The beginnings of ~ y z y a is no t very c lea r . ' We have t o

depend on wide rurmises here. The o r i g i n of NyXya can be traced

t o t h e d i s p u t a t i o n s among scho la r s i n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of

Vedic t e x t s . Genera l ly , t h e term 'Nyzya' means 'argument'.

I n the upani&d8 t o o we find argumentat ive debates rush a$

t h a t between ~ i r g i and Yfgnavalkya and hence the o r i g i n of ~ y H y a

could be t r aced back t o the upani$ds. The use o f t he word I ~ a n s n ; i t s e l f i n t h e Brhadaranyakopanisad shows t h a t t h e reasoning

a

through arguments was prosc r ibed f o r the knowledge of acquiring

Atman. I n ~ h a n d o ~ ~ o ~ a n i $ a d , Narada dur ing h i s conversa t ion

with Sanatkwnara, e n m e r a t e s t h e s c i e n c e s s tud ied by him, among

which t h e r e i s a mention of the s c i e n c e of ~ i k o v i k y a t

Sa hovlga rgvedam bhagavo adhyzmi yajurvedam &ma vedama tharva?ami t ih58a purinam panqamam veddnsm vedam pitryam C - railin dalvam nidhim*v~kovikyainek~yan&m devavidyim brahmavidyim bh t t av2dy~m lctatravldyim n a l g a t r a v i d y h , 8arpadevajanavidyim atrdbhagav; a d h y h i O 1

0 The term ' ~ i k o v z k y a ' has been explained by Sankara and o t h e r s

ar t h e sc ience of reasoning. As a l ready noted, t h e e n t i r e

~ i ~ n a v a l k y a k h d a i n t h e ~ ~ ? a d i r a n y a k ~ ~ a n i & i d revea l s a ve ry

high type of reasoning. S imi la r ly , i n t h e o l d e r lJpaniiads l i k e

Chhdoqya, Katha, Kena and MandGkys t h e r e are ample evidences

ehowing t h e ex ia tence Of sc ience of reasoning. L a t e r i n t h e

Mahabharata Narada has been descr ibed as:

I ~ a n ~ ; v s ~ a v a ~ u k t a s y a v;kyasya punadosavit. 2

This show8 t h a t t h e science of reasoning s tud ied by Narada war

of an advanced type where t h e process of reasoning was based

on t h e ryLlogirm of ' f i v e f a c t o r s . F u r t h e r , Manusmrti (1.43). * ~ i g n a v a l k y a r r ~ t i (1.311). ~ i r n a ~ a n a ( ~ ~ o d h ~ ' . k g n d a lm.39) and

Mshabharsta (s:ntlparva 318.34) use t h e term 'xnv lk?sk i t which

means reasoning. Th i s shows t h a t t h e r e was a s c i e n c e of

reasoning even b e f o r e t h e advent of Buddhism. Besides, the

Mahabharata mentions t h e word 'NyHyatantra ' used by t h e debators .

There is a l s o a term 'Tarkavidya' used i n t h e Mahabharata. Thus

one cannot deny t h e e x i a t e n c e of t h e s c i e n c e of reasoning p r i o r

t o t he advent of Buddhism.

Mr. Bodas ray. t h a t the Xpastamba who l i v e d before t h i r d

century O.C. ured the word ~ ~ i ~ a i n t h e sen.. of ~zm.'asa. ' The .

word Nyrye, jf we take i t s d e r i v a t i o n from t h e r o o t ' N i ' ( t o lead),

could be i n t e z p r e t e d a s having one p a r t i c u l a r meaning and hence

Vedic accent8 of wordr could be noted a8 Nyzya. ~ ~ t o y ~ y a n a

i n h i s B h b y a on t h e Nysyasiitxa 1.1.1. a r y s t h a t t h e ~ c i e n c a

which was known a s ~ ~ z y e was the same as r e f e r r e d t o by t h e name

Xnvik!aki. The meaning of ~ y i ~ e a8 the mean8 of determining

t h e r i g h t meaning i r accepted by ~ i t r ~ ; ~ a n a and i a rpproved 'by

~ i c a ~ p a t i ~ i h a i n h i a ~~iyavirtikatltparyatTka. ~ i t e r p r t i

~ i & a also compares t h e meaning of t h e woid Nyiya wi th

e t y n o l o g i c a l meaning o f t h e word Xnviktaki. The meaning of

7 n v i k r a k i could be underntood i n two ways namely, Anumana which 8

i r dependent on Pra tyak ta and The second meaning of

~ ~ z ~ a i s t h a t s c i e n c e through which one can know what one

cannot know e i t h e r through pe rcep t ion o r through v e r b a l test imony,

I n i n f e r e n c e , t h e p a r t played by reasoning i s very impor tant and

hence it ha8 a l s o corns t o be known as '~e tus 'a ' s t ra ' . As t h e

argument@ ( ~ G d a ) are more i n t h i r hrtro it i s a l s o known a s

'~ jda$;s t ra ' . As i t e n q u i r e r i n t o means of v a l i d knowledge, It

i s a l s o known ae ' ~ r a n ~ n a s ' k t r a ' ,

Although t h e r e are spf f i c i e n t proofs o f t h e e x i s t e n c e of

a s c i e n c e of reasoning from very a n c i e n t t imes, it is n o t p o s s i b l e

t o know t h e axact n a t u r e of t h a t s c i e n c e p r i o r t o t h e ~ y ~ y a r ~ t r a 8

of Gautama. It i s i n t h e ~ ~ i ~ a s l t r a of Gautama t h a t we find

a de ta$ led e x p o s i t i o n of ~ ~ i y a as a system. The p r e s e n t

~ ~ i ~ a d a r h n a i r completely based on t h i s ~ y i ~ a e G t r a o f ~ k ? a p g d a

Gautama. P t seems. t h a t t h e s h r a work was composed f o r

diacuscling t h e n a t u r e of Atman and o t h e r knowable8 of t h e phys ica l

world from , the commonsense view po in t , It waa a180 in tended f o r

d e f e a t i n g the arguments of the Buddhists who were a n t a g o h i ~ t i c t o

t h e accepted conception of Atman and o t h e r o b j e c t s o f t h e

phys ica l world, The ve ry i n c l u s i o n o f t h e concepts of ~ g d a ,

J a l p a , Vitanda, ~ s t v i b h t s a , Chala, ~ E t i and ~ i ~ r a h a r t h z n a

revea l8 t h a t there war rone p e c u l i a r oppos i t ion t o t h e k t r a

most probably from t h e side of Buddhism.

Gauthma is t h e a u t h o r of ~ ~ : y a s 3 t r ~ i , muit hive l i v s d brtvarn

483 and 347 B.C. Bodes, i n h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e Tarkasangraha

holds t h a t f o u r t h c e n t u r y B.C. must be t h e date of ~ ~ b ~ a s ~ t r a .

As regaxds the q u e s t i o n whether t h e whole s u t r a work i r from

the pen of a s i n g l e person o r from d i f f e r e n t persons, it may be

said t h a t i t i s t h e work of a single a u t h o r , tha t i s Gautama,

who ha8 kep t Apavarga a s h i s objcct iv@. ' The ~ ~ g ~ a s i t r a i s

d iy ldad i n t o f i v e Adhyayrs w i t h two s e c t i o n s c a l l e d knhikas in

each. Each i n h i k a has several prakarants and each ~ r a k a r a ? ; has a

a set of shr&. Thus, on t h e whole t h e f i v e ~ d h ~ a ~ g s c o n t a i n

84 prakaranzs and 528 attrgs. The work beg ins with t h e enume- b

r a t i o n o f 16 c e t e g o r i r ~ - p r a m h a , ~ r a m i y a , ~arn(aya, ~ r a ~ z j a n a ,

~ r a t / n t r , . ~ i d d h z n t a , Avayava, Tarka, W i r y y a , J a l p a ,

Vitanda, ~ e t v z b h i a c l , Chala, ~ i t i and ~ i ~ r a h a s t h g n a . I( Is

stated t h a t t h e s e c a t e g o r i e s a r e necessary t o a ~ r i v e a t t r u e

knowledge,' I t i s throiigh t r u e knowledge t h a t one can a t t a i n

t h e 8rrmmum bonm of l i fe . l ~ a t t v a j n i n s i n ni:rryas~dhigama?'

1.1.1). Thi f i r i t c h a p t e r i e devoted t o the d e f i n i t i o n and

~ l a n s i f i c a t i o n of t h e s e 16 c a t e g o r i e s , . I n t h e remaining

ehap te r8 , t h e au thor has discussed, examined and verified a l l

t h e 16 e a t e g o r i e 8 w i t h i l l u s t r a t i o n s i n accordance with t h e

procedure enumerated by t h e k t r a i n the beginning. Hero, a

brief account of the s a l i e n t paints of t he ~ y s y a s t t r a s i s

p t s s e n t e d i

1, Exis tence of Atman i s proved through inference .

2. There are only 5 sense organs, in the form o f ~nlnendr iyga

narnaly d r ~ t n , Tvr k, Fak!u, ~hrg?a and Flacan; and no

~ a r m & d r i y z s and the s:traktra d e n i e s Manas a s a sense

osgan,

3. Several sys temat i sed schools of Ind ian philosophy e x i s t e d

be fo re Gautama cou ld be noted with t h e usage of words l i k e

' ~ a n t r ; d h i k a r a ~ a ' , 'Sarvatantn ' and ' P r a t i t a n t r a ' . 4, Gautama accepts o n l y one v i s u a l sense organ a s d i v i d e d by a

nose-bone and t h u s giving an impress ion a s though it were

two

5. ~ : v a r a i s the i n s t rumenta l cause of the Universe.

~ ~ t r ~ ~ ~ a n a ~ s ~ ~ i y a b h b y a i r t h e e a r l i e a t commentary a v a i l a b l e

today on t h r ~ y # ~ ~ s [ t r a r . vgtsyZyana i s a180 known a8

pak!ila8vimln whole d,ate is second c e n t u r y B.C. Since t h e ~ t y l r

of thirr .4fieya i s very obscure and e l i p t i c a l I t is d i f f i c u l t t o

connect t h e ~ h i ~ ~ a with the ~ i t r a a t many places. Genera l ly ,

the ~ h i s y a k a r a follows t h e ~ Z t r a k z r a . Yet, he has introduced

m8ny o l d theories i n h i s wosk, I t i s however d i f f i c u l t t o t race

4thoee o l d theori@ar t o the i r sources. A t many places, . t h e

I3hisyak;ra differs from the ~Gtrakzra. He ha8 made aome

significant o r i g i n a l po in t8 which have become t h e bar i8 f o r

l a t e r writers on ~ y i y a . Keeping a l l these general features of

~ ; t e ~ ~ i ~ a n a ~ s Bhhya , an account o f i t s s a l i e n t po in t s i s g i w n

below8

1. ~ i t c ~ i ~ a n a must have l k e d crftnr Buddha brcrute the four

Arthapadani of t h e B h b y a mutt be bared on t h e f o u r I

Aryasatyani o f t h e Buddhists.

2. ~ ; t ~ ~ z ~ a y e n a says t h a t Manas can be d i r e c t l y perceived w i t h

t h e pecu l i a r t ype of con tac t between Atman and Manas.

3, v;tsy&ana accepts Manas a s a sense organ f o r t h e Atman

percept ion.

4, ~ ~ t s y ~ y a n e , f o r t h e f i r s t t ime, mentions s i x p o s i t i v e

c a t s p o r l r r namely Dravya, Gupa , Kanna, ~ i m i n y a , vilela

and ~ a m a v s yam

5. Regarding the types of Inference, he mentions p ~ r v r v a t , L I &!.vat and ~ a m a n ~ r t ; d r r t a . .

6 . According t o ~ ; t r ~ ~ ~ a n s , ~ h t i k a cannot accept a ?;sttntcl

a8 it w i l l load t o re l f -cont rad ic t i o n ( ~ a p r k t a ) and*

BahirvyIp'pti i s a l so ruled out a8 it goes a g a i n r t the theory

of Momentary F l u x and he can only accept ~ n t a i v ~ i ~ t i where

a D r s t a n t a i s n o t needed. @ r

~ i t 8 ~ z y a n a accep t s 4 types of v a l i d means of knowledge

v l r . , Y t a t y a k p , Anumana, Upamana and dabdr . ~ G t o y t y a n a quote8 from Pbninian ~Gtras.

vztryay&ia mentions J a l p a , Vitanda, Chala, ~ & i and

~ i g r a h a s t h i n a rs kind8 of wrong reasoning.

~ ~ t r y ~ ~ a n a ha8 con t r ibu ted h i s own o r i g i n a l p o i n t s t o

e l u c i d a t e t h e Nyzya viewpoints,

v;tsyiyana d i f f e r 8 from Gautama i n many places .

He b e l i e v e s t h a t I n sus 'upti no c o g n i t i o n is produced.

Vrtti I I concept i s empha818ed by v:tsy&ana.

According t o V;tsyiyana t h e v i s u a l r ense organs are two and

n o t one, and t h i s h e proves wi th arguments.

Buddhi i s e t e r n a l .

1:vara is n d i p t i n e t Atman.

~ d ~ z t s k a r r (6 th c e n t u r y A.D.) wrote h i $ ~ a ' r t i k a on the

Ny8yabhgsya of ~ ~ t a ~ ; ~ a n a . Subandhu' s ~ g s a v a d r t t a makes a mention

of ~ d y ' o t a h r a - 'Nyfiasthi t imiva ~ d ~ ~ t a k a r a s v a r ~ p a m ' , udy&kara

i r a l s o known a8 ~ ~ d u ~ a t ~ i c h ~ r ~ e , He was a master of Buddhist

philoeophy and fo r i j ubs tan t i a t ing t h i s , we have ample evidences '

i n h l r v z r t i k a . Udy;takara har adopted h i s own p e c u l i a r method

of e x p l a i n i n g t h e f a c t r . He fo l lowt~ the method o f a ~ h & ~ a k z r a

a s well a& a V ~ r t i k a k z r a . H I S method of exp lana t ion i r very

l u c i d , a . d sometimas v e r y elaboxate, Though ~dygtskara has very

gxeqt xegard , ton ~ ; t f i ~ a ~ a n a he d i f f e r 8 from him on many point.

and s u b s t a n t i a t e e it from h i s own viewpoint , The fo l lowing are

some of t h e s a l i e n t p o i n t s of the ~ & t i k a k z r a r

1, Regarding Hetvabhgrae being mentioned separa te ly from

~ i g r a h a s t h h n a s , h e says t h a t valba, Jalpa and Vitanda

ha8 d i s t i n c t scope and thus d i f f e r 8 from t h e ~ h b y a k h

under s h r a 1.1.1.

2, Under e z t r a 1.1.3, if Bhzsyakcra exp la ins t h e compound

P z a t i p a k t a a. ~ v ~ r ~ i b h s ' v s , udy; t a kara t akas it 8s

rid iaarnisa . 0 -

3. Even while diecursing the meaning of Samanyatodrrta, b the

~ k t i k a k g x a gives h i 8 own exp lana t ion , not a c c e p t i n g t h e

op in ion of t h e ~ h ~ s y a k i r a .

~ d ~ z t a k a r a , fox t h e f irst time, recogn i ses the s i x kinds of ,

c o n t a c t namely ~amyEga, ~arnyukta-samavzya, ~amyukta-samavGta-

While c x i t i c i e i n g the views of o t h e r schools on In fe rence ,

u d y G t a ~ a r a refers t o a d e f i n i t i o n of Anumana according t o I

~ h ~ l 1 ~ i 8 . While e x p l a i n i n g t h e i d e a of p l u r a l i t y , ~ d y ~ t a k a r a

g ive r i n r t s n c e a of ' ~ a r l d a d ' and 'Sangha'. Ha gives d i f f e r e n t

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 8 f o r cer ta in terms used' i n t h e 6 t r a and at t r ibutes

them t o d i f f e r e n t persons, He i s of t h e opinion t h a t o u r

eyes come i n contact with ParaGnue end t h e y are not perceived I

I It "i6 on , t h i ~ , lyiyrv;rtika of ~ d ~ z t a k r r a t h a t ~ g $ a s ~ a t i Miarr.

has w r i t t e n a luc id commentary. As t h e au thor h i m d e l f s ays ,

t h e aim i n wr i t ing h i8 ~ ; t ~ a r y a t & a on the ~~;yav. '+ t ika was t o 1

acqu i re mer i t by restoring the very o l d teachings of ~ d y c t a k a r a 1 which had been overwhelmed by the unassa.ilable wrong reasonings I of the Buddhists. It i s t o be noted here t h a t ~ d y z t a k r r a had

j e s t a b l i s h e d a school of h i s own by subjec t ing t h e Buddhis t view8 \ t o , a e v e r e c r i t i c i sm. But t h e t r a d i t i o n es t ab l i shed by Udy'itakara

'

had almost crumbled due t o t h e severe a t t a c k s of the Buddhiat

l o g i c i a n s l i k e ~ h a x m a k i r t i and other.. It must be s t a t e d t o t h e

credit of pati pa ti MI& t h a t t h e t r a d i t i o n of UdyEtakara was

r e r t o r e d by hi. e f f o r t s . Thus , it i s due t o v;carpati ~ i b r a

a lone , t h e aeore t s of t h e ~ ~ i ~ r : ~ s t r a could be f u l l y r e s to red

t o P o s t e r i t y .

~ i ~ a c p a t i l i i r a has actually w r i t t e n two work^ on ~ ~ ~ ~ a l ~ s t r a .

One i s ~ ~ ~ ~ a v ~ r t i k a t ~ t ~ a r ~ a t T k r which i s a l ready mentioned. - - The o t h e r one is ca l l ed Nya'yasucinibandha. T h i s work is a

va luab le con t r ibu t ion t o t h e ~ y ~ y a k s t r a , i n a8 much a s i t

p resen t s t h e c o r r e c t v e r s i o n of the ~ h r a s of ~ a u t a m a . As t he

author himeelf has s t a t e d , h i8 was an a t tempt a t r e s t o r i n g t h e

b x t of t h e ~ y a ' y a s ~ t r a s i n t h e i r proper form' and sequence. When

it Wa8 subjec ted t o eevaxe i l l - t r ea tmen t by t h e Buddhists, who

t r i e d t o d i s t o r t and t w i ~ t t he ~ t t r a s , The aim of t h e author

in w r i t i n g t h a t ' b o o k was t o have before himself the correct

ve r s ion of t h e ~ ; t r a work before proceeding t o wri te h i s c o m e n t r r y

on t h e Ny&av&tikr. This is c l e a r from the fol lowing remark

a t t h e end of th is work:

Thus ~ g $ a r p a t i ~ i d r a has re8torcd the Nyiyasttra. a8 well

a4 the ~ ~ i y a v & i k a from the mud of wrong reasonsinga o f the

Buddhi~ta through h i s two works ~ ~ i y a a t ~ ~ n i b a n d h a and

~ ~ ~ ~ m v ~ r t i k a t ~ t p s r ~ a t ? k a . An attempt i a made here t o highl ight

the contribut ion of ~ & p s p a t i k d r a to blyZya rystem through a

topicwiae study o f ~ ~ ~ ~ a v ~ x t i k a t ~ t p a r ~ a t ~ k a .

Gautama i n the f i r r t sutra o f h i s ~ ~ E ~ a s ; ~ t r a s h a s enumerated

s i x t e e n ~atgg0rieS s t a r t i n g from Pramzna and ending w i t h

~ i ~ r a h a e t h z n e ' n i . f he ~y 'ayabhzsya of ~ z t s ~ & e n a e l u c i d a t e s t h e

sixteen c a t e g o r i e s b r i e f l y . The Nyzyavsrt ika of ~ d ~ z t a k a r a

rophasises t h a t t h e ~ y ~ y d r s t r a e o n s i ~ t i n p i n t h e e x p l a n a t i o n

of d x t e e n c a t e g o r i e r l e a d s t o ~ i d r z ~ a s and t h e n speaks of t h e I

s igni f icance of Prarnina etc. Vzcaapat i Misrg t a k e s i n t o account

the Nyiyabhasya and the ~rrtllta in& comments on each of t h e 4

p o i n t s involved i n them, and makes h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o thosa

p o i n t s by r e f u t i n g t h e o b j e c t i o n s l e v e l l e d a g a i n s t them by

r i v a l achoo l s of t h o u g h t such a s t h e Bouddha etc.

v & a s p a t i ~ i $ r a rhows a t t h e o u t r e t the s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e

played by ~ d ~ c t a k a r a i n defending t h e views o f t h e ~h&~ak;ra

a g a i n s t t h e ill conceived arguments of t h e Buddhist l o g i c i a n s .

such a s Pinnzga, The most impor tan t q u e s t i o n t h a t is r a i s e d

and annwered by V'.caspati i~ in r e s p e c t of t h e v a l i d i t y

of the sixteen pad&thgs, The v a l i d i t y of these padgrtha's can

be a t t h e o u t r e t e s t a b l i s h e d on t h e ground t h a t t h e y a re r e l a t e d

t o t h e a t t a i n m e n t of t h e h i g h e s t good ( ~ i , & i ~ e r ) . Following t h e

1 ~ t a t e m e n t of t'he ~ ~ b v r r t i k a t h a t t h e aim o f t h e i s t r a i s t o

r r a r c h f o r the r e a l i t y which is no t grasped e i t h e r by P r a t y a k f a I o r by Anumana, v;caopati Mista h i g h l i g h t s t h e s t a t e m e n t as

i n t ended t o a the ob jec t ion t h a t t h e k t r a would be wi thou t

any purpose since t h e knowledge of t h e categories can be

o b t a i n e d through t h e Pramsna i t se l f , The reference h e r e t o

the grasping of objects through hatyaksa and ~nwnzna r e f u t e s

t h e cha rge o f . i n v a l i d i t y of the o b j e c t s . The categories

such a s Pramii?a, Pramzya e t c . , a re n o t the o b j e c t 8 of Upamha,

hence Upamha P r a m h a i s n o t r e f e r r e d t o here. Although t h e I

~remgyb~ ruch as Atman are grasped through dabdapramz?a, ye t

&dapram~na is not taken into account here i n view of the a

f a c t t h a t tabdl bring t h e iptav;kya is roo ted i n e i t h e r ~numa?la

o r Pratyakra. S t i l l the o b j e c t i o n t h a t the k s t r a would be

purpoee less on t h e ground t h a t t h e c a t e g o r i e s can be known

through Pram;'anSs themse lves standr, Here it i s argued by

~ & e 8 ~ a t i a ~ l b r s on t h e a u t h o r i t y of ~ ~ a y a v i r t i k a t h a t t h e k t r a

i s i n t e n d e d f o r t h e s e e k e r s o f knowledge who may n o t grasp t h e

higheat r ea l i t y which is not unders t andab le e i t h e r th rough

p r a t y a k t a o r through a n d n a . The ~ i l r i ~ a s i o t h e aim of t h i s 0

enquiry i n t o t h e knowledge of t h e c a t e g o r i e s . The aim here is

not somethiw Connected with the a t t a i n m e n t of a seen result.

The e n q u i r y i n t o the c a t e g o r i e s w i t h such an o r i e n t a t i o n can be

found i n t h i r Qz@trr o n l y and nowhere else. Hence? the prerent

Q i a t r a serves a ve ry useful purpore.

m

Na ayam 8bhisandhiP. N a t f ~ t a p r a y ~ j a n ~ p a y o g i j l g n i s a i h h p r k J viva k l i t i , kintq ni:riyariipayogl padrzthi

. j ignEai . Sa ca asrninniva i a 3 t r e p r a v r t t i h t t u ~ , n b y a t r a 1' 1) 1

tadidamuktam.

The ~ i l r g ~ a a being t h e aim of t h e & s t r a p t h e purpose of t h e

h s t r r i s not only e c l t a b l i s h d but a l r o the v a l i d i t y o f the

s i x t e e n c a t e g o r i e s r e l a t e d t o ~ i d r ~ ~ a s is proved.

I t is w i t h reference t o t h e a t t a inment of ~ i & A ~ a s , t h e

v a l i d i t y of the !sixteen c a t e g o r i e s can be proved. drgya8

c o n s i s t s i n happiness a s well as t h e removal of what i s unpleasant .

This I. what Udyi;takara mesnr when he a lt{reya? punab sukham

a h i t a n i y f t t i q a 1 1 . 2 Thia d r ~ y a r i r two-fold as Y f ~ t a and

Adrsta. According t o ~dy;takarta, it i a P f s t a i n t h e sene0 t h a t . it c o n s i s t s i n Sukha, t h a t is happiness , and it is Adrs ta i n the

I I

senae t h a t it a l s o c o n s i s t s i n t h e removal of . the unpleasant ,

Hen, ~ Z c a s p a t i ~ i d r a makes h i s s p e c i a l obse rva t ion which

o b v i o u ~ l y d i f fers from t h e vir t ika.

V ~ A S P A T X MIFSUIS CLASSIFICATION OF SUKHA AS WELL AS DWKHA - --

INTO DRSTA AND ADRSTA

I 0 ~ ~ c a s ~ a t l Misra t h i n k s tha t t h e c l a a a i f i c a t i o n o f ~rzyas

i n t o Orate and Adrrta (seen, unseen) is n o t intended p ~ ~ l i c a b l e a a a e

t 1. ~ ~ ~ ~ a v i r t i k a t H ~ a r ~ a & a of ~ z ~ a s p a t i Misra, Viz ianagaram

Sanrkrit Series No.15, e d i t e d by Mahamahopadyaya Gangadhara Sartri Tai langa , p r i n t e d end published by E,J, Lata rus and Company, Benares , 1898.

