The Exit Option

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The exit option: mediation and thetermination of negotiations in the

Northern Ireland conflictNiall O Dochartaigh

School of Political Science and Sociology, National University of Ireland, Galway,Ireland, and

Isak SvenssonDepartment of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Uppsala,

Sweden and National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Otago University,Dunedin, New Zealand

Abstract

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the mediation exit option, which is one of the mostimportant tactics available to any third party mediator.

Design/methodology/approach The paper analyzes a crucial intermediary channel between theIrish Republican Army (hereafter IRA) and the British Government utilizing unique material from theprivate papers of the intermediary, Brendan Duddy, including diaries that cover periods of intensivecommunication, extensive interviews with the intermediary and with participants in thiscommunication on both the British Government and Irish Republican sides as well as recentlyreleased official papers from the UK National Archives relating to this communication.

Findings The study reveals how the intermediary channel was used in order to get information,how the third party and the primary parties traded in asymmetries of information, and how theintermediary utilized the information advantage to increase the credibility of his threats oftermination.

Research limitations/implications The study outlines an avenue for further research on thetermination dynamics of mediation.

Practical implications Understanding the conditions for successfully using the exit-option isvital for policy-makers, in particular for peace diplomacy efforts in other contexts than the NorthernIreland one.

Originality/value The paper challenges previous explanations for why threats by mediators tocall off further mediation attempts are successful and argues that a mediator can use the partiesinformational dependency on him in order to increase his leverage and push the parties towardssettlement.

Keywords Mediation, Northern Ireland, Violent conflict, Back-channel, Negotiation, Negotiating,Conflict

Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction

Finally, by mutual consent we both stood up. But, not before I had walked him into it, asking,Am I to take it that the people you represent do not wish to continue this link? He visiblyturned grey, as I knew he would. Most certainly not! he almost shouted. I simply staredthrough him, as I knew full well that he would be crucified if he came back with the reportthat I had walked out [. . .] (Brendan Duddy, diary entry for 5/12/75. POL 35/62, Duddypapers).

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at

www.emeraldinsight.com/1044-4068.htm

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International Journal of Conflict

Management

Vol. 24 No. 1, 2013

pp. 40-55

q Emerald Group Publishing Limited

1044-4068

DOI 10.1108/10444061311296125


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The exit-option, that is, the mediators potential to put an end to mediation efforts whenconfronted with major obstructions or stalemates, is a crucial tactic for mediatorsaiming to end violent conflicts and find peaceful settlements. Paradoxically, the mainaim of threatening termination is to avoid termination. In fact, since the mediators

withdrawal tactic implicitly underlies all other tactics (Princen, 1992), understandingthe conditions under which it can be successfully used is crucial for understandingwhy some mediators are more successful than others[1].

Previous research suggests that threats of termination are effective when made bypowerful mediators, who have important resources to withhold from the parties(Princen, 1992); or when blame can be allocated in front of an audience that can punishthe primary parties for their obstructions (Kydd, 2005); or when the termination ofmediation is performed in a mutually hurting stalemate, and the mediator is the wayout of this stalemate (Touval and Zartman, 2001).

We challenge these previous explanations by examining a case of successful use oftermination threats to change the positions of parties to a negotiation by a mediatorlacking resources, acting in secrecy, and without a mutually hurting stalemate existing

between the parties. We analyse a crucial intermediary channel between the IrishRepublican Army (hereafter IRA) and the British government utilizing unique materialfrom the private papers of the intermediary, Brendan Duddy, including diaries thatcover periods of intensive communication[2]. We also draw on extensive interviewswith the intermediary and with participants in this communication on both the BritishGovernment and Irish Republican sides[3]. This material is supplemented by recentlyreleased official papers from the UK National Archives relating to this communicationand the private papers of Ruair OBradaigh, the key Republican contact in this channelin the 1970s[4].

We outline the circumstances under which a private individual acting as ananonymous mediator in back-channel negotiation can credibly and effectively threatentermination and the complexities surrounding the use of the exit-option. This case

cannot be explained by previous theories of mediation termination, and we develop anew argument in order to explain it.The premise for our argument is that a mediator can be an important source of

information between the parties (Kydd, 2003, 2010; Rauchhaus, 2006; Gilady andRussett, 2002). Given that the intermediary possesses critical information, the primaryparties have incentives to not jeopardize the relationship with the third party.Therefore, even if they are not interested in maintaining good relationships with theother side, or seeking to end violence, or seeking a solution, or seeking to avoid publicblame, the parties have incentives to uphold the relationship with the mediator as acritical source of information. We argue that mediators can exploit partiesinformational dependency in order to maximize leverage. One implication of this isthat the longer a mediator has been involved at the intersection between two parties

and utilized the asymmetries of information to exert pressure there, the more likely thatthis termination threat can be used effectively.In line with our theoretical argument, we find that both sides have incentives to

avoid taking responsibility for termination. Thus, even when they seek to terminatethey do it by trying to manoeuvre their opponents into terminating. For instance,parties terminate without formally announcing termination, in order to force the otherparty into formal termination. Thus, the Provisional IRA (hereafter IRA)[5] renewedarmed action in late 1975 without formally ending its ceasefire while the Britisheffectively ceased negotiating in mid-1975 while continuing to attend meetings with

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IRA representatives. Neither party wanted to be blamed for the ending of the ceasefireand this fact gave leverage to the intermediary who could play a role in allocatingblame by choosing the timing of termination and providing information to others in aposition to publicly allocate blame. This cannot be explained by previous theories.

