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The design analogy: a model for moralproblem solving
Kees Dorst, Faculty of Design, Architecture and Building, University of
Technology Sydney, P.O. Box 123, Broadway NSW 2007, Australia
Department of Industrial Design, Eindhoven University of
Technology, P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB, Eindhoven, The Netherlands
Lamber Royakkers, Faculty of Technology Management, Eindhoven
University of Technology, P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB, Eindhoven, The
Netherlands
In this paper we explore an analogy between design and ethics, first drawn
by Whitbeck. We investigate her claim that such an analogy can help to
understand moral problems and aid us in dealing with them by suggesting
strategies for addressing moral problems. We explore the nature of
analogies, and extract criteria for what constitutes a ‘good’ analogy. We
use some of the established knowledge about design and design reasoning
to consider critically and to extend Whitbeck’s design analogy. We
establish the practical merits of the design analogy in a thought
experiment, solving a moral problem in a manner that is closely modelled
on a design method. Our conclusions include suggestions for further
research and a fledgling vision of the future role of design methodology.
We propose that the design analogy could be fruitful in shedding light on
problem solving in various areas of human endeavour not traditionally
associated with design.
� 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: design process, problem solving, ethics
There is a clear trend in many professions to see the work people
do as ‘designing’. For instance, managers now ‘design’ company
policies, and in education, teachers ‘design’ a curriculum. There
has been an extensive study into the possibilities of a ‘design methodol-
ogy of the social sciences’ where professions, such as Lawmaking and
the creation of Government Policy, have been described in design-like
terms (Van Heffen et al., 1999). The design analogy is often hard to
make, though, and if this is not done carefully the potentially useful
analogy degenerates to being little more than a metaphor. This happens
when the authors can be suspected of just taking a few aspects of design
Corresponding author:
Kees [email protected]
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0142-694X $ - see front matter Design Studies 27 (2006) 633e656
doi:10.1016/j.destud.2006.05.002 633� 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Printed in Great Britain
634
that seem comparable to the field in question and draw far-reaching
conclusions about ‘the nature’ of that field on this rather shaky basis.
Still, the design analogy is potentially valuable e designers’ open, crea-
tive, solution-focussed way of working could be very valuable in fields
that have suffered from an overly deterministic approach, or from an al-
most complete focus on the ‘context of justification’ (this is where design
knowledge could help describe the ‘context of discovery’). The central
question to be addressed in this paper is how this ‘design analogy’ can
be made validly, and what kinds of knowledge design practice and de-
sign studies can then offer to other fields of human endeavour.
One field in particular will be the focus of this paper: the comparison to
design has now been made by several authors within the field of Ethics.
Making an ethical decision is a complex process that ethicists already
have organised in a series of ‘steps’ (see, e.g., Harris et al., 2000;Mitcham
and Duvall, 2000). These steps have proven useful both in teaching
ethical concepts to students, and in analyzing ethical issues in real-
life situations. The design analogy has been introduced by engineering
ethicist Caroline Whitbeck (1998a,b) in her book Ethics in Engineering
Practice and Research. In this book the design analogy is mainly
used as a metaphor. Whitbeck provides us with a compelling sketch
of what a designer-perspective on moral problems could offer, but e
in our opinion e the analogy was not fully developed.
In this paper we will probe deeper into the nature of analogies, and we
will try to establish whether the analogy between ethics and design holds
up to scrutiny if we try to construct it more carefully and completely.
Our own motivation for doing this is that the writers, as a design meth-
odologist and a philosopher, believe that the design analogy has a lot to
offer and that it really provides additional insight into moral problems
and moral problem solving. To make these claims, however, we need
to be careful and develop the analogy in as much detail as we can,
and take all relevant aspects of designing and ethics into account.
This article reads as follows: Section 1 summarizes and criticizes the de-
sign analogy, as described by Whitbeck. In Section 2 we will delve
deeper into the nature of analogies, and try to extract criteria for
what constitutes a ‘good’ analogy. Some of the established knowledge
about design, which we will need as basic material for constructing
the comparison between ethics and design, will briefly be discussed in
Section 3. Section 4 critically considers the design analogy as Whitbeck
Design Studies Vol 27 No. 6 November 2006
The design ana
made it. Then the design analogy will be tried out in Section 5, by
constructing a problem-solving process formoral problems that is closely
modelled on a design method. We end with conclusions and ideas for
further research.
1 Moral acting as designing: a reviewof Whitbeck’s analogyMoral problems are often simply defined as conflicts of values, rights, or
professional responsibilities. These moral problems are very compli-
cated, since they have the nature of conflicts about the very way of think-
ing about ethics. They involve the combination and integration of
insights drawn from diverse and often incompatible systems of ethical
thought, in response to some intuitive sense of their rightness in a prob-
lematic situation. Thus the real cause of the intractability of so many
contemporary ethical problems, not least in scientific fields, is not the in-
herent irresolvability of the questions themselves but the failure to re-
solve the prior question of ethical methodology. This problem is
difficult to overcome; the acceptance of the apparent irresolvability of
these questions has become so widespread that there has been a loss of
confidence that there can even be ‘right’ answers to moral problems
(cf. Black, 2002, pp 43e44). This is not to say, however, that this com-
mon presumption should be lightly or quickly accepted. Rather, the
problem needs to be tackled at its core, by determining which general ap-
proach to ethical decision-making is most satisfactory. We believe that
the design analogy can offer new insights into ethical decision-making.
The analogy of moral problems with design problems was introduced by
Whitbeck (1998a). Unsatisfied with existing normative and applied ap-
proaches in ethics, she argues for a different approach that will be briefly
explained now, and commented upon.
