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October 2011

Douglas B. Shaw, EditorConference Proceedings

THE CONTRIBUTION OF

NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONES

TO THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

AND DISARMAMENT REGIME

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The Contribution of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zonesto the Global Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Regime

The United States Institute of PeaceThe George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs

On May 2, 2011, President Barack Obama submitted the Protocols to the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent to ratification. The United States signed these agreements, known respectively as the Treaty of Pelindaba and the Treaty of Raratonga, in 1996 following a global diplomatic campaign to achieve the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The successful extension of the NPT made explicit reference to the relevance of nuclear weapon-free zones to global non-proliferation and many of our NPT partners are parties to nuclear weapon-free zone agreements because they believe these agreements promote their national security. While the Senate has not formally considered a nuclear weapon-free zone agreement since then-President Ronald Reagan ratified the Protocols to the Latin American and Caribbean Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in 1981, these agreements are understood by other governments to be important. Like much of the substance of nuclear security and proliferation prevention, nuclear weapon-free zones may seem esoteric, but are deeply relevant to the crucial U.S. national security objectives of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and the use of these weapons against the United States or our interests. This document offers a partial explication of that relevance and the role these agreements play in effective global non-proliferation.

America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, released in May 2009, included a recommendation that the United States should “renew multifaceted diplomatic activity and engagement” to reenergize nuclear non-proliferation.1 In an effort to explore one avenue for this renewal, on March 23-24, 2010 the U.S. Institute of Peace and The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs convened a conference on “The Contribution of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones to the Global Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Regime.”

Twenty-two speakers representing eighteen nationalities and terminal degrees in four disciplines led the discussion among more than forty participants. Senior diplomatic representatives from states party to each of the nuclear weapon-free zones,

including eight serving and two former ambassadors and two deputy chiefs of mission, took part. U.S. Institute of Peace Jennings-Randolph Senior Visiting Scholar Jayantha Dhanapala gave keynote remarks that were broadcast by the Voice of America and United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Sergio Duarte offered a luncheon address.

The participants discussed ideas for innovation in the use of nuclear weapon-free zone agreements to promote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Detailed summaries of each speaker’s remarks follow; salient ideas from each panel are highlighted below.

The first panel focused on steps toward the creation of nuclear weapon-free zones and was chaired by Dean Nabil Fahmy of the American University of Cairo and featured presentations by Thai Ambassador to the United Nations Norachit Sinhaseni, Dr. Togzhan Kassenova of the University of Georgia, and Dr. Zia Mian of Princeton University. Progress toward a Middle East nuclear weapon-free zone was identified as crucial to the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Progress toward the establishment of additional nuclear weapon-free zones was identified as possible and important. Panelists suggested that nuclear weapon-free zone organizations, states party, and other multilateral bodies frequently could reaffirm support for the establishment of additional nuclear weapon-free zones and states; that the articulation of key provisions of new nuclear weapon-free zones could facilitate negotiation; that nuclear weapon-free zone negotiation could be linked to other regional confidence-building measures; and that negotiation itself may be confidence-building even before substantial agreement is possible.

The second panel focused on connections between energy development and nuclear weapon-free zones and was chaired by Leonor Tomero, of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, and featured presentations by Indonesian Ambassador to the United Nations Hasan Kleib and Counselor Julio Bravo of the Chilean Embassy to the United States. Panelists observed that nuclear weapon-free zone states party share a common interest in effectively managing the nuclear proliferation dangers related to nuclear energy development, but that non-proliferation incentives offered by the nuclear weapon states to resolve NPT compliance concerns (e.g. in

1 America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace) May 5, 2009, Page 80.

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Iran and North Korea) or promote regime universality (e.g. the U.S.-India deal) may be misaligned with their stated purposes. Panelists also suggested that nuclear weapon-free zones can strengthen confidence in the non-proliferation and disarmament commitments of their states party, thereby strengthening the case for additional assistance in the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Sovereignty can be asserted by nuclear weapon-free zones states party through positive examples of energy development consistent with an increasingly effective nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. In this context, renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies could be important.

The third panel focused on coordination among nuclear weapon-free zone states party and was chaired by former Secretary General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), Peruvian Ambassador Enrique Román-Morey, and featured presentations by New Zealand Ambassador to the United Nations Jim McLay, South African Ambassador to the United Nations Leslie Gumbi, and Uzbek Deputy Chief of Mission to the United States Dilyor Khakimov. Panelists observed an administrative deficit as an obstacle to coordination among and between nuclear weapon-free zones; that states party to nuclear weapon-free zones could be in more regular contact with one another, other nuclear weapon-free states, other governments, and international organizations about shared interests on non-proliferation, disarmament, and energy development; that these communications could take the form of caucusing within the NPT Review process and other multilateral fora; and that institutional linkages could be established to facilitate these communications.

The final panel focused on the experience of a nuclear weapon-free hemisphere in relationship to the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and was chaired by Ambassador Dhanapala and featured presentations by Philippine Ambassador to the United States Willy C. Gaa, Mexican Deputy Chief of Mission to the United States Mabel Gómez Oliver, and Dr. Jeffrey Lewis of the New America Foundation. Panelists discussed the utility of a comparative study of the nuclear weapon-free zones to identify best practices and challenges to thickening international legal obligations related to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, including negative security assurance terms in nuclear weapon-free zone protocols,

administration, withdrawal clauses, zones of application, restrictions on nuclear waste disposal and transportation, and energy development. Scholarly critique of nuclear weapon-free zone performance was discussed as a means to develop and strengthen international norms related to non-proliferation and disarmament, with particular emphasis on the relationship of extended deterrence to nuclear weapon-free status. The advantages of universal nuclear weapon state membership in all relevant nuclear weapon-free zone protocols were discussed.

This report summarizes the discussion at the conference. I have done my best to capture the spirit of each participant’s remarks and taken a conservative approach to editing their language. Direct quotes are indicated by quotation marks on points that were particularly intricate. I am solely responsible for any distortions introduced by my editing.

The success of the conference owed much to the leadership of U.S. Institute of Peace President Richard Solomon, Associate Vice President Dr. Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, and Senior Program Officer Colonel Paul Hughes (USA-ret.). Thanks are owed to several other members of the U.S. Institute of Peace team, including Brian Rose and Janene Sawers. The Dean of The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, Dr. Michael Brown, personally participated in the conference, which also benefited substantially from the efforts of Elliott School staff Katie O’Donnell, Nick Massella, Alicon Morgan and Betsy Cantwell. Grant Schneider deserves special thanks for his tireless efforts to ensure a large number of substantive and logistic complexities resolved into an effective event.

Video of the keynote and luncheon addresses, as well as each of the panels, is available through the Elliott School Web Video Initiative at: http://elliott.gwu.edu/news/events/nuclear-policy-talks.cfm. The conference program, transcripts of the keynote and luncheon addresses, summaries of the other remarks follow.

— Douglas B. Shaw Associate Dean for Planning, Research and External Relations Elliott School of International Affairs The George Washington University

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Keynote Address U.S. Institute of Peace Jennings-Randolph Senior Visiting Scholar Jayantha Dhanapala “Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones—Affirmative Action by Non-Nuclear Weapon States in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”

WeLCoMe Address By deAn MICHAeL BroWn Dean, The Elliott School of International Affairs

PAneL I: CreAtIng nUCLeAr WeAPon-Free Zones: CHALLenges And PAtHs ForWArd• Moderator: Dean Nabil Fahmy, American University of Cairo

• Ambassador Norachit Sinhaseni, Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations

• Dr. Togzhan Kassenova, University of Georgia

• Dr. Zia Mian, Princeton University

PAneL II: energy deveLoPMent In nUCLeAr WeAPon-Free Zones• Moderator: Leonor Tomero, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

• Ambassador Hasan Kleib, Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations

• Counselor Julio Bravo, Embassy of Chile to the United States

PAneL III: CoordInAtIon AMong nUCLeAr WeAPon-Free Zones stAtes PArty For gLoBAL dIsArMAMent

• Moderator: Ambassador Enrique Román-Morey, former Secretary General of OPANAL

• Ambassador Jim McLay, Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations

• Ambassador Leslie Mbangambi Gumbi, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations in Vienna

• Dilyor Khakimov, Deputy Chief of Mission, Uzbek Embassy

PAneL Iv: A nUCLeAr WeAPon-Free HeMIsPHere In A nUCLeAr WeAPon-Free WorLd• Moderator: Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala, U.S. Institute of Peace Jennings-Randolph Senior Visiting Scholar

• Ambassador Willy C. Gaa of the Philippines to the United States

• Minister Mabel Gómez Oliver, Deputy Chief of Mission of Mexico to the United States

• Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, New America Foundation

ConCLUdIng reMArKs By CHAntAL de Jonge oUdrAAt And doUgLAs sHAW

The Contribution of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zonesto the Global Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Regime

The United States Institute of PeaceThe George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs

AgendA

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KEyNOTE:NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONES: AFFIRMATIvE ACTION By NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES IN THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATy

JAyAntHA dHAnAPALA: Thank you, Chantal, for those warm and generous words. Chantal has gone very deep into my past, 1957 and all that. And that makes me remember one of the aphorisms of the famous 17th century French writer, Francois de La Rochefoucauld, who said, “Good advice is something a man gives when he is too old to set a bad example.” And so with that pinch of salt you can listen with some comfort to what I have to say. But, seriously and sincerely, I’d like to thank the Elliott School of The George Washington University and the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) for inviting me to deliver this keynote address to a very important conference that begins tomorrow on nuclear weapon-free zones. I think I’d like to pay a tribute to both these institutions for holding aloft the banner of multilateralism in U.S. foreign policy, as well as the pacific settlement of disputes which is so important in this day and age.

For me, Washington of course is familiar ground. As Chantal said, I’ve had to visit and live in this city, acquiring many avatars (and that is of course before the word was acquired by James Cameron; and I didn’t have a blue face in any of those avatars!). I was here as a student delegate; I was here as an official representative of my government twice; I was here as President of Pugwash; I was here as an international civil servant; and I’m here now, happily, as a Senior Visiting Scholar at USIP.

And on every occasion I’ve been here, I’ve been impressed by the robust, and sometimes boisterous, politicking that goes on in this center of a very dynamic democracy—and we saw something of that last Sunday in Congress. And of course the question arises as to how much of this deep divisiveness is in fact valuable in terms of democracy.

But, one keeps going back to that age old statement of Sir Winston Churchill who said, “Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

Ladies and gentlemen, we are six weeks away from the NPT Review Conference, which will be held in New York. And having been associated with the NPT for over 25 years, I have a sense of deja vu, and almost a sense of cynicism about the scrambling and the preparations that are going on before this conference. It is as if the Treaty did not exist in the last five years.

From time to time, we have this ritual of hectic preparations for a review conference, of conferences that take place amongst delegations, in order to try to ensure a successful result. And this year of course is no different. But, it is different because 2005 was a dismal failure, and we all want to ensure that 2010 is a success.

But, this conference, co-sponsored by the Elliott School and by the U.S. Institute of Peace, is a conference with a difference because it focuses on one of the successful ventures of non-nuclear weapon states in order to maintain and strengthen the norm of non-proliferation. Too often, NPT review conferences are full of mutual recrimination between non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear weapon states. And so it is for me a very pleasant task to address a success story of nuclear non-proliferation in terms of the nuclear weapon-free zones that we have in the world today.

What I propose doing this evening is to discuss the history of these nuclear weapon-free zones, their significance and their specific features. Thereafter, I would like to proceed to

U.S. Institute of Peace President Dr. Richard Solomon and Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala

Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala

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look into the future and explore what further zones can be established which could be declared nuclear weapon-free, and then to conclude with some remarks.

But, let me first explain the title of my talk and why I have selected the topic, “Nuclear weapon-free zones: Affirmative Action by Non-Nuclear Weapon States in the NPT.” I realize that I have used the term “affirmative action” from the political lexicon of the U.S. political discourse and the discourse in other countries who want to have a label for policies or programs providing advantages for people who have been traditionally discriminated against—weaker groups.

And in a sense, what I have suggested is that the non-nuclear weapon states—who are indeed weaker groups and largely small to medium size developing countries in the southern hemisphere—have grouped together in order to assert their own rights and in order to design their own national security posture without nuclear weapons.

All five of them—and they have adopted very exotic names —have grouped a total of 114 countries in order to show a strong opposition to nuclear weapons and to create building blocks for a nuclear weapon-free world which today has become the vision of the President of the United States of America.

They are in fact quarantine zones to protect these countries from the nuclear weapon contagion. They have no nuclear umbrellas. They have no extended deterrence. But, they have, through a policy of self reliance, adopted a nuclear weapon-free zone in order to protect themselves.