2. ~ ~ i ~ a v b r t i k ~ . p u b l i r h ~ d by Royal Asiatic Socie ty , Calcutta, 1944, e d i t e d by Vlndhyeshwori Prarad Sama, p.2.

t o Sukha and A h i t a n i y r t t i r e r p e c t i v e l y , but, a s applicable t o

each of them s e p a r a t e l y . Accordingly, t h e seen happ iness is

t h a t which i s born from the @xpsrience involving t h e garland,

s a n d a l p a s t e , women, e t c . , wh i l e t h e unseen bappinese con8 iats

i n heaven etc , S i m i l a r l y , t h e c lase i f i c a t i o n of seen and

unseen must be appl i ed t o t h e removal of sorrow a l r o . Thua,

J r i y a s i n the forn o f removal of sorrow i~ D f ? t s when it 18

z t y a n t i k a ( f i n a l ) w h i l e it i s unseen when it i s n o t f i n a l .

adzh ha dr#tzdrqtabhtddma - ~ a v ~ i s a j ~ ~ k i n t u p ~ a t ~ ' i k a m l t ~ ~ h a dqptam rukham srkcandrnavanit~dibhagajanma, e m I adfr tam $a sukharn ~ v s r g z d i . Evam Fa d u h k h a n i y f t t i r a p i $reyo cifstam-

acllatsm $*ti vo'janivam. A h i t a n i v r t t s h $ s o y a d i t y a n t i k a t v & " ' 3 n a n a t y r n t i k a t v e t ad d r s t ~ d r s t a s y a 1 b e bhzdam,

JUSTIFICATIUN OF DOUBT AND THE REST

The B h ~ s y a k i r r ~ ~ t ? y a y h a a n t i c i p a t e s an o b j e c t i o n t h a t

doubt and t h d reet which could be i n c l u d e d e i t h e r among Prania'nas

o r among Prarngyas c a n n o t be regarded a r d i f f e r e n t from them. He

foxmulatee a n answer t o t h a t saying t h a t eventhough doubt etc.,

may be inc luded under t h e ~ ra rn? inZ~ and t h e ~ r a m g y i s , it i s

necessary t o e n u n c i a t e them s e p a r a t e l y i n order t o i n d i c a t e t h e

Severa l s u b j e c t 8 dea l t wi th by t h e ~ ~ ~ ~ a ~ d r t r s . F u r t h e r , he

proceeds t o bring o u t t h e s p e c i a l purpose of each of t h e cate-

gor i e o from doubt onwards.

The ~ & t i k a k ~ r a ~ d y s t a k r r a fol lows t h e same argumentation

o f t h e Bhg?yakhra t o a r r i v e a t the arm. conclueion. ~ i f a ~ p a t i

~ i & a agrees w i t h t h e same. Hare and there he m k e ~ a few remarks

which d i f f e r from both t h e ~ h z s y a and the ~ F r t i k a . For ins tance ,

while speaking about ~ r a y 5 j a n a it i s s a i d t h a t Preyo'jana is t h e

r o o t of ~ y z y a o r reaeoning. Pu t t ing the quest ion a s t o what i s

PlyZya, the 0hisyak%8 answers t h a t ~ y z y a o r reasoning i r t h e

examination of th ings by means of proofs - 'Pramhe ar tha- - pariktanam ~ ~ j y a ? ' . Here by P r a J n i s the BPB~~L;~ . obviously

means Inference based on perception and verbal cognit ion. The

~ $ t i k s k i r a underrtands by ~ r a m i n r t h e r e a s ' d l l t h e mean. of

v a l i d knowledge: According t o him, ~ ~ ; ~ a c o n s i s t s i n t h e

acqu io i t ion of knowledge through t h e processes' of a l l means of

va l id knowledge:

It i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note here t h a t ~zca'c.rpati ~lsfra take8 I <

t he word Pramha ih here i n the sense of t h e f ive a v a y a v ~ r of 8 b

1y110gistic reasoning, namely ~ r a t i f n a , H&U, r t c . , which are

based on Pratyaksa, e t c .

Pretyakridi pnmzna m h a ? p r a t i jzadayab panp;vayavab praffl~nllni. T a i h i a r tha rye l ingasya pariifanam nyzya iti. 6

4. Ny~yadrr$ana w i t h ~; tay;~ana ~ h a q y a , e d i t e d by Ganganath Jha,

Chowkhemba Sanr krit S e r i e s , Vidyavilar P ress , Benarea, 1925,pm23..

I n t h i s vary connect ion , w h i l e speaking about ~ ~ % ~ g b h g s a

t h e Ohg~yakgxa rays t h a t i t is In fe rence , which i s c o n t r a r y t b

P e r c e p t i o n and Verbal Cognition. A t t h i s junc tu re , ~ g $ a s ~ a t i

~ i d a adds t h a t Upama'na a l s o along with P r e t y a k f s end Xgarna as

t h e three f ac to r s c o n t r a r y t o which Anumgna becomes a Nygyabhhsa:

~ r a t ~ a k s ~ ~ a r n a ~ ~ h virodhgbhidhznat taduktam upamhamit i . 7

As regards Vitanda (wrangl ing) t h e Bhzaya p u t s forward the

arguments a g a i n s t t h e i r being any motive i n Vitanda, A t t h i s

p o i n t , t h e v&tikak;ra observes t h a t the d e f i n i t i o n of Vitanda

does no t mean t h a t t h e Vai tandika can have no p o s i t i o n of h i s

own and t h a t t h e motive i n Vitanda d o e s n o t lie i n t h e maintain-

i n g of any p o s i t i o n t h a t he may hold , b u t , s imply i n showing t h e

u n t e n a b i l i t y of t h e opponent ' s p o s i t i o n :

Na du:anam~trg v i t a n d z , k i n t u abhyup;tya palccam yo n a r t h i p a y a t i sa va i tand ikabm8

Here vZFaspa t i ~i :ra observes t h a t t h e Vaitandika r e f u t a s

t h e opponent 's ground wi th ttre i n t e n t i o n o f ach iev ing t h e

e s t ab l i shment of h i s awn view, bu t i t i s immaterial whether one's

own view i s e s t a b l i s h e d by r e f u t i n g t h e opponents ground o r nott

" - Paxassdhana dudanha asya svaps!?ah s idhya tu , mavh

raitsret, s a t u .ve'palc!a s idhyaiva prsyojanGna para sf dhsnam i h m t T t i bh~vah. '

Defining Drstanta , t h e bhzsyakgra says t h a t it is such a I

an in s t ance which i a perceivable wherein the observat ions of

the ord inary pereon and t h e expert do n o t d i f f e r . ~ a t i k a k g x a

tr ies t o expla in t h e s ta tement of the Bhzsya v i t . , IPratyaksa a I

v l $ r y ~ r t h g d r s t i n t a ? ' . . i n tho l i g h t of the subsequent i taternsnt

of t h e Bhhya. 'Yatra laukike pariksak&&i darlanarn ns I

vyshanyate' . I Heria, v;casPati Misra come8 o u t with a vexy f ine expla-

nation. By the ~ t r t i k a quer t ion , 'Kimuktem bhavet i ' , h e under-

stands an ob jec t ion t h a t whatever is the object of percept ion

is not drstanta becruas what i s Drstanta can a l s o be an ob jec t I I I

of percept ion and t h a t whatever t h a t is ?:stanto i s not t h e

ob jec t of percept ion because it can a s well be an o b j e c t of - Agama e t c . He f i n d s en answer t o t h i s ob j ec t ion i n t h e vzrt ika

s ta tement t h a t 'Laukika pa r lk radnzm ddar(e&igh;ta h ; tu r i t i1 . I

It i 8 p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t ~ g ~ a s p a t i Misra

f u r t h e r understands t h e v i r t i k a statement as meaning, IL I 1 -

I K v a ~ i t iaulcike psriksakanam 0 . kvaqi t laukikanam k v a t i t

p r k s a k n m , Otherwise, as ha t h i n k s what i s no t known t o I a

t h e laukikae , say the atom, which i s known only t o t h e exper t s

Cannot be regarded a8 l l ~ s t s n t a . Here it must be underrtood

t h a t what I s Drstenta i s l i k e t h i s , b u t n o t what i s l i ke t h i s . i s t h e Dro tanta:

Q *

E t a t ca kvacit . . . i t i mantavyam. ~ n ~ a t h i yadaprariddham laukl$n~a k&alaa panditarcpz vidaniyarn paramz?vgdi t a r y a na d r r t i n t a k a syzt . Atra f a yo d n t h t a $ r a evam,

I b I I

n a t u ya evam sa dxs tan tah iti drstavyam. 10 8 b #

Siddhan t s i s def ined by the Bh8syakira a s t h a t which is * admit ted as eomethinp tenable : 'Astyayam iti anu7nayam~no

a r t h a ? siddh'.ntabf The ~irtikakrra def ines it sr a r t a t e of

a c c e p t i n g something i. e. , '~bhyuprgarnavyavasthi s iddh in ta? ' . The ~{rtikakcxa a n t i c i p a t e s an o b j e c t i o n . Saxvatantre 8iddh';nta

cannot be a s iddhgnta a t a l l because t h e r e i s no uniform s t a t e

of acceptance . Thia object ion i r a v e r t e d by t h e va'rtikakara

with the statement t h a t what i s accepted by a l l tantras i s itself

t h e s t a t e of acceptance. Although ~ i d d h z n t a i s a Pramzya it i s

mentioned s e p a r a t e l y because i n t h e c a s e of d i f f e r e n t ~ i d d h t n t g a

under discussion, ~ g d a , J a l p a and Vitsnda proceed againtr t them.

There p o i n t s o f the ~rrtlkakgra are nicely e l u c i d a t e d by

v i F a r p a t i ~ i i r a . He says t h a t t h e outcome of the conc lus ion

of a l l systems can be a l s o the knowledge of t h o s e d e b a t o r s who

d i f f e r from each o t h e r , I n t h e p a r t i c u l a r aspects of t h a t

conc lus ion arising from a l l systems l i e , t h e conclusions of

d i f f e r e n t systemr. For example, i n t h e caae of p o t which i s

accepted by a l l , b u t , the d i f f e r e n t systems proceed as regards

what i t s e u b r t r a t m has been, whether i t i s t h e ( a v a y a v i ) t h e

whole o r t h e c o l l e c t i o n of atoms, o r of t h e n a t u r e of knowledge, '

whether i t i e t h e . m o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e Pradhana o r m o d i f i c a t i o n I

Of the Brahman o r the V i v a r t a of Brahman:

T a t r a s a r v s t a n t r a s iddhanta s iddap t i v a t v i p t a t i p a n n ~ n & a p i vGdingm dharmo taeye r e r v a t a n t r e s iddhgnta s iddhasya v ~ ~ c . @ ! u p r a t i t a n t r a 8iddhznt.Q p r i s v a r t a n t c t a t h ~ h i - y a d i ghato nama na a a r v a t a n t r a s i d d h i n t s aiddab kimzlraya? avayavi v i pa ra rnzp sam;hovi j t i n a k z r 8 v; p radhf ia parin%novi bnhma parl?;mov= t a d v i v a r t z v h i p r a t i t a n t r a r i d d i a ~ t a h p r a v a r t a n t e . 11

AS r ega rds Nir?aya, t h e ~ h & ~ a l c & a says t h a t it i s t h e

ascertainment of t r u t h which happens t o be t h e t r u t h of t h e

~ramZn%tr * ~ i r ~ a ~ a r t ~ t t v s j % n a m p r o d n i n a m phialam' . ~ i y i s p a t i

~i:ra.;elucidates t h e Bhzfya statement well. The 8 t a t m e n t t h a t

l ~ i ~ ~ a ~ a r t a t t v r ~ ~ n a r n ' ahould not be taken s e p a r a t e l y , because

i n t h a t c a s e , whatever t h a t i s perce ived by t h e c o n t a c t of the

sen*.. w i l l have t o be conr ide red a s t a t t v a r n ~ n a and as t h e

Nirpaya. Hence, it has t o be taken w i t h ' ~ r a d ? ~ n i m Phalarm'.

Thie h i n t s a t t h e f i v e members of the syl logism, wherein we

f i n d t h e c o l l e c t i o n of the ~ r a r n i ~ b wi th reason. I n f a c t , Nix?aya should be r ega rded as t h e a sce r t a inment o f t r u t h preceded

by reasoning. The conc lus ion o f even percep t ion e t c . , a s s i s t e d

by reason should be regarded a s Nir?aya which i a i t s f r u i t :

~ i r ~ a ~ a s t a t t v a j % ~ n a m i t i - Yedyevam indriyapathejanma priatyaksa j%3namapi tat tvaj%nsmi t i nirqayap ry;dityata S aha - Pram&inarni t i . Anena panciva yava vgkyam upa laksya t i . 8 I l a t r a s a t a r k a n i n praman$nam 8amav;yat. param%tatacltu tarka p ~ v a k ; t a t t v a v i n i a p a y c v i n i r n a y a W e

m - t i P r a t y a k ~ i d i n ~ m a p l t a r k a aahayanam nir?aya? p h ~ l a t v a r n iti:12

Thus, i n t h e e luc ldat lon o f the s ixteen padarthas, as as pa ti ~ i l r a not only elucidates the point . made by the L3hisyrk5a and

~ c r t i k a k i r a but, a l so dev iates from them and contributer h i s

or ig ina l po ints . The .main discussion t h a t is taken up here i a

i n respect o f showing the purpoee of each of.the sixteen

categor ies bnurnerated by Gautama, vZtsyGana and ~ d y h k a r a

have ahown'that a l l the eixteen padarthas are mentioned sepa-

rate ly w i t h some pvrpore. ~ i i 5 a a p a t i ~ i l r a explain. t h e i r

statements and contributes h i s own pointr .

I n t h e ~ G t r a e of Gautama, the na tu re of the i nd iv idua l I I P r a m a ~ a i s f i x s t given i n t h e f i r s t adhyryaa The genera l

d e f i n i t i o n of ~rzimina i s takan up l a t e r i n t h e second adhycya.

Hers, the general d e f i n i t i o n of Pramha and d iscuss ion on it

i n t h e l i g h t of ~ ~ ~ ~ a v ~ r t i k a t ~ t p a r ~ a t ~ k a are takan up before - - t h e expos i t i on of the i nd iv idua l Pramanas. The ~ G t r a k g r a and * the l3h;syak.'ra have antic ipated a p<rvapak8a • view regarding

t h e t e n a b i l i t y of praman& a s inatruments of knowledge. The

~ g r t i k a makes obse rva t ions on it. It i s i n t h e e l u c i d a t i o n

given by t h e ~ r x t i k a k z r a t h a t we f i n d c l ea r expos i t i on of t h e

~ t r v a ~ a k s a I a view embodied i n the ~ i t r a s and t h e ~ h & y a .

~ ; c a e ~ a t i @ ~ilrzi p o i n t s ou t tha t t h i s ~ S v a ~ a k ~ a view comes

from the &dhyamika school of Buddhist philosophy. According

t o this view, there i s nothing i n t h e world which can bear

any i nves t iga t ion . Hence, ~rsrn;?. i s a mat te r t h a t cannot

atand any i nvee t iga t ion . Yet , they try t o show tha t ~rarngnzs I

accepted by ather people axe not t enab le , I t i s an i n - b u i l t

defect of t h e ~ramanzs themselves t h a t they d r i f t away by I

t h e i r own i n c o m p a t i b i l i t i e s . To s t a t e the arguments against

PraGna it may be r a i d t h a t Percept ion etc., cannot be ~ r a m ~ n z s n *

because they cannot prove o r i n d i c a t e t h e ex i s t ence of t h e i r

ob jec t s a t any p o i n t of' t ime* That which does no t prove its

o b j e c t a t any time cannot be a ~ r a m i n a . It i s l i k e t h e

4 concept ion of asavisa'na (horns of t h e ha re ) :

Ayarna tra Purvapa I$? inah mzdhyami kasya abhisandi?; yadyapi n- v i d v a v i c i r a asahatva vgdina? prsm3n.m

a na'nu n a k i n ~ i d a s t i v i c a r ~ s a h a m . Ta thzp i loka- - m sfddh%y$vr p n d n s ~ i t a i r e v a pramanai? paryalocys- d n & i v i c z r a g na *.ahante. sayam prapnznarn dparbho y i n i s v a v i r o d h ~ n a v i l z y a n t e na mam'.par2bhl~ iti.. . p r a y ~ g a s t u pra tyak?idayo na prama~a tvzna vyavahartav$? k; latray3pi a z t h a p r a t i p z d a k a t v a t . ~ a d & a m na t a t

I pramanrtv~nn. v y a v a t p a t e , yath; r a s a v i s ~ n a m I @ t a t h i Gri t . ; tm.it t ~ t h ~ iti.'

The ob jec t ion raised by the ~ ~ d h ~ a m i k ~ s regarding the Praip&

on t h e ground t h a t t h e y do no t prove o r i n d i c a t e t h e presence

of t h e i r o b j e c t s a t any of t h e three p o i n t s oaf t ime , is s e t t

a s i d e by the bh&yakira. v;cac.spati Misra s u b s t a n t i a t e s the

point very c l e a r l y . As a g a i n s t t h i s ~Zdhyamika view vZcaspa t i

~ i : r a a s k s a t o what he means by ' the absence of o c c a s i o n f o r

i n v e s t i g a t i o n ' . Does h e mean t h a t i t does not bear i n v e s t i g a t i o n

o r t h a t t h e r e i s no occasion f o r doubt s i n c e t h e o b j e c t s are

known t o a l l people? Here, a s regards t h e f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e ,

it may be urged t h a t Prsmtnya of other people is rejected by 8

a defec t ive s t a n d which doer not bear i n v e s t i g a t i o n . As regards

t h e second a l t e r n a t i v e , it may be s a i d that what i s not a~rgmznva I - f o r a l l people i s i t s e l f having t h e Yrama~yai

- I Yadi m~dhyamik; brzya t pratya??5din%n aprama?yam trrik:ly&iddhiriti . . . t a t A d a m u$yate.. . k i m punaridam

'avicgfita aiddhatvam k i m vic&asahatvam Zho rarva- 1

j a n ; s i d d h a t a y ~ ~ a n d i h a n b p a d a t v a m , t a t r a purvarmin kalpe vi+a sahatvzna ivayam d u s t i t r n a anyirgm - 0 pramanyam brdhya te it1 8ubh;sitrm t a smit u t t a r a g kalpah a t a t d ca na sarvaprim8?yam, t a sya iva pram8qyat. 2

Af te r d i s c u s s i n g about P r a m h a i n genera l , the ~ z t r a k b r a

take. up the examination o f each of the ~rmm%nKs, Prs tya lc ta ,

etc . Here some object ions are r a i s e d rega rd ing t h e concept ion - m of t h e s e Pramanas and answered, The bhzsyaka'ra and t h e

8

~Zrt ikrdra follow the ~ G t r a k z r a ' 8 method and make a n attempt

t o e x p l a i n the ~ ; t r a s . ~ T y s p a t i ~ d r a c o n t r i b u t e 8 h i * p o i n t s

w h i l e explaining t h e bh%sya and t h e ~ g r t i k a .

Gautama, the a u t h o r of t h e ~ y X ~ a s ~ t r a s enumerates f o u r

~ramsna'e - P r a t y a ~ g a a I ( P e r c e p t i o n ) , ~nutnzna (~nferenee) , upamZna I

(Analogy) and Sabda ( verbal Testimony) ( ~ ~ g y a s z t r a 1.1.3).

These ~ramzds are d e f i n e d by Gautama i n h i s subsequent ~ u t x a s .

The Bh%yakgra ~ ~ t t l ~ a ~ ~ n a and udyGta kara the ~Frtikak&a have

i l l u s t z a t e d t h e s e d e f i n i t i o n s and have brought o u t t h e conception

of t h e f o u r Pramens accepted i n the ~ y i y a system, ~ j ~ a s ~ a t l . . ~i~!r'ra has made s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o r b i n the e l u c i d a t i o n of

t h e s e d e f i n i t i o n s . An account of his c o n t r i b u t i o n on t h e

P resen t topic i s g i v e n belowt

1, The Def in i t ion of Pratyaksa:

Gautama def ines Perception a s t h a t cogni t ion which i s

produced by the con tac t of the ob jec t w i t h t h e sense organ

(~ndri~irthasannikar~~t~annam), which i s not expressible by

words (avyapa4edyam), which is no t erroneous (avyabhicbri) and

which i s Well def ined ( v y a v a ~ ~ ~ ~ t r n a k a r n ) ,

v;tsyayana refers to the point that the contac t of t h e

mind w i t h t h e sense organ i s not mentioned i n t h e s h r a and

expla ins that there is no necessity for the mention of o t h e r

condi t ions when perceptual cogni t ion is d is t inguished from o the r

forms of cogni t ion on t h e bas i s of t h e contac t of the sense

organ w i t h the cognised objec t . I n t h i a connection,

~ ~ x t i k a k i r a h a s explained t h i s s ta tement of the Bhafya i n two

ways t

The Bh%ya s ta tement is:

~ h i d ~ a m a ' n a s ~ a pratya; aj%nasya nzyam bhidyate iti samznatvbt nzkta iti. !

The f irst explanat ion i s ' t h e con tac t of t h e mind w i t h t h e sense

organ i a as good a d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e of Percept ion as the

con tac t of the organ w i t h the objects'. This is what i s meant

by 'gzaminatvatfi. B u t the ~ i t r a doe. not po in t ou t a i l its

d i s t i n c t i v e f ea tu re s . One is q u i t e enough to d i f f e r e n t i a t e

Pratyaksa .. from a l l o t h e r forms of cogni t ion.

The second exp lana t ion is ' t h a t t h e refers on ly t o

t h e c o n t a c t of t h e sense organ wi th t h e o b j e c t beacusa i t

forms t h e d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e o f eve ry i n d i v i d u a l P e r c e p t i o n ' .

When one Percep t ion d i f f e r s f ram a n o t h e r Pe rcep t ion , t h i

d i f f e r e n c e does n o t l i e i n t h e c o n t a c t of t h e mind with t h e

sense organ.

I n t h e case of t h e l a t t e r exp lana t ion , it i s d i f f i c u l t

t o e x p l a i n t h e word ' s a m ~ n a t v z t t , I t is t o be noted he re t h a t

v 2 a s p a t i ~ i & a take. i n t o account t h e l e t t e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

only.

A s r ega rds t h e a d j e c t i v e 'avyapad~s!~am' i n t h e Sutra, it

is observed by ~ ~ t s ~ ~ ~ a n a t h a t some people hold t h e view t h a t

t h e r e is no P e r c e p t i o n which i s e n t i r e l y f r e e from Verbal

Represen ta t ion . Here i t is s i g n i f i c a n t t o note t h a t v;caspati

htiirs t a k e s t h e word dabda no t i n t h e s e n s e of 'Verba l t but

i n t h e s e n s e of ' a s s o c i a t e d wi th t h e word o r t h e namet. Th i s

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s in tended t o show t h a t Savikalpaka c o g n i t i o n

cannot be excluded f ram sense pe rcep t ion . Although t h e ~ Z r t i k a

18 n o t e x p l i c i t on t h i s p o i n t , ~ & s s p a t l ~i!ra has. g i v e n h i 8 ,

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n such a way a s t o i n c l u d e Savikalpaka a l so i n

.en$. pe rcep t ion . The a t t empt msde by vZFaspati ~ i : r l i a .. I

f u r t h e r e x p l i c i t i n h i s exp lana t ion of t h e a d j e c t i v e 'vyavaeayat-

makam' . He urges t h a t t h e a d j e c t i v e ~ ~ a v a s G ~ g t m a k a m should be

i n t e r p r e t e d i n such a way a s t o i n c l u d e Savikalpaka c o g n i t i o n ,

Thus, accord ing t o him, t h e a d j e c t i v e 'avyapad%dyam' a p p l i e s t o - I Nirvikelpaka p e r c e p t i o n while t h e termVyauasayatmakm a p p l h s t o

Savikalpaka pe rcep t ion ,

The. au thor j u a t i f i e s h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by say ing t h a t

the ~h;!ya and t h e ~ z z t i k a have no t made a mention of

Savikalpake P r a t y a \ f a th ink ing t h a t it was too p l a i n t o

r e q u i r e any e x p l a n a t i o n and t h a t h e has taken recourse t o

th is i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n accordance w i t h t h e view q f Tri locanagurur *

~ a s m i t a v y a b h i p ~ r i p a d e n a i v a sambay&&e n i r a ~ t e navikr lpaka pra t y a kqavarodhgrtha. upad&n&am

m m vyvasayatmaka padam 8am;aya.j nana pra tyaksrtclyg karanarn snvap inbti . . .. vyavar&atma rapadam s?tkvat ~ a v i k a l p a k a s y a vztakarn, t a t h a h i v y v a J y o v i n i s t a y o vikalpa i t y e n a r t h ~ n t e r a m sa evztma rupam yasya t a t mviks lpakam pratya$am. ~ a d e t a d a t i ~ ~ h u t a t v s t t h y a i r gamyata eva i t i bh8syavQrtika kzrabhya'm a v y ~ k h y ~ t a m , ~ ~ m i b h i ? t r i l o % a n a g ; r h n l t a m~rg~nuPa'mnonmukh.ih yathimanam ~ a t h ' l v a s t u vy'akhyjtam idam iglfsam. 4 '

It i s however, necessa ry t o n o t e t h a t accord ing t o the

~ h s s y a and ~ g r t i k a , sav ika lpaka c o g n i t i o n would no t be

Percep t ion . The e n t i r e d e f i n i t i o n of P ra tyaksa i s a p p l i c a b l e I

t o Nirvikalpaka c o g n i t i o n only. Thus, t h i s d e f i n i t i o n of

P ra tyaksa agrees wi th t h a t of t h e Bouddhas. I t goes t o t h i I.

c r e d i t o f v & a s p a t i ~ i & a t o a rgue i n f a v o u r of S rv ika lpaka

c o g n i t i o n a s a form of Pra tyaksa . He s a y s t h a t e v e r y o b j e c t e a

has a name, There i s nothing that i s w i t h o u t a name, This

Prover the i n s e p a r a b i l i t y of a t h i n g from i t s name. When a

t h i n g ' i s cognised, i t i s cognised a s bea r ing a name, The name

i s mot. t h e means by which the objec t is known becawe when t h e

o b j e c t l i k e cow i s . seen , a s ' t h i s i s cow1 *here i s a c l e a r

c o o r d i n a t i o n between t h i s and t h e cow. Thus, thing8 being

i n s e p a r a b l e from t h e i r names, t h e Pe rcep t ion of t h ing8 must

always invo lve t h e P e r c e p t i o n of t h e name a l s o . Hence t h e r e

cannot be Pe rcep t ion d ivo id of Verbal Express ion.

With r ega rd t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f Yratyatcca,a fundamental

o b j e c t i o n is r a i s e d by the opponents t h a t it is not tenable a s

i t i s an incomplete s t a t emen t , I n 1.1.4 ( ~ y z ~ a s ~ t r a ) , t h e

c o n t a c t of the s e n s e organs w i t h the object8 i s a lone mentioned

as the cause of pexceptua l knowledge. This i s incomplete

because t h e c o n t a c t of t h e mind wi th t h e Atman should have been I

mentioned a s t h e c a u s e of Pe rcep t ion . vZ5aspat i Misra has

a l r e a d y r a i s e d t h i s p o i n t whi le e l u c i d a t i n g t h e 0h'lfya and

~ z r t i k a on ~ y z ~ a s ~ t r a 1.1.4. The conc lus ion has been t h a t

the ~ t r v a p a k s a . . argument ref erred t o i n ~~a'yasctrgs 2.1.21-22

i s a l r e a d y answered.

