The Development of Un Peacekeeping

7/25/2019 The Development of Un Peacekeeping

1/48

BA Thesis, 15 credits in Peace and Conflict Studies

Department of Global Political Studies

Malm ni!ersit"

#i! S$!strm, %&'%'()*1''

Super!isor+ Tommie Sber-.all Semester /'1'

The De!elopment of 0 Peaceeepin-

A stud" of human securit" and robustness in peaceeepin- then andno2

Abstract+

nited 0ations 304 peaceeepin- principles affect all peaceeepin-, thus it is important to under)

stand their de!elopment Man" important chan-es in peaceeepin- concern robustness and humansecurit" This paper in!esti-ates de!elopments in these t2o areas and their interrelation b" means ofa literature re!ie2, document anal"sis and case studies of t2o contemporar" 0 peaceeepin-missions 6t identifies three -enerations in 0 peaceeepin- mared b" chan-es in human securit"and robustness and relates these chan-es to the concept of so!erei-nt" .urther, it identifies humansecurit" as the main moti!ation behind increasin-l" robust 0 peaceeepin- and finds that robust

peaceeepin- can, but does not necessaril", lead to -reater human securit"

Key words+ nited 0ations, robust peaceeepin-, human securit", so!erei-nt", use of force


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Index1 Abbre!iations1/ 6ntroduction/

/1 Problem Statement7

// 8esearch 9uestions 7/7 Theor"*/* Method5/5 Delimitation and .urther 8esearch&/: Disposition1'

7 The De!elopment of 0 Peaceeepin-1171 Peaceeepin- .rom 0;. 6 to the ;nd of the Cold uman Securit"?7%

: Conclusion*1( #ist of 8eferences*7

(1 Published Sources*7(/ 6nternet Sources and 0e2s Papers*5(7 0 Documents*:


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1 Abbreviations

CPA Comprehensi!e Peace A-reement

DDR Disarmament, Demobili@ation and

8einte-ration

DDRR Disarmament, Demobili@ation,

8einte-ration and 8epatriation

ECOMIL ;conomic Communit" of


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$ Introd'ction

The nited 0ations 304 has a lon- histor" of peaceeepin- and throu-h the "ears there ha!e been

man" ideas of 2hat peaceeepin- consists of 6n the be-innin- peaceeepin- 2as mainl" about

obser!in- ceasefires it has de!eloped into nation)buildin-, and has been compared 2ith 2estern

imperialism 3is Marten /''*4 Peaceeepin- has mo!ed from focusin- on national securit", the

securit" of states, to focusin- on human securit", the securit" of indi!iduals, 2hich mi-ht lead to the

conclusion that to ensure human securit" the international communit" can disre-ard so!erei-nt"

this de!elopment has been understood as t2o -enerations 38amsbotham, et al./''(+17*4

The main contemporar" 0 document on human securit" and the protection of ci!ilians in peace)

eepin- is the 0 Brahimi 8eport, published in /''' 3AE55E7'5)SE/'''E%'&4 The report states that

peaceeepers need clearer and stron-er mandates that allo2 them to use force and to protect ci!il)

ians, since this has been lacin- in pre!ious peaceeepin- 6t is possible that, if 2hat the Brahimi

8eport called for has been enacted, that it started a third -eneration in peaceeepin-

The aim of this paper is thus to e=amine the de!elopment of 0 peaceeepin- and the rele!ance of

the Brahimi 8eport in relation to human securit" and the increasin- robustness in 0 peaceeepin-,

in both historical and recent peaceeepin-

To stud" this is important for the field of peace and conflict studies The 0 is the lar-est peace)

eepin- or-anisation and as such both conducts most peaceeepin- and sets the principles for other

peaceeepin- Therefore, 2hen 0 peaceeepin- principles chan-e it is !er" important to docu)

ment ho2 and to loo for the reasons behind and conseFuences of these chan-es

/


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$(1 Prob%e) State)ent

Peaceeepin- has chan-ed a lot o!er the "ears M" interest area is t2o specific chan-es+ The focus

on human securit" and the use of force, 2hich in modern peaceeepin- is refereed to as robustness,

t2o factors that ha!e -raduall" chan-ed durin- the de!elopment of peaceeepin- These chan-es

mi-ht be seen to ha!e culminated in the Brahimi 8eport 3AE55E7'5)SE/'''E%'&4 since it proposed

radical chan-es to both the use of force and to human securit" in 0 peaceeepin- Since the

Brahimi 8eport is !er" recent 2e cannot no2 if onl" a chan-e in theor" has occurred, or also a

ne2 -eneration of peaceeepin- in practise So, the focus of this paper is ho2 and 2h" human

securit" and robustness in 0 peaceeepin- missions ha!e chan-ed o!er time and ho2 the" relate

to each other

6 2ill also relate this to the issue of so!erei-nt", since inter!ention for human securit" can be seen

as the opposin- the principle of so!erei-nt" This important to tae this into account since so!er)

ei-nt" is one of the fundamental principles of international relations, and thus of 0 peaceeepin-

3Stanford /'1'4, and it can help 2hen tr"in- to understand the relationship bet2een robustness and

human securit" in peaceeepin-

$($ Researc* +'estions

Main Fuestion+

W*at is t*e re%ation between *')an sec'rity and rob'stness in ! ,eace-ee,in./

The main Fuestion is operationali@ed throu-h four sub)Fuestions+

1 >as the 0 chan-ed to2ards more robust peaceeepin- in the last :' "ears?

/ 6s there a third -eneration in the practise of 0 peaceeepin- mared b" chan-es in human

securit" and robustness, and if such a chan-e occurred, 2as it initiated b" the Brahimi

8eport?

7 6s human securit" a main moti!atin- factor for more robust peaceeepin-?

* Does more robust peaceeepin- achie!e -reater human securit"?

These Fuestions 2ill be ans2ered b" e=aminin- the de!elopment of 0 peaceeepin- and case

studies of t2o 0 peaceeepin- missions

7


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$(0 "*eory

This paper 2ill ha!e t2o main theoretical focus points+ the concept and understandin- of human

securit" and the conseFuences of this for so!erei-nt"

>uman securit" is a concept that has a lon- histor" and in recent times it has recei!ed -ro2in-

attention 6t can be defined as+ the securit" of people H their ph"sical safet", their economic and

social 2ell)bein-, respect for their di-nit" and 2orth as human bein-s, and the protection of their

human ri-hts and fundamental freedomsI 38/P /''1+154 >uman securit" thus focus on indi!iduals

and is often opposed to state securit", 2hich freFuentl" translates to state so!erei-nt" The reason

for this opposition is that states ha!e been no2n to either themsel!es !iolate their citi@ens human

ri-hts or to let other forces do so .or a lon- time this 2as seen as the indi!idual states businessand, in the olocaust, and the creation of

the 0 31&*54 and the ni!ersal Declaration of >uman 8i-hts 31&*%4 Mar" Laldor 3/''%+/1)//4

conceptuali@es this ne2 ethical approach b" Fuestionin- the oldjus ad bellum, la2 in 2ar She

ar-ues that the ri-hts of indi!iduals supersede the ri-hts of states and that, therefore, international

la2 that applies to indi!iduals o!errides the la2s of 2arI 3Laldor /''%+/14 .rom this Laldor dra2s

the conclusion that onl" self)defence is an acceptable reason for 2ar 3Laldor /''%+7'4


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thou-ht is further stren-thened b" international human ri-hts norms 38/P /''1+174 This -a!e rise

to the 8esponsibilit" to Protect 38/P4, 2hich is a document, produced b" the Canadian -o!ernment

in /''1, that tries to define the role of human securit" in relation to so!erei-nt" and peaceeepin-

