The Future of UN Peacekeeping Operations

Definitions of Key Terms

1. Peacekeeping: an effective means to help countries torn by conflict restore and sustain peace.

2. UN Peacekeepers: workers deployed by the UN to monitor and observe peace processes in post-conflict areas who may assist ex-combatants in implementing peace agreement commitments that they have undertaken.

3. Peacekeepers Day: 29 May – International Day of United Nations Peacekeepers; dedicated to honor and pay tribute to the men and women who have lost their lives in peacekeeping operations.

Introduction

Since the creation of the United Nations in 1948, the world has faced many crises, ranging from political to humanitarian. One of the most pressing issues it has had to deal with is the stabilization of countries that have either just ended a war or signed a ceasefire. Given these circumstances, the Security Council has been given the primary responsibility of using UN peacekeepers as tool of international crisis response, determining where and when these missions should be deployed. The Security Council monitors the progress of the various global operations by continuously releasing reports and by holding specific committee sessions dedicated to discussing a certain mission. Seeing as all member states ratified to Article 25 of the UN Charter, any and all resolutions passed by the Council must be implemented.

Background information

Peacekeeping operations are based upon three fundamental values: consent of parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate. Currently, peacekeeping operations are in place not only as a method of keeping the peace, but also as a way to assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, support the organization of democratic elections, and promote human rights. By taking a multi-faceted approach to solving these issues, this UN program ensures that they are solving the issue from all sides, truly understanding the roots so that stability can be attained and sustained in a nation.

However, it is important to note that despite many altruistic efforts; oftentimes UN peacekeeping operations are not 100% successful. This is due to the fact that these operations take place in some of the most dangerous and difficult countries in the world. The majority of these countries do not have a stable governmental authority; they face high levels of violence and of corruption. Thus, it becomes incredibly difficult for peacekeepers to avoid the use of force, which leads to increased controversy from nations who do not support the UN’s missions. They argue that using force to ensure peace is hypocritical and counters the essence of this program. Many have gone as far as calling the UN efforts futile because the “peace-keeping operations contribute to the suffering of the very people they were mandated to assist.”

In an attempt to better the UN Peacekeeping Program, various reforms have been

set in place since 2000, thanks to the Brahimi Report. This document aimed to identify and assess the shortcomings of the program over the past couple of decades so that solutions could be found to make it more efficient. Due to this report, more funds were allocated to the program so that the UN operations could be properly resourced and equipped. In addition, more peacekeeping policies where drafted and published so that peacekeepers would have a clearer understanding of their principles and guidelines in the field. This may have been one of the most important reforms, seeing as the program was often criticized for ambiguity and unclear mandates. Lastly, the Secretary General imposed a zero-tolerance policy regarding sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers in the host countries.

Furthermore, it is important to recognize that none of these missions would have been possible without the help and support of other organizations. The UN Peacekeeping operation is a global partnership that works hand in hand with several institutions, including the African Union, the European Union, the World Bank and the UNDP (United Nations Development Program). Thanks to their collaboration, the UN Peacekeeping Program is able to maintain and fund 16 active missions with a relatively small budget of $7.23 billion; less than 0.5% of world military expenditure.

Major countries involved

Over the course of 60 years, many nations have been involved with some sort of peace-keeping operations, either directly as the site of a conflict or indirectly through the deployment of their troops to the area. One of the most talked about peacekeeping operation was UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) which ran from October 1993 – March 1996.

Rwanda This conflict arose between two tribes in Rwanda, the Hutu’s (who controlled the

government) and the Tutsi’s (who were seen as a rebel group). After a civil war in the country, UNAMIR was established to go into the country and aid the implementation of the Arusha Accords, signed August 4, 1993, which were meant to end the Rwandan Civil War. However, on April 6, 1994, there was a genocide that lasted around 100 days, where approximately 1 million people (both Tutsi and Hutu) were killed. What is more, 10 Belgian UNAMIR soldiers were targeted by Rwandan government troops and killed. It is said that their death was a direct result of an unclear mandate regarding the use of force for self-defense, because the UNAMIR soldiers apparently made no effort to fight back.

At this point, chaos had broken out, not only in the country with the cessation of the

peace agreement, but also within the UN community as they did not know how to proceed with their mission. Nobody was sure how to act in the case of genocide, and Belgium pulled out all of its troops from the mission. With less than 300 troops, the operation was crumbling and within a few years, UNAMIR pulled out completely. Although this mission is generally categorized as a failure, there were many important lessons that the peacekeeping program learned from this experience and it is evident that they have taken measures to ensure that this does not happen again. UN involvement

Since its establishment, 68 peacekeeping operations have been deployed by the United Nations. At present, there are 16 operations, taking place across 4 different continents. From data collected from 2010-2012, it was shown that the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom provided the greatest source of financial support for the program, while Bangladesh, Pakistan and India were the individual countries that contributed the largest portion of troops. This information is displayed in the charts below:

FACT SHEET

VITALA central element of international conflict response UN peacekeeping provides essential security and support to millions of people as well as fragile institutions emerging from conflict. Peace-keepers deploy to war-torn regions where no one else is willing or able to go and prevent conflict from returning or escalating.

The international character of UN Security Council authorized peacekeeping missions provides unparalleled legitimacy to any UN peace op-eration.

UN peacekeeping is an impartial and widely accepted vehicle for both burden-sharing and effective action. UN peacekeeping provides a vital stabilizing element of security in post-conflict situation that enables peace efforts to proceed, but it maynot be the only tool needed to address every crisis situation.

Peacekeeping supports a peace process, it cannot substitute for one.

ROBUSTA massive enterprise

The UN is the largest multilateral contributor to post-conflict stabilization worldwide.Only the United States deploys more military person-nel to the field than the United Nations.

There are more than 104,000 personnel serving on 20 peace operations led by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) onfour continents in 12 time zones, directly impacting the lives of hundreds of millions of people.This represents a seven fold increase in UNpeacekeepers since 1999.

In addition, the newly established Department of Field Support (DFS) supports another 13 special political and/or peacebuilding field mis-sions managed by the Department of Political Affairs, as well as a number of other UN peace offices requiring administrative and logisticalassistance from UN Headquarters.

The UN does not have its own military force; it depends on contributions from Member States. In January 2008, 119 countries contributedmilitary and police personnel to UN peacekeeping.

As of January 2008,more than 80,000 of those serving were troops and military observers and about 11,000 were police personnel. In ad-dition, there were almost 6,000 international civilian personnel,more than 13,000 local civilian staff and some 2,300 UNVolunteers fromover 160 nations.

Women are increasingly performing key leadership functions in peacekeeping: between February 2007 and January 2008, there was an in-crease of over 40% of women serving in peacekeeping.Currently,one woman leads a peace operation as a Special Representative of the Sec-retary-General (SRSG) and two women as Deputy SRSGs.The Officer-in-Charge of DFS and the Chief of Staff of DPKO are also bothwomen.In addition,the first all-women contingent to serve in a peacekeepingmission,a Formed Police Unit from India,was deployed in 2007to the UN operation in Liberia.

EFFECTIVEA high success rate

Since 1945,UN peacekeepers have undertaken 63 field missions,which, among many other things, enabled people in more than 45 coun-tries to participate in free and fair elections; and helped disarm more than 400,000 ex-combatants in the past decade alone.

The UN is an efficient and cost-effective force provider. Its specialists, particularly in integrated missions, possess a wide range of civil andmilitary capabilities needed to stabilize and help develop post-conflict situations.i

In 2007, the UNGeneral Assembly authorized a comprehensive programme of internal restructuring, including the reorganization of the De-partment of Peacekeeping Operations and the establishment of a separate Department of Field Support.The restructuring also included amajor augmentation of resources and the addition of new capacities and integrated structures to match the growing complexity of mandatedactivities and to ensure unity of command and integration of effort.

In the new structure,DPKO focuses on providing strategic direction,management and guidance to peacekeeping operations,while DFS pro-vides operational support and expertise in the areas of personnel, finance and budget, communications, information technology and logistics.Added to DPKO’s portfolio are a new Rule of Law and Security Reform Office and an enhanced Office of Military Affairs.

UUNNIITTEEDD NNAATTIIOONNSS PPEEAACCEEKKEEEEPPIINNGG

LESS EXPENSIVEUN peacekeeping is cost effective UN peace operations are far less expensive than other forms of international intervention and their costs are shared more equitably amongUN Member States.

The approved peacekeeping budget for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008 is approximately US$7 billion. This represents about 0.5%of global military spending (estimated at US$1,232 billion in 2006).

When costs to the UN per peacekeeper are compared to the costs of troops deployed by the United States, other developed states, the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or regional organizations, the United Nations is the least expensive option by far. ii

A recent survey by Oxford University economists found that international military intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is themost cost-effective means of preventing a return to war in post-conflict societies.iii

A study by the US Government Accountability Office estimated that it would cost the United States approximately twice as much as the UNto conduct a peacekeeping operation similar to the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) – $876 million compared to the UN bud-geted $428 million for the first 14 months of the mission.iv

FLEXIBLEAdaptable to different environments and needs The UN has demonstrated an increased flexibility in the structures and types of its field deployments. This flexibility has allowed it to respondto unique challenges and the risk of overstretch.vi

The UN increasingly works in peacekeeping partnerships with other international and regional organizations, such as the African Union (AU)or the European Union (EU), for maximum effect.

From law enforcement operations in the slums of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, to the joint AU-UN mission in Darfur, UN peacekeeping continues toevolve and adapt to today’s global peace and security challenges.

From protecting civilians in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to supporting elections in Timor-Leste or Liberia, UN peace-keeping matches the tools provided by the UN system to the task of keeping and building sustainable peace.

DYNAMICUN peacekeeping continues to evolve In addition to maintaining peace and security, peacekeepers are increasingly charged with assisting in political processes, reforming judicialsystems, training law enforcement and police forces, disarming and reintegrating former combatants, and supporting the return of internallydisplaced persons and refugees.

UN electoral assistance has become an increasingly essential feature in UN peace operations. Recently, UN peace missions have supportedelections in seven post-conflict countries – Afghanistan, Burundi, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, the DRC and Timor-Leste – with populations totalingover 120 million people, giving more than 57 million registered voters the chance to exercise their democratic rights.

Holding its personnel accountable to the highest standards of behavior is a major priority for UN peacekeeping. For example, UN peacekeep-ing has adopted a comprehensive three-pronged strategy (prevention, enforcement and remediation) to address the issue of sexual exploita-tion and abuse by UN personnel. UN peacekeeping has established conduct and discipline units at Headquarters and in the field, and is workingwith its troop-contributing countries to ensure effective follow-up and full implementation of the recommendations contained in the March2005 report of Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al Hussein, the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.

RELEVANTUN peacekeeping makes a difference where it matters most The security environments into which recent peacekeeping operations have deployed are among the most difficult and least governed of anythat international operations have ever encountered.v Peacekeeping missions deploy where others cannot or will not and play a vital role inproviding a bridge to stability and eventual long-term peace and development.

EEXXTTEENNSSIIVVEE In 2007 alone, UN peacekeeping operated:

20 military hospitals and over 230 medical clinics; More than 18,000 vehicles and 210 aircraft; 450 satellite earth stations, 40,000 desktop computers and 2,800 servers, with approximately 3.5 million emails and 2.5 million

Top 20 Contributors of Uniformed Personnel to UN Peacekeeping Operations

12,000

10,000

9,000

8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

Num

ber o

f Uniform

ed Personn

el

Pakistan

Bang

ladesh

India

Nepal

Jordan

Ghana

Urugu

ay

Nigeria

Italy

France

Senegal

China

Ethiop

ia

Morocco

Benin

Brazil

South Africa

Spain

Germany

Kenya

Top 20 Providers of Assessed Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Budget

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

Percentage of A

ssessed Co

ntrib

utions

USA

Japan

Germany

UK

France

Italy

China

Canada

Spain

Rep. of Korea

Netherlands

Australia

Russian Fed.

Switzerland

Belgium

Sweden

Austria

Norway

Denmark

Greece

26%

17%

9%

8% 7%5%

3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2%1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%

10,616

9,7179,345

3,656 3,569

2,9322,585 2,539 2,449

1,943 1,9361,828 1,827 1,536 1,312 1,281 1,204 1,183 1,150 1,083

UNITED NATIO

NS PEACEKEEPIN

G FA

CT SHEET

phone calls routed every month (approximately 1 per second) and an average of 200 video conferences held per month. As part of UN peacekeeping, mine clearance operations managed by the UN Mine Action Service are supporting the deployment of peace-keepers and the fulfillment of mandates in Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea/Ethiopia, Lebanon, Sudan and Western Sa-hara.

Mine action teams have so far cleared 50 percent of the main roads in southern Sudan, allowing peacekeeping and relief convoys tomove through the area.

The UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan has cleared landmines and explosive remnants of war from more than 1 billion squaremeters of land.

The Mine Action Coordination Centre of South Lebanon, attached to UNIFIL, has already cleared 32.6 million square meters ofthe 38.7 million square meters of land that had been contaminated by cluster munitions during the conflict in the area in 2006.

As of December 2007

As of 1 January 2008

sdfEndnotes

i James Dobbins et al., “The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building”, RAND Corporation, 2007.ii William J. Durch et al., “The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations”,The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003.iii Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler,“The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War”, Centre for the Study of AfricanEconomies, Department of Economics, Oxford University, 26 March 2004.

iv “Peacekeeping: Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical U.S. Operations in Haiti”, United States Government Ac-countability Office, Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on International Relations, Houseof Representatives, GAO-06-331, February 2006, p. 7.

v The Challenges Project,“Meeting the Challenges of Peace Operations: Cooperation and Coordination”, Phase II Concluding Re-port 2003-2006, Elanders Gotab, Stockholm, 2005.

vi See “Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007”, Center on International Cooperation, New York, 2007, pp. 2-12.