Therefore, only by applying an informational perspective on mediation can weunderstand the dynamics of the exit-option.

This paper is structured in the following manner. We start by outlining thetheoretical discussion about the exit option in mediation, develop our critique about thelimitations in previous explanations and our argument about how mediators cancredibly and effectively threaten to terminate their efforts. Thereafter, the use of theexit option in the secret channel in Northern Ireland is empirically explored. We end bydiscussing the implications of our findings and theories for termination theory inparticular, and mediation research in general.

2. Theoretical discussion

International mediation is by definition voluntary (Bercovitch and Jackson, 1997).Therefore, both of the parties in conflict have to accept mediation for it to occur, andthe mediator also needs to agree to supply the mediation services. This acceptance onthe mediators part can, however, be withdrawn. The mediator can consider theexit-option: to call the mediation effort to a halt and end his or her efforts to bring aconflict to an end[6].

The exit-option has been widely used. Examples of its use include during the MiddleEast peace process in 1991 by the US Secretary of State James Baker (Baker, 1999); in theformer Yugoslavia, by the American negotiator Holbrooke in confronting the Bosnian-Serbleader Karadzic (Holbrooke, 1999); and by US Assistant Secretary of State ChesterA. Crocker in the negotiations in Southern Africa at the end of the 1980s by using the factthat impending US elections and a probable change of administration would effectivelybring the mediation efforts to an end (Crocker, 1999). In other cases of conflict mediation,mediators have been reluctant to utilize the exit-option as a strategic mean of getting theparties to move towards a solution because it implies pressurizing and threatening theparties. This was the view taken by Ambassador Jan Eliasson, for example, in the variousarmed conflicts in which he acted as mediator (Svensson and Wallensteen, 2010).

The exit-option has been recognised as an important source of leverage formediators by using the exit-option a mediator can influence the parties to take themediators efforts more seriously, to make progress towards a solution and get thesense of urgency that might be needed in order to get to a deal (Touval and Zartman,2001; Crocker et al., 2004). The exit-option is used to maintain momentum, to produceconcessions that will help to move the process forward. In this sense the aim of thethreat of termination is to prevent the termination of negotiations by one or other of theparties, or to prevent the negotiations dragging on with no prospect of success.Termination threats can vary in their character depending on the position of the partiesinvolved. In negotiations that the parties all wish to see continue it can be invokedagainst all of them as a threat to allocate blame equally. In a situation where themediator sees one party as recalcitrant it can be invoked to pressure that party to shiftposition through the implicit threat to allocate blame and to position that partyunfavourably in the subsequent stage. Where the mediator is holding one side backfrom renewed violence with great difficulty it is effectively a threat to cease acting onbehalf of the other party to restrain their opponents.

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2.1 Conditions for successful use of the exit-optionFor termination threats to be successful, the belligerents must consider mediation to bevaluable; and believe that the mediator will carry out the threat if the desired actionsare not taken.

A first line of thought links the use of the exit-option to the value of mediation.According to Touval and Zartman (2001), the conditions under which the exit-option issuccessful depend on the structural conditions of the overall conflict: if the mutuallyhurting stalemate is present, they will be sensitive to the threat of leaving. Thisimplies that the threat will not be effective if a stalemate does not exist.

Clearly the mandate a mediator enjoys also affects their use of threats oftermination. A mediator who is backed by a powerful organisation or a state has amuch greater capacity to exert pressure by threatening termination. In this case thethreat of termination might effectively be a threat to withhold or withdraw resources oreven to deploy coercive force on behalf of one of the parties. Princen (1992) suggeststhat it is difficult for mediators without resources to set deadlines in a credible manner.

A second condition for the successful use of the exit-option has to do with the

mediators credibility. Given that the threat of collapsing the talks is aimed at ensuringthe continuation of talks there is an inherent credibility problem with such a threat.The fact that mediators also have a strong normative preference for continuednegotiation (that is, after all, most often the reason why they choose to intervene in thefirst place) compounds this credibility problem. Abortive attempts to utilize the threatof termination can reduce a mediators credibility further still. As Watkins (1999) notespremature efforts to drive for closure can easily backfire, triggering breakdown orundermining credibility (emphasis added).

Kydd (2005) suggests that the mediator can overcome this credibility problem bycasting blame on one of the parties in front of an audience, by which it is important forthe obstructing parties to be perceived as cooperative. If the mediator is powerless,there must be some other powerful audience before whom the parties wish to appear

accommodating, which in turn trusts the mediators word about which side is beingintransigent. Thus, front-channel mediators are in the public eye and are in a strongposition to influence the allocation of blame in the media by publicly terminating in away or at a time that damages the parties.

