The Construction of a Syllabus for Aesthetics in Art Education

National Art Education Association

The Construction of a Syllabus for Aesthetics in Art EducationAuthor(s): E. F. KaelinSource: Art Education, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Mar., 1990), pp. 22-24+33-35Published by: National Art Education AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3193203 .

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E. F. Kaelin

The Construction of a Syllabus for

Preface For these remarks to be understood one must keep in mind the difference between talking about an intellectual discipline and solving a problem or performing a task _ within it. Teachers of the humanities talk l about humanities disciplines, often reduc- ing them to a set of conclusions, which are to constitute the background culture of our college students. Professional philosophers do not perform in this way; we askf them to do philosophy, to provide their . . . . students with the techniques of analysis and other methods for solving the prob- , : lems of the students' everyday lives. To contribute the philosopher's share of a program of art education to be made up of art production, art criticism, art history, and aesthetics, I shall select those concepts of traditional aesthetic theory which must be turned into a means by which our students are to pursue their ends in the ongoing venture. Presumably they will themselves be teachers of art educators, and they shall be asked to further operationalize the concepts to be assimilated in the behavioral patterns of their students; and so on, down the line, until the ultimate pay off of actual classroom instruction.

To accomplish my end of the bargain, I shall select three aesthetic concepts: that of a work of art (and its cognate in criticism, 'the object of criticism'; funded reflective judgment (the typical pattern of aesthetic judgment), which will allow us to evaluate the procedures of criticism); and, finally, aesthetic experience, which hap- pens to be the concept that permits us to relate the other two.

22 Art Education/March 1990



Aesthetics in Art Education

What is to be done with these concepts (and others from the whole tradition of philosophical aesthetics as they are needed (i.e. become useful)) will become apparent as I distinguish between aesthetics and the philosophy of art in what follows. Rather than dealing in substantive issues I shall concentrate on the philosophical techniques of analysis that will permit me to sketch out a patterned set of lessons for a college course in the philosophy of art. No substance, but techniques skills -; no subject matter, but methods for improving the level of cultural literacy.

Prologue Preparing syllabi for art education is not a one-level process. Since the task is to explain what skills pertaining to the discipline of aesthetics are relevant to the skills to be taught students in the public schools, one can not lose sight of the fact that two levels of instruction intervene between the work of a theoretical aesthetician and the behavior of our students in grades K through 12. The teachers of the teachers are to be taught, just as those teachers are themselves to be taught.

Therefore, any attempt to connect the content of a relevant discipline to the be- haviors of elementary students that would abstract from the behavior of the other two levels of teachers would be a serious error in judgment. There is no such thing, and there can be no such thing as a "teacher proof" curriculum. And if this is the case, it would seem wise to structure a DBAE curriculum with this hierarchical pedagogi-

Art Education/March 1990 23



cal activity in mind, and to permit represen- tatives of the various levels within the pedagogical process to cooperate with "the experts" in developing whatever curriculum these teachers would eventually be charged with implementing.

One of the practical consequences of the Getty Foundation's development of their DBAE program is the redefinition of the discipline of art education itself. If the instruction in the arts within the public schools is to reflect the relevant skills of four different disciplines, with their subject matters adjusted for level of difficulty ahd readiness of the students, then art education becomes defined in a de facto manner to be the mix of those four disciplines; and an "expert" in art education would be one who manages the proper mix. Once that mix has been constructed, curricula may be produced that would achieve the aims stipulated by the theory.

For this reason, I should propose that a DBAE curriculum committee be composed of active participants in education, art education, aesthetics, art history and criticism, and the creative arts. This committee would be charged with determining the curricula at the various levels: for the teachers of the teachers of students; for the teachers of the students; and, lastly, for the students themselves.

This paper is intended only to state some of the problems and issues currently discussed by aestheticians as being relevant to their "discipline." In short, whether we consider 'aesthetics' the name of a distinctive subdomain of philosophical inquiry (other possibilities of location are in psychology or sociology) having as its purpose to explain the conditions under which the objects of experience are appreciated for a distinctive kind of value or; whether, on the other hand, as the application of techniques of philosophical analysis to the contents of other disciplines which are of the first order of importance, such as art, morality, science, and the like, the discipline of aesthetics (or of the philosophy of art) attempts to answer such questions as "What is an aesthetic object?" "Under what conditions are such objects experienced?" and "How do aesthetic experiences contribute to the well-being of the individual having them, or to that of their societies?" Such analyses as these are descriptive.

When the philosopher's or the aesthetician's interest turns to a second kind of inquiry, as it does when he or she asks "How do we justify the judgments we make of aesthetic objects (works of art)?", the nature of the inquiry changes into normative aesthetics. If the claim is made that an artwork is good, a natural question is "What makes it so?" In examining the various answers given to this question throughout the histbry of our culture, the aesthetician is plying the trade of a meta- critic, whose task relative to criticism is analagous to that of the critic relative to the working artist.

