-grant-help-build-png-s-resilience-climate-change> viewed 1 November 2015. Asian Development Bank, ‘Papua New Guinea: Economy’, 2015. < http://www.adb.org/countries/papua-new-guinea/economy> viewed 16 November 2015.

70

Aviation safety advisory group, ‘Resource guide to aircraft fire fighting & rescue’, n.d. < http://aviationsafetyadvisorygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/pdfguide.pdf> viewed 11 October 2015. Banks G., ‘Challenges of evidence-based policy-making’, Australian government website, 2009. < http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications-and-media/archive/publications-archive/evidence-based-policy> viewed 1 November 2015. Barker. P., ‘Research of economic growth in Papua New Guinea’, Working paper, Institute of National Affairs, No. 17, 2007., pp.1-14 < http://www.inapng.com/pdf_files/Research%20of%20Economic%20Growth%20in%20Papua%20New%20Guinea.pdf>viewed 27 September 2015. Barr. J., ‘Drought assessment: the 1997–98 El Niño drought in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands’, James Cook University, Cairns, Conference paper, 1998. < https://ajem.infoservices.com.au/downloads/AJEM-14-02-08>viewed 3 November 2015. Barter, P., ‘Responses to the 1997–98 Drought in PNG’, in R.M. Bourke, M.G. Allen and J.G. Salisbury (eds), Food security for Papua New Guinea, conference paper, Lae, 26 -30 June 2000. <http://aciar.gov.au/files/node/306/pr99_pdf_10703.pdf> viewed 9 October 2015. Berlin. I., The proper study of mankind: An anthology of essays, Hardy, H and Hausheer, R. (ed.).,Pimlico, London,1998. Bourke. M,’ As Papua New Guinea faces worsening drought, a past disaster could save lives’, Australian National University, 26 August 2015. http://www.anu.edu.au/news/all-news/as-papua-new-guinea-faces-worsening-drought-a-past-disaster-could-save-lives viewed 19 October 2015. Brooksbank. N., ‘TFS USAR CAT 2 deployment to Christchurch 2011: Beyond the rubble pile’, Fireground Winter, 2011, http://www.fire.tas.gov.au/userfiles/tym/file/Fireground_Winter_2011.pdf viewed 16 November 2015. Buck. D.A., Trainor. J.E., & Aguirre. B.E., ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Incident Command System and NIMS’, Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management: Vol. 3, 2006, pp. 1-27. Cannon. M., ‘New service agreement with National Department of Health signed’, Media release, St. John Ambulance website, 1 October 2015. http://www.stjohn.org.pg/#!New-service-agreement-with-National-Department-of-Health-signed/clfr/560ea7730cf25fa7fe22e324 viewed 29 October 2015. Canton. L. G., Emergencies, disasters and catastrophes in Emergency management: concepts and strategies for effective programs, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. New Jersey & Canada, 2007.

71

Carter. W.N., A disaster manager’s handbook, Asian Development Bank, 2008https://openaccess.adb.org/bitstream/handle/11540/5035/disaster-management-handbook.pdf?sequence=1 viewed 20 October 2015. Choi, N. ‘PM calls for unity against disasters’, EMTV website, 24 August 2015. < http://www.emtv.com.pg/article.aspx?slug=PM-Calls-For-Unity-Against-Disasters&> viewed 24th August 2015 Commonwealth, ‘Papua New Guinea, The Commonwealth year book’, Commonwealth website, 2015. http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/yb-pdfs/papua_new_guinea_country_profile.pdf viewed 19 October 2015. Conway. G., ‘AIIMS doctrine: have we got the fundamentals right?’, The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2012,pp.54-57 < https://ajem.infoservices.com.au/items/AJEM-27-02-12> viewed 21 November 2015. Copernicus, ‘Conference on disaster management -2015’, 2015. http://www.copernicus.eu/events/wcdm-2015-world-conference-disaster-management viewed 20 October 2015. Davies. H., ‘The 1994 eruption of Rabaul volcano – A case study in disaster management’, University of Papua New Guinea, 1995, http://www.pacificdisaster.net/pdnadmin/data/original/JB_DM311_PNG_1994_disaster_management.pdf viewed 12 October 2015. Davies. H.L., Davies J.M.,.Perembo. R.C.B & Lus. W.Y.,’ The Aitape 1998 tsunami: Reconstructing the event from interviews and field mapping’, University of Papua New Guinea website, < http://nctr.pmel.noaa.gov/PNG/Upng/Davies020411/> viewed 12 October 2015. Dent. A. W., Davies. G., Barrett. P., & de Saint. P. J., ‘The 1994 eruption of the Rabaul volcano, Papua New Guinea: injuries sustained and medical response’, The Medical journal of Australia, Vol. 11-12, 1995, pp. 635-9. Department of Fire & Emergency Services, ‘State Emergency Services’ Department of Fire & Emergency Services website, http://www.dfes.wa.gov.au/aboutus/operationalinformation/Pages/stateemergencyservice.aspx viewed 15 October 2015.. Department of Provincial Affairs, Rationalisation of Emergency Services PNG, Final Report, Government Printer, Port Moresby, 2007. Easton. D., A framework for political analysis, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice–Hall, 1965. Elapa. J., ‘Bush fire damages homes in Ialibu District’, Post Courier, 24 August 2015, http://www.postcourier.com.pg/Stories/bush-fire-damages-homes-in-ialibu-district/#.VdquXE3ou70, viewed 24th August 2015.

