The CIA in Afghanistan, 2001-2002E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) SEGRETNNOFORN//X1 Afghanistan . I. E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) .__ _ _, The first insertion of an . intelligence team to

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DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL E013526 SECTION 53(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO 2012-041 document no 1 DECLASSIFICA~ION DATE May 6 2019

SEGRE11NOFORNX1

On themiddotFront Lines

The CIA in Afghanistan 2001-2002 (U) middot

H_enry A Crumpton D

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Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (SO USC section 3S07)

In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001

terrorist attacks bullbullbull the President bullbullbull calledfor unilateral CIA covert

action operations with liaison services and

support to the US militarys effort in the Afghanistan theater

Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (SO U SC section 3S07)

Henry A Crumpton serves in the CIA Directorate of Operations

Editors Note The following essay refiects the perspective ofa veteran officer of the Clandestine Service who led the CMs camshypaign in Afghanistan from

20 September 2001until28 June 2002 As Chiefofthe Countershyterror(st Centers Special Operamiddot middot

tions he participated directly in unfolding events from the White House to the front l~nes Given the brevity ofthis overview and authors singular optic much remains to be told Nevertheless the narrative is designed to conmiddot tribute to the critical dialogue on how the United States should wage counterterrorism wars in

the future lt5fNF)

in the aftermath of the l1 Sepmiddot tember 2001 terrorist attack~ i~ New York and Washington the President of the United States ordered the Director ofCentral lntelligel)ce cocn to launch a covert action war against the al Qaida terrorist organization and its Taliban supporters in Afghanshyistan This order in response to a proposal submitted to the Presshyident by the head of the DCIs Counterterrorist Center four days after the attacks called for unilateral CIA covert action middot operations with liaison services and support to the US militarys effort in the Afghanistan theshyater (j3NF) middot

By the second week ofDecember three months after the Presidenshytial directive all major Afghan

cities had fallen to US and allied tribal forces and surviving enemy forces were on the run A core ofOcIA and0USArmy Speshycial Forces (SF) ersonnel

1i~~lYS airp~--o-w_e_r-=-h-a-dd-e_stroy-ed ~e Tali

ban regime and disruptedmiddotalshyQaida with approximately 25 percent of the enemys leaders killed or captured More than 20 almiddotQaida training camps and middot sanctuaries had been seemed

IEO 13526 section 14(c) I

Some ---~~=-~---

5000 to 10000 eneiny had been killed while US casualties

remained low1 And finally more than 5000 prisoners had been rounded up some of intelligence value $INF)

Although the global war against iI~Qai~ remains unfin~lhed the initial military campaign in middot Afghanistan sitcceeded The collapse of the Taliban enabled

middot the Afghan people oo begin

1 One CIA officer and one Special Forces soldier detailed to the CIA died in combat both casualties oftreachery-the fmat was killed by revolting prisoners the second byan Afghan teen~r manning a local roadshyblock The US military suffered fewer than 100 casualties the majority the trac result offriendly fire or transport acc1denta Northern Alliance and other allied tribal forces lltgtsses were in the low middot hundreds)iJfNF)

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reclaiming their country and provided the US with an opportunity to build a partnership with an emerging government f$fNF)

What were the elements ofwar -in Afghanistan and how were they combined to produce such a

dramatic outcome Internal elements_those within the purmiddot view of the US governmentshyincluded intelligence collection combat capabilities covert action communications bureaucracy technology strat shyegy politics logistics and

UNCLA88IFIED

leadership External elements pres~nting both challenges and opportunities included geograshyphy weather history tribal alliances deployment of enemy forces enemy tactics regional politics Afghan culture and world opinion Often these elements complemented one another producing synergy and positive momentum At other times however combinations of elements created stress and internal conflict What did we learn in Afghanistan about how internal and external elements of warfare influenced each other

deg and were managed Ana how can we apply these lessons to counterteITOrism (CT) warfare in the future kBINF)

Authority Responsibility and Leadership (U)