And so from the Treaty of Tlatelolco for Latin America and the Caribbean, the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga for the South Pacific, the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok for Southeast Asia, the 1996 Pelindaba Treaty for the entire continent of Africa, and finally the most recent of them, the Treaty of Semipalatinsk for Central Asia in which I, as Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs, had a personal involvement because the five Central Asian states had in the fall of 1997 requested the Secretary General of the United Nations to assist them in having a Central Asian nuclear weapon-free zone.

And it was my privilege through my department in the United Nations to help them organize several meetings to

provide them with the expertise, until finally in 2006, after I had ceased to be Under-Secretary General, they were able, in the very site where the old Soviet nuclear weapon tests were conducted, to sign the Treaty of Semipalatinsk.

Now, there are several points that must be emphasized with regard to the features of nuclear weapon-free zones. First and foremost, it is important to point out that the concept of nuclear weapon-free zones preceded the concept which led to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In her introduction, Chantal has already referred to the Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki, who in 1957 proposed the Rapacki Plan for Central Europe. But coming as it did from a Warsaw Pact country in the height of the Cold War, it is no surprise that the Rapacki Plan had no traction and was soon abandoned.

But, shortly after that in 1959, we had the first nuclear weapon-free zone created through the Antarctica Treaty where a large part of the global surface which is uninhabited was declared nuclear weapon-free and remains so today. Shortly after that of course came the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the fact that we had Brazil and many other Latin American countries concerned about the danger of nuclear weapons, especially if it was located in their continent.

And over a period of time the Latin American countries negotiated the nuclear weapon-free zone, which was the first of the nuclear weapon-free zones. But, we had also succeeded in negotiating by that time in 1967 an Outer Space Treaty which declared that outer space was also going

U.S. NPT Ambassador Susan Burk confers with Ambassador Mabel Gómez Oliver of Mexico

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to be nuclear weapon-free. And that, in the current context of the threatened weaponization of outer space, is a very important factor that we should continue to bear in mind.

The second point I’d like to emphasize is the fact that many of these nuclear weapon-free zones are in fact in the global south. And indeed, despite the fact that Central Asia is north of the equator, and despite the fact that Australia and New Zealand are developed countries in the global south, the opposition to nuclear weapons is very much part of the political identity of the southern hemisphere.

Not all developing countries, as you know, have shunned nuclear weapons, because even in my own area of South Asia we have India and Pakistan who have crossed the threshold with their 1998 nuclear weapon tests. But, I think it is true to say that the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77, have a number of common identities, an opposition to nuclear weapons is one of them, and this is what gives nuclear weapon-free zones a special importance.

It’s also important to bear in mind that nuclear weapon-free zones were conceived as a national security posture. It is a conscious rejection of nuclear weapons as part of the armory which countries wish to use for their national security. It is also in many ways a conservation method because many of them have written into their treaties prohibitions of the dumping of radioactive waste.

All these treaties have established the five nuclear weapon-free zones—and I am not referring to single country nuclear weapon-free zones such as Mongolia, and I believe Austria and New Zealand also have within their domestic legislation provisions for being nuclear weapon-free—because I would like to focus rather on the groups of countries who have gathered freely in order to establish nuclear weapon-free zones.

They have, all of them, done so within the ambit of the UN Charter’s Chapter VIII on regional arrangements and principles that were established through discussion and negotiations within the UN.

In 1975, a UN General Assembly resolution proposed certain principles for the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones. In 1978, the first special session of the UN General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSODI), which reached a historic final document, and I think it remains the highest watermark

of a multilateral disarmament consensus, had very specific language with regard to how nuclear weapon-free zones should be established, and how they should be respected, and how they would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation and the nuclear disarmament norms that were upheld in that special session.

Subsequently the UN Disarmament Commission, which is the universal body in the UN for a focused discussion on the UN and the disarmament role that it fulfills, also came out with a consensus document regarding nuclear weapon-free zones. And that, too, is quoted frequently. Most recently in the UN Security Council Resolution 1887, which came up after a summit meeting of the Security Council chaired by President Obama himself, there is a preambular reference to nuclear weapon-free zones.

So nuclear weapon-free zones have been identified as an initiative that member states take within the ambit of the UN’s machinery and the UN’s principles and norms. There is also a great deal of infrastructural support for these nuclear weapon-free zones which have been created through their treaties. We have Tlatelolco, the first of the nuclear weapon-free zones, creating OPANAL which is the Spanish acronym for the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, and that has its seat in Mexico City.

There is the consultative committee of the Treaty of Rarotonga, and an executive committee for the Treaty of Bangkok and so on. But, more importantly, there are also verification procedures that are legislated for within these

Ambassador Leslie Mbangambi Gumbi of South Africa with Associate Dean Douglas Shaw of GW’s Elliott School

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nuclear weapon-free zones. And special inspections are possible by the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, as a result of the close links between nuclear weapon-free zones and the IAEA.

There are also bilateral arrangements, as the one that exists within Latin America between Argentina and Brazil, ABACC, where a provision is made for officials and technical officers of both countries to visit each other’s sites where the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are conducted. Some of them prohibit armed attack on each other’s installations for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. All this implies that there is a very sophisticated mechanism within the nuclear weapon-free zones for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to be conducted through IAEA inspections and safeguards as well.

Another very important feature is, of course, the protocols. In addition to the treaty which is signed by the member states of that particular zone, there are protocols open for signature by non-members, in particular by nuclear weapon states. And there is through these signatures of the protocols, a respect that is tendered by the nuclear weapon states towards the nuclear weapon-free zones.

Now, it is regrettable that not all these protocols have been signed by all the nuclear weapon states, with the sole exception of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. In the case of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, all five nuclear weapon states of the NPT have signed and ratified the protocols. But, in the case of all the

other four nuclear weapon-free zones, we have not had all of the nuclear weapon states sign the protocols, nor have we had them ratified.

The reason behind this is of course, sometimes related to concerns and reservations that nuclear weapon states have about the freedom of the high seas, about the ability of their vessels to carry nuclear weapons—freely in parts outside the territories of these nuclear weapon-free countries. But, whatever the reasons may be, I think it is important for negotiations to be conducted between countries within the nuclear weapon-free zones and the nuclear weapon states in order to disentangle the problems and to make progress with regard to making these protocols effective and viable.

Fundamental to the signature and the ratification of the protocols is the fact that by their signature, the nuclear weapon states are extending to the nuclear weapon-free zones guarantees of their nuclear security. And these are guarantees that the non-nuclear weapon states have been requesting the nuclear weapon states to give them by treaty for a very long time. “Negative security assurances” is the technical term that is used, and this remains a demand of the non-nuclear weapon states at every NPT review conference.

The Security Council guarantees that have been given have been qualified, and they have not satisfied the non-nuclear weapon states who remained threatened by the use of this most destructive weapon ever invented by humankind.

Finally, let me state that the nuclear weapon-free zones in fact represent a new paradigm for the southern hemisphere. I mentioned the fact that there is already a sense of solidarity with regard to nuclear weapon-free zones in the southern hemisphere. And that has led to an annual resolution in the first committee of the UN General Assembly on nuclear weapon-free zones and the southern hemisphere. And it led in 2005 to the first meeting of nuclear weapon-free zones in the southern hemisphere, which was held in Mexico City.

And the final document of that conference makes very interesting reading because it is a call for greater coordination, for greater cooperation, in the face of nuclear weapon states, and a concerted appeal for the strengthening of the norm of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

Ambassador Willy Gaa of the Philippines (left), Counselor Julio Bravo of Chile (center), and Ambassador Jim McLay of New Zealand

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In many ways, therefore, this conference which will be repeated this year on the 30th of April in New York, being the second conference of nuclear weapon-free zones, is a means of buttressing the NPT. It is a tangible expression on the part of non-nuclear weapons states within the nuclear weapon-free zones of their solidarity with the principles of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

It is also an acknowledgement of the rule of law. It is a model of self-reliance. And so it is the kind of self-assertive action taken by a group of politically disadvantaged countries in order to help themselves. And therefore, it is a model in which I believe that the discrimination that they feel within the NPT between non-nuclear weapons states and nuclear weapons states is alleviated because of the fact that they have their own zones which have banded together like-minded countries.

Now, looking ahead to the future, what further regions can be declared nuclear weapon-free? There was a time when South Asia was seen as a candidate for a nuclear weapon-free zone. And indeed there used to be a hardy perennial resolution which came up in the First Committee. But, I think the events of 1998 have put an end to hopes that we in South Asia had of converting South Asia into a nuclear weapon-free zone. And while we must never use the word “never” in politics, I think it is certainly a distant prospect that South Asia will be converted into a nuclear weapon-free zone.

But, there are two other areas that I would like to address this evening. The first is the Middle East. And here many of you may also be surprised because the Middle East—and we have the visit of the Israeli prime minister right now—is perhaps one of the most complex and conflict-ridden regions of the world with Israel clearly in possession of nuclear weapons, and the rest of the region very much opposed to the Israeli possession of nuclear arms.

But, a resolution for a nuclear weapon-free zone and indeed for a zone free of weapons of mass destruction has been proposed in the UN every year for a very long time. It was the president of Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak, who proposed this idea of a nuclear weapon-free zone and thereafter a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

And in 1995, when it was my privilege to preside over the NPT Review and Extension Conference, it was very clear

that the Arab countries would not join a consensus for the indefinite extension of the NPT unless there was some addressing of their own problems within the Middle East. And so the Resolution on the Middle East was drafted and co-sponsored by the United States, by Russia and by the United Kingdom, who are the three depository states of the NPT; was made part and parcel of the package of three decisions that went into the adoption of the extension of the NPT indefinitely without a vote.

Everybody present in 1995 can vouch for the fact that without the Resolution on the Middle East, we would not have had the indefinite extension. And it is a tribute to the Arab countries that many of them who had not joined the NPT at the time in 1995 then went on to sign and ratify the NPT thereafter, so that today every country in the Middle East save Israel is a member of the NPT and has pledged not to have nuclear weapons.

I believe that the neglect of this resolution since 1995 has been a source of great irritation and indeed deep anger amongst the Arab countries. And in 2005, when the NPT Review Conference failed, this was one of the main reasons for its failure. So, I would hope that before the 2010 Review Conference, all those who are preparing for the conference should find ways and means to advance the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East.

Nobody expects a weapons of mass destruction-free zone to be created in the Middle East overnight. But, it has to be a parallel process that goes hand in hand with the peace process. And although the peace process today is fraught with many, many difficulties, some modest preliminary steps can be taken in New York in May. The government of Egypt has proposed a conference to discuss this matter. I know that others have proposed the appointment of a special coordinator who can consult with all the countries.

Whatever the final decision might be, it is vitally important for some steps to be taken to implement the resolution on the Middle East of 1995. I fear that if that is not done, the resolution will remain a dead letter and we may find the NPT crumbling under the weight of broken promises.

The other area I would like to address very briefly is the Arctic. It is a subject on which I have worked on and on

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which Canadian Pugwash has come out with a proposal, that in the context of climate change where we know that the summer ice of the Arctic has disappeared in two consecutive summers, and that this dreary and desolate area will soon be converted into a hive of commercial maritime activity.

In an ironic twist, many geological ages ago, the Bering Strait was a bridge across which the earliest human beings moved from Europe into the Americas. It could once again be a bridge of friendship, but it could also be a bridge which could exacerbate the hostile movements of nuclear submarines and other strategic weapons. Because it’s a cockpit in which the United States and the Russian Federation face each other, where NATO armies and navies have access, too.

It’s very important, therefore, that before any rivalries can intensify, we should insulate this very important area from nuclear weapon rivalry.

The best way to do that is to begin negotiating a nuclear weapon-free zone: the Arctic Council, which includes, of course, all the countries around that region, including Canada, the United States, Russia, Scandinavian countries, but also including some of the indigenous people, the Inuits and others who live in that area and who have their own traditional interests. That all these interests be harmonized in forming a nuclear weapon-free zone.

In doing so, I think we can benefit from a number of other treaties and agreements, such as the Incidents at Sea Agreement between the US and the former Soviet Union.

We could also draw lessons from the existing nuclear weapon-free zones, as well as many other disarmament treaties, in order to create a zone that would be of benefit to us in this day and age of climate change, and with the vision of a nuclear weapon-free world.

Let me conclude my remarks by saying once again, and emphasizing that the non-nuclear weapon states have been proactive with regard to their obligations under the NPT. One

way in which they have demonstrated their fulfillment of their obligations is by the creation of nuclear weapon-free zones.

We also have the fact that nuclear weapon-free zones are not an end in themselves. But they are a step towards a nuclear weapon-free world, and towards peace and security in their own region.

It’s true that in these regions we’ve had no total elimination of conflict, nor total disarmament. At least, we have the countries turning their backs on the acquisition of nuclear weapons. That, I think, is a very great step forward.

In this capital, which has recently been riven with political rivalries, I can only conclude by quoting two great presidents, one a Republican and one a Democrat, who talked about the importance of getting rid of nuclear weapons.