72

EM TV online, 2015, ‘Guina: El Nino situation in PNG critical’, 12 November 2015, EMTV website, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_LAcd48zzLQ Viewed 15 November 2015. Energy Publications, ‘PNG’s economic growth to outpace competitors’, n.d., Energy Publications website, http://www.energy-pubs.com.au/blog/pngs-economic-growth-to-outpace-competitors/ viewed 16 November 2015. European Commission for Humanitarian Office, “ECCHO crisis flash No. 1: Papua New Guinea- drought/frost’, 14 September 2015, http://reliefweb.int/report/papua-new-guinea/echo-crisis-flash-no-1-papua-new-guinea-drought-frost viewed 6 November 2015. Ewart. R., 2015, ‘Drought-coping programs were denied funding by the PNG government: NARI’, 28 August 2015, ABC website, < http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-28/drought-coping-programs-were-denied-funding-by-the/6731738> viewed 1 November 2015. Google, ‘definition of disaster’, n.d., google website, https://www.google.com.au/webhp?hl=en#hl=en-AU&q=definition+of+disaster viewed 4 November 2015 Google, ‘definition of emergency’, n.d., google website,https://www.google.com.au/webhp?hl=en#hl=en&q=definition+of+emergency viewed 4 November 2015. Government of New South Wales, ‘Publication Guide’, n.d. NSW Fire & Rescue Service website, http://www.fire.nsw.gov.au/page.php?id=907 viewed 16 November 2015. Government of PNG, ‘Speech by Hon. Peter O’Neill CMG MP Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea at the Papua New Guinea Defence Academy 2nd Defence Force commissioning course (DFCC) graduation parade’, Speech, Papua New Guinea Prime Minister’s website, 22 October 2015, http://www.pm.gov.pg/index.php/news-centre/390-speech-by-hon-peter-o-neill-cmg-mp-prime-minister-of-papua-new-guinea-at-the-papua-new-guinea-defence-academy-2nd-defence-force-commissioning-course-dfcc-graduation-parade viewed 6 November 2015. Government of USA, ‘2015 Pacific resilience: PNG and U.S. Army partner for disaster response exercise in Lae’, Media release, Government of USA website, 6 May 2015. <http://portmoresby.usembassy.gov/mr05062015.html>viewed 6 November 2015. Government of USA, ‘U.S. relations with Papua New Guinea’, Fact sheet, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Government of USA website, 9 February 2015. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2797.htm viewed 6 November 2015.

73

Guess, G. M & Farnham, P.G, 'The policymaking process: between technical rationality and politics', in, Cases in public policy analysis, Guess, G. M & Farnham, P. G (3rd edn), Georgetown University Press, Washington,2011, pp. 1-22.