Mainstream ethics, Whitbeck (1998b) explains in the online appendix of
her Ethics in Engineering Practice and Research, has been dominated by
rational foundationalist approaches. As a result, ethics has focused pri-
marily on the analysis of moral issues, on a quest for the ultimate ratio-
nal foundations of morality. This means that the field of ethics as we
know it now is typically searching for one, or a limited number of, basic
moral principle(s), and tends to build on unrealistic decision-making
problems. The rational foundationalist approach, according to Whit-
beck, is unnecessarily reductive and therefore misleading. She holds
that moral philosophy should be tolerant towards different approaches,
and should overcome the idea that dealing with moral problems is only
logy 635
636
about analyzing preset moral problems, and selecting the one best
option through justified principles.
One need not agree completely with Whitbeck’s criticism on moral phi-
losophy in general to appreciate the alternative she seeks to offer with
her design analogy. This analogy can be understood best by considering
the central notion of ill-structured problems. Whereas well-structured
problems (such as basic arithmetical calculations), usually have clear
goals, fixed alternatives to choose from, usually maximally one correct
answer and rules or methods that will generate more or less straightfor-
ward answers, ill-structured problems have no definitive formulation of
the problem, may embody an inconsistent problem formulation, and
can only be defined during the process of solving the problem. More-
over, ill-structured problems may have several alternative (good, satisfy-
ing, etc.) solutions, which are not easily compared with each other
(cf. Cross, 1989; Rittel and Webber, 1984; Van de Poel, 2001). For
Whitbeck, the fundamental mistake rational foundationalists make is
that they fail to see that moral problems are ill-structured. By framing
moral problems as ‘multiple-choice’ problems (where we have a fixed
number of possible alternatives to choose from, of which only one is
right), moral philosophers implicitly suggest that moral problems are
well structured. As an alternative, Whitbeck proposes to take the ill-
structured nature of moral problems as a starting point for considering
moral problem solving. Given the fact that designers have to deal with
ill-structured problems all the time, Whitbeck holds we can learn a lot
from designers and engineers when dealing with moral problems in
domains that are not traditionally associated with ‘design’.
The most important lesson to be learned from designing is that practical
problem solving is not only about analyzing the problem and choosing
and defending a certain solution, but also about finding (new) solutions
(Whitbeck calls this ‘synthetic reasoning’).
‘‘Because engineers recognize the importance of engineering design as
well as engineering theory, they appreciate the importance of practical as
well as theoretical problems and of synthetic as well as analytic reasoning.
Devising a good response requires synthetic reasoning. Ethics has been
more involved with analytic reasoning .’’ (Whitbeck, 1998a, p 55).
Designers engage in a designing process, during which new information
may (will) arise, uncertainties and unknowns are taken to be defining
characteristics of the problem situation, and several possible solutions
are pursued simultaneously. Another lesson from designing is that de-
signers seem well able to satisfy apparently conflicting demands at once.
Whitbeck maintains that even though some moral problems may be
Design Studies Vol 27 No. 6 November 2006
The design analogy
irresolvable, it is misleading to present moral problems as such from the
start.
‘‘The initial assumption that a conflict is irresolvable is misguided,
because it defeats any attempt to do what design engineers often do so well,
namely, to satisfy potentially conflicting considerations simultaneously’’
(Whitbeck, 1998a, p 56).
For Whitbeck, the design analogy has a number of attractive features.
It shows that moral acting is not only about deciding between a fixed
number of alternative actions or values, but that it also involves a pro-
cess of acting in which the moral problem unfolds itself and new op-
tions may arise, options that may bring together seemingly
conflicting moral demands. This much more dynamic and open ap-
proach for describing moral problems allows for a study of the uncer-
tainties and changing interpretations that are part and parcel of real-life
problem solving.
In Whitbeck’s book, the design analogy mainly has a metaphorical
function. It goes no further than giving an idea of what a designer-
perspective on moral problems could offer. In her sketch of the design
analogy, Whitbeck has focused mainly on synthetic skills ascribed to
designers. This is understandable, given the fact that Whitbeck has
tried to show designing implies skills that are mostly neglected in moral
philosophy. But Whitbeck on her part has neglected the fact that anal-
ysis, structuration and evaluation are also vital parts of any design
process. In Whitbeck’s book, ‘designing’ remains some kind of magical
synthetic device, able to bring wonders to ethics, but secretive in its
workings.
We agree with Whitbeck that the design analogy has a lot to offer, but
would venture to say that the analogy can only be convincing if it is pur-
sued further, and takes into account all aspects of designing. We believe
that when this is done, we may learn from designers even more than
Whitbeck has suggested. Insights from design methodology could po-
tentially help develop this comparison of moral problems with design
problems in a systematic way, covering both ‘synthetic’ aspects of de-
signing as well as analytic, structuring and evaluating ones. Before we
elaborate the design analogy we need to delve a bit deeper into the con-
cept of ‘analogy’ itself, and establish criteria for the quality and validity
of analogies.
2 On analogyThe ruling tradition within the philosophy of science (and the fields of
science and technology themselves) does not easily accept the use of
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analogies within scientific thinking: analogies were traditionally consid-
ered to be vague ways of thinking that had no business being associated
with the pure reasoning of the sciences. This tradition, which can be
traced in diverse schools of philosophy such as rationalism, empiricism,
scepticism, and dogmatism, only recognised logical deduction and em-
pirical testing as means to attain and justify knowledge. At the begin-
ning of the 20th century, scientific knowledge was considered to be
a special kind of knowledge, which was to be preferred to other kinds
of knowledge due to its rational justification. ‘Rational’ in this context
means reasoning purely logically: The good scientist does not allow him-
self to be influenced by personal preferences or by idiosyncratic ‘good
reasons’, but a good scientist reasons according to logical principles.