Meta-criticism is grounded in aesthetic theory, which summarizes the results of a descriptive aesthetics; and aesthetic theory is bound on the upper level by the principles of logic (or rules of evidence) and upon the lowest by the creative and appreciative experiences of men and women who produce the works of art of primary concern to the art educator. This upper level is meta-theory, which pre- scribes what conditions should be fulfilled for a theory to be successful in the first place. But it should not be ignored that a number of aestheticians have maintained that 'art' and its derivative notions are open-ended, indeed that for this reason no theory of art is possible. This position, being about theories of art, is therefore itself an issue in meta-aesthetic theory.

What guides the inquiry from the level of meta-theory to the supporting data provided by actual aesthetic experiences at the entry level of aesthetic inquiry are the laws of evidence, requiring that any descriptive statement made be true and that all definitions and statements be free of logical contradiction. Add one further rule, a pragmatic one, that once the preceding referential and rational rules are found to apply that any further reasoning in aesthetics be guided by the clear aware- ness of what must be done, and in what order, to achieve the aims of the inquiry. Here the question asked is "What is the problem you are asking me to solve?" or "What do I have to do to fulfill the purposes of this inquiry?"

When one adopts this point of view the philosopher's activity is not defined as a set of conclusions about special domains of possible inquiry, as in times past philoso-

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phy was considered the study of logic (of the conditions of truth), metaphysics (the nature of reality), of morality in ethics, or of "beauty" in aesthetics. Philosophy has no distinctive subject matter; it thinks about (reflects upon) all human experiences. And to do so it constitutes itself as a method by which to analyze significance wherever and however it is found by individuals interacting with each other, with nature, and with their social institutions. In this scheme both philosophy and art are institutional forms of behavior. Presumably, the purpose of introducing a DBAE program of art instruction is to permit our students to participate to the maximal extent in the institutional practices of our art institutions.

For those who insist upon a "subject matter" point of view, let them be consoled with the notion that aesthetics and the philosophy of art both are concerned with aesthetic experiences, and that their ultimate aim will be served when their students are led to understand what makes a given experience "aesthetic". But more importantly still, if they can be persuaded to follow the methodological plan outlined here, they will know where to look for the evidence of their claims to be true.

I

Definition of aesthetics. This is one of the tasks of aesthetics itself. But before defining 'aesthetics,' I usually start with a definition of 'definition'. The definition of the first term is a theoretical concern; of the second, a meta-theoretical one. This distinction between theory and metatheory is methodology, and hence properly belongs to philosophy as a second level discipline investigating the methods anyone might use to solve problems, gain knowledge, or build a better mouse-trap.

A. The Nature of the Discipline Traditionally, there is a distinction be-

tween aesthetics and the philosophy of art. According to that distinction, aesthetics is a subject discipline within philosophy concerned with the study of beautiful objects of any kind - the conditions of their perception and the nature of the judgments justified by such acts of perception. If you

have ever heard of philosophy as the study of the true, the good, and the beautiful, you recognize aesthetics as the third of these subdisciplines. The others are logic (pure and applied, or science) and ethics.

These three fields are distinctive in that each possesses both a descriptive and a normative component. Besides attempting to describe the phenomena involved and explaining how they are experiences, each must attempt to explain how normative judgments within the field may be justified. Theoretical aesthetics, then, should produce a set of categories that may be used to describe aesthetic phenomena and to explain how judgments of value may be justified in terms of such categories. In this way, the uses of theory are for the purposes of meta-criticism, which either establishes by prescription a plan for making aesthetic judgments, or to criticize the actual judgments made by practicing critics. Critics, of course, talk about and evaluate works of art.

The philosophy of art is aesthetics limited to the phenomena of art. Art here is the primary discipline, and philosophy is derivative, and secondary. As a field of inquiry it would include meta-theory (the logic of evidence and theory construction), theory (the derivation of the aesthetic categories necessary for the development of a meta-criticism), meta-criticism (the criticism of criticism.

Finally, in this scheme, criticism and the creation and appreciatioh of artworks form the two levels of activity of those individuals engaged in an act of aesthetic commu- nication. We may consider this level of experience (the "art" in the 'philosophy of art' to be an institution of our society; and if we do, we may better show the social benefits of education in the arts. Or we may consider it as the kinds of activities casually exemplified in the behavior of artists, critics, museum habitues, and the like. For theoretical purposes, it is most probably better to select the notion 'work of art' as the focus of our (aesthetic) examination of the phenomenon.

So much for the discipline, considered in its widest extent.

B. Kinds of Activities Depending upon the level of the philosophical activity described above, the activity is conceptual; and its techniques




are analytical or observational. One must observe works of art in various periods of history to be able to stipulate what categories are necessary and sufficient to define a domain of possible inquiry. Here the active aesthetician may be aided by the history of his own discipline.