Hamilton. C., Running from the storm: the development of climate change policy in Australia, UNSW Press Ltd, Australia, 2001, pp.1-178. Hamilton. L.C., ‘Education, politics, and opinions about climate change evidence for interaction effects’, Springer, 2009, < http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Lawrence_Hamilton/publication/226722589_Education_politics_and_opinions_about_climate_change_evidence_for_interaction_effects/links/00b49516bf5e5109af000000.pdf> viewed 1 November 2015 (Published online 14 December 2010). Handmer & S. Dovers, Handbook of disaster & emergency policies & and institutions, Earthscan, UK & USA, 2007. Head. B. W., ‘Three lenses of evidence-based policy’, The Australian Journal of Public Administration, vol. 67, no. 1, 2008, pp.1–11. Hewitt, K., ‘The idea of calamity in a technocratic age’, in K. Hewitt (ed), Interpretations of Calamity from the Viewpoint of Human Ecology, Allen and Unwin. London, 1983. Holderhead. S., South Australia’s emergency services will be merged into one department, The Advertiser, 15 September 2014, http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/south-australia/south-australias-emergency-services-will-be-merged-into-one-department/story-fni6uo1m-1227059510556?sv=414ef907a4e16cfdf59e2445ba6f6c1f viewed 15 October 2015. Howlett, M., Ramesh, M & Perl. A , 'Understanding public policy: theoretical approaches', in Howlett, M., Ramesh, M & Perl, A., Studying public policy: policy cycles & policy subsystems, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press, Don Mills, Ont., 2009. Hill. B., ‘Juffa says it's time for PNG to ask for drought help’, ABC website, 27 October 2015 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-10-27/juffa-says-it's-time-for-png-to-ask-for-drought/6890022 viewed 1 November 2015. Hill. B., ‘PNG government accused of politicising drought aid’, ABC website, 21 September, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-09-21/png-government-accused-of-politicising-drought-aid/6792636 viewed 21 September 2015. Independent State of Papua New Guinea, ‘Constitution of the independent State of Papua New Guinea’,n.d. < http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/pg/pg011en.pdf> viewed 19 October 2015 Independent State of Papua New Guinea, Disaster Management Act 1984, Papua New Guinea Government website, n.d. https://www.ifrc.org/docs/idrl/323EN.pdf viewed 10 October 2015.

74

International Federation for Red Cross and Red Cross Society, ‘New IFRC Report calls for greater recognition and support for local humanitarian actors’, International Federation for Red Cross and Red Cross Society website,15 September 2015. <https://www.ifrc.org/en/news-and-media/press-releases/general/wdr-press-release/> viewed 19 October 2014. International Federation for Red Cross and Red Cross Society, ‘World Disasters Report 2014 – Data’, International Federation for Red Cross and Red Cross Society website, n.d.<https://www.ifrc.org/world-disasters-report-2014/data>viewed 19 October 2015. Ishada. T, Ohta. M., Katsurada.K. & Sugimoto.T., 1984, ‘The emergency medical system in Japan’, The Journal of Emergency Medicine, vol.2, 1984, pp.45-55, <http://ac.els-cdn.com/0736467984900489/1-s2.0-0736467984900489-main.pdf?_tid=55c9213c-8abc-11e5-bad2-00000aab0f26&acdnat=1447497900_b40b4547c29f3c73650d74e28d26b919> viewed 14 November 2015. Jones, J.H. ‘Papua New Guinea 2015: At a crossroads and beyond’, Lowy Institute website, May 2015. http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/papua-new-guinea-in-2015-at-a-crossroads-and-beyond.pdf viewed 7th September 2015. Kenneth. G., ‘K30m needed for Highlands provinces’, Post Courier website, 21 September 2015, http://www.postcourier.com.pg/Stories/k30m-needed-for-highlands-provinces/#.Vf-pxk3ou70 viewed 21 September 2015. Kingdon. J. W., Agendas, alternatives, and public policies, 2nd ed, Addison – Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 2003. Lapauve. J. Jr, ‘Polye calls on Government to save St John’s Operation in nation’s capital’, EMTV website, 6 September 2015. http://www.emtv.com.pg/article.aspx?slug=Polye-calls-on-Government-to-save-St-John-s-Operation-in-Nation-s-Capital&subcategory=Top-Stories viewed 7th September 2015

Lasswell. H., Politics: Who gets what when, how, Cleveland, OH, Meridian Books, 1936. Marshall. S., 2007,’ Aussie aid workers rush to help after PNG cyclone’, ABC website, 2 December < http://www.abc.net.au/news/2007-12-02/aussie-aid-workers-rush-to-help-after-png-cyclone/974830 > viewed 22 September 2015. May. R. J., Anere. R., Haley. N. & Wheen. C., Election 2007: The shift to limited preferential voting in Papua New Guinea, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 2013. < https://books.google.com.au/books?id=GapBAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA21&lpg=PA21&dq=papua+new+guinea+2007+economy+US+$&source=bl&ots=7wmqcZMCMB&sig=qqBXLGxNeCRElICe3mmwwa1zGok&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CFUQ6AEwCWoVChMIsKS