Next q u e s t i o n t h a t i s raired by t h e ~;rvapslcca i s t h a t

p e r c e p t i o n i s o n l y i n f e r e n t i a l c o g n i t i o n because i t i s a

c o g n i t i o n t h a t proceeds from the Cogni t ion of a component p a r t :

Here, the ~ G r v a ~ a k s a is obv ious ly taking such a c a s e as L .

t h e p e r c e p t i o n of a'tree. The c o g n i t i o n of the t r e e proceeds

from t h e apprehens ion of one of i t s p a r t s . What the o b s e r v e r

a c t u a l l y pkrceives i a on ly t h a t p a r t of t h e tree which i s

nea res t t o himself , Hence, it i s a case of cogni t ion proceed-

ing from the cogni t ion of a component p a r t , jus t l i k e the

i n f e rence of fire f r o m t he apprehension of s m o k e , I t I s a t I

t h i s point t h a t v f $ a s p a t i Misra makes a very important obser-

va t ion , He says ca tagor i ea l l y t h a t t h e r e i s no ques t ion of

cans ider ing Pratyaksa a s ~numgna a t a l l . It i s s a i d t h a t . b *

Percept ion i s i n f e r e n t i a l knowledge because it i s a cogni t ion

proceeding from t h e cogni t ion of a component p a r t . What i s

presented a8 the Hetu here i s got through Pratyaksa only, I.

Otherwise, i f there is no cogni t ion of a component p e r t , the

i n f e rence cannot arise a t a l l . It cannot be s a i d t h a t t h i s

inference can ar ise from another i n fe rence betause it would

amount t o ~navasthr. Therefore , t h e o b j e c t like t ree is

eognised through Percept ion. The propae i t ion t h a t 'Pratyaksa I

is ~nurn=nsl 1s n u l l i f i e d by the Hetu i n the form of ekad~t!a-

grahan'inupalabhdhi. Lf t h e cogn i t i on of t h e component p a r t by n

Pratya\qa is not accepted it cannot a r i s e from any o t h e r means,

the Hetu becomes Asiddha, Therefore, t h e opponent i s caught

i n both ways:

Na pratyalctarya a n u m ~ n a t ~ , KutaQ ygvad eked'askbh~taaya I

ar thsj ; tasya agrahanam eikadesagraha?zd upalabhdhe? I t y a t r a he tav i rhya t ; t i vadap i p r a t ~ a k s s n a . ~ n y a t h ;

I ekadeaagrahanibh&ena anudbnsnudayi t. num man an tar;^ - I

vz tad graha;e anavas thrpa ta t . Ata? t ' ivatah a r t h a j i t a s y a p n t y a k r & a i p a l m b d t t i v a t p ra tya ktaman&nmitf

'2 2 pnt i j . f iahetuna e k a d r $ ~ g r a h a n ~ n u p a ~ b h d h e ~ i t y a n k a badhit.,. ' 6kcldc(agrahac)asya ~ r a tya k$na anabhyupagamz va pnGnintarisyr ! t a t r a '.nupapa t t;? as iddh i hetuh;

The main pohint t h a t i s involved here is whether there i s a n

avayavin a p a r t from the avayava"s o r t h e avayavin i s only t h a t

which i s made up of t h e p a r t s . The view t h a t t h e o b j e c t 56 a

composite substance made up of p a r t s i s accepted by the

~ a i ~ i ~ i k 5 s . It i s n o t p o s s i b l e t o i n f e r t h e composite whole.

~ h u . v i p s s p a t i ~ i & a c o n t r i b u t e s a n impor tan t p o i n t t o t h e

d i s c u ~ a i o n which settles t h e i s s u e i n favour o f t h e ~ a i ~ 3 ~ i k ; s .

The followfn~ Is ~ i p c l ~ ~ a t i ~ibra's o b s e r v a t i o n on t h e point :

Avayavinastu s v ~ v a y a v e ~ u yf.tt i m prati navayavantar'.ni srntrt i rupanZtre?a t a t t a vartate avayav i iti. T a r k t na k i n p i t k v a p i t kartsyzna ekadgdrna vg v a r t a m ~ n s m drs tam I. iti t a y o r v r t t i m p r a t i vygpakatvam ariddham, * ~ c ~ a s ~ a i v a na gemakatvarn t m f a avayavinyapi a s t i t i vya'pakanupalabhd?tb asiddhe nivayavinah avayavz!u 1 9 v r t t i n i v r t t i r i t i ~ i d d h a m . 0 a . *

( i i ) The D e f i n i t i o n of ~ n m z n a :

~ n u r n i n a i s d e f i n e d by Gautama a s t ~ a t p f r v a k a m ' i n t h e ~ ; t r a

' 'Atha tatpkcqakam t r i v i d h a m anums'namiti' ' . Here v;$aspati 1 Misra taker the word ' a t h a ' i n t h e sense of znan ta rya . It means

' a f t e r p e r c e p t i o n 1 , which precedes as t h e Hetu f o r t h e ~ n u m i n a ,

and ~ n u m i n a which i s the ~Gtumat i s d e f i n e d l a t e r . This 'is i n

accordance with the Bhgpya statement t h a t r

~ a t ~ & v a k a m i tyangna l inpa l in i d h lambandha dar.'.nam 1 ingadar$arumabhirambadhYat%, 3 *

I ~ i ~ a s p a t i Miera has made s i g n i f i c a n t observat ions on t h e

above statement o f t h e ~ h z t y a k z r a . Here he taker the guidance

of t h e t h r e e vigrahZ$ of Ta tpurvakam, viz.,

~ a t ~ < r v a k a m ityangna samzna asamgna j g t i y e b h y c anurnham vyavacg idyata iti. ?'hi, te', t a t p s v a m yasya yadidam tatp&vakam. 9

8 v;caepati Miara a n t i c i p a t e s ob jec t ions aga ins t de f in ing

~nurngns a s ~ r a t ~ a k f a p z r v a k a . F i r s t l y , since &an., :?r?rti,

sam:aya and v ipa ry i r a o n be ~ r a t ~ a k ? a ~ G v a k a , a l l of them will

have t o be considered a s ~ n u n s n a only. F u r t h e r , an inference

preceded by an in fe rence cannot be an inference because it does

not f u l f i l l the condi t ion o f ~ r a t y = k & a p ~ r v a k a t v e .

Thus, t he defects of ~ t i v ~ S ~ t i and ~ v ~ z p t i can be pointed

out. A t against th is , following the vzrtika, ~ z f a r p a t i ~ i & a

urges t h a t these defects can be explained away. I f we t ake the

f i r a t Vigraha of Tatpcrvakam given i n the ~ r r t i k a (taLenipGvam

yesye t a t ) , t he re w i l l be no de fec t of ~ v y g p t i because by ' t g n i '

are meant Pratyalcca etc . Here it may be asked that the

explana t ion given here would be a g a i n s t t h e Bh:sya, Here, I

v h s p a t i Misra draws t he ~ r r t i k a t o stall t h i s ob jec t ion .

According t o t h e ~ h t i k a , ~ra tyak~ap ; rvaka tva is there f o r

~ ~ u m z n a by Pzramparya ( succe r r ion ) , I n o rde r t o sernove

~ t i v ~ g p t i , t h e second i n t e r p r e t a t i o n v i z . , ' 'Yadapi vivzkgt

t; p u r A yasya t a t t a tp~rvakam" is given. Here, there is

reference to two percept ions as preceding i n f erenee. When we

see f i r e and smoke t o g e t h e r , it i s one percept ion, t h a t of t h e

r e l a t i o n between f i r e and smoke. A f t e r sometime when we see

t h e smoke, it happens t o be t h e second percept ion. On see ing

the smoke we remember the r e l a t i o n t h a t we had perceived. This

l eads us t o the i n f e r e n c e of f i r e which i s t h e unperceived

member of t h e r e l a t i o n :

Syzdzta t a t i v y z p a k a m ~ t a t t a tp;rvaka tvam t a d i t i pratyaksam . I parb~usa tyananty i ; t , t a t h z ca pratya!jap6rvakatvam

1 I

anumBnasyava Pgamasp~t~~am~ayaviparya'Yanam apya s t i t i t 'anyapi anmloaarn prasa jjy&an. ~nume'na?l tp&w kaa Fa anurnham na pratyaksipurvakamit i n~nu&nam rysdanunana lak!an&a avy;panzt. ~ a s & t avy~pt~tivy~ptibhyablak(ana- mzta t i t y a t a ;ha tatp&vakamiti . ~ a t ~ l u r v a k a r n i t i evr tya

# ma' vigraha t r aya pradarsanam. Ta t ra rath hem;/ v igrahe t;nityanantsram rGtramullanghya v i b h i g a r ~ t r r p a t a ~

pra tya kf'idayrh sambandhrniya$ yogyatvi t . ~ a d a n i n a I -

l a k s a y s y . av;ipti; p a r i h r t i . I m ~adidamzha y a b e t a n i t i .

Nanvivam pratyak?op~rvaka i t i b h b y a &&ha i t y a t a a aha p~rsrnpsr$nat I. Pzrampaty'ena h i pratyaksap;rvakatvam .

uktam bh~rya\ctg, t a s d n n a v i rodha iti. ~ t i v ~ i p t i 9

nirzrlya d v i t i y ~ r n vigraharn v i v r n i j t i yadapTti. Te iti 'I vigrahi a n a n t a r a s u t r a g a t a m ~ v a p ra tya \ )a padam rambadhyate t e th ; $a dvz pra tyeks i phvam yasya

I r m ' * pratyalcfasya l ~ g a p a r a m a r ~ a j n a n a r ~ r pratyak~aphalarya tedidam tatp&vakam pratyakfan t e t t u svsvii;ye pratya&amapi r n u m ~ y t i ~ t h a pratyayakurvldanwnf namIIO

After e l u c i d a t i n g t h e d e f i n i t i o n of I n f e r e n c e , ~ ~ c a s ~ a t i

bestows h i s thought on t h e t h r e e kinds of Anumana v iz . ,

~ t ~ v a v a t , ~ I s a v e t and ~ $ n a n y a t & A g r t a . He accepts ~;rvavat as

t h e I n f e r e n c e i n which t h e effect i s i n f e r r e d from t h e cause,

46sav.t a s t h a t i n which the cause i s i n f e r r e d from t h e e f f e c t

and ~a 'manya tbdrs ta a s t h a t i n which the i n f e r e n c e is based upon a 9

a g e n e r a l o b s e r v a t i o n , ~ F $ e s p a t i ~i !rs f i n d r f a u l t w i t h t h e

example of ~ z m a n y a t a q j s t a g iven by the B h h y a k z r a as incompre-

hena lb le and a8 coming under k s p v a t anuma'na I t s e l f ;

- L I Vrajyapurvakam I . a n y a t r a Q s t a s y a anyat radarsanam iti t a t h a ca i d i t y a s y a , t a s d d a s t l a p r a t y a k f a p v p i adityasya

4 1 vraj ya . . I It i s po in ted o u t here t h a t t h i s c a n be a case of I n f e r e n c e

of Vrajya t h e c a u s e , by observing t h e a f f e c t i n t h e form of a *

d e d ~ n t r r a p r a ' p t i of the run. Hence, i t is an example of k?crvrt I anurnaza i t s e l f . . T h e r e f o r e , ~ g c a a ~ a t i Misra accepts the

exp lana t ion and the example given by t h e \j;rtikak&a i n t h i s

regard. ~ s r t i k z k a r a expla ins ~ a ' m a n ~ a t G d r s t a as: a

~k;r~akiiara?ibh;tena yatr;vinabh&ina vi:ztan;na 1, vi(i!yam~nodharm~ gamyate t a t s ~ m a ' n y a t o d r s t t .

12 a I

Y a t h i bzl:kaya s a l i l h m a n a m .

It can be seen h e r s t h a t t he i n f e r ence of s a l i l a i s obtained

on t h e i n sepa rab l e r e l a t i o n between the ba lskss and the p lace

connected wi th water,

I Thus, ~ r c a s ~ a t i Misra makes h i s valuable obse rva t ions on

t h e d e f i n i t i o n and kinds of Anwnana.

I n connect ion w i t h t he d i s c u s s i o n on t h e q u e s t i o n of Anumana

being a ~ r a m i n a the ~ h z s y a k z x a makes a n obse rva t ion t h a t In fe r ence I

i s a p p l i c a b l e to a l l t h r e e p o i n t s o f time because i t apprehends

t h e t h r e e po in t s of time: ' ' ~ r i k F l a v i $ a ~ a m anumznam traikglya-

grahan;t1 '. As a g a i n s t t h i s , a n o b j e c t i o n i s r a i s e d from t h e a

po in t of view of t h e Bouddhas t h a t there i s no p re sen t time.

The reaeon g iven here i s through an i n s t a n c e of an o b j e c t when

it f a l l s . When an o b j e c t f a l l s , t h e p o s s i b l e p o i n t s of t ime are

( i) t h a t through which something has f a l l e n ( p a t i t a k z l a ) , (ii) t h a t through which it has t o be f a l l e n ( p a t i t a v y a k z l a ) .

The f irst one r e f e r s t o t he p a s t and t h e second one r e f e r s t o the

fu tu re . The answer t o t h i s o b j e c t i o n is t h a t p a s t and f u t u r e

Would be inconce ivable i f t h e r e i s no present because they are

r e l a t i v e t o it. The Bhzsya e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t a l l t h e t h r e e p o i n t s

of time are r e a l i t i e s and hence t h e r e i s nothing wrong i n

c o n s i d e r i n g I n f e r e n c e aa app l i cab le t o t h r e e p o i n t s of time*

It i s s a i d t h a t t ime is n o t manifested when conceived o f i n

r e l a t i o n t o space. It i s manifested by t h e a c t i o n of f a l l i n g .

Hence, we have t h e concept ion of t ime t h a t has been f a l l e n

through ( p a s t t ime) when t h e a c t i o n of f a l l i n g has stopped.

When t h a t a c t i o n is going t o happen we have t h e Idea of time

t h a t has t o be f a l l e n through. This i s f u t u r e time. When

the a c t i o n o f f a l l i n g i s perce ived a s going on a t t h e moment

t h e r e i s a c l e a r concep t ion of p r e s e n t time, Without pe rce iv ing

t h e a c t i o n a s going on, t h e r e cannot be a concept ion o f the

a c t i o n a s having ceased o r of t h e a c t i o n a s going t o happen.

Here ~ z c a r p a t i ~ihe makes a very r t r i k i n g po in t . He r a y s t h a t

i f t h e p r e s e n t a c t i o n were no t there, what would be t h e r e t h a t

I s produced by t h e g r a v i t y of t h e t h i n g ? Whose e f f e c t would it

be t h a t t h e t h i n g touches t h e ground? I t i s n o t p o s s i b l e t o

c o n s i d e r e i t h e r t h e p a s t o r t h e f u t u r e as t h e effect o r t h e cause

because bo th are n o t e x i s t e n t a t t h e time:

Na a t i t g d i r j p a t a kzl'lssya, karakavyangya'tayos t zdavs t y j t a p i t u k r i y ~ v y a n g y 5 . Tarn khal u uraqctya pravartarnZnan-

ayam atit:nHgata vartama'nrn p t a t i p a d y a t e ngnyathf y a d i khalvyam puru)ah phalam ~ r a v a r t a m z n a patanakriy; v i r i s t a m p r a t i p a d y a j e tad; vyapadi:ati p a t a t i p h a l a n i t l . ~ a n m \ l e ~ t a s y a a t i t & g g a t a t v e a p a t a t phalarn p a t i b y a t I t i . Napa vartamina patanam asiddham yena 'na kslam v y a n j y i t . Tadaaatve kesyzdarn kzranam gurutvam, kasya ca phalam karakam, kasys cs phala; bhumisamyzgah kzryah? Naca

para tv~paratviidhini?rnapi r i d d i e , p a r a r p a r ~ p ~ k s ; . . . t a e m i t a t l t & ~ ~ ~ a t c l f a h vartam3n8p8ksrtvi t , va;tam~nasya ea tadap'Cksetviit a r t i t r i k i l y a m i t i ' ~ i d d h ~ n t a b . 13

7

It i a f u r t h e r argued t h a t t h e present should be accepted

because t h e r e could be no cogn i t ion of anything without it,

In t h i s connect ion , v ~ c a r p s t i ~ i l r a g i v e s a f i n e argument t h a t

a c t i o n s o f f a l l i n g e t c . are eueh as appear and d i sappear a t

t h e p r e s e n t t imes b u t , t h e a c t i o n of being i s such a s extends

over a l l p resen t th ings . Hence, i f t h e present is denied , it

amounts t o denying the ac t i on of being tha t oxtendr over a l l

things, Then p e r c e p t i o n is imposs ib le and o t h e r forms o f

c o g n i t i o n a l s o become impossible:

Etaduktam b h a v a t i - patanzdayah k r i y s h vartam;netu a p a y a n t i upayan t i a , a s t i k r i y f t u sa rva v a r t a d n a ~ ~ : ~ i n i . Tadevam a s t i k r i f i v i r i s t a s y a ~ a r t a d n a s ~ ~ b h ~ v v . sarvagrahanam pra t y a ksgnupapa t t5h. Naca a v i d yamanam tasya viva;anam a s a d i i i . ~ a c i ~ a ; vartarnh;bh;vavLdi

-* 14 vidyam~namsa t k i n t i t a n u j a h a t i .

( i i i ) Nature of upam;na:

. upam;na i s def ined by Gautama a s t h a t which accompliahes

i t s purpose thraugh s i m i l a r i t y t o a known object.

The UhSgya exp la in* t h e Gtra and shows t h a t ~ n a l o ~ y i s tha t

which makes known what i s t o be made known through s i m i l a r i t y

t o a n o b j e c t t h a t i s a l r e a d y well known:

~ r a f i ~ e n a rtminyZt prajnl;panlyasya praj:ipanan upamznami t i . , . ya thg gaurgvam gavaya it1 upambne prayukts gav t samsnadharmam artham i n d r l y i r t h a - sannikar t8d upalabhamino asya qavaydabda? sarnrhg iti, astnfia'samjnisambandham iti. 15

The example i s , when a person f i n d s s i m i l a r i t y t o the cow,

he a c t u a l l y t h e object that had been referred t o i n

the analogy. Then he comes t o cognise t h e connection of t h e

o b j e c t wi th t h e name mentioned i n t h a t analogy. This cogn i t ion

i r t h e purpose accomplished by analogy, When the anology i n the

form of ' y e t h i gauh evam gavaya?' i s pu t forward, a man who has ' .

heard of t h i s happens t o perceive through con tac t of h i s sense

organs an object s i m i l a r t o cow. Then he r e a l i s e s t h a t the

word 'gavaya?' i s t h e name of t h i s object and thus comes t o

cognise the r e l a t i o n of t h a t p a r t i c u l a r name with t h a t p a r t i c u l a r

o b j e c t .

As r ega rds t h i s o b j e c t of a n a l o g i c a l cogn i t ion and t h e

exac t form of t h a t c o g n i t i o n , t h e ~ h t i k a k i r a and ~ Z t p a r ~ a -

txkika'ra agree w i t h t h e ~ h 2 ~ ~ a k ; r a . According t o Bhllgya on t h e - I one hand, and ~ Z r t i k a and ~ z t p a r y a t i k a on t h e o t h e r hand, t h e

o b j e c t of analogy is t he r e l a t i o n of the name wi th t h e o b j e c t

and t h e form of the c o g n i t i o n i s t h a t t h i s o b j e c t I 8 what 18 named t gavaya'. But, as regards means o f a n a l o g i c a l c o g n i t i o n , t h e r e

is a marked d i f f e r e n c e of opinion between ttlem.

According t o t h e bhfsya, the s i m i l a r i t y a s expressed i n

t h e a s s e r t i o n 'Yatha gau? evam gavayapt is the means. Thir

a s s e r t i o n i s remembered e t the time when t h e man s e e s t h e animal

resembling t h e COW. b u t according t o t h e ~ i r t i k a and

~ ; t p a r ~ a t h a , it i r the s i m i l a r i t y t h a t i s a c t u a l l y seen when

Igavayat i s seen t o resemble t h e cow. It i s t h i s perceived

s i m i l a r i t y aided by t h e remembrance of the s i m i l a r i t y a s expressed

i n t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t becomes the means f o r t he a n a l o g i c a l

cogn i t ion .

. The view of t h e ~ g r t i k a and ~ ; t ~ a r y a t i k a i s l o g i c a l . I t

is p a r t i c u l a r l y noteworthy t h a t t h e ~ i t p a r ~ a t r k a remark8 t h a t

for t h e c o g n i t i o n t h i s animal what i s c a l l e d gavaya, i t i s

necessary t h a t t h e o b s e r v e r should know t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t

'gavaya' i s s i m i l a r t o t h e cow and a l s o t h a t he should perce ive

t h e s i m i l a r i t y t o t h e cow i n t h e animal concerned. I f on t h e

o t h e r hand, a n a l o g i c a l c o g n i t i o n were t o have remembered, simi-

l a r i t y a s i t s means, then i t s v a l i d i t y would be as doub t fu l as

t h a t of srprti i t s e l f :

m

~ a ~ i s o u v ~ k y a m i t r a 8shiya) ap ra tyaks i l t r t a gosh tdya (lavayapindarn arou grvaygkhya lti p ia t ipa t tum a r h a t i . Naca v;kyam v i n i pra tyaksemi tr'*et, tasGat zggama pr;tyaks;bhy~n anyad~ved;m bama ~mrt'isahitam S&II~~~-

" 16 j:s'nam ;pam~ni khyam ~rarnznarn zs theyam. rn

A8 regards analogy a s a Pramzna, t h e r e i s an o b j e c t i o n 1

ra ised t h a t it cannot be there on t h e basis of e i t h e r perfect

o r p a r t i a l resemblance. The answer t o t h i s o b j e c t i o n i s t h a t

analogy is a prarn;?a because i t i s based on tuoh resemblance I

as i s a c t u a l l y cognised. I n t h i s connect ion, v;caspati Misxa

c o n t r i b u t e s some r e l e v a n t po in ts . He says t h a t a aentence

conveys i t s exact sense on the b a s i s of contex t and such o t h e r

c i rcumstances bu t not by i t se l f . Hence, what s o r t o f n

reaemblasce i s expressed by a cer ta in aentence w i l l be clear

from t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of these th ings . When i t i s s a i d ,

' as the b u l l so t h e gavaya' w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o a person who

knows a l s o the b u f f a l o e t c . What i s meant is a semi-perfect

resemblance when t h a t man says the 'gavaya' and finds s e v e r a l

p o i n t s of resemblance wi th the bull i n i t , he recogniaes it as

the 'gavaya' . Even though t h e r e i s similar resemblance

between t he b u l l and the buffa lo , t h e man w i l l n o t recognise

t h e animal a s t he b u f f a l o . T h i s is because he a c t u a l l y knows

what a b u f f a l o is. Therefore , under t h e s p e c i a l c i rcumstances

of the case , a s t h e b u l l so t h e gavaya, is never understood

t o be a s t h e b u l l so the buf fa lo :

~ n k a r a n ' a d y a p e ~ s a m h i vikyam sjartham pra t ip i idaya t i na kivaiam. ~ e d vaLZt ca k v a c i t a t y a n t a d ~ ~ $ ~ a r n

0 pra t r y a t e , kva5itbhyaF kdhsrmyam, kvagi t akadesa ~ ~ d h a n n ~ a m . Tadiha p r a G t a mahisdaikam purupm pra ti 'ya tha gauh, evam gavayah' iti vzkyam u g c r y a t e tad; mahis%dapsr ih%r~ya 6 bhPyah aidharmyam vivak?itam i t1

I avrgrtam. ~ a k ~ z r t h a m smaran mahiszdisu vane gos~dharmyam

I ' I pasyan,api na gavaya s a a n a m n i v e s a y a t i , a p i t u szdharm~a-

m 8 v a t i gavaya eva tam n iveaaya t i , Yastu a p r a t l t a m a h i d d i h

1

tam p r a t i etad vikyam upam~nam na bhavatygva it1 parsmgrthah. 17

vic,acpepati ~ i i r a f u r t h e r argues t h a t t h e r e can be no r e s t r i c t -

ion a s t o any p a r t i c u l a r kind of resemblance in t h e case of

Analogy. When One becomes cognisant with some sort of xesemblance

by an advisory sen tence one comes t o recognise the r e l a t i o n of

cauee and ef fec t between t h e resemblance and the c o g n i t i o n of

the r e l a t i o n between the p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g and the p a r t i c u l a r

name. The precise s o r t of resemblance depend upon circumstances.

Hence, t h e r e can be no such r e s t r i c t i o n t h a t analogy should be

based on p e r f e c t reremblanke on ly o r semi-perfect resemblance

only o r s l i g h t resemblance only;

Etaduktam bhavati - na niyama9 k i n t u kvac i t k i n c i t ladharmyarn z?rtya a t idc ia v;kyem p r a v a r t i t e . T; t ca

prakaranidyunn<yan iti.18 1

This idea has been e l a b o r a t e d f u r t h e r i n ~ ; t ~ a r ~ a t T k a ~ a r i : u d d h i .

Hero , on the ground t h a t it i s a case of c o g n i t i o n o f whet

i s not perceived ( f o r instance ' gavayat ) by means of what i s

perceived ( t h e resemblance i n the b u l l ) , analogy should be con-

a ide red a s f u l l y inferential . I n e l u c i d a t i o n o f t h i s p;rva- I

paksa view, ~aFa8pati Misra observes, even though t h e givaya Is

a c t u a l l y perceived when ana log ica l c o g n i t i o n appears, s t i l l it

cannot be s a i d t h a t the animal bearing the p a r t i c u l a r name i s

perceived. The a p p l i c a t i o n of the nanle , however, depends upon

the a t l d r l a v ~ k y a . When the q u a l i f yinp name i s not perceived,

even when the animal i t s e l f i s perceived it i s as good a s saying

t h e anlmal i s not perceived. Hence, the pu'vapakqa view i 8 t h a t

it is a case o f inference!