President Eisenhower, in his 1961 military industrial complex speech, said as a farewell to the nation, “Disarmament with mutual honor and confidence is a continuing imperative. Together we must learn how to compose differences, not with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose.”

In the same year as President Eisenhower’s speech, addressing the UN General Assembly, President John F. Kennedy said, “Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation, or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us.”

Today, with President Obama at the helm, and with his stirring call for nuclear weapon abolition in Prague, we hope that the United States will lead the rest of the world not only to a successful conclusion of a new START treaty with the Russian Federation, with whom it shares 95 percent ownership of the 23,300 nuclear weapons in the world, but also go on to have a successful review conference in New York as a major step towards achieving Global Zero, which is the desire of the overwhelming majority of the world. Thank you.

“ Whatever the reasons, I’m happy it’s happened”— Dean Nabil Fahmy

PARTICIPANTS’ REfLECTIONS ON ThE CONTRIBUTION Of NUCLEAR WEAPON-fREE ZONES TO ThE GLOBAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIfERATION REGIME

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deAn nABIL FAHMy oF tHe AMerICAn UnIversIty oF CAIro: The motivation behind the acquisition by states of armaments generally, and nuclear weapons in particular, is essentially a desire to defend against substantial security threats. For most nations, except those with global security interests, including even many who have traditionally been part of “alliance” structures, these threats, most of all lie within their regional theater. Consequently, looking at regional efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is particularly interesting because they are testimony not to the acquisition of nuclear weapons to ensure security but rather of wise, rational, hard headed calculations that concluded that the introduction of such weapons into their regions diminishes rather than enhances national security.

Amongst the most common approach and translation of these efforts is the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones. The existing zones are, Latin America (the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific (the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga), Southeast Asia (the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok), Africa (the 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba) and Central Asia (the 2006 Treaty of Semipalatinsk).

A quick review of these zones clearly indicates how much they have in common, e.g. prohibiting the acquisition of nuclear weapons, a defined theater of application, verification procedures and a reaffirmation of the rights of all states to the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Nevertheless, they also have different and unique characteristics including the scope of substantive prohibition, as well as difference on geographic scope. Some originally allowed for peaceful nuclear explosions, others did not. Some regions like Mongolia are of one state, and others encompass many states such as Tlatelolco including potentially a whole continent.

As a contribution to the process of fleshing out the issues related to the creation of more nuclear weapon-free zones, it would be extremely useful for the panelists to shed some light on the evolution of the nuclear weapon-free zone in their regions, and the lessons learned from that process, good and bad. I believe that it would be of great interest to have inter-alia the following questions addressed by the panelists:

• When and what was the genesis of the proposal to create a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in your region?

• What was the process used to generate support for the objective, and what was the negotiating process pursued to achieve it?

• How were the geographical delineation, and the scope of prohibition, the verification system, and entry into force and withdrawal clauses determined?

• What were the greatest obstacles and opportunities that emerged during the process of establishment of such a zone?

• Are there elements/provisions of the zone agreement that have or that you believe should be revisited after years of application?

Needless, to say the panelists are also invited to address any other issues they see of interest to them or believe would be useful to the audience.

Nuclear weapon-free zones are all about security, especially for states that have decided to remain outside an alliance, including the Middle East and Egypt particularly. Iran first proposed a Middle East nuclear weapon-free zone in 1974 at the United Nations and Egypt subsequently carried this idea forward. In April 1990, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak widened this idea to a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The idea of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, reflected in the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference, “was crucial—and I’m not exaggerating here—it was crucial in achieving Arab support for the indefinite extension without a vote. There was no doubt at all—no question at all—that the Arab countries would have broken the consensus and voted against, at least some of them. I say that because I had the instructions. Had there not been a Middle East Resolution we would have, as Egypt, called for a vote and broken consensus. So, that’s how important this is for us and that’s why for us it’s an integral part of the package of extension.”2 Successful management of the Middle East issue at the 2010 NPT Review Conference will require three steps: first, a set of

2 Dean Fahmy’s remarks are summarized, direct quotes are included between quotation marks.

PANEL I

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measures to reaffirm the goal of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East without caveats or exceptions; second, some confidence-building measures to demonstrate that this is a serious project; third, practical steps to identify positions of the various prospective states party and protocol parties on geographic scope, obligations, entry-into-force provisions, verification procedures, and administrative requirements; and finally, linking this effort to a negotiating process.

AMBAssAdor norACHIt sInHAsenI, PerMAnent rePresentAtIve oF tHAILAnd to tHe UnIted nAtIons: The United Nations First Committee is debating many of the same issues it was debating fifteen years ago, but there is an opportunity now for forward movement. One small example is that the United States changed its position last year on the resolution proposed by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) from voting against to abstaining and the UK from abstaining to voting in favor, leading to the adoption of the resolution with no negative votes. The general feeling among many delegates is that there is now a window to achieve progress on many issues. The states party to the SEANWFZ view it as the same thing as ASEAN. ASEAN views the SEANWFZ as a practical, regional approach to controlling the spread of nuclear weapons and that our security would be better served without these weapons, with a strengthened global non-proliferation and

disarmament regime, and through regional confidence-building measures.

SEANWFZ was originally envisioned by ASEAN in the context of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971 and is still understood in that larger context in the region. In 1976, ASEAN foreign ministers agreed to begin negotiations on SEANWFZ. A Plan of Action was agreed in 1993 and negotiations were concluded by an ASEAN working group and the Treaty signed in 1995. The Treaty was negotiated and agreed upon among only six parties, but it was always the intention of the negotiators that it should include all ten countries now members of ASEAN. The Treaty entered into force with the deposit of the seventh instrument of ratification in 1997 and the tenth and final instrument of ratification was deposited in 2001. A review of SEANWFZ was completed in 2007.

The SEANWFZ Commission, now chaired by Vietnam, has developed a Plan of Action to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty: enhancing contacts with other NWFZ and international organizations, convening workshops and promoting nuclear safety, and discussions with the nuclear weapon states. One nuclear weapon state has expressed readiness to sign the SEANWFZ protocol, although none have yet done so and this reflects, in part, a failure by the states party to adequately respond to the concerns of the nuclear weapons states. The nuclear weapon states have posed questions to the SEANWFZ parties that have yet to be resolved among them. SEANWFZ allows states party to decide the issue of ports and airfield visits and transit rights for themselves. SEANWFZ includes the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of its states party as well as the continental shelf adjoining the states party in its zone of application. This specification of the zone of application concerns the nuclear weapon states but reflects specific challenges of the time SEANWFZ was negotiated and was included to prevent dumping rather than to establish wider claims of sovereignty, so resolution may be possible. SEANWFZ stipulates that protocol parties would not use nuclear weapons anywhere within SEANWFZ—this geographically defined negative security assurance may be perceived as wider than those of other NWFZ. Ambassador Norachit also expressed interest in the question of the eventual membership of

Dean Nabil fahmy and Ambassador Norachit Sinhaseni of Thailand

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Timor L’Este and Papua New Guinea. SEANWFZ reflects the desire of ASEAN to support the NPT, specifically including non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. SEANWFZ limits the use of nuclear energy, materials, and facilities of states party exclusively to peaceful purposes and supports the development of nuclear technology by states party in accordance with International Atomic Energy Agency standards and obligations.

dr. togZHAn KAssenovA, UnIversIty oF georgIA: Several factors make the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ) unique. There were 1,400 weapons located in Kazakhstan after the fall of the Soviet Union and each state party included some component of the former Soviet nuclear military program. The Republics made a very determined choice of becoming nuclear weapon-free, establishing the Treaty and, taking on additional non-proliferation obligations including adherence to the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. CANWFZ created a disarmament pocket in an otherwise volatile region, bordering Russia and China and in close proximity to India, Pakistan, and Iran. It constituted a conscious step toward a nuclear weapon-free world geographically—as the first zone completely located in the Northern Hemisphere—and in terms of expanding norms.

Mongolia announced nuclear weapon-free status in 1992. In 1993, Uzbek President Karimov proposed the idea of a CANWFZ to the United Nations General Assembly. In 1997, the Almaty Declaration acknowledged the regional commitment to establishing the CANWFZ. Text was agreed in 2005, signed in 2006, and entered into force in 2009 after all five ratifications were completed. The speed of the negotiations is even more remarkable given the economic and political challenges the region faced at this time. The CANWFZ negotiating process was notably open to expertise from the outside, particularly including the James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies, and actively communicating with representatives of other nuclear weapon-free zones, nuclear weapon states, and the United Nations.

The parties initially considered extension of the zone of application to neighboring states, but dropped this idea due

to opposition from the United States. At the time, experts suggested that the US concern was possibly related to the fact that Iran, Turkmenistan’s next door neighbor, might apply to join CANWFZ and that this would further complicate the situation surrounding Iran’s nuclear program.

The Treaty prohibits the importation of radioactive waste to any of the parties, but allows each to decide independently whether to allow the transit of nuclear weapons. Annual consultative meetings among the parties provide for implementation support. Russia and China have expressed their support for CANWFZ and their intent to become protocol parties, but other nuclear weapon states remain concerned with the issue of correlation of CANWFZ with other treaties. Specifically, the 1992 Commonwealth of Independent States Collective Security Treaty signed by four Central Asian states (not including Turkmenistan) with Armenia, Belarus, and Russia specifies that in the case of an act of aggression by another state, parties will render all necessary assistance, including military. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States are concerned that this might grant Russia the right to introduce nuclear weapons into Central Asia. Article XII of CANWFZ specifies that it does not affect the rights and responsibilities of the states party under other treaties to the extent that these do not interfere with CANWFZ obligations. Dr. Kassenova emphasized that nuclear weapon-free zone agreements create a context for their states party to receive strengthened and legally-binding negative security assurances, provide a positive example of the security benefits of nuclear weapon-free status, boost regional security through confidence-building and suppressing the danger of regional proliferation, and by interweaving nuclear weapon-free state and nuclear weapon state commitments to strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation norm, creating tangible progress toward a nuclear weapon-free world.

dr. ZIA MIAn, PrInCeton UnIversIty: South Asia demonstrates that everything that can go wrong sometimes does. South Asia contains two countries that have never signed the NPT, used technology acquired for peaceful purposes to develop nuclear weapons, and the U.S.-India nuclear deal has undermined the regime and Pakistan is now seeking a deal of its own. “There is a nuclear weapons-

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free zone story in South Asia” beginning with a 1972 proposal by Pakistan for such a zone by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto within months after starting Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and interest remains in some sectors of the Pakistani Government. The idea has been seen by civil society in the region as a path forward, there is a regional architecture, and interest in non-nuclear weapon state neighbors. Barring impetus from the nuclear weapon states and others, the prospective parties of a South Asian nuclear weapon-free zone will not be able to move in this direction. While the BJP would be opposed and the Congress Party has not expressed support for denuclearization in South Asia, left wing parties in India that represent the third pole of mainstream Indian politics have come forward in support of nuclear disarmament and denuclearization of the region. There is a concern for strategic stability in Pakistan, where the Government views nuclear weapons as a balance to Indian conventional forces. A South Asian version of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe could respond to this concern. Unlike the existing nuclear weapon-free zones, South Asia is already thick with nuclear weapons and large stockpiles of nuclear weapon-usable fissile materials (over 100 weapons worth on both sides) and a closed fuel cycle in India including breeder reactors that will produce

weapons-grade plutonium. This suggests a large and worsening breakout potential for a potential future nuclear weapon-free zone in South

Asia. The International Panel on Fissile Materials estimates that India has accumulated about 700 kg of plutonium for weapons and may have separated ten times that amount of reactor-grade plutonium outside safeguards. Pakistan has about two metric tons of highly-enriched uranium and about 100 kilograms of plutonium for weapons. When Pakistan talks about the asymmetry of stockpiles, they are talking about the 7 tons of reactor-grade plutonium and the facilities that go with it. A key step to stabilize a South Asian nuclear weapon-free zone would be to end reprocessing and breeder reactor programs in South Asia. India also produces highly-enriched uranium for naval fuel, which is not envisioned to be banned. India plans to increase its nuclear power generation capacity 200-fold by 2050; this would mean that in 2050 India would have more nuclear reactors than the entire world does today. A nuclear weapon-free zone based on a regional security architecture also provides the possibility of a regional architecture for the control of nuclear power facilities —the possibility of regionalized planning, construction, and operation of these facilities.

“ This conference, I feel, is most timely and it is indeed heartening that the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Elliott School have chosen to focus on this subject. I note [Dean] Fahmy’s point that it is not one that you would commonly think of the U.S. hosting. For us we feel it’s important and timely.”