6n this document so!erei-nt" is seen to ha!e t2o different meanin-s+ so!erei-nt" as control and

so!erei-nt" as responsibilit", 2hich both ha!e internal functions and e=ternal responsibilities

So!erei-nt" as responsibilit" is seen as the contemporar" form of so!erei-nt", and it has three

implications+ .irst, it implies that the state authorities are responsible for the functions of

protectin- the safet" and li!es of citi@ens and promotion of their 2elfare Secondl", it su--ests that

the national political authorities are responsible to the citi@ens internall" and to the international

communit" throu-h the 0 And thirdl", it means that the a-ents of state are responsible for their

actions that is to sa", the" are accountable for their acts of commission and omissionI 3ibid+174

This describes the mo!e from


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The three main methods in this paper are literature re!ie2, a critical summar" and assessment of

the ran-e of e=istin- materials dealin- 2ith no2led-e and understandin- in a -i!en fieldI 3Nupp

/'':+1:/4, document anal"sis, The detailed e=amination of documents produced JOK, tain- a

!ariet" of forms from the 2ritten 2ord to the !isual ima-eI 3ibid+(&4, and case stud" method, An

approach that uses in)depth in!esti-ation of one or more e=amples of a current social phenomenon,

utili@in- a !ariet" of sources of dataI 3ibid+/'4

The reason for usin- literature re!ie2 is that the issues this paper deals 2ith too place both o!er a

lon- timespan and far a2a" 6t 2ould be possible to stud" peaceeepin- b" onl" usin- primar"

sources, but that 2ould ha!e been a 2aste of resources, since peaceeepin- has been e=tensi!el"

researched pre!iousl"

Document anal"sis 2ill be used 2ith m" primar" sources, 2hich are !arious 0 documents The

combination of these t2o methods has allo2ed me to mae use of a !ariet" of sources and thus

achie!e -reater !alidit" of e=planation alidit" of e=planation, also no2n as internal !alidit", is

ho2 !alid a -enerali@ation of the research results can be and this can be -ained, as it 2ill be in this

stud", b" usin- man" independent sources 3ibid+711)71/4

.urther 6 2ill conduct t2o descripti!e case studies 2hat characterises a descripti!e case stud" is

that it 2ill attempt to pro!ide a full portra"al of the case or cases bein- studiedI 3ibid+/'4

Descripti!e case studies are needed for m" research since the" are an efficient 2a" to -i!e a picture

of contemporar" peaceeepin- .e2 scholars ha!e "et anal"sed the missions deplo"ed after the

Brahimi 8eport, this means that 2ithout the case studies 6 2ould onl" ha!e theoretical data

describin- contemporar" peaceeepin-, and 2ithout practical data it is impossible to conduct a

complete anal"sis of peaceeepin-

6 chose to stud" the 0 missions to Sierra #eone and #iberia The reason this is that Sierra #eone

2as the last mission before the Brahimi 8eport and #iberia the first maor one after A more recent

mission mi-ht ha!e -i!en better results since more of the recommendations in the Brahimi 8eport

mi-ht ha!e been implemented, but 6 lac the material to do so .urther, the times of deplo"ment of

these missions maes it possible to stud" both contemporar" peaceeepin- and the Brahimi 8eport

:


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$((1 So'rce Criticis)

Source criticism is a 2a" to test if the sources used are reliable, but it is ust a method and certainl"

not infallible 3ThurQn /''7+(:4 But e!en thou-h conscientiousl" e=amined sources still can turn

out to be unreliable source criticism is an indispensable tool 2hen doin- research

6 ha!e t2o t"pes of sources, primar" and secondar" Since 6 am usin- the method of document

anal"sis for dealin- 2ith m" primar" sources there are some essential points that ha!e to be

considered The most prominent Fuestions that ha!e to be ased concern the documents authenti)

cit", credibilit", representati!eness and meanin- 3Nupp /'':+%'4 To establish that a document is

authentic, produced b" the author, is comparati!el" simple in this stud" since the primar" sources

are taen directl" from the 0s 2ebsite and there are !arious si-ns, such as resolution number, that

assures their authenticit" 6 am treatin- the 0 as one actor, 2hile still sometimes statin- 2hich 0

bod" published the document, so 6 escape the problem of 2hich indi!iduals are the actual authors

and 2ho 2ere in!ol!ed in creatin- the documents 3for more see chapter /*/4

Also the credibilit" of the documents, defined as+ The credibilit" of the document as e!idence

hin-es on the truth and accurac" of its reference and ho2 2idel" it represents the phenomena the

researcher is in!esti-atin-I 3ibid+%'4, is eas" to establish since the documents are used to representthe 0s actions Mandates and documents published b" the SG and the SC are the opinions and

actions b" t2o of the leadin- 0 or-ans and as such are !er" credible This also maes them indis)

pensable for this stud"

.urther 6 mae e=tensi!e use of secondar" sources, such as boos and articles, 2hich are associated

2ith a number of source related problems The main problem is that these sources ha!e alread"

been interpreted b" another, or man" other, scholar3s4 3ThurQn /''7+5:4 and that 6 cannot no2 the

purpose behind their research Tendenc", the possibilit" of bias, is somethin- that researchers

al2a"s ha!e to be !i-ilant of 6t is hard to no2 both whether the researchers that -enerated the

information 2ere biased and in 2hat directionthat bias mi-ht -o 3ibid+:14 To escape this 6 ha!e

tried to di!ersif" m" secondar" sources and to sta" critical 2hile main- use of them and thus reach

-reater !alidit" of research The de-ree to 2hich the research findin-s are trueI 3


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peopleI 3Nupp /'':+7'54, this is a common !alidation strate-"

.urther the fact than man" of m" sources describe historical facts, such as "ears and e!ents, 2hile

reco-ni@in- that bias mi-ht e=ist in the selection process, maes it possible for me to mae use of

them to dra2 m" o2n conclusions

6n source criticism a source is considered more reliable the more contemporar" it is 3ThurQn

/''7+**4 Because of this 6 ha!e done m" best to use contemporar" sources and, 2hen not, to be

able to support the information in older sources 2ith the ne2er ones


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member states can present and effect their forei-n policies 3


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$(3 Dis,osition

This paper starts b" in chapter three presentin- the de!elopment of peaceeepin-, from after


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0 "*e Deve%o,)ent o4 ! Peace-ee,in.

Peaceeepin- 2as ne!er mentioned, and thus ne!er defined, in the 0 Charter 31&*54 6t is a later

de!elopment and has been constantl" e!ol!in-, because of this the definitions of it !ar" Peace)

eepin- is not e=clusi!el" used b" the 0 it has been used b" both re-ional or-anisations, such as

the 0orth Atlantic Treat" r-ani@ation 30AT4 and sin-le states 6t consists of a multilateral force,

a force 2ith se!eral le!els of actors, often of both ci!ilian and militar" elements, 2hich is deplo"ed

to a conflict @one 6n such a conflict @one fi-htin- is still on-oin- or, as is more often the case,

fi-htin- has recentl" stopped, and neutral outsiders and fundin- are needed to enforce orEand

obser!e that peace a-reements are follo2ed 30 *4

nl" clear)cut peaceeepin- 2ill be discussed peacemain-, 2hich addresses conflicts in process,

lie peaceeepin-, but b" diplomatic non)!iolent methods, and pure enforcement missions, that are

characterised b" a full)scale use of force 2hich is similar to traditional interstate 2ars 3AE55E7'5)

SE/'''E%'& art 1%4, such as the Gulf and Lorean


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eepin- that 2as practised then The first -eneration of peaceeepin- starts at the end of


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peaceeepin-, 2ere not allo2ed to be enforced 3ibid+/*, *%4

The codification of 0;. 6s use of force rules came later in a summar" report 2ritten b" SG Da-

>ammarsld in 1&5% 3ibid+*(4 6n this report concernin- the use of force b" 0 peaceeepers