2.2 Problems with previous theory and our argumentWe have seen that previous explanations for the successful use of the exit-optionemphasise structural conditions (mutually hurting stalemate), the resources of thethird-party mediator, or the presence of an influential audience that the mediator canconvince of who is to blame. Yet these explanations cannot explain the occurrence andsuccess of the exit-option for secret mediators with few resources in on-going conflicts.The threat of termination must operate differently for different kinds of mediators.

Back-channel mediators are not in a position to directly influence media allocationof blame because they have not established a public profile and record in relation totheir mediation role that will lend authority to their analysis. This weakness is notaccidental. In fact, the inability of official blame-allocation that a mediator canpotentially wield through threats of termination in back-channel negotiation mighthelp to explain the preference of parties for this form of contact. It is less likely that themediator can become a significant independent source of pressure on the parties.

Our argument builds on the assumption that one of the key aspects of mediation isto provide information about the parties, thereby mitigating the problem of

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information failure (Kydd, 2003, 2010). Parties in conflicts have strong incentives tomisrepresent information, and this may cause them to incorrectly estimate thelikelihood that their strategies will be successful in pressuring the other side toconcede. It follows from this theory that parties turn to mediators because of the value

of acquiring information. Hence, Rauchhaus argues that mediators are frequentlyselected, or self-selected, precisely because they possess or can gain access to privateinformation (Rauchhaus, 2006, p. 214). Thus, the informational advantage ofmediators may help to explain why they are accepted or requested as mediators.

We argue that the exit-option can be feasible when the mediator can put his ownrelationship at stake. Threats of termination can be credible because mediators caninvoke their own interests and preferences as plausible reasons for termination. Beingblamed by the mediator for ending the mediation would put the relationship with theintermediary at risk, and this potential source of information would be difficult toreplace or restore. The implication of this is that mediators are most likely to threatentermination when they can plausibly blame one of the parties for the breakdown andthus credibly raise the prospect of a breakdown in relationships with the intermediary.

Another implication of this is that the value of mediation will increase over time,hence making the threat of termination much more costly in later rather than earlierphases of conflict mediation processes. The extent to which the role of mediator hasbecome established in a negotiation process is therefore important. A threat oftermination made by an individual who has just begun their involvement in anegotiation or who has not established a central role will have less force than a threatfrom a figure who has become established as a long-term, active and central participantin negotiation. The more information a mediator has the greater its ability to bargain,and, hence, the more influence it has over the disputants (Princen, 1992). Therefore, amediator involved in a situation for decades might be much more willing to use thetactical threat of termination at a later stage than an earlier stage.

3. Empirical analysis: Northern Ireland3.1 ContextAlmost 3,500 people were killed in the violent conflict that broke out in NorthernIreland in 1969 and that continued until the mid-1990s (Dixon, 2001; Tonge, 2006). IrishRepublicans in the IRA and Sinn Fein, the political party with which it was associated,aimed to reunite Ireland as an independent Republic by bringing an end to Britishsovereign control of Northern Ireland through the use of violence. The unionistmajority in Northern Ireland sought to remain within the UK and loyalist paramilitarygroups used illegal violence to supplement state efforts to defeat the IRA. The conflictwas ended through a negotiated settlement in 1998 that drew in armed militants fromboth republican and loyalist organisations (Hancock, 2008; Arthur, 2000; Bew et al.,2002; MacGinty and Darby, 2002). During three key phases of this conflict BrendanDuddy, a Derry businessman with strong and extensive political connections, acted asan intermediary between the IRA and the British Government. He was at the heart ofintensive contact between the two parties in the early and mid-1970s and acted asintermediary again in negotiations aimed at ending the 1980 and 1981 Republicanhunger strikes in which ten IRA and INLA[7] prisoners died. He was also the key figurein the contacts between 1990 and 1993 in the approach to the crucial IRA ceasefire of1994 (Mallie and McKittrick, 1996; Mallie and McKittrick, 2001; ODochartaigh, 2009;Powell, 2008; Taylor, 1998; Taylor, 2001; Rowan, 1995).

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3.2 InformationFrom the outset both the Republicans and the British government valued this channelof communication as a source of information and this fact is central to our argumentabout the use of the exit option. As Sinn Fein President Ruair OBradaigh, the key

Republican link in the channel throughout the 1970s, put it:

Bh se usaideach ar bhealach a leitheid a bheith ann mar is feidir le daoine gnomhu arnuaocht nach bhfuil for, rialtas Sasana no an tira [. . .] n amhain go raibh se usaideach, bhse luachmhar a leitheid a bheith ann.

It was useful in a way to have this because people can act on information that is not true, theBritish government or the IRA [. . .] not only was it useful, it was valuable that this existed(personal interview with Niall ODochartaigh, 2/12/09).