75

5j4qXyAIVhyiUCh335QW5#v=onepage&q=Economypapua%20new%20guinea%202007%20economy%20US%20%24&f=false> viewed online 27 September 2015. Moe. T.L. & Pathranarakul. P., ‘An integrated approach to natural disaster management: Public project management and its critical success factors’, Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal, Vol. 15 No. 3, 2006, pp. 396-413 <http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/09653560610669882> viewed 7 April 2015. National Geographic, ‘Ring of Fire’, National Geographic website http://education.nationalgeographic.com.au/encyclopedia/ring-fire/ Viewed 3 November 2015. Neumann. K., The 1994 volcanic disaster and its aftermath in East New Britain: comments and observations, Australian International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction Committee, Emergency Management Australia, 1996, < http://www.pacificdisaster.net/pdnadmin/data/original/JB_DM167_PNG_1994_comments_and_observations.pdf> viewed 12 October 2015. O’Brien. G., O’Keefe. P., Rose. J. & Wisner. B., ‘Climate change and disaster management’, Disasters, Vol. 06, No. 30, 2006, pp.64−80, Overseas Development Institute, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, USA http://www.glerl.noaa.gov/seagrant/ClimateChangeWhiteboard/Resources/Uncertainty/climatech/obrien06PR.pdf viewed 19 October 2015. Owen. C. & Dwyer. I., ‘Review of incident management teamwork and multi-agency collaboration’, Report, Bush fire CRC website, 2009. < http://www.bushfirecrc.com/sites/default/files/downloads/aiims_national_report_bcrc_utas_v2.pdf> viewed 21 November 2015. Papua New Guinea government, High Commission of the independent state of PNG, Canberra, Australian government website, n.d. < http://www.pngcanberra.org/trade/infrastructure.htm> viewed 19 October 2015. Papua New Guinea, Part X – Emergency powers, in the constitution of Papua New Guinea, World Intellectual Property Organisation, n.d.< http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=199188#LinkTarget_1948> viewed 11 October 2015. Parker. C., ‘Salvation Army in Papua New Guinea responds to Cyclone Guba’, Salvation Army website, 21 November 2007 < https://www.salvationist.org/intnews.nsf/vw_web_articles/74C365A55C86DD0B8025739A003DF6E6?opendocument> viewed 6 November 2015. Post Courier, ‘Opening of new IOM office in Wabag’, Post Courier website, 30 October 2015. http://www.postcourier.com.pg/News/opening-of-new-iom-office-in-wabag/#.VjZsh03ou70 viewed 2 November 2015.

76

Post Courier, ‘Polye cautions PM of politising drought relief efforts’, Post Courier website, 28 August 2015. <http://www.postcourier.com.pg/News/polye-cautions-pm-of-politising-drought-relief-efforts/#.VeAQME3ou70 v> viewed 3 November 2015. Quarantelli, E. L., ‘Catastrophes are Different from disasters: Some implications for crisis planning and managing drawn from Katrina’, Social Science Research Council, 2006, http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Quarantelli/ viewed 10th September 2015. Queensland Government, ‘Annual report: 2006-2007’, Department of Emergency Services website, < https://ambulance.qld.gov.au/docs/Annual%20Report%202006-07.pdf> viewed 31 October 2015 Rezohazy. R., ‘Values: psychological perspectives’ in N. Smelser and P. Baltes (eds), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Amsterdam and New York: Elsevier, 2001. Rice. S., ‘CFS volunteers threaten to quit over SA Government’s emergency services merger plan’, The Advertiser website, 8 February 2015.< http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/south-australia/cfs-volunteers-threaten-to-quit-over-sa-governments-emergency-services-merger-plan/story-fni6uo1m-1227212303130> viewed 18 October 2015. Rogers. C., Bleakley. R., Ola. W. & CARE Integrated Development Project Team, ‘Rural poverty in remote Papua new Guinea: Case study of Obura –Wonenara’, Australian National University website, < https://devpolicy.anu.edu.au/pdf/2011/Rural_Poverty_Remote_PNG_Report.pdf> viewed 7th September 2015 Salmang. G. A., ‘NEC approves fire safety steps: Dion, Post Courier website, 25 August 2015, <http://www.postcourier.com.pg/Stories/nec-approves-fire-safety-steps-dion/#.VjHHWU3ouUk>Viewed 25 August 2015 Sawlani. G., ‘Drought threatens to bring major bushfires to PNG’, ABC website, 23 September 2015. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-09-23/drought-threatens-to-bring-major-bushfires-to-png/6799412 viewed 6 November 2015. Sawlani.G, ’Michael Somare resigns from ruling Papua New Guinea party he founded’, ABC website, 12 October 2015. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-10-12/michael-somare-resigns-from-papua-new-guinea-party-he-founded/6848060 viewed 3 November 2015 Savage. A., ‘Sweeping changes to Victoria's emergency services’, ABC website, 10 December 2012 < http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-12-10/sweeping-changes-to-victoria27s-emergency-services/4419434> viewed 18 October 2015 Shaluf. I. M.,‘An overview on disasters’, Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal, Vol. 16, No.5, 2007, pp. 687 – 703 < http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/09653560710837000> viewed 19 October 2015.