>ammarsld 2rote+A reasonable definition Jof self)defenceK seems to ha!e been established in thecase of 0;., 2here the rule is applied that men en-a-ed in the operation ma"ne!er tae the initiati!e in the use of armed force, but are entitled to respond2ith force to an attac 2ith arms, includin- attempts to use force to mae them2ithdra2 from positions 2hich the" occup" under orders from the Commander,actin- under the authorit" of the Assembl" and 2ithin the scope of its resolu)tions The basic element in!ol!ed is clearl" the prohibition a-ainst an" initiati!ein the use of armed force 3AE7&*74

This defined the self)defence doctrine and separated it from more robust peaceeepin- that 2ould

need a Chapter 66 mandate

6n later 0 peaceeepin- missions the fact that force 2as onl" 2as allo2ed in self)defence 2as

seen as fundamental, and necessar" for peaceeepers to be able to be impartial and carr" out their

mandates But the principle 2as untested and ho2 it 2ored on the -round !aried 3.indla"

/''/+%/4 Problems durin- comin- missions arose from not ha!in- a-reed on 2hat self)defence

entail, this lead to t2o lessons for follo2in- peaceeepin- missions The first one 2as to sta" out of

intrastate 2ars, since these 2ars lead to more use of force that mi-ht result in peace enforcement,

this 2as done b" eepin- first -eneration missions small The second lesson 2as to clarif" the self)

defence doctrine so that it 2ould not be misunderstood 3ibid+%()%&4

The resultin- definition of the self)defence principle 2as 2ider than the pre!ious understandin- of

self)defence Self)defence no2 contained, as can be seen in he 0 Peaceeepin- .orce in C"prus

30.6CP4 32hich 2as established in 1&:* and is still deplo"ed4, amon- other thin-s, usin- force

2as no2 allo2ed 2hen resistin- bein- disarmed, protectin- the ci!ilian components, establishin-buffer @ones and defendin- them 2ith, freedom of mo!ement 2as restricted, and finall" if hindered

in carr"in- out the mission commanders orders 3ibid+&/)&74

6n 0;. 66, a peaceeepin- force in 1&(7 sent to super!ise a ceasefire bet2een 6sraeli and ;-"ptian

forces, the use of force 2as taen one step further and the 0 e=panded the classical self)defence

principle to defence of the mission, meanin- that Self)defence 2ould include resistance to

attempts b" forceful means to pre!ent it from dischar-in- its duties under the mandate of the

17


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Securit" CouncilI 3ibid+1''4 Thus force could no2 be used to ensure that the mandate 2as carried

out >o2e!er it could still not be used pre)empti!el", onl" as a reaction, and thou-h the defence of

the mission principle 2as established durin- the first -eneration of peaceeepin-, it 2as not to be

commonl" used until later

0(1($ 5')an Sec'rity and Soverei.nty

6n the follo2in- para-raphs the impact of the traditional understandin- of so!erei-nt" on human

securit" in first -eneration peaceeepin- 2ill be e=amined

Most first -eneration missions 2ere deplo"ed in interstate 2ars and this shaped them


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.irst -eneration peaceeepin- did not deal 2ith the underl"in- causes of conflicts ne

conseFuence of this is that some missions could not 2ithdra2 since the conflicts did not end

;=amples of this are 0.6CP and the 0 Militar" bser!er Group in 6ndia and Paistan

30MG6P4 2hich 2ere deplo"ed in 1&:* and 1&*% respecti!el" and are still deplo"ed The main

reason for this is that the missions 2ere not desi-ned to 2or to2ards a settlement of the conflict,

but to ensure a stable en!ironment for hi-h)le!el diplomac" 38ichmond /''1+7* Sber- /'':+*'4,

this mi-ht also be seen as an effect of human securit" not bein- a priorit" at the time

At the end of the Cold


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0($(1 "*e se o4 #orce

The rules for use of force in peaceeepin- did not chan-e -reatl" durin- the second -eneration,

there 2ere some chan-es thou-h The second -eneration 2as characterised b" a successi!e mo!e

a2a" from authori@in- missions under Chapter 6 to2ards authori@in- them under Chapter 66 of

the 0 Charter Chapter 66 includes coerci!e measures that allo2 the 0 to enforce peace The

stron-est of these measures is set forth in article */, 2hich states that the 0+ ma" tae such

action b" air, sea, or land forces as ma" be necessar" to maintain or restore international peace and

securit"I 30 Charter 1&*5+Chapter 66, art */4, thou-h the mandates authorised under Chapter

66 at this time did not mae use of the stron-est articles, and instead tried to sta" inside

>ammarslds ima-ined Chapter 6)and a half 3Thaur, et. al /''1+/7/4

The role of the militar" did not chan-e thou-h, in second -eneration peaceeepin-, lie in first,

IThe role of the militar" is basicall" to help maintain a secure en!ironment in 2hich the ci!ilian

component can 2orI 3Sber- /'':+*74, but some missions de!iated from this and a fe2 peace)

eepin- missions e!en, 2hen on the -round, de!eloped into peace enforcement 3Gouldin-

1&&7+*5/)*574

The most si-nificant chan-e 2as that the defence of the mission principle 2as more often

emplo"ed This allo2ed peaceeepers to use more force than the" had in earlier missions, aconseFuence of this 2as hi-her casualties amon- peaceeepers Bet2een 1&*%)1&&' onl" 7&% died,

bet2een 1&&1)1&&5 *5: peaceeepers died 3Sber- /'':+*74 The hi-her death numbers resulted in

man" rich 2estern nations sendin- fe2er troops than before, despite this troop)contributin- coun)

tries increased -reatl" in the 1&&'s 38amsbotham, et al./''(+17: Schmild /'''+1:4 So despite

that the rules for use of force did not de!elop much 2ider mandates combined 2ith the use of

defence of the mission made peaceeepin- more dan-erous than pre!iousl" and in practise the use

of force increased

6n the end of the 1&&'s, as a conseFuence of the hi-her death numbers and failed 0 missions, the

0+

2as unable to fulfil e=pectations of mana-in- more comple= opera)tions H and 2isel" limited itself to or-anisin- smaller, more limitedmissions, JOK .or more comple= missions, a di!ision of labour hasemer-ed 2hich allo2s -o!ernments to mae use of capabilities andstren-ths of !arious actors, the 0s role bein- often limited to

pro!idin- a mandate and some components of missions 3Schmild

/'''+1(4

1:


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This is ho2 man" 0 missions ha!e turned out, 2ith a nation or a coalition of the 2illin-, lie

0AT, pro!idin- the militar" force and the 0 mainl" authori@in- for helpin- 3ibid+1(4, and ho2

it 2ould be until the be-innin- of the third peaceeepin- -eneration

The reasons for the chan-es in the use of force can be man" The end of the Cold


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All this mo!es a2a" from the pre!ious focus on international peace and securit", defined as peace

bet2een nation states, to2ards a focus on human securit" and a more comprehensi!e !ie2 on 2hat

peace mi-ht entail


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replace the ones that had paral"sed the 0 durin- the Cold


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The brea bet2een second and third -eneration peaceeepin- is, at least in theor", clearl" mared

b" the Brahimi 8eport, 2hich e!aluated and ased for drastic chan-es in peaceeepin- The

Brahimi 8eport contains a number of recommendations to mae 0 peaceeepin- more effecti!e

and from the desired chan-es some conclusions can be dra2n concernin- the underl"in- aims of

peaceeepin- Amon- other thin-s the Brahimi 8eport called for more robust peaceeepin-, the

ar-ument for this 2as that the missions in the 1&&'s had failed to protect ci!ilians The Brahimi

8eport can thus be seen as the theoretical start of a third -eneration of peaceeepin- 3AE55E7'5)