— Ambassador Norachit Sinhaseni

PARTICIPANTS’ REfLECTIONS ON ThE CONTRIBUTION Of NUCLEAR WEAPON-fREE ZONES TO ThE GLOBAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIfERATION REGIME

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PANEL II: ENERGy DEvELOPMENT IN NUCLEAR

WEAPON-FREE ZONES

Leonor toMero, oF tHe Center For ArMs ControL And non-ProLIFerAtIon: As global interest in developing or expanding nuclear energy programs increases, it is vital that the international legal framework for managing nuclear energy and proliferation risks keep pace. With the potential rapid spread of nuclear technology and possible increasing interest in dual-use technology, nuclear weapon-free zones could play a leading role in defining the terms of this emerging new era by strengthening non-proliferation, preserving regional stability and enhancing the value and influence of the nuclear weapon-free zone paradigm.

The intersection between (1) the potential spread of nuclear energy globally, seen by many countries as an important element of development and scientific advancement, and (2) nuclear security, regional and international, is becoming more salient. Over forty developing countries having signaled to the International Atomic Energy Agency their interest in starting nuclear programs. Meanwhile adoption of uniform safeguards standards, particularly of the more intrusive and effective Additional Protocol, has been uneven. Countries objecting to the Additional Protocol often cite sovereignty concerns and a perceived lack of progress by nuclear weapon states on their Article VI commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as key reasons. In addition, at least half a dozen countries have declared their plans to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium, suggesting that the expansion of nuclear energy might be accompanied by the spread of particularly sensitive nuclear

fuel cycle technologies.3 The spread of nuclear energy without appropriate confidence-building measures could lead to increased risks of proliferation or uncertainty about the proliferation intentions of certain states, as the cases of Iran and Syria (which has declared its interest in developing nuclear energy4) suggest.

It is in this context that NWFZs play a leading role in strengthening nuclear non-proliferation and arms control norms. One area in which NWFZs can contribute to creating a paradigm for managing an expansion of nuclear power while minimizing the proliferation risks is in the area of safeguards and verification. The Central Asia NWFZ explicitly requires its states party to adopt the Additional Protocol, suggesting a potential direction for other NWFZs, individually or collectively. While important objections remain to the Additional Protocol, for example notably from Brazil, Venezuela and other countries, this is a promising area in which NWFZs contribute to strengthening regional and international norms related to the further spread of nuclear energy. Another important area for consideration by NWFZs which could advance nuclear non-proliferation objectives is restricting or banning the production and use of fissile materials for civilian purposes. This idea builds on the record of several NWFZs phasing out the use of HEU (including South Pacific NWFZ and South East Asia NWFZ countries being cleared of HEU). A third, potentially more politically complicated, idea could be regulation of reprocessing facilities and/or enrichment facilities—potentially through establishment of multi-national facilities or even critical consideration of the overall viability of new reprocessing facilities anywhere in the 21st Century. The development of an international fuel bank would have important implications for this idea. These ideas could increase certainty as nuclear power spreads to regions that are not only nuclear weapons-free, but also free of nuclear weapons ambitions with more clearly specified and observable technical indicators and a longer period of latency standing between states and the acquisition of nuclear weapons. If nuclear energy indeed grows to the levels projected, this approach may offer regional and global security benefits far larger than its costs. A concerted

3 Joby Warrick, “Spread of Nuclear Capability Is Feared,” The Washington Post, May 12, 2008, at A01.4 Syria Wants Civilian Nuclear Energy: http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jE9l1eCzpD4lCokS4YGxnJPithEg

Counselor Julio Bravo of Chile; Leonor Tomero, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation; and Ambassador hasan Kleib of Indonesia

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approach to the development of nuclear energy and minimizing nuclear weapons capability proliferation would give NWFZs a leading voice in shaping a viable construct for safe energy development. The consideration of nuclear proliferation risks is often piecemeal. For example, the dangerous precedent set by the United States-India nuclear cooperation deal and the more helpful model established by the United States-United Arab Emirates nuclear cooperation agreement differ substantially, creating uncertainty about future norms of nuclear development and dangerous and costly confusions for governments and industry. Considering the intersection between energy and security, would also further add to the historic contribution of NWFZs to nuclear disarmament in fulfillment of the Article VI obligation shared by every NWFZ party. As Professor Scott Sagan has proposed, NPT commitments and obligations should be understood not only as non-proliferation responsibilities for non-nuclear weapon states but also as arms control responsibilities in terms of curbing or banning the development of dual-use enrichment and reprocessing facilities.

Important challenges and opportunities arise from these ideas and the possibilities of the expanding and evolving contribution of NWFZs to international peace and security. The first challenge pertains to assertions of sovereignty and rights pursuant to Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. NWFZ states may remain reluctant to give up perceived sovereign rights and take on additional commitments. However, the opportunity to assert sovereignty and NWFZ identity internationally through further leadership in shaping and strengthening the non-proliferation norm and a new global order could trump individual states’ interests that will not prove sustainable in the long-term for preserving stability and predictability in the international order. Another challenge is the perceived scientific research and development status and benefits associated with the development of nuclear energy and sensitive nuclear technology and the need to weigh the vested interests of scientific, technical, and industrial constituencies against the broader policy interests of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament as crucial to international peace and security. The development and promise of cutting-edge renewable energy technologies as effective new energy sources that can contribute to facilitating development while solving global

warming may provide further opportunities for discoveries and investment spurring scientific engagement and leadership—perhaps suggesting that energy development cooperation among NWFZ parties may not always be strictly limited to nuclear energy development.

A third challenge and opportunity relates to wielding diplomatic leverage. Resisting additional commitments as a means to press nuclear weapon states to make further progress on commitments and promises in the context of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences is only one path to a stronger international norm and enforcement mechanism. NWFZs could leverage their nuclear weapon-free status—as a positive identity distinct from and in addition to their NPT non-nuclear weapon state status, to assert new norms in the area of safer energy development that could later spread even to the nuclear weapon states. Furthering the NWFZs identity would help not only press nuclear weapon states in the context of the NPT on their disarmament obligations, but also shape an international order for the development of nuclear energy, thereby increasing their leverage to achieve progress on disarmament.

QUestIons For ConsIderAtIon:• What risks are associated with the spread of nuclear

energy and do these risks warrant a new set of principles that outweigh the benefits of asserting individual states’ rights? How do NWFZ states party view the potential for the spread of nuclear weapon capability and the implications for regional stability and security?

• Could the adoption of strengthened safeguards further the role of NWFZs for shaping and strengthening elements of the emerging and evolving global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norm?

• Could expanding the framework of NWFZs to include not only non-proliferation obligations but also disarmament responsibilities through greater controls on fissile materials or dual-use technologies for civilian purposes benefit regional and global security?

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AMBAssAdor HAsAn KLeIB, PerMAnent rePresentAtIve oF IndonesIA to tHe UnIted nAtIons: Every country has the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including those with significant oil and gas resources. Medical, agricultural, and other peaceful uses of nuclear technology are also important benefits. But there are risks associated with nuclear development, including the risk of diversion of peaceful nuclear programs to military purposes, the safety of the reactor itself, and the safety of the materials. Within the NWFZs, where all the states party have committed themselves to non-proliferation and exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear technology, these risks are much smaller than elsewhere. The nuclear weapon states have not yet committed themselves to the SEANWFZ protocol and are not bound by its prohibitions. NWFZs reduce the incentive for states to seek nuclear weapons and reduce the incentive for the nuclear weapon states to retain these weapons by promoting nuclear non-proliferation and by prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons within the NWFZ. The nuclear weapon states support the non-proliferation objective of the NWFZs, but inside the Zones we have a double objective: non-proliferation and limiting the scope of the threat or use of nuclear weapons in the Zone. NWFZs are regional building blocks of nuclear disarmament.

As a coordinator of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) on disarmament for almost fifteen years, Indonesia is particularly sensitive to the challenges of seeking consensus among the NAM. Some concerns are broadly shared, including the perception of imbalance in addressing the three pillars of the NPT: nuclear proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Multilateral meetings, including this one, focus overwhelmingly on non-proliferation and insufficiently on nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. When we talk about non-compliance, we only talk about Iraq, Iran, the DPRK, Cuba, Syria, India, and Pakistan. The nuclear weapon states also have obligations; are they complying? I understand the non-proliferation concern about the DPRK and Iran and the possibility of non-state or terrorist acquisition of nuclear materials. Indonesia is a faithful party to the NPT, has integrated safeguards, and is a member of a NWFZ. We have responded with UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1887, of which the operative paragraphs are all about non-proliferation. UN sanctions, the

UN Summit, the Nuclear Security Summit are all dedicated to non-proliferation. Why are we not spending more attention on nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy? When we do talk about nuclear disarmament, there is no significant progress. Fighting over the CTBT, the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, negative security assurances, and nuclear weapon-free zones is a piecemeal approach. Why don’t we have one nuclear weapon convention, just like we have a biological weapons convention and a chemical weapons convention? Malaysia and Costa Rica have come up with a draft nuclear weapons convention to jump start negotiations in the General Assembly, but it has not received wider support. If we talk about compliance at the NPT Review Conference in May, we should talk about compliance by the nuclear weapon states on their obligations to start faithful negotiations toward nuclear disarmament and on peaceful uses.

A second issue is of incentives. We understand the interest of the nuclear weapon states in non-proliferation. UN Security Council Resolution 1887 clearly states that “enjoyment of the benefits of the NPT by a State Party can be assured only by its compliance with the obligations thereunder.” So many countries, including Indonesia, comply; so where is the benefit? The approach in practice is that there are three categories of states; this is my own personal perspective. First, states of concern—proved to have nuclear weapons or suspected of trying to possess nuclear weapons: the DPRK and Iran. In response to these states, the nuclear weapon states offer substitution for their possession or intention to possess nuclear weapons. The DPRK received a very generous incentive and even after testing the nuclear weapon states are coming to them. The nuclear weapon states are also coming to Iran to offer incentives, with everything on the table. The nuclear weapon states are very generous with the so-called states of concern. There are Security Council sanctions, but their impact is insignificant. What would happen if Indonesia had a nuclear reactor somewhere about which it was not transparent and lacking in cooperation with the IAEA? Would we get an offer? A second category of states are those not party to the NPT: India, Pakistan and Israel. These states also receive incentives. India has made deals with the United States and Russia and Pakistan is here in Washington to ask for the same. There is no incentive

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for these states to join the NPT if they already receive the benefits. The third category is states that are faithful non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT; Indonesia is one of these, voluntarily relinquishing our right to have nuclear weapons, with integrated safeguards, and even party to a NWFZ. What does a faithful country get? We get suspicion, suspicion of diversion to military purposes, illegal trafficking, and provision of nuclear technology to non-state actors. We have to mend this reality—particularly the United States and Russia because if they lead the P-5 will follow.

CoUnseLor JULIo BrAvo, CHILeAn eMBAssy to tHe UnIted stAtes: The first thing that I would like to highlight is that NWFZs create an environment that contributes to confidence-building, improving trust and transparency among neighboring countries. The 1991 agreement between Argentina and Brazil allowed Chile to join the NPT as a consequence of increased confidence. Also, since Cuba joined the LANWFZ in October 2002, the Cuban Missile Crisis will not be repeated. All 33 states of Latin America and the Caribbean have signed and ratified the treaty. The second point that I would like to stress is that nuclear weapon-free zones generate obligations for nuclear weapons states to respect the status of zones and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against zone states party. The protocols provide NWFZ states party with legally-binding negative security assurances. My third point is that NWFZs are not just ends in themselves but also a major mechanism to pursue general disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear weapons. The fourth point that I would like to mention this morning is that NWFZ states party retain the inalienable right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; this is a global public good in light of the need to reduce carbon emissions. The negotiators of the NPT envisioned enrichment and reprocessing as squarely within the category of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Any attempt

to reinterpret Article IV in a way that erodes this dimension of peaceful uses is abusive and worse, conducive to a new layer of division between the haves and have-nots.

Enrichment and reprocessing do pose proliferation risks and these risks justify the enhanced safeguards of the Additional Protocol. Chile has signed and we encourage NWFZ states party to move in the same direction. The Additional Protocol is essential to the IAEA’s efforts to provide credible assurance about the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and materials in non-nuclear weapon states.

It would be productive to create incentives for non-nuclear weapon states that do not need to embark on the extremely costly and complex development of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to take other paths while respecting their legitimate sovereign rights. We believe that we should establish a multilaterally negotiated and legally guaranteed mechanism to ensure nuclear fuel supply to states that need it. The formulation and implementation of such a mechanism should include economic and market realities and opportunities. No state with a legitimate interest in the commercial benefit of such an arrangement should be excluded. NWFZs can play a constructive role.

Nuclear terrorism is an important danger and the international community is responding through legally-binding conventions, the work of the IAEA, and UN Security Council Resolutions. These instruments do not conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of states participating in the NPT. For some, the threat of nuclear terrorism may have added a new, fourth pillar of nuclear security to the NPT. This is an area where all countries, nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapons states have a responsibility and a role to play. NWFZs could contribute by encouraging the conversion of reactors from highly-enriched to low-enriched uranium. Chile has completed this process and I understand that other countries are doing so.