Clarity ofpurpose clarity of comshymand and accountability are critical inwar At the outset of the Afghan war the President conveyed unique and specific authOJities to the CIAvia a Presidential Finding He reinshyforced this directive with a visit to Headquarters on 26 Septemshyber 2002 His message to the CIA leadership and those in CTC given responsibility for executshying his orders resonated clearly Destroy al-Qaida Ilis detenni~ nation which translated as raw political will and strong leadershyship set the tone Froni themiddot President via the DCI the Depmiddot uty Director ofOperations CrgtDO) and the Director of CTC directly down to me as Chiefof CTCs Spedal Operations (CTCSO) the authorities and responsibilities were clearly defmed CBfNF middot

The White House and CIA leadshyership declared the major objectives set broad parameters expecentted results and remained intensely engaged with hard questionsmd some deep conshycerns-yet they refrained from micro-management The QCI provided daily briefmgs to the President and senior officials at the NSC To reinforce the link between policy and operations the DCI asked that I accompany

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him for these briefings on more middot than 20 occasions during the war (The White House of course also received daily updates from thEl US military) r$NF)

To their credit the DCI and other CIA leaders especially the Direcshytor ofCTC demonstrated political middot coilrage and leadership by allowshying unprecedented operational leeway within a clear complemenshytary policy context that demanded accountability Daily briefings throughtextgraphsmapsand oral presentations kept them informed and provided the stimushylus for constructive dialogue and guidance Understanding the need for timely operational decisionshymaking on the ground in Afghanistan the CIA encomaged operators to operate Not once did CIA leaders order OTCSO to scrub a mission but the same CIA leadshyers probed deeply prior to any major operation Other leaders less confident and more risk adverse might have secondshyguessed operational decisions and tactical moves or distanced themshyselves from responsibility--ejther action could have pulled the war effort into politicalbureaucratic gridlock Avoiding a repetition of errors made in Vietnam and Somashylia the White House and CIA leadership unleashed operational forces Inso doing they facilitated the application of innovative and unconventional tactics which led to victory and in the process help~d to forge a CT war congrushyent with broad US policy objectives JJINF)

To their credit CIA leaders demonstrated political courage and

leadership by aIlowing tinprecedented

operational leeway

HUMINT at the Core (U)

The US governments politicalshystrategic understanding of the region tactic9J military operashytions and lethal covert action programs all depended on HUMINT Rooted deeply in cov~rt action operations against the USSR and its puppet governshyment in Afghanistan from 1980 to 1992 GIA intelligence netshyworks were expanded

I EO 13526 section 14(c)

SEGRETNNOFORNX1 Afghanistan


__ _ _ The first insertion of an intelligence team to meet with Northern Alliance Commander Ahmed Shah Masood occurred in May 1997 ~INF)

The al-Qaida attacks against US e~bassies in East Africa in middot August 1998 led to a limited Presidential Finding and a White House demand for increased intelligence collection focused on al-Qaida comshymandcontrolcommunications

middot (03) in Afghanistan Liaison with the Northern Alliance im roved

2 The Northern Alliance a loose network of competitive tribal forces Included TajikS as the majority but also Uzbeks Hazaras and others (U)

I EO 13526 section 14( c)

Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 USC section 3507) middot

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SEOREfNOFORNX1 Afghanistan

IE0 13526 section 14(c) This agent inventory expanded

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exponentially after 9111 whenCIA offieers

started recruitillg tribal armies

i The pace of operational activity again accelerated after the al-Qaida attack on theUSS COLE in Yemen in October 2000 ~NF)

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s With ll() US Embassy in Kabul and the activities of al-Qaida spanning the globe intelligence operations ~instUsama bin Laaen (UBL) were ban ed by a Chiefof Station (COS) heading a virtual ~tion at CIA Headquarters (OTCUBL) INF)

Intelligence the bulk from HUMlNT provided the means to measure a number of the extershynal elements of war-including the stre~gths of allies and eneshymies~wliicn formed the basis for US government internal decisionshy~akillg-on policy strategy and covert action (including psychoshyogical operations) HUMINT

afforded the CIA considerable nfluence over ~trategic planshy

ning with a covert action war at its center which in turn led to more resources and more intellishygence ~NF

IThe Pakistanis wresshy-=-~tled with their fears of a new

IEO 13526 section 14(c) I bull4 5ampCRETNOFORNX1

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I EO 13526 section l4(c)