Indeed, British government officials regularly characterised it primarily as a process ofinformation exchange and information gathering (Mallie and McKittrick, 1996; Rees,1985). This was necessary in order to reconcile the use of this channel with thegovernment ban on negotiation with the IRA, but it also captures a key dimension ofthe communication. At the early stages the channel was used for intensive discussionon the political positions of both parties and for information exchange on specificincidents. Thus in January 1974 the channel was used by the British in attempts toestablish whether missing German industrialist, Thomas Niedermayer had, in fact,been kidnapped by the IRA, whether he was dead or alive and whether the IRA wasseeking to strike a deal for his release (see Fco87/345 at the UK National Archives).

No IRA statement on the disappearance was ever issued and none of these items ofinformation was publicly available. Within a few days the British had been informedthrough this channel that Niedermayer had probably been killed. The informationitself was of value to the British government because it came under direct pressurefrom the German government on the issue (see Fco87/346 at the UK NationalArchives). It emerged several years later that he had been accidentally killed by hisIRA captors three days after he was kidnapped and that the kidnapping had probablynot been authorised by the IRA leadership (Howard, 2004; Bowyer Bell, 1993; Phoenix,2009). For these reasons the IRA had an interest in avoiding publicity and publicstatements on this issue while the British had an interest in the information. A secretexchange of information on the issue was in the interests of both parties.

The channel was also a source of information for the British at the political level.Days after contact on the Niedermeyer case the intermediary requested that the Britishgovernment make a public statement on electoral participation that would strengthenthe hand of IRA moderates who were locked in struggle with more radical forces inBelfast. The account of internal divisions, related by the intermediary in order tosuccessfully make a case for a British concession was also viewed by the British as a

useful item of information in its own right:[. . .] assuming that this intermediary has painted an accurate picture, there was apparently areal division of opinion in the Provisional ranks, with many of them seeking a way out fromtheir present policy of violence (Douglas-Home to Dublin Embassy 10 Feb 1974, FCO87/288,UK National Archives).

In late 1974 and early 1975, as the British government explored the possibility of anegotiated settlement with the IRA, the channel acted as a source of information for theBritish on the IRAs political thinking and the IRAs willingness to declare a long-term

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ceasefire. This informational aspect of the channel also served the interests ofRepublicans who sought to reduce uncertainty about their intentions. The keyRepublican figure in this channel, Sinn Fein President Ruair OBradaigh, saw it asimportant that the British have a clear and accurate understanding of their political

position:

Bh se an-tabhachtach a bheith soileir faoin iomlan, agus nach bhfheadfadh le Duddy no naSasanaigh m-thuiscint a bheith ann faoin a raibh i gceist againn.

It was very important to be clear about the whole thing, and that Duddy or the Englishcouldnt misunderstand what we meant (personal interview with Niall ODochartaigh,2/12/09).

The channel also served to provide information to the IRA about British governmentintentions and about internal struggles on the British side. Thus, in late 1974 theBritish Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, was giving serious consideration to a policy ofdisengagement from Northern Ireland that might produce a formula acceptable to theRepublican movement (Bew et al., 2009; McGrattan, 2010). It was not practicable tocommunicate the extent of this thinking publicly, given the sensitivity of the issue.This channel provided a private means for this internal thinking within the Britishgovernment to be conveyed directly to the IRA. Crucially, it also provided informationon the extent of resistance within state security forces to government requests toreduce activity. While this information exchange could contribute to the resolution ofconflict by reducing uncertainty, it was valuable regardless of the intentions of bothparties.

Even when the British government and the IRA began to position themselves in late1975 for the renewal of violence, this channel continued to serve as a useful source ofinformation for both and was maintained with the agreement of both. Both the papersof Sinn Fein President Ruair OBradaigh and the diaries of the intermediary show thatthe intermediary provided regular extensive analysis of the British position toRepublicans, drawing on hundreds of hours of contact with British representatives.

Similarly, the arguments made by the intermediary to the British in late 1975 in anattempt to draw the British back towards making a deal with the IRA provided theBritish with an insight into the thinking of the IRA and the state of the IRA ceasefire(Rees to Wilson, 29 Nov 1975, PREM 16/958, UK National Archives).

Republicans continued to use the channel even after they assessed in June 1975 thatthe British government was content to Let the truce slide away. The intermediaryssuggestion at that point not to meet the British any more, thus causing Cabinetconcern at the lack of pulse-taking illustrates the understanding that thecommunication was valued by the British as a source of information and thatinterruption of contact could thus be used to pressurise them even if they did not seekto reach an agreement (Brendan Duddy, diary entry for 12/6/75, POL 35/62, BrendanDuddy Papers).

That the channel acted for the Republicans as a significant source of information onBritish policy was particularly evident during the early 1990s when it was used to passseveral documents to Republicans that provided detailed insights into the internaldivisions on the British side, including a document describing divisions at cabinet level(Sinn Fein, 1994).

The fact that the channel was valued as a source of information by both sides,independent of their commitment to a negotiated solution, was recognised by the

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intermediary as a problematic issue. He looked on meetings with British agents as akind of struggle in which both sides sought to leverage the channel for informationalpurposes:

[Michael] Oatley[8] was here to do a job and that was to soak in as much data as possible, andmy job was to get as much data as I could from him (personal interview with NiallODochartaigh, 26-27/11/09).