“ The topic is one of considerable importance and the timing is impeccable.”

— Ambassador Jim McLay

PARTICIPANTS’ REfLECTIONS ON ThE CONTRIBUTION Of NUCLEAR WEAPON-fREE ZONES TO ThE GLOBAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIfERATION REGIME

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LUNCHEON ADDRESS

UnIted nAtIons HIgH rePresentAtIve For dIsArMAMent AFFAIrs sergIo dUArte: Oscar Wilde once said that he could resist everything—except temptation. In my case, however, I must resist the temptation to speak at great length about the ponderous theme of this conference: the role of nuclear weapon-free zones in the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

This is actually one of my favorite subjects, and not just because Brazil was one of the first to propose—during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962—the establishment of a Latin American nuclear weapon-free zone. These zones really have made a very significant contribution to global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts and I congratulate the organizers of this conference for recognizing this fact. I am therefore very grateful to Richard Solomon, the President of the U.S. Institute of Peace and Dr. Douglas Shaw of the Elliott School of International Affairs, for inviting me to speak with you today.

It is unfortunately true that efforts to create regional nuclear weapon-free zones arose from the failures of past efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament. The UN Charter—dedicated to strengthening international peace and security while saving future generations from the scourge of war—established disarmament and the regulation of armaments as key goals of the United Nations. In January 1946, the General Assembly clarified in its first resolution that “disarmament” referred to the elimination of nuclear weapons and all other weapons “adaptable to mass destruction” (WMD).

Later that year, the General Assembly adopted another resolution concerning the regulation of armaments—and ever since, the UN has had these twin, parallel goals of WMD disarmament and conventional arms control. These goals were combined in 1959 under the term “general and complete disarmament,” which remains the “ultimate goal” of the United Nations. This is a goal found in a dozen multilateral treaties, including both the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the treaties establishing all five of the existing regional nuclear weapon-free zones.

In September 1961, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to agree on what has been called the McCloy/Zorin

joint statement, which outlined how the two superpowers intended to achieve general and complete disarmament. President Kennedy’s speech to the General Assembly on 25 September that year remains one of the real classics on this subject—it put forward a clear and compelling case for proceeding simultaneously with efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, while also limiting conventional arms.

I’d like to mention here that the McCloy/Zorin joint statement—while not mentioning regional nuclear weapon-free zones—had the following to say about the relationship of disarmament to world peace: “Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.” This quote is quite useful to recall, given that many commentators today have adopted a different approach, saying essentially that world peace is a necessary precondition for disarmament to occur. I am certain, however, that McCloy/Zorin got it right: disarmament and other initiatives to strengthen international peace and security—including non-proliferation—are mutually reinforcing and must be pursued together, not in any contrived sequence.

Unfortunately, both this and earlier efforts to pursue a treaty on general and complete disarmament became casualties of the Cold War. This led the world community in the early 1960’s to pursue this goal by other, less direct means called “partial measures.” One such measure was the Tlatelolco Treaty—signed in 1967—which established a nuclear weapon-free zone in Latin America. Another was NPT, signed a year later—its Article VII recognized the right of any group of States to establish regional nuclear weapon-free zones.

Now if the key goals of the NPT are to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote their elimination, what is the real need for regional nuclear weapon-free zones, especially if all the members of such zones are NPT parties? The answer is that these regional treaties significantly reinforce the NPT in at least eight ways.

First, their Protocols contain legally-binding negative security assurances, which commit the nuclear weapon states not to engage in the threat or use of nuclear weapons against the

“These zones really have made a very significant contribution to global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts and I congratulate the organizers of this conference for recognizing this fact.”

— United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Sergio Duarte

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parties to such zones. Although the statements of adherence to the protocols by the nuclear weapon states contain interpretations and reservations that modify their original purpose, such protocols are usually taken as good faith commitments to respect the nuclear weapon-free status of the zones to which they apply.

Second, these treaties explicitly outlaw not just the acquisition but also the stationing or basing of nuclear weapons (or other nuclear explosive devices) within the region. They do not, however, constrain the development, research, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. As a matter of fact, Article I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco says that the States party “undertake to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction.”

Third, while the NPT lacks an institutional infrastructure—beyond the safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—most of the regional treaties establish various organizations or committees to assist in implementing treaty goals.

Fourth, the Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk Treaties also require their Parties to have physical security controls over relevant nuclear facilities, which can help in preventing nuclear thefts or terrorism.

Fifth, all of these regional treaties (except Tlatelolco) explicitly address environmental controls, notably including a prohibition against the dumping of radioactive wastes within the region.

Sixth, the withdrawal procedure in virtually all the regional treaties (with the exception of Tlatelolco) is lengthier than the 90-day advance notice found in the NPT—and in the case of the Bangkok and Rarotonga treaties, a withdrawal is allowed only after a material breach of the treaty by a State Party.

Seventh, the Pelindaba Treaty included a prohibition on military attacks on nuclear facilities—though such a provision is not found in the other treaties.

And eighth, these regional treaties also include provisions for the settlement of disputes, which are not found in the NPT.

My discussion so far of how the regional zones reinforce the NPT is not at all intended to convey the impression that they alone will lead us to a world free of nuclear weapons. After

all, nuclear weapons were absent from the territories of such zones when they were established. We must all remember that they are still widely viewed as only “partial measures” serving their common goals of nuclear disarmament and, more broadly, general and complete disarmament. In short, these treaties are not ends in themselves.

The twin tests for the success of these zones are that they be successful in totally excluding nuclear weapons from the respective regions, and that they bring the world closer to achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament.

By many indicators, these regimes have been enormously successful in achieving the former goal. Today, virtually the entire Southern Hemisphere is free of nuclear weapons—except for the possible circulation of nuclear-armed submarines. Some 60 percent of UN Member States belong to treaties establishing such zones or have ratified their protocols. Cooperation is also increasing between members of the various regional zones—in 2005, Mexico City hosted the first conference of states party to regional treaties establishing such zones, and next month another such conference will be held in New York at the United Nations. I also wish to note here that the enormous Central Asian nuclear weapon-free zone came into existence last year, the first such zone to be established entirely north of the Equator. In addition, Mongolia has gained international recognition of its nuclear weapon-free status.

These are all very welcome developments, testifying to the great potential of these zones to strengthen international and regional peace and security, while advancing disarmament and non-proliferation goals.

Yet the full potential of these zones has yet to be achieved, as many challenges remain in ensuring their full implementation.

There are, first of all, some significant differences between these treaties. The Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk Treaties, for example, prohibit both research and development of nuclear weapons, while such activities are not specifically addressed in the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties—and of these activities, the Bangkok Treaty only prohibits development. In addition, only the Pelindaba, Rarotonga, and Semipalatinsk Treaties extend their prohibitions to include unassembled or partly assembled nuclear weapons.

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Also, none of these treaties prohibits the stationing of nuclear weapon-related support facilities by the nuclear weapon states, such as relevant radar stations or communications systems used for strategic nuclear purposes of such States.

While the Pelindaba Treaty became the last such regional treaty to come into force in July 2009, many of its parties have not yet deposited their instruments of ratification. Many states throughout these regions have yet to conclude their comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Many have not yet adhered to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials or the Nuclear Terrorism Convention, which—though not required by all these treaties—would further help to strengthen security in these regions. There is no consensus among the states in these regions that the IAEA Additional Protocol should be the applicable safeguards standard, though it is a criterion found in the Central Asian treaty.

And last, but by no means least, it is troubling that the Protocols to four of the five regional nuclear weapon-free zones have not been ratified by all the nuclear weapon states. The United States and Russian Federation have not ratified the Pelindaba Protocol, the United States has not ratified the Rarotonga Protocol, and none of the nuclear weapon states has yet ratified the Protocols to the Central Asian and Southeast Asian treaties. And as I noted earlier, those who did, have also attached various conditions or provisos to their negative security assurances.

Another serious challenge relates to the lack of any progress whatsoever in implementing the Resolution on the Middle East, adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference as part of the “package deal” that led to the indefinite extension of the Treaty. This inaction proved to be quite a controversial issue at the 2000 and 2005 NPT Review Conferences and I fully expect that it will continue to be the focus of intense deliberations at the 2010 Review Conference next May. The goal of establishing such a zone has been endorsed by the General Assembly every year since 1974, virtually always without even requiring a vote, and the strong will of the world community for progress in this area no doubt will persist until a real effort is made to achieve this goal.

In terms of other issues, I think it is also worth noting that none of these zones addresses missiles or other nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Even the UN Disarmament Commission’s agreed guidelines in 1999 on establishing such zones did not refer to such delivery vehicles. Yet historically, there is at least some evidence of an early intention to do so. In his Nobel Peace Lecture of 11 December 1982, for example, Alfonso García Robles referred to the Joint Declaration of 29 April 1963—in which the Presidents of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico announced that their governments were willing to sign a Latin American multilateral agreement by which they would undertake not “to manufacture, store, or test nuclear weapons or devices for launching nuclear weapons.” The Preamble of the NPT also contains language referring to the goal of eliminating both nuclear weapons and “the means of their delivery”—though in practice such delivery systems are seldom addressed at NPT Review Conferences.

All of these various gaps or limitations in these treaties, however, do not at all detract from their positive contributions to global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation goals. Together, these treaty regimes help to de-legitimize nuclear weapons per se and this is, I believe, their most important contribution in achieving both of these goals. We will not get rid of nuclear weapons as long as they are heralded as essential or vital to security, indispensable for maintaining deterrence, or widely perceived as sources of great power status and prestige. The treaties creating these regional nuclear weapon-free zones send precisely the opposite message—they herald the security benefits from non-acquisition and they go far in cultivating a global norm or taboo against possession.

But I have now spoken too many words today, and stand victim to Oscar Wilde’s quote about resisting temptation. I wish once again to thank the organizers of this conference and invite all of you in this audience today to join in the ongoing global effort to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, a goal that will no doubt be advanced by the establishment and full implementation of regional nuclear weapon-free zones.

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AMBAssAdor enrIQUe roMAn-Morey, ForMer seCretAry generAL oF oPAnAL: In order to address the important topic of how coordination among nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) parties promotes nuclear disarmament, we need to have a clear picture of how each NWFZ was created and especially the international political circumstances of the respective moments in which they were conceived, developed and approved, which gave them—individually—a framework in which they have reached international recognition. Although they share common principles and interests, they are all different from each other.

The nuclear weapon was the main actor during the cold war era. The destructive power of nuclear weapons proved to the international community in 1945 Hiroshima was a war test and Nagasaki was a war excess. The then newly created United Nations approved its first Resolution on January 24, 1946, on the “Establishment of a Commission to deal with the problem raised by the discovery of Atomic Energy.” Para 5 c) of this resolution clearly stated that the Commission shall make specific proposals “for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.” Of course, like many other international decisions in this field, this resolution was never complied with, making the cold war era the most dangerous period for world and human security. The ideological confrontation between the super powers was enshrined militarily by a nuclear weapons competition.

The military competition between the two power blocks made it possible that new nuclear states appeared in the international arena. The only way to become a nuclear power

in that time was through nuclear weapon testing, creating even more insecurity and unjustified consequences for other regions that were not involved in the nuclear competition. Fifteen years after the first UN Resolution aiming to ban the nuclear weapon, the XVI General Assembly in 1961 approved two resolutions on efforts for banning the test of nuclear weapons, with special reference to the African continent. Res. 1652 (XVI) calls upon UN member states “to consider and respect the continent of Africa as a denuclearized zone.” This was the first embryo for the creation of a NWFZ. That same UNGA adopted a Declaration, not a Resolution, which clearly defines the use of nuclear weapons as “contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the UN and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the UN.” Besides the extreme criticism of the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons as “contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity,” the Resolution considers use “a crime against mankind and civilization.” This strong language used by the UNGA could be considered one of the first negative security assurances (NSA) for the member states not willing to develop nuclear weapons.

In October 1962, a year after these important, legally binding instruments were approved by the UNGA, the world experienced the most dangerous moments of modern history, the so called Cuban Missile Crisis. As a consequence of this crisis and recognizing that the region was going to be affected by any military confrontation between Washington and Moscow, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean decided to embrace the very strong political will never to develop, test, manufacture, produce, possess, acquire, stockpile or transport nuclear weapons anywhere within the zone. Through the Additional Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco they also acquired and set for the entire zone negative security assurances (NSA) from the then five nuclear powers and established an international organization (OPANAL) to ensure compliance with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, better known, as mentioned, as the Treaty of Tlatelolco. This first nuclear weapon-free zone treaty was negotiated from 1962 and was open for signature on February 14, 1967, more than one year before the UNGA adopted the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

PANEL III: COORDINATION AMONG NUCLEAR

WEAPON-FREE ZONES STATES PARTy FOR GLOBAL DISARMAMENT

Dilyor Khakimov, Uzbek Embassy; Ambassador Leslie Gumbi of South Africa, Ambassador Enrique Román-Morey, former Secretary General of OPANAL; and Ambassador Jim McLay of New Zealand

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The countries of the South Pacific region finished drafting the Treaty of Rarotonga in August 1986, almost twenty years after the Latin America and the Caribbean NWFZ. With the end of the Cold War era, at the beginning of the 90’s, and the “atomization” of the Soviet Union, the Bangkok Treaty for the Southeast Asian countries was open for signature in December 1995 and finally the Treaty of Pelindaba for the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone opened for signature in Cairo in April 1996. Lately, the countries of the Central Asian region and Mongolia in a separate unilateral legal decision have adopted the NWFZ regime. So we have three different origins in time for NWFZs: those that were conceived and created as a consequence and in spite of the Cold War, others adopted during its regime, and those that were possible only after and because the demise of this era.