Afghaniftan beyond their influshyence but eventually succwnbed to USpressure and played an important middotsupporting role

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InAfghanistan HUMINT was critical SIGINT

_________played an important role as did imagery from NRO_ satellites US militn7 aircraftand dronesl

I shyNonethel~ss it was the fusion of technicai collection with HUMINT that proved to be the formula fo~ success A dynamic system ofchecking and retaskshy

- ing multiple assets-human and technical-proved highly effecshytive For example when a source reported the coordinates of an shyene~y carigtp using GPS (global positioning technology)~ the inforshymation would be forwarded to the Intelligence Community (IC) for evaluation and if deemed credishyble redirection of satellites planes and other collection sysshytems to corroborate the report New data on the site would lead middotto refined tlaeisk~i~n~fi~liilwu111 nal source

te_chnology an intimate partnership with the USnmicrolifaey

and fastmiddot offensiye action turned out to be

the k~y tmiddot t~rgeting

ElectroDie mappiDg

-

______I In the final anltlysis the CIA unilateral HUMINT netshyworks developed over the last two d~cE-des -provided botnthe critical intelligence reporting and the muscle for covert action in Afghanistan ~NF)

Targeting (U)

CIA targeting support played a crucial role in deconflicting tarshyget proposals facilitating precise air and ground attacks and susshytaining the overall intelligence cycle of collectionfusiollltaraet- _ ingoperations Afghans have long b~nexpert at targfiting as_

middot British arid Soviet invaders could attest AI-Qaida also excels at ambushe_s against fixed sites out- middot side combat zcmes rather than large-scale military engageshyments The CIA and the US military needed to target and destroy such adept enemies

-before they could acquire a bead on our positions $NF middot

A revolutionary targeting sysshy~ tem using electronic mapping

technology an intimate partnershyship with the US military and fast offensive action turned out to be the key CTCSO created a

6EGRETNNOFORNJIX1 Afghanistan

special targeting uni

rectly linked with eight other US government entities most importantly NSA and CENTshyCOM5 The CIAs Office of Military Affairs also played an important role r

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I EO 13526 section 14(a)

6 The US military Central Command based in Tampa Florida was under the command of Gen Tonuny Franks CENTshyCOM oversees all military oferations in the Middle East and Centra Asia (U)


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The CTC80 targeting unit fismiddot serimicroilated its product to the field directly assisting US pilots and CIAand trS military forces to outmaneuver and engagethe enemy Importantly the saine fusfid all~ource intelligencethat enabled dynamic targetit~galso benefited HUlIIINT collection psychologilal programs and covertaction-operations 181NF)

The RightmiddotPeople middot (U)

The right people bringing their imperfe~ miX Qfexperience pride emotions and instincts were the cotoerstone of US sueshy ceas in Afghanistan On 11

September 20011 the CIAbad no cpmponent no staff and no supshyport mechanism structured to launch and mana e this uni ue war against a terrorist army hid-

Qlg in amiddotfracturedland on the far side of tbe globe Fortunately the CIA-especially CTC and the

DOs Sp~cial Activities Division (S~)-had develolgt~cl~e 11xpershytiseover theyears 9gt briild such an organization IiINF)

Within days of911 the Director middot ofCTC reciilled me from a formiddot

eign assigrunent to establish and leadfCTCSO My deputy was a Nayal Academy graduate with 26 years of gov~ent service Who had WQrked QT targets in South

-Asia CTC80 included a covert action ops middotofii~ a former MariQ

IEO 13526 section l4(c)

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Within 16 days of the attacks on US soil the eight-person Northern Alliance Liaison Team

was inSide Afghanistan

I EO 13526 section l4(c) 1 I IThe chief ofreports a middot 25-year veter1micro1 marsliall~dmiddota small cadre of specialists to manshyage and disseminate the HUMINT Senior analysts brought a wealth ofknowledge including practical experience tra middot counternarcotics tarshygets

Militarj liaison Officers included a S cial Forces (SF) colonel a

commander and analysts-all

-------~ super proven performers They were given complete access to CTCSO information and immeshy

diately assumedmiddotmvaluable fully integr~~~Jfl~+ (fltff)