It seems clear that the IRA was particularly alert to this aspect of the channel in the1990s. While the British representative sent nineteen messages through the intermediarybetween 1991 and February 1993, there was only one response from the Republican side,prompting the British representative to suggest that they use the channel more actively(Sinn Fein, 1994; Mallie and McKittrick, 1996). In retrospect this seems like a calculatedRepublican decision to tightly control the informational aspect of the channel. After theend of the IRA ceasefire of 1975 a new Republican leadership had taken over, arguingthat the old leadership had been deceived by the British during the talks (Moloney, 2002).It is possible that this new leadership felt that the British had used the channel as a

source of information about IRA intentions in the 1970s in order to gain politicaladvantage when conflict was renewed. They may have aimed to control theinformational dimension to the channel more tightly in the 1990s in order to prevent arecurrence of this. After this channel had been revealed in 1993, the key Republicanfigure, Martin McGuinness, expressed the view that The contacts with Britain [ . . .] hadprovided Sinn Fein with valuable political intelligence and that republicans gainedmore than the British side from the exchanges(Rowan, 1995, pp. 70-71). His commentsindicated a keen awareness of the informational dimension to the channel.

Even after the prospects of a deal through this channel receded in late 1993 Britishofficials argued that the contact should be maintained both because of its potentialrole in bringing violence to an end, and because of the political intelligence it yields(Duddy papers, POL 35/301). After the channel had been exposed and shut down in late

1993 to the great embarrassment of the British Government, at a time when the Britishstill refused to meet directly with Republican representatives, British Prime MinisterJohn Major regretted the loss of the back-channel (Major, 1999). The absence of thischannel drastically curtailed his governments understanding of the politics of theRepublican leadership. In 1993 the IRA had secretly offered a ceasefire directly to theBritish government through this channel. By contrast, John Major first learned of the1994 IRA ceasefire in a phone call from the Irish Prime Minister and the Britishintelligence agencies did not predict it (Mallie and McKittrick, 2001).

The channel thus had an informational value to both sides that was independent oftheir desire for a negotiated agreement. As a consequence, threats of termination by themediator could be effective regardless of whether the parties genuinely soughtagreement or whether a mutually-hurting stalemate existed. They could be an effectivesource of leverage even if the parties were intent on returning to violence.

3.3 Termination threats in the negotiationThe literature on mediation includes many examples of clear and direct threats oftermination but our case illustrates that such direct threats are simply one end of acontinuum of termination threats that includes implicit warnings of breakdown,negative analysis by the mediator of his or her position and of the relationshipsbetween the parties involved and deadlines for agreement set by a mediator. This ispart of the dynamic in what has been labelled as deadline diplomacy (Nathan, 2006).

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One might argue that no termination has been threatened unless it is explicitly stated,but as we will show below, the intermediary in this case clearly understood, andintended, the warnings he gave about breakdown, and the analysis he provided, asimplicit threats of termination.

As one of the few sources of leverage the mediator had, the threat of terminationwas deployed from a very early stage, but initially in a very tentative way, as animplicit threat. From the beginning of 1974 the intermediary regularly urged theBritish government to secure the transfer to Northern Irish prisons of a number of IRAmembers who had been jailed in Great Britain and who had gone on hunger strike todemand their transfer. He attempted to exert pressure by hinting at termination:

There was also the threat, unspoken, that I may have decided to give up [ . . .] and I had to be

very careful how I played that one. I had to keep them, that they wouldnt know, for definite,

whether I would give up or not give up. [I would say] I cant keep doing it, were going

nowhere. These negotiations are not worth it. Youre not sincere (personal interview with

Niall ODochartaigh, 28/7/09).

While termination was not explicitly threatened it is clear that the intermediary soughtto exert leverage by suggesting that termination was inevitable if concessions were notmade. Ultimately several of these prisoners were transferred amidst huge publiccontroversy and despite the intense resistance of sections of the British state.

Later in 1974, after one of these IRA prisoners, Michael Gaughan, died on hungerstrike, the intermediary pushed hard for the transfer of Frank Stagg, a prisoner in asimilar position. Once again he invoked the implicit threat of termination to exertpressure:

I said to the British, look [. . .] I really cant sustain the type of work I do with you, and the type

of work I do with the IRA if there is absolutely nothing coming back[9] (personal interview

with Niall ODochartaigh, 28/7/09).

In each of these cases the threat of termination, as Duddy describes it, was tentativeand implicit, reflecting the fact that this channel was still in the early stages ofdevelopment and the intermediary could not be certain how much value the Britishattached to it. And in each case, the implicit threat was made in order to secure aconcession that might then generate a reciprocal gesture by the IRA. The key purposeof a termination threat was to maintain momentum in the process.

By early 1975, however, the channel had become much better established and therole of the intermediary much more crucial as he held long regular meetings with bothBritish and IRA representatives in between the secret formal meetings that were thentaking place between the two sides (OBradaigh papers; Duddy papers, 1975 diary,POL35/62). By spring 1975 the British were backing away from a deal and the ceasefire

was in immediate danger. In these circumstances the intermediary began to regularlyinvoke the threat of termination against the British. In many cases the threats wereimplicit, warning the British that the ceasefire was about to break down, suggestingthat his role was becoming impossible, stating that the process would be over if theBritish did not act by a certain deadline (Duddy papers, 1975 diary, POL35/62).