~ a t h z gauh evem gavaya iti h i vikyam pratyaksgna gavz a n n

gavayapratya\sam pra t ip idaya ti. Na khalu srtav; kycpi I

yadi pra tyaks ina gavayam pasya ti tad; va kyrrthadhigamid- I I

adhikam k i n c i t @ pra t ipgdyate . SamJna semlni $atnbandh~pi

a nena vz kye'ddeva svaga tab. ~ a c m i t ~ r a tyaks;na gavz pra tyaksasya gsvayacl ye gava$ samj ;avi:i8isrya pra t i t i h

19 upams'nasya anumznata ~ i t i G r v a h paksah. I @ I

I The r e p l y too i s formulated by v%,aapati Misra. When i t

i s sa id ' a s the b u l l , so the gavaya' , the g a v a y a j a t i ( s p e c i e s )

t o which the name gavaya b e l o q s i s not cognised. The atid;&

sentence (adv i so ry ) j u s t expresses t h e resemblance of a certain

unknown animal t o the b u l l . The word gavaya occurr ing i n the

oentence does no t deno te t h a t resemblance. Hence, when the

sentence i s heard , t h e man doe8 not become aware o f the

connection between Igavaya' and t h e unknown animal. What

a c t u a l l y happens i s t h a t , when t h e p a r t i c u l a r an imal comes t o be

reen, t h e species t o which it belongs becomes perceived., From thir

ari8e8 the c o g n i t i o n t h a t t h i s animal belongs t o the animal

ca l led 'gavaya'. Thus, t he opera t ion of Analogy o p e r a t e s upon

the pet ce ived and not t h e uYlpercrived grvayar

Gavayatvarn h i 8a rn5 i n a c r t a t yath; pauh warn gavaya iti, 8 9 ' I I

vgkyat p r a t r y a t r , s p l t u kasyac i t gava iadrayam. Na ca e * 8

v;kyrprto pavryas%bdah t m y a k c a k a h . T a t h i tadanim 0 ' I ' agrhrt't. s a n g a t i t v i t . Na sadrsyan Bam'jni, t r a m i t

I @ 8 I

pra tyaksa eva gavay; gavaya tvarya pra tya k!atvzt, Y '

eilmj na-samjri sambandhapariccidah p r a 6 n a r t h a h . 20 ' a 0

t ( i v ) Sebda ~rarnzq r

I I I Gautarna d e f i n e r Sabda i n t e n s of 'Aptopadeqa' i .e . , the

I a s s e r t i o n of a r e l i a b l e person. ~ z c a r p a t i Misrr gives a very

i l l umina t ing e x p o s i t i o n o f ' the term 'upa&:a1. The word

updi$a according t o h i m s t ands f o r words u t t e r e d f o r the bene=

f i t of o the r s . It a p p l i e s t o ' the sen tence as wall as t o the

meaning of t h a t sen tence . When t h e sen tence i s con8 idered

as t h e means of t h e cogn i t i on , the knowledge of the meaning of

t h a t sen tence i s its f r u i t . dhen, on the other hand, t h e

knowledge of the sen tence is the means, the idea of acqui r ing

o r d i s c a r d i n g the t h i n g under r e f e r e n c e i s the f r u i t : - - Upadisyat'a anzna ityupacfeso v:kyajnanam, t a d a r t h a j i b a m v j ~ b t k d i y a tr , t a tra v~k~:j%na pr'mzn,ya pa ks; t edar tha-

I

j%nam phalam. . . tadarthafisna pprhhya pa ksr t u h;nCdi t

buddih phrlam.21

I Then fa l lowing t h e Bhzsya and ~ G t i k a , v;caspati Miora

b;$inyS out tile P U ~ V O S ~ of Ll~e ternin ' c P t a o i n Lhc d e f i n i t i o n I

of ~ b b d a , t h a t Sabda s t a n d s f o r t h e a s s e r t i o n of t h o r e l i ab l e L

persons such as t h e rsis, a r y z s and ml?cczs b u t no t o f t h o s e b m *

t h i n k e r s who are pervaded by d e l u s i o n such ae Bouddhas, J a i n a s ,

e t c . L I ~ ~ t z n a m ' r ~ ~ ~ r ~ a n l t ~ ~ Z n a r n I * upad;:ah sabdo na tvanzp t in%n

m I d y a & h a n i r m i t a n a n b u d d h a r l s b h ' a b ~ a n pram'ana v i ruddhe

I t i s t o be no ted t h a t , by t a k i n q t h e i n s t a n c e of mlgcczs, ' t v;caspati ~ i d r a means t o s a y t h a t t h e word of even a m l k ~ e

could be t r u e and r e l i a b l e . For i n s t a n c e , a f t e r a r o b b e r has

taken away all t h a t a t r a v e l l e r p o s s e s s e d , i f he i s asked t o

p o i n t o u t a p l a c e , what he i n d i c a t e s , t u r n s o u t t o be a r i g h t

pa th . The words of such people i s r e l i a b l e o n l y when t h e y have

no r e a e o n f o r g i v i n g incor rec t informa t ion. Hence, ~ g c a s p a t i I

Misra asserts t h a t f o r being an i p t a i t i s n o t n e c e s s a r y t h a t

one s h o u l d be comple te ly free from a l l d e f e c t s :

~15c,$a a p i p r a t i p a t h a m avasthit;)! panthznam apakfta

rarvasvfib ma'rgzkhygne h c t u d a r d a n a b ~ n y ~ b h a v a n t i 8pta iti. ~ a d a n 6 n a i p t a m dofa kfayam v i d u r i t i par8gam - a p t a l a l t ~ a n a m avyspa kamuktam b h a v a t i . 23

I Sabda, according t o Gautama, i s of two kinds as Ll rs t i r tha

and ~ c l ~ e t z r t h e . h r . , the ~ ~ t i k a k i r a e x p l a i n 8 t h a t the

c l a s s i f i c a t i o n can be e i t h e r on t h e bar i s of v i i a y a b h k s o r

va!t$bhida. This po in t ha6 been nice ly i l l u s t r a t e d by ~ i p a s p a t i

i n h i s l ~ t p a r y a t i k a . If words speaking of v i s i b l e th ings

a l o n e were r e l i a b l e , then , the Veda would become excluded. Hence,

it is sa id t h a t words speaking o f i n v i s i b l e t h i n g s a r e a l s o

r e l i ab le . The i n v i s i b l e t h i n g s a re heaven, e t c , These are I

known by Sabda a lone , t h e v a l i d i t y of which can be a s c e r t a i n e d

on t h e ground o f i p t a v z k y a t v a , i .e . , the words of God. When

the o r d i n a r y person speaks of heaven e t c . , his words a r e

~ d r s t g r t h a i n two senses . F i r s t l y , t h a t t h e thing i s cogn i sab le . I by means of words whose v a l i d i t y can be inferred and secondly

t h a t t h e man speaks of t h i n g s t h a t he has not seen. It i s on

t h e b a s i s of t h i s double meaning of A d r s t z r t h a t h a t t h e . . fz tparyat ' ika o f f e r s e second i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the words

~ r s t z r t h a and ~ d r s t z r t h e t

# I x p t a p r a n i t a t v a l i n g ~ n u m i t a pr:mhya ~ a b d a i k a v i s a y a s v a r p a y & ~ d i rambandhidinan anunana vi$ayata. ~e thgha f3hZ:pk'srah ... n a d r s t b r t h o . I yasya Bgamasya sa t a t h i evam t a r p i t i . ~ a d g v a bhhyama tzna vya khyiya svamatena v y i $ a s t e v a k ~ ~ b h ~ d e n s t i . D r t t o srth; sna sa? d r s t s t h a ! 1 t

pravak t i . Evam aciistz anuni tzr th 'o ena aa? t a th ' l rsyzyah . asrnadidayrsca, ~ n u m i t i r t h a asmadzdaya e v e t i . Evamapi babdadvaividyam d d h a n e m'.bhid apak!adharmrti itl ' pravakttpadena I . p;rayati.m. a d r s t l r t h a ? . . pxavaktz ~ a s ~ z ~ a - masya sia t a thzktag. . . na simanya bdmpt'an%rn v j k y ~ n i m pra'mznyam. 24

* There I s an o b j e c t i o n t h a t Sabda i s Anmana i t s e l f because

what i s known from it i s not apprehended by Percep t ion . The I

o b j e c t cognised by Sabda is such a s i s amenable t o i n f e r e n c e

only. This o b j e c t i b n 18 answered by t h e fo l lowing S u t r a t

l x p t o p a d e k s h a r t h y i t dabdcci a r t h a ~ a m p r a t y s y a ? ~ (2.1,53), I

i , e . , t h e r i g h t c o g n i t i o n Of an o b j e c t a r i s e s from Sabda on

t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e s t a t e m e n t of a t r u s t w o r t h y person. Th i s

idea of ~ptopade!as;rnarthya has nothing t o do wi th I n f e r e n t i a l

Cogni t ion . Here t h e Bhaayakzra and the ~&tikakzrr e x p l a i n

t h e p r e s e n t ~ h r a t o mean t h a t t h e connec t ion of a t r u s t w o r t h y I

person i s necessa ry i n ~abda jza 'na which is n o t t h e case wi th

I n f e r e n t i a l Cogni t ion . r(ut v i t a s p a t i ~ i & a e x p l a i n s t h e ~ G t r a

i n accordance wi th the n a t u r e of t h e ~ Z r v a ~ a k ~ a argument.

According t o him, what i s meant by t h e ~;tra i s , tha t t h e know I

l e d g e produced by Sabda i n r ega rd t o impercep t ib le t h i n g s is

go t th rough t h e i n j u n c t i o n s of a t rus . twor thy person, b u t no t

through In fe rence . Since t h e s e i n j u n c t i o n s a r e embodied i n t

Sabda, t h e Cogn i t ion t h a t a r i s e s canno t be cons ide red as I

I n f e r e n t i a l . The r e l a t i o n between &bda and ~abdaj%na i s n o t

t h e same a s t h a t between t h e Probans and I n f e r e n t i a l Cogni t ion .

I n t h e case of t h e l a t t e r , t h e Probans must subsist i n t h e I

Yaksa w h i l e Sabda never s u b s i s t s i n t h e s u b j e c t of t h e t

~ a b d a j?a'na. This i s t h e f undarnantal d i f frrenee between ~numa'na I

and Sabda. ~ g c a s ~ r t i ~ i l r a f e e l s t h a t the connect ion o f word 4 I

Sabda w i t h a re l iable person as a d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f a c t o r of Sabda

from I n f e r e n c e i s g i v e n by t h e tlhgsya and t h e ~ z r t i k a o n l y as a n

a d d i ti.ona.1 reason:

x p t o k t a t v a n t u svarg;di p r s t i p b a k a s y a Zigamasys przmil?yZ , l ingameva. Na $a etzvat; pad.'rtham Znutnaniko b h a v a t i . Nahi p r a y ~ t t i s ~ m a r t h y ~ n u m i t a pr'amznyasya p ra tyak?asya vi$ayo b h a v a t i &unznikah. ~ r t h a v i h i ~ a m h i pramgqam p r & n ~ ~ y a v idaye ~a p r a y 5 t t i s % n a r t h y i p t l k t a t v e iti. Evrm v y a v s s t h i te a b h y u ~ ~ z y a ms t ra taya bh%sya v z r t i k a k i r i b h y h ~ p t o k t a t v x et.aYa t v l n w a i t v e :aid&umana bheda h e t u t a y s upanyas te iti mantavyam. ZS

I ' As r e g a r d s t h e r e l a t i o n between Sabda and t h e t h i n g s

denoted by them, t h e r e i s a l o w d i s c u s s i o n i n t h e ~ h z s y a and I

t h e ~ z r t i k a . ~ z c ~ a s p a t i Misra b r i n g s t h e d i s c u s s i o n t o a l o g i c a l

c o n c l u s i o n m He t a k e s the example of Yava. This word i s used

by t h e Aryans i n t h e s e n s e of B a r l e y , b u t t h e same word i s used

by t h e ~ le f$s i n t h e s e n s e o f long-pepper. Such d i f f e r e n c e i n

usage canno t be p o s s i b l e i f n a t u r a l rela t i o n s h i p between worde

and t h e i r d e n o t a t i o n s were admi t t ed , Even i f thousands of

a r t i s t s make a n a t t e m p t , l i g h t which has a n a t u r a l r e l a t i o n wi th

t h e i l l u m i n i n g of t h i n g s and making c o l o u r c o g n i s a b l e , canno t

be connected w i t h t a s t e otodour. This d i f f e r e n c e i n usage

i n t h e c a s e of words can be exp la ined o n l y on the b a s i s of

convent ion which can d i f f e r amongst d i f f e r e n t , peoples:

~ v ~ b h P v i k o h i sambrndha) k a a y a c i t s'sbdasya kenat it ' r r th ina a s t l na Barvaays s a ~ v i ? a . ~ a t h ; s a t i Cabdgrtha

vyavarth; na r y a t evam $8 t a r h i nar$y%yamleccinam niyamkh iyitm l a t h s h i yavaiabdah b y a i r d i r g a l u k e p a d i r t h e pravuj;ate; t o h i y a v d a b d i d d i r i h a g ~ k a m padir tham prati- p i d y a n t e , m l e ~ ~ i s t u priyangau prayunja td . Teh i , t a t a h ' . . . . . . , .. . .

p r i y a n g m p r a t ipadyante . . . . nah i avzbhgvika sambaddha i l oko r&e?a s a h a e r i n a p i d i l p i b h i ! r a s b i sambaddhah $ a k y a ~ kartum. . . ~ ~ y i m aniyama? s&nuhiliatve upapadyate p u r u a e c c ~ d h ~ n a .I t v a t , t a e y i s e a aniyam'at. 2 6

C Under Sabda ~ram;na,there i s a d i scu8s ion on Sabda a s t o

whether it i s : e t e r n a l o r non-eternal , The s tand of t h e I

~ a i ~ & r i k ; s is t h a t Sebda i a not e t e r n a l . On t h i s q u e s t i o n , I v;ccaspati Misra c o n t r i b u t e s some o r i g i n a l p o i n t s i n e s t a b l i s h i n g

the ~ a i y z y i k a view. vZ$aspa t i ~ i t r r . argues t h a t if it were I

e t e r n a l , Sabda cannot have any d i v e r s i t y e i t h e r n a t u r a l o r

a c c i d e n t a l . Ae f a r a s hea r ing is concerned, no d i v e r s i t y would I

be p o s s i b l e i f Sabda were o n l y man i f e s t ed by some m a n i f e s t e r

ab id ing i n e i t h e r t h e b e l l o r some o t h e r t h ing . I t may be

s a i d t h a t t h e va ry ing d e g r e e s of i n t e n s i t y a r e no th ing b u t

d i s t i n c t sounds, Then i n t h a t case, t h e y should a 1 1 be heard

s imu l t aneous ly because a l l of them have been man i f e s t ed by some

stroke of t h e bell and t h e r e i s no th ing e l s e t h a t could c r e a t e

d i v e r s i t y . If , on t h e o t h e r hand, i t were held t h a t sounds are

produced by t h e stroke of the b e l l , t h e d i v e r s i t y i n t h e hear ing

i s e a s i l y explained, The sounds themselves are d i v e r s e and have

been b rough t o u t by t h e diverse moments of vary ing d e g r e e s of

i n t e n s i t y t

I Nityasya $a sabdasya na svibh$viko bhedo n r p i aupadhlka iti upap%litam adhast: t. Yadi t u t i r n t d d a y a h ta'vanta eva $8bda ni tya) , tzvanta eva yugapad;va psmyecrn v i tkdabh ivz t , ekohyida'. vyanjaka) s t h i r a h lti. A t r santana ntti? t a t h i p i sarva eva t a t s a n t a t i p a t i t a h

* d r * samarth; i tygdyenalva sarve vyajygran natu szmana desanarn ramina indriyagraha?am vyagjaka niyam; yukta itl upa- p5ditam a d h a s t i t .27

his is one of the reasons why eound cannot be regarded a s n i t y a ,

Referr ing t o S u t r a ~ upto 2.2.38, vZcaspati Misra says t h a t

they d e a l with sound i n general. From t h e Sutra 2.2.39 onward8

t h e t o p i c of l e t t e r sound. (~ar$tmaka!abda) i s d e a l t with. I

I n connect ion wi th t h e p resen t s e c t i o n , vzcaspa t i Misra r e f e r e

t o the ~ g n k h y a view and r e f u t e s t h e op in ion about t h e modifi-

c a t i o n of those sounds. The ~ z n k h y a view i s t h a t sound i s

manifes ted as co-ex i s t ing with colour and o t h e r q u a l i t i e s . When

t h i s view is r e f u t e d , the ~ s n k h y z s would immedietely t u r n and

say t h a t though sound may not be e t e r n a l i n t h e sense of c o n t i n u i

t o e x i s t i n t h e same unthangsd form, Yet, i t could be e t e r n a l

i n t h e sense t h a t it con t inues t o e x i s t and undergoes modifi- I

ca t ion . This i a t h e same as P r a k r t i being regarded a s e t e r n a l I. .

and j u s t a s gold remains gold i n i t s e n d l e s s modif ica t ions . The

grammatical laws of sandhi can be supported t o t h i s view. By

means of these laws of sandhi, l e t ter sounds undergo c e r t a i n

modff ica t ions , his view should be demolished. I n the case of

l e t t e r Souhds, t h e r e is no such modi f i ca t ion o r t ransmuta t ion

and t h e r a is no j u s t i f i c a t i o n t o regard them as having a eonti- I n u i t y of exis tence. v;$aspati Minra f u r t h e r argue. t h a t i n the

wel l known ins tances of modif icat ion, a s per. i n s t ance , a iump

of gold undergoes modi f ica t ion a s ear rings e t c . , they are

regarded a s modi f ica t ions because i n whatever shape the orna-

ments might be every one of them have the cha rac t e r of gold

pexa ia t ing i n them. But i n 'Ya ' as i n 'DadyatraV , we do

not f i n d any such p e r s i s t a n c e a s t h e ' E ' sound. Hence, t h i s

cannot be regarded as a modif icat ion;

I fadzvam rcpgdi s ann iv i s t ah aabdah vyajyate iti sznkhya- matad;s'ite, aa sva i ~ n k h ~ ; ~ va rn i su a m pralcf.tivik%ra'bhgva g f t eh rn5tsuvar?idivat p a r i n h i n i t y a varna iti y a d i pra t i a v a t i s t a t e tatra p a r ~ $ i m a t a b h a t e , dv iv idas P am

- + &bda iti vika'ro'padedopi ne dhvani G t r e sabde a s t i t i natasya par i d m i n i tya t im ;paday itum a r h a t i , ksvalam var:'atrnany~padayet, yadyasarndchah syzt, a s t u t a t h z p l sand;hab, t a t h i h i ikoyanaci i ty5dikam vik'sropade8bm a q a k s a t a eke, any; tu ide;dpade(am t a b vy;kh$ff

I 8 pratlpett2? samsayam. Tanmzpariksya sakyam a v a d h s a - yitum i tya r tha ) . ~ u v a r n a j;t&ah kLalu avayavab.. .

0 - pariqamante. A s t i h i t'etu sarv8;u suvarna j i t iyanam avayav%dm, anugarnab , ns tu yaka're , i k a r a s ya v i tad- a'rarnbhakasya v i avryavasya anugamam i4simahe. asm mid vikarabhivgd ideda tvam asya nirginurna f ti. 28

I I Hence, both t h e views t h a t Sabda i s manifested and t h a t Sabda

undergoes modi f ica t ion a r e t o be r e j e c t e d . Then it can be

* 28. Nyiyavgrtikatitparyatika, pp. 323-324,

8 e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t Sabda i s a n i t y a .

I N i t h t h e s e i n t e r e s t i n g arguments, ~ G c a s p a t i Miara c o n t r l -

butes his p o i n t t o t h e ~ a i ~ s ~ i k a view on t h e n o n - e t e r n a l l t y of I

Sabde, etc .

I Thus vZgaspati Misra has c o n t r i b u t e d va luab le point . i n

t h e e l u c i d a t i o n of t h e concep t s of f o u r prarnznss. The i n t r o -

d u c t i o n o f t h e idea of Sav ika lpaka Pratyak:a i s a c o n t r i b u t i o n

of ' ~ g ~ a s ~ n t i ~ i d r a . S i m i l a r l y , the e l u c i d a t i o n of t h e three

kinds o f ~numgna i s a l s o i n t e r e s t i n g . F u r t h e r , t h e c o n t r i - I

b u t i o n of v i F a s p a t i Misra t o t h e c o n c e p t of Upamha is a l s o

noteworthy. His e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e term ~ p a d i d n i n the d e f i - I

n i t i o n of Sabda i s also very v a l u a b l e . His e l u c i d a t i o n of t h e I

concept o f sank& as under ly ing Sabdg and the things denoted I

i n connection with Sabda ~ r a m z n a is also noteworthy.

1 3 I I -

Ga utama has enumerated twelve Prameyas namely Atman, S a r i r a , I n d r i y a , Axtha, nuddhi , Manas, P r a v r t t i , Dosa, ~ r ' e t ~ a b h i v a , * Pha la , Duhkha and Apavarga. The d e f i n i t i o n s o f these are given

by Gautama i n h i s subrequen t ~Btrzs. These are explained i n

t h e I3hiqya by r a i s i n g Some impor tant p o i n t s . ~ % t i k a a l s o moves

i n t h e lame d i r ec t i on . It I 0 the ~ i t p a r y a t i k r of ~ Z c y p r t i I Misra t h a t gives a f i n i s h i n g touch t o a l l these concep t s , Hence,

I t h e p o i n t s c o n t r i b u t e d by v c c a s p a t i Misra on t h e s e concepts a r e

g iven below.

r tman i s t o be d e f i n e d . Here, the ~ j t r a k c r a gives c e r t a i n

f a c t o r s a s t h e probans o f the Atman. He says ' I c c ~ d v e s a p r a y a t n a . a u k h a d u h k h a a n a n i i tmano lingarn i t i t . Desire, a v e r s i o n ,

e f f o r t , p l e a s u r e , p a i n , and c o g n i t i o n are t h e probans of t h e

Atman. The i n t e n t i o n of t h i s ~ Z t t r a according t o tho bh.'ryakzxa

ie t o show t h a t the Atman is cognised through inference a l s o I

as a g a i n s t the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t i t i s cognised by means of Sabdo

alone,

Sa k i m ~ p t o p a d r s a rn; t rad5va p r a t l p a d y a t r i t i ? Netyucyate. 1 A n u r n a n ~ c c ~ 6 p r a t i p a t tavya l t i .

4 # E l u c i d a t i n g t h i s p o i n t , v;caspati Misra says: From Sabda

i . ~ . , Veda, i t i s krlvwri i t 1 a gerrernl way that there i s sucll a

t h i n g a s Atman; t h i s knowledge is r a t i f i e d by I n f e r e n c e .

8 Tatasca i p t o k t a t d n u m e n a siddhamapi przrncriYarn sabdasya t adac iha aamvgdakena anum~nrna drdataram bh;vnyartha$. 2

It i s an t h i s s t a t e m e n t of ~ i z t p a r ~ a t r k a , the ~ a r i l u d d h i k g r a

has f u r t h ~ r s a i d r e g a r d i n g what i s r a t i f i e d . I t i s said t h a t

by being r a t i f i e d i s meant t h a t the vague g e n e r a l c o g n i t i o n i s

s p e c i f i e d i,c., t h e e x i s t e n c e of p a r t i c u l a r s o u l s i r r p a r t i c u l a r

bodies beco~nr cognised .

I n t h i s connec t ion , an o b j e c t i o n can be raised as t o why t h

SOUL i s n o t known through Percep t ion . As a mat t e r o f f a c t , the

Soul is always a m a t t e r of mental p e r c e p t i o n , being always

perce ived a s ham'. This concep t ion of Aham appears alonq

with e v e r y Coyni t ion . This o b j e c t i o n i s answered by vZ5aspat i

~ i t r a and l a t e r s u b s t a n t i a t e d by Udeyana i n h i s ~ z t ~ a r ~ a t r k a -

par iduddhi . I t i s however t r u e t h a t we have t h e n o t i o n of Aham,

But, t h i s might be t aken a s r e f e r r i n g to the body, t h a t being

t h e case, it cannot be a s u f f i c i e n t proof f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e of

t h e Soul a p a r t from t h e body, s o long a s i t i s not s t r eng thened

and r a t i f i e d by o t h e r means of Cogn i t ion , I n f e r e n c e , etd.:

I I - - I ham it i j nznarn ga urzdys/c&arn sariravabhzsanam nasa kyam ghat;dij%hnavadr;p a tmani prarns~ayl tum i t y a b h i p r s y a b

p a r a d e h a d i v e r t i ; t n a b h i p r a y s m v ~

I t I s clear from t h e above s t a t ement t h a t t h e answer i s from

t h e s t andpo in t of one who does not regard the Soul a s pure ly

p e r c e p t i b l e , and t h a t t h e answer from t h e s t andpo in t o f one who

regards Soul 0s p e r c e p t i b l e i s t h a t t h e passage r e f e r s t o t h e t

Soul of o the r s . With t h l 8 s ta tement , v;caspati H i s r a looks

a t t h e Soul from both t h e s t andpo in t s . Whatever the a t andpo in t ,

f o r tho reason a l r e a d y s t a t e d , the Soul cannot be taken a r

e x c l u s i v e l y p e r c e p t i b l e . T h i s i s t h e impl ica t ion of \ l i i ~ a s p a t i

M I 8 alucidat lon.

The process of I n f e r e n c e involved i n t h e c a s e o f proving the

Soul i e given by ~ z ~ a s ~ a t i ~ i d r a under t h e Su t ra 3.1.12. The

man f i r s t pe rce ives t h e eo lour and smell. He remembers t h e

t a s t e a s s o c i a t e d with such co lour and smell. Then he d e s i r e s

t o exper ience t h e t a s t e . The d e s i r e e x c i t e s t h e organ of t a s t e .