IEO 13526 section 14(c)

--------JThe Headshyquarters component focused on strategic goals linked Policy and operations assembled and disshyseminated intelligence and coordinated support for the vanshyguards of the war the CIA teams deployed into Afghanibull stan 18NF)

In Afghanistan the CIA teams operated semi-autonomously as a

network so that they could resigtond to widely varying geoshygraphic tribal and tactical conditions Each collected local informti~on received bro~d allshysowce intelli~nce from OTCSO assessedis own situations made deciBions coordinated with Headshyqutirters to gauge strategic middotconsequences and most of allmiddot executed ita core mission which was to find and use all means to destroy al-Qaida A centralized CIA command element inside Argbatiistan or worse based in middot the United States would have iriipeded the middotbetter-informed disshypersed teams on the ground CTCSOs immediate aim thereshyfore was to deploy and support teams and encourage their tactishycal autonomy within a strategic plan congruent with US g~vernshyment policy objectives (1211NF)

These teams blended diverse talshye~ts and b~ted highly experi~nced leaders who excelled in misaioriB demanding indepenshydence and initiative Despite the erosion ofCIA paramilitary (PM) capabilities since the end of the Cold War CIA had managed to retainmiddota core ofPM officers in

SAD mos onn~r y rom e

-u~pecial Operations commushynity SAD nonetheless provided the backbone for CIA teams deploying irito Afghanistan Many of these PM officers were cross-trained and experienced o erationsintelli ence officers

e same time CIA operations officers with these requisite

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quidificatiq~s had 1ittle if any militaxy ~Pe~nce ormiddottrainU1g other thrul baaic CIA weapons

fairiiliariZatianmiddot Yet the right combinaon ofpersQnnel with the right t(jam Ieadership proved sufficient for the mission

)$INF)

In all typesmiddotofweather and comshybat oonditi9ns sADI I

al~mg With the us military air infrastructure served as the -umbilical cord for the CIAteams SAD middotpilots fieW helicopters (Rusbull sian )fi-178) and fixed wingaircraft into Mghamstan

j1$fNF)

Of the seven CIA teall1s ceployedmiddotin the first wave of insertions from 27 September until 19 Novlmber the Northshyern Alliance Liaison Team middot

(NALT) ledtheway into the Paaj~hirValley Within 16 days of the attacks 0n-iUS soil this teamwas insidemiddotArghanistan ChiefNALT - veteran operashytions officer spoke FarsiDari ang knew many of the key Afghan political players His deputy aJormer Special Forces soldier apd veteran PM operashytions officer provided compl~rigtentary military expershy1ise (lrom ~he Pentagons perspective this would be the middot equivillent of generals leading an A-team-sizedunit into the heart of the fight) The eightshymemJie~ team included operashy

tio~-Qffi~ers PM officers a medic and ~-communications speciaist bull They averaged45 yearsofflge and25 years pfproshyfessional experience Members oftheNAIT recombined themmiddot

8ECRETNNOFORNX1 Afghanistan

IEO 13526 section l4(c) I

Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 USC section 3507) l

selves at will with US military uni~ on the ground as specific mi~sion requirements evolved (87NF)

The remaining six teams Alpha through Foxtrot averaged eight members all experienced in Third World crises Each included multiple officers with foreign language capabilities including FarsiDari Uzbek Rusmiddot sian and Arabic

All but one team _e_e_r_s-po_esome loCal lanshyguage or dialect Two team leaders- wollld receive the Intellishygenc~ ~ss for supreme valor on the battlefield These ~ams like

the NAJr combined with the US military for specific missions Some teams included SF elemiddot

ments at the time of inaertion Many team members performed remarkable tasks like the medic who amputated the leg of an Afghan soldier using only a Leatherman tool TeamDelta members and SF forces captured a senior Taliban intelligence offishycial deep inhostile territorybull Team Alpha directed a Northern Alliance element to middotrescue two US journalists lost and trapped by fighting near Konduz NALT I middot Im Pakistan tracked Western hostages and supported their rescue and extraction from Afghanistan Some teams led Afghan forces into combat kWNF)

The CIA and IC effort encom- ~ passed scores of components and thousands of people making critishy