Occasionally however, the threats were explicit. In July 1975, for example, theBritish representative, Donald Middleton, phoned to say that the British might notattend the next scheduled meeting with the IRA. Duddy wrote in his diary:

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I was personally very annoyed after all the work I had done to get the drift to war halted. Ireacted very strongly and said I was not going to let this drift position develop.

I challenged Middleton saying I would cut off the talks, and that I could then begin to enjoylife with my children, letting whoever likes do the work [. . .] I said I was fed up with the strainof holding both ends together (Brendan Duddy, diary entry for 19/7/75. POL 35/62, Duddypapers).

The intermediary invoked personal costs and criticised the British action asundermining his personal efforts (after all the work I had done). In this case thecredibility of the threat was established by highlighting the continuing personal costsand arguing that these were unsustainable. During the early period the intermediarygradually became more explicit in threatening termination as the channel became betterestablished and thus more valuable to the parties on both sides. It does not appear thattermination was threatened at any stage during the hunger strike negotiations in1980-1981. When contact was re-established in 1990 and 1991 the intermediary was in aquite different position to the one he had occupied during the early stages of negotiation

in the 1970s. In the 1990s the contact clearly depended on him as an individual from theoutset and this gave him increased leverage, particularly because he had agreed to actagain as intermediary at the express request of the British government[10].

In addition, Duddys attitude had changed in the intervening period. In 1975 therewas a particular intensity and urgency to his efforts to prevent the renewal of violence.The talks had collapsed in 1976 despite all his efforts and in the 1990s he appears tohave been much more sanguine about the possibility of breakdown. After the Britishpulled out of a planned meeting with Republican representatives in 1993, creating acrisis in relations between the two parties, Duddy (codenamed June) spoke on thephone with MI5 agent Robert McLarnon (Fred). As Duddy recalled it in a narrativethat he dictated a few days later:

June thanked Fred and reminded him that the damage caused by this adventure would be

very great [. . .

] Fred said that it was remarkable how cool June had remained and Juneresponded that it wasnt all that difficult as she had seen it all before (Duddy Papers, POL35/266).

In addition, the intermediary, receiving information from the Republican side thatstrongly indicated that the IRA were seeking to end their campaign through anegotiated compromise, was impatient with the British government. There was apersonal dimension to this impatience. Duddy had watched a succession of Britishrepresentatives become involved in these contacts and then continue to promotions intheir careers, apparently unaffected by the failure of the efforts. He expressed thisimpatience to MaClarnon, the new representative in 1991:

[. . .] I had got to the point with Robert [McLarnon], I had experienced with Michael [Oatley]

coming and going, R.[11] coming and going, Donald [Middleton] coming and going and reallyit was getting to a point where I was saying really I have had enough of this. More of lettingmy disaffection be known rather than Im out the door (personal interview with NiallODochartaigh, 26 and 27/11/09).

Once again, tentative expressions of disaffection and frustration, that I have hadenough of this were used in preference to direct threats of termination that would haveraised the stakes excessively. This dissatisfaction with the extent of Britishgovernment movement formed the backdrop to a clear and explicit threat of

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termination successfully deployed by the intermediary in spring 1993. The British hadagreed to a formal face-to-face meeting with Republican representatives for the firsttime since the contacts of 1975/6. The British representative then called to say that theywere pulling out of the meeting because of recent IRA attacks. Duddy applied intense

pressure on him to come to the meeting:

There was real biting confrontation [. . .] There was three to four, five hours possibly oftelephone calls in which I was very bluntly saying to Robert [McLarnon], this is it, it hastaken a big effort for me to get Kelly and McGuinness[12], it has taken a big effort for them tocome. If you dont come now dont come back next week, you are really blowing it. I deeplypressurised him and I also added that I wouldnt be around next week if they came to do this(personal interview with Niall ODochartaigh, 26-27/11/09).

The British representative eventually agreed to attend and the meeting went ahead. Hewas not officially authorised to do so (Duddy papers, POL 35/307). In this case thethreat of termination had produced a clear and direct outcome. Crucial to this was thefact that the intermediary looked on the current phase of contact as the continuation of

a long effort and was more confident in his power and more prepared to wield it. Hewas also aware from his experience in the 1970s that termination did not precludefuture renewal of contact at a time when the chances of success might be higher.

4. DiscussionExamination of the termination threats by the intermediary in the Northern Irelandconflict yields some important insights for the theory of the exit option. We willelaborate on the insights from the empirical analysis here.

A central purpose of mediation is to increase the chances of a successful agreementby reducing uncertainty about the intentions of the other side through the exchange ofinformation. But, as Richmond notes, disputants may be guided by objectivesunrelated to finding a compromise solution (Richmond, 1998). They may even be

involved in negotiation with the express intention of buying time while they prepare toreturn to violence. In these circumstances the information aspect of mediation isvaluable in allowing them to prepare more effectively for a return to conflict. Theinformation exchange facilitated by a mediator thus has a value to the parties that isindependent of the desire of the two sides to reach a negotiated settlement.