After the entry-into-force of the NWFZ treaties the negative security assurances accepted by all nuclear weapon states, the countries and nations within the territories of the respective NWFZs will be essentially placed under an internationally recognized and legally binding “nuclear weapon-free umbrella,” while patiently waiting for a world free of nuclear weapons. Actually only the Latin America and Caribbean Treaty of Tlatelolco is universally and fully in force.

One affirmation regarding NWFZs is uncontestable: they have been pursued, achieved and maintained by as many as 113 countries, almost 60% of the international community. I apologize for bringing to your expert memories these well known facts, but I consider them necessary to put in a real perspective the role of the NWFZs in nuclear disarmament and the coordination between them as essential.

In order to give even more basis for the necessary coordination that the NWFZ should carry among and between them, we would need to define what they are. First of all they are a concrete and tangible manifestation of regional efforts to limit, to stop, and finally to ban the most destructive weapon created by humankind. But they are meant to achieve more than this, since they are a significant contribution to maintaining international peace and security in extensive and densely populated areas of the world, with different historical backgrounds. These elements give them a special characteristic since they are not an end in themselves but a means to acquire world nuclear disarmament vis a

vis the nuclear weapon, as a deterrent, in that the nuclear weapon relates to security from a traditional military perspective while nuclear disarmament relates to security on the basis of common security or what could be called “the democratization” of security.

We also need to put questions to the success of NWFZs, if any. Have the NWFZs served to strengthen our collective security? Or perhaps solely helped to preserve a global imbalance between the “haves” and the “have-nots,” helping to extend the international status quo? The original legitimate spirit of NWFZs, besides international security, was to give up the nuclear weapons option in return for a compromise from the nuclear weapon states to give up their own. The NPT enshrined this principle one year after the first NWFZ was established. But here the big question is whether we have been tricked by giving concessions against never honored promises? I leave the answer to this question to you.

We all know that we need a change in the political will of the nuclear weapon states, whether it is really a lack of political will (as it is frequently called) to find a solution to nuclear disarmament or a very clear political will of the “haves” not allowing any change at all. Perhaps we can find the answers to this question during the upcoming Review Conference of the NPT, for which I think there is a positive atmosphere. This atmosphere is framed in President Obama’s speech in Prague last year talking about a world free of nuclear weapons, as envisaged in the NWFZ Treaties. The recent “rapprochement” between Washington and Moscow to find a replacement to START I can be also considered a positive step. But I am convinced that we would like to be witness of this dream in our lifetime and for sure we do not want to wait another sixty years or so, like we have been waiting since the first Resolution on nuclear disarmament of the General Assembly. In this case, paraphrasing some not so new ideas from different disarmament experts although in a new political language, I would like to see at least a world in which the nuclear weapon states, recognized or not, would get together around a table and in one voice repeat “yes we can.” Only then, perhaps, we can move from a quantitative disarmament (that is from so many thousands of warheads to so many less thousands of warheads, which is mainly done by obsolescence) to a qualitative nuclear disarmament (from one to zero nuclear weapons).

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I would like to leave with you a very important question which can be the homework for the NWFZs: which is better or worse, a nuclear inaction or a nuclear complacency? If there is no coordination among NWFZs and between them and every free man or nation of this world who wants to live free of the nuclear danger, we will get to the negative situation of nuclear complacency which will make us live in the same world where we have been living in the last sixty-five years.

I truly hope that you will find these ideas provocative enough to ignite questions on this or any other important topic. Thank you for your kind attention.

AMBAssAdor JIM MCLAy, PerMAnent rePresentAtIve oF neW ZeALAnd to tHe UnIted nAtIons: Any discussion on cooperation between nuclear weapon-free zones requires some understanding of the context and the background in which those zones were established. First, these zones are not a new idea. They date back almost as long as nuclear weapons themselves and the first such zone actually predates the NPT by a year. Second, zones have played an important role in promoting regional peace and stability and in promoting norms that are conducive to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, even if those tasks are as yet uncompleted. They are not a stand-alone mechanism, but have to be viewed in the context of wider non-proliferation and disarmament.

In considering the scope for enhanced cooperation between NWFZs, it’s worth noting the influence they’ve had on each other in the 43 or so years since the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The context, motivations, and the establishment of each zone were unique. Leading, as the High Representative’s presentation reminded us, to provisions that were unique to the particular treaties. Some, such as the South Pacific zone, drew on environmental concerns, particularly relating to nuclear testing by nuclear weapons states and to the disposal or transit of nuclear waste within the region. Others, such as the Southeast Asian Zone, stemmed in part from a desire by non-nuclear weapons states to reduce the risk of devastating nuclear exchanges between nuclear weapons states within their region. And still others, such as the Latin American and African zones have supported efforts to prevent regional nuclear proliferation and competition by

encouraging states to reaffirm their commitment to non-proliferation and by providing assurances and, in some cases, strengthening verification measures. The Central Asian zone has unique provisions for adherence to the Additional Protocol and the CTBT.

The cynical might suggest, and I actually heard someone comment on this over the lunch break, that such zones are empty or symbolic gestures largely established in regions that are less likely to be nuclear battlegrounds and by states that lack either the resources or the inclination to acquire nuclear weapons. But that criticism, I suggest, doesn’t bear any reasonable scrutiny. The emergence of these zones owes much to direct experience of threats. Before the establishment of the relevant zones, nuclear weapons states conducted nuclear tests in Africa, in Central Asia, and in the South Pacific, usually far from their metropolitan territories—a matter that, particularly in my region, drew very critical comment. Two signatories to the African zone are known to have conducted clandestine nuclear programs before their treaty entered into force. And two states party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco also pursued such programs before their accession. As part of the former Soviet Union, some of the countries of the Central Asian zone hosted a formidable arsenal of nuclear weapons and served as testing grounds. Moreover, part of the significance of these Zones has been their collective impact in generating an increasingly powerful global norm against nuclear weapons and in support of efforts both to contain their spread and to work towards their ultimate elimination. With two new zones, Central Asia and Africa, coming into force recently, covering a total of almost 60 countries just those two, it’s clear that many continue to regard NWFZs as a relevant and a significant part of the global disarmament and non-proliferation jigsaw. Overall, the establishment and gradual strengthening of the NPT framework and some reduction in nuclear arsenals, and more limited deployments since the end of The Cold War, have invited consideration of the role that NWFZs might play in promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. And in this gradually changing environment, and to underline the word “gradually” changing environment, that leads us to our ask how such zones might cooperate in that disarmament and non-proliferation effort. Moreover, this year’s NPT Review Conference will be an important

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opportunity to inject much needed momentum into multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation, particularly given the singular lack of success of the NPT Review Conference of 2005.

I’m going to focus, quickly, on five areas for possible cooperation. It’s not an exhaustive list and in each case there’s a clear, if not yet fully defined, overall objective.

First, the opportunity for zones to learn from each other regarding provisions about environmental issues, transport verification, and nuclear security. In many ways the various treaties have to adopt Isaac Newton’s glorious phrase that they “stood on the shoulders of the giants that preceded them.” Building on each other and evolving with changing international standards. While the circumstances of each region are different, there is definite scope for members of these zones to learn from each other regarding their respective provisions covering environmental issues, transport verification, and nuclear security. We should encourage the zones to share information and learn from one another and build on the experience of those who’ve gone before.

Second, the opportunities for cooperation and advancing common goals in the multilateral context, not least in this year’s NPT Review Conference. There is an opportunity for zone members to cooperate in advancing common multilateral goals. An obvious area for such cooperation would be in supporting some high levels of ambition regarding the NPT Review Conference and in promoting progress in areas such as nuclear disarmament generally. Zones and their members could also use their combined weight to continue to promote the total elimination of nuclear weapons—to cooperate in multilateral fora including, but not limited to the NPT, to achieve outcomes consistent with the objectives and aspirations of the zones of which we are members.

Third, NWFZs and their members might collectively focus on efforts to strengthen, expand, and link existing zones. For example, since 1996 in the U.N. General Assembly, New Zealand has supported calls for a nuclear weapon-free southern hemisphere. In the current session, we introduced such a resolution with Brazil and it was supported by 170 of the 192 member states and we continue to engage with the nuclear weapons states regarding their residual concerns

about that proposal. It will be a long exercise, I suspect, but we ultimately plan to get there.

Fourth, the role zones might collectively play in building and maintaining non-proliferation norms at the regional level. NWFZs have also played, and should continue to play, an important role in building and maintaining non-proliferation norms at the regional level including reacclamation of commitments to concluding comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA. The zones might provide an additional channel for the IAEA to engage some zone states that have yet to conclude safeguards agreements. Similarly, they could encourage zone states to update and extend their commitments in respect of nuclear security verification and physical protection. Zones could be an additional channel through which the IAEA might provide policy advice and technical assistance to members in areas such as environmental issues and nuclear safety. And, of course, as Leonor Tomero’s scoping paper for panel two suggests, there are opportunities for zones to cooperate in the context of nuclear energy development indeed in respect of all peaceful uses of nuclear technology. So here the overall objective is more complex and it requires more effort to play a role in building and maintaining non-proliferation norms at the regional level and to encourage and facilitate cooperation with IAEA.

And finally, to consider what outcomes we might collectively seek from the forthcoming conference of states, parties, and treaty signatories to nuclear weapon-free zones.

The Second Conference of States party and Signatories to Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones to be held in New York on the 30th of April will be an important opportunity to consider what steps can be taken, individually and collectively to advance the objectives and the ideals that underpinned the original establishment of our zones. An obvious focus will be on the messages we might send to the NPT RevCon the following week and certainly reinforces the area I mentioned earlier of multilateral cooperation, which will be critically important in this particular year. We intend to support and seek a strong, clear, and substantive statement from that conference to go to the RevCon. We’d like to think that, on some issues at least, we will be able to speak and pursue our interests with one voice. But that conference will also be an opportunity to consider other possible forms of interaction

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within and between nuclear weapon-free zone states over the longer term, particularly relating to benchmarking the mutual standards and commitments made within each zone, information sharing, and how we might address shared issues and challenges and achieve more coordinated engagement and better communication.

In listing those five areas for possible cooperation between zones, I should also acknowledge the opportunity for support that comes potentially from outside zones. We should recall the basic efforts of the giants that came before. We should promote not only the immediate objectives of peace and stability that underpinned the zones that we’ve established, but we should also promote the norms that are conducive to longer term global disarmament and non-proliferation. We should also ask how, with cooperation, the objectives and norms that gave rise to nuclear weapon-free zones might become universal rather than just the aspiration, and then the declared wish, of individual regions or zones. Those should be our objectives.

AMBAssAdor LesLIe gUMBI, PerMAnent rePresentAtIve oF soUtH AFrICA to tHe UnIted nAtIons In vIennA: Nuclear weapon-free zones are critically important nuclear disarmament measures because states party to treaties establishing these zones commit themselves not to manufacture, acquire, test, or possess nuclear weapons. This attribute of nuclear weapon-free zones is perhaps the most distinguishing factor that has made them important and relevant throughout contemporary history, from their

conception in the Rapacki Plan through the Cold War and most recently through the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty on the African continent. Secondly, the commitment not to possess, manufacture, test, or acquire nuclear weapons is of unlimited duration. This indefinite time span of NWFZs contributes to the maintenance of international peace and security and the potential for creating a conducive environment negating the probability of future nuclear arms races in a nuclear weapon-free zone. Third, this may serve as a regional confidence and security-building measure and thus reduces the compulsion for acquiring nuclear weapons. In turn, the trust and transparency that is usually borne out of credible confidence and security-building measures could lay the necessary foundation for regional cooperation and assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology and thus remove the need for future nuclear weapons and materials in nuclear weapon-free zones. Another important aspect of nuclear weapon-free zones is that they are more robust than the NPT because they proscribe the introduction into, possession of, and the presence of nuclear weapons and nuclear material in a declared nuclear weapon-free zone, even by the five declared nuclear weapon states recognized by the NPT. Nuclear weapon-free zones therefore tend to establish greater transparency and stronger verification measures than those posed by the NPT member states. NWFZs currently cover extensive tracts of the globe. We should resist the growing tendency to adopt new measures, while failing to optimally utilize what is already available.