1 EO 13526 section 14(c)

8ECAETUNOFOANX1 7

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cal middotcontributions CIA logistics ofli9ers a~ltl$ili~ aircrews middotigtmchas8Q packed tiarisported aiidair drop~dweapomicros andmiddot gemiddotmicro to teaml inSjde Afghanishystan Firearcentls instrucfurs middot cartographers computer technishycians anal~ts soldiers reports officers translator13_semmty officers medics pilots communishycators and man Others played vital roles

Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intemicroigence Agency Act of 1949 (50 USC section 3507)

qualified personnel The CIA depended on the ingenuity of a amall number of suPerior field communicators aridJater US military aasistan(lE becamicrose of antiquated tacticalcommunicashytions gear and the limited middot number ofqualified field commushynicatiorui officers The CIA middot lacked sufficient foreign-lanshyguagequalified operations officers DIA blesijed With expeshyrienCed officers y6t burdened by a eumbersome bureaucracy conshytributedmiddotmipimal information and res0U1ces fjNF)

EO 13526 section 14(c)

J EO 13526 section 14(c)

middot The lelffi -teams and support middot branChes were able to move lt1uickly and nimDiy aronnd middotbureaucratic barrlera within the Agency and the IC-strong ~ency leadershiQ llld Iq supshyport~Q fa~ta~dmiddotthis

Jin tly Afghanallies d suchmiddotsmalMeems as coushy

rageolU partners rather than an invadirig army )iJlNF)

Money and Supplies (U)

Funding flowed in a torrent The CIA teimicronsJiterally slept onmilshylions middotorus dollars The financial incentive fkassets and tribBI

------------------------------ armycommruidets to c0opeiate

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was substantiM and immediate f$NF)

Just as critical wer~ the supplies tliat kept the teams and Afghan allies warm fed andca able Of combat

IEO 13526 section l4(a)

Moreover customized bundles and unconventional requests proved the norm rathermiddot than the exception~ For exlilllple whenan ethnic Uzbek commander told us that his mO-st critical need was horsefeed GTCSOs experishyenced Iogisfi~s offioors made the purchases arid worked with the middotUS Air Force to airdrop the

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supplies within days of the re uest


Portable hospitals ---~-J

were purchasecf and shipped middot~or~d vests medical packs Korans foiid binoctilars toys kiiives Piclru trucksmiddot middot enades saddles and

phia Undr~ds ofother ~tems were pushedto the field OTCSO-never rejected any tactishycal-supply request from one of its teams )81NF)

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The CIAtea~s literally slE~pt on millions of US ---------- dollars


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middot Oespite these Walbington-b~ed -issuea tiie CIA forged a solid

wjth_Q~NTCOM artnerahip andius rur Components

Whil~--~e-middotthe debate with the Pentashygon cen~ on powerand control tlte dialog witli CENT COJtbuiii others oeusea ~ore on

middot how tomiddotachi~ye victory The CIA provicJedHUMINT psYchological

operatj~nS eii)erienee cash

middot middot I lethalcoVertaction capabilities

land entiee to tribal allies(p~ust~e politicalguidance reqmrecfiQleverage and coordishynatemiddotiMsemiddotAfghruimiddotallies) In turn tiieUS niilitary offered combatexpertise awesome fireshypbwermiddot Iogistics and com1nunications architecture IM1Nl andSIGINT In some centases the personal relati~nahips betwejn CIAand JJS~litary

peisonnel mapydevelo ed in such CT b middot fiei=li_---J

ted the part-nership jsecttlNF)

The near ad hoc formation of these flexible CWsF teams-supportedbyU~ $power and themeldingOf orgapizational

autboritjeamp-and themiddotdefi~ce of resttictive doct~e and cultural tio~s ~~e the pattnerships woik ClNTCOMs Gen Franks embraced and expanded upon

this ~volvingco~cept of war durshyfog a ciitical aQctober 2001 plannihg sessionMoreover the clqselfu~ forged in the field Yith micros Iri~~~rfighters espaciallYSF L__Jand the Air Force~ proved extraordinary In

IE()13526 section_l4(c)