1948

1949

1964

1974

1978

1991

1993

1999

1999

2000

2002

2003

2004

2004

2005

2006

2006

2007

2007

2007

MIDDLE EAST

INDIA/PAKISTAN

CYPRUS

SYRIA

LEBANON

WESTERN SAHARA

GEORGIA

KOSOVO

DEMOCRATIC REP. OF CONGO

ETHIOPIA/ERITREA

AFGHANISTAN

LIBERIA

CÔTE D’IVOIRE

HAITI

SUDAN

SIERRA LEONE

TIMOR-LESTE

BURUNDI

DARFUR (Sudan)

CENTRAL AFRICAN REP./CHAD

UNTSO—UN Truce Supervision Organization

UNMOGIP — UNMilitary Observer Group in India and Pakistan

UNFICYP— UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

UNDOF— UN Disengagement Observer Force

UNIFIL — UN Interim Force in Lebanon

MINURSO—UNMission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

UNOMIG— UN Observer Mission in Georgia

UNMIK— UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

MONUC—UNOrganizationMission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

UNMEE— UNMission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

UNAMA—UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNMIL — UNMission in Liberia

UNOCI — UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

MINUSTAH—UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti

UNMIS — UNMission in the Sudan

UNIOSIL — UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone

UNMIT— UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste

BINUB— UN Integrated Office in Burundi

UNAMID— AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur

MINURCAT— UNMission in the Central African Republic and Chad

YEARLAUNCHED LOCATION NAME OF MISSION

Prepared by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations in cooperation with theUnited Nations Department of Public Information—DPI/2429/Rev.2— February 2008

Current DPKO-led Peace Missions

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FAC T SHEE T

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GA Committee – Topic Area B 3 © 2012 by University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece, for Thessaloniki International Student Model United Nations. All Rights Reserved.

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I. Introduction

One of the primary purposes of the United Nations is the maintenance of international peace and security. Since its creation, the UN has often been called upon to prevent disputes from escalating into war to persuade opposing parties to use the conference table rather than force of arms, or to help restore peace when armed conflict does break out. Over the decades, the UN helped to end numerous conflicts, often through actions of the Security Council- the primary organ for dealing with issues of international peace and security. During the 1990s the end of the cold war led to an entirely new global security environment, one marked by a focus on internal rather than inter-state wars. In early 21st century, new global threats emerged. The attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States clearly demonstrated the challenge of international terrorism, while subsequent events heightened concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the danger from other non- conventional weapons, casting a shadow over people throughout the world. 1 The organization of the UN system mobilized immediately in their respective spheres to step up action against terrorism. On 28 September, the Security Council adopted a wide-ranging resolution under the enforcement provisions of the UN Charter to prevent the financing of terrorism, criminalize the collection of funds for such purposes, and immediately freeze terrorist financial assets- establishing a Counter-Terrorism Committee to oversee its implementation.2 The UN has also reshaped and enhanced the traditional range of instruments at its command, strengthening its peacekeeping capacity to meet new challenges, 3increasingly involving regional organizations, and enhancing its post-conflict peace building capability. Civil conflicts have also raised complex issues regarding the adequate response of international community, including the question of how best to assist civilian victims of war- a concept known as the ‘’responsibility to protect’’4 To deal with civil conflicts, the Security Council has authorized complex and innovative peacekeeping operations. Since its establishment, the UN has played a major role in ending conflict and fostering reconciliation, including successful missions in El Salvador and Guatemala, in Cambodia and Mozambique, in Sierra Leone and Liberia and Tajikistan to name but a few.5 Other conflicts however – such as in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s – often characterized by ethnic violence and the lack of any internal power structure to deal with security issues, brought new challenges to the United Nations peacemaking and peacekeeping. Confronted with the problems encountered in these conflicts, the Security Council did not establish any new operation from 1995 to 1997. But soon the essential role of the UN was dramatically reaffirmed, as continuing crises in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, East Timor, Kosovo and Sierra Leone led the Council to establish five new missions as the decade drew to a close. The Council has established 28 new peacekeeping missions since 1995, including the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea(UNMEE) in 2000 ; the United Nations Mission in Liberia(UNMIL) in 2003; the United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI), the United Nations Stabilization Mission in

1 ‘’The United Nations Today’’, United Nations Publications, New York 2008 ,Chapter 7 ,pp 78-79 2 John Terence O'Neill and Nick Rees, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, Cass Series on Peacekeeping, Chapter 10, (2005), pp. 238-255 3 Especially after the 09/11 incidents the Security Council became stricter on the issues of security posting deterrence as a top method and priority in the peacemaking process. So the mandate of several peacekeeping operations was extended where the area remained unstable. 4 Lise Morjé Howard , UN Peacekeeping in Civil War, Introduction, (29 Nov 2007) pp. 10-15 5 Missions in El Salvador, Guatemala, in Cambodia and Mozambique, in Sierra Leone and Tajikistan have seized to exist. The only one still in force is UNMIL(United Nations Mission in Liberia).

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Haiti(MINUSTAH) and the United Nations Operation in Burundi(ONUB) in 2004; the United Nations Mission in the Sudan(UNMIS) in 2005; and the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste(UNMIT) in 2006. Many of these new missions have already completed their mandates; including most recently the missions in the Central African Republic Burundi and Sierra Leone. On 31 July 2007, the Council authorized a joint United Nations/ African Union hybrid operation in Darfur(UNAMID), to take necessary action to support implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, as well as to protect its personnel and civilians, without prejudice the responsibility of the Sudan. On 25 September 2007, determining that the situation in the region of the border between the Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic constituted a threat to international peace and security, the Council approved the establishment in Chad and the Central African Republic, in concert with the European Union, of a multidimensional presence intended to help create the security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons.6 No other institution has the global legitimacy, multilateral experience, competence, coordinating ability and impartially that the UN brings in support of these tasks. In addition to its complex operations in places such as Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Liberia and Kosovo, the UN has established special political missions and peacebuilding support offices in a number of other countries, including Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste. There also UN political offices for Somalia, the Middle East, Lebanon, West Africa and Nepal. Those last two examples indicate the way that the United Nations coordinates with entities and international organizations in order to increase effectiveness in the peacemaking procedure. The Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General7 all play major complementary roles in fostering peace and security. United Nations activities cover the principal areas of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, enforcement and peace building.8 Those types of engagement must overlap or take place simultaneously if they are to be effective.

II. History of peacekeeping missions United Nations peacekeeping operations are crucial instrument at the disposal of the international community to advance peace and security. The role of UN peacekeeping was recognized in 1988, when the United Nations peacekeeping forces received the Nobel Prize. While not specifically envisaged in the charter, the UN pioneered peacekeeping in 1948 with the establishment of the United Nations Supervision Organization in the Middle East. Since then it has established a total of 66-operations. III. Security Council’s jurisdiction

Peacekeeping operations are deployed with the authorization of the Security Council and the consent of the host government and or the main parties to the conflict. Peacekeeping has traditionally involved a primarily military model of observing ceasefires and the separation of focus after inter-state wars. Today, it has evolved

6 Peace Operations after 11 September 2001 (Cass Series on Peacekeeping) , Thierry Tardy (27 May 2004), Chapter 3, pp 27 7 See page 16 for the role of the Secretary General the Security Council and the General Assembly in the establishment of a new peacekeeping operation. 8The part of the process we are examining is peacekeeping and especially operations.

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into a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundation of a sustainable peace. In recent years , the Council has introduced the practice of invoking the enforcement provisions in Chapter VII of the UN charter when authorizing the deployment of certain UN peacekeeping operations, or mandating them to perform tasks which may require the use of force – such as the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. Traditionally, UN peacekeepers could only use their weapons in self-defense, but the more “robust” mandates under Chapter VII enable them to use force, for example, to protect civilians.9 The military personnel of peacekeeping operations are voluntarily provided by member states and are financed by the member states, which are assessed under the peacekeeping budget. Troop-contributing states are compensated at a standard rate from that budget. Conflicts today are a complex mix. Their roots may be essentially internal, but they are complicated by cross-border involvement, either by states or by economic interests and other non-state actors. Recent conflicts in Africa and Middle East showed the deadly mix of civil strife and illegal proliferation of goods and armaments. Peacekeeping operations are established by the Security Council as aforementioned and directed by the Secretary-General, usually through a special representative. Depending on the mission, the force commander or the chief military observer is responsible for its military aspects. The United Nations has no military force of its own, and member states provide the military and civilian personnel for each operation. The power to deploy peacekeeping mission does not lie within the text of the Chapter but came as a result of the demanding need to assure international peace and security in an effective and permanent way. It can be easily derived from the obligation of the Security Council that lays in article 24 Chapter 5:

‘’Article 2410

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the

Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree

that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and

Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of

these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII. ‘’

IV. Existing Missions: Enumeration-Mandate a. Operations in numbers

9 The blue helmets as often called jurisdiction and competence to use force is often a topic under ongoing discussion. Their special status and the power that is derived from the UN Chapter separates them from any kind of military troops. Their scope is to maintain peace and under that they shall retain they political independence and neutrality as part of the United Nations Organization. 10 Chapter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Department of Public Information United Nations, New York, 2008 Chapter 5, pp. 20-21

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There have been 66 operations since 1948. After the peacekeeping operations have completed their work as stated in the resolution that deploys them or in the extensional decision taken by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) they seize to exist. As of December 31 2011 the current peacekeeping operations are 15 plus one special peace operation that is supported by the DPKO, UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). b. Coordination DPKO provides political and executive direction to UN Peacekeeping operations around the world and maintains contact with the Security Council, troop and financial contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of Security Council mandates. The Department works to integrate the efforts of UN, governmental and non-governmental entities in the context of peacekeeping operations. DPKO also provides guidance and support on military, police, mine action and other relevant issues to other UN political and peacebuilding missions. DPKO traces its roots to 1948 with the creation of the first UN peacekeeping operations: UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Up to the late 1980s, peacekeeping operations were operated through the UN Office of Special Political Affairs. The official DPKO was formally created in 1992 when Boutros Boutros-Ghali took office as Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Peacebuilding Commission, which became operational in 2006, is a new intergovernmental advisory body of the United Nations specifically dedicated to helping countries make the transition from war to lasting peace. It aims to do so by bringing together all of the relevant peacebuilding actors, including international donors, the international financial institutions, national government, troop contributing countries and representatives of civil society; proposing integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery; helping ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and sustained financial investment over the medium – to longer – term; extending the period of attention by the international community to post conflict recovery; and developing best practices on issues that require extensive collaboration among political, military, humanitarian and development actors. It achieves that by funding activities designed to respond to imminent threats to the peace process, support for the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue, activities undertaken to build and/or strengthen national capacities to promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict and to carry out peacebuilding activities; also activities undertaken to revitalize the economy and reestablish essential administrative and related human and technical capacities. To Fund those activities the commission has approved a total of $267,8million starting from October 2011. Peacebuilding Commission does not provide any kind of coordination to the United Nations Operations. Instead it supports peacekeeping actions and activities by funding them directly within the state in need.11 c. Financial aspects

Approved resources for the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 for all operations are about $7.84

billion: A new all time record for the United Nations Peacekeeping. Estimated total cost of operations from

1948 to 30 June 2010 about $69 billion.

11 Not to be confused with DPKO. Although part of the peacekeeping process, Commission has no authority over operations, or even the obligation to fund them. The aforementioned paragraph is just to make a vital disambiguation as the bureaucratic system of the UN would easily cause confusion.

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d. Personnel

Personnel in general consist of uniformed, civilian personnel and UN volunteers.