77

Shugg. D.,’First responder program- a program using fire fighters and ambulance paramedics’, conference abstract, Journal of Emergency Primary Health Care (JEPHC), Vol.1, No.3-4, 2003, <http://ro.ecu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1030&context=jephc> viewed 14 November 2015

Silas. I. K., ‘Rationalization of Emergency Services in Papua New Guinea’, 2013 http://www.pacificdisaster.net/pdnadmin/data/original/JM2013_SAM_S5_P_PNG_RationalisationExperience_SilasIsaac_20130704.pdf viewed12 October 2015 Simos. M., ‘MFS chief quits fire service ahead of emergency services merger’, The Advertiser website, 1 March http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/south-australia/mfs-chief-quits-fire-service-ahead-of-emergency-services-merger/story-fni6uo1m-1227243713677?sv=5bab73e428aaee6aff8baf32ee1ccdcd viewed 15 October 2015. South Australia State Emergency Services, ‘About the SES, website http://www.ses.sa.gov.au/site/about_us/about_the_ses.jsp Viewed 15 October 2015. Steketee. M, ‘Politics trumps physics in climate change frenzy’, ABC website, 12 September 2014, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-12/steketee-politics-trumps-physics-in-climate-change-frenzy/5738548>viewed 1 November 2015. Stewart. J., Public policy values, Palgrave MacMillan Publishers limited, 2009. St. John’s Ambulance Papua New Guinea, Emergency Ambulance, St. John’s Ambulance Papua New Guinea website, n.d. http://www.stjohn.org.pg/#!emergency/i7afs viewed 8 September 2015. The Conversation, ‘As Papua New Guinea faces worsening drought, a past disaster could save lives’, The Conversation website, 28 August 2015. <http://theconversation.com/as-papua-new-guinea-faces-worsening-drought-a-past-disaster-could-save-lives-46390> viewed 5 November 2015. The National, 2015, ‘Fire leaves families homeless’, The National website, 9 September, http://www.thenational.com.pg/?q=node/94444, viewed 9th September 2015.

The World Bank, 2011, ‘Papua New Guinea: Second Gazelle restoration project’, The World Bank website, 11 April 2011. < http://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2011/04/11/papua-new-guinea-second-gazelle-restoration-project> viewed 31 October 2015. The World Bank, ’Managing disaster risks for resilient development’, The world Bank website, 10 April 2014. http://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2013/04/12/managing-disaster-risks-resilient-development viewed 20 October 2015.