Friction was inevitable DQDJ2 qu~stion~d

- -everymampJor

~ - -geostrategfo obje~tive of the CWCENTCOM

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the eqd oommon sense fortified by ovenvhelfuirig mutual commitshyipent tltgt tM ~issio~ outweighedmiddot bweauclaticand doctrinatconshystraints f$fNF)

Strategy (U) middot

The Afghan campaign involved combininstlie-iiitern~middot eleme~ts

ofwar managed by the US govshyernment with key external factor~primarily the nature of the enemy and hi~ ~rrain-into an interd(pendent -flexible plap fltr ex6eittfon (U)

ThefirstqUestion Who isthe erieiny Stip Tzustressed tbe importance ofdefining the enemy with premaion foCmicroSfug on criti~al nodes aiid recrtiitb1g co0pting

margll)aliZingfiightening cOereshy~gparse

or usingany other meansfOmiddot enemy forces He wro~middot middot

Th~middotwhowin every oattieate not really skillful--those who reQder others annieshelpless withoufightiiigmiddotarethebest ofall In CTCISO we operated orithe understanding that the enemywanotAfg~stan pot the Afghanpeople and not eventhe Taliban as a govemment or institution The eneniy wasmiddotal-Qaida particushylarly the terrorists qommand and coritrol network and their specific

Talibanleaderehip allies The Tai- middot iban as a fighting force presented merely a secondary target an obstaele towaldthe ultitnate qbjeoshy

Pl~ tivemiddot ($1NF)

The CIA launched an intensive and comprih~nJive middotpsychologicaloperation tO capitalize on tlie Afgh~middottracli~~ of switching sides as liattlesevolve andinducedefections through cash PlilYshyments food suppliesJincfthreats

middot(especiaUYeffectjve when backed by precisiop bombing) T)le PsYmiddot chological operations offered poteptial allies in the Tuliban

ranks choices of sulVival means to enhooce prestig~ ~ope andpersonal gain The center ormiddotgraVity rested in the minds oftribalcommooderswho fusd aligned with the Taliban as amatter ofpolitical advantag~The CIA operations soughttoshift that ltenter of gravitymiddot8INF)

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The reality ofnorthern1)ijik and Uzbek opposition and Pashtun ambivalence toward the Taliban regiile andespeciallymiddotits ~ishyQaida allies prompted our censhytral ~litegic and psychological theme The war was east as a

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l battle QY Afghan patriots against the foreign Arab Ch~chen and Pakistani terrorist invaders Fol~ lowing this theme the role of the UmiedSta~s would be to proshyvide the unifying strategy coordinated C3 across tribalfacshytional lines fused intelligence airpower supplies and political leverage for the Afghan allies in critical partnership wjth CIA operatives and US soidiera to

8EGRE+JINOFORNX1 11

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Afghanistan

Alll~ Mllltary ObJeotlve~ In Afghanistan Eerly November 2001 ($NP) w shy middotshy - ~middot eabull

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wage a fast-paced war on the ground centNF)

The next question How to gain lethal access to the _target The answer crune in two parts Qualshyity intelligence collectors and cQvert action forces calling upon unilateral assets and tribal allies would serve as the first composhynent Special Operations Forces directing precise airstrikes would be the-second These two partners CIA and ~F would merge to form an epoxy that would bind tribal ground forces with US air power The joint

1~ 6ECRETNOFORNX1

CWSF teams would provide timely specific geographic coordishynates using hand-held GPS devices laser designators and real-time communications US forces would define geographic location in exact terms and with uncompromised speed strike enemy forces with quality psyshychological operations lethal covert action unconventional ground attacks and ultramodern munitions from all quarters ltSfNF)

SBeRMI NOFORN

The piactical application of US strategic thinking evolved into a three-phase war plan

First unconventional ground middot w~are and conventional airshypower would defeat any massed al-Qaida and 11aliban forces that did not defect or

flee

Second US and allied forces would locatemiddot and eradicate remaining al-Qaida pockets

Third and most difficult the United States would seek to middot

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middot capture or kill specific alshyQaid(l leadefE de~ignated )Ijgh Value Tlrgets (HVTs)WNF)