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PANEL Iv: A NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE HEMISPHERE

IN A NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE WORLD

dr. JAyAntHA dHAnAPALA, JennIngs-rAndoLPH senIor vIsItIng sCHoLAr, U.s. InstItUte oF PeACe: In a quest for national security within a nuclear armed world, some nation states have opted for single-state nuclear weapon-free zones, regional nuclear weapon-free zones and continental nuclear-free zones—all of them now legally in force. These have been, predominantly, in the Southern Hemisphere and although not contiguous, because large parts of ocean fall outside the zones, it has added one more distinguishing feature between the developed countries of the North and the developing countries of the South in the North/South hiatus that still exists in global politics.

The unique option of renouncing the world’s most destructive and inhumane weapon with like-minded countries in one Hemisphere has led to a sense of Southern, and virtuous, solidarity among countries who have, by and large, been victims of imperialism and colonialism as Latin American, African and Asian countries. While the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone falls outside this hemispheric division—as indeed some parts of the zones delineated by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Pelindaba and Bangkok do—and while nuclear-armed countries including India, Pakistan and DPRK are from the “Global South” the distinction of being nuclear weapon-free is part of the political identity of the South. Common membership of nuclear weapon-free zones has been an additional basis for enhanced co-operation. It is consistent with the NPT and enhances the NPT prohibitions and IAEA verification by additional means, such as those agreed upon between Argentina and Brazil.

This has led to an annual resolution in the UN General Assembly’s (UNGA) First Committee on “Nuclear weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas” which is adopted by an overwhelming majority with very few nuclear weapon states and their allies voting against or abstaining. The resolution expresses the strong sentiment that such zones follow the outlines set by the Final Document of the First Special session of the UNGA devoted to disarmament in 1978 and the Disarmament Commission’s 1999 substantive session and that they are a positive contribution to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to disarmament.

In addition a Conference of States party and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones was held in Mexico in 2005 and another is scheduled to be held on April 30 this year in New York immediately before the NPT Review Conference. In between a meeting of focal points of nuclear weapon-free zones was convened in Mongolia in April 2009. Although all the zonal treaties are legally in force not all parties (except for Rarotonga) have ratified their treaties and not all the Protocols have been ratified by the five nuclear weapon states in the NPT. The hope is also expressed by the members of existing NWFZ treaties that similar NWFZs will be formed in other regions, especially in the Middle East.

On the basis of the above considerations this Panel may wish to address the following questions:

• Has a hemispheric consensus on being nuclear weapon-free actually led to enhanced regional security and a diminution of conflict? Is there a desirability and/or a possibility that such zones may extend the consensus to include a regulation of conventional arms, a reduction of military expenditure and the resolution of conflicts within them?

• Should a nuclear weapon-free South begin to extend the benefits of its status by persuading India, Pakistan and DPRK to give up their nuclear weapons before addressing the other nuclear weapon states or at least obtain some security assurances from them even if it is outside the context of the NPT?

• What are the expectations of the states within the existing zones in the Southern Hemisphere of the forthcoming Second Conference of NWFZ states in April 2010 and how will the outcome influence the NPT Review Conference in the following month?

• In the context of President Obama’s vision for a nuclear weapon-free world and neo-Spenglerian theories of the decline of the West and a “Post American world,” has the South in fact been a pathfinder of a new paradigm in international relations given the examples of Brazil and South Africa in particular? Following the political philosophy of non-violence of Gandhi, Martin Luther King and Nelson Mandela would the rejection of nuclear weapons as a symbol of political violence lead to a new world order?

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I think it’s important when we look at this particular panel. I am not so sure that the nuclear weapon-free zones would be so patronizing as to want to teach the world lessons, but rather to hold themselves up as a viable model in terms of a building block, as I said yesterday, for a nuclear weapon-free world.

And what they have achieved, in a sense, is in spite of the nuclear weapon states, because it is the nuclear weapon states who have, thereafter, to come and sign the protocols. Only the Treaty of Tlatelolco has had its protocols signed by all nuclear weapon states.

AMBAssAdor WILLy C. gAA oF tHe PHILIPPInes to tHe UnIted stAtes: In accordance with the grand bargain during the NPT negotiations 40 years ago, to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons in exchange for the nuclear weapon state commitment to total nuclear disarmament, developing countries established NWFZs. The idea of SEANWFZ began in 1971 when the original five members of ASEAN explicitly recognized the significant trend toward establishing NWFZs for the purpose of promoting world peace and security by reducing the areas of international conflicts and tension and declared Southeast Asia a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality. As a fledgling association in the very early stages of building mechanisms for cooperation, SEANWFZ was a major confidence-building measure in a region marked by active border disputes and opposed religious and political systems.

SEANWFZ also closed gaps in the NPT. The NPT prohibits transfer to, acceptance of, and manufacture of any nuclear weapons or other military nuclear explosive devices by non-nuclear weapons states. Stationing of nuclear weapons is not prohibited in the NPT. On the other hand, Article III of SEANWFZ, expressly prohibits the stationing of nuclear weapons in addition to all NPT prohibitions. In this sense, SEANWFZ promotes a path not just to disarmament, but also to non-proliferation by effectively fencing off the region from nuclear weapons.

SEANWFZ is unique as it includes two elements that go beyond other existing NWFZs. First, the zone of application includes the continental shelves and Exclusive Economic Zones of the states party. The Philippines is probably one of the very few countries in the world where, by its constitution,

it provides that the country should be nuclear weapon-free. Being party to SEANWFZ, we also want our neighborhood free of nuclear waste. And that is precisely the reason why this SEANWFZ Treaty is unique in itself in that it extends this protection to the states party Exclusive Economic Zones.

Second, SEANWFZ requires a negative security assurance which implies a commitment by the nuclear weapon states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons anywhere within the zone of application. Together with the other regional NWFZs, SEANWFZ is an important component of what is now a nuclear weapon-free Southern Hemisphere. SEANWFZ also offers a model for the expansion of the geographical scope, and inclusion of expanded negative security assurances.

Ten years after its entry into force, SEANWFZ was reviewed by ASEAN. The review found progress in implementation of the Treaty, including engagements with the IAEA with most of the states party having acceded to safeguards agreements, as well as direct consultations between states party to the treaty and the nuclear weapon states. ASEAN adopted a Plan of Action to strengthen the implementation of SEANWFZ from 2007 to 2012. The Plan of Action outlines measures in pursuit of: 1) fulfillment of commitments under the treaty and accession to IAEA safeguards; 2) consultations for the accession of the five nuclear weapons states as protocol parties; 3) cooperation with international partners to strengthen capacity and implementation of the SEANWFZ and institutional arrangements.

In January 2008, the 62nd U.N. General Assembly adopted the ASEAN-sponsored resolution on SEANWFZ which encourages states party to the Treaty to work towards resuming their consultations with the nuclear weapon states to resolve outstanding issues and ensure early accession of the nuclear weapon states to the SEANWFZ protocol. ASEAN has institutionalized a mechanism for dialogue with the nuclear weapon states, and other nuclear capable states. During the first ASEAN-U.S. meeting last November, the leaders jointly recognized the importance of SEANWFZ, and both sides committed to resolve the outstanding issues to ensure the early accession to the protocol. The renewed U.S. focus on disarmament and non-proliferation is a positive development. We have seen changes in the

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voting patterns of the United States in the First Committee and the General Assembly. Though none of the nuclear states have acceded to the SEANWFZ Protocols, all parties remain deeply engaged in the process of discussions, which have succeeded in identifying and narrowing the points of disagreement.

Since being elected as president of the review conference last year, the Philippines has engaged states party, and advised stakeholders with utmost neutrality and transparency. A workshop was hosted in Manila last February, among representatives from key governments, intra-government organizations, and selected NGOs to enhance preparations on what the Review Conference should accomplish and how this should be achieved.

AMBAssAdor MABeL gÓMeZ oLIver, dePUty CHIeF oF MIssIon oF tHe MexICAn eMBAssy to tHe UnIted stAtes: I don’t think any state in the nuclear weapon-free zones has the desire to teach the world anything, but only to show the firm conviction that the nuclear weapon-free world is possible. And that we have been able to provide the world with areas free of weapons that provide us the safety or security shield to our people, to our countries, and that have allowed us to prevent the development of nuclear military capabilities within the regions and have protected us from any nuclear threat. The main reason Tlatelolco was finally signed, was the real risk of a nuclear attack on Cuba in the 1960s. So after that we take any opportunity to speak out about our conviction that the nuclear weapon-free world is possible if every country enters into negotiations, into flexibility, of course, sacrificing a little bit.

First of all, I wish to emphasize again the remarks of Ambassador Dhanapala last night when he said that the NWFZs are conceived as a national security posture. The NWFZs differentiate themselves from the rest of the world through a totally different security approach, in which nuclear weapons are not even considered so there is no need for deterrence. There is no need to have nuclear weapons, use them or threaten to use them. Second, this approach implies not only the renunciation of nuclear weapons, but also undertaking disarmament in some cases and compliance with disarmament and non-

proliferation commitments. Third, the NWFZs themselves build confidence. So the states that are part of these zones don’t need to develop nuclear military capabilities and this confidence enables the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes on the basis of international safeguards. The fourth element I would like to highlight is the sense of community that the states have developed among themselves around the common goal of reaching a nuclear weapon-free world. These four elements give cohesion to the group of states that have created the NWFZs and provide them with undisputable moral standing and political force, as well as a proven record of important contribution to international peace and security that the international community, in general, has recognized.

The NWFZs may increasingly act as a group and make joint declarations, try to influence the proceedings and the debates in the NPT Review process, and chart a way forward toward a nuclear weapon-free world. The NWFZs open a window of opportunity to contribute even more to the non-proliferation and disarmament regime. First, they can work internally in order to stand out as a more decisive and leading actor, that can be increasingly recognized as such by the international community, especially by other non-nuclear weapon states in the developed world that have common interests, but even by the P-5. There is an effort still to be made among the nuclear weapon-free states to really consider themselves as a group, act as a group, and consolidate as a group to be more proactive. Second, I think that they have to find their own identity, to differentiate themselves from other groups participating in the NPT discussions and in other disarmament and non-proliferation fora. When the nuclear weapon-free states try to develop joint declarations today, there are often substantial commonalities between these statements and those made by the Non-Aligned Movement. Of course, the majority of the nuclear weapon-free states are non-aligned, but there are other countries that are there that are non-aligned, but still they join these kind of statements that are very similar. They have to differentiate themselves from the Non-Aligned Movement more specifically.

The nuclear weapon-free states need an open and candid exchange about their own challenges within the NWFZs, including ratification, for example, as the Treaty of Pelindaba

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of course is already in force. But there are several countries that still have to ratify the treaty. Another difficulty is the ratifications of the protocols by the nuclear weapons states and the unilateral interpretations and declarations by nuclear weapons states upon the ratification of protocols that we would like to see changed or even withdrawn. Not all the zones, as you know, prohibit the dumping of nuclear waste; it’s important from my point of view to open up a discussion within the zones about whether it is important to have a common standard in relation to this specific issue among the zones. Transit of nuclear weapons through the zones and in the high seas is a very complex and difficult issue for the nuclear weapon states. Freedom of the seas is claimed by the nuclear weapon states and it is a tremendous challenge for the NWFZs to get into negotiations with the nuclear weapon states, but it is important to discuss it and try to figure out whether it is feasible to propose negotiations with the nuclear weapon states in this regard. We could open up discussions on the issue of precedence to existing treaties over nuclear weapon-free zones treaties, and I am referring of course to the CANWFZ. The provision gives precedence to existing treaties over the CANWFZ is causing the U.K. and the U.S. not to ratify the protocol since with that provision Russia would retain the right to deploy nuclear weapons in the zone. Another area where the zones could have an open discussion is other areas, unexplored areas, such as banning nuclear weapon related facilities in the zones. As far as I know, none of the treaties provide for this prohibition and, in fact, there is an issue right now under the Treaty of Pelindaba. Of course, there is a sovereignty dispute on Diego Garcia where there is a Naval Support Facility that is causing trouble in the context of the Treaty of Pelindaba—this issue may not be ripe for discussion but it may be constructive to try to discuss what we could do as nuclear weapon-free states in terms of amending our treaties or at least considering the possibility of banning nuclear weapon-related facilities in our zones. Every treaty has its own withdrawal provision, but if any state decides to withdraw from the treaty, there is nothing to prevent it. And of course, there is a risk that any state that withdraws from the treaty will be able to start developing nuclear military capacities. Outside the zones, we could be more proactive in encouraging the creation of other NWFZs and even the establishment of other nuclear weapon-free states such as

the one that Mongolia decided to unilaterally establish. I remember that our host in Ulan Bator, the representative of Mongolia, suggested this specific issue considering that there are countries which need negative security assurances from their neighboring states, not only with respect to nonuse or threat of use of nuclear weapons, but that their territory would not be used for placing nuclear weapons. And he even mentioned as an example of a potential state, the case of Afghanistan, but I only referred to this to share with you his views. We could start specific actions to support the CTBT ratification process, starting with a few members that are nuclear weapon-free states that have not ratified the CTBT. So we could teach, by example, trying to push for the ratification of CTBT. We could also encourage and support practical measures to end the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and even make a substantive contribution to the hopefully eminent negotiations for FMCT. And of course, also contribute with a more substantive discussion of negative security assurances text that we would like to see discussed in the conference of disarmament. And in relation to the NPT, that would be my expectation for the second conference of the nuclear weapon-free states to be held on the 30th of April. It would be to make a substantive contribution through specific proposals in strengthening the NPT regime with specific elements for a plan of action to obtain a nuclear weapon-free world. We could even make an effort to go through the 13 Steps proposed in the 2000 Review Conference because, every time we refer to the 13 Steps, the nuclear weapon states say they are not valuable anymore because they are not updated. So well if they are not updated, let’s have a discussion on what we want to do with the 13 Steps then.