SE/'''E%'& 8amsbotham, et al./''(+17%4

0(0(1 "*e se o4 #orce

The Brahimi 8eport starts b" statin- that+


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morall" compelled to do soI 3ibid art 5'4 An e=ample of 2hen force should be used in this 2a" is

the -enocide in 82anda in 1&&* 3ibid art 5'4 This means that not onl" international securit" can

moti!ate peaceeepin- missions an" more, but also moral issues and especiall" human securit" So

not onl" the use of force but also the reasons for doin- so ha!e 2idened B" separatin- a--ressors

and !ictims and the allo2in- for pre)empti!e force peaceeepers are no2 allo2ed to mae choices

in 2ho and 2hen to attac

0(0($ 5')an Sec'rity and Soverei.nty

Priorit" of human securit" is one of definin- traits of third -eneration peaceeepin- .ormer SG

Lofi Annan 31&&&4 said that e ends his speech b"

e=plainin- his hope for the future and statin- that This de!elopin- international norm in fa!our of

inter!ention to protect ci!ilians from 2holesale slau-hter 2ill no doubt continue to pose profound

challen-es to the international communit"I 3ibid4 This clearl" ar-ues that human securit" should

not onl" be a factor 2hen deplo"in- missions, but a reason to deplo" them 6t is then no lon-er !iol)

ations of state so!erei-nt" and threats to the international peace that needs to be the aim of 0

peaceeepin- missions, if not peace has a different meanin- 2hen Annan uses it than it had pre!i)

ousl"

#ie in the 1&&'s, in the /'''s intrastate conflicts continued bein- the normState failure, meanin-

that states could not fulfil their function, beeomes a common concept durin- the third -eneration

and a reason for the 0 to inter!ene, since a states main function 2as no2 seen as the assurance of

human securit" 3Thaur, et. al /''1+/7')/714 This implies a shift in the meanin- of so!erei-nt",

from so!erei-nt" as po2er to so!erei-nt" as responsibilit" Such a shift ma" also e=plain ho2

missions deplo"ed into intrastate conflicts 2ere not percei!ed as in conflict 2ith so!erei-nt", but

follo2in- an international norm in fa!our of inter!entionI

/1


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A further indicator of the priorit" of human securit" at this time, both as a cause for inter!ention and

as a responsibilit" of the state intert2ined 2ith so!erei-nt", is that the 0 mo!ed a2a" from

needin-, thou-h the" often sou-ht it, consent from the 2arrin- parties before deplo"in- a peace)

eepin- mission li!er P 8ichmond 3/''1+7*4 puts it lie this+

the increasin-l" multidimensional approach of peaceeepin- has -i!en riseto tensions bet2een the disputantsR claims to so!erei-nt"R and the politicalinterests of the or-ani@ation J0K Multidimensional peaceeepin- forcesha!e depended on consent so as not to be seen as imposin- order et thelo-ic of human securit" led to the concept of peace)enforcementR based on

the claim of normati!e superiorit" and 0 le-itimac"I,meanin- that the normati!e !ie2 of the 0, 2hich -i!es priorit" to human securit", is no2 o!er)

ridin- traditional so!erei-nt" These obser!ations lead to the conclusion that the purpose of

peaceeepin- has chan-ed fundamentall" since its first -eneration A -oal of third -eneration peace)

eepin- is fundamentall" about establishin- ustice for all in societies that ha!e been unustI

3Marten /''*+114 This means that international peace mi-ht not be the main -oal of peaceeepin-

an" more, or it mi-ht impl" that the concept of peace, as pre!iousl" stated, has chan-ed 6f the -oal

of peaceeepin- has chan-ed, it 2ould e=plain that the methods ha!e too

The chan-e in the meanin- of so!erei-nt", the priorit" of human securit" and the possible chan-e in

the understandin- of 2hat peace entails ma" ha!e led to a chan-e in discourse on 2hat a threat to

international securit" is, since intrastate conflicts ha!e more and more come to be seen as threats to

international securit" 3Thaur, et. al /''1+/7/)/774, e!en 2hen the conflict is limited to one

countr" This leads to the conclusion that national borders ha!e lost some of their rele!ance, since a

national threat can be seen as a threat to the international securit", or possibl" international is no

lon-er percei!ed as meanin- crossin- a national border

To conclude, durin- third -eneration peaceeepin- human securit" led to a redefinition of so!er)

ei-nt" So!erei-nt" is no2 seen as somethin- that has responsibilities that to be fulfilled if it is to be

claimed These responsibilities in!ol!e protectin- the human securit" of its citi@ens, if a state fail to

do this it can be named a failed state, and then the 0 is not onl" allo2ed to inter!ene, it is its

responsibilit" to do so This is a simplified ima-e of the situation durin- the third -eneration, there

are still !oices that stron-l" support the classical


25/48

"*ird Generation Peace-ee,in. in Practice

6n this chapter t2o case studies 2ill be presented and anal"@ed The purpose of these case studies is

to test if there is a third -eneration of peaceeepin- not onl" in theor" but also in practice .or this

t2o 0 missions are used, the first, the 0 Mission in Sierra #eone 30AMS6#4 too place ust

before the Brahimi 8eport, and the second, the 0 Mission in #iberia 30M6#4 2as the first maor

mission after the Brahimi 8eport These t2o missions can thus both establish if a third -eneration in

peaceeepin- in practice had started b" the time of these missions, b" comparin- to material

presented in pre!ious chapters, and if the Brahimi 8eport 2ould be the start of such a -eneration

The case studies 2ill be follo2ed b" a chapter 2here the" are compared to each other and to

pre!ious peaceeepin-

(1 nited !ations Mission in Sierra Leone

6n this chapter the 0AMS6# 31&&&)/''54 2ill be presented The chapter is split into three sub)

chapters The first 2ill present the bac-round of the conflict the second re!ie2 the mandate and

other 0 documents relatin- to the use of force and human securit" in the mission and the third

describe ho2 the mission 2as carried out

(1(1 7ac-.ro'nd

Sierra #eone is a countr" located on the


26/48

The aim of the 8. 2as to o!erthro2 the -o!ernment, situated in Sierra #eones capital .reeto2n

6n the be-innin- the national arm" mana-ed to defend a-ainst the 8., but in 1&&/ the arm" turned

and o!erthre2 the -o!ernment The 8. continued its attacs on the ne2 militar" -o!ernment

After ne-otiations in 1&&: ne2 parliamentar" and presidential elections 2ere held and the unta

stepped do2n The 8. did not reco-ni@e or participate in the elections and the fi-htin- continued

6n 0o!ember 1&&: ne2 ne-otiations 2ere held, 2hich resulted in the Abidan Accord, an attempt at

a cease)fire and peace a-reement bet2een the -o!ernment and the 8. This fell throu-h because

of a ne2 militar" coup in Ma" 1&&( This time the arm" oined forces 2ith the 8. and to-ether

formed a rulin- unta under Maor Nohnn" Paul Loroma and his Armed .orces 8ulin- Council

3A.8C4 The A.8CE8. rule 2as characterised b" e=tensi!e cruelties a-ainst the population, such

as Imurder, torture, lootin-, rape, and the !irtual criminali@ation of state functions and institutionsI3Bones /''1+5% lonisain /''%+/1 0 74

The first 0 in!ol!ement in the conflict 2as in 1&&: 2hen a Special 8epresentati!e of the SG 2as

sent to Sierra #eone, this 2as at the reFuest of the current -o!ernment and 2as to be an aid in ne-o)

tiations 2ith the 8. The 0 helped to reach the Abidan Accord but their in!ol!ement 2as

minimal for a lon- time after that 3fuate")Lodoe /''7+177 0 74 .irst in Au-ust 1&&(, si=

2ees after the coup, did the SC respond to b" !otin- in fa!our of an arms and oil embar-o a-ainst