Uniformed Personnel at the very moment is up to 99.245 people. This is consisted by 82,377 troops, 14.300 police and 1.962 military observers. Civilian personnel are as of 31 October 2011 18,379. The UN Volunteers are 2,347. Total number of personnel serving in 16 DPKO-led peace operations: 121,591. There are 114 countries contributing uniformed personnel to the assistance of the United Nations.

e. Peacekeeping Operations in detail (current missions)

1. United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) Established in the disputed area of the Western Sahara 12 by Security Council resolution 690 of April 199113 in accordance with settlement proposals accepted on 30 August 1988 by Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro(Frente POLISARIO). Its mandate is to enforce a settlement plan provided for a transitional period for the preparation of a referendum in which the people of Western Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco. Total strength of the operation is 514 uniformed, blue helmets and volunteers. To the day there have been 15 fatalities in the operation, people that fell doing their task. Its approved budget for the period 07/2011-06/2012 is $63,219,300 as indicated in the fifth committee of the General Assembly resolution A/C.5/66/14. 2. United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

Established on 1 june 2004 by Security Council resolution 1542. The UN mission succeeded a Multinational Interim Force(MIF) authorized by the Security Council in February 2004 after President Bertrand Aristide departed Haiti for exile in the aftermath of an armed conflict which spread to several cities across the country. The devastating earthquake of 12 January 2010, which resulted in more than 220,000deaths(according to Haitian Government figures), including 96 UN peacekeepers, delivered a severe blow to country’s already shaky economy and infrastructure. The Security Council, by resolution 1908 of 19 January 2010, endorsed the Secretary-General’s recommendation to increase the overall force levels of MINUSTAH to support the immediate recovery, reconstruction and stability efforts of the country. Following the completion of Presidential elections in 2011, MINUSTAH has been working to fulfill its original mandate to restore a secure and stable environment, to promote the political process, to strengthen Haiti’s government institutions and rule of law structures, as well as to promote and to protect human rights. The Mission has continued to mobilize its logistical resources to assist in the effort to contain and treat the cholera outbreak of October 2010. This example is not unique. In a lot of case the mission is expanded to due unprecedented or unforeseen events that occur in the region of mandate. This fact itself increases the cost of the mission and exceeds the budget which is approved on an annual basis. The mission consists of 13,770 personnel civilian and uniformed. Fatalities since 2004 have rise with the strike of the earthquake to a tragic 168. Fatalities are not an irrelevant figure that we

12 Western Sahara is a region in Northwestern Africa which has been in question for over 3 decades now. After the Spanish colonial forces left the territory claims have been risen by Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania leading in the outbreak of war. After Morocco managed to finally guarantee control on the disputed area it became quite clear that the right for self determination was necessary to be used by the people by the Western Sahara. To these means the Security Council approved the MINUSRO with general obligation organize and carry out the referendum in the area. 13 SC/690/1991- http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/26/IMG/NR059626.pdf?OpenElement

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decided to provide. The United Nations Organization has to compensate the families of the ones that perished on the time of duty. Bearing in mind the fatalities every year in the 16 operations those costs have risen in the past few years. Approved budget for the period 07/2011-06/2012 is $793.517.000 by the resolution A/C.5/66/1414. 3. United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

(MONUSCO) MONUSCO took over from an earlier UN peacekeeping operation – the United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo(MONUC) – on 1 July 2010. It was done in accordance with Security Council resolution 1925 of 28 May to reflect the new phase reached in the country. The new mission has been authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate relating, among other things, to the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts. Total Strength of the operation is 23,383 people. Fatalities since 2010 have already reached 33. The approved budget for the period 07/2011-06/2012 is $1,489,390,500, resolution A/C.5/66/14. 4. African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) The African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur, referred to by its acronym UNAMID was established on 31 July 2007 with the adoption of Security Council resolution 1769. UNAMID has the protection of civilians as its core mandate, but it also tasked with contributing to security for humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying implementation of agreements, assisting an inclusive political process, contributing to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law, and monitoring and reporting on the situation alonf the borders with Chad and Central African Republic (CAR). Total strength of the operation rises up to 27,501. The approved budget is $1,689,305,500. 5. United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) From early March 1974, the situation in the Israel-Syria sector became increasingly unstable, and firing intensified. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force was established on 31 May 1974 by Security Council resolution 350(1974), following the agreed disengagement of the Israel and Syrian forces in the Golan Heights.. Since then the UNDOF has remained in the area to maintain the ceasefire between the Israeli and the Syrian forces and to supervise the implementation of the disengagement agreement. Total strength of the operation is 1,187. Fatalities till 2011 were 43. Approved budget for the period 07/2011-06/2012 is $50,526,100( A/C.5/66/14 15. 6. United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) UNFICYP was originally set up by the Security Council in 1964 to prevent further fighting between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. After the hostilities of 1974, the Council has mandated the Force to perform certain additional functions. In the absence of a political settlement to the Cyprus problem, UNFICYP has remained on the island to supervise ceasefire lines, maintain a buffer zone, undertake humanitarian activities and support the good offices mission of the Secretary-General. Total strength reached

14Resolution of the 5th committee of the General Assembly A/C.5/66/14 : http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/C.5/66/14 15 Fifth committee of the General Assembly resolution A/C.5/66/24 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/C.5/66/14

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1091 in November 2011. Fatalities since 1964 are 181. Approved budget for the period 07/2011-06/2012) $58,204,247 including contribution of one third from Cyprus and $ 6,5 million from Greece( A/C.5/66/14 ) 7. United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

Originally, UNIFIL was created by the Security Council in March 1978 to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security and assist the Lebanese Government in restoring effective authority in the area. The mandate had to be adjusted twice, due to the developments in 1982 and 2000. Following the incidents in July/August 200616, the Council enhanced the Force and decided that in addition to the original mandate, it would among other things monitor the cessation of hostilities; accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the south of Lebanon; and extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced people. Total strength is 13,036 blue helmets and volunteers. Fatalities to the moment are 293, a tragic and devastating figure. Approved budget is up to $545,450,600 A/C.5/66/14. 8. United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)

The Security Council, by its resolution 1990 of 27 June 201117, responded to the urgent situation in Sudan’s Abyei region by establishing the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei(UNISFA). The Security Council was deeply concerned by the violence, escalating tensions and population displacement. The operation would monitor the flashpoint border between north and south, and is authorized to use force in protecting civilians and humanitarian worked in Abyei. UNISFA’s establishment came after the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) reached an agreement in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to demilitarize Abyei and let Ethiopian troops to monitor the area. Total strength estimated 3,818. Fatalities so far are 5. Approved budget 07/2011-06/2012 is $175,500,500 [A/C.5/66/24]. 9. United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) On July 2011 South Sudan became the newest country in the world.18 The birth of the Republic of South Sudan is the culmination of a six year peace process which began with the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. In adopting resolution 1996(2011)19 on 8 July 2011, the Security Council determined that the situation faced by South Sudan continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region. The Security Council established the United Nations Mission in the Republic of the South Sudan (UNMISS) for an initial period of one year, starting from 9 July 2011. There is one fatality since July 2011.Total budget approved is $722,129,600. 10. United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) Having determined the situation in Cote d’Ivoire continued to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region and acting under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the security Council, by its

16 The ‘’July War’’ between Hezbollah and Israeli army, after Hezbollah fired missiles in border towns of Israel as a diversion for an anti tank missile attack near the Golan Heights. 17Resolution 1990/2011 of the Security Council: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/389/50/PDF/N1138950.pdf?OpenElement 18 Following the decision took by the referendum which took place in South Sudan 9-15 January 2011. 19Resolution 1996/2011 of the Security Council : http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/405/83/PDF/N1140583.pdf?OpenElement

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resolution 1528(2004)20 of 27 February 2004, decided to establish the United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire(UNOCI) as from 4 April 2004. UNOCI replaced the United Nations Mission in Cote d’Ivoire (MUNICI) a political mission set up by the Council in May 2003 with a mandate to facilitate the implementation by the Ivorian parties of the peace agreement signed by them in January 2003. Following the 2010 Presidential election and the ensuing political crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, UNOCI has remained on the ground to support the new Ivorian Government. Personnel are 12,415. Fatalities since 2003 are 89. Approved budget is $645,961,400. 11. United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) The mandate of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo(UNMIK) was established by the Security Council in its resolution 1244(1999)21. The Mission is mandated to help ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo and advance regional stability in the western Balkans. The Missions character is mainly administrative but is also included in the peacekeeping operation as the area of Kosovo has been quite unstable in the past 2 decades causing a lot of fraction among its inhabitants and the Serbian government. The total strength of the mission is only 407 personnel mainly civilian. No fatalities have been reported and the budget for the year starting 07/2011 is $44,914,800. 12. United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established by Security Council resolution 1509 (2003)22 of 19 September 2003 to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the peace process; protect United Nations staff, facilities and civilians; support humanitarian and human rights activities; as well as assist in national security reform, including national police training and formation of a new, restructured military. Strength of the operation is 10,929 blue helmets. Its approved budget rounds up to $ 525,612,730. 13. United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) A multidimensional, integrated UN peacekeeping operation was established by Security Council resolution 1704 of 25 August 2006 in the wake of a major political, humanitarian and security crisis which erupted in Timor-Leste in April-May 2006. Among other things, UNMIT has been mandated to support the Government in consolidating stability, enhancing a culture of democratic governance and facilitating political dialogue among Timorese stakeholders, in their efforts to bring about process of national reconciliation and to foster social cohesion. Strength is as of November 2,704 personnel. Approved budget (07/2011-06/2012) is $196.077,500. 14. United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) Following the tension in the disputed areas of Jammu and Kashmir, UNMOGIP came as a response from the UN to prevent further escalation. The first group of United Nations military observers arrived in the mission area on 24 January of 1949 to supervise the ceasefire between India and Pakistan in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. These observers, under the command of the Military Adviser appointed by the UN Secretary-

20Resolution 1528/2004 of the Security Council : http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/253/20/PDF/N0425320.pdf?OpenElement 21Resolution 1244/1999of the Security Council: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement 22Resolution 1509/2003 of the Security Council : http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/525/70/PDF/N0352570.pdf?OpenElement

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General, formed the nucleus of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Following renewed hostilities of 1971, UNMOGIP has remained in the area to observe developments pertaining to the strict observance of the ceasefire of 17 December 1971 and report thereon to the Secretary-General. Its total strength has varied over the years at the moment it is 115 personnel. The case of UNMOGIP follows another system of funding and there is a total appropriation approved by the fifth committee in a binary basis. For the biennium 2012-2013 the appropriation is $21,084,400. 15. United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) Set up in May 1948, 23UNTSO was the first ever peacekeeping operation established by the United Nations. Since then, UNTSO military observers have remained in the Middle East to monitor ceasefires, supervise armistice agreements, prevent isolated incidents from escalating and assist other UN peacekeeping operations in the region to fulfill their respective mandates. Total Strength of the operation reached in 2011 the 383. The funding of this operation follows the system of appropriation which is in the biennium 2012-2013, $70,280,900. 16. UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is a very special peacekeeping mission, more accurately a political mission established by the Security Council in 2002 at the request of the Government to assist it and the people of Afghanistan in laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development in the country. On 22 March 2011, the 15-member UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1974(2011)24 renewing UNAMA’s mandate until March. Since the coalition of the western forces left Afghanistan UNAMA’s work has been intensified. The case of Afghanistan and especially UNAMA serves as a very unique prototype of political mission. A lot of UN agencies and programs have joined forces in order to work together on five main priorities which include 1)peace, reconciliation and reintegration; 2) human rights protection and promotion; 3) sub-national governance and the rule of law; 4) maternal and newborn health; and 5) sustainable livelihoods. Because of those special characteristics and the fact that UNAMA apart from peacekeeping is mainly political operation it is coordinated only by the Department of Peacekeeping operations and is the funding of the operation is not under the approval of the 5th committee of the General Assembly which is the case in the rest of the operations. This doesn’t change the fact that UNAMA is a large scale operation that requires a large amount of funds.

V. Means of funding

According to Article 17 of the United Nations Charter the General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization and the expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly. In its resolution 55/235 of 23 December 2000, the General Assembly reaffirmed the general principles underlying the financing of peacekeeping operations:

23 This is the longest peacekeeping operation, it has been established in 1948 and since it has maintained a vital role in the Middle Eastern region. 24 http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/4836671.94843292.html

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‘’The financing of such operations is the collective responsibility of all States Members of the United Nations and, accordingly, the costs of peacekeeping operations are expenses of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, 25of the Charter of the United Nations;’’ In order to meet the expenditures caused by such operations, a different procedure is required from that applied to meet expenditures under the regular budget of the United Nations; Whereas the economically more developed countries are in a position to make relatively larger contributions to peacekeeping operations, the economically less developed countries have a relatively limited capacity to contribute towards peacekeeping operations involving heavy expenditures; The special responsibilities of the permanent members of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security should be borne in mind in connection with their contributions to the financing of peace and security operations; The same resolution decided the rates of assessment for peacekeeping based on ten levels of contribution. General Assembly Resolution 55/236 on voluntary movements in connection with the apportionment 26of the expenses of United Nations peacekeeping operations also decided that: ‘’...at any time during the scale period, a Member State may make a voluntary commitment to contribute

at a higher rate than its current rate by information the General Assembly through the Secretary-General, and

the Assembly may take note of that decision.’’

In 2006, by its resolution 61/26327 the General Assembly endorsed the updated levels of contribution for

peacekeeping operations contained in annex II to the Secretary-General's report on the Implementation of

General Assembly resolutions 55/23528

and 55/23629 and decided to review the structure of levels of

contribution for peacekeeping at its sixty-fourth session. a. Peacekeeping budgets

In its resolution 49/233 A of 23 December 199430, on the administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations, the General Assembly decided that the financial period for each peacekeeping operation shall be from 1 July to 30 June. According to the timetable endorsed by this resolution the Fifth Committee resumes its work annually for a period of four weeks in May to consider the administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping budgets are prepared based on the mandate from the Security Council. A Start-up team is deployed as soon as feasible after the Security Council establishes mandate. A detailed budget is then prepared on the basis of findings of survey mission. It is prepared on an annualized basis (1 July of first year to 30 June to the following year) and therefore covers one mandate period and beyond. In line with the provisions of resolution 55/231 on results based budgeting, the budgets of peacekeeping missions are prepared based on the measures approved in the resolution including to:

25 Article 17 par 2, ‘’The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly’’ 26 While there is no formal definition of the term "apportionment" as the term most often used is "assessment", it should be noted that Article 17(2) of the Charter states that "The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly." 27 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/510/15/PDF/N0651015.pdf?OpenElement 28 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/573/25/PDF/N0057325.pdf?OpenElement 29 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/573/31/PDF/N0057331.pdf?OpenElement 30 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/762/61/PDF/N9576261.pdf?OpenElement

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‘’Ensure that the expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement are directly and clearly linked to the objectives of the programs and in accordance with the different nature of the activities of the programs, taking into account rules 104.7(a) and 105.4(a) of the Regulations and Rules Governing Program Planning ’’ This resolution was reaffirmed in section III of resolution 61/276, which: ‘’Requests the Secretary-General to integrate operational, logistical and financial aspects fully in the planning phase of peacekeeping operations by linking results-based budgeting to the mandate implementation plans of peacekeeping operations.’’ b. Current Process for establishing and extending peacekeeping operations

The process is actually consisted by 4 main steps: -A Survey mission is sent to the area of the peace-keeping operation (for approximately one week), the findings form the basis for developing the operational plan and budgetary analysis. -The Secretary-General presents his report to Security Council on the need to establish a peace-keeping operation, together with financial implications and statement of preliminary estimated costs31. - The Security Council resolution establishes mandate (usually for six months or less).