The e x c i t a t i o n appears i n t h e form of flow of s a l i v a . Un see ing

t h i s , we i n f e r t h a t t h e man has been moved by a d e s i r e . ' F u r t h e r ,

from t h i s d e s i r e we i n f e r t h a t t h e man has had a remembrance of

something. This remembrance would n o t be possible un less t h e r e

were a s i n g l e a g e n t pe rce iv ing t h i n g s through s e v e r a l sense

organs:

Kasyac i t ~ m l a c i r a b i l v ~ d e h anubhbtasya tena sahaca r i t am rcpam 'va p ~ n d t k n v i anub iava t i . Atha t a t sahec;ritam resam anusmara ti. ~ m r t c a c a ipga ti, iqca t o rasane'ndriya . a

v i k z r o d a n d d a k a samplava lak?ana? p r a v a r t a t e , t a t n

darlanicca . * asya i c ~ a a n m i y a t e . 1ccayica , * a a .?<ti?. s h a m s ~ n p . ? asatv'stmani sa rv indr iya v i s s y a v r d i n i ns b h a v i t m a r h a t i t i . 4

I As regards the p o i n t t h a t t h e exp lana t ion of S a r i r a should

come a f t e r t h a t of t h e Atmen, t h e Bhgsya says t h a t i t i s t h e a

l ~ h ~ ~ a d h i r t ~ n a ' i e , the r e c e p t a c l e o f t h e Soul s exper iences . i Her., v i s a s p a t i Misn e l u c i d a t e s by say ing t h a t t h e body i a t h e

receptacle of the S o u l ' s exper ience8 i n t h e form of j o y and

sorrow, I t is t h i s body which l i e s a t t h e r o o t of the series

of b i r t h s and r e b i r t h s , Therefore , i t must be t r e a t e d b e f o r e

lndriy;s e t c . ( sense-organs) t

0 - tlhEgah sukhaduhkha samvit , t a d a d h i s thznam sa r i r am, tadane'na sarva sygsya a n a r t h a sambhgras ya paramanid;nam I

sariram, a t a b t a d i v a ind t iysd ibhya? piirvam l a ksaniyam 5 . i tyuktam.

I Gautrms defines ~ a r i r a a s t h e v e h i c l e of a c t i o n s of sense

organs and of o b j e c t s . According t o the f3hzsya and t h e v r r t i k a ,

t h e S u t r a con ta in8 t h r e e d e f i n i t i o n s of t h e body v i z . , I

1 $i t tP&aya? i a r i r a m , - t h e v e h i c l e of a c t i o n s ; I - ( 2 ) 1 n d r i Y i d t s y r h r i a , - t h e v e h i c l e of t h e sense o rgans t

( 3) ~ r t h ~ l r a ~ a h 8briram.

Some ph i losophers t a k e t h e ~ { t r a a s providing a s i n g l e d d l -

n i t i o n a s 'It is the v e h i c l e of a c t i o n s , sense organs and objects

This op in ion i s r e j e c t e d by t h e vgxt ika . A t t h i s point , ' vg taspa t I

Misra auppor t s t h e view of the ~ i r t i k a by ray ing t h a t i f t h e

sJ.rLa

t hen

were t o be t aken a s c g s t a , i n d r i y a and a r t h a t o g e t h e r , I -

n e w l . 1 1 havv to t r t l ~ ~ ~ i L l t ~ a I; clvc?n l.I~p A t t r ~ l ~ a Il,+ve Sarim Lva

because t h e y have a l l this as t h e ~arnavz~ik3ranFs of 1ndr iyzsr ' I

0 - Apica yadz ~ ~ s t h d r i ~ ~ r t h a s y a samav~yyena sariratvam haniabho i n d r i y a s a m a v ~ v i kGanesu paramanusu samasta-

N e x t t h e r e is a q u e s t i o n about t h e composition of t h e body,

There are o p i n i o n s t h a t t h e body i s composed of a s i n g l e

subs tance and t h a t i t i s composed of s e v e r a l subs tances . I t

i s t o be seen a s t o whether t h e former op in ion i s t r u e o r the

l a t t e r opinion. As regards t h e human b o d i the ~ a i y ~ y i k 2 s a r e

of t h e op in ion t h a t it i s composed of P r f h v i only because we

f i n d i n it gandha which i s t h e d i s t i n c t i v e q u a l i t y of P r t h v i , a I

The b h ~ s i a k z r a h a s argued a t l e n g t h t o conclude t h e t the human

body should be composed of P r t h v i . • only. One of t h e reasons

g iven f o r t h i s i s t h e t i t i s not p o s s i b l e f o r any s i n g l e product

t o be produced out of s e v e r a l he terogeneous c o n s t i t u e n t s . f t

i s a t t h i s j u n c t u r e t h a t we f i n d a very use fu l p o i n t be ing

c o n t r i b u t e d by v & a s p a t i ~ i $ r a . He shows t h a t f o r t h e format ion

of a product t h e combination of theRaramZnus i n Dv~anuka and

Tryanuke o r d e r h a s been recognised. I n t h a t c a s e , the

ParamJnzs of d i f f e r e n t subs tances cannot combine t o form

dvyanuka etc,:

Ayam abhisandhi? pr t v i l p y a paramgnu tzvannaikam dvyanukamgrabdhum a r h a t a ) , t a yzh k p a r a s a v a t v i n a t a d h m b h a sambhava tv&i gandha;a t v ~ b h ~ v a pra sang; t. Evam p a r t h i v i ? ~ ramaGtasya gandhasya ekatvzna snarambha ka t v z t . ~ ; ~ i p g r t h i v a pararn'a?~ dvayam ekas5. pg thas ryah p a r a d n u h i tyancnam s'tambhaka t v e g a n d h a v a t v o p a p a t t i r i t i s;mkratarn, paramg?h& bah;n%i angrambhakatv'it . . . . dvyanukeca v i jit f ia anzrambha- k a t v e s i d d h e s e n a i v a c lp t ' sn tena a n y a t r g P i v i f$ t iy&a f iambho nidedhyah. 7

8

The l n d r i y e $ a r e sense organs . They a r e t a k e n up f i r s t

a s t h e i n s t r u m e n t s f o r b r i n g i n g a b o u t t h e e x p e r i e n c e of joy and I

sorrow - ' ~ h g ~ a s a ' d h a n a n i ' . Here, ~ z c a s p a t i Misra s a y s t h a t

t h e sense organs a r e t h e presenters of t h e o b j e c t s . I n t h i s

r e s p e c t , t h e y d i f f e r f rom t h e objects t h a t a r e p r e s e n t e d . That

is why t h e y are explained before t h e objects:

4 4 - I n d r i y a s y a upan:yakatv&a a r t h Z d i b h 6 v i s e s a d l n d r i y % & n

8 arth;dibhyah pzrvam leksppam.

The s t a t e m e n t of the &h:sya a s 'bhGgastdhanani puns?' - i n t r o d u c i n g the Sutra enumerat ing t h e s e n s e o rgans i s t a k e n up

by v;caspati hiis'ra a s t h e g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n of 1ndr iyZs . The

~Gtr. p r o v i d e s t h e d e f i n i t i o n s of t h e p a r t i c u l a r o r g a n s o n l y

s i n c e t h e s e p a r t i c u l a r d e f i n i t i o n 8 a r e not I n t e l l i g i b l e , u n t i l

we hdJe i genera l d e f i n i t i o n of sen.. organ. The Bhl?ya supp l i e s

t h e g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n i n i t s i n t r o d u c t o r y s ta tement . This i s

t h e o b s e r v a t i o n of ~ r p a ~ a t i ~ id ra , who f u r t h e r add. t h a t the

general d e f i n i t i o n of t h e sense organs should have been s t a t e d

t h a t t h e y a r e t h e ins i ruments by which d i r e c t c o g n i t i o n s are

brought about and t h a t i t i s w i t h a view to e x c i t i n g d i s g u ~ t

a g a i n s t t h e organs t h a t t h e ~ h & y a speaks of them a s t h e means

of exper ience of joy and sorrowt

I Naqa vi(efa laksanam I I akrte a * a%nZnyalak?ane rakyam it1 bhasyekyrah prathamam indriy%nrm s8mgnyalaksanam . nirvedopiy; yuktam aha. ~ h ~ ~ g ; s s ~ d d h a n & ~ t l . . . . s ~ k ? $ t p r a t ' i t i s ~ d h a n a m indriyam it1 v a k t a v y j bho'ga- sa'dhanam nirvedzpgye y o g i t i . 9

I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e h e r e , t h a t so f a r a s szksit-

p r a t ~ t i s ~ d h a n e t v a is concerned, it a p p l i e s to manas only,

because 'ghrgna etc. a re o n l y t h e means of exper ience through a

'meditat ion.

~ h e r n ~ a r ~ e ~ e t u bh&a~;dhanarn ghrhad?narn 0 1 . s: k?:t mana; eva t a t b d h a n a t v z t sukhaduhkha s i k s ~ t k ~ r a s y a bhrga tva t . 10

The ~ i i t r a k & r . s a y s t h a t t h e s e n s e organs ghrg?a e t c . proceed

from material subs tances :

A t t h i s po in t . t h e 6hity.k& aaya t h a t t h e organs proceed

from d i v e r s e sources and hence t h e y a re r e s t r i c t e d t o p a r t i -

c u l a r objects . This would n o t be poss ib le if a l l of them

proceeded from a s i n g l e source:

- I I - 12 ~ i n t ~ r a ? $ t i n a m esFm sa tam visayaniyamo naikapra krt inam. ' a

I T h l ~ p o i n t has been v e r y a b l y e l u c i d a t e d by ~ z ~ a s p a t i Misra i n

h i s ~ i t ~ a r ~ a t < k a . AS a matter of f a c t , oddur which i s the

q u a l i t y of earth i s grasped by the o l f a c t o r y organ on ly , T a s t e ,

which is the s p e c i f i c q u a l i t y of water i s cognised o n l y through

t h e o rgan of t a s t e , S i m i l a r l y it ohould be unders tood i n t h e

case of o t h e r o b j e c t s a l s o . T h i s i s so because t h e o l f a c t o r y

organ proceeds from the e a r t h and the organ of t a s t e proceeds

from water . If both proceeded from a s i n g l e s o u r c e a s fo r

i n s t a n c e the hhamkzra ta t tva as he ld by t h e ~ h k h y z s , t h e n we

canno t accoun t f o r the above f ac t s :

~ P r t h i v a m p j t a r i y a m vz b h a v a t i t a s y a pgthivye; p ; t a s i m m

yo gu?avilelro gandhova rnadhura' eva va ra sabhgdar tena p f p v i abvGve'dibhyah :pi; va p T ~ h i v y ~ i b h y a ~ vyavaccid-

a y a n t e i tar~tar:bh;ta ' h e t u vyavap$;dah;tuh s a tgncva i n d r i y i n a g r h y a t e n%ny<net i.. . anena khaiu a h a m d r i k h i * . * 13 i n d r i y a n l t i ~ a d b h u h sfmkh$h tanni rakr tarn .

m I a

The question whether t h e sense organs a re t h e m o d i f i c a t i o n s

of p r i m o r d i a l matter or made up of e l ementa l s u b s t a n c e s l i k e

~ ~ t h v i e t c . ( ~ y z ~ a b h ; ! ~ a , , in t roducing ~Gtra 3.1.32). I t i s

i n t e r e s t i n g note here t h a t v;caspati ~ i J r a d i s c u s s e s t h e

con t roversy between t h e 6 n k h y E s and the ~ a i y z y i k g a fo l lowing the

Bhifya and then b r i n g s i n the cont roversy between the ~ a i ~ g y i k g s

and the Bouddhaa f o r d i scuss ion . The doubt t h a t is r a i s e d i n

the ~hi!ya is - ' K i m a v y a k t l k ~ n i a h z s v i t bhout ikzni? ' - . I

vicaspati Misra says t h a t t h i s doubt i s from the po in t of view

of the con t roversy between t h e sinkhy;s and t h e ~ a i ~ ' a ~ i k : a .

He says t h a t t h e r e should be ano the r doubt whether t h e v i s u a l

organ c o n s i s t s o f o n l y t h e pup i l o r ' t h e luminous subs tance

under ly ing the p u p i l a l s o ( ~ z t r a 3.1.32). This doubt i s from

the p o i n t of view of con t roversy between t h e Bouddhas and the

' ~ a i ~ z ~ i k 2 s . According t o the ~a1y:yik;s t h e v i s u a l organ consis ta

of no t on ly t h e p u p i l b u t a l s o t h e luminous subs tance underlying

t h e pup i l . B u t accord ing t o t h e Bouddhas t h e organ i s nothing

a p a r t from t h e o u t e r p h y s i c a l body, t h a t i s , t he p u p i l only.

v:$ssppti ~ d r a f u r t h e r adds t h a t i n the op in ion of t h e ~ Z n k h ~ a ' s ,

t h e sense organ i s n o t e x a c t l y a m o d i f i c a t i o n of p r imord ia l

matter, b u t t h e d i r e c t product o f ~ h a m k z r a which is t h e product

of Buddhi, t h e d i r e c t product of p r imord ia l matter:

Upalaksanam c a i t a t. Yadapi b h o u t i k i n i t a d e p i k i m * r I

kxsnajaram y a t t a d i t a t upalabhyate, tadevendriyam " . I m I aho tadadhis th lnam t a i j a s a m i t y a p i sam8ayo ?2astavya?. . , tatra pj+vsh sinkhya n a i y i y ikgyob v i p r a t i p a t t e h , u t t a r a s t u s w a t a n a i y z y i k a y z r i t i . Avyaktika tvam, ahamk;rikatvrm $%as tavyarn. Ahamkzraddhi buddhivik l rad vaik5rik; t ekada$&drlyi?i j zyan te i t i h i dnkhyah .

Avyakt ika tvantu avyaktasya r n ~ l a k ~ r a n a t v ~ t uktam. 1 4

The m a t e r i a l s u b s t a n c e s are e a r t h , water , f i i e ; a i r and

ether, These a r e enumerated i n the d t r a 1.1.13. This S u t r a

i n not n o t i c e d i n t h e ~ i r t i k a and the ~ r t ~ e r y e t T k a .

t I Gautama enurnera t e s gandha, rasa, rupa , sparsa and sabda

a8 t h e object8 of earth e t c . ( ~ ~ ' i y a a z t r a 1.1.14).

vnlhen t h e Sutra is i n t e r p r e t e d according t o the Elh;?~a it

would imply t h a t t h e f i v e q u a l i t i e s v i z . , gandha, r a s a , rupa , I

sparra and dabda a l o n e a rc percept ible . The ~ 5 r t i k a and

~ g t ~ a r ~ a t i k a do n o t agree with t h i s view t h a t Gandha and t h e

o t h e r f o u r q u a l i t i e s a l o n e are percept ible . Hence, t h e y inter-

pre t t h e ~ h r a and l3h2fjyys i n a d i f f e r e n t way.

I ~ Z ~ a ~ ~ a t i Misra i n h i s ~ j t ~ a r y s t i k a has g iven a new inter-

p r e t a t i o n of t h e ~ z t r a . He takes t h e l a s t word of t h e ~ c t t r a

v i z . , ' t a d a r t h z h ' t o mean t h a t which is sought a f t e r by t h e sense 8

organs. I n t h i s manner, he t a k e s t h e word a s embodying t h e

d e f i n i t i o n of t h e f o u r t h prarnGya c a l l e d Artha. The r e s t o f the

~ z t r a , accord ing t o him, i s no t a d e f i n i t i o n . I t o n l y s u p p l i e s

some d e t a i l s of information:

A t r a sa uddelakrama smzr i t a a r t h a l aksatay i p r s t i p r t t r v y a b , t ~ s a r n ' c a • e lakranarn t a d a r t h i t i t a d i t ; anan ta ra l a k f i t i n i ' v

I i nd r iy$ i parzmmraati. . . Tesam indriyzn'am a r t h a h i n d r i y a i b a r y r d q a t v a m arthangm laksanam. ~ t a i a t a i v a r n lakqane

B . p a r y a v a s i t e p . r rh ivyadigu~a iti. ~ { f h i v y a p t e j h s i Fa gunae$a dharmg? sinkhya karmzdayah. v ibhgge t i e tava- tevapa t; gandhbdyabhidh;nam s u h r d i h ~ v e n s i n d r i y e vi:aya

15 . . niyama jnaTanzrtham.

Although t h e above i n t e r p r e t a t i o n given by the ~ ~ t ~ s r ~ a t i k a

i s n o t n a t u r a l t o t h e ~ t t r a , t h e r e i s a thoughtfu l reason behind

the new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a s g iven by t h e ,

t3h:sya would prec lude t h e p e r c e p t i b i l i t y of o t h e r q u a l i t i e s such 1

I ae number, s e p a r a t e n e s s , e t c . ~ z c a s ~ a t i Misra would l i k e t o

understand here the 24 gunas.

5. Buddhir

Gautama d e f i n e r Buddhi as 'buddhirupalabhdhih j%nm

i t y a n a r t h s n t a r a m ' , Uuddhi i s apprehension and cogn i t ion . Thus

Buddhi. Upslabdhi and ~;i?na are synonymous terns. According ta

t he ~ h % ~ a , t h i s s t a t e m e n t is in tended t o serve a8 a r e f u t a t i o n

of t h e view of t h e ~ a ' n k h ~ s s t h a t Cogni t ion is t h e f u n c t i o n of

Buddhi. The s ta tement a l s o s e r v e s t h e purpose of providing a

d e f i n i t i o n of Buddhi. The way i n which t h e d e f i n i t i o n of Buddhi

is p u t forward s e r v e s t o se t a s ide t h e Sankhya view.

The s:nkhya view and i t s r e f u t a t i o n are, c l e a r l y s t a t e d i n

the ~ ; t ~ a r ~ a t ? k a . ere, ~ i ~ a . ~ a s ~ a t i ~ i $ r a s t a t e s t h a t according

t o t h e s<nkhye's, buddhi f s t h e product of t h r e e gungs which ere a

i n s e n t i e n t i n na tu re . S ince t h e gunzs arc i n s e n t i e n t , Buddhi 6

is a l s o i n s e n t i e n t . Through t h e medium of t h e s e n s e organs

~ u d d h i becomes modif ied i n t o t h e form of t h e o b j e c t . When

Buddhi comer i n t o close proximity w i t h consciousness , it reflects

t h a t consciousness w i t h i n i t oe l f . Then i t appears as i f it i s

Conscious. G e t t i n g modified i n t o t h e form of t h e o b j e c t it

cognises it. Thus, the modi f i ca t ion of huddhi i n t o t h e form of

the thing cognised , c o n s t i t u t e 8 the c o g n i t i o n of t h a t thing,

The connect ion o f t h e conscious e n t i t y w i t h buddhi i n t h e shape

of t h e o b j e c t cognised c o n s t i t u t e s t h e f u n c t i o n of the Soul.

It i s ca l led t h e apprehens ion of t h e o b j e c t by t h e Soul . J u s t

a s t h e moon wi thou t t h e l i g h t of i t s own, reflects t h e l i g h t of

t h e sun a n d , t h a t r e f l e c t e d l i g h t i l l u m i n e s o b j e c t s i n t h e same

way, Buddhi wi thout consc iousness of i t s own, re f l ec t s t h e

consciousnsss of t h e Soul and the reby cogn i ses o b j e c t s and makes

them apprehended. T h i s i s t h e view of t h e sgnkhy5s f o r t h e

r e f u t a t i o n of which t h e term 'anartha'ntaram' (paryZya) i s used

i n t h e &rat

Buddhi? kila t r i g u n y a v i k ~ x a ) , t r igu?yan ta a c i t a n a m i t i m

ate tanam k;valam. I n d r i p p r a n z l i k a y l a r t h 3 i b r c n a I

paripamate; c i t i $ a k t i s $ a I apa i ins rn in i , n i t y a c a i t a n y a , . svabhiva, t a s y i h sannidhgngd ayaakaltamanikalpa buddhih t a t pra t ibimba kdprah?taya .. $ a i tanya riipaiam a'panneva

LI I

a r t h i k s x a p s r i ? a t i r t h a m 5etayate; t e n 3 yo?ou n i l a t ~ r a ? pari?rrno' buddh2h w j%nalaksa?a y % t t i r i t y u $ y a t e . Atma Pratibirnbeeye t u buddhi rankra'ntasya yo b u d d h ~ z k z r a nilssambandhah sa itmano vygpara Iva upalabhdhih itmano

y r t t i r i t v a k h y z y a te; tadidam buddhi t a ttvrrn j adspra?$ t i - t a y i indumandalamiva rvayam r p r a k l h m p a i t ~ n y a mhthndm m a n d a l a o ~ y ~ p a t y a p rakada te praka!ayati ga artharn i t i t a n n i r ~ k a r a ~ ~ y a p a r y ~ y o ~ a n y % a h . 1 6

he r e f u t a t i o n o f t h e ~Znkhya view implied i n t h e bhzsya a

1s a c t u a l l y p resen ted by ~zc:spati ~ika. He a r g u s l t h a t

Buddhi cannot r e f l e c t t h e conscious Soul i n t h e same way as

t h e moon r e f l e c t s t h e l i g h t of t h e sun, Consciousness i s not

modi f i ab le , There c a n n o t be any r e f l e c t i o n of it. T h e r e f o r e ,

it becomes necessa ry t o a t t r i b u t e Consciousness t o t h e Buddhi

i t s e l f . Then e v e r y c o g n i t i o n w i l l have two consc ious agentst

~itms v x t t e ? . . upalabhdheh anya a s ti buddhi?, n i p 1 buddhlyfttigne'nam a n y a d i t i . Ayam abh i sandh ib na ta'v. t budde? ztmacc'syrpa a tti; ind&iva mzrtsnda- mandala t e j a h s a n k r ~ n t l b , p & a 6 r t h i k r ~ i t e h aparingmi- t a y i sankrarn ' iyog~t. ~asm;t b h r z n t i ? aa %a n a t k a ;

buddheh t a s y a a ~ ~ a i t a n y a t . ~.'pyRmanah t a ~ ~ ~ v r t t i k a t v ~ t * .. a . . tath; tvs paricema pa tteh. ~asm'a t Impal?;dhanamiva ztma ~ a i t a n y a m n a s v a p a r z b a k i r i i t f buddhe9 svibhEvikam

I $ s i t a n y a n i s th;yam. lath: ca ubhayacai tanye du~anam-

17 I

uktam.

Thus, a l though t h e d e f i n i t i o n of Buddhi does n o t look like

a d e f i n i t i o n , i t can b e taken t o define Buddhi a s t h a t t h i n g

which i s denoted by t h e synonymous upalabhdhi and ~ r i f n a . a It

Whether o d d h i i s E t e r n a l ' o r Non-eternal t

As regards the q u e s t i o n whether Buddhi is e t e r n a l or non-

eternal, t h e 8 h i p y a i a of the opinion tha t i t i~ non-eternal .

The ground g i v e n i s t h a t t h e c o y n i t i o n (Uuddhi) is r e l a t e d t o

a11 the t h r e e p o i n t s o f time;

A t t h i s j u n c t u r e , ~ 2 c o r p a t i I ~ i d r a d i s c u s s e s t h e q u e s t i o n

in a d i f f e r e n t way, He raises t h e q u e s t i o n whether by Buddhi

one means t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o g n i t i o n of t h i n g s or t h e Mahat of

t h e s;nkhyis, If t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o g n i t i o n of t h i n g s i s meant

by i t , t h e n , the whale q u e s t i o n about i t s e t e r n a l i t y o r other-

wiee becomes useless because no one can h o l d such c o g n i t i o n s

as e ternal . They ere o n l y momentary, And, i f t h e Mahat of t h e

~ i n k h ~ j s i s meant by Buddhi, t h e n i t becomes necessary t o dis-

cuss whether it e x i s t s o r not before c o n s i d e r i n g the cheracter

of r u c h r t h ing , because the t4aiyayrkas do not admi t any cuch

p r i n c i p l e 8

I Yadi upa labhys r6nr j%navisaya! samdaya? so anupapaniah,. e

sinkhyinam a p i t a d a n i t y a tvasya abhyupagamit Atha sPnkhy&hhlmata aunatat@ttva vidayah tarya a a t v a eva

v l p r a t i p a t t i r i t l ku tas tadga ta dharma v i p s r a ? , s a t i - d h a r m l ~ i dharm;? c:ntyante, na sandtllyhdha s a t v a iti b h ~ v a ? .I9

There fo re , a c c o r d i n g t o ~ r c s s ~ a t i ~ i l r a , the main r u b j e c t 8

of e n q u i r y i s n o t whether Buddhi is eternal o r n o n - e t e r n a l .

Th i s q u e s t i o n h a s been in t roduced I n i t i a l l y . It i s i n t e n d e d

t o e r t a b l i s h t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e r e i s no such t h i n g as

Mahat which t h e ~ g n k h ~ z s c o n s i d e r a s d i f f e r e n t from t h e cogni-

t i o n s of t h i n g s . The f a c t i s t h a t if Buddhi were something

e t e r n a l , it should be rega rded a s something di f ferent from t h e

c o g n i t i o n s which a re momentary. I f , on t h e o t h e r hand, t h e

arguments t h a t are advanced f o r proving t h e e t e r n a l i t y of Buddhi

a re found t o be i n c a p a b l e of e s t a b l i s h i n g it, t h e n t h e r e can be

no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r supposing any u n i v e r s a l p r i n c i p l e a p a r t

from t h e c o g n i t i o n s . There fo re , i t i s firmly e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t

Buddhi and C o g n i t i o n a re synonymous terms, a s s t a t e d i n the

~ ~ S y a s G t r a 1.1.15r

Ayam a b h i p d y a h - neha nity;nl tya ~ i e f r o p i t i a n a ~ a dvara y f t t s r a t i r i k t a sankhyGbhimta buddh i rn i r ;k r iya te , s3mhnyato buddhi ma'trasya n i t y z n i t y a t v a v i q S r e ~ a . Yadih n i tyzbuddh ih s y i t t a t o y x t t i b h y a udayavipaya-

' v a t i b h y z t i r i k t a m , mahattatvam antahkaranam s y i t . Atha t u n i t y e t v s G d h a G n i p r a t i c a n d h ~ n ~ d r n i na buddhi n ~ t ~ a t v a $ y e d a t e t a t o v r i t t a y a . . eva buddhaya n a t u t a d 4 a a i k t a m buddh i t e t tvam s i d d h y a t i t i buddhirupalabhdhi t - j"nrnsm i t y a n a r t h ~ n t e r a m i t i buddher laksp~arn.

20

A s regards t h e i n d i c a t o r s of t h e e x i s t e n c e of mind, the

Bhzpya says t h a t S m r t l , ~ n u m i n a , e t c . , a r e such i n d i c a t o r s i n . a d d i t i o n t o them, the B h s ~ y a finds t h e subsequent ~ i t r a (1.1.16)

a s con ta in ing a n o t h e r proof of t h e e x i s t e n c e of mind, v iz . ,

'Yugapat jn'eninupapatti?' . The non-appearance of simultaneous,

cogn i t ions . ~ g 5 a s p a t i ~ i d r a e x p l a i n s t h i s as implying a Krarna

(sequence) i n t h e c o g n i t i o n s . When sense organs are

connected w i t h t h e mind, t h e objects such as n i l a , e t c . , become

connected i n a sequence:

Yada t a s y a i v a manab samyuktasya i n d r i y a s ya kramzna n ~ l i d a y z a r t h i h sarnbadyand, tada t a t kraGt kraia

21 ' i t y a r t h a k .