Sierra #eone The embar-o 2as left to the ;conomic Communit" of


27/48

murder, arson and dismemberment 2ere appro=imatel" :''' ci!ilians deaths and /''')/5''

missin- children 6n the end ;CMG mana-ed to retae the capital, but their casualties numbered

around 1''' dead soldiers this contributed to their decision to 2ithdra2 from Sierra #eone 2hen it

had returned to ci!ilian rule Also after the capital 2as retaen the fi-htin- continued in other parts

of Sierra #eone This offensi!e has been named peration 0o #i!in- Tin-I b" the 8., and left

5''' dead in its 2ae 3Bones /''1+5& lonisain /''%+774

;=tensi!e ne-otiations 2ere started bet2een the Sierra #eone -o!ernment and the rebels 2hich lead

to the si-nin- of the #omQ Peace A-reement, a ceasefire 2hich also contained e=tensi!e directions

for ho2 to rebuild the countr" n //ndof ctober 1&&& 0AMS6# 2as created to replace

0MS6# and to help carr"in- out the pro!isions of the Peace A-reement 30 74 A possible for

deplo"in- the stron-er 0AMS6# force 2as the 0s concern for human securit", as A Bones3/''1+5:4 2rites+ Ithe 0 finall" reco-ni@ed the pli-ht of the ci!ilian population of Sierra #eoneI,

the 0 also reco-ni@ed that 2hen ;CMG 2ithdre2 there 2ould be nothin- to stop a rene2ed

ci!il 2ar 3ibid+5&4

(1($ "*e Mandate and ! Doc')ents

0AMS6#s creation and mandate 2as set forth in resolution SE8;SE1/(' b" the SC on the // ndof

ctober in 1&&& 6t starts b" statin- that the situation in Sierra #eone is a threat to international

peace and securit" in the re-ionI 6n article % the 0 decides to create 0AMS6# 2ith the

follo2in- mandate+ a4 to implement the #omQ Peace A-reement b4 to assist the -o!ernment of

Sierra #eone 2ith the disarmament, demobili@ation and reinte-ration 3DD84 of former combatants

c4 to that end, to be present at e" locations throu-hout Sierra #eone d4 to ensure the freedom of

mo!ement to all 0 personnel e4 to monitor adherence to ceasefires, as stated in the ceasefire

a-reement of Ma" 1% 1&&& f4 to encoura-e the parties to create confidence)buildin- mechanisms

and to support their functionalit" -4 to facilitate the deli!er" of humanitarian assistance h4 to

support the operations b" 0 ci!ilian officials and i4 to pro!ide support for elections in Sierra

#eone

To achie!e these ends 0AMS6# 2as launched under Chapter 66 of the 0 Charter and ma"

tae the necessar" action to ensure the securit" and freedom of mo!ement of its personnel and,

2ithin its capabilities and areas of deplo"ment, to afford protection to ci!ilians under imminent

threat of ph"sical !iolenceI 3SE8;SE1/(' art 1*4 This article allo2s for a 2ide use of force b"

0AMS6# and maes 0AMS6# to a robust peaceeepin- mission Accordin- to the follo2in-

/5


28/48

article 0AMS6# personnel should include people trained in humanitarian, human ri-hts and

refu-ee la2, this indicates that the mission 2ill 2or both 2ith the underl"in- causes of the conflict

and 2ith human securit" Article 1%, 2hich states+ emphasi@es that the pli-ht of children is amon-

the most pressin- challen-es facin- Sierra #eoneI, is e!en clearer in its concern for human securit"

since the plightof children rarel" directl" threatens international securit"

The mandate allo2ed for :''' militar" personnel but a number of subseFuent resolutions raised

this number 6n .ebruar" /''' resolution SE8;SE1/%& raised the militar" component of 0AMS6#

to 111'' troops, in Ma" /''' resolution SE8;SE1/&& raised it to 17''' troops, in March /''1

SE8;SE17*: further increased the number to 1(5'', and 2hen the mission 2as at its lar-est in

March /''/ it amounted to 1(7:% militar" personnel 3SE8;SE1/%& SE8;SE1/&& SE8;SE17*: 0

/4 This indicates that the 0 had failed to predict ho2 lar-e a force 2ould be needed

8esolution SE8;SE1/%& did not onl" raise the militar" component but also, in li-ht of the conditions

on the -round, enlar-ed the mandate 6t no2 included the facilitation of the free flo2 of people,

-oods and humanitarian assistance, the pro!ision of securit" at all sites of DD8, and help 2ith the

sur!eillance and disposal of 2eapons, ammunition and other militar" eFuipment collected from e=)

combatants 0AMS6# 2as also authori@ed to tae the necessar" actions to fulfil these tass,

includin- the use of force 3SE8;SE1/%& art 1'4 The resolution also e=panded the permissible use of

force further than before The rules for use of force are e!en more clearl" stated in a report b" the

SG 32hich is supported b" the SC accordin- to SE8;SE17*: 74+

6n its mo!ement and deplo"ment for2ard, 0AMS6# 2ill continue toproect the necessar" militar" stren-th and determination to deter an"attempt to use force a-ainst the nited 0ations and its mandate inSierra #eone The Missions rules of en-a-ement allo2 it to respondrobustl" to an" attac or threat of attac, includin-, if necessar", in a

pre)empti!e manner 3SE/''1E//% :'4

This clear and stron- lan-ua-e stra"s far from the pre!ious self)defence doctrine and e!en from the

protection of the mandate principle since it allo2s for pre)empti!e attacs b" the peaceeepers

The lan-ua-e is close to the one used in the subseFuent Brahimi 8eport concernin- the use of force

3see chapter 7714

0AMS6#s mandate 2as under Chapter 66, had a lar-e militar" component, !ie2ed pre)empti!e

attacs as self)defence, and use of force 2as allo2ed to be used to protect ci!ilians and to secure

DD8 areas .urther it said that 0AMS6# should send robust patrolsI into 8. areas 3SE/''1E//%

:14 This is in line 2ith the recommendations of the Brahimi 8eport 2hich ur-ed for stron-er

/:


29/48

mandates and more robust peaceeepin- There are also man" references to the protection of ci!il)

ians in the mandate and other documents of the SC and SG on Sierra #eone This indicates that the

dedication and time that the mandate allo2s for is spent on anal"sin- the condition and protection

of ci!ilians in Sierra #eone, as 2ell as the militar" force used for this purpose, -oes be"ond 2hat

can be moti!ated if the onl" -oal is to stop a threat to international peace and securit"

(1(0 "*e Mission in Practice

.rom the start 0AMS6# failed to e=ercise its robust mandate The real crisis started in Ma" /''',

there had been 2arnin- si-ns but the 0 2as still taen b" surprise b" the stron- resistance the"

meet from the 8.