31 The Secretariat with its specialized agencies Department of Economic and Social Affairs(DESA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations(DPKO) processes the need for a new operation and estimates a total cost depending how pressing the situation in the region in need is.

1Image of the Largest contibutors to UN peacekeeping by percentage

2 Source: Year In Review, Department of Peacekeeping Operations,

United Nations Publications

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On the basis of preliminary estimates for start-up costs of a new mission or additional requirements due to expansion of mandate and operation, and requirements for an existing mission, commitment authority of up to $50 million for one mission is requested for start up costs from ACABQ. Provided that the total commitment authority granted by the ACABQ32 at any one at a time must not exceed a cumulative amount of $150 million. For more than $50 million, commitment authority is requested from General Assembly. (See General Assembly resoluti0n 49/233 A, part IV).33 A Start-up team is deployed as soon as feasible after the Security Council establishes mandate. Afterwards detailed budget is prepared on the basis of findings of survey mission. It is prepared on an annualized basis (1 July of first year to 30 June to the following year) and therefore covers one mandate period and beyond. Review of budget by ACABQ and General Assembly. The General Assembly (5th Committee) approves budget and appropriate amount for current mandate period and for additional period, subject to extension of mission's mandate. Letters of assessment corresponding to mandate period are sent to Member States after General Assembly approves appropriation. Before the end of mandate period, Secretary-General prepares report to Security Council on future of mission or the extension of the already existing one. This is the procedure to deploy a peacekeeping process and it is modified but close enough to the one followed when a peacekeeping operation is renewed. After establishing the peacekeeping operations this brings us to the second part of the process which is find the estimated costs and actually make sure that the UN receives the funds to sustain the operation. The General Assembly apportions peacekeeping expenses based on a special scale of assessments34 under a complex formula that Member States themselves have established. This formula takes into account, among other things, the relative economic wealth of Member States, with the five permanent members of the Security Council required to pay a larger share because of their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security(as seen in the image above). In its resolution 55/235 of 23 December 2000, the General Assembly reaffirmed the general principles underlying the financing of peacekeeping operations: ‘’The financing of such operations is the collective responsibility of all States Members of the United

Nations and, accordingly, the costs of peacekeeping operations are expenses of the Organization to be borne by

Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations;

In order to meet the expenditures caused by such operations, a different procedure is required from that

applied to meet expenditures under the regular budget of the United Nations;

Whereas the economically more developed countries are in a position to make relatively larger

contributions to peacekeeping operations, the economically less developed countries have a relatively limited

capacity to contribute towards peacekeeping operations involving heavy expenditures;

32 ACABQ stands for Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Question, a subsidiary body to the General Assembly responsible for replying to issues mainly within the jurisdiction of the 5th Committee of the General Assembly. 33 Resolution 49/233 A part IV clause 3 ‘’Decides that, if a decision of the Security Council relating to the start-up phase or expansion phase of peace-keeping operations results in the need for expenditure, the Secretary-General is authorized, with the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and subject to the Financial Regulations of the United Nations and the provisions in paragraph 2 below, to enter into commitments not to exceed 50 million United States dollars per decision of the Security Council; the cumulative total of outstanding commitment authority, in respect of the start-up or expansion phase of peace-keeping operations, not to exceed 150 million dollars at any one time; however, appropriation by the General Assembly of any outstanding commitments shall automatically restore the balance of the limit of 150 million dollars to the extent of the amount appropriated 34 The amount of money which the General Assembly determines should be assessed to finance the approved appropriation, shared among Member States in accordance with the scale of assessment. Letters of assessment for the regular budget are sent to Member States on 1 January of each year.

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The special responsibilities of the permanent members of the Security Council for the maintenance of

peace and security should be borne in mind in connection with their contributions to the financing of peace and

security operations;

Where circumstances warrant, the General Assembly should give special consideration to the situation

of any Member States which are victims of, and those which are otherwise involved in, the events or actions

leading to a peacekeeping operation;’’

The same resolution decided the rates of assessment for peacekeeping based on ten levels of contribution. General Assembly Resolution 55/236 on voluntary movements in connection with the apportionment of the expenses of United Nations peacekeeping operations also decided that: ‘’...at any time during the scale period, a Member State may make a voluntary commitment to contribute

at a higher rate than its current rate by information the General Assembly through the Secretary-General, and

the Assembly may take note of that decision.’’

Giving this way the option for a state to offer voluntarily a certain amount of money or anything

that would be possible, as such contributions can take any form a state wishes. Budgets of peacekeeping operations are based on the missions’ mandate from the Security Council. As such, they are strategic documents aligning resources to achieve the overall objectives of the operation.35 Each peacekeeping operation has its own budget and account which includes operational costs such as transport and logistics and staff costs such as salaries. In its resolution 49/233 A of 23 December 1994, on the administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations, the General Assembly decided that the financial period for each peacekeeping operation shall be from 1 July to 30 June36. According to the timetable endorsed by this resolution the Fifth Committee resumes its work annually for a period of four weeks in May to consider the administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of peacekeeping operations.=Peacekeeping budgets are prepared based on the mandate from the Security Council. A Start-up team is deployed as soon as feasible after the Security Council establishes mandate. A detailed budget is then prepared on the basis of findings of survey mission. It is prepared on an annualized basis (1 July of first year to 30 June to the following year) and therefore covers one mandate period and beyond.37 Many countries have also voluntarily made additional resources available to support UN Peacekeeping efforts on a non-reimbursable basis in the form of transportation, supplies, personnel and financial contributions above and beyond their assessed share of peacekeeping costs. The following chart taken from the resolution Implementation of General Assembly resolutions 55/235 and 55/236 Report of the Secretary-General38 shows the way that the General Assembly calculates the assessments of each country based on the GDP per capita and thus categorizing the state and marking them with a letter which is followed by a certain percentage of discount.

35 A Guide to the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions , Dakota Stevens (Jan 2011), Chapter 3, pp 100-110 36 A rule that has been implemented and applies to all peacekeeping operations with the exception of the political ones that have a binary basis appropriation. 37 Documents on the Law of UN Peace Operations, Bruce Oswald, Helen Durham and Adrian Bates (25 Mar 2010),Chapter ‘’Peacekeeping and financing’’ pp 20-30 38 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/64/220

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Large amount of the funds goes to the reimbursement of the states that provide peacekeepers. Troops serving in UN peacekeeping operation s are paid by their own Government according to their own national rank and salary scale. Countries volunteering military contingents and formed police units are reimbursed by the United Nations. The standard rates, approved by the GA, are used to compensate for pay and allowances of all troops and supplementary payment for specialists (within unites). In addition, troop contributing countries, are reimbursed for the usage of personal clothing, gear and equipment, including personal weaponry. The current rates of reimbursement paid by the UN too troop contributing countries per peacekeeper per month include: $1,028 for pay and allowances, $303 supplementary pay for specialists; $68 for personal clothing, gear and equipment; and $5 for personal weaponry. 39 VI. Challenges in the new era

One of the challenges that exist in the new era as peacekeeping expenditures have significantly risen is the objection that some states, especially amongst the larger contributors, that the burden has become quite unbearable. Among them the United States of America has a long-going objection over the budgetary issues that the United Nations has been approving every December. The UN remains really dependent on the largest contributors and is really vulnerable to political pressure when that occurs. Recent example is the United States stance on the admission of Palestine in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. The United States of America in a response to the admission of Palestine to the organization undertook the decision to freeze their funding to UNESCO. This decision of course hindered the scope and the goal of UNESCO as it lost the largest contribution overall. The contribution of the states to the United Nations in general, and other specialized institutions and agencies UNESCO and DPKO are not to be confused. They are separate assets that are transferred to each institution separately and the way that are calculated with deferent factors each time. 40 Another argument that the criticizers use against peacekeeping operations is the lack of effectiveness. A peacekeeping operation can be considered successful in the short term, if the mandate given to it by the Security Council was effectively fulfilled. But ultimately, the UN effort in a post-conflict situation will be judged by the ability of the country involved to sustain long-peace and stability, and embark on the road to rebuilding and development. There are examples in which the UN can take pride. On the other hand, some countries which hosted peacekeeping operations lapsed back into conflict a few years after the UN mission was completed: ‘’Successful operations, in which the patient died’’ had once called them the Under-Secretary General. 41It is in fact truth that most of them never ended in the mandate’s schedule included the first resolution by the Security Council that deployed them. It is in fact a costly and complex procedure to expand a peacekeeping operation, and that makes a lot of states and specialists argue that effectiveness is a trait that most of the operations lack. 42 Apart from that another challenge has risen for the peacekeeping ranks. Many reports for sexual exploitation, sexual abuse, human trafficking, murders and extortions have been submitted to the DPKO and the United Nations Secretariat. Those events, true or false, have stained the reputation of the UN and threatened to

39 United Nations Peacekeeping, Meeting New Challenges, United Nations Department of Public Information Chapter 10 pp 13 40 The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Security: A Challenge to be Met by Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin (30 Sep 2003) 41 United Nations Peacekeeping, Meeting New Challenges, United Nations Department of Public Information, 2006, Chapter 13 pp 68-72 42 Peacekeeping and the International System by Norrie MacQueen (29 Jun 2006)

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undermine its ability to secure a peaceful environment for traumatized regions. This issue becomes financial when law suits reach the New York Headquarters. United Nations as an organization can stand a trial both as prosecutor and as a defendant. The lawsuits include compensation demands which of course are paid from the bulk of contributions the UN gathers each year. 43 Last but not least the new economic era is another worsening fact for the peacekeeping operation statistics. The economic recession that has been deepening ever since has brought a lot of state in a disappointing position in their financial and budgetary maneuvering. This economic chaos we are experiencing has slowed the pace of growth and has brought a deadly stalemate to transactions all over the globe. Governments have tried cuts on every sector possible to avoid a deepening of the economic recession. Instant example is the European Union that struggles amid financial turmoil and a never ending fall of the euro. It is in fact a figure that cannot leave the funding of the peacekeeping mission unharmed. Among the large contributors lies Germany, along with Italy and Spain. Except from that United States of America entered the new presidential- rally period with an enormous external debt that forces the Congress to discuss cuts in vital sectors of the state. Another large contributor, Japan, has been hit this past summer by an unprecedented tsunami which left in the aftermath a devastating 20% reduction in its growth pace. 44 Although the payment of peacekeeping assessments is mandatory, as of 31 December 2011, Member States owed approximately $2.63 billion in current and back peacekeeping dues. This has been one of the bigger problems in the peacekeeping funding. Despite the fact that the assessments are a mandatory obligation ex lege45 of the member states, some states have been delaying their payment in due date. VII. Steps towards a reform

During the first months of his tenure, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon proposed a number of basic reforms aimed at strengthening the capacity of the UN to carry out its mission in the world. Among these was the restricting of the United Nations peacekeeping. In a letter to the General Assembly, the SG noted that ‘’the number of peace operations is at an all-time high, with almost 100,000 personnel in the field’’. Reforms in 2000 had aimed to enable DPKO o launch one new multidisciplinary mission per year, but ‘’ the past 36 months alone have seen the start-up or expansion of nine field missions, with three additional missions currently in active start up’’. ‘’ Over the course of the next year the number of personnel in UN peace operations could increase by as much as 40 per cent’’ the Secretary – General said. He therefore proposed the creation of a new Department of Field Support to handle the planning, deployment and support of peacekeeping operations, leaving the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to focus on such matters of strategic oversight and operational policy guidance.46 On 15 2007 endorsed the proposal and established the new Department of Field Support(DFS) to ensure more effective, coherent and responsive support to field operations and more efficient management of resources. Apart from that DPKO has put into action a new system of organizing operations where cooperation with regional and collective security organizations is a key factor. In the search for sharing the burden to guard peace the United Nations has been increasingly cooperating with regional organizations and other actors and

43 Military Implications of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations by U.S. Government (Oct 2011) 44 Peacekeeping: Peacebuilding, Peacemaking, United Nations Charter, Peace Enforcement, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, History of United Nations Peacekeeping, NATO Peacekeeping, Lambert M. Surhone, Miriam T. Timpledon and Susan F. Marseken ,19 May 2010, Chapter 2, pp 60-70 45 Ex lege(latin)=from the law 46 The United Nations Today, United Nations Publications, New York, 2008, Chapter I: The United Nations Organization, pp 29

2nd


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mechanisms provided for in Chapter VIII of the Charter. It has worked closely with the Organization of American States(OAS) in Haiti; the European Union(EU) in the former Yugoslavia and the Democratic Republic of the Congol the Economic Community of Wes African States(ECOWAS) in Liberia and Sierra Leone; and the African Union(AU) in Western Sahara, the Great Lakes region and Darfur-just to name a few. This has created new opportunities for the developments of a more flexible and responsive system that is better able to address the complex challenges posed by violent internal conflict. VIII. Conclusion

Putting all these facts together we can see the bigger picture. The United Nations Peacekeeping funding needs to adjust to the new data that the past few years brought to the foreground. It is high a revision from an economic perspective is achieved in order to match the new status quo of the modern world. The second Committee of the General Assembly being the economic and financial one has to find ways to revitalize the UN funding system brought down to a reasonable framework where effectiveness wouldn’t be sacrificed. Peacekeeping is one of the most important – if not the most important- of all UN charges. It is indeed possible to find alternatives and still serve the UN ideas and principles. What the United Nations needs is agility and adaptability to new situations and new demands of the contemporary world. Peace costs a lot less than war; we shall make sure it will be the same in the future. IX. References

1. ‘’The United Nations Today’’, United Nations Publications, New York 2008

2. John Terence O'Neill and Nick Rees, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, Cass Series

on Peacekeeping

3. Lise Morjé Howard , UN Peacekeeping in Civil War, 2007

4. Peace Operations after 11 September 2001 (Cass Series on Peacekeeping) , Thierry Tardy, 2004,

5. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: History, Challenges and the Call for Reform ,Paperback ,Joao

Tavares ,2010

6. Chapter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Department of Public

Information United Nations, New York, 2008

7. A Guide to the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions , Dakota Stevens (Jan 2011),

8. United Nations Peacekeeping, Meeting New Challenges, United Nations Department of Public Information

9. Peacekeeping: Peacebuilding, Peacemaking, United Nations Charter, Peace Enforcement, Department of

Peacekeeping Operations, History of United Nations Peacekeeping, NATO Peacekeeping, Lambert M.