The justification of non-logical forms of reasoning, such as inductive,
abductive and analogical reasoning then has to rest on their content
(the ability to formulate their content in hypotheses that can be falsified
through empirical testing, and through the ‘standard’ scientific appara-
tus of logic and deduction) rather than their form, because these forms
of reasoning as such cannot be rationally legitimised.
A renewed appreciation for the analogical way of thinking grew in the
second half of the 20th century. Empirical research done within the
framework of the philosophy of science demonstrated that metaphors
play a far greater role in science than was assumed in the past. Besides,
philosophers like Popper and Kuhn showed that a strictly logical
approach of the development of science is inadequate. Nowadays, anal-
ogies are considered to be a central part of heuristics: the problem-
solving science (cf. Hesse, 1963). The use of analogical reasoning is
accepted as a common tool in science and technology. Analogies can in-
fluence technological design and may contribute to a better understand-
ing of scientific and technological development, as Sarlemijn (1987)
illustrated by the history of the transistor research. Very often, however,
analogies (‘a is like b’) are used without clearly specifying the similarities
and the differences between subject a and referent b. This is really nec-
essary in order to avoid the danger that the notion of analogy becomes
synonymous with ‘some very vague resemblance’. As Sarlemijn and
Kroes (1988) have shown, analogies in the technological sciences can
be given a precise meaning: ‘‘the use of analogies is an important instru-
ment for theory formation, design and construction.’’
We agree with Whitbeck that the analogy between design problems and
moral problems can be pragmatically useful to get more grip on how to
deal with moral problems. But caution is, nevertheless, in order. In gen-
eral, the analogy helps us to see rules or principles with respect to
Design Studies Vol 27 No. 6 November 2006
The design analogy
dealing with design problems that might be relevant for dealing with
moral problems. The danger is that we may be so taken with the similar-
ities of the two objects that we fail to recognize important differences.
These dangers can only be averted by carefully building up the analogy,
and developing it fully.
An analogy requires, first of all, a base line or point from which we can
start and by reference to which we can compare and contrast any par-
ticular problem case or situation. This implies a process of selection: it
is not just a retelling of the shared and distinct features that are impor-
tant but also a judgement of which shared features are important and
which distinct features are to be ignored (see Bankowski, 1995).
FollowingTversky’s (1977) contrastmodel, similaritywill be constructed
as a ‘set theoretic process of feature matching’. Comparison statements
of the form ‘a is like b’ are assessed by comparing features of a
with features of b. People’s ordinary interpretations of comparison
statements make it clear that not all features of a and b are consid-
ered. Instead, only a relevant subset of the features of a and the fea-
tures of b is selected prior to any comparison or matching operation.
As such, the number of features that can be attributed to any given
object is unlimited; any theory of feature matching must postulate
prior feature selection. Tversky’s contrast model postulates prior ex-
traction of those features that are relevant for the task: ‘‘Thus the
representation of an object as a collection of features is viewed as
a product of a prior process of extraction and compilation’’ (pp
329e330). So, features that are not relevant are excluded, and those
that might be relevant would be included.
Comparison statements often display marked asymmetry, where the
judged similarity of a and b differs from the judged similarity of b and
a, in other words, the order in which the objects are placed, is not revers-
ible e not without changing the meaning of the judgement. Of course,
we can change the sequence in ‘Juliet is like the sun’ to ‘The sun is
like Juliet’, but this reversal does not express Romeo’s intention very
well. Tversky attributes such asymmetries to the differential salience
of the features of a and b. Informational value, or diagnosticity of a fea-
ture (see Note 1), is one determinant of feature salience. With respect to
asymmetrical judgements of similarity, Tversky makes a distinction be-
tween ‘subject’ and ‘referent’ which corresponds with, respectively, ob-
ject a and object b in the comparison ‘a is like b’. Confronted with
such a judgement, the receiver focuses on features of referent b and
subsequently compares these with features of subject a. According to
Tversky, we assume that the referent has the most salient features, which
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justify a comparison. If we consider the comparison ‘Moral problems
are like design problems’, design problems can be considered the refer-
ent (e.g., of the implicit category ‘ill-structured problems’) and moral
problems the subject. Because the referent has more salient features
than the subject, the subject will always be more similar to the referent
than vice versa.
In the design analogy, the referent is the ‘design situation’, which con-
sists of design problems, design solutions and the design process (Dorst,
1997), and the subject is the ‘moral situation’. Whitbeck mainly founds
the design analogy on the similarities between the design solutions and
ethical solutions. Based on these similarities, she justifies the design
analogy and suggests some strategies for addressing ethical problems.
In our opinion, this is premature and too restrictive. Firstly, she takes
no notice of the dissimilarities. Secondly, the features she compares
are limited, and essential features of the design situation are neglected
without explanation. This is rather important, especially when one
wants to draw the kind of far-reaching conclusions that Whitbeck has
in mind. This requires a ‘strong’ analogy: most salient features of the de-
sign situation have to be shared by the ethical problem-solving situation,
and an explanation is required why salient features not shared by the
ethical situation can be ignored to maintain the analogy.
3 Redrawing the design analogyBefore we go into a detailed description of the salient features of design,
in comparison to ethics, we need to establish one final point to ensure
the analogy between ethics and design is going to be fruitful. For the
design analogy to be valid we need to establish that design is not a gen-
eral and vague category that basically encompasses ALL kinds of prob-
lem solving (if this were the case, then moral problem solving would be
a direct subset of ‘design’ problem solving, and the analogy would
falter).