The 8. continuousl" challen-ed 0AMS6#, 2hich responded b" not usin- force to preser!e its

freedom of mo!ement or e!en in self)defenceI 3.indla" /''/+7154 The 8. started disarmin- 0

troops on the 1stof Ma", and the da" after, 2hen the 8. tried to disarm troops a-ain, the 0

troops tried to defended themsel!es but failed .ollo2in- this mass detentions of 0AMS6#

troops too place, often, it appears, 2ithout an" resistanceI 3ibid+71:4 This resulted in almost 5''

0AMS6# troops bein- taen as hosta-es and some illed b" the 8. 3lonisain /''%+7, 574


30/48

6n response to the situation the SG appealed for capable states to pro!ide a force to support

0AMS6# This force 2as to be used for deterrent purposes and to sol!e the hosta-e situation,

Great Britain decided to inter!ene and at its hi-ht it deplo"ed 1/'' troops 3lonisain /''%+:74

Their official purpose 2as to e!acuate British and other forei-n nationals that 2ere trapped in Sierra

#eone, but in realit" the British militar" did much more than that The" 2ere soon+ helpin-

or-ani@e and train 0 troops, establishin- fortified positions, mannin- roadblocs, securin- .ree)

to2n and its airport, conductin- oint patrols 2ith 0AMS6#, and comin- under fire and returnin-

it robustl" in self)defenceI 3.indla" /''/+7'14 The British forces 2ored closel" 2ith 0AMS6#

and, accordin- to 0AMS6# #ieutenant)Colonel Philip


31/48

($ nited !ations Mission in Liberia

6n this chapter the 0 peaceeepin- mission to #iberia 3/''7)on-oin-4 2ill be presented 6t is, lie

the pre!ious, split into three sub)chapters The first 2ill sho2 the bac-round of the conflict the

second a re!ie2 of the mandate and other 0 documents relatin- to the use of force and human

securit" in the mission and the third describe of ho2 the mission 2as carried out

($(1 7ac-.ro'nd

The conflict in #iberia started in late 1&%& and b" 1&&' hundreds of people had alread" died The

roots of the conflict consisted mainl" of anta-onism bet2een different ethnic -roups and -oes all

the 2a" bac to 2hen #iberia first became a state B" ctober 1&&' refu-ees in nei-hbourin- coun)

tries alread" numbered :''''' and the conflictin- parties used ci!ilians as the primar" 2ar

obecti!es and the focus of !iolenceI 3lonisain /''7+117)11*4 The initial fi-htin- 2as bet2een

-o!ernmental forces and the 0ational Patriotic .ront of #iberia 30P.#4, 2ho 2ere led b" the

former -o!ernment official Charles Ta"lor, but b" 1&&5 ei-ht 2arrin- parties 2ere reco-ni@ed The

reason for this 2as that 2hen the -o!ernment lost po2er local 2arlords appeared ;C


32/48

T2o main rebel -roups emer-ed in 1&&& and /''/, respecti!el", the #iberians nited for 8econcili)

ation and Democrac" 3#8D4 and the Mo!ement for Democrac" in #iberia 3MD;#4, both 2ith

the aim to o!erthro2 president Charles Ta"lor 6n the be-innin- of /''7 the t2o rebel -roups occu)

pied almost t2o)thirds of the countr" and threatened to attac the #iberian capital Monro!ia

3SE/''7E%(5 5, &4

n the 1stof Au-ust /''7 the 0 authori@ed a multinational force to #iberia to help stabili@e the

countr" 30 14 and on the 11thof Au-ust, after substantial national and international pressure pres)

ident Ta"lor resi-ned and left for e=ile in 0i-eria .rom this the situation started to impro!e The

1%thof Au-ust the 2arrin- parties sin-ed the Comprehensi!e Peace A-reement 3CPA4 in Accra and

;C


33/48

preudice to the efforts of the -o!ernment, to protect ci!ilians under imminent threat of ph"sical

!iolence, 2ithin its capabilitiesI 3ibid 4, and to facilitate the pro!ision of humanitarian assist)

ance, includin- b" helpin- to establish the necessar" securit" conditionsI 3ibid 4 There are more

mentions of human securit" in the resolution Articles & reminds of the special need to protect chil)

dren in armed conflict and in article 1' the 0 Demandsthat all parties cease all use of child

soldiers, that all parties cease all human ri-hts !iolations and atrocities a-ainst the #iberian popula)

tion, and stresses the need to brin- to ustice those responsibleI, article 11 points out the importance

of -ender perspecti!e in peaceeepin- and post)conflict peace)buildin-, and encoura-es 0M6# to

address the issue of !iolence a-ainst 2omen and children as a tool of 2arfareI 3ibid art 114

A clearer statement concernin- the use of force can be found in the SGs report to the SC

3SE/''7E%(54 made on 11

th

of September /''7


34/48

Commission of DD88 30CDD884, 2hich 2as a bod" made)up of all national and international

staeholders in #iberia 6n the be-innin- of the DD process 0M6# 2as o!er2helmed because the"

laced both the number of personnel and facilities to carr" it out properl" After this the DD

pro-ram 2as suspended 2hile the implementation 2as -one o!er, this lead to a limitin- of the

number of combatants to /5' per cantonment site per da" 6n ctober /''* 0M6# officiall"

declared that the DD 2as done, thou-h in some areas it continued lon-er 3ibid+1%&)1&14

6n Nanuar" /''5 0M6# announced that 1'71'& combatants had been disarmed before the

pro-ram started 0M6# had predicted that there 2ere 7%''' combatants that needed to be

disarmed, this miscalculation lead to a number of chan-es in the implementation of the pro-ram 6n

the initial pro-ram /1 da"s 2ere allocated to each indi!idual, but soon the" 2as reduced to fi!e, and

the initial W1*'' allocated to each person 2as reduced to under W%'' Another problem 2ith thepro-ram 2as that !er" fe2 hea!" 2eapons 2ere handed)in, 2hile there 2ere indications of hea!"

2eapons bein- smu--led into nei-hbourin- countries Also the reinte-ration and repatriation 3884

pro-ram had problems and 2as behind schedule, mainl" because of lacin- sufficient funds B" the

end of the pro-ram onl" half of the /1''' child soldiers had -one throu-h 88 3ibid+1%&)1&14

Despite 0M6#s stron- Chapter 66 mandate there 2as reports of atrocities committed in the

!icinit", and sometimes e!en in the presence, of 0M6# troops 3Clea!er V Masse" /'':+1%&4

There 2ere e!en reports of se=ual abuse of minors b" 0 peaceeepers and aid 2orers 30e2 or

Times /'':4 Thou-h these had been hard to substantiate this puts the peaceeepers commitment to

human securit" in Fuestion, but does not necessaril" sa" an"thin- about the 0s commitment

6t is said that 0M6# made it a priorit" to ha!e man" 2omen as part of the mission Because of this

2omen accounted for 1* U of the 0Ci!Pol part of 0M6# Gender 2as a bi- issue durin- the

ci!il 2ar since a lot of the !iolence durin- the ci!il 2ar 2as se=ual !iolence directed to2ards

2omen and children The 0 tried to be conscious of this both in resolutions and in the composi)

tion of 0M6# 30e2 or Times /'1'4

0M6# is also made up of a lar-e 0Ci!Pol component 6t is their mission to help restructure the

police The #iberian Police Ser!ice had been so corrupted under Ta"lor that it 2as disbanded and a

ne2 police force 2as created to tae its place 0M6# also helped to restructure the national arm"

6n both the arm" and the police force all efforts 2ere made to ensure that the ne2 recruits had not

participated in an" human ri-hts !iolations 3Clea!er V Masse" /'':+1&74

7/


35/48

6n ctober /''*, three da"s before the end of the DD88 pro-ram, disarmed fi-hters rioted in

Monro!ia The riots lasted for three da"s and *'' people 2ere 2ounded and 15 illed 3Doctors


36/48

But in practice 0AMS6# 2as not as robust as its mandate A probable e=planation is that the

national rules of en-a-ement often are not in s"nc 2ith the rules of the mission This can lead

national contin-ents to decline to use force 2hen ordered b" the mission commander, 2ithout

authori@ation b" their national authorities, ConseFuentl", 2hen the use of force becomes necessar",

the supposedl" robust mandate is rendered toothlessI 3Aboa-"e V Bah /''5+/%%4 This leads to the

conclusion that e!en thou-h the peaceeepin- tradition in the 0 has chan-ed, if the nations that

contribute troops do not full" a-ree 2ith this chan-e it mi-ht not be enacted The Fuestion then

becomes if 0 peaceeepin- can be split from 2hat is practised on the -round

0M6#s mandate is under Chapter 66, but it did not ha!e the opportunit" to sho2 if it 2as trul"

robust This maes it harder to no2 if it in practise 2ould ha!e beha!ed lie 0AMS6#, 2hichcan be liened to second -eneration prior to the British inter!ention, or it 2ould ha!e been trul"

robust

6s there then a reason for this robustness, if onl" in nameI? The ans2er to that is "es To -i!e