Surhone, Miriam T. Timpledon and Susan F. Marseken ,19 May 2010,

10. The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Security: A Challenge to be Met by Bruce Russett

and James S. Sutterlin

11. Peacekeeping and the International System by Norrie MacQueen

12. A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, Kofi Annan, United Nations Publications 2004

13. P. Naskou Perraki- The law of international organizations(in Greek) Ant. N. Sakkoulas 2011

14. United Nations Peacekeeping website : http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/

2

The Role of Nigeria in Peace Building, Conflict Resolution, and Peacekeeping since

1960

Muhammad Juma Kuna

Department of Sociology Usmanu Danfodiyo University

Sokoto

The organizers of this workshop have asked me to speak on Nigeria's role in what can only be very broadly termed conflict management. Conflict management encompasses a wide range of issues such as peace building, conflict resolution, and peacekeeping. To undertake an analysis of Nigeria’s role in conflict management since 1960 therefore is to focus on its various efforts towards building, supporting, and enforcing peace across Africa and the rest of the world. Such efforts are grounded concretely not only in the availability of material resources and military capabilities and how they are or should be deployed in the pursuit of our national interest; they are also historically grounded in our commitment to peace, justice, and equality of all peoples, as well as in the belief in, and respect for the right of all peoples to collectively determine their destiny. It is these commitments that have informed our role in peace building regionally, continentally, and globally.

1. Experience

Over the past twenty-five years, Nigeria has emerged from a relatively obscure

position under colonial domination to a major power in international affairs. This position as well as the commitment underpinning it, has been expressed more forcefully in the defence of Africa which, in cooperation with other countries within the continent and in the Diaspora, has helped in keeping alive the pan-African ideal. Thus between 1960 and 2005, Nigeria has been actively involved in various ways in the struggle against colonialism in Southern Africa; in demonstrating the cultural richness and diversity of Africa (cf FESTAC); in building and maintaining peace throughout the West African region; and in helping to establish, and continuing to support the Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS (1975)] the Organization of African Unity [OAU (1963), now AU (2001)], the Non-Aligned Movement, and other organizations concerned with bringing peace to regions and peoples across the world. It was in defence of these objectives that Nigeria broke off diplomatic relations with France in 1961 over the latter’s nuclear tests in the Sahara desert. Similarly, its membership of the “Frontline States” during the struggle against Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and apartheid South Africa; its long-term chairmanship of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid; and its leadership of peacekeeping missions in Chad (1979-82), Liberia (1990-98), Sierra Leone (1996-00), and Cotê d’Ivoire (2000-Date) are all reflections of its commitment and role to peace building, peace keeping, and conflict resolution.

2. Engagement

It is on this basis that it becomes imperative to grasp the historical significance of the ongoing United Nations reforms effort, and for us to correctly locate Nigeria’s

3

position and role in this reform process. The contemporary manifestations and complexities of conflicts across the world require influential members of the United Nations across continents that have the capacity, the resources, and commitment to peace to intervene in order to prevent the reoccurrence of humanitarian catastrophes such as those that have occurred in Somalia, Rwanda or the Democratic Republic of Congo. The DRC, Rwanda and similar events across Africa send chilling signals that the international community is either too tired of Africa’s conflicts or that the dominant interests within it are busy fanning such conflicts in the struggle to control resources. In either case, there seem to be a general fatigue and reluctance to intervene in Africa’s conflicts. Africa must seize the opportunity, within a reformed, democratic Security Council that gives all peoples irrespective of race, an equal status and voice in the management of world affairs. This is precisely why we need to squarely reject the current calls from certain quarters in the Nigerian foreign policy community and their international collaborators for a disengagement from Africa’s problems based on the spurious and untenable position that just as economic liberalization requires a minimalist, non-interventionist state domestically, so too is a minimalist state required internationally. Since Nigeria, so the argument goes, is facing enormous domestic economic difficulties, it should draw back into its shell and face its own problems (Okpokopo: 1999).

3. Recolonization

This position overlooks both the simple connection between previous and contemporary forms of imperialist domination, appearing today more intrusively as globalization, and how both are implicated in many of Africa’s current conflicts. Nigeria’s commitment to peace in Africa and the rest of the world must be contextualized and justified not just in historical terms as a relic of past achievements; that commitment must be reinvigorated and informed by the imperatives of contemporary global events. Africa possesses a substantial share of the world’s fossils and fuels; yet, it is also one of the most marginalized, if not the most marginalized continents in the world. It is a fact that this marginalization is intensifying to the extent that notions of ‘recolonization’ are today re-echoing in scholarly circles. And there are concrete reasons for this; the deployment of military resources by the West (military training/aid, military bases, arms sales, and increasing reliance on mercenaries, - now ‘respectably’ called Private Military Companies – in ‘outsourcing’ arrangements) are real manifestations of this growing marginalization, and an expansion of what Nkrumah warned against in the case of the Congo: the continuing struggle for the control of Africa’s resources (Kuna: 2003). It is common knowledge that the State Department has estimated that in the next 10-15 years, the bulk of the energy requirements of the United States will come not from the Middle East, but from the Gulf of Guinea. In anticipation of this, there are already military training programmes with, and attempts to secure military bases in a number of countries in West Africa (Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Sao Tome and Principe, and Equatorial Guinea) by the United States. Indeed a large deep sea military base is being contemplated by the US in the Gulf of Guinea.

These are disturbing facts, and lend credence to the general idea of the recolonization of Africa. This is all the more reason why Nigeria’s commitment to peace and development in Africa should be strengthened. If it helped fight colonialism and apartheid as manifestations of imperialist domination and marginalization from the 60s

4

and 70s, its role in conflict management within contemporary global contexts ought to be a logical extension of the struggle of the 60s. This is because we need realize that the current conflicts in Africa are largely manifestations of these new and emergent forms of imperialism. They should and must be addressed vigorously. 4. The Background

An analysis of the role Nigeria has played in conflict management within and outside Africa must necessarily be situated historically and within the context of its foreign policy objectives. Although these objectives have themselves evolved over time, and that an independent, pan-African and anti-colonial foreign policy became increasingly evident during and in the aftermath of the civil war in 1967, it seems that the dominant approach to conflict management could be located in the notion of the four “concentric circles” of national interest. At the core of these circles lies a concern with Nigeria’s own security predicated on the cultivation of good neighbourly relations especially with our immediate neighbours: Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. This is in recognition that our security is inextricably tied to the security of West Africa, and it is for this reason that the second circle expands to include the whole West African region. Continental Africa then constitutes the third circle, and just like in the previous two circles, the major focus is the promotion of peace, economic integration, development, and the fight against all forms of colonial domination. The fourth and final circle focuses on Nigeria’s relations with bodies and countries outside of Africa. 5. The Practice

These concerns constitute the bases of understanding Nigeria’s commitment to peace building, conflict resolution, and peacekeeping within and outside of Africa. The promotion of peace both within and outside of Africa is based on a policy of non-interference, respect for inherited borders, commitment to African unity, economic integration, and to decolonization. It was in furtherance of these objectives, that these concerns began receiving legal and constitutional backing as from the late 1970s. Thus, in both the 1979 and 1999 constitutions, the promotion of African unity; the political, economic, social, and cultural liberation of Africa; the elimination of racial discrimination and the promotion of cooperation across the world became central tenets in the conduct of foreign policy. Section 19 sub-sections (a) to (e) of the 1999 constitution for example clearly support this role by emphasizing the promotion of ‘African integration and support for African unity’ (b) as well as of ‘a just world economic order’ (e). Although such clear constitutional provisions were rare prior to 1979, Nigeria’s concrete actions in the years 1960-1979 very clearly demonstrate the same commitments. Thus the recognition in 1975 of the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) provided a major encouragement to the liberation struggle in southern Africa, marking the beginning of a more engaged commitment to decolonization and African integration. Nigeria’s success in isolating UNITA, its role in the struggle for Zimbabwean independence and particularly its role in the Lancaster House Accords; its support to Namibia not just during the struggle but also in post-apartheid reconstruction in which it contributed about US$20 million in assistance to the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in the 1989 elections, as well as financial and military support to other liberation movements in Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and South Africa were notable planks in the commitment to a

5

free and united Africa. Nigeria’s support for the conduct of elections in several countries such as Niger Republic, are clear indications also to a commitment to the democratisation of Africa.

These goals were also pursued on the economic and cultural levels through various forms of aid, technical assistance, and civil and military training to various African countries. The provision of scholarships/grants/fellowships, training facilities, medical supplies, as well as equipment must also count as part of the general commitment to these objectives. Indeed, it was these forms of assistance that culminated in the Technical Aid Corps Scheme in 1987 wherein Nigerian professionals enlist to serve in Africa, the Caribbean, and Pacific countries that need such services. All these form the general background of Nigeria’s commitment to peace, development, and the economic integration of Africa. They are also the broad guidelines that inform our interventions in conflict situations across the continent in various capacities as mediators, negotiators, facilitators, and peace keepers.

6. The New Situation

The collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the emergence of the United States as a single dominant world power have had far-reaching, and in certain cases implications on the nature, causation, and intensity of war and conflict in Africa. In general, wars and conflicts have become more lethal, violent, and complex: multiple interests that have created a thick mesh between states, multinational corporations, militias, criminal gangs, and vigilantes within and across state boundaries are now dominant features of such conflicts. The conflicts themselves, in contrast to those of the 1970s, are increasingly intra- rather than inter-state. Although largely intra-state, the impact of these conflicts in terms of the intense humanitarian problems they create (refugees, child soldiers, small arms proliferation, sex slaves, and the use of terror as a technique of war etc) is difficult to confine within specific borders. In other words, these conflicts have become borderless, and the crises they unleash are in consequence, also borderless. The character of these new conflicts also dictates changes in the way peace building, peace keeping, and conflict management in general are organized. It is therefore appropriate that Nigeria seem to be redefining its role in peace building from a more cautious one in the 1960s to one of greater involvement especially in the West African region.

Both facts – changing nature of conflicts and security, as well as changing nature of our involvement in peace are influenced by other pertinent historical and contemporary factors. To begin with, size (population, land mass and economy) makes Nigeria the only power especially in West Africa that can contemplate long-range power projection, and thus about the only country in the region, and one of possibly only three in the continent with South Africa and Egypt, capable of sustaining a fairly large military contingent over a long period of time far away from their borders or shores. Its population is almost twice the population of the combined population of other West African countries, with an army of about 94,000, thus overshadowing the combined military forces of all the other West African states put together. Secondly, the sheer diversity of West Africa and the many obvious cultural ties between peoples across colonial boundaries, itself makes Nigeria’s security inextricably tied to the security of that of all of West Africa. In fact, in today’s global context, conflict management is particularly impossible outside of a

6

collective framework. Thirdly, it is significant to recall that the international community is getting fatigued and increasingly reluctant to intervene in Africa’s conflicts. The refusal of the United Nations and the rest of the international community to intervene in Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi, and Sierra Leone - even with very clear warnings that these countries were on the verge of crises are indicative of this fatigue. Finally, Nigeria is the only country in the world with the largest concentration of black people. And as the most populous country in Africa, it is perceived, and perceives itself as responsible for Africa and its problems. Certainly its actions in peace building and conflict resolution demonstrate this fact. All these seem to define a new, more involved role in the furtherance of Nigeria’s central foreign policy objectives. 7. Peace-Building

Nigeria’s effort at peace building has been predicated principally on the pursuit of domestic security through the promotion of peaceful relations between herself and neighbours, and between neighbours themselves. It is against this background that Nigeria’s role in peace building across Africa should be examined. Nigeria strives to put its neighbours at ease and attempts to stave off problems that could arise especially over inherited colonial boundaries by establishing bilateral agreements as the case of relations with Equatorial Guinea since 1988 demonstrate. The dominant role in the mediation of the crises between Liberia and Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso and Mali, and Togo and Ghana are some of the clearest indications of this peace building role. The biggest effort to date however could easily be seen in the case of the conflict with Cameroon over the Bakasi Peninsula. The extreme restraint that Nigeria has demonstrated and its acceptance of the International Court of Justice ruling that ceded the Peninsula to Cameroon is a supreme example of its quest for peace.

This commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts was one of the major catalysts in the formation of the Economic Community of West African States in 1975. Besides securing its overall objectives of regional economic integration, ECOWAS served, by that measure, to reduce the reliance of other West African countries on Western foreign powers for economic and military assistance. Although colonial divisions, especially between British and French West Africa still exist, ECOWAS has the singular effect of weakening these divisions, contributing to greater regional integration and stability, providing an atmosphere for the resolution for border disputes, creating a mechanism for conflict management, and strengthening West Africa’s hand within Africa and in the international community. More specifically, through social and cultural policies, trade agreements, investments opportunities, customs agreement, monetary policies, and mechanisms for conflict management such as the Early Warning System with its four observatories based in Banjul, Cotonou, Monrovia and Ouagadougou, as well as ECOMOG, ECOWAS sought, and has gone a long way in creating a broad framework within which economic integration, peace, democracy and regional development could be realized. Article 42 of the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1999), in recognition of the significance of the peace building role of ECOWAS, establishes its role in stemming social and political upheavals, in addition to being

…involved in the preparation, organisation and supervision of elections in Member States… [ECOWAS] shall also monitor and actively support the development of democratic institutions of Member States. [ECOWAS] shall

7

endeavour to assist Member States emerging from conflicts to increase their capacity for national, social, economic and cultural reconstruction. In this regard, all [ECOWAS] financial institutions shall develop policies to facilitate funding for reintegration and reconstruction programmes.

In addition, there are numerous roles Nigeria has played towards peace building that have rarely come to public notice. Such efforts include those in the Sudan, in the recent crisis in Benin after Gnasingbe Eyadema’s death, and others. This is not to say that there have not been problems, such as lingering border disputes with Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, and Chad. But Nigeria’s preference remains the peaceful resolution of such disputes.

8. Conflict Resolution

As in peace building, the role of Nigeria in the resolution of actual conflicts has been vigorous. In the specific case of conflict resolution, various protocols endorsed by Heads of State and Government provide an effective institutional framework for the resolution of disputes. The ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention mentioned earlier, the Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED, 2002), the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defence (1981), and the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001) are all mechanisms for the resolution of both domestic and regional conflicts. Some of these protocols have lead to the establishment of specialised institutions such as the Mediation and Security Council, Defence and Security Commission, ECOMOG, the Council of Elders, and the office of Political Affairs, Defence and Security (PADS). While these mechanisms have a number of shortcomings, their value in creating a framework for the early detection and resolution of ongoing conflicts is inestimable.

Some of these mechanisms created the grounds for intervening in some of the conflicts in West Africa such as those in Liberia (1990-98), Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Cote d’Ivoire. In the case of Liberia, the situation by December 1989 was serious with Charles Taylor’s offensive launched from Cote d’ Ivoire’s boarder with Liberia. By early 1990, there was real possibility that Liberia would slide into anarchy. With the refusal of the United Nations, the United States and the rest of the International Community to intervene, it was left to ECOWAS at the instance of Nigeria to quickly act to stem the threat to law and order not only in Liberia, but also throughout the Mano River Union, and possibly across West Africa. The Standing Mediation Committee established after ECOWAS’s Banjul meeting failed to address the crises, and it had to later that year raise a 3,000 strong army constituted of troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone and the Gambia to intervene in the Liberian crisis. These troops helped to stabilize that situation that culminated in the Liberian warlords negotiating for peace that led to the elections of July 1997. In monetary terms, it contributed well over ten (10) billion U.S Dollars in maintaining her troops in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In Sierra Leone (1996-99), ECOMOG forces first intervened early in 1998 to reinstate President Ahmed Kabbah. At the peak of the operations ECOMOG had 13,000 troops in the country which conducted both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Late in 1999, the disputants in the Sierra Leonean conflict signed an agreement in Lome, Togo

8

to end the crises, thus paving the way in 2000 for UNAMSIL (United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone).

9. Peacekeeping Roles

The history of Nigeria’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations dates back to 1960 in the Congo just few days after her independence, wherein she not only contributed troops, but also commanded the UNOC operation. Since then, Nigeria has been involved in many UN peacekeeping operations in many parts of the world some of which are in Bosnia Herzegovina, Iraq, Kuwait, Western Sahara, Rwanda, Somalia, Mozambique, Cambodia, Lebanon, Angola, Beirut, India and Pakistan. Nigerian troops are still serving in many UN missions in places like Kuwait, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone. By December 2000, Nigeria had 3404 troops serving under the UN, making her the second largest contributor to UN peacekeeping missions in the world after Bangladesh with a total contribution of 6040. Over 100,000 Nigerian troops have served in UN peacekeeping missions around the world since her first participation in 1960 and four of these missions have been commanded by Nigerian senior military officers (Congo, Angola, and Beirut). The first major peacekeeping role however was that of Chad (1979-82) which Nigeria undertook under the auspices of the OAU. That operation cost Nigeria about $82m which had to be written off. Nigeria has also been, for a long time, the chair of the UN Special Committee on Peace Keeping Operations. Finally, her leadership both as Chair of the Security Council at various times, as well as in other areas in the UN System has given her the opportunity not only to build peace, but also to push for positions favourable to Africa. This long history of participation in peacekeeping operations has given Nigeria’s military sufficient exposure and experience that is valuable not only to the country but also to the entire sub-region.

10. Conclusion

Given these contributions in the maintenance of regional peace, given her enormous human and natural resources, given her experience and capabilities in conflict management, and given the changing nature of global conflict, Nigeria stands in good position to represent Africa and the Black people all over the world in the Security Council. Regionally, Nigeria’s efforts in institutional capacity for conflict management clearly demonstrated in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Togo, Guinea Bissau, and Equatorial Guinea, as well as its support for democracy and development have become indispensable in the dealing with crises. Continentally, concern with pan-African economic integration, and bringing in experiences learnt in ECOWAS and ECOMOG has helped it demonstrate leadership in affairs affecting Africa.

If this leadership role were to be relevant to Nigeria and Africa in the coming years, it must be placed at the service of pan-African integration, an active engagement and struggle, in conjunction with other countries in Africa against its marginalization, and an insistence on self-reliance, fair trade terms, and a pursuit of greater south-south cooperation. Finally, an active agenda must be pursued in dealing with international financial institutions, especially the World Trade Organization (WTO).

INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY & PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, LLC !

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U.N. Peacekeeping:

Few Successes, Many Failures, Inherent Flaws !

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!#

www.IDPPCenter.com ! 3472 Research Parkway, #104-231 Colorado Springs, Colorado 80920 ! 719-268-7198; 719-651-3366 cell!

Code of Conduct !

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A Few “Successes” !

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!

Egregious Failures !

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!

Increased Prostitution, Sexual & Child Exploitation !

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!U.N. Peacekeeping Operations:

2005 Reported Incidents of Sexual Exploitation & Abuse14 !

Accused U.N. Personnel

Total Allegations

Dismissed by 1

st Head

Unsub-stantiated

Pending Investig.

Substan-tiated

Sent to UN Hdqts

OIOS Investig.

Civilian 123 (36%) 4 18 2 15 33 51

Police 24 (7%) 0 6 5 4 0 9

Military 193 (57%) 50 25 5 22 15 71

Totals 340 54 49 12 41 48 136

Percentages 15.9% 14.4% 3.5% 12.1% 14.1% 40.0%

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Policing in Peacekeeping and Related StabilityOperations: Problems and Proposed Solutions

Summary

One of the most crucial and difficult tasks in peacekeeping and related stabilityoperations is creating a secure and stable environment, both for the foreignpeacekeepers and for the indigenous population. During the past decade, the UnitedStates and the international community have tried various approaches to providingthat security. Most of these approaches have included the use of United NationsInternational Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL), whose forces are contributed on a caseby case basis by U.N. Member states. (While other countries usually contributepolice personnel from their own national forces, the United States contracts those itcontributes through a private corporation.) In a few cases, such as Afghanistan andIraq at this time, coalition and U.S. military forces, and not the United Nations, trainand work with indigenous police forces to provide security.

Despite continuing improvements over the past decade, the current system hasseveral drawbacks. UNCIVPOL has been unable to provide an adequate number ofwell-trained policemen for individual operations and to deploy them rapidly. Theirpolice forces experience a lack of consistency in the type and levels of training anda shortage of needed skills. Military forces, on the other hand, are usually not trainedto deal effectively with police situations. These deficiencies lead to three gaps thatimpede the establishment of law and order, particularly those cases where not allparties to the conflict are dedicated to peace or where criminal networks have takenroot. The first is the deployment gap, when international police are not available asquickly as needed. The second is the enforcement gap, where those deployed lacknecessary skills, in particular combined military and policing “constabulary” skills,as well as investigative and intelligence-gathering skills to deal with organized crime.The third is the institution gap, where competent judicial and penal personnel areneeded to provide follow-up services to police work.

Policymakers have long recognized these problems. In February 2000, theClinton Administration sought to remedy them through Presidential DecisionDirective (PDD) 71’s broad policy reforms and guidelines. Although it did notallocate or request the necessary resources for effective implementation, the BushAdministration is implementing some provisions. In August 2000, the U.N. BrahimiPanel report proposed several remedies to improve the U.N. civilian police system,as did another report by contributing nations. Some are being implemented.

Three pending bills would address policing and related capabilities forpeacekeeping and stability operations. H.R. 1414 would establish a rapidlydeployable U.N. civilian police corps. H.R. 2616 calls for NATO to establish asecurity component to be used in post-conflict reconstruction environments and aU.S. police reserve for use in international operations. S. 2127 provides for theUnited States to develop a corps of rapidly deployable personnel, of which rule oflaw personnel may be a part. Related options recommended by experts includeimproving training, increasing international constabulary capabilities, and developinga “stability force” to supplement police with judicial and prison personnel. Thisreport may be updated if warranted.

2/8/2015 Reform of peacekeeping. United Nations Peacekeeping

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Reform of peacekeepingIn 2000, the UN started a major exercise to analyze itspeacekeeping experience, and introduce a series of reformsto strengthen its capacity to manage and sustain fieldoperations.

This was brought about by the surge in demand for UN peacekeepers,with the ‘blue helmets’ being increasingly asked to deploy to remote andoften volatile environments. Peacekeeping also faced a varied set ofchallenges which included:

deploying its largest, most expensive and increasingly complexoperations;designing and executing transition strategies for operations wherestability has been achieved;equipping communities as far as possible with capacity to ensurelongterm peace and stability.

Highlevel Independent Panel on UN PeaceOperationsSecretaryGeneral Ban Kimoon established a Highlevel IndependentPanel on UN Peace Operations on 31 October 2014. The High LevelPanel will make a comprehensive assessment of the state of UN peaceoperations today, and the emerging needs of the future. Announcing thedecision, the SecretaryGeneral said that “the world is changing and UNpeace operations must change with it if they are to remain anindispensable and effective tool in promoting international peace andsecurity.”

He appointed Mr. Jose RamosHorta of TimorLeste to chair the Panelwith Ameera Haq as ViceChair, which will draw together individuals witha wide range of experience and expertise. The 17member Panel consistsof distinguished individuals with experience in different fields.

The Panel will consider a broad range of issues facing peace operations,including the changing nature of conflict, evolving mandates, good officesand peacebuilding challenges, managerial and administrativearrangements, planning, partnerships, human rights and protection of

150

Related documents“Brahimi Report”

New Partnership Agenda:Charting a New Horizon for UNPeacekeeping

New Horizon Initiative:Progress Report No.1

New Horizon Initiative:Progress Report No. 2

Global Field Support Strategy[A/64/633]

Related linksUN peacekeeping Fact Sheet

Peacekeeping policy andguidance

More on New Horizon

Historical overview of howpeacekeeping has changed

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civilians. The review will encompass both UN peacekeeping operationsas well as special political missions (SPMs), which are referred tocollectively as “UN peace operations. With the 15year anniversary of theBrahimi report approaching, the SecretaryGeneral felt that it wasnecessary to again take stock of evolving expectations of UNpeacekeeping and how the Organization can work toward a shared viewof the way forward.

Brahimi reportIn March 2000, the SecretaryGeneral appointed the Panel on UnitedNations Peace Operations to assess the shortcomings of the thenexisting system and to make specific and realistic recommendations forchange. The panel was composed of individuals experienced in conflictprevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

The result, known as the “Brahimi Report” , after Lakhdar Brahimi, theChair of the Panel, called for:

renewed political commitment on the part of Member States;significant institutional change;increased financial support.

The Panel noted that in order to be effective, UN peacekeeping operationsmust be properly resourced and equipped, and operate under clear,credible and achievable mandates.

Peacekeeping policy and strategy reformFollowing the Brahimi report, UN Member States and the UN Secretariatcontinued major reform efforts, including through:

“Capstone Doctrine” (2008), outlining the most importantprinciples and guidelines for UN peacekeepers in the field;Peace operations 2010 (2006), containing the reform strategy ofthe Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO);2005 World Summit [A/RES/60/1] , establishing the PeacebuildingCommission;Highlevel Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change [A/59/565] ,setting out a broad framework for collective security for the newcentury.

New HorizonThe most recent reform documents – The New Partnership Agenda:Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping (2009) and its ProgressReports No.1 (2010) and No.2 (2011) – assess the major policy andstrategy dilemmas facing UN peacekeeping today and in the comingyears.

They attempt to reinvigorate the ongoing dialogue with Member States andother partners on how to better adjust UN peacekeeping to meet currentand future requirements. Read more about New Horizon.

Restructuring the peacekeeping departmentThe major structural change as part of peacekeeping reform took place in2007. To strengthen the UN’s capacity to manage and sustain new peaceoperations, the SecretaryGeneral restructured [A/61/858] thepeacekeeping architecture by:

Splitting DPKO into two, creating a new, separate Department of

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Field Support (DFS);Bolstering the support for new activities in DPKO;Augmenting resources in both Departments and in other parts of theSecretariat dealing with peacekeeping.