The subject of the kind of problem solving that is associated with design
has been an issue in design methodology since Herbert Simon distin-
guished ill-structured problem solving as a fundamentally different spe-
cies of reasoning in his seminal book, the ‘Sciences of the Artificial’
(1969). Lately, Armand Hatchuel (2002) has been developing this issue.
He states that there is a distinction to be made between ‘design’ and
problem solving, and he builds his argument upon Simon’s notion of
ill-structured problems. Hatchuel argues that there are three important
differences between design problem solving and ill-structured problem
solving in general:
Design Studies Vol 27 No. 6 November 2006
The design analogy
- The first difference is that design includes the expansion of the
concepts in which the situation is initially expressed and framed.
This makes the solution process a project, involving several formative
steps, instead of a problem. In design, imagination needs to be applied
right from the very fundamental level of the interpretation of
concepts.
- A second difference is that design requires the design and use of
‘learning devices’ in order to get to a solution. These ‘learning devices’
are sub-processes that help ‘learn about what has to be learned or
should be learned’. They include experiments and simulation
techniques.
- Thirdly, in designing the understanding and designing of the social
interactions is part of the design process itself. The stakeholders
need to develop a way of reaching a solution, which cannot be sup-
posed to exist before the design situation arises. This point comes
very close to the work of Louis Bucciarelli, where he claims that
‘design is fundamentally a social process’ (Bucciarelli, 1994).
From this comparison we can conclude that design undoubtedly in-
cludes stretches of ‘normal’ ill-structured problem solving, but that it al-
ways also contains other processes. Hatchuel states that any model or
description method that tries to reduce design to ill-structured problem
solving is bound to miss important aspects of the design activity.
For describing the salient features of design, we turn to a more de-
tailed source within design methodology. In the third edition of his
standard work How Designers Think, Bryan Lawson (1997) summa-
rizes the salient features of design problems and solutions and the
lessons that can be learnt about the nature of the design process itself
(see Note 2):
Design problems
- Design problems cannot be comprehensively stated
- Design problems require subjective interpretation
- Design problems tend to be organised hierarchically
Design solutions
- There are an inexhaustible number of different solutions
- There are no optimal solutions to design problems
- Design solutions are often holistic responses
- Design solutions are a contribution to knowledge
- Design solutions are parts of other design problems
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Design process
- The process is endless
- There is no infallibly correct process
- The process involves finding as well as solving problems
- Design inevitably involves subjective value judgement
- Design is a prescriptive activity
- Designers work in the context of a need for action
We will now look in detail at the descriptions Lawson gives of the 14
properties of designing. For every property, we will discuss whether
Whitbeck recognizes these properties to be the properties of moral
problems as well, and if to what extent the analogy can be usefully
pursued further. The work of Van de Poel (2001) will also be used
to inform this assessment: he has developed an analogy between eth-
ical problems and ill-structured problems that is similar to
Whitbecks’.
3.1 Design problems cannot be comprehensively statedAccording to Lawson, many aspects of design problems emerge
only after attempting several solutions, and some are never uncov-
ered at all. Furthermore, objectives and relative priorities are uncer-
tain and will probably change during the design process. Design
problems are in dynamic tension with their solutions. One of the
explanations for this is that design problems are generated by several
parties, with varying degrees of involvement in the decision-making
process.
According to Whitbeck, many ethical theorists suggest that moral prob-
lems can be thoroughly described beforehand. She believes this is wrong:
the problem will unfold itself during the process of solving it. Van de
Poel also seems to touch the issue when he addresses the problem that
e also in moral problems e not all relevant data are available at the out-
set of the problem-solving activity. And he remarks that relevant moral
criteria and principles (fairness, utility, etc.) have to be operationalised
during the process of dealing with the problem, which will further define
the problem.
Thus the analogy seems justified on this specific point: There is plausi-
bility in the claim that in order to solve a concrete moral problem, it
is unlikely, if not impossible, to come up with a comprehensive problem
description.
Design Studies Vol 27 No. 6 November 2006
The design analogy
3.2 Design problems require subjective interpretationAccording to Lawson, a characteristic of design problems is that
designers (but also users, clients, etc.) perceive problems differently:
‘‘our understanding of design problems and the information needed to
solve them depends to a certain extent upon our ideas for solving
them’’ (p 89).
Whitbeck does not address this issue. There seems, however, to be some
links to moral problems. At least, part of dealing with moral problems
has to do with deciding how to interpret the problem, and accounting
for all possible views (i.e., interests of stakeholders, employers, etc.)
towards the problem. Lawson goes one step further in suggesting that
not only is the perception of the problem subjective, but that the percep-
tion of the solution is subjective as well.
3.3 Design problems tend to be organised hierarchicallyOften, design problems can be viewed as symptoms of other, higher level
problems. On what level the problem has to be tackled, depends on the
time, power and the resources available to the designer (pragmatic
choice). Whitbeck does not address this issue either. The analogy could
be drawn at this point: a specific case is often, if not always, an instance
of one or more, larger ethical dilemma(s) or problem(s). We could say
that in moral problem solving, too, the level at which to tackle the prob-
lem depends on practical circumstances, especially when it concerns
public controversies.
3.4 There are an inexhaustible number of differentsolutionsWhitbeck focuses mainly on the analogy of design solutions and moral
solutions. According toWhitbeck, as we have seen, there is often no cor-
rect solution to a moral problem, and of several possible good solutions
it is often impossible to say that one of them is best. Whitbeck, however,
goes further than Lawson: she does state that there may be no ultimate,
good solutions, but there are bad ones, and some responses to a moral
problem are unacceptable. Van de Poel is less explicit, but given his re-
mark that it is not always clear what options for actions there are, and
that there may be alternatives, he seems to endorse the analogy on this
point.