Phae~s One and Tyvo of course could overlap with Phase middotThree This in fact wtlBmiddothow al-Qaidas seeond-m-cQmJland Ivlohamed AJef wasJdlled in a US iijrshystrUte -But where to begin

middotPhase One With- the Taliban eontrq~gcor influencin ut middot 80percentofthecourit e fewmiddotarea~ofAfghap trib~ opposhysitiOndictatedthe answer CIA te~nis ~ould begin work ~th the strprig~st ~Iliad Afgh~ ~orc~s wliere the local comshy

mander demonstrated sufficient ability to protect an inseltel middot team and the means and will to attaek the enemy ~NF)

Phase Qn~ TalibanAl-Qai4Armies (U) middot

W4ere to a1ttaCk Through Nor(hern Alliance partners CIA had~ aooeamps to tjie mountainous nortbeast~~~r ofAfghanistan inclucijng the PaDjshir Valley wbtch openedinto th~ Shomali Plains north of-Kabul Other lllied tribal elemicroients loosely folded under the Northern Allishyance ~eld-raggedchunks of

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How best~ erigjige microldclestroy the enemyRecentmiddotlristoiy proshyvidedmiddotthe ~er middotInihesummer of1997 Northern Alliance forces had coniroll~dMaziir~e-aharifand the landbtjdg~ fo Uzbekistan tlrtd bad~anag~dmiddotto eutHigbway Qne which-nrilBfromKiibulriorth tO middot Kondw thus encircling thoushysandsofTalibanforcesfu-the Konduiaiaquan area middotThe~Tali~ bari however had maintained-anarrlink to their surrounded forces Eind kept themr~uPptieQ Jalishyban operatives eventuaUybribecl Gen DostUins subcommanders to swit~ side8 forcillg Dostiunfo flcente Mazar andbrealmicrong the potential seige J5NF)

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middotGIA apd t_le -US military ained torepeatJhisencirclement of Thlibanal~Qaida forces In OctoshymiddotberNovember-200i with US middotaITTgtover controlling the skies

CIASF (Teams _Alpha and-Bravo) s11pplied and dire~d_allied Afghtm ground forces tO drive

L north captUre Mazar aDdmiddotesta~ flishmiddot a landbridge to Uzbekistan JConcurrentlY in early November cNorthern AliiaDee forcesmiddotstruck middotmiddotftom the e~~temmountimicrons and

drove westwafd with a northern and southern pincer movement around the Konduz area Hazshyara Shia foree~ assisted by Team

middotDelta pusheQ froimicro Bamian to middotthe east whilemiddot Northern Allishy ailce1armje~ assisted by the NALT ~las~dmiddot s()uth through the Shomali Plamsmiddot toward Kabul middot arid alao swUng l~stWard to cut Highway One and gain control of the SalWig iuiuiel Tbis ~iosed theloop trapping enemy forcentes 4i the K0ndnz pocket In coordishynated movemen~ IsliiailKhans

forces supported by Team Charshylie cut the Natfonal Ring Road in the far west to interdict enemy resuppply effQrts and then pUshed to Heratandmiddot eventually Shindand Airfield -8fNF)

The Pashtun south reqia4_ied a greater challenge given that

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_dimicrolirii~ With the Uriited Statesdependent onmiddot helfoopters andmiddotsmall fixed-wing aircraftfor microiQbjliiy the battie required conshycitiiuon prior to the end of Decembefu otherWise the eftori oohldslipse-eralmonths The USshyrespoiise-demailded speed and fleXibility to matcenth the variWle conditionsmiddoton-the ground fifJNFgt

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Pliase lwo middotAl~Qaida Concentrations (U)

How to locate and destroy almiddot Qaida pockets in the_ aitermath of theTaliQan defeat Phase One strategy was unsuitable for Phaae Two ~ ~he Taliban cqllapsed as a unUie4middotfightingforce amd alshy

-Qailt4i remnantsfledmiddotto high mountainsanetuaries Some Penshytagon pessimists were stunned at the overwhelming success Even CENTCOM and CIA while confimiddot dant ofvi~tory were surprised and unprepared for the rapid pace of success and the demands of enemy pursuit The strategy of Phase One whereby tribal allies

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carried the -mass weight and occushypied ground would not apply asmiddot