0M6# a Chapter 66 mandate, 2hen it mi-ht ha!e been able to carr" out its duties under a

Chapter 6 one, ser!es as a deterrent Nust as the peaceeepers of 0;. 6 had 2eapons, 2hich the"

2ere not allo2ed to use, ser!ed as a deterrent 3.indla" /''/+1%4 To allo2 for more force than is

needed, or e!en that "ou belie!e the countries committin- troops mi-ht be 2illin- to allo2, mi-ht

help to ensure than no force 2ill be needed As the S2edish Militar" >istor" Commission

concluded after 0C that+ 0 units must be of such stren-th, Fualit" and conduct that the" earn

the respect of all parties affected 6n the Con-o some of the fi-htin- could probabl" ha!e been

a!oided if the 2eaness of the 0 units had not encoura-ed the parties to JcommitK acts of !iol)

enceI 3ibid+%74, the same could possibl" be said for 0AMS6# and 0M6# So, e!en if

appearance is not e!er"thin-, it can mean a lot, for the more po2erful the force the -reater the

deterrent and the less liel" it is that force 2ill need to be usedI 3ibid+%74 This means that the

robustness that the Brahimi 8eport ass for and that characterise third -eneration peaceeepin-

mi-ht sometimes come from a robust mandate, and not a trul" robust mission, since this mi-ht be as

successful in achie!in- -reater human securit"

So 2hile 0AMS6# had clearer and stron-er rules for use of force and can thus be seen as more

robust than 0M6#, compared to second -eneration peaceeepin- thou-h 0M6# too 2as a robust

peaceeepin- force The conclusion that can be dra2n from this is than a third -eneration of peace)

7*


37/48

eepin- e=ists not onl" in theor" but also in practice, since both these mission fall 2ithin the frame)

2or of third -eneration peaceeepin- Another conclusion is that the Brahimi 8eport partl" called

for somethin- alread" in e=istence, 0AMS6# did not lac a more robust mandate, it laced people

2illin- to carr" out the robust mandate Thus third -eneration peaceeepin- started before the

Brahimi 8eport, but the reasonin- represented b" the Brahimi 8eport is still the core of third -ener)

ation

(0($ 5')an Sec'rity and Soverei.nty


38/48

de!iates for pre!ious -enerations of peaceeepin-, both in theor" and practise, is 2ell reflected and

ar-ued for in the Brahimi 8eport 6t is thus a sensible tool 2hen definin- third -eneration, but

should not be seen as a di!idin- line

7:


39/48

2 "*e Re%ations*i, 7etween 5')an Sec'rity and

Rob'stness in ! Peace-ee,in.

This chapter attempts to ans2er t2o of the research Fuestions b" main- use of the facts and

thou-hts presented in pre!ious chapters 6t is split into t2o sub)chapters, the first tries to ans2er the

Fuestion+ 6s human securit" a main moti!atin- factor for more robust peaceeepin-? the second

tries to ans2er+ Does more robust peaceeepin- achie!e -reater human securit"?

2(1 Is 5')an Sec'rity a Motivator 7e*ind Rob'st Peace-ee,in./

>uman securit" and the de!elopment to2ards robust peaceeepin- are t2o simultaneous de!elop)

ments in 0 peaceeepin-, but this does not mean that the" are necessaril" related or that one is the

cause of the other, since correlation does not impl" causation But from the reasonin- presented in

the pre!ious chapters human securit" seems to be a moti!atin- factor for Fuestionin- the principles

of first -eneration peaceeepin-, such as neutralit", and also for the more comple= missions under

the second -eneration, and this in its turn 2ould seem to ha!e, at least partl", moti!ated the more

robust missions The fact that force can be used to protect ci!ilians in later peaceeepin- is in itself

a si-n of both, the human securit" as moti!ator, and that peaceeepin- has -otten more robust

The mo!ement in human securit" is connected to the chan-e in the perception of so!erei-nt" 6n

first -eneration peaceeepin- the understandin- of so!erei-nt" as control is clearl" dominant The

principles of peaceeepin- created durin- the first -eneration, such as consent and neutralit", are all

in support of it and formulated in such a 2a" that state so!erei-nt" 2ill be respected .urther the

purpose of peaceeepin- in first -eneration 2as to help so!erei-n states, to obser!e, and to ensure

that international peace and securit", understood as ensurin- that states so!erei-nt", 2ere not !iol)

ated

This can be contrasted 2ith third -eneration peaceeepin- There -o!ernments can be seen as

perpetrators, so that their consent, 2hile bein- ased for, is not a necessit" an" more This, as 2ell

as the robustness of third -eneration peaceeepin- 2ould !iolate the old understandin- of so!er)

ei-nt" This implies a redefinition of so!erei-nt" as so!erei-nt" as responsibilit" since the 0 is

7(


40/48

e=pressl" commitment to upholdin- state so!erei-nt", as can for e=ample be seen in the 0 Charter

31&*5 art /4, and its Declaration on the 6nadmissibilit" of 6nter!ention in the Domestic Affairs of

States and the Protection of Their 6ndependence and So!erei-nt" of 1&:5 The understandin- of

so!erei-nt" as responsibilit" leads to the conclusion that the principle of consent, as applied durin-

the first -eneration, does not lead to -reater respect for so!erei-nt", since the state, if labelled

perpetrator, has alread" lost its so!erei-nt" le-itimate consent can onl" be obtained, if there is a

le-itimate so!erei-n to issue it

Since the -reater focus on human securit" is a de!elopment that can be seen in the 2hole 0

3Annan /'''4, and since so!erei-nt" as responsibilit" is in man" 2a"s so!erei-nt" as protectin-

human securit", this leads to the conclusion that the -reater mo!ement to2ards human securit" is

the moti!atin- factor behind the chan-e in so!erei-nt" This also means that concern for humansecurit" is necessar" for -ainin- and eepin- so!erei-nt", from the perspecti!e of the 0

This redefinition of so!erei-nt" is necessar" for robust peaceeepin- since in the older definition it

2ould had !iolated the states so!erei-nt", 2hich the 0, accordin- to its Charter, is tr"in- to

sustain and protect The redefinition of so!erei-nt" as responsibilit" also necessitates robust peace)

eepin-, since it is belie!ed to achie!e -reater human securit", and thus the best 2a" to protect and

re)establish so!erei-nt" .rom this it can be concluded that human securit" moti!ated the -reater

robustness in 0 peaceeepin-, b" leadin- to a chan-e of so!erei-nt", 2hich the 0 is tr"in- to

protect

2($ Does Rob'st Peace-ee,in. Ac*ieve Greater 5')an Sec'rity/

This an e=tensi!e Fuestion and an" ans2er found from the facts presented in this paper 2ill not be

conclusi!e, but this does not mean that it 2ill not increase our no2led-e on this issue

6f the moti!ator for more robust peaceeepin- is human securit", as ar-ued for in the pre!ious

chapter, then the most rele!ant Fuestion for the future de!elopment of peaceeepin- is+ Does robust

peaceeepin- achie!e -reater human securit"? Since if it does not, ne2 methods 2ill ha!e to be

found

6f -reater human securit" is the moti!ation behind the chan-e to2ards more robust peaceeepin- in

the third -eneration, there is a fundamental problem 2ith one of its premisses+ that pre!ious -enera)

7%


41/48

tions of peaceeepin- 2ere ineffecti!e 2ith re-ard to human securit" 3is Marten /''*+/()7(4

o2e!er it is impossible to no2 2hether this

deterrent effect 2as reall" necessar" ;speciall" in li-ht of the stron- commitment to the peace

process of all local parties, the necessit" of a stron- 0M6# becomes sli-htl" dubious