3.5 There are no optimal solutions to design problemsLawson refers to the need of making trade-offs and compromising
here. These are, according to Lawson, a matter of skilled judgement.
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Furthermore, there are no methods for deciding how good or bad a
solution is. The best test of a design is to wait and see how well it works
in practice.
The issue of trade-offs is important for both Whitbeck and Van de Poel.
Whitbeck emphasizes that engineers are good at trying to satisfy several
competing (paradoxical) demands at once, and that it is often possible to
at least partially satisfy many of these demands. Whitbeck deems engi-
neering skills in this context of special relevance to ethical problem
solving.
3.6 Design solutions are often holistic responsesLawson refers to the fact that parts of design solutions do not map di-
rectly to corresponding parts of design problems. It is not clear whether
Whitbeck would include this aspect of designing (integration) into the
analogy. She possibly refers indirectly to a type of holistic thinking,
when she describes design as ‘synthetic reasoning’.
3.7 Design solutions are a contribution to knowledgeThis is a very general point: designs add to the knowledge about design-
ing. Surely Whitbeck would agree with this e she uses multiple case
studies not just to illustrate ethical concepts and moral reasoning, but
also to describe the growth of the knowledge about ethical reasoning
(see for instance her treatment of the Challenger disaster).
3.8 Design solutions are parts of other design problemsThe fact that most solutions have undesirable side effects, and can thus
be seen as the creation of new problems, is an implicit part of ethical
reasoning. For example, the energy problem to reconcile global human
need and environmental preservation. To tackle global warming, we
therefore have to look for ways of producing and using electricity which
significantly lessen the CO2 burden. And in deciding how best to tackle
global warming, we have to take into account both the cost effectiveness
of alternatives to fossil fuels, the cost of their environmental impact and
their impact on global security. Suppose, we decide for nuclear energy
as the most beneficial to our society. There are, however, some undesir-
able side effects of using nuclear energy which creates new problems.
These effects include the actual safety of using nuclear energy, the
nuclear waste it produces, and the atomic weapons that nuclear energy
promotes. Whitbeck does not explicitly mention this point in her book.
3.9 The process is endlessThe ninth property of designing according to Lawson is that design
problems cannot have a finite and identifiable end. The process simply
Design Studies Vol 27 No. 6 November 2006
The design analogy
‘ends’ when it no longer seems worth the effort of going further because
the chances of significantly improving on the solution seem small: ‘we do
the best we can.’ BothWhitbeck and Van de Poel do not, or not directly,
address this issue. For some moral problems, spanning a longer range of
time for example, the analogy seems to hold (compare, e.g., the way in
which we are slowly progressing in developing a way to deal with issues
regarding genetic manipulation). In politics, when at a certain time de-
cisions have to be made, the analogy might also hold.
3.10 There is no infallibly correct processAccording to Lawson, the solution of the design problem is not just the
logical outcome of the problem. We might, however, analyse the struc-
ture of the problem, and try to control or vary the design process. This
seems to be in line with Whitbeck’s statement that the development of
possible solutions is separate from definition of the problem and may re-
quire more information (i.e., her claim that moral problems are no mul-
tiple choice problems). Also, it once again states that we need to
investigate the problem before trying to solve it e an important claim
of casuistic theories. The analogy seems useful here with regard to the
relation between the (non-logical) design process, and the role of analy-
sis and the use of metaphors as stepping stones for reaching an original
solution, and the analogical reasoning often visible in design.
3.11 The process involves finding as well as solvingproblemsProblems and solutions are seen as emerging together rather than one
following logically upon the other. Both problem and solution become
clearer as the process goes on. This point has been covered already.
Whitbeck seems to agree here (see also point 3.10). This is a crucial
point: it would change the model of moral problem solving (from being
largely linear to a model that involves but iterations).
3.12 Design inevitably involves subjective valuejudgementQuestions about which are the most important problems and most suc-
cessful solutions are often value laden, says Lawson. Whitbeck does not
address the issue, van de Poel does. He states the process of valuation is
important (how much is a man’s life worth) e objectivity problems are
of course pervasive in ethics (how do we decide, how do we compare
competing valuations/values). This point in the analogy does not change
our image of moral problems drastically. It is what ethics is about e the
question is, mostly, how to get beyond the initial subjectivity that we
bring to a problematic situation.
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3.13 Design is a prescriptive activityDesign is quite unlike science. Whereas the scientific method is mainly
a descriptive activity, designers create, in a way, the future: it is prescrip-
tive. The design process, according to Lawson, deserves ethical and
moral scrutiny. Whitbeck seems also to refer to this issue. Engineers rec-
ognize the importance of engineering design as well as engineering the-
ory. Devising a good response requires synthetic reasoning as well as
analytic reasoning. Ethics had been more involved with the analytic
part e Whitbeck’s central plea is for more attention to synthetic
reasoning.
3.14 Designers work in a context of a need for actionThe last property of designing is that it is bound to a context of action,
by which Lawson seems to mean that engineers do not work in ideal cir-
cumstances, and that there is always a pressure to act (we cannot think
forever). The designer is often not free to decide that he needs more in-
formation, and often has to make decisions on the basis of inadequate
information. For Whitbeck, this is important too. She emphasizes
that people confronted with ethical problems must do more than simply
make judgements: they are faced with a practical problem, and have to
figure out what to do. For Whitbeck, this changes the way we should ap-
proach moral problems. For instance, when faced with crucial ambigu-
ities or uncertainties, these should be understood as a defining
characteristic of the situation. Furthermore, she tries to account for
the fact that engineers as well as moral problem solvers have to work un-
der time pressure. For instance, she recommends pursuing several pos-
sible solutions simultaneously.