DFS developed the Global Field Support Strategy [A/64/633] in 2010aimed at transforming “service delivery” to the field and adapting it to therequirements of today’s peacekeeping operations. Once implemented ,support to the field will become more predictable, professional and flexible,while ensuring cost efficiencies and transparency.

Rates of reimbursement to troopcontributing countriesHistorically, the countries who provide troops for peacekeeping missionsare reimbursed for their contribution by the UN. The question of the ratesis therefore extremely important for a large number of countries whetherit's through the direct provision of military personnel or through thefinancial obligations that make deployment of a peacekeeping presencepossible.

In 2011, the General Assembly (GA) decided to tackle this subject in acomprehensive manner. The GA requested the SecretaryGeneral toestablish a Senior Advisory Group (SAG) to examine the "rates ofreimbursement to troopcontributing countries and related issues" (ref. GAResolution 65/289 of 30 June 2011). The SAG's membership, stipulatedin the Resolution, includes five eminent persons of relevant experienceappointed by the SecretaryGeneral, five representatives from major troopcontributors, five representatives from major financial contributors and onemember designated from each of the regional groups. Former UN DeputySecretaryGeneral and Canadian Deputy Minister of Defence, LouiseFréchette, was appointed as the Chair of this Group. The SAG intends tocomplete its review by the summer of 2012, and its report will besubmitted to the SecretaryGeneral and then passed to the GeneralAssembly.

Conduct and discipline reformOther reforms have been introduced in the field of conduct and discipline.

The SecretaryGeneral imposed a zero tolerance policy followingallegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers in hostcountries.

At the request of the SecretaryGeneral, the then PermanentRepresentative of Jordan to the UN, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid AlHussein,produced a sweeping strategy, known as the Zeid Report [A/59/710] . Itrecommended engaging troop and police contributors, other MemberStates and the wider UN system in a new conduct and discipliningarchitecture for peacekeeping.

In 2008, an UNwide strategy for assistance to the victims of sexualexploitation and abuse by UN personnel was adopted by the GeneralAssembly in resolution A/RES/62/214 .

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The United States and the Future of Peacekeeing Workshop in Washington, DC December 15, 2010 This workshop was made possible by the generous support of the Robina Foundation. In 2000, the United Nations (UN) published the landmark Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, also known as the Brahimi Report. That report recommended sweeping reforms of UN peacekeeping, from the introduction of a peacebuilding strategy to improved logistical support in the field. A decade later, the UN has enacted many of the Brahimi Report’s recommendations, though numerous policy issues remain partially or not at all addressed. With the New Horizon Initiative, a multi-year peacekeeping reform process, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is making a renewed push to improve UN peacekeeping. Due to engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the threat of terrorism from conflict zones around the world, the United States has renewed its interest in peace operations. Washington has increased capacity building and logistical support for UN, regional, and bilateral peacekeeping forces. Nevertheless, the United States has not yet articulated an updated peacekeeping strategy that takes into account the current strains on U.S. forces and likely sources of future conflict. As the primary funder of UN peacekeeping—contributing 27 percent of the budget—the United States has a vested interest in increasing its effectiveness and efficiency. However, internal politics on both sides has impeded robust synergy between the United States and the UN. As part of the Making Multilateralism Work series, the International Institutions and Global Governance (IIGG) program sponsored a workshop on December 15, 2010, in Washington, DC, to bring together stakeholders from the UN, the U.S. government, think tanks, and academia to discuss the United States and the future of peacekeeping. What follows is a summary of the discussion, which was conducted on a not-for-attribution basis. Ten Years After Brahimi: An Assessment of UN Peacekeeping The United Nations has entered an unprecedented era of peacekeeping. Even as UN officials speak of a period of “consolidation,” more troops than ever before are deployed around the world in support of fifteen peacekeeping missions. When the Brahimi Report was published, the UN had 27,000 peacekeepers deployed; today, there are over 120,000 in the field. This surge in deployments exposed structural weaknesses in UN peacekeeping, prompting the New Horizons reform process. Further, relations between major UN stakeholders remain strained—particularly

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between the UN Security Council, which creates missions’ mandates, and troop-contributing countries (TCCs), which provide personnel to carry out those mandates. Despite its flaws, the UN retains several important comparative strengths. First, it is unique in its ability to deploy and sustain troops and police from around the globe in a multinational force that has an advanced capacity to approach conflicts comprehensively. Second, it has flexibility in adjusting to diverse needs on the ground, including through experimentation with different command-and-control structures. Third, it has international legitimacy unparalleled by any other security-focused organization. Fourth, it is cost effective—a critical attribute given the current financial environment. The New Horizons Initiative: A Progress Report DPKO’s New Horizons Initiative aims to improve four main areas of peacekeeping:

— Policy Development: DPKO is working to clarify main components of peacekeeping mandates and to improve their implementation. The UN seeks to refine the protection-of-civilians mandate, including planning for mission scenarios and mapping the capabilities and resources necessary for civilian protection. The political transition from conflict to peace is another important issue for the UN. Peacekeepers are important actors in the early phases of effective peacebuilding: they are responsible for articulating peacebuilding priorities while also supporting consensus among national counterparts; enabling peacebuilding assistance programs through security and creation of political space; and implementing peacebuilding support in limited areas. Finally, DPKO wants to hone its robust approach to peacekeeping by achieving consensus among TCCs on the appropriate balance of deterrence and use of force.

— Peacekeeping Capabilities: DPKO is working to identify and sustain the required capabilities for peacekeeping operations, moving from numbers-driven to capability-driven peacekeeping. To generate and sustain the necessary resources and capabilities, DPKO is developing guidance and capability standards involving TCCs and police-contributing countries (PCCs); strengthening training through monitoring standards and assessing troop readiness; and encouraging more contributions from PCCs and TCCs in the global South while leveraging western countries’ high-end capabilities.

— Reforming Field Support to Meet Twenty-first-Century Requirements: DPKO has already produced a Global Field Support Strategy, which aims to transform service delivery to the field by arranging civilian logistic support for military deployments. Nevertheless, the Department of Field Support requires greater professionalism and cost efficiency.

— Strengthening Planning, Management, and Oversight of Peacekeeping Operations: The UN has already enacted measures to institutionalize “triangular cooperation” through systematic consultation between the Security Council, TCCs and PCCs, and the UN secretariat. There are now secretariat briefings of Security Council members, PCCs, and TCCs before and after technical assessment missions, as well as regular consultations with TCCs and PCCs. DPKO is also evaluating peacekeeping command and control models, a process that will take until next summer.

Persistent Challenges for UN Peacekeeping DPKO is acutely aware of the need to do its job better as the international security landscape grows more challenging and the future of the global economy remains uncertain. Looking ahead, DPKO is preparing itself to do more, be more effective, and be successful with fewer—or perhaps static—resources. Part of this process, as one participant noted, involves identifying what DPKO cannot be expected to perform and implement, as well as areas where implementation is feasible but DPKO needs to improve its capabilities.

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In workshop discussions, participants agreed on several persistent challenges for UN peacekeeping:

— DRC and Civilian Protection: Because it is the largest-ever peacekeeping operation, many look to the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) for evidence of peacekeeping reform’s impact. MONUC’s and now MONUSCO’s struggle to protect civilians focused attention on the need for greater DPKO capacity to fulfill this mandate requirement, which is active in eight ongoing UN missions. DPKO is developing a strategic framework for the protection of civilians in consultation with UN country teams. The framework seeks to define the role of the host government, UN mission, and the planning process in ensuring civilian protection. The framework is part of a larger effort to improve performance in implementing mandates, and to convey realistic messages to the Security Council about what can be achieved on the ground—particularly in the case of Congo, which is the size of western Europe.

— The Intersection of Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: One major paradigm shift resulting from the Brahimi Report

was recognition by member states that peacekeeping and peacebuilding are not separate endeavors; rather, peacebuilding starts on day one of a peacekeeping mission. Despite the existence of the Peacebuilding Support Office, the UN lacks a coherent strategy covering the full spectrum of peacebuilding activities, which involve a wide array of actors throughout the UN system. While tools such as the Integrated Mission Planning Process have been developed to coordinate peacebuilding actors, many gaps remain at the mission level. One area needing improvement is prioritization: when compressed into a short timeframe, the peacebuilding process creates what the World Bank calls “policy stress,” which detracts from overall effectiveness. Better prioritization is needed so that the most important activities—usually security and rule of law—receive attention in the early stages of peacebuilding. The peacebuilding funding structure also requires reform: as the UN hands over peacebuilding to national governments, UN agencies must continue sustainable assistance programs; however, the voluntary contributions that fund these agencies do not arrive on time, causing budget shortfalls and inconsistent assistance delivery.

— Realistic Mandates: Many participants noted the discordance between peacekeeping mandates approved by the Security Council and the resources available to DPKO from TCCs and PCCs. Helicopters were an often-cited example of a critical resource that DPKO lacks, but chronic gaps should be identified and addressed. There is a need to harmonize realistic mandates and capabilities, which is a goal of the New Horizons Process, though acceptance of a “two-step” mandate process—which would involve an iterative exchange between the Security Council and TCCs/PCCs—is unlikely in the near future.

— Resources: Some participants raised the question of distribution of resources among peacekeeping missions; both long-standing missions like the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which began in 1964, and large, ongoing missions like those in the DRC and Darfur, Sudan, can strain financial resources. DPKO hopes to stabilize the peacekeeping budget by improving performance.

— Police: Participants agreed that DPKO’s police capacity is in poor condition. DPKO is not getting the support it needs from donor countries to improve police quality and there are no standard specifications among those police already in the UN system. A greater challenge is adapting police to local situations: because police come from diverse PCCs with different legal and policing systems, and because DPKO lacks a coherent strategy for building local police forces, UN police officers often create confusion in the communities in which they operate. Although police serve an important function in training local forces, the UN also needs more experts who can design new police structures that reflect local needs rather than imported norms and procedures. Several interlocutors referenced the ongoing debate over whether police capacity building should remain the purview of DPKO; for the foreseeable future, DPKO will remain the primary locus.

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— Civilian Capacity: DPKO suffers from insufficient civilian capacity to support its missions. The human

resources system at the UN struggles to update and maintain rosters of civilian experts around the world. There is also a need to identify more experts from the South. To address this problem, a civilian capacity review is under way, the results of which will be released in a report in January.

— Regional Organizations: Although cooperation with regional organizations is an objective that dates back to the UN Charter, procedures for cooperation between the UN and regional organizations on peacekeeping remain inchoate. DPKO is testing different models: a hybrid UN−African Union (AU) mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and a UN-supported and AU-executed mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The UN community does not view the hybrid UNAMID model as a success because the UN and AU differ on major strategic issues; consequently, it is unlikely to be replicated. AMISOM is viewed more favorably, especially by the AU, which prefers to have a unified AU command structure with UN support. In the coming year, DPKO will examine UN regional organization arrangements from a policy perspective in order to better understand the role of the Security Council, mandate formation, reporting structures, command responsibilities, and appropriate rules of engagement.

— Training: One of the greatest challenges for DPKO is ensuring the high quality of its personnel. When the

training budget was cut this year, the UN organized a donor conference, but member states opted to devote extra-budgetary contributions to “sexier” issues like civilian protection, rather than field recruitment. Peacekeeping training centers play an important role in filling the UN’s capability gaps. DPKO is seeking greater partnership with these centers, several of which have expressed interest in collaboration. China, for example, has demonstrated a strong interest in assuming a greater role in peacekeeper training; China has two large peacekeeping training centers, and the Chinese government recently organized a one-week course on UN peacekeeping for senior military commanders. The United States also conducts training through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). The challenge for DPKO, however, is holding regional training centers to UN standards. One U.S. government participant noted that there is insufficient visibility and transparency about what other training and equipment contributors are doing; this lack of openness creates inefficiencies because countries cannot build on each others’ successes.

Ideas for the Future Workshop participants offered a variety of ideas for how the UN can address the aforementioned and other challenges it faces in years ahead.

— Greater Role for Emerging Powers: As Group of Eight (G8) industrialized countries (the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and Canada) draw down their military commitments to reduce financial strain, emerging TCCs like China and Indonesia may pick up the slack. The new Security Council includes several large and important TCCs (including India and Brazil) who will add their voices to the peacekeeping debate. Further, the Group of 20 (G20) may become a venue for expanding the conversation about peacekeeping beyond the G8. Despite differences of opinion about whether peacekeeping is an appropriate topic for the G20—which has previously focused exclusively on economic issues—several participants agreed that peacekeeping is a subject about which G20 states share common ground.

— Expanding DPKO’s Range of Options: DPKO should expand its flexibility so that the international community will have more options to choose from when addressing threats to peace and security. Ideally, capabilities would range from heavy peacekeeping for civilian protection missions to a light footprint for ceasefire monitoring and peacebuilding.

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— Enhancing DPKO’s Capacity: According to participants, DPKO needs greater expertise in these areas: conflict

early warning, political and strategic analysis, operations management, logistics and financing, peacebuilding programming support, development and humanitarian assistance, and rule of law and police functions. While the New Horizons Initiative will address some of these shortcomings, member states need to take a sustained interest in the nuts-and-bolts, if “unsexy,” aspects of peacekeeping.