The empirical analysis has shown that the belligerent parties valued theintermediary not only because of his role in pursuing an agreement but also as a sourceof information. They chose to engage in the mediation process not only because theywished to explore the possibilities for a negotiated settlement of the conflict but alsobecause they could get information. In particular, they sought information that couldnot be generated through public channels. Moreover, the fact that the parties soughtinformation from the intermediary also had implications for how the mediation process

unfolded. The intermediary and the primary parties engaged in a bargaining overinformation. There was a process of trading asymmetries of information between theintermediary, on the one hand, and the parties, on the other. From this point-of-view,there was a constant struggle and tension between the informational and the moreclassical problem-solving aspects of the communication. The more information theintermediary accumulated, the more his influence and leverage increased. Yet that alsotransformed his role from facilitator of the process to a bargaining party.

The analysis also reveals that the intermediary, because he possessed the value ofbeing a unique information channel for the parties, was able to create momentum and

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get procedural concessions during the process by putting this channel at risk bytermination. The credibility of this threat was enhanced by two mechanisms. First, aspredicted by the theory, by putting his own role (and the information that flowed fromit) at stake, he could make the parties back down from intransigent positions.

Second, the empirical analysis reveals that the intermediary could utilize the costsincurred by himself as a way of increasing the credibility of the exit-option threat.When he could show the parties that his personal commitment and costs wereunsustainable, it lent credibility to his threats of termination. Paradoxically, conditionsthat worsened the situation for the intermediary actually increased his leverage as amediator, by enhancing the credibility of the exit-option.

Another important insight, that may deserve further exploration, is the relationshipbetween the onset and the termination. The ability to utilise the exit option wassignificantly increased when the intermediary was acting on the request of one of theparties, as happened in the 1990s in this case. When parties had asked for theintermediary, they were also more vulnerable to threats of his withdrawal. Hence,mediation by request from the parties, rather than initiated by outside interventions,

may therefore have greater potential for effective deployment of the termination threat.Our empirical analysis also yields insights that were not predicted by our

theoretical framework. One important observation in this regard is that threats oftermination will also be used when continued negotiations on the existing patternthreaten to damage the intermediary in a variety of other ways. Thus, a mediator mayterminate negotiation in order to protect the integrity of their role, a measure which insome cases may also be necessary to safeguard their life. A mediator who urges oneside to stay in negotiations when it is clear to the mediator that the other side seeksonly to gain tactical advantage and has no intention of reaching a negotiatedsettlement, runs the danger of becoming an instrument of the latter. In this case the roleof mediator is undermined and termination is necessary in order for the intermediary toavoid becoming an accomplice in the deception of one party to talks. We conclude from

this that mediators must be prepared to threaten termination and to accept that theymight trigger a renewal of violence if their role is not to be compromised.In discussing threats of termination, it is important to note that there is a continuum

between pressure for compromise, warnings of breakdown, and threats of terminationwith sometimes fuzzy boundaries between each of these. Deadlines can play a fruitfulrole in negotiation processes since they facilitate agreement, lower expectations, callbluffs, and produce final proposals (Zartman and Berman, 1982). The refusal by anintermediary to relate a message, for example, or a statement by an intermediary that aparticular stance or decision or position is certain to provoke the other side to renewviolence are forms of pressure aimed at altering and shaping responses through animplicit threat of termination.

Zartman has argued that such threats can succeed when there is a mutually

hurting stalemate and neither party wishes to return to violence. But there are twodifficulties with this argument. If the structural pressures for negotiation implicit in theconcept of stalemate are very strong, parties might actually be quite sanguine aboutthe withdrawal of a particular mediator on the basis that they can simply be replaced.Threats of termination might have less force in these situations than in others.

Secondly, we might infer from Zartmans analysis that parties that do not perceivethe situation as a mutually hurting stalemate or that wish to return to conflict might beimpervious to threats of termination but we argue that this is not the case. A mutuallyhurting stalemate is not a necessary condition for the successful exertion of power

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through a threat of termination. Regardless of their attitude to the negotiations and theimportance they attach to a successful outcome, parties must remain oriented to apossible future relationship with the intermediary after the breakdown/failure ofnegotiations. A mediator can play a significant role in allocating blame simply by

choosing the timing and thus the political context for breakdown. The desire tomaintain working relationships with the intermediary is thus crucial to understandingthe leverage a mediator can exert.

5. ConclusionThis study set out to explore the dynamics surrounding the exit-option in internationalmediation. We conclude that the exit-option is an important tactical resource that aninternational intermediary can use in order to improve the prospects for progress innegotiations. It is used at some crucial stages of international negotiation byintermediaries in a way that cannot be explained by previous theory.

Empirically, this paper has shown that an anonymous mediator without significant

independent resources and operating in secrecy can credibly and successfully deploy thethreat of termination regardless of whether a mutually hurting stalemate exists and despitethe fact that they are unable to authoritatively allocate blame in front of an importantaudience. Crucial to this is the informational value of the mediator to the parties.