4 DiscussionThe first question we should answer now is: does the analogy of moral
situations with design situations e with the moral situation as subject,
and the design situation as referent e work? We compared ethical prob-
lem solving and design on the properties we could find in design meth-
odology literature, and noted many similarities. The dissimilarities we
found are concentrated around two comparatively minor points: (1) it
is not clear whether we can say that the process of the solution of ethical
problems is potentially endless, like in design. This is simply because eth-
ical problem solving tends to involve fewer steps than design problem
solving. And (2) the making of value judgements in design can be
a very subjective step, involving the designers’ perception of the design
problem and solution, the interpretation and prioritising of the needs of
the stakeholders, etc. In ethics, these judgements are at least a bit more
Design Studies Vol 27 No. 6 November 2006
The design analo
constrained by the fact that there are two dominant (well-described)
ways in which the whole issue of value judgements can be approached:
one can either go down the deontological (emphasizing duty and abso-
lute rules) or utilitarian (emphasizing the consequences of an action)
road.
The existence of these two set roads, and the fact that the taking of these
two roads often leads to different conclusions, is a major difference be-
tween ethics and design. But this is not so important for the analogy: in
saying that we are effectively changing the ‘subject’ and the ‘referent’
around . and please be reminded that we are not defending the thesis
that ethics IS design, but just that an analogy can be drawn in which de-
sign is the referent and ethics is the subject. Within this paper, we hope
to have argued that there are many differences between ethics and de-
sign, but that the similarities are also striking.
This brings us to the next crucial point in the evaluation of the analogy,
is it useful? The answer depends on whether it allows us to adopt or
adapt the models, methods and techniques that have been developed
in design methodology for the use in ethics problem solving. As in all
methodology, the proof of the pudding is very much in the eating: it
is important to see whether the analogy can be the basis for a new de-
scription of the moral problem-solving process that does make sense,
and yields new and interesting insights for ethics teaching and the deal-
ing with the ethical dimension of problems in parts of human endeavour
that are not traditionally associated with design.
5 A solving process for moral problemsWe will now briefly dwell on the general models of design problem solv-
ing that have been developed in the last 40 years.
Within design methodology, the main paradigm is that of considering
design to be a rational problem-solving process. Design problem solving
is described as
‘‘. the search for a solution through a vast maze of possibilities . Suc-
cessful problem solving involves searching the maze selectively and re-
ducing it to manageable solutions.’’ (Simon, 1969)
In the rational problem solving view of designing, the design problem
defines the ‘problem space’ that has to be surveyed by going through
problem-solving cycles. According to Simon, the ‘design’ problem-solv-
ing process is seen as different to other kinds of problem solving in two
ways: design problems are ‘ill-structured problems’, which are to be
tackled in an ‘immediate problem space’. And the result of the design
gy 647
648
problem-solving process is not necessarily the ‘best’ solution, but one
that ‘satisfices’. In problem-solving theory, a ‘good’ (most efficient) rea-
soning process is defined as the one that involves the shortest search
path through the problem space. For ill-structured problems like de-
sign, the shortness of the search path is important, but there are a num-
ber of factors that could lengthen the search process while still being
considered good design practice: for instance, it is widely accepted
that one should take time to explore more than one view of the problem
and solution. It is also considered good design practice to accumulate
knowledge around an acceptable solution, which will aid its later mod-
ification and embodiment.
In the last 40 years, the various early models of the engineering design
process and the models of designing that have been developed in the
realm of architecture have converged and found a common basis in
the ‘basic design cycle’. This basic design cycle has been widely ac-
cepted, and has been the basis for the international standards for design
processes (cf. Cross and Roozenburg, 1992). This is a basic problem-
solving cycle of analysisesynthesisesimulationeevaluation (note: in
the architectural design methodology literature, the ‘simulation’ phase
is often implied, but not mentioned explicitly). Given this basic model,
we will now proceed to describe a problem-solving process for moral
problems that explicitly includes this cycle of analysisesynthesisesimu-
lationeevaluation. We will illustrate this by a very simple example
(Baase, 2003):
You are a computer system manager. An employee is out sick and another
employee requests that you copy some files from the sick person’s com-
puter to his computer so he can do some work.
Please note that this example is simply an illustration of a problem-
solving situation in which a problem occurs that has a clear ethical
dimension, in an area that would not normally be associated with design.
In ‘traditional’ ethics this problem would be modelled as an ethical
dilemma, requiring a one-off ethical decision based on a thorough re-
view of applicable ethical principles. In applying this design process
model to the ethical case study, we will also try to illustrate the
usefulness of comparing moral problem solving to designing. This use-
fulness can be illustrated by adopting a specific method, the ‘morpho-
logical chart’ (see many design textbooks, e.g., Roozenburg and
Eekels, 1995) that has been developed in design methodology, to
help solve this moral problem. The particular problem in this
example was selected because it is a small and simple problem, it is
outside the design field, and in this problem situation ethical consid-
erations are important.
Design Studies Vol 27 No. 6 November 2006
The design analogy
5.1 AnalysisAccording to the basic design cycle, we have to define the moral problem
statement. We have to define the interests of the stakeholders, the limi-
tations (e.g., legal limitations) and the relevant facts, in order to discuss
a moral issue intelligently. So, we must start with a consideration of
what those facts are. In any given case, many facts will be obvious to
all, and they should be taken into account. However, if people disagree
about some facts, or if they are not all aware of the same facts, this may
make a marked difference in the way they approach and solve the moral
problem (cf. Harris et al., 2000).