Individually I think that there was a very interesting proposal made by Tibor Tóth, the Executive Secretary of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission when the focal points were gathered in Ulan Bator. In terms of nuclear weapon-free states, start a process of adopting legislation prohibiting and preventing nuclear explosions as Mongolia has already done. Tibor Tóth highlighted that this is an obligation of states already provided by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. Some states that have already ratified the CTBT are eager to adopt this kind of legislation are giving indications that they will not adopt this kind of legislation

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until the CTBT is in force. But, on the contrary, the nuclear weapon-free states all have a legal basis already to ask their parliaments to adopt this kind of legislation. How will this legislation help to strengthen the non-proliferation regime? By prohibiting nuclear explosions, making these explosions a criminal offense with appropriate penalties, and by adopting import and export controls and safety and security measures to ensure that nuclear materials do not fall into the hands of unauthorized persons and are not trafficked.

Another issue that should have a place in the agenda of the nuclear weapon-free states is the verification of compliance by the nuclear weapons states. I think that there’s a real opportunity for NWFZs to participate in the verification processes. Every nuclear weapon-free state has an institutional link to the IAEA and we have a moral and political standing to be a confident partner in that department. So, I think that two elements would be needed to have a more proactive role in terms of verification. First, to have a consensus, that might be difficult, within the NWFZs that we have a key role to play in that department. And second, a recognition of other ways in which we can play a role.

The nuclear weapon-free states have the energy and willingness to act as a group, but lack a leading actor or actors or a sort of core group that drives the nuclear weapon-free states to this proactive approach. Such leadership among the nuclear weapon-free states could allow them to exercise greater leadership in the broader international community. This proactive approach has to turn into specific proactive measures. These specific proactive measures will contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament regime within the zones through existing multilateral mechanisms, joint actions, and the efforts of individual states.

And as a conclusion, I think that it is very important that the whole international community recognizes the key role and importance of the nuclear weapon-free states and nuclear weapon-free zones, not only by providing or by accepting in text such as the resolution of the Security Council 1887 that NWFZs are important, but also by listening to them, by trying to enter into real negotiations and show willingness to strengthen also the nuclear weapon-free zones.

In this regard and in all these approaches that I have presented to you, I think that it will be also very important for the NWFZs to make stronger partnerships with civil society and with developed non-nuclear weapon states, such as Norway, Ireland, Austria, Sweden, to mention some that have a common interest and that see the processes of the nuclear weapon-free zones to make a difference in the disarmament and non-proliferation debate. We hope that, at some point, we will be able to see that world. It will take decades. Of course, we are not expecting to have a nuclear weapon-free world in two years, of course. That would not be realistic. At some point as you have seen also, and the history of the nuclear weapon-free zones provides you with an example that it’s not only a group of 33 counties in Latin America that wanted to make this real, but the number of states that believe in a nuclear weapon-free world is growing and we expect to have even more countries joining these efforts.

dr. JeFFrey LeWIs, tHe neW AMerICA FoUndAtIon: I will do my best to address the question I was asked, which is to provide the view of a nuclear weapon state, understanding that I only know about the United States and I work for an NGO. I think the place to start is where everyone else has: by noting that the phrase “teach the world” causes some discomfort. Instead, I want to address what NWFZs mean, and what they mean for the United States, and what that tells us about the prospects of signature and ratification of the various protocols.

The universalist NPT and various regional NWFZs approaches began separately, but today we endeavor to ensure that they’re complimentary. NWFZs make the good neighbor bargain in the NPT explicit.

We often talk about the NPT as a bargain between the haves and the have nots, but it’s also a bargain among all the have nots to stay that way. And to the extent the NWFZs remind regional states that this bargain is stabilizing and important, that’s a good thing.

If we look at the history of NWFZs, they are an effort to stop the arms race from extending into new regions—initially Latin America, Africa, outer space, Antarctica. I think someone earlier said, “We sign nuclear weapon-free zones

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where there are no nuclear weapons.” The implication of that is that NWFZs are a fundamentally different approach to security. They were a regional approach that was an alternative to the Cold War practice of the spread of nuclear weapons and extended deterrence. They were an alternative to the superpower confrontation we saw in Europe and Northeast Asia. As another colleague said, “We don’t want to be part of your nuclear battlefield.” That is an important observation because if you think of NWFZs as an alternative to, say, the network of extended deterrence commitments as embodied in the U.S. alliance system, you can understand the ambivalence on the part of many in Washington.

I say ambivalence because, on the one hand, there is a consensus in Washington that non-proliferation is strongly in the interest of the United States. On the other hand, it is hard to miss the implicit rebuke that NWFZs present for the conduct of US foreign policy and the operational practices of the United States military. So there is, I think, real friction. The place that you see the friction is when the obligations of nuclear weapon-free zones rub up against the operational practices of the United States military as it relates to nuclear weapons and the extension of deterrence.

We see this debate expressed about the protocols that the nuclear weapons states are asked to sign, largely for the purpose of providing negative security assurances—promises not to use nuclear weapons against states party to the NWFZs—but also the provisions or restrictions on the transit of nuclear weapons. It is the visceral reaction to those provisions, rather than the careful, lawyerly language, that has prevented the United States from signing many of these agreements and ratifying some we have signed. It’s important to be explicit about this. As someone who has spent a lot of time thinking about the “neither confirm, nor deny” policy—and Ambassador McLay can probably say significantly more than I can about this—the depth of the United States’ reaction to New Zealand’s actions in the 1980s goes far beyond the operational implications. When I look at SEANWFZ, I know that much of the difficulty had to do with the difficult U.S.-Philippine relationship and the conditions under which the United States military withdrew from the Philippines.

I have three kinds of recommendations for both negotiation of new NWFZs or the expansion of their obligations to help lessen this friction. The first starts out sounding anodyne: when negotiating a NWFZ or new obligations the would-be states party should coordinate closely with nuclear weapons states. Everybody says that, but I would make a pitch for what I would call a savvy consultation, which is to say that if we’re honest about the visceral reaction that one is likely to get in Washington and elsewhere, it’s important to understand that it’s not just a matter of would-be states party negotiating with the United States. This process forces difficult debates in the United States about nuclear weapons policies. Janne Nolan, who I am replacing on this panel, wrote an entire chapter in An Elusive Consensus about the United States’ debate over signing the ANWFZ Protocol. Much of the current U.S. policy of calculated ambiguity is a direct result of that debate. So this friction can be constructive, but we may not always like its outcome.

On the issue of negative security assurances, it looks like the Obama Administration is going to issue a mostly clean negative security assurance, one that says the United States wouldn’t use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a state that’s party to the NPT or other relevant agreements and that are in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. That last phrase “in compliance with their obligations” is a direct result of the debate about the ANWFZ.

The transit issues will be trickier. I don’t think the Nuclear Posture Review, for example, makes any effort to address the “neither confirm nor deny” policy or a variety of transit issues. Although, whether that reluctance to address that is likely to persist is hard to say because a lot of it has to do with Japan and the Japanese are not being so easy on that issue. So if you’re thinking about a nuclear weapon-free zone you should know that you will be walking into this ugly domestic debate that really has nothing to do with the zone unless you go with language with which the United States has accepted before.

The second recommendation is that NWFZs should emphasize stronger non-proliferation obligations, like universal adherence to the Additional Protocol, more physical protection measures, and more enforcement

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of export control measures. Creating real and tangible contributions to international security makes it much harder for the United States to walk away.

The third recommendation I know will not be popular, but I will say it anyway: take compliance seriously or at least to take it more seriously than states have in the past. One of the major issues associated with the ANWFZ was the widespread, and in retrospect accurate, belief that Libya was going about the business of building nuclear weapons, so there was a sense that the parties didn’t take the treaty seriously because they didn’t take the compliance of the members seriously. I always think non-proliferation regimes will face hard cases—the good thing about treaties is that they give us tools that we can use to respond. SEANWFZ would have a much stronger case in the United States about the value of signature and ratification if, for example, the states party used the clauses for consultation and fact-finding missions to dig into the question that Pierce Corden asked earlier about what the Burmese are doing with the North Korean government. If the states party use those kinds of mechanisms more frequently it would be much harder to cynically dismiss these treaties.

I regret if this talk seems a bit of a polemic, but my goal was to make explicit the tension between the approach embodied in NWFZs and the practice of extended deterrence. That tension was a manageable tension and could be left implicit as long as we were putting nuclear weapon-free zones in places like Latin America and Africa. But if our goal is to see NWFZs extend into places like the Middle East, or Northeast Asia, then that tension is necessarily going to become more explicit as those zones begin to bump up against places where the U.S. nuclear umbrella is.

AMBAssAdor dHAnAPALA: Going back several decades, a ban on nuclear weapon tests had widespread public support. There were demonstrations. Civil society was quite agitated about it because, first of all, atmospheric testing had affected the atmosphere. Mother’s milk was contaminated with Strontium-90 and there was quite an active campaign, leading to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and, eventually, to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. During the Cold War, also, we had massive

demonstrations, not only in New York and London and other places, but all over the world. But at the end of the Cold War, I think there was a sense that the prospect of a global nuclear exchange had receded.

So there was a complacency that Enrique Roman-Morey was warning us about together with other issues beginning to capture public attention. But we are seeing, once again, the centrality of the nuclear age. The specter of WMD terrorism, especially after 9/11, and the concern that non-state actors could acquire weapons of mass destruction and could cause havoc are more vivid today than in the past.

Similarly, the climate change issue and the emphasis now on nuclear energy has also begun to focus attention on whether or not there is a credible firewall between peaceful uses of nuclear energy and non-peaceful uses and so on.

So, we are beginning gradually to see a fresh salience of the nuclear issue. It’s not going to be to the same degree of concern, but I think there’s a gradual build up. And, of course, the contribution made by the four elder statesmen here in the United States, The Wall Street Journal piece by Shultz, Kissinger, Nunn, and Perry, as well as the similar editorials in other countries are symptomatic of a new concern about these weapons and the importance of having a nuclear weapon-free world.

And while I have the floor, may I also say that with regard to the Prague speech and the hedging with regard to the time scale—which, in fact, is not very different from the Global Zero campaign, which has been going on and of which I am a member—which also projects, in 20, 30 years, the final date for the elimination of nuclear weapons going down to zero in an incremental, step-by-step process.

But when President Clinton declared that the United States would be ready to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, that too, I think, led to a great deal of debate. Some of the allies of the U.S. were dragged, unwillingly, to the negotiation table.

And despite all the problems of the negotiating process, we finally have a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty which only India, at that stage, opposed in the Conference on Disarmament. But through a process, it was brought to the U.N. General Assembly and adopted and the United States was the first signatory.

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Of course, subcritical tests were allowed and that was, perhaps, the reason why it was possible to have the CTBT acceptable to most of the nuclear weapon states and, in the case of the United States, there was the stockpile stewardship program which was very well-funded. Of course, that has still not resulted in the ratification and the entry into force of the CTBT because of the internal, political processes here.

But I would think that we are, in many ways, held captive by the problems of the American political process

and the fact that you are, in fact, a divided nation when it comes to issues like this. And just as much as Woodrow Wilson’s very noble idea of the League of Nations ultimately didn’t get passed in the Senate, it is possible that very noble ideas of President Obama may not get passed as well.

“ This conference, itself, is a significant landmark, I think, in the growing recognition of the important step that countries have taken in making, voluntarily, a decision to reject nuclear weapons as a form of security.”

— Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala

PARTICIPANTS’ REfLECTIONS ON ThE CONTRIBUTION Of NUCLEAR WEAPON-fREE ZONES TO ThE GLOBAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIfERATION REGIME