78

The World Bank, ‘Introduction to disaster risk management’, The World Bank website, 2015. http://einstitute.worldbank.org/ei/course/introduction-disaster-risk-management-0 viewed 20 October 2015. The World Bank, ‘Building resilient communities: Risk management and response to natural disasters through social funds and community – driven development operations’, The World Bank website, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSF/Resources/Building_Resilient_Communities_Complete.pdf viewed 20 October 2015. Tiozek. E., ‘Papua New Guinea defends drought relief program amid growing frustration and desperation’, ABC website, 22 October 2015. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-10-22/papua-new-guinea-drought-relief/6877370 viewed 6 November 2015. Tupper. A., Carn. S.., Davey. J, Kamada. Y., Potts. R., Prata. F. & Tokuno. M., ‘An evaluation of volcanic cloud detection techniques during recent significant eruptions in the western Ring of Fire’, Remote Sensing of Environment, Vol. 91, 2004, pp. 27 – 46. Unknown author, in Chapter 5, ‘Identity politics and institutionalised instability: The political economy of nationalism’, http://www.polsis.uq.edu.au/OCIS/Colman.pdf viewed 1 November 2015. Unknown author, ‘The roles of the Defence Forces, Operation ples drai: The PNG and Australian Defence forces working together for the people of PNG during 1997-1998 drought’, 1997-1998. http://www.global.net.pg/png_drought_relief/htmls/page3a.html viewed 6 November 2015 United Nations Office for coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), ‘What is UNDAC?’, United nations website, n.d. <http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/undac/overview> viewed 18 October 2015. United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, ‘What is the International Strategy?’, United Nations website, n.d. http://www.unisdr.org/who-we-are/international-strategy-for-disaster-reduction viewed 18 October 2015. United Nations, ‘Papua New Guinea: Annual progress report, United Nations website, 2011. https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Papua-New-Guinea-UNCP-Annual-Progress-Report-2011_Final-high-res-2.pdf viewed 1 November 2015. United Nations, ‘Papua New Guinea, UN Data’, United Nations website, http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=papua%20new%20guinea viewed 19 October 2015. United Nations office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Papua New Guinea - Tsunami OCHA Situation Report No. 7’, United Nations website, 28

79

July1998, < http://reliefweb.int/report/papua-new-guinea/papua-new-guinea-tsunami-ocha-situation-report-no-7> viewed 6 November 2015. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Papua New Guinea: Cyclone Guba OCHA Situation Report No. 2’, United Nations website, 26 August 2007.<http://reliefweb.int/report/papua-new-guinea/papua-new-guinea-cyclone-guba-ocha-situation-report-no-2> viewed 27 September 2015. Victorian government, ‘2009 Victorian bushfires royal Commission’, Report, Victorian government website, July 2010, < http://www.royalcommission.vic.gov.au/finaldocuments/summary/PF/VBRC_Summary_PF.pdf> viewed 6 November 2015. Victorian government, ‘Victorian help Canada fight wildfires’, Media release, Victorian government website, 12 July 2015, < https://4a5b508b5f92124e39ff-ccd8d0b92a93a9c1ab1bc91ad6c9bfdb.ssl.cf4.rackcdn.com/2015/07/1107-NEVILLE-GARRETT-FIRES-HM.pdf> viewed 6 November 2015. Victorian government, ‘Victorians help Canada fight wildfires’, Premier of Victoria’s website, 12 July 2015, http://www.premier.vic.gov.au/victorians-help-canada-fight-wildfires viewed 6 November 2015. Victorian State Government, ‘The Commissioner’, Emergency Management Victoria, Victorian State Government website <https://www.emv.vic.gov.au/about-us/the-commissioner/> viewed 18 October 2015. Volunteer Fire Brigade Victoria, ‘VFBV response to counsel assisting’s submissions on amalgamation of Victoria’s fire services’, 2009 Bushfires Royal Commission Submission, 17 May 2010, <013_Amalgamation.pdf> viewed 18 October 2015. Waigeno. D., ‘Government to address disaster management concerns’, EMTV website, 28 October 2015. <http://www.emtv.com.pg/article.aspx?slug=Government-To-Address-Disaster-Management-Concerns&subcategory=Top-Stories viewed 31 October 2015.

Wela. M., Kanua. B. & Bang. S., ‘Postdrought agricultural rehabilitation: the 1997–98 El Niño Drought in PNG in PNG’, in R.M. Bourke, M.G. Allen and J.G. Salisbury (eds), Food security for Papua New Guinea, conference paper, Lae, 2000, < http://aciar.gov.au/files/node/306/pr99_pdf_10703.pdf> viewed 15 October 2015. Woolner, D., ‘Papua New Guinea: 20 Years On’, Parliamentary Research Service, Parliamentary Library, Canberra, Research Paper No. 4, 1995-96, 1995. < https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/rp/1995-96/96rp04.pdf> viewed 23 November 2015. World Bank, Papua New Guinea Overview, World Bank website, last updated 8 April 2015 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/png/overview viewed 8 September 2015.