5.1.1 Application to the exampleSuppose there is a strong policy against personal use of the computer
system, and it is routine practice for employees to share files while work-
ing on a project, then there might be no moral problem with copying the
files. This shows the importance of facts in a moral controversy. What
can look like a moral problem can actually just be a lack of information
about the facts of the situation? In this example, we assume that there is
no policy against personal use of the computer.
The moral problem concerns invasion of privacy. The moral ‘solu-
tion’ must satisfy the requirements that can be expressed by limita-
tions. For example, if there is a legal rule for invasion of privacy if
you copy personal files, then there is a risk to you (the system man-
ager) and to the company from a complaint or lawsuit. On the other
hand, the employee making the request and the company might suffer
if important work is not completed on time. So the limitations are
not always very clear-cut. The obvious stakeholders include the sick
employee, the employee making the request, and you. There are,
however, others. Other people working on the same project might
suffer negative consequences if lack of access to needed files delays
its completion. In any business scenario, if the revenue and success
of the business as a whole could be seriously affected, the owners
((perhaps) thousand of stockholders) and other employees are stake-
holders. In this example, we will assume the impact on this group is
minor.
5.2 SynthesisIn this stage, we have to explore the widest possible array of moral
solutions given by the corresponding options for action. These options
for action have to meet the requirements defined in the analysis.
649
650
5.2.1 Application to the exampleThere might be a very simple option for action: Call the sick employee,
and ask permission to copy the files. But he may not be reachable. Let us
say that in this case the employee is overworked, and cannot be con-
tacted as that might adversely affect the person’s health (doctor’s
orders), which can be seen as a limitation as described in the analysis
(the previous stage).
To illustrate the usefulness of design methods for the solution of moral
problems, we can now use a variant of the ‘morphological chart’ method
that is often used in engineering design to chart all the possible solutions.
In this chart (see Table 1) the vertical axis contains all the subsequent
actions that have to be taken in order to copy the data from the com-
puter. Horizontally, we have listed the parties that could do these ac-
tions (‘actor’ 1 through 6).
So now the entire possible action scenario’s can be constructed by select-
ing one ‘acting party’ for every step in the data-searching-and-extracting
process. This gives us a huge number of possible action scenarios: 66
(¼ 46 656). This is one of the basic problems of morphological charts:
while they do give a complete overview of all possible solutions in a
defined problem area, the number of solutions quickly becomes so
high that they cannot all be tested. So we need to use one of the heuris-
tics that have also been developed in design methodology to artificially
lower the number of solutions, hopefully without throwing away any of
the really good ones. In doing this we are aiming for a ‘satisficing’ solu-
tion, and not necessarily the best one. This is very much part of real-life
design practice (cf. Lawson, 1997).
First of all we can limit the number of solutions by a factor 6 by the fact
that the sick employee cannot be contacted with the consequence that he
cannot do any of the six actions. In addition, the automated computer
file search program can perform only action 3. We could limit our search
by stating that the privacy issues are less of a problem if the actor has
a greater distance from the employee who has fallen ill. So for every ac-
tion in the process (especially the last three actions), we would like to use
actor 5: if we can get a ‘third person’ (someone we just pick from the
street, or hire an independent expert) to do the action, there is less dan-
ger of a privacy issue coming up. But alas not all steps can be done by
a third person e some actions (notably actions 4 and 6) do require an
intimate knowledge of the project and of the usefulness of some infor-
mation, otherwise it might not be possible to create a set of search terms
Design Studies Vol 27 No. 6 November 2006
The design analogy
that would bring up all the relevant files in the computer system (and not
other files). Actually there is also no way to test the effectiveness of such
a list of search terms. So, actor 5 cannot do the actions 4 and 6. The final
action really poses the greatest problem: how can we validate the status
and worth of the data (it could be that the owner’s work has been
steadily decreasing in quality as he was approaching the ‘being over-
worked’ point, in which case the data you copy may be incomplete or
erroneous e which might have serious consequences for the project)?
As a consequence, for the last action only the system manager or
Table 1 The morphological chart for the example problem
Actor 1:
the
original
user
Actor 2:
the
company
manager
Actor 3:
the system
manager
Actor 4:
a
colleague
Actor 5:
a third
party
Actor 6:
an
automated
computer
file search
program
Action 1:
turn on
computer
Action 2:
type in
access
code
Action 3:
search for
the project
files
Action 4:
select the
files
Action 5:
copy the
files
Action 6:
validate
the data
that is in
the files
651
652
a colleague is in a position to perform the action in a satisfactory
manner. Two possible action scenarios given the heuristics above are,
for example, indicated by the dashed line and the straight line. However,
here they risk invasion of privacy. So, this method shows that the deci-
sion to copy the project files inevitably leads to invasion of privacy.
Other requirements that can be used to roughly limit the search space
within the morphological chart are the available resources (time and
money available to extract the data, compared to their estimated
value/the time it will cost to generate the data again), the minimal legal
requirements, etc. These can also be used to evaluate possible action
strategies, and select the best ones for simulation, more extensive evalu-
ation, and the final choice for the ‘best’ solution. We will not go into the
details of applying these and other design choice heuristics here. But we
hope to have demonstrated that the design analogy not only holds, for
this synthesis step of the problem-solving process, but that it can actu-
ally be very useful because it allows us to borrow methods and tech-
niques from design methodology.
5.3 SimulationAccording to the basic design cycle, the options of action have to be sim-
ulated. This simulation for these options of action can obviously not be
done by drawing, models and scenarios as in the design process. The
moral simulation consists of the moral consequences of all the options
for action separately. The moral consequences can be gained by differ-
ent theories. Some main theories are utilitarianism and deontological
theories. Deontologists tend to emphasize duty and absolute rules, to
be followed whether they lead to good or ill consequences in particular
cases. One example is: Do not lie. An act is ethical if it complies with
ethical rules and is chosen for that reason. Utilitarianism is the most
common form of consequentialism. Its guiding principle is to increase
happiness, or ‘utility’. We should consider the consequences e the ben-
efits and damages to all affected people e and ‘‘calculate’’ the change in
aggregate utility. An act is right if it tends to increase aggregate utility
and wrong if it tends to decrease it: the greatest happiness of the greatest
number.