Trade in informational asymmetries is one of the most important processes ininternational mediation, and this also has implications for when the exit-option can beused. When such trading is deemed as useful by the parties, the intermediary also has abase for making effective threats of terminations, since the ending of mediation effortswould be costly for the parties involved. This adds insights to the dynamics of themediation process from a bargaining perspective. The informational basis of themediator helps to explain the conditions under which the mediator can crediblythreaten to disengage from mediation processes, in order to build pressure on theparties to move forward towards peace.

Given that successful trading between the parties generates information thataccumulates to the mediator, this source of leverage over the parties would be expectedto grow over time. As a consequence the mediator can become an increasinglysignificant party in the negotiation process. Our findings indicate that mediators whoare involved in their role over an extended period and who accumulate information thatincreases their value to the parties involved, are in a stronger position than others toexert influence on the parties to move them towards settlement. This has implicationsfor both mediators and parties to a dispute. It might be valuable for mediators to thinkin a more calculated way about these two aspects of their role: the duration of theirinvolvement and the informational aspect of their role, because these aspects cansignificantly increase their capacity to influence parties to move towards settlement.

It is important for parties to conflict to be aware that the informational role of amediator, particularly where that has developed over a long period of time, creates acertain capacity for the mediator to act as a third party and to exert influence, evenwhere that mediator does not have the capacity to cast blame or to withhold resources.

This study suggests some important avenues for further exploration. First, being astudy of a single case, albeit a crucial one, there is an obvious need for comparativeapproaches when it comes to termination dynamics. Second, there is a need for a moreintegrated analysis of the entry and exit dynamics this study shows that how theintermediary came in also affected the possibility of utilising the exit-option. Third, the

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so-called role-bargain (Princen, 1992), where the intermediary shifts role over time isan important theme for further research. We have seen in this study that the trading ofasymmetries in information gave the intermediary more leverage over time and shiftedhis strategies and tactical possibilities. How such bargaining over roles plays out is an

important area for further exploration.

Notes

1. In line with previous research, such as Princen (1992), we do not draw a sharp line betweenthe terms intermediary and mediator and throughout this study we use the conceptsinterchangeably.

2. POL35, The Brendan Duddy papers at the Archives, James Hardiman Library, NationalUniversity of Ireland, Galway.

3. Details of interviews by Niall ODochartaigh: Brendan Duddy, Derry, 11-13 May, 27-29 July,13-16 October, and 26-27 November 2009; Ruair OBradaigh, former President of ProvisionalSinn Fein, Roscommon, 2 December 2009 (interview conducted through the medium of Irish);

unattributable interview with former British official, 7 October 2008

4. POL 28, The Ruair OBradaigh Papers at the Archives, James Hardiman Library, NationalUniversity of Ireland, Galway

5. In 1970 the IRA split into two competing organisations. The Official IRA espoused Marxistideology and hostility to traditional nationalism. It wound down its activity from 1972onwards and ceased to be a significant force by the mid 1970s. The Provisional IRA emergedas the key republican paramilitary organisation, despite the existence of other smallergroups.

6. Mediation is considered here as an approach that can be aimed at either conflict managementor conflict resolution (for a discussion about the difference, see Wolff, 2006, p. 134).

7. Irish National Liberation Army, a Marxist Republican paramilitary group that emerged from

the Official IRA and was highly active from the mid 1970s until the late 1980s.8. British representative in contact with the IRA in the mid-1970s, Oatley was involved in this

channel again in 1980/1981 and in the early 1990s.

9. According to Duddy the British agreed to transfer Stagg but subsequently retreated fromthis agreement. Stagg too died on hunger strike.

10. As described in the 2008 BBC television documentary, The Secret Peacemaker.

11. British representative in 1975.

12. Senior Sinn Fein elected representatives who were reputed to also be senior IRA leaders.

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About the authorsDr Niall O Dochartaigh is College Lecturer at the School of Political Science and Sociology,National University of Ireland, Galway. His research is focused on the politics of conflict inNorthern Ireland, conflict and new technologies and conflict and territory. He is the author ofCivil Rights to Armalites: Derry and the Birth of the Irish Troubles (Cork University Press 1997;

2nd ed. Palgrave 2005) and two books on internet research (Sage 2001; Sage 2007). He haspublished in political geography, mobilisation, Irish political studies, identities andcontemporary British history. Niall O Dochartaigh is the corresponding author and can becontacted at: [email protected]

Dr Isak Svensson is Assistant Professor at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research,Uppsala University, Sweden and Postdoctoral Fellow at the National Center for Peace andConflict Studies, Otago University, New Zealand. His research has covered primarily issues suchas bias and neutrality in international mediation, and religious dimensions of armed conflicts. Hehas published in, for instance, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research,

International Negotiation, andEuropean Journal of International Relations. His latest book is TheGo Between: Jan Eliasson and the Styles of Mediation, co-authored with Professor PeterWallensteen, and published by the US Institute of Peace Press (2010).

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