I v;aapati Misra f u r t h e r shows t h a t Manas is regarded as

t h e means of S y 5 t i etc . , only f o r t h e purpose o f c rea t ing Nirveda

Tadidamapi manah s a f t y i d i s h h a n n t a y a bhkyamgnnen

nirvGdzya k e l p a t a iti siddham. 22

According t o the ~ G t r e k a r a , P r a y ~ t t i ( a c t i v i t y ) c o n ~ i s ts i n

t h e o p e r a t i n g of speech, mind and bodyt ' ~ r a v r t t i r v ~ ~ b u d d h i a

:ariraday. i ti (1.1.17).

6. Manast - As regards the i n d i c a t o r s of the ex i s t ence of mind, the

t)hz?ya says t h a t S y y t i , ~nurnzna, e t c . , a r e such i n d i c a t o r s i n

a d d i t i o n t o them, t h e BhSsya f i n d s the subsequent ~ t t r a (1.1.16)

as con ta in ing ano the r proof of the e x i s t e n c e of mind, v i z , ,

'Yugapat j n z n h u p a p a t t i ? ' . The non-appearance of simultaneous. I

cogn i t ions . vg5aspat i Misra exp la ins t h i s a s implying a K n m a

( sequence) I n t h e cogn i t ions . When sense organs are

connected w i t h t h e mind, t h e o b j e c t s such a s n i l a , e t c . , become

connected i n a sequence8

Yada t a sya iva manab samyuktasya i n d r i y a s ya kramha nil;dayE arth'ah sambadyant;, tada t a t k r d t kraia

21 ' i t y a r t h a h .

v:c,arpati ~i:ra f u r t h e r shows t h a t Manas is regarded as

the means of S?;ti e t c . , only fo r t h e purpose o f c r e a t i n g Nirvedat

Tadidamapi manah mfty;d i s idhana taya bhkyarnb;lam

nirvGdzya ka lpa ta iti siddham. 22

According t o the ~ T t r a k a r a , P r a y r t t i ( a c t i v i t y ) cons?s t s i n

t h e o p e r a t i n g of speech, mind and body: ' ~ r a v r t t i r v ~ ~ b u d d h i . I lariredry. iti (1.1.17).

The word Buddhi i n t h e ~ c t r a should be taken i n t h e sense

of Manas h e r e by r e s o r t i n g t o t h e d e r i v a t i o n a s 'buddhyate a n h a

iti buddhip ' (Bh'jasya, p.104).

e ~ G $ a s p a t i Misra c o n t r i b u t e s t h e fo l lowing t o t h i s t o p i c .

He says t h a t o p e r a t i o n s a re of two k inds , some g i v i n g r ise t o

c o g n i t i o n and o t h e r s g i v i n g r i s e t o a c t i o n . For i n s t a n c e , t h e

a c t i v i t y of speech is t h e cause of v i r t u e o r s i n i n accordance

with the n a t u r e of the c o g n i t i o n produced by it i n t h e mind of

t h e pe r son addressed. Hence, t h a t speech ( ~ z k ) should he re

s t and f o r aLl t h o s e a c t i v i t i e s which bring about c o g n i t i o n s .

Then t h e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e eye and t h e o t h e r organs c o n s i s t i n g

i n the p e r c e p t i o n of a g r e e a b l e o r d ieagreeab le o b j e c t s a r e

inc luded i n it. The second c a t e g o r y of a c t i v i t i e s l e a d i n g t o

a c t i o n a r e of two k i n d s v i z . , t h o s e t h a t have t h e body f o r i t s

cause and t h o s e t h a t have mind f o r i t s cause. Thus ~ i c a s p a t i

id re has e l u c i d a t e d P r a v r t t l a s of two kinds: t h e f i r s t one, . . i n t h e form of '~a 'gzrambha' covers t h e f i r s t kind of o p e r a t i o n s

v iz . , t h o s e t h a t g i v e r i s e to c o g n i t i o n . Then t h e two kinds o f 8

P r a v r t t i as '8uddhyirambhat and 'sar;rarnbha1 a r e brought under b

t he second kind of o p e r a t i o n s v i z . , t h o s e t h a t give r ise t o

a c t i o n ;

irambhah p r a y 5 t t i h , s; dvidhS - G i n a h e t u ? kriy;hetusce. Tatra yk jnano tp ida dv;re?a pu?yapspahitub J vbk p r a y ~ t t i ? v E g i t i c a j%pakahe t~pa la kgaW t i n a manasP i8 tadlvat ;dyanucintsna . paksurzdibhi? s ~ d h v a s ~ d h u I

dacdansd i .'usit;. bhavat i . ~ r l y ~ h e t u r d v a y i k i y a n l m i t s * 23 manznimit tz c e t i .

This i s def ined by Gautama as having i n c i t i n g f o r i t s

d i s t i n g u i s h i n g feature: 'P ravar tanPlaksanz do'&h1. I n t h i a @

connect ion t h e Bh%ya ke'ra says t h a t wherever t h e r e is ignorance ,

t h e r e are defects of a t tachment and aver s ion . T h i s h a s been

r i g h t l y expla ined by ~ z t a s p a t i ~ d t a thus: Both a t tachment and

aver s ion (higa, ~ v i q a ) a r i s e from ignorance ( ~ s h a ) . They urge

man t o a c t i v i t y . This is what is meant by ~ r a v a r t a n z a s a

p e c u l i a r i t y of a t tachment and avers ion and t h i s p e c u l i a r i t y

r e s i d e s i n the same s u b s t r a t e a s t h e ignorance:

~;~'gsdv&&hi d h a p r a bhavou. rurusam p r a v a r t a d n s r n p r a v a r t a y a t a h i tay5rdharmah p r a v a r t a n r ; sa ca m o h a i k ~ r t h a s e m a v ~ ~ a h t~vadednii ayam r ' eg~d iva iah .

24 I apandata ya'vadasya m%h&ar ta t a i t i.

t As expla ined i n the ~ ; t p a r y a t i k a p a r i s u d d h i , what i n s i t e men

t o a c t i v i t y a r e ignorance and t he consequent a t tachment and

a v e r s i o n towards the o b j e c t .

I Further, ~ i ~ a s p a t i blisrr makes a n impor tant o b s e r v a t i o n a s

to when a t tachment and avers ion become defects, He says with

r e f e r e n c e t o 'bahuntktarn bhava t i ' ( a r t a t ement i n t h e ~ h ; ? ~ a )

t h a t a l l t h a t the words express a r e the mere forms of the .defects,

They do no t g i v e any i d e a of t h e i r being e x c i t a n t s of a c t i v i t y .

Unt i l t h i s f a c t i s made c l e a r , there can be no d i s g u s t towards

the d e f e c t s . Attachment and aver s ion are not wrong by

themselvesm Only when they give rise to a c t i v i t y , r e s u l t i n g i n

pleasure a.nd paina, t hey a r e considered a s c e r t a i n t h i n g s t o be

shunned:

~ s s ~ i r t h a l ) 8var;pata) s p h u t a t v i p i na nlrvida vl:ayataG aphutat;, taya $.ha p ~ a ~ z j a n 8 m p r a v a r t a n a v a t t v ~ n a c a l t r

I nirv;da v isaya? s; qa prav5ty; kirye?a l e k ? a t a iti 'karma lak?anz ityuktarn. Yata? karmani p r a y f t y i pravar taka

I rapsdiyuktat puru!a l rkf yante it; r'agildi\am pravar t an i - vatvamapi laks i tarn bhava t i , 25

I As regards pr;tyabh:va, v:cacpati Mi. ra e l u c i d a t e s t h e ~ i t r a ,

13higya and ~ j r t iks . Here, v;csrpati ~ i d r a . says t h a t the doubt

i n regard t o r e b i r t h i s a s t o whether it belongs t o the Soul o r

t o apprehension o r t o the Body. The ~ Z r v a ~ a k ~ a view i s t h a t

this form of doubt cannot arise because i t i s a l ready determined

under the ~ G t r a 1.1.19 t h a t r e b i r t h i s of the Soul. The answer

i s t ha t according t o the ~ C t r a 1.1.19, the r e b i r t h appears t o

c o n s i s t i n death and birth, Hence t h e q u e s t i o n t h a t n a t u r a l l y

arises i s how can b i r t h and death belong t o the Soul which being

eternal cannot die ' o r ba born. The view of the ~ a i ~ ~ ~ l k i s i 6

t h a t r eb i r th i s something belonging t o t h e Soul not i n t h e sense

t h a t i t * i @ dost rayed and produced b u t i n the sense t h a t i t s

re ta t ion wf ih '*itsm bddy, e n i n t e l l e c t , feeling, ete . is a > A

pmducldl'a8d d1*Chfed;.. ' ~ h u i ' t h i p o i n t is made c h & i bv

> ' <..; .> ,* k~ka,t,, f , i $ 3 ,

~t~3dacced; p r i t y e b h j v o n~e'atmano nl tyaaya ,tau .stqtf r , } I . i ! I .\ ., ' * . : ' ',* , a ' ta '~ma& ssrnin dardane n8 yuktetj p t ' ? tyabh~vah. vaina$i- .krlh"dntu.ratt+&&da' irifodh;bhyim yukta) p d t y a b h i v s ? . . .:, p&v&hyast.s;tre atme n i t y a tva vyavas tdpan$t . ~ a t t v 8 t ~ ~ d o c c i d e f a krtahgna a$:t:bhyggama do8ina .' I m

rbhyudaya ni$reya8;rtham aprayytti$ yapad~s!an&thakya p r a ~ a n g z 5 F a avadeh2ndriya buddhi sarnvedan: sambaddhot$da vinedo" n i t y a s y a itmanah janma prav:?e t a t h a ~ z p a ~ a n n a ?

' 26 pr'letyabhzvah iti s iddhintah.

Some Questions Hegaxdi nq the Prorl!~ction of l'hinqs:

In connect ion w i t h the q u e s t i o n rega rd ing the product ion of

t h i n g s , the ~yHyas<ttra and tlhSsya mainly d i s c u s s two views.

First, the view of the N i h i l i s t s i s discussed ,only t o be r e f u t e d ,

Secondly, t h e view t h a t God i s the cause of t h e un ive r se i s

es tabl ished. Xn t h i s connect ion , the Vedanta view i s d i scussed t

and r e f u t e d . In connection with t h e s e p o i n t s , v;caspati Miera

has made some u s e f u l c o n t r i b u t i o n . T h i s w i l l be p resen ted here.

I n order t o e l u c i d a t e the s ta tement of the dh?iya ' a p i t u

a s a t a h k z m n i t u t p a t t i r n a yukta ' ( ~ ~ z ~ a b h & y a , 1.1.17) ~ g $ a s ~ a t i I

hiisra says t h a t t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e seed cannot be t h e cause

t h e b i r t h or thf? nprout . I t i s aryrred h ~ r r ! t h a t i f t he

d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e seed was t he cause of t h e b i r t h of t h e s p r o u t

then i t may be asked a6 t o why t h e r e i s no appearance of t h e

sprout when t h e seed i a broken up i n t o pieces by a hammer, It

g i v e s r i s e t o a n o t h e r q u e s t i o n a l s o a s t o why t h e d i s r u p t u r e d

component pieces do n o t form a n o t h e r composite. The s p r o u t

appears o n l y when t h e d i s r u p t i o n of t h e seed i s fo l lowed by a

fresh composi te formed o u t of i t a p i e c e s . These t h i n g s show

tha t the b i r t h o f the s p r o u t does n o t a r i s e o u t of the destruction

o f t h e seedt I

~ I j e v i d s ' a B ~ e d ankurotpsdahetuh , a a t h a v i n a s t e b i j e t adavayavi%u p a r r s p p a ~ v i q ~ i n n e q u r s a t i t c b h v y u h t n t a r e k a s d d ankuro na b h a v a t i , b h a v a t i t u s a t i ts&m vyuhe t a & t vinacltebh* a n k u r a n u ~ a p a t t e q ~ a s a t i $he na b i j a n%!ah karanarn iti s t t r & t h e h .

Then, as r e g a r d s t h e t h e o r y t h a t God is , t h e cause of t h e I world, v;caspat i Misra d i s c u s s e s i t i n d e t a i l . He says t h a t the

b

I ~ ~ a ~ a s ; t r a 4.1.19 v i z . , ' I s v a r a h kzranam.. . e tc . ' i s p r e s e n t i n g

t h e ~ { x v a ~ a k s a view i n accordance with t h e Vedanta d o c t r i n e .

According t o t h e Vedanta view, God i s t h e m a t e r i a l cause o f t h e

world. It is e x p l a i n e d from the p o i n t of view of t h e Vedanta

d o c t r i n e t h a t t he wor ld might no t have come out #of t h e void. I t

can c e r t a i n l y be produced o u t of Brahman. The Brahman becomes

modif ied i n t o several names and forms i n t h e same manner as t h e

c l a y i s modified i n t o j a r , e t c , It i s t h i s Brahman t h a t is I

meant by t h e term I s v a r a i n t h e 4.1.198

~ i b h i t ayam n b r r u p a prapan5ah du'nyatop~d'danou a p i t u brahma u d d a n o bhav i iya ti. Brahmaivahl prapanpa r i p e n a parfrfamets ) f t t i k i v a p h s t a d a r ~ v o d a n p a n s d i bh i i ena . . . . ~ l v a r o brahtns i h n s y G g a t . $et'an~:aktih

0 ' kriYisbktisFa i i a n a . s a g i s t i brahmani t i brahma i s v a r a h

28 kjrr?am Jaga tah . , 8

A f t e r s t a t i n g the Vedanta view a s t h e ~ G r v a p a k s a , v;caspati I Misra considers ~Ytrs 4.1.20 as p u t t i n g forward arguments again81

t h e Vedanta t h e o r y t h a t a l l t h i n g s e v o l v e o u t of Brahman, As

a g a i n s t t h i s , it i s argued t h a t it i s not j u s t i f i a b l e t o hold

t h a t Brahman evo lves o r modi f i e s i n t o t h e e n d l e s s phenomenal

subs tances . Thus Brahman cannot be regarded a s t h e up;dgna-

kzrana of t h i n g s . I t may be admit ted t h a t Brahman o r God a8

t h e ~ i m i t t a k " a a n a :

~dama trs ;khan-na t i v a t qqttikiva dmarupa prapansa r i p e ? a brahma pa r inana te . . . t a s m s t i b v a r o j a g a t

I b h h e n a v i v a r t s t a ;tyayuktam. Nirnittamtu sygd i i lvaro j aga ta!. 29

F i n a l l y , t h e ~ : t ~ a r ~ a t & a p u t s the Siddhanta of t h e

~ a i y g y i k a s c l e a r l y a s follows:

The ~ p i d h a k z r a n a of the world is c o n s t i t u t e d by the

atoms and God is t h e Nimi t t akz rana a s i n f l u e n c e d by men's

ac t ions . For t h e s e a c t ions a l s o God i s t h e N i m i t t akzrana ,

There i s n 0 , i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y in t h i s s ta tement - eventhough the

c a r p e n t e r i s he lped and inf luenced by t h e axe, y e t the axe i s I

mad. by him. According t o ~ g $ a s p a t i Misra , t h e argunent put

fornard i n ~ G t r a 4.1 .W ( na purudakar&bh&e phala a n i s p a t t z ) )

has no power a g a i n s t the view of t h e world i s t h e work of God

as ass is ted by men's act ions . While it i s an e f fec t ive argu-

ment a g a i n s t t h e view t h a t in c r e a t i n g t h e world God does not

require any help outside himself:

- 3 I 2arad?upad&asya jagatab purusa kardpzk!; isvaro n

n i m i t t a kPa?am, ya$ta tena apzksaniyam purusakarrna 8 8

t a d a p i ilvvara n i m i t t ~ k a m ~ v a . N a ~ a yadapckr'y;te terya an imi t ta tvam i t y u p a r i s t ~ t p r a v ~ d a y i $ y ~ m a h . Tasma'd

4 i h a ~ k g r i r a t v i t putubha ' rasya t a t saheya isvaro n imi t t a klranam jagata: i t ya sya h s y a nir'a karane - ' - ~urusakarmabhave phala a n i p p a t t ; x i t y ~ h u h nirap;k;esvara

3U I

nimit ' takatve d t u r e v a i t y a r t h a h . I Thus, vZcaspati M i s r a g i v e r a perfect shape t o the Purva-

1 .

paksa and the ~ i d d h g n t a view regard ing the cause of the world,

from the p o i n t of view of t h e ~ a i ~ z ~ i k t s .

10, Phala:

According t o the ~ G t r a . Yhala means a t h i n g produced by

a c t i v i t y and d e f e c t - ' ~ r a ~ ~ t t l d o s ' a j a n i t a h a r r t h a h ' (1.1 ,201.

It i s here t h a t v+aepati ~ i !ra metes a re levant observa-

t i o n * He says t h a t Phala i s t h e d i r e c t result of man1a

a c t i v i t y a l o n e b u t t h e S u t r a i n c l u d e s d e f e c t s a l s o a s g iv ing

rise t o Phala. ~ g c ~ a r p a t l ~ i d r a t h i n k s t h a t t h i s r e f e r e n c e t o

defect. in &e d t r a is with t h e purpose of showing t h a t

defects a r e the c a u s e of a c t i v i t y and t h a t pleasure and pa in

which c o n s t i t u t e t h e Phala , are the r e a u l t s o f d e f e c t a l so . He

obse rves t h a t when t h e sa i l of the Soul i s i r r i g a t e d w i t h the I

water of d e f e c t t h e seeds of merit a n d demer i t g i v e rise t o t h e

fruits of pleasure and pain:

A t r a ca p r a v r t t i j a n i t a I iti vaktavye dogagrahapan na

krvsl;rn p r a v r t t i r n a m p r a t i d o l a n ~ r n h e t u bhava! a p i t u

p r a v r t t i k i r y e sukhaduhkhe a p i p r a t l t i d a r $ a n ~ r t h a m , * *

dosa s a l i l ~ ~ a s i k t ~ ~ y a m k h a l u itmabhumou dhaxmgdharma 31 bi j e sukheduh t h e j anaya t sh nanyatha.

11. Duhkha:

This i s d e f i n e d by Gautama a s ' bzdhanzlaksanam' , t h a t is a ' a

t h a t which i s connected wi th annoyance. ~jzdhana is exp la ined i n

t h e f3hisya as r u f f e r l n g or i n j u r i n g ( ~ i d a t ~ p a i t i ) . Here

~ i c a s ~ e t i ~ i d r a s i g n i f i c a n t l y adds Annoyance ( bgdhana) . Here

i t s t a n d s f o r 'bjdhsn;vidaygbuddhi' i . e . , the f e e l i n g of bahana.

It p r i m a r i l y refera t o p a i n and s econda r i l y t o body and o t h e r s

slsq because all these are n e c e s s a r y f a c t o r s i n t h e f e e l i n g

o f pain:

Atrs cs brdhaniti bzdhan'd vi.'eyam buddhirn 1ak:ayati.

Tcna & d h a ~ ;a t adanusang iva sca darireday; gauna

tnukhya b h g v m a l a k ? i t i bhavanti . Saiva h i b i d h i n i buddhih I duhkhe mulchy; A r i d d o " gaun i t i . 32

12, Apavarga:

I T h i s i s d e f i n e d by tiautama a s ' t a d a t y a n t a vimoksah' .

0 e

cotdi ding t o t h e ~ h i ~ ~ a , t h e word ' t a t ' s t a n d s f o r b i r t h - 'Tena duhkhzna janman: a tyan tam vlmukt ih apavargah' (8hrsya.

p.110) . I

Hero, ~ z ~ a s ~ a t i Misre e x p l a i n 6 t h a t t h e word ' t a t 1 i n

the ~ G t r a s t a n d s n o t o n l y f o r p a i n p r o p e r , b u t a l s o f o r a l l

such p r o d u c t s 'as t h e body, t h e s e n s e o r g a n s , etc. Since t h e

name P a i n c a n b e a p p l i e d t o a l l t h o s e t h i n g s i n i t s s e c o n d a r y

sense:

T a d i t y a n a n t a r a m gauna rnukhya bhzdabhinnam duhkham

paramrsatit$ha a a b h h ~ a k i r a h tenaduhkhe 'ne t i . ~ u k h ~ a m ~ v a duhkham iti bhrem; mzbhut ata aha j a n p a d iti. Anena

I js'yrrnzn'n. duhkhr sabdena ~ a r v ; . b r i & d a y a h ucyan te

33 e e

i tyuktam bhavati .

The f i n a l release i s charac ter i sed by immortality, freedom

from fear, i m p e r i s h a b i l i t y , and at ta inment of b l i s s and this L

is cal led t h e s t a t e of Urahman (Bhzsya , p.111). vgcarpat i

~ i d r a says that i t s t a n d l for the fear of belnq born i n t o t h e

world. The e p i t h e t i m p e r i s h a b i l i t y i s given with a view to

denying t h e op in ion t h a t Brahman evolves i t s e l f i n t o diverse

names and forms, The t h i r d epithet a s immoxtality i s intended

t o e x c l u d e the Uouddha theory of mzksa c o n s i s t i n g i n t h e

absolute c e s s a t i o n o f the mind like t h e e x t i n c t i o n of t h e lamp:

Punah samszra bhay:bhzvamahe abhayan ca brahmeti. I

Aaakyt abhayasxt%?. I I Etu brahmaiva n~mar~paprapan- citmanz parinamsta i tyzhuh tarnpratfkh a j a r a m i t i . . .

t 1 .

v a i n z s i k a ~ przhu! pradipas ya iva nirvznam moksa?, ' 34 t a s y a cztasah iti , tam pra tyHha amrtyupadamiti.

a ' b

t Thus, v:caspati Misra has made h i s r e l e v a n t observat ions

on each of the twelve ~rarn5~; s . l n some cases, a s noted above,

he has contributed his original p o i n t s .

The n e x t f o u r c a t e g o r i e s ~ a m l a y a , ~ r a y E j a n a , ?r,~t;nta and

siddha"nt8 are t h e p r e l i m i n a r i e s of blyTya ( reasoning). The I - f i r s t two c a t e g o r i e s a r e Pramanas end Pramzyas. A 1 1 knowledge

depends upon PX.~~?;S and Yramey(ls and they are t h e objects

s o u g h t t o be known. Reasoning i n a l l i t s d e t a i l s ha s t o be

r e s o r t e d t o f o r eeek ing and conforming knowledge. Among a l l t h

d e t a i l s of r e a s o n i n g , doub t should come f i r s t because u n t i l

there is d o u b t , the re is no o c c a s i o n for any r e a s o n i n g , Then

comes pray; j a n a , urs t a ' i t a and ~ i d d h z n t a . Gautama defines then I a

i n h i s ~ c t r a s and t h o N y z y a b h z ~ ~ y a e l u c i d a t e s t h e ~ h r i s . Ther

~ C r t i k a sometimes makes a n a t t e m p t t o i n t e r p r e t t h e ~ z t r %

d i f f e r e n t l y . ~ g 5 e s p e t i ~ i & a i n h i s ~ r t p a r y a t r k a follows t h i !

t r e n d and c o n t r i b u t e s h i s p o i n t s by way of s u p p o r t i n g the ~ F r t :

As r e g a r d s ~ r a ~ z j a n a and q r s t h t a , t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f t h o

~ h ; ~ y a , ~ S t i k a and ~ F t p a r ~ a t i k a agree. According1 y , t h a t

o b j e c t a iming a t which one a c t s is t h e motive;

Yamartham a d h i k r t y a p r a v a r t a t e t& prayGjanam. . (1.1.24).

It i s poin ted o u t t h a t t h e word Artha r e f e r s t o two k inds

of ~ r a G j a n a : (1) ~ u k h ~ a ~ r a ~ ~ j a n a , ( 2 ) ~ a u ~ p r a ~ ~ j j e n a ( t h e

Primary and s e c o n d a r y motives) .

The Primary mot ive i s t h e a t t a i n m e n t of h a p p i n e s s and remc

of sorrow and t h e Secondary mot ive i s t h e means t o t h e P r imary

motive. - 8 0 -

Then ~ ~ s t a ' n t a i s t h a t with r ega rd t o which both the

o r d i n a r y man ( l a u k i k a ) and t h e e x p e r t ( par ik5aka) e n t e r t a i n

similar ideas:

II

Laukika parik?ak;n~m yasminnarth: buddhi shyam s c i y t s n t a ? ,

and l l ~ a t ~ n t a is shown t o be u s e f u l when c o n t r a r y o p i n i o n s are

t o be overthrown and a l s o when o n e ' s op in ions a r e t o be

confirmed. l l % s t ~ n t a is u t i l i s e d i n t h e i n f e r e n t i a l process

consisting of f i v e avayavzs.

I t is w i t h regard to ~ a m s b y a and ~ i d d h i n t a l o t of t h i n k i n g

has been made i n ~ i t ~ a r y a t i k a . ' t h e same w i l l be p r e s e n t e d here .