These simulations are evaluated on the basis of the criteria (interests,
limitations, etc.) formulated in the analysis. Depending on the degree
of complexity, this will be done in many layers, quickly rooting out
the worst options for action right after the idea, and just pursuing
some options in more detail. The synthesis phase thus typically includes
several rounds of idea generationeanalysisesimulationeevaluation.
Design Studies Vol 27 No. 6 November 2006
The design analogy
5.3.1 Application to the exampleLet us consider the option that you comply with the request. In a deon-
tological view this option is morally unacceptable: One has to respect
the privacy of others. If you do not comply with the request, however,
we could also say that this is in a deontological view morally unaccept-
able, since you have to obey the orders of your authority.
In a utilitarian view, we can defend the option that you comply with the
request: The people working on the same project and the company suffer
negative consequences if lack of access to needed files delays. On the
other hand, this option could set a precedent affecting privacy of the files
of all employees who use the company computers, which can be consid-
ered as a negative consequence. Depending on the case, the option is
right if the option increases aggregate utility, the assessment of which
is often not a simple task to perform.
So, as the example shows, ethical theories do not always give a clear
answer to the moral problem, but they can help clarifying one’s think-
ing. For example, the theories can help to make clear which values
and interests are conflicting, which can help to pursue some options in
more detail, starting with the analysis.
5.4 EvaluationThe evaluation of the final option for action is still done under condi-
tions of uncertainty. Moral problems are basically open-ended: The
evaluation of the ‘solution’, and its performance can lay the seed for
new moral problems since we cannot oversee all the consequences of
the option, restarting the cycle. Suppose you would copy anything
that is inappropriate (or even illegal) and you would see it. What is
the right thing to do?: a new moral problem.
We emphasize that a solving process for moral problems is not a linear
process. This is in stark contrast to, e.g., the ethos system methodology
of Harris et al. (2000). The properties of design as well as moral prob-
lems and solutions determine the dynamics of the process. The process
of moral problem solving can be seen as consisting of many of these
problem-solving cycles of analysisesynthesisesimulationeevaluation,
at different scales. (These problem-solving processes are nested: the
small local cycles that deal with sub-problems can just take a couple
of seconds, and bigger ones that take days or months). The complete
process project can also be seen as one cycle of analysisesynthesise
simulationeevaluation, and the phase models that are the root of the
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654
ethical methodology are all based on this basic design cycle of
analysisesynthesisesimulationeevaluation.
6 ConclusionsAs we already stated in Section 4, we are satisfied that there is enough
evidence to draw the analogy between design and ethics. And we have
seen in the last section that there are a number of possibly interesting
models, methods and techniques that could be brought from design
methodology into the realm of moral problem solving. For future re-
search it would be interesting to explore the applications of other
methods and techniques from design methodology for the moral prob-
lem solving. Possible candidates are, e.g., quality function deployment
(QFD) and analysis of interconnected decision areas (AIDA). Now
that we have established this analogy between ethics and design, the
list of interesting potential links between the two fields is practically end-
less. For instance, the descriptions in design methodology of the dynam-
ics in the co-evolution of design problem and design solution (Dorst and
Cross, 2001) can shed new light on the often-problematic start of moral
problem solving processes. Some of the maxims of design practice can be
applied directly and fruitfully in the ethical domain. And the interest in
design methodology for the comparison of novice versus expert behav-
iour, and the striking differences in the approach to design problems
that these studies reveal, can be a source of inspiration for the teaching
of practical ethics, too. We heartily agree withWhitbeck that the general
skills of designing engineers, and the way they approach their problems,
are not at odds with moral problem solving. On the contrary, they can
be applied to the solution of moral problems outside the scope of engi-
neering ethics.
For design methodology, this is just the beginning e design analogies
like this one could possibly be established with many other fields
(in the introduction, we already mentioned management and education,
but there are more .). In our opinion, this is one of the biggest chal-
lenges before design methodology in the coming years. We believe
that the knowledge and the methods that designers and design method-
ologists have developed over the last 40 years are much broader in scope
than just the fields of design, architecture and engineering. It will be
a new task for design methodologists to spread this ‘design’ knowledge
and ‘design’ methods to other professional domains that can benefit
from them.
This will ultimately be to the benefit of design methodology, too. The
systematic application of ‘design’ knowledge and methods in other fields
Design Studies Vol 27 No. 6 November 2006
The design analog
can be an inspiring and stimulating exercise, as we hope to have demon-
strated in this paper.
AcknowledgementsWe are very grateful to Melissa van Amerongen for helpful suggestions,
comments and discussion.
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1. We do not go into details concerning the explanation how the juxtaposition of
two (or more) objects can stress some features and suppress others, since this
would obscure the points we want to make. In brief, we must give an account
of the prominence that context plays in similarity judgements. When someone
faces a set of objects, he clusters them e according to Tversky e in groupings
such that (i) within each group the similarity among the objects is maximized
and (ii) the group is maximally distinct from every other group (the so-called
‘diagnosticity principle’). The given set of objects will emphasize and make certain
features of these objects salient.
2. Another overview of the important characteristics of design situation was given
by Nigel Cross (1990) in his article ‘The Nature and Nurture of the Design
Ability’ which corresponds with Lawson.
Design Studies Vol 27 No. 6 November 2006