0AMS6# is more complicated 6t is clear that peaceeepers endan-ered their o2n securit" b" not

main- use of their robust mandate 6t is further possible that the pure robustness of the mandate

combined 2ith too small and un2illin- a force could ha!e contributed to some of 0AMS6#s

problems The mandate made both the 8. and the Sierra #eonean population belie!e that

0AMS6# 2ould tae o!er 2here ;C


42/48

attempt to deter b" a robust ima-e endan-ered both the 0 troops and the ci!ilian population more

than a less robust mandate 2ould ha!e As it 2as 0AMS6# 2as seen as a part" in the 2ar b" the

rebels, and as a force that could protect them b" the ci!ilians, 2hen it 2as neither

Despite all this, both 0M6# and 0AMS6# are considered successes, but 2hether this is true for

0AMS6# is debatable


43/48

3 Conc%'sion

As 0 peaceeepin- de!eloped it clearl" -ot more robust Durin- the first -eneration, mainl"

deplo"ed in bet2een the end of the uman securit" had a !er" lo2 priorit" durin- this

period, 2hile state so!erei-nt" 2as !ie2ed as in!iolable The second -eneration, mainl" deplo"ed

in the period from the end of the Cold


44/48

Third -eneration peaceeepin- is !er" recent and thus there ha!e not been man" missions or studies

of them, because of this t2o case studies 2ere conducted to -ain a better understandin- third -ener)

ation peaceeepin- in practice and the role pla"ed b" the Brahimi 8eport

These case studies sho2ed that a clear third -eneration of peaceeepin- e=ists not onl" in theor",

and that it is defined b" 2ider mandate, 2hich allo2s more use of force, and a stron- focus on

human securit" The" also sho2ed that more robust mandates do not ha!e to result in a more robust

mission ne mission, 0AMS6#, too place before the Brahimi 8eport and the other, 0M6#,

after 0AMS6#, thou-h failin- to be robust on the -round, did ha!e much clearer use of force

rules than the 0M6#, this indicated that the Brahimi 8eport 2as not as radical as it has been

supposed and that the start of third -eneration peaceeepin- 2as before the report Despite this the

reasonin- and moti!ation presented in the Brahimi 8eport represents both missions 2ell and can

thus be seen as a -ood e=ample of third -eneration peaceeepin-, in practise as 2ell as in theor",

but more research remain to be conducted on ho2 the third -eneration 2ill de!elop

The case studies 2ere also used to in!esti-ate 2hether robustness in peaceeepin- achie!es -reater

human securit"


45/48

8 List o4 Re4erences

8(1 P'b%is*ed So'rces

Abiodun, A, Macinla", N, and lonisain, .,

1&&&Peacekeepers, Politicians, and

Warlords: The iberian Peace Process To"o+

nited 0ations ni!ersit" Press

Aboa-"e, . and Bah, Alhai M S, /''5!

Tortuous "oad to Peace: The Dynamics o#

"egional, $% and &nternational 'umanitarian

&nterventions in iberia. Je)booK A!aliable

throu-h+Xhttp+EE222issco@aEpubsEBoosETortu

ous8oadEContentshtmY Jaccessed '( Nan /'11K

Annan, L A, /''' We the Peoples: The role o#

the $nited %ations in the ()st*entury 0e2

or+ nited 0ations

Bones, A, /''1Peacekeeping in +ierra eone

6n+ Mc8ae, 8 and Grant >ubert, D ed'uman

+ecurity and the %ew Diplomacy: Protecting

People, Promoting Peace.tta2a+ McGill)

9ueens ni!ersit" Press

Chambliss, D . and Schutt, 8 L, /'':

aking +ense o# the +ocial World: ethods o#

&nvestigation./nded Thousand as+ Pine .or-e

Press

Clea!er, G and Masse", S, /'':iberia: a

durable peace at last-6n+ .urle", and Ma",

8 ednding!#rica/s Wars: progressing to

peace.#ondon+ Ash-ate Publishin- Group

de uman Securit" Centre, /''5'uman +ecurity

"eport (334: War and Peace in the ()st

*entury, 0e2 or + =ford ni!ersit" Press

Nupp, , /'': The +!5 Dictionary o# +ocial

"esearch ethods.Gateshead+ SAG;

Publications

*7
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/TortuousRoad/Contents.htmhttp://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/TortuousRoad/Contents.htmhttp://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/TortuousRoad/Contents.htmhttp://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/TortuousRoad/Contents.htm


46/48

Laldor, M, /''%1rom 6ust War to 6ust Peace.

6n+ de urst V Co #td

8amsbotham, , ,

/''( *ontemporary *on#lict "esolution. /nded

Cambrid-e+ Polit" Press

8eport of the 6nternational Commission on

6nter!ention and State So!erei-nt", /''1 The

"esponsibility to Protect.tta2a+ 6nternational

De!elopment 8esearch Centre

8ichmond, P, /''1 The imits o# $% ulti7

dimensional Peace 2perations.6n+ 0e2man, ;

and 8ichmond, P ed $nited %ations and

'uman +ecurity.0e2 or+ Pal-ra!e

Schmild, ; A, /'''Peace 2perations9etween War and Peace.#ondon+ .ran Cass

Sber-, T, /'':1rom orea and +ue8 to &ra;:

'al# a *entury o# $nited %ations *on#lict

anagement.#und+ Seel Bofrla-

Tard", T, /''* The 9rahimi "eport: #our years

on.Gene!a+ Gene!a Centre for Securit" Polic"

Thornberr", C, 1&&:Peacekeepers, 'umanit7

arian !id and *ivil *on#licts 6n+


47/48


48/48

8(0 ! Doc')ents

$nited %ations, o# (? 6un. )@A4. The *harter o#

The $nited %ations

$nited %ations "eport o# the +ecretary75eneral,

!BC@AC o# @ 2ct. )@4. +ummary study o# the

e=perience derived #rom the establishment and

operation o# the #orce

$nited %ations 5eneral !ssembly, ()C) o# ()

Dec. )@?4. Declaration on the &nadmissibility o#&ntervention in the Domestic !##airs o# +tates

and the Protection o# Their &ndependence and

+overeignty

$nited %ations +ecretary75eneral, !BAEB(EE >

+B(A))) o# )E 6un. )@@(. !n !genda #or Peace:

Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace7

keeping

$nited %ations, +5B+BE)(? o# (3 +ep. )@@@.

+ecretary75eneral presents his annual report to

the 5eneral !ssembly

$nited %ations +ecurity *ouncil, +B"+B)(E3 o#

(( 2ct. )@@@. "esolution )(E3 F)@@@G

$nited %ations +ecurity *ouncil, +B"+B)(@ o#

E 1eb. (333. "esolution )(@ F(333G

$nited %ations +ecurity *ouncil, +B"+B)(@@ o#

)@ ay (333. "esolution )(@@ F(333G

$nited %ations 5eneral !ssembly, !B44BC347

+B(333B3@ o# () !ug. (333. *omprehensive

review o# the whole ;uestion o# peacekeeping

operations in all their aspects

$nited %ations +ecurity *ouncil, +B(33)B(( o#

)A arch (33). %inth report o# the +ecret7ary75eneral on the $nited %ations ission in

+ierra eone

$nited %ations +ecurity *ouncil, +B"+B)CA? o#

C3 arch (33). "esolution )CA? F(33)G

$nited %ations +ecurity *ouncil, +B(33CBE4 o#

)) +ep. (33C. "eport o# the +ecretary75eneral to

the +ecurity *ouncil on iberia

$nited %ations +ecurity *ouncil, +B"+B)43@ o#

)@ +ep. (33C. "esolution )43@ F(33CG