I 1. Samsayat --

~ a m s i y a ( ~ o u b t ) i a defined by Gautarna as: '~ama'nanoks-

dharmopapattzh v i p r a t i p a t t e h upalabhdhi anupalabhdhi avya- I v a r t z t a s ~ e ~ i s k ~ ~ e k ~ o vimarsav sarn:ayahn. This ~ h r a hat3 been

i n t e r p r e t e d by t h e uh>syake'ra i n such a way a s t o give rise t o

f i v e kinds o f doubt, The f i rst kind of doubt a r i s e s from t h e

c o g n i t i o n of common c h a r a c t e r s (~arn~nadharm~papatt 'eP). The

second doub t arises from t h e c o g n i t i o n ,of c h a r a c t e r s t h a t he lp

t o d i e t i n g u i s h an o b j e c t f mm d i v e r s e objects.(~n;kadharm'bpa-

p a t t i ? ) . I h e t h i r d k ind of doubt a r i ses from the presence o f

c o n t r a d i c t o r y o p i n i o n s ( vipra t ipa t t ;h) . The f o u r t h kind of

doubt a r i s e s from u n c e r t a i n t y w i t h regard t o p e r c e p t i o n s

(Upalabhdhi a v y a v a s t h ~ t a h ) . The f i f t h kind of doubt arf ses

from uncer ta i r l ty associ i ted with non-perceptions (Anupalabhdhi

avyavasthita?) . The doubt according t o the ~h;rya i s a

case o f wavering judgement i n which t h e d e f i n i t e c o g n i t i o n

of the s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r of an o b j e c t i s wanting. Such a

doubt arises i n f i v e ways a s shown above, g iv ing r i se to i t s

f i v e kinds,

, According t o v i r t i k a and l 'g tparyat rka , t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

of t h e 5;tra should b e made d i f f e r e n t l y . According t o them,

the ~Ctra lays down only three kinds of doubts. The f i r ~ t

kind of doubt arises from t h e c o g n i t i o n of the characters

common t o t h e concerned o b j e c t s . The second kind of doubt

arises from the c o g n i t i o n of c h a r a c t e r s t h a t s e r v e t o d i s t i n g u i s h

an o b j e c t from d i v e r s e o b j e c t s . The t h i r d kind of doubt ariees

from t h e prelence of c o n t r a d i c t o r y op in ions . The ~ g t ~ a r ~ a t i k a

c l e a r l y shows t h a t 5am:aye is not a mere ' ~ i d e s r ~ e k s a h vimarsah' I

but upalabhdhi anupalabhdhi a v y a v a ~ t h ~ t a ) vimardap I. The

~&,~tpar~atika remarks t h a t the mere presence of ~ ~ e k ! ; i s no t

enough. It should be an apek:; due t o u n c e r t a i n t y associated

with pe rcep t ions and non-perceptions:

vibcra? !irahp5nyadiq I I vi:isyete an ina I sthino! iti anupalabhdha sgm~nyanyatiyjpi kvas id upalabhdhi anupa- l a b h d h i svvavasth: a s t i t i , vath; saptame ras; d a s h ,

dravye, n a h i tatra Gdhakam bzdhakam vz a s t i .

Pradnanarnca randayah a vibe?gpiksah . iti e t k a t i iti. 1

~ g $ a s ~ a t i ~ i i r a i s q u i t e c l e a r a s regards t h e three kinds

of doubt r e fe rxed t o i n the He draws the s u p p o r t of

t h e ~a'rtikakgra and says8

I I T a t r a $a samsaya iti lak(yani rd&h, vimarsa iti lakc$?apadam, ekasrnin d h a r n i y i v l r o d h i ngnnbtha evamari(o vimar!a? k i m s v i d i t i j8a'narn. T a d a n h a

a s a m h a j z t i y & h y a h pramgn&ibhya) saminajf t iy .bhyasga I

viparyay&libhya? samsaya? ' n i v a r t i t o b h a v a t i . ~arnanz- ty;dinztu t r l n i visbs? l a kap$?i.. . ~ a m b a d h a r m G ~ a - pa tt'.? anetediarmopapatt?h v i p r a t i p a tf;riti. ~ d n i pra tygkan lesaih 6 padaik ;petgni l a k t a n z n l iti. f a t *tadah v h t i k & e r a h - tatha sam&eti . ~ r i v i d h ; e v e t i , ye paAca~idham Waksat; t e n i d k r t a h . 2 * ' 0 ' B

I Thus, a c c o r d i n g t o ~ g c , a s p a t i Misrs three kinds of ssrns!aya

are: ( 1 ) ~ a m a n a d h a r m z p a p e t t i h sarn:ayah, ( 2 ) ~ n ~ k a d h a r m z p a ~ a t t i h I sarnsayah and ( 3) v i p r a t i p a t G h sandayah.

I

For example, t h e f i r s t kind o f d o u b t occurs when a man

perce ives t h e q u a l i t i e s of l e n g t h and b read th which a r e common

t o man and post . The doubt t a k e s the form of ' s thanu& m

purusova'. The second kind of doubt can be i l l u s t r a t e d thus:

The preaence of odour d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e e a r t h from water and

the rest, a s a l so from q u a l i t i e s and ac t ions , I f , f o r instance,

sound i s found t o be endowed with a s p e c i f i c p r o p e r t y i n t h e

form of being produced by disjunction, t h e c o g n i t i o n o f t h i s

c h a r a c t e r g i v e s rise t o t h e doubt a s t o whether sound i s a

substance, a q u a l i t y o r an a c t i o n . I n t h e ea r l i e r c a s e , o f t h e

e a r t h , wt~cr l Wc? say e a r t i , is irn e n t i t y , wr! arc u n c e r t n l n a s

t o its beinq e i t he r a s~lLmt;lr\ce, i~ quil1it.y o r arI a c t i o n . l t

dharrnah' has been i n t e r p r e t e d in two wi3ya hy the ~Gtika and

t h e ~ g t ~ a r y a t ~ r k a . First e x p l a n a t i o n i s 'angkam t a s m i t

v i i e p k a h dharma?' . The words ' t a s m i t vides,akahl are supp l i ed

here. The second e x p l a n a t i o n i s ' t a s y a angkasya dharmah * vyzvartakataG' .

An example o f the t h i r d kind of doubt arises from such a

s t a t e m e n t as ' t h r ? Snul ax4 . r , tn t , accnrrlinrr t o nrlrt sya ten1

phi lo sophy , while a n o t h e r system d e c l a r e s t h a t there i s no

such a t h i n g a s a Soul.

Gautama e x p l a i n s t he t o p i c of ~ i d d h 3 n t a in s ix ~3tra's .

The first of thc?se ~ G t r z ~ q i v o s Lhc c~i-ncr~il rlcf i n i t i o n o f

~ i d d h ~ n t a , The n e x t ~ { t t r a enunlerates four k i n d s of ~ i d d h r n t a .

The rest of the four d e f i n e t h e s e four kfntis of ~ i d d t l z n t a .

The definition of ~ i d d h z n t a a c c o r d i n g to Gautama i s :

'Tantradikaranahyupagama san~sthitih aiddh"atah ' . Here, the

Bhzsyakzra takes ' tantradikaranzbhyuPagama' a s a Dvandva compound

and c o n n e c t s s a m s t h i t h i w i t h e a c h one of them. I n e f fect , the

u h i s y a i n t e r p r e t a t i o n makes the ~ Z t t a to c o n t a i n a n enumerat ion

of the d i f f e r e n t kinds of ~ i d d h g n t a . The ~ r r t i k a , an the I

o t h e r hand, interprets ' t a n t r n d i k a r a n e ' a s a Uahuvr ih i • . compound I

and the rest of the word i s taken as S a s t i t a t p u r u s a ( g e n i t i v e ) .

This is exp la ined well i n t h e rZtparyatTka:

Tantram premrnam tad& ndhikaransm i!raya? j;;.bakatv;na

d8rn arthanam' t e ta th 'okta? ( t a n t r a d h i k a r a n a h ) . [ ~ a n t r h h i k a r a n h n a m abhy upagamah tantr;dhikaranibhyupagamah,

t a n t r a d h i k a r a n a s y a a a m s t h i t i h t;ntra'dhikatanasamsthitihj. I

If one follows t h e method of t h e bhzpyakara, a as pa ti

~ i 2 . a t a k e s note of t h e mention of t a n t r a s a r n e t h i t i , Adhikarana- 0 '

s a r i s t h i t i end Abhyupagamasarnsthiti a s r e f e r r e d t o i n t h e ~ i t r a .

Then he s u g g e s t s t h a t t a n t r a should be t a k e n a s two-fold;

S a r v a t a n t r a and Y r a t i t a n t r a . 1'0 make up t h e number of

k inds o f S iddhanta a c c e p t e d by Gautama, it will be c lear from

the n e x t ~ i i t r a .

Thus, according t o t h e ~ Z t p a r y a t G a , the ~ r t ' t r a i n q u e s t i o n

c o n t a i n s the g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n of ~ i d d h z n t a and t h a t i t has

to be i n t e r p r e t e d on t h e l i n e s of t h e v z r t i k a . I n f a c t ,

~ r t a 8 p a ti ~ i A e ha8 r e c o n c i l e d t h e dh%ya i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of

t h i s d t r a w i t h t h e ~ r r t i k a i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e same. He

says t h a t the f3h;sye s t a t emen t p r i o r t o s z t r a 1.1.26 c l e a r l y . shows t h a t what i s given i n t h e ~ { t r a i s t h e d e f i n i t i o n of

~ i d d h i n t a . The ~ h z a ~ a e x p l a n a t i o n following t h a t ~ G t r a shou ld ' . be t a k e n a c c o r d i n g t o him a s t h e p r e f i x e d e x p l a n a t i o n of ~ & r a

1.1.27. The I3hbya ~ t a t e m e n t i n t r o d u c i n g t h e ~ i t r a 1.1.27 I

Provides t h e c l u e t o t h e s t a t e m e n t of ~ Z ~ a s p a t i Hisrsr

T a t r a tant rabhe 'da t tu khalu sa c,aturvidhah.

The four kind8 o f Siddhgnta are: ~ e r v a t a n t r a s i d d h z n t a ,

pra ti t a n t r a r iddhznta , Adhikaranasiddhanta and Abhyupagama-

r iddhzn ta . For in6tanc.t ~hr:?. e t c . a r e t h e sense o r g a n s ,

garxiha e t c . a r e the sense o b j e c t s , t h e e a r t h e t c . a r e t h e

m a t e r i a l subs tances , These are t h e examples of P r a t i t a n t r a -

s iddhznta s i n c e they a r e not incompat ib le w i t h any system

( S a r v a t a n t r a av i ruddhae) . The ~ r a t i t a n t r a s i d d h z n t a i s t h a t

d o c t r i n e which i s p e c u l i a r t o one system of philosophy. I t

i s a d o c t r i n e accep ted by one system and no t accepted by other

systems. For example, ' ngsa to vidyat 'e bhzvah, ns b h h o

v i d y a t e s a t a h t i s a p e c u l i a r d o c t r i n e o f t h e ~a 'nkhy2s.

~ d h i k a r a n a s i d d h a h a i s t h a t on t h e acceptance of which depends

the accep tance of a n o t h e r f a c t . For i n s t a n c e , when t h e f a c t

t h a t t h e c o g n i s e r i s d i s t i n c t from the body a d t h e s e n s e organs

is proved by t h e f a c t o f one and t h e same o b j e c t being cognised

by t h e organs of v i s i o n and touch, several f a c t s a r e implied.

I t i a impl ied t h a t t h e r e a re more s e n s e organs t h a n one, t h a t

t h e s e n s e organs o p e r a t e on p a r t i c u l a r kinds of o b j e c t s , e t c ,

The f o u r t h kind o f ~ i d d h g n t a known a s ~bhyupagamasiddha"nta i s

a c a s e of h y p o t h e t i c a l d o c t r i n e t a k i n g which f o r g r a n t e d t h e

examination of p a r t i c u l a r d e t a i l s fo l lows . Eor example, t ak ing

sound as a s u b s t a n c e , one may proceed t o i n v e s t i g a t e whether i t

is e t e r n a l o r non-e ternal . I t i s t o be noted he re t h a t t h e

d e f i n i t i o n of ~ b h ~ u ~ a ~ a r n a s i d d h ~ n t a runs as ' ~ ~ a r i k s ~ t a b h ~ u ~ a -

g a 6 t t a d v i d e s s par?ksenam A abhyupagamasiddh;ntaht. Here, ~ G t i k r

c a t e g o r i c a l l y remarks t h a t the word ~ ~ a r ~ i s i t a does n o t occur

in the ~ C t r a . Yet , i t i s p o s s i b l e t o take it i n t h e sense of

not i n v e s t i g a t e d . ~ g ~ a s p a t i ~ i ! r a construes the Sutra as:

Tad vErtikak;ro v y z s a s t e , a p a r i k q i t 5 s u t r l t a iti I

sutritasya prgye?a par ikg i sambandhzt. Manasch h i indr iya t d n a a s h i t s s y i p i indr i y a tva abhyupagabah prarnanadhikarano ya tah tasmat ayam abhyupagamasiddhantah sutranfa evam yojaniyam as; tr i t~bhyupagam~d het th hatah.

0

tadv i iasa a parikfa?arn kriyate tarmid v i ~ e q a p a r ~ k ~ ; n s j - ' , $zyate as; tr i tacykpi abhyupepa tam r ~ t r a k ~ r t n e , soyarn asya abhyupagam5 abhy upagama siddhlnta? . 4

'

Thus, the ~ : r t i k a k r r a and ~ ~ t p e r y a t i k a k & a take a 1 together

a dif ferent line of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n from t h a t of the bh1syak;ra.

Gautama mentions f i v e members of s y l l o g i s t i c r eason ing

a,: (1) ~ r a t i j & ( s t a t e m e n t of t h e p r o p o s i t i o n ) , ( 2 ) ~ ; t u '

(statement of the l l robans) , ( 3) ~ d z h a r a ~ a ( Sta tement of

c o r r o b o r a t i v e i n s t a n c e ) , ( 4 ) Upanaya (Reaffirmation) and

(5) Nigamana ( F i n a l c o n c l u s i o n ) .

I t i s p o s s i b l e t o ob jec t here t h a t it is not proper t o

g i v e a l i s t of the ~ v a ~ a v z s without g i v i n g the g e n e r a l de f i -

n i t i o n of Avayave I t s e l f . This o b j e c t i o n is met by &aspati 0

I M i m a i n h i s ~rttpar~atrka. Speaking about the concerned sitre

1 3 2 h e says t h a t the ~ Z t r a i n d i c a t e s t h e g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o ~

of Avayava a l t h o u g h it i s in tended t o g i v e the vibhZggr i .e. ,

t h e l i s t of d i f f e r e n t ~vayav:s. The g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n can be

grasped from the word Avayava i t s e l f . I t is through Avayavatva w

alone t h e r e is t h e common feature of P r a t i j n a e t c . It shows

t h a t each of these f i ve ~ v a ~ a v z s a re interconnected in b r i n g i n g

o u t something t o be concluded;

vibhZga paramapi e t a t a r t h i t avayava s&n~nynyalakqaqam s:$ayateti sitram... atra avayava pada'deva s h a n y a .

laksanam avagamyate. Avayavatvenaiva ekav i kyata L I

d a r d i t a . Sa $a padanam paras para essmpratyeyi tspehsita sambandha yogysrtha pratyayena bhava t i . ~ a s m z t t a tha

II a 0 - v i d h r r t h a pratyayanameva pretirn'admnam avryava samrnya lakqa?arn siddham. 1

Thus, vGaspati l i & a shows ttla t the word Avayava? i t se l f

i n d i c a t e 8 the g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n of Avayave. The words which

convey t h e meaning t o o thers become combined i n a s e n t e n c e and

conveys the meaning of the sentence ' t h rough mu tua l connec t ion .

Thus t h e y become t h e anggs of t h e sen tence . In the present

i n s t a n c e , ~ r a t i j k etc. combine in a c o n t e x t and b r i n g o u t the

idea t o be conveyed through mutual r e l a t i o n . Thus, t h e y t o o .

serve as the angas of the whole n i t u a t l o n , Hence, those

tha t bring o u t t h e i n t e n d e d sense through mutual c o n n e c t i o n

a re the ~ v a y a v g s .

The 1 3 h ~ s y e k ~ x a mentions f i v e o t h e r ~ v a y a v ' a s v i , ~ i f n s s a , I I t

Sansaya, 5akyapr j ip t i , ~ r a ~ z j a n a and Samsayavyudha , a l o n g with

the f i v e ~ r a t i G e t c . and s a y s t h a t accord ing t o some

~aiy;~ik;s the ~vayav1rr are ten i n number. As regards the I f i v e , ~ i ~ n ' s a e t c . , ~ ? c , a s ~ a t i hlisra s a y s t h a t t h e y a r e not

f i t t o become t h e ~ v a ~ a v a s of s y l l o g i s t i c r eason ing because

they are n o t intended t o convey any th ing t o o t h e r s .

By corroborating the B h h y a as well as ~ c r t i k a , he says

t h a t ~ i g n s s e e t c . can g i v e rise t o a Prakera?a , Bu t , t h e y do

n o t become t h e A ~ L S of the Prakarana through the conveying of

any i d e a t o o t h e r s . ~ r a t i j n z and o t h e r s are necessa ry f a r a

Prakarana because they are. capable of conveying t h e ideas t o

others through t h e i r meanings. Hence. ~ i g n b a e tc . a r e not

u s e f u l i n s y l l o g i e t i c reasoning:

Te $1 j ign;sa'dayab utpannih I praka ranasya u t thCpaksh sva rup lna na puna) svnjna'nnenn yens ivalnbda p r o t i - * p$dyaji sarltav p r a k a r n ~ f p i anqam bhav~yul; yatt \z

p r a t i j n h a y a ? sva j n rnene s d r t h a m pratipgday'dayentah. l'asrntd s a r v a t h a i v a j i g n g s a d i v j $ a k s d i padapray8glh I

a n a r t h a k a b i t i b h b v a ~ . ~

T h i s p o i n t h a s been f u r t h e r c l a r i f i e d i n ~ z t ~ a r ~ a t i k a - I p a r i ~ ~ d d h i i n t h i s connec t ion . Thus, ~ i ~ n z s a e t c . h e l p the

d i s c u s s i o n by their mere p resence w h i l e E ' rat i jna e t c . h e l p by

t h e i r c o g n i t i o n . I n o t h e r words, i f ~ i ~ n z s a i s t h e r e , the

~ ~ S C U $ S ~ O ~ goes on. There is no n e c e s s i t y t o apprehend JSgngsa

o t c . P r a t i j n a c t c . ,on the other hantl , slloultl be n e c e s s a r i l y

known b e f o r e t h e y can lead t o the f i n a l c o g n i t i o n of t h i n g s .

I As reyards tlrr! in t l iv j . t l~ la l ~ v a ~ n v ; s , V;caspa t i Lisra of f ~ r s

his e l u c i d a t . i o n here and thorc and cont , r ibut .es h i s points t o

make t h e concepts c l e a r . The same i s presented here.

Y r n t i j % and IlnCu: --lllllCIICe*

m I P r a t i j n a i s defined a s 'Sadhyan i rdesa ' i.e., referonce t o

what i s t o be proved. Hetu is d e f i n e d a s t ha t which demons t i

rates probandurn t h r o u g h i t s similarity t o the c o r r o b o r e t i v 4 '

i n s t a n c e and also t h rough i t s d i s s i m i l a r i t y t o it. vgtaspati I

shows the l o g i c behind the sequence of Hetu after ~ r a t i j ? a .

He s a y s t h a t t h e r e i s a n o c c a s i o n f o r t h e statement of probans

t h e s t a t ement of P ropos i t ion . Wise people u t t e r t h e i r

words f o r convincing others. Others are t o be taught only that

which they Ought t o know. I n t h a t cage, t h r o u g h , t h e s t a t ement

of what is desired, t h e other person w i l l be i l l umined by it. - A person who speaks a f a ~ g v i d a r a tree when he is asked about

the Amra t r e e canno t be regarded a s one a t t e n t i v e t o t h e

q u e s t i o n p u t by t h e o t h e r person. For i n s t a n c e , a d i s c i p l e by

name ~ g t h a r a was advised t o bring Samits (sacred f u e l ) by the

teacher. He b r i n g s it accord ing ly but does not inform h i s

t e a c h e r t h a t he has. b rough t t h e sac red fue l . l h e n he e n t e r s

t h e presence of t h e t e a c h e r , the t e a c h e r becomes angry towards

him. I n t h e same way, i f one says ' k r t a k a t v z t ' w i t h o u t * b

mferring t o ' a n i t y a ? dabda;' f o r the advantage o f s person 4

who wants t o know t h a t Sabda i s a n i t y a . A l l t h a t amounts t o

i r r e l e v a n t t a l k i f Hetu I s mentioned w i t h o u t mentioning t h e

~ r a t i j c a :

~ t a t i j f t n a ~ t a r a m h e t u vacpnasya avasa ra? t a t h g h i - parapra tyayanzyr vaganam u ~ ~ ~ r a y a n t i p r e k p k a n t a b t a d h a p a pa re bodhayitavyz yad bubhutsan'te. T'ath; s a ti anena apeksitzbhidh:nat para bodhi to bhava ti, no khs lu Tmran pf ?tab. k&idarzn %a k g h a ~ ~ f s t t ~ t avadheya vaFano bhavat i . . . ~ a t h ; sa ~ g t h a r a samidhan S I a h a r r t i guruna p r e s i t a h , e &ham daremi i t yanuk tva tadartham yd&arn grha; p r a v i sb ti tada armai k u p y a t i gur*. . . evan anl tyam sbbdam b u b h u t r a m ~ n a ~ ~ a a n i t y a ? 4abd.h iti snuktva yzideva kin$iduc,yate tcrFtakatv:diti

m

v a , y a t f;tskam tadani tyam Iti v;, lcttakaspa tabdam iti va, t a t aarvam a s y a anapekfi tam zpatatab asambaddhibhi- - 3 dhgnam, t a t h z =a anavah i to na boddhum a r h a t i t i .

I ~ 2 5 a s p a t i Misra f u r t h e r expla ins t h e d e f i n i t i o n of Hetu.

The word Hetu i n t h e ~ i t r a refers t o what i s def ined . Its

gene ra l d e f i n i t i o n i s t h a t which demonstrates the probandurn.

(s;dhya sgdanam). iyith t h e etymology of 'sa"dhanal a s

' ~ C d h y a t c anena' and t h a t i s i l l u s t r a t e d by such s ta tements

a s tkmr;takatvzt ' e t c . I f Hetu were def ined as j u s t Vacanam

t h a t might amount t o ~ r a t i j & which i s a t r t e d i n a s s o c i a t i o n

with ~ g d h y a . Therefore, there would be ~ t i v y g ~ t i . Therefore ,

~a 'dh~assdhanarn is tachnfcaLLy a p e r f e c t d e f i n i t i o n of Hetu.

There i s no ~ t i v y z ~ t i of t h i s d e f i n i t i o n i n Hetvabhzsa's be-

cause t h e word ' ~gdhanam' i t s e l f re jec ts t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y .

Although it i s j u s t mentioned as gene ra l ly Hetu, it

should be understood a s r e f e r r i n g t o Anvaya and ~ y a t i A k a

Hetu by contex ts :

Hetur i t i l a k t y e nird;.'ab.. . t a s y a s%n&ya lak?a?am s5dhya szdhanarn. Sgdhyate anBnet i vyutpatya. . .

# lcctakatv%litys'dikam vaganarn upa laksaya t i . Yadi ca vacanam hetuh iti ucyzta t a t sgdhyena samabhi- vya'hrtarn • I ' pra ; i j~a sygt . A t r v a c a n a m i t y s t ~ v a d u c y ~ t a t a d 8 a t i v y s p t i h sy'.t.. . hetvzbh:rasga na sadhanamit i s;cihane padena;va nifilcrta?. . . iday&them d rou tan tu vidsraleksanam o h i t u r i t i yadyapi shanyapadam tath%pi

4 prakaransd anvaya v y a t i r e k i hetuparam drstavyam. , I ' . .

I ~hus, v;caspati hlisra i l l u s t r a t e s some important p o i n t s

i n s e t t l i n g t h e sequence between ~ r a t i k and Hetu and i n

e l u c i d a t i n g t h e dof i n i t i o n of Hetu.

The t h i r d Avayava c a l l e d UdEharana i s de f ined by Gautama

a s t h a t f ami l i a r i n s t a n c e which through s i m i l a r i t y t o what i s

t o be proved (szdhya s~dhermy"at) i s possessed of a proper ty

of t h e s u b j e c t ( tad dharmabhavi) ( 1.1.36). This d e f i n i t i o n

makes i t c l e a r t h a t t h e ~ d i h a r q a should possess two

p r o p e r t i e s in common with t he s u b j e c t , One proper ty is to

be proved and t h e other proper ty is a l r e a d y known t o s u b s i s t

i n the sub jec t . The word ~ j d h y a ordinarily stands for the

probandum, the presence of which i n the s u b j e c t i s t o be

proved.

The ~ h g ~ y a k c r a has expla ined t h e word s;dhya i n two ways

Accordingly, sgdhya i s of two kinds - (1) t h e p rope r ty as

belonging t o the o b j e c t , f o r i n s t a n c e , a s t he non-e t e rna l i t y

of sound, and (ii) t he o b j e c t a s q u a l i f i e d by t h e p r o p e r t y ,

f o r i n s t a n c e , a s sound i s non-eternal , According t o t h e

t l h ~ s y . a k ~ r a , it i s the l a t t e r k ind o f s;dhya t h a t i s referred

t o by t h e pronoun ' t a t ' i n t h e compound ' t a t dharmabhzvi't

szdhyanca dvividham - d h a n n i v i s l s tEvz dharmap, 4

sabdasy; ani tya tvam, dharmavis is t o vz dharmi,

an i ty rh dabdah i t i . ~ h z t t a r a m t a d grahanena 5 gxhyate - iti.

he Vrxtika 'and Tgtparyatcka make it c l e a r t h a t t h e

word ~ i d h y a does no t mean t h e probandurn i n t h e ~ z t r a under

c o n ~ i d e r a t i o n . A 8 c l e a r l y explained i n the ~ G t ~ a r ~ e t h a , t h e

word 'shdhyas;dharmya ' should mean t h e s i m i l a r i t y of the

i n s t a n c e to t h e subject (srdhya = Dharmin). For i n s t a n c e ,

i n t h e reasoning, sound is non-eternal because it is a product,

t h e s i m i l a r i t y c o n s i s t s i n t he presence of t h e proper ty of

' k r t a k a t v e ' which i s t h e Hetu. Thia i s present i n t he I *

s u b j e c t , sound which i a t o be proved a s non-eternal and i n

t h e i n s t a n c e ' ~ t h : l i ' e t c , Un t h e b a s i s of t h i s s i m i l a r i t y ,

the in s t ance i s found t o possess ano the r proper ty belonging

t o t h e same s u b j e c t , i . e . , sound. That proper ty is of non-

e t e r n a l i t y w h i c t ~ is found i n the i n s t a n c e s l ike ' ~ t h z l i ' e t c .

T h i s i. presented i n t h e ~ a ' t ~ a r ~ a t n a thus:

sZdhyena srdharmyzt i t y g d i bhspam. Tasya'rtha? - r b h y e n a dharrninz iabdena sgdharmyan q$st&tasya sth=ly%ie; ,$$taka tvam tadva t i n i tya tveha sa'dhyeca I

A b d e B p t l n t e ~ a s th2lyfdou aamznan, tasm'st kbranat prayojaka t t a d dharma bhzvi t a s y a i v a rgdhyasya I aabdasya d h a d dhharm%taram eva v i s i s t a b babdah

sl(8ihayit!ito an i tya tvzna t a d a n i t y a tvsm t ad dha;molr aa eva bhfva; t a d b h z v a ~ s o s y i s tit1 tad dharmabhzvi s th$lya 'dirani tyatva dharmavanti $vat. 6

It may be observed here t h a t t h e bhzfya, the ~brtika and

t,he f;;tparys agree i n one r e s p e c t , i . e . , is r e s p e c t o f taking

s:dhya i n the ~ t t r a a s r e f e r r i n g t o Dharmi ( s u b j e c t ) because

they th ink t h a t it i s not possible t o have Sadhnrmya between

t h e i n s t a n c e which i s a Dharmi and the Probandm which is a

Dharma. A s a l r eady pointed out, ~ h s s y a cons iders t he

p o s s i b i l i t y of ~ i d h ya as 'Dharmaviairtah dharrnah I .