For there to be an adequate account of what is involved in the making of works of art the traditional categories of matter (sensuous stuff), form, and expression must not only be given interpretation, but also sup- plemented by some notion of function, if the social uses of an art product are to be given their due in our philosophical account of artistic phenomena. Here, the history of aesthetics is replete with examples, which will be selected as they fulfill the pragmatic requirements of this inquiry - to supply a list of the categories most helpful for understanding what makes an aesthetic experience aesthetic, or a "creative" experience creative.

C. Sources Traditional aesthetic theories, art historical treatises, museums, creative activities of students and teachers.

D. Competing Ideologies I can't see the relevance of this question, since it seems to me obvious that no one should teach error as the truth. One merely selects what seems fitting from all the existing materials at one's disposal to throw some light on the problem one is concerned with at the moment. Historically, however, there have been "idealistic" aesthetics, "physicalistic" ones, pragmatic ones, and the like.

Currently, the preference of practitioners seems to be for an analytical approach, rather than a synoptic or speculative one. Whether one pretends to analyze only the words used to describe or evaluate aesthetic objects, as "analytical philosophers" claim to do, or to analyze the kinds of experiences it is possible to have of aesthetic objects, as "phenomenologists" claim to do, it seems obvious to me that any concepts of our ordinary languages that are helpful to denote aesthetic objects or ways of experiencing them must be tested against an actual experience, which is itself an object of analysis, and that if we wish to analyze our aesthetic experiences we must use concepts of our ordinary lan-

guage to communicate the results of such analyses to our fellows. The preference of one form of analysis over the other, then, would seem to be a prejudice of an un- thinking philosopher.

E. Plan of Attack (Recommendations for Doing the Job). Begin (when teaching teachers at whichever level) by working down the explana- tory (theoretical) ladder of discourse relevant to the description or evaluation of an aesthetic product. In the end, the aesthetician teacher will meet his students, whether the teachers of teachers or the teachers of elementary pupils, at the interface between meta-criticism and criticism. If they meet successfully, the student will have succeeded in describing and criticizing a work of art and the teacher will have succeeded in making that student see that he or she has done just that.

II.

Ordering of the Skills (covered by the sketch of the philosophy of art given above).

Observational. Perception of sensuous properties and their relations. Remember that in the order of qualities, 1+1=1, not 2. That is, the relation between two different properties is another single property: as a relation between a warm and a cool color is a space tension; between two or more tones of a chord, a harmony; and the like.

Linguistic. Knowing the names for desig- nating sensuous properties and their relationships. Here the examination of the elements and principles of an aesthetic experience of a work of art.

Conceptual. In the representational arts, knowing the difference between iconology and iconography for the art of "interpreting" the ideas depicted therein. Recognizing that an idea might be represented by the relationships between objects depicted in a pictorial design. For this reason: the concepts used to identify the images depicted within the design and the ideas represented by their relationships.

Judgmental. Noting the manner in which the observed sensuous properties (an aesthetic surface) take on an added qualitative determination by "deepening" into an iconographic significance (the aesthetic depth) of the work.




Reflection. Noting the conditions obtain- ing that permit the deepening of an aesthetic surface, or the relatedness of the elements of an aesthetic surface (in the case of nonobjective works), and in consequence determining the experience we have of such works.

Criticism. Locating the "object of criticism" within the parameters of the experience defined by the reflection.

III.

Teachability of the Skills Noted Above. In my opinion, there is little chance in pro- ducing the cultural literacy of our elementary school students if their teachers are culturally illiterate. For this reason, the students must have teachers who are trained in aesthetics; they need all the skills they are expected to pass on to their students.

The problem is to monitor the manner in which aesthetic categories get passed on from generation to generation of participants involved: a DBAE committee, acting the role of teachers of teachers; their students in graduate schools of education, who, upon graduation, are certified as teachers of art or art specialists in the schools; and, finally, the students of these

teachers. As always the problem here is fitness of

the instructional packages, and that depends upon the readiness of the students (at whichever level) and the effective skills of their teachers (at whichever level).

The task, to apply aesthetic concepts to the teaching of art in the public schools, depends upon the development of a delivery system for translating those concepts into behavioral pattems of students. And to achieve that task it is important that each participant in the enterprise cooperate with the other - as we do when communicating with one another in natural speech: when one of us talks the other listens, and if we both hear what is said we will have communicated, provided we understand the language. And as a precondition to this kind of communi- cation, a modicum of good will is expected of both parties. Finally, as I said before, if we expect our teachers to turn an aesthetic concept into a behavioral, conditioned, re- sponse in his or her students, then they must be asked to participate in the design of the instrument.

E. F. Kaelin is Professor of Philosophy, Florida State University, Tallahassee.




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The Construction of a Syllabus for Aesthetics in Art Education