The United States and the Future of Peacekeeping The Obama Administration and UN Peacekeeping Despite intermittent enthusiasm and rhetorical support for UN peacekeeping at the UN and in the National Security Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, and Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, the United States lacks a clearly articulated strategy for peacekeeping. Inattention to UN peacekeeping comes at the United States’ peril, several participants suggested, given emerging threats around the world as well as China’s increasing involvement. Other interlocutors were more sanguine about Washington’s approach, contending the Obama administration is attuned to the need to get inside the UN and aspires to be deeply engaged in multilateral affairs and to partner with international institutions. The United States is focusing diplomatic attention on marrying the political strategies of peacekeeping with successful mission function. If mandates do not match capacity, or if peacekeeping becomes unhinged from the political track, missions will fail. In recent months, the U.S. government has engaged diplomatically in numerous countries to support the goals of the UN peacekeeping operations there: Cote D’Ivoire, Sudan, DRC, Liberia, Haiti, and Somalia. Of course, the fruits of engagement are not immediately apparent. Some participants suggested expectations for the Obama administration’s multilateral engagement set the bar too high. Even as the United States has engaged on Sudan and Somalia, UN member states accuse Washington of “selective engagement” and criticize the lack of attention to other hotspots with a UN presence. The NGO community expected a high-profile rollout of a new peacekeeping strategy; when this effort stalled after the January 2010 Haiti earthquake, many experts concluded that the Obama administration was doing nothing on peacekeeping. Given American commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, DPKO is looking to Washington mostly for political and financial support. Even though the United States contributes 27 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget, its paltry personnel contributions engenders negativity from large TCCs and PCCs. Leadership on peacekeeping by the Obama administration could pay large dividends: when President Obama met with major TCCs at the UN in September 2009, the response was overwhelmingly positive. There is a need for leadership in the search for creative solutions to UN peacekeeping’s problems, and the United States can fill this gap. Congress and UN Peacekeeping Given the legislative environment in Washington, workshop participants questioned whether Congress would be supportive of more vigorous American engagement with the UN on peacekeeping—for example, extra-budgetary support for high-priority initiatives. There was particular concern that the new Congress would push for cuts in American contributions to the UN, or make contributions contingent on reforms. As one participant noted, the “quietness” of the Obama administration’s approach to peacekeeping may be gaining points at the UN in New York, but it is losing political capital in Washington. Another warned that the State Department’s failure to give precise accounting of its expenditures on peacekeeping would have dire consequences for future budgets in Congress. Others were more optimistic, describing a bipartisan consensus about the importance of the UN in Lebanon, Haiti, and Iraq

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and Afghanistan over the long term. The best way to ensure congressional support for the peacekeeping agenda would be better reform management, accountability, effectiveness, and budgetary oversight. Mechanisms for U.S Peacekeeping Support Going forward, the U.S. government should increase the quantity and quality of its linkages with the UN. The current administration must build on the enduring bureaucratic architecture devoted to peacekeeping to make ongoing programs as effective as possible.

— Global Peace Operations Initiative: The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is the primary mechanism of

U.S. support for international peace operations, including the UN. It is responsible for U.S. efforts to build and maintain capability, capacity, and effectiveness of peace operations through seven objectives and activities: training and equipment, regional and institutional capacity building, clearinghouse activities, transportation and logistics support, deployment equipment, stability police, and support for sustainment and self-sufficiency. The UN hopes to work more closely with GPOI in aligning U.S. resources with UN needs.

— Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance: The U.S. State Department’s Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program implements about half of GPOI’s funding. ACOTA has invested in training peacekeepers as well as trainers. Since most peacekeepers in Africa are from African TCCs, ACOTA has built up national training center capacities in TCCs such as Uganda, Ethiopia, and Senegal. Ninety-two percent of peacekeepers trained by ACOTA deploy to peacekeeping missions; training peacekeepers for deployment to AMISOM is a top priority, followed by UNAMID, other missions in Africa, and regional standby brigades. While success is difficult to determine, peacekeepers trained by ACOTA are tracked through after-action review conferences. DPKO hopes to work with GPOI and ACOTA to evaluate staff officer candidates as well as infantry performance.

— Staff Officers: Although President Obama pledged to increase American staff officers at the UN, due to the UN’s regional quote system, there are few opportunities for U.S. personnel. Americans are at a disadvantage because few have the requisite prior peacekeeping experience, and the inter-agency recruiting process takes a prohibitively long time. The U.S. government is working to circumvent this lengthy process by having eligible personnel on hand, but it is unclear whether and when this change will occur. Still, the question of congressional approval remains, though participants viewed Congress as favorable to U.S. personnel “enabling” UN peacekeeping, though not “directly participating.” DPKO is interested in recruiting more staff officers from the United States and other western countries that do not contribute contingents to build understanding of UN peacekeeping.

Building a Peacekeeping Strategy Workshop participants offered a diverse set of prescriptions for a renewed American peacekeeping strategy:

— Intelligence Sharing: The United States could provide situational awareness as well as early warning information to the UN. While overt U.S. intelligence support would be toxic, the United States could pass information to DPKO that would increase mission safety on the ground and bolster existing early warning and analysis functions. Beyond information, the United States could also provide situational awareness technology and analysts to the UN.

— Women in Peacekeeping: Increasing deployment of women police and peacekeepers would advance the UN’s goal of gender mainstreaming. The United States has a comparative advantage in deploying women because it allows women in combat and police roles.

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— Advocacy in Turtle Bay: U.S. advocacy on the following issues could have positive impacts on UN peacekeeping:

The United States can send a strong message to UN leadership that the most important criterion for selection of senior mission leadership (such as special representatives of the secretary-general and their deputies, force commanders, and police commissioners) must be quality, rather than political considerations.

The United States can advocate for more coherent interventions on the ground, particularly better transitions from heavy military deployments, which are expensive, to lighter civilian-led operations.

— Training Metrics: To improve training of peacekeepers through GPOI, the United States could improve the tools used to measure trainees’ success. A better understanding is needed of the gaps in training by American trainers, as well as trainers trained by the United States.

— Lessons Learned: With enhanced niche capacities resulting from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States can leverage new expertise and repurpose it for UN peacekeeping operations.

Code: SCC/1/1 Committee: United Nations Security Council C Topic: Strengthening United Nations Peacekeeping Operations The United Nations Security Council, 1 2 Stressing the importance of the resolution S/RES/2086, which recognizes the responsibility of nation states to 3 maintain international peace and security, 4 5 Affirming the need for cooperation between United Nations bodies involved in peacekeeping operations, 6 7 Stressing the importance of such cooperation in order to facilitate communication in establishing a universal training 8 program, 9 10 Acknowledging the need for the training of peacekeepers to include gender equality education as a supplement to 11 peacekeeping training, 12 13 Recognizes that the mandate of each peacekeeping mission includes specifics about the needs and the situation of the 14 country or region concerned, 15 16 Determined to create a standardized training program in order to protect peacekeepers, and ensure adequate levels of 17 preparation for any crisis in today’s complex and ever-changing world, 18 19 Recognizes the work of the United Nations Integrated Training Services to better prepare peacekeepers for 20 peacekeeping operations, 21 22 Taking into consideration the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) involvement in deciding training 23 location, 24 25 Noting the success that Quick Impact Projects have had in building confidence in peacekeeping missions, mandates, 26 and peace processes, especially in Darfur, 27 28 Understanding that diplomacy and humanitarian aid take precedence over military force as a means to create 29 conditions for peacekeeping missions, 30 31 Applauding the success of the peacekeeping operations in East Timor and Tonga which developed localized police 32 forces in their respective regions, 33 34 Stressing that United Nations Security Council will only issue a mandate for military intervention within a mission 35 under the most dire circumstances, which will be determined at the discretion of the United Nations Security 36 Council, 37 38 Convinced that the use of military force is a last resort, 39 40 Recognizing that the United Nations has no role to play in the facilitation of regime change, 41 42 Noting the success and lone use of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC’s 43 (MONUSCO) ‘Intervention Brigade’ as outlined in S/RES/2098, 44 45 1) Calls upon the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to determine clear and finite training standards details 46 regarding the evaluation of unsuccessful and successful peacekeeping operations, to determine the most efficient use 47 of tactics and strategy; 48 49 2) Calls upon Member States to create the conditions necessary for peacekeeping operations to function effectively, 50 by the possible use of further ‘Intervention Brigades’ based on MONUSCO’s 2013 Brigade in the Democratic 51 Republic of the Congo; 52 53

3) Supports peacekeeping training for local police forces, which focuses on ensuring long-term peace and security, 54 through measures including, but not limited to; 55

a. Police Development Programs, which will help local police to professionalize and become more 56 efficient relative to their location, 57

b. Delivering appropriate strategic training in order for civilians and police to reinforce their own 58 leadership; 59

60 4) Requests that the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission send an annual report to the DPKO that will include 61 but is not limited to, information: 62

a. Outlining and acknowledging peacekeeping servicemen and servicewomen who are best fit to train 63 future peacekeepers, 64

b. Giving special consideration to those who have; 65 i. Been in similar conflicts or have experienced peacekeeping in that particular country, 66 ii. Demonstrated outstanding behaviour and conduct in the field, 67 iii. Provided effective services to the United Nations; 68 69

5) Recommends collaboration with local NGO’s to gain further knowledge on domestic regions and generate local 70 autonomy for training programs; 71 72 6) Requests an increase in psychological preparation and rehabilitation, to ensure peacekeepers are mentally as well 73 as physically able to fully enter an operation and return to civilian life; 74 75 7) Recommends the use of Quick Impact Projects to help train local police officers to assist in infrastructure projects, 76 including but not limited to hospitals and schools; 77 78 8) Decides to remain actively seized of the manner. 79

Code: Draft Resolution SCC/1/2 Committee: United Nations Security Council C Topic: Strengthening United Nations Peacekeeping Operations The United Nations Security Council, 1 2 Recalling A/RES/62/214 that condemns all acts of sexual abuse or misconduct perpetrated by peacekeepers, 3 4 Recognizing the importance of issues raised by S/RES/2106, which states that sexual violence is a crime against 5 humanity, and calls upon nation states to prosecute cases of sexual misconduct in a timely manner, 6 7 Deeply concerned with sexual violence against women in general and deeming any misconduct by United Nations 8 peacekeepers in particular as unacceptable, 9 10 Noting the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations’ (C34) report A/66/19, which suggests the inclusion of 11 women and promotion of gender equality in Peacekeeping Operations as a means to reduce sexual misconduct, 12 13 Recognizing the instrumental work of gender based violence prevention training workshops organized by the Group 14 of Friends of Corrections for corrections officers of the United Nations, 15 16 Further noting recommendations made by the International Peace Institute (IPI) regarding the appointment of a 17 gender advisor for each peacekeeping operation, 18 19

1) Suggests appointing a Gender Advisor who will have previously occupied a command position on a 20 peacekeeping mission, and who will be selected by the Secretary-General, in consultation with officials 21 from training institutions and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), whose responsibilities 22 will include but will not be limited to; 23

a. Discouraging peacekeepers and other United Nations staff, including policemen and aid workers, 24 from engaging in acts of sexual misconduct by providing the proper and necessary training; 25

b. Reporting to the Secretary-General of the United Nations cases of sexual violence among 26 peacekeepers and other United Nations staff; 27

28 2) Looks favorably upon assisting civilian women and children who are victims of sexual violence by 29

peacekeepers and other United Nations staff, through programs implemented by CSW, WHO and NGOs, 30 and managed by 5th committee of the General Assembly, assisted by the Group of Friends of Corrections 31 and similar organizations, providing assistance including but not limited to; 32

a. Psychological support, 33 b. Medical assistance, 34 c. Financial aid; 35

36 3) Encourages Member States to promote gender equality by including women in all peacekeeping missions 37

to reduce and eliminate sexual violence against civilian women and children; 38 39 4) Recommends that Member States, in addition to NGOs such as the Group of Friends of Corrections, host 40

training workshops dealing with prevention of gender based violence to promote gender equality among 41 United Nations correctional officers; 42

43 5) Calls upon Member States to cooperate with International Criminal Court (ICC) in prosecuting and 44

upholding sentences for peacekeeping officers found guilty of war crimes and sexual violence against 45 civilians; 46

47 6) Decides to remain actively seized of the manner. 48

Code: SCC/1/3 Committee: United Nations Security Council C Topic: Strengthening United Nations Peacekeeping Operations The United Nations Security Council, 1 2 Recognizing the generous contribution of troops to peacekeeping operations by United Nations Member States, 3 4 Understanding the financial burden that a state incurs in providing resources to the peacekeeping efforts, 5 6 Drawing attention to the report of the Secretary General to the General Assembly A/60/692, which states the 7 necessity of additional funding for United Nations peacekeeping efforts, 8 9 Deeply concerned by the insufficient funding of peacekeeping operations, 10 11 Expressing hope that all Member States will provide resources for peacekeeping operations and that those that 12 already contribute continue to provide resources, 13 14 Recognizing the need for more participation from Member States in providing resources to peacekeeping operations 15 in accordance with Article 17 of the Charter of the United Nations, 16 17 Taking into consideration the fact that some states have a greater ability to provide financial support for 18 peacekeeping missions, 19 20 Further recognizing the work of United Nations Contingent-Owned System (UNCOS), which meets every three 21 years to address reimbursing states that contribute to peacekeeping forces, 22 23 Welcoming non-monetary support in terms of voluntary human resources, logistical support, general administrative 24 support, humanitarian aid, and intelligence, 25 26 Acknowledging the General Assembly fifth committee’s authority on budgetary issues, 27 28

1) Requests that the UNCOS meets annually rather than every three years to attend to the orders of 29 reimbursement to state contribution to ease concerns and frustrations; 30

31 2) Decides to increase the level of funding from the United Nations Security Council Members for 32

peacekeeping operations, based on an increase in percentage funding as to be determined by the GA5; 33 34

3) Urges the GA5 to consider an increase in Peacekeeping operation funding from all United Nations Member 35 States; 36

37 4) Decides to remain actively seized of the manner. 38