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middot oilil celebrating tribal allies _ many of whom at thismiddotpoint were

more mterested in the spoils of war than hunting-hardened Arab and Che_chen fighters ensconsed

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During the December battle for th~ ~ra Bora redoubt allied Afghan fighters served as bfockshying fQrces with some success in the north but very little in the west where ru-Qaida commandshyers-including bin Laden-and some of their men slipped over the border into Pakistan CIA operatives on the ground middotexpressed to CIA Headquarters their concei-n about the limited abilities ofAfghan and Palmicrostani allies but t)le Agency was too thin on the ground and CENT COM too slow to close the porous loop

The Pakistanis -ca=pctur-=e~som~e-lut many others fled to sanctuaries irr Pakistan or to their home countries Nevershytheless the enemy was routed a critical sanctuary was captured and time was not wasted middotLawrence ofArabia said Betshyter to let thegi do it imperfectly than do itmiddotpe~ctly yourself for it is their country their way and your time is ~hort ~INF)

The key to victory in Tora Bora rested again on the uniono=f-- CIA SF and US airpower

a Joint Direct Attack Munitiona use a guidance kit to convert unguided free-fall bombsfutoall-weathersmartmunitiona (U)

SECRETNOFORNX1 Afghanistan

In the March 2002 battle of Shashyhikot after weeks of preparation the US military worked the tarshy

middot get with significantly larger numbers ofUS forces and even greater firepower than at Tora Bora As many as 800 enemy were killed Nonethel~ss the weeks of delay enabled al-Qaida to prepare and many escaped to the Waziristan tribal area of Pakistan CIA-sponsored tribal blookini forces again did not shut down enemyrat lines across the border ~INF)

IEO 13526 section vifc) SECRETNOFORNX1 17

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Whatofthe futuremiddot What have we learned from the Afghan camshypajgn We have the might and

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middot at evEry level with empowered warriors on the ground w~ lllust learn themiddotart-ofthis unique and evolving contiictwhich requiresmiddot greater in~ospecticin and intellishygence collection than past-wars to d~te~e the optimumicroi Qalance orinternal and external fiictors to achie~e strategc_~d tacti~isucshyc~ss against anew kind ofenemy estNF)

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What were the elements ofwar -in Afghanistan and how were they combined to produce such a

dramatic outcome Internal elements_those within the purmiddot view of the US governmentshyincluded intelligence collection combat capabilities covert action communications bureaucracy technology strat shyegy politics logistics and

UNCLA88IFIED

leadership External elements pres~nting both challenges and opportunities included geograshyphy weather history tribal alliances deployment of enemy forces enemy tactics regional politics Afghan culture and world opinion Often these elements complemented one another producing synergy and positive momentum At other times however combinations of elements created stress and internal conflict What did we learn in Afghanistan about how internal and external elements of warfare influenced each other

deg and were managed Ana how can we apply these lessons to counterteITOrism (CT) warfare in the future kBINF)

Authority Responsibility and Leadership (U)

Clarity ofpurpose clarity of comshymand and accountability are critical inwar At the outset of the Afghan war the President conveyed unique and specific authOJities to the CIAvia a Presidential Finding He reinshyforced this directive with a visit to Headquarters on 26 Septemshyber 2002 His message to the CIA leadership and those in CTC given responsibility for executshying his orders resonated clearly Destroy al-Qaida Ilis detenni~ nation which translated as raw political will and strong leadershyship set the tone Froni themiddot President via the DCI the Depmiddot uty Director ofOperations CrgtDO) and the Director of CTC directly down to me as Chiefof CTCs Spedal Operations (CTCSO) the authorities and responsibilities were clearly defmed CBfNF middot

The White House and CIA leadshyership declared the major objectives set broad parameters expecentted results and remained intensely engaged with hard questionsmd some deep conshycerns-yet they refrained from micro-management The QCI provided daily briefmgs to the President and senior officials at the NSC To reinforce the link between policy and operations the DCI asked that I accompany

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Documents

The CIA in Afghanistan, 2001-2002E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) SEGRETNNOFORN//X1 Afghanistan . I. E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c) .__ _ _, The first insertion of an . intelligence team to