~ e n c e , t h e concept ions of ~ d i h a r a ~ a according t u

Gautama's ~ i i t r a has been i n t e r p r e t e d t o mean t ha t P ra t zn t a m

i e a f a m i l i a r i n s t a n c e which i s s i m i l a r t o the s u b j e c t and

which possesses t h e property of t h a t sub jec t . The simpler

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has been suggested by l a t e r commentaries like

Khadyo t a on the ~ y ~ y a b h ~ ~ y a :

s a h y h a dharmzna anityatvtna s6dharmyzt stdhha?$t samSnzdhikaxanyZ t , szdhyaszma nadhikaranam dharmgnte-

riqi utpe t t id iarmakatvam avalamblya . t a i dharmabhgvi ridhyadharmavgn d ~ s t g n t a h udrharanam iti . 7

That f a m i l i a r i n s t a n c e which possess ing a proper ty ' th t

i s known t o be co -ex i s t en t o r concomitant w i t h the Probandurn

possesses a l s o t h e Probandm is ca l l ed the ~ d z h a r n a . @

~ i t ~ a r ~ e t ika however f ollowr t h e ~ h h t y a a d t h e ~a'rtika

i n t h o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the ~ ' i t r a . ~ z 5 a r p a t i ~ i s ' r a doer n o t

th ink of what i s considered t o be a simpler i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

of t h e ~ G t r a . The basic problem has been the consideration

t h a t there cannot be ~zdharmya between a Dharmin and a Dhanna.

The 8hZByaka+a give. examples f o r two kinds of p f ~ t i n t e

i , ( i sgdhya s3dharmy;t t a d dharmabhxvi dqp tgn ta?

and ( ii) ~a 'dhya vaidharmyzd a t a d dharrnebhavi drat8ntal1. .I

Here, the f i r s t one is t h o homogeneous instance and t h e

second one i s , t h e he terogeneous i n s t a n c e . l h e Bh'aryakara

g i v e s t h e fo l lowinq a s a n example a s t h e l a t t e r k ind of

d t l t t n t a - 'Ani tysh dabdal! utpsttidhsr"akatv:t, a n u t p a t t i

dh~ tmaka tvam ni tyam i tm'idi ' . Here Atrna e t c . are g i v e n a8 t h e

Ilere, the Uhl?yaklra s a y s t h a t on accoun t o f t h e f a c t t h a t

t h e Soul e t c , do n o t have the character of being produced,

t h e y d o not p o s s e s s the proper ty of the subject i n the form

of sound i,e.., n o n - e t e r n a l i t y . When we see i n t h e case of

Soul t h e c h a r a c t e r of being produced b e i n g absent i t does not

p o s s e s s n o n - e t e r n a l i t y . We infer t h e c o n t r a r y i n t h e case of

the sound i . e . , because sound i s possessed of the character .

o f b e i n g produced, it is non-e ternal ;

a t r a atmgdou t5r t g n t e u t p a t t i dharmatvasya a b h G t an i tya tvam n r b h a v a t l t i upalabharnana? dabde viparyayam a n m i n t t i - u t p a t t i dharmakatvasya bhava?d a n i t y a h s'abdah iti.'

I . . G c a s p a t i Misra i n h i s ~ Z t p a r ~ a t f i a takes except ion t o

t h i s example g i v e n i n t h e I3hhya. He does n o t agree with the

s t a t e m e n t t h a t the absence of t h e p r o p e r t y t o be proved i s

due t o the nboence o f t h e c h a r a c t e r whiclr prove6 it. tie says

t h a t t h i s i s n o t r i g h t a s i n t h e c a s e of the ~ n v a ~ a v ~ a t i A k i

reasoning. Eventhough a Vaidharmya i n s t a n c e i s a v a i l a b l e ,

t h e r i g h t course i s a l w a y ~ t o t a k e t h e s;dharmya i n s t a n c e

s i n c e t h e d i s s i m i l a r i t y of a t h i n g i s recognised always a f t e r

i t s s i m i l a r i t y . Therefore, it i s n o t r i g h t t o have r e c o u r s e

t o t h e round abou t way when a s t r a i g h t way is a v a i l a b l e f o r the

same purpose:

At ra bhzfysks rena anvaya v y a t i r e k i p h a sutrEdahAtab atrZpi u d a i F t a h : s h h a n a dharm%bhavena prayuktanca

* m e shdhya, dharrnzbhfia $yo'& am, ~a ccayuktarn, I I anvaya v y a t i r e k i n i h e t o u s a t y a p i vaidharmye ssdharmya udalharnamna uci tam, t a t r a t a t p u r v a katvzd vaidharmya p r a t ~ t i b . EIuj i r n ~ r ~ e n a s iddhya tosrti .. t a r ~ a vekrena s ~ d h a n ~ ~ o : a t

Thus, a f t e r f i n d i n g f a u l t w i t h t h e i h = ? ~ a example, v2$aspa 8

Misra g i v e s the f o l l o w i n g example f o r the Vaidhannya d ~ j t z n t a :

Here , the p r o p e r t y of t h e s u b j e c t ~ i v a ~ $ a ; i r a v i r . , having

t h e life b r e a t h i s not p r e s e n t i n t h e j a r . There fo re , when the

Probans i s s t a t e d a f f i r m a t i v e l y , t he i n s t a n c e c i t e d should be

homogeneous. If t h e reasoning i s put forward w i t h the Probans,

s t a t e d nfiqil Llvt:ly, tirun I r e t ~ r n y crl\naur 11,s ti, ncu stroilltl bo I

c i t e d as shown by ~ g c a s ~ a t i hl isra.

Upa na ya : -

Upanaya ( r e - a f f i r m a t i o n ) i s i n accordance w i t h t h e two

kinds of d y s t z n t a s t a t e d i n t h e two preceding ~ T t r a s by Gautama

The ~ t t r a speak ing abou t Upanaya s p e a k s a c t u a l l y of two kinds

of Upanaya:

Udaharan3peksph t a the tyupasamhsro na t a t h e t i va ssdhyasya upanayah. ( ~ y z ~ a s t t r a 1.1.38).

Upanaya i s t h a t which on t h e strength o f ~ d s h a r a n a reaffirms

the s u b j e c t as be ing ' s o ' o r a s b e i n g ' n o t s o t . ~ g $ a s ~ a t i

~ i d r a observes here t h a t t h e def in i , t i on EOlnmDn t o b o t h k inds

o f Upanaya would be i n this formt

I t i s rioted here t h a t " t a t h a ' and l a t h a t a t speak about t h e

p a r t i c u l a r d e f i n i t i o n s of the two k i n d s of Upanaya.

-

It i s d e f i n e d by t h e ~Etrakzra a s t h a t which i s the re -

s t a t e m e n t o f the, p r o p o s i t i o n o n t h e bas i s of t h e s t a t e m e n t of

the Pmbsne: ~ ~ e t v a ~ a d e d ; t pratiyn:ya? punarvacanam nigamanaml

The Nigamana or t h e f i n a l conc lu r ion i a what i a sata-

b l i e h e d or proved. The p ropos i t ion or ~ r a t i j r a i s s sta te -

ment which is y e t t o be proved. What appears i n t h e conclus ion .

a s proved is e x a c t l y what has appeared before i n t h e propo-

e i t i o n has t o be proved, Therefore , t h e r e 18 no incompati- -@w a

b i l i t y i n the s t a t e m e n t ' P r a t i jnayah punarva5anam 'nigamanam' . I

A t t h i s p o i n t , ~gc,acp.pati Misra a rgues t h a t the Nigamana is

not t h e same a s the pratij;li. I t must be noted t h a t ~ r a t i j b

puts forward the f a c t only tentatively as something to be

proved wi th the he lp of t h e Probans and t h e ins tance .

Nigamana, on t h e o t h e r hand pu t s forward the f a c t which i s

fully e s t a b l i s h e d and thus p rec ludes the p o s s i b i l i t y of the

t r u t h being . c o n t r a r y t o it. Th i s c a n n o t ' b e done by the

~ r a t i j G i t s e l f . I f t h a t were t h o case, then t h e rest of t h e

~ v a ~ a v z s would be e n t i r e l y . use less ;

-, Etena nigamanam prati jnayeh sam2n$bhidhzyatvepi p r a t i j n % t a r t a t v e n a prayukt;n. ~ r a t i jngYat! s rdhya

I paratv;t. Nigamanesya v i p a A t a sanka n i y f t t i

. para t v h i t i prayo j ana bheda s&n$nya ma t r a v iva ksaya 12 ete nityuktam.

I Thus ~ z c a s p a t i Misra has brought o u t ve ry , impor tant po in t s

on each of the f i v e members of s y l l o g i s t i c reasoning. His

c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the ~ i i t r a d e f i n i n g

~d;hsra?a and h i 0 obse rva t ions on the two kinds of ~ f s t z n t a

and the d i f f e r e n c e between ~ r a t i j s an3 Nigamana a t e noteworthy.

FACTUHS SUPPLEMENTARY Td REASONING

( TAHM, NIH~~,YA , vAIUA , JALPA , VITANUA )

Among the 1 6 c a t e g o r i e s of blyiya, Tarka, Nirnaya , ~ z d a ,

Ja lpa and Vitanda a r e the f i v e supplementary f a c t o r s of reason-

ing ( ~ ~ z ~ a ) . Tarka comes next a f t e r t h e ~ v a y a v z s bccauee it

s e r v e s t h e purpose of s t r e n g t l ~ e n i n g t h e i n f e r e n t i a l c o n c l u s i o n

by s e t t i n g as ide t h e view t h a t i s c o n t r a r y t o it,

Nirqaya comes n e x t as t h e conformed t r u t h when between

two views one i s r e j e c t e d and t h e o t h e r i s accep ted ( w i t h

proofs). v&, Jalpa and Vi tanda are t h e t h r e e forms of

'Katha ' i . e . , c o n t r o v e r s y , t h e o c c a s i o n of which a r i s e i n

c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s , I t is proposed t o note t h e p o i n t s made

by t h e ~ g t p a r y a t i k a w i t h r ega rd t o Tarka c t c . Tarka is def ined

by Gautama a s a c o g i t a t i o n w i t h p r o o f s i n s u p p o r t of a c e r t a i n

c o n c l u s i o n wllen t h e r ea l character of a t h i n g is n o t well I

known. v$caspati Misra p o i n t s o u t here t h a t Tarka i s n e c ~ s s a r y

a l t h o u g h i t i s s u b s e r v i e n t t o Pramzna. Yet i t may be asked - s i n c e Tarka i s not t h e means o f a s c e r t a i n i n g t h e t r u t h whi le

rram%na is a c c e p t e d a s ' t h e means, t h e n what i s the use of Tarka I

here. v;caspati Y i s r a answers s a y i n g t h a t ~ r a r n j n h depend

upon t h e op in ion of t h e i n d i v i d u a l . That being the Case, t h e

pram'ina's may become j o l t e d by th,e doub t abou t t h e c o n t r a r y

t o what i s a r r i v e d a t by t h e Prarnzna. Then Tarka comes a s a

means of cementing the process of reasoning:

- 100 -

Prarn#?asya r h a r t h y g d i t i taxkasya s ~ z t l n t ~ y l m apzka to t i . ~ y g d e t a t , yadi na t a r k a ? t a t t v a n i lpaya sgdhanam clpitu pram'iqam.'vva, hantabKbh kimartham

0

t a t h i vzde pramjpa t e rk r s idhane tyuk tam, . . vyak t i abhiprgyena p x e r n ~ d n & i t i prarnanavi$aya viparyrya h n k i v i g a i i t a n i p;am~!fii p t a t i ssndadhinam i t j a x t h a h . 0 1

-I . Secondly, Tarka i e d i s t i ngu i shed from sarndaya and J ignasa.

Although sandaya and ~ i ~ k a i a proceed when the real cha rac t e r

of a thing i s not known a s is the case with Tarka, y e t Tarka

differs from them i n respect of i t s adherence t o t h e proofs:

Yadyapi aatnlaya j i G 8 s e a av ignz te t a t t v a pravar te te , t a t h i p i na k h a n c p a p a t t i t a h iti tay%h

2 vyavaft'eda? . Nir?aya i s de f ined a s the a s c e r t a i n m e n t of a rea l

c h a r a c t e r of a t h i n g a f t e r duly d e l i b e r a t i n g over t h e Paksa

and P r a t i p a k e a ( t h e argument i n favour of a c e r t a i n conclusion,

and t h e argument a g a i n s t t h a t conclusion), As regards the

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e words Pak!a and Prat ipak?a, t h e

~ z t ~ e r ~ e t i k a fol lows tho Uh%iya and t h e ~ r r t i k a . T h i ~ I s I c l ea r from t h e fo l lowing s ta tement o f ~ z c a s p a t l Misra:

Yasya d d h a n a s ya vs upglambhasya v: avsr thtnlm taaye s%ihanarya vz up~lambhasya v; yo a r tha ) paklah

3 pratipaks'o v s tasya avadh~ra?amity%rthah.

He f u r t h e r points ou t tha t t h e present' d e f i n i t i o n of

Nirnaya i s not t h a t Of conclusion i n general, b u t a a c e r t a i n -

ment w i t h r e f e rence t o t h e bone of contention following Tarka.

I t i s not mere arthzvadha'rana, b u t t h a t supported by the

o f Paksa end Prat ipaksa. Otherwise, the d e f i -

n i t i on wuld app ly t o Fra tyak ta born of t h e c o n t a c t of t he

senses with t h e o b j e c t s . The a'rthzvadhgrana i s t h a t Wich

follow8 Tarka:

8 Na nirnayam'atrasya idem laksanarn ap i tu par ik?avisayasya a . . . arth:vadh&an,am nirqaya iti etkanmZtram lakqanam

i n d r i y g r t h a ~ a n n i k a r k h ~ a n n a p t a t ya ksi bhava trti yojar% 8 . . . sambendhah ta rkf nantaiya l a kganah a r thaspa prayo-

janam r a m e n ~ 8 ; r n ~ a j ~ t i ~ ~ ~ ~ v r t t i r i < ~ a r t h a h . L 4

It may be noted here t h a t G c a r p e t i ~ i t r a i s trying t o I

d i s t i n g u i s h Nir?aya from conclusion i n genera l . Nirnaya is I

d i s t i n g u i s h e d from perception on account of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e

l a t t e r does not have either d e l i b e r a t i o n or t he two sides of

t h e problem. In the case of ~ z d a ( d i s c u s s i o n ) we have two

s i d e s of t h e q u e s t i o n but not d e l i b e r a t i o n . Therefore ,

Nirnaya d i f f e r s ' f r o m t h e conclus ion of t h i s a l s o . The con-

c l u s i o n of ~u$r thsnumana a l s o i s not Nirnaya because there is

n e i t h e r doubt nor two s i d e s i n i t s case. Therefore , ~ i r r h i y a a

h e r e which comes a f t e r deliberation of two sides, comes af te r

Taxka

4. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ v ~ r t i k a t ~ t ~ a r y a t ~ k a , pp. 212-213.

v a a consists i n t h e edvineernent of a Paksa and a h a t i -

paksa i n which there i s the ' suppor t ing and condemning. by means

of proofs and reaoonings , which' is n o t opposed to t h e main

d o c t r i n e and which i s l carr ied on i n accordance wi th t h e method

of ~ ~ i i ~ a through f i v e f a c t o r s (Panc%rayav~s) . Jalpa i~ also

endowed w i t h t h e same c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s b u t the s u p p o r t i n g and

t h e condemning is done through Cha la , ~ a ? i and ~ i ~ r a h a e t h i n a .

Vitanda i 8 t h a t d i s p u t a t i o n wherein t h e r e i s no establ ishing

o f t h e P r a t i p a k s a .

The ~ h z s y a , t h e Vgrt ika and t h e ~ ; t ~ a r ~ a t k a have cndea-

voured t o d i s t i n g u i s h among t h e s e t h r e e types of c o n t r o v e r s y ,

I.*., Kathi . ~ g $ a s p a t i ~ i & a I n h i s ~ a ' t p a r ~ a t T k a gives a n

e x p l a n a t i o n of t h i s . I n Vitanda t h e r e is t h e p u t t i n g forward

of Paksa and P r a t i p a k s a b u t there is no suppor t ing o f t h e I

P r a t i p a k a a i n it. The main purpose of Vitanda ' i s t h e demoli-

t i o n of each o t h e r s p r o p o s i t i o n and t h e r e i s no s u p p o r t i n g a t

a l l .

I n the J a l p a , t h e r e i s t h e p u t t i n g forward of Paksa and

P r a t i p a k s a a long w i t h t h e s u p p o r t i n g of the Yratipak!a (counter -

argument) b u t the s u p p o r t i n g and condemning are n o t by reason-

ings and proofs . From both Vitanda and J a l p a , Vida becomes

d i s t i n g u i s h e d by r e a s o n of i t s having both t h e s u p p o r t i n g a d

t h e Condemning done w l t h r eason ings and proofs:

. P r d n a tGka radhan8palambha padasya t i tparyam2ha.. . Yadyapi v l t and lygmapi pa kra p r a t l p a k e a @ ~ a r i ~ r a h r ~ t i

I .

t s thFpi prstipakta sbhanam &ti t a r 6 h ~ r d h a n a hrnatvgt . Yadyapi j a l p c p i pa kspprr t i p ~ & o sjdhane- masti, t a t h z p i ns pra6na m u l i i t i avayavaih t a r b v a

I

$a 8hhanopalambhou iti *jalpa vltandzbhfam pram%na tarka shhano'palambha vyavacc~dshm5 * * -

Thus, G t a a p a t i ~ i i r a follows tho Bh#?ya and t h e ~zrtika

i n e luc ida t ing the material on the f i v e supporting factors of

~ ~ C y a , v k . , Tarka, Nirnaya, ~ a a , Ja lps a d Vitanda. I

.fn.fi! ..?',+ ? ? r . I fhr ' , t h HtthvibhF6a i a not d d i n e d i n the S U t x l . 'The

j . t 1 ' f ? r a 3 + i 41 'V~\?':;IL At, ~ , P , ; $ < I . ! l$ ;p j., . 'K! ' ?' "6 lr,*.!:?f,.#y, :," 0,.

~ h . 4 ~ 1 rxpls n8 Hetvabhar?~ a* tho*. t k i t ' d b not porraar a l l I - . .. ,.,." 1 . r ? .

i ' ' ? $ , : ?$ ; '3 , I . , , f";;,. ,

the ohrrrolrrrrtas8 or r$ri'khe"~etu, mh th i t irr rtA$fieUifti~ : .i",,$ * a , _ I w :, :, , r

airnilsr t o the Hatu ( t o ippear as the ~ e t u ) ; ' ' ~ ~ t u l i k t r n a - 0 . , , ., , ,Pt ,,# ' . * >

b h i i i t 8hrtavs hetusamany~d hrtu~ad~bh=arrn%aqfi

. 8

hi^'' explanation has been accepted by the ~ r r t i k a kira.

v ic repa t i @ ~ i : t a explain8 the dmfinition of Ltvibhssa and B ~ D W S

the c lass i f i ca t ion of the ~ e t v Z b h a 5 a in to f ive kinds . The

f ive ~etv ibhzsar as enumerated in the ~ W x a are& (1) Savyabhi-

czra, ( 2 ) Viruddha , ( 3) Pra karanasama , ( 4) ~rdh~aosma and - I -

( 5 ) K a l a t i t a .

With regard t o the concept ion o f t h e s e ~ e t v ~ b h g s z s , and i n

view o f the l a t e r development of the concept ion of these, I

~ ; t ~ a r ~ a t x k a of vGaspat i Uisra p l a y s a very Important role.

The contribution of vg5aspsti M ~ A t o this topic will be high-

l i g h t e d i n the subsequent paraa,

I t is defined in the ~;tra as 'Anaikantika' i.e., that I

which i s v i t ia ted by indecision. 'Here ~ z c a s ~ a t i Misra ,

remarks that the terms ~ a v ~ a b h i c ~ r a and ~ n a i k i n t i k a are synonyms.

It daperrtls ulmn the s ti~tierr t 111 clac irle as 11) wtilct) Is tllc? t.errn

def ined and which i s the term d e f i n i n g It. If he knows t h e

meaning of Savyabhicgra and not t h a t of Anaikrntika, then t h e

l a t t e r s h a l l be the term defined and t h e former ahal l be the

term de f in ing it' and v i ce versa:

Atra $a ana ikant ika iavyabhie.'ra dabdou pary:you. Purusa bhedgpekhaya laksya 1;ksanatvena I . avas th i tou . Yasya anafkzntika padzrtha? aprar lddha?, pramiddharga savyabhiczra padz'thah tam p r a t i anaikbnta iti l sk rya * nird'ida). ~ e v ~ a b h i e s a iti lakga?am, yarya t u ~ a v ~ a b h i c i r a p a d ~ r t i s ? apras iddha? prariddharga anaikaTtika pedzrthah tam p r a t i savyabhiczra it i

1 l a k t y a n i r d d a h , ,anaika%tika i t i laksanarn. b I .

The example taken i n the ~ h % y a and taken explained i n I t r

t h e f E t p a r y a t f i a is 'Nityah sebdah, a spa r r a tv%t BparBavan

kunbhah s n i t y a h drstah. Na ca t a t & s p a r b v S n ibbdah, t a r b t e @ a 4

I a s p a r h t v s n n i tyah sbbdah I iti ' . Here ~ i c a s ~ a t i Misra explain8

t h a t i t cannot be sa id t h a t a l l non-eternal th ings are

t ang ib l e , For i n s t a n c e , Buddhi i s non-eternal and y e t i t i s

in t ang ib l e . If Atman and such o t h e r th ings which a re eternal

a s well a s i n t a n g i b l e a re c i t e d as t h e instances, then intangi-

b i l i t y should be regarded as the Probans and this would be found

not , n e c e s s a r i l y concomitant w i t h e t e r n s l i t y . Hence, both

kinds of ins tancer , t h e r e is indec is ion . Thus, ~rpar : tv~ t .ba? , ,

a Hatu, is ~ a v ~ a b h i c ~ r a i , ,

Nahi yrdanityan t a t sarvan spars$vad buddhyzdibhi? vyabhica'rat. ~ c d h a r m ~ i p i .:a vyabhic&rh vaksyate

2 I I

iti ih; nzktam.

La te r ~ a i ~ G y i k z s consider t h e example given above a s an

instance of one kind of ~avyabhicrra cal led ~ g d h g r a p a i .e. ,

too wide Hetu because i t i s concomitant w i t h both t h e

Probandurn ( say Nitya tva) and i t s c o n t r a r y (Ani tyatve) . Two

o the r kinds of savyabhicgra c a l l e d Aszdhfiank and ~nupaeamhzr i

are enurnera t ed end explained by l a t e r ~aiy5yik:e. ~s idhsrana * i s t h a t Hetu which e x i s t s i n Paksa b u t n e i t h e r i n Sapaksa nor

Vipeksa as f a r instance, i n , 'dbdo ni tyah $abdatvztf .

~ n u p a s a m h k i i s t h a t Probens which i s non-exclusive a s the

Paksa. I n t h i s case, it is a l l i n c l u s i v e and leaves nothing

by way of Sapaksa and Vipaksa as for i n s t ance i n 'Sarvam

a n i t yam pramha t v ' t ' ,

I It may be noted here t h a t v;caspati Misra just brings o u t

only one kind of ~ a v y a b h i c s r a a s noted above. We do not f i nd

t h e t r a c e s of the o t h e r two v a r i e t i e s i n h i e l ~ t ~ a r y a t ~ k a .

~ a v ~ a b h i c ~ x a is a case o f Hetu which f u l f i l l s t he condi t ion

of Sapaksasattva b u t doers no t f u l f i l l the condition o f Vipakea-

v y z y t t t i . The l a t e r v a r i e t i e r of ~ a v y a bhiczra have arisen . by virtue of the three p o r ~ i b l e ways i n which ~ n a i k z n t i k a t v a

o f a ~ a v ~ a b h i c g r a could occur.

2. Viruddha:

Viruddha has been def ined by Gautama a s t h a t He tu which is

c o n t r a r y to t h e c o n c l u s i o n d e s i r e d to be drawn, i.e., - w

'Siddha am abhyupgtya t a d v i r o d h i v i ruddhas ' ( ~ ~ Z y a s i t r a 1.2.6). t From t h e ~ y ~ y a b h ~ ~ y a i t i s c l e a r t h a t it is a Hetu which

is c o n t r a d i c t o r y t o sonre d o c t r i n e which i ts propounder h a s

already accepted. For example, ' vik:ro ~ y a kt;rapaiti,

n i t y a t v s p ra t ldgdha t - apet&ypyesti v i ~ : e p r a t i $ e d h ~ t ' . The f i r s t s t a t e m e n t says t h a t t h i s world be ing a m o d i f i c a t i o n

ceases from manifestation, because i t s e t e r n a l i t y i s denied.

Here t h e Probans i s ' ~ i t ~ a t v s p r a t i r t ! d h ~ t ~ . Th i s is c e r t a i n l y

c o n t r a d i c t o r y t o t h e d o c t r i n e e n u n c i a t e d i n t h e second s t a t e -

ment - even when t h u s c e a s i n g , i t c o n t i n u e s to e x i s t because r l

i t s utter d e s t r u c t i o n i s den ied , The doct r ine of 'Vinasa-

p r a t l s ~ ~ a l is already accep ted by t h e Yoga ph i losopher . Then.

t h e He tu l ~ l t y a t v a p r a t i : ~ d d a ' g i v e n i n t h e f i r s t s t a t e m e n t is

c o n t r a d i c t o r y t o t h e accepted d o c t r i n e . Hence, it is Viruddha,

The a c c o u n t 'of Viruddha g iven by l a t e r ~ a i ~ ~ ~ i k ~ s i s

d i f f e r e n t from t h e one g iven above a c c o r d i n g t o t h e o lde r

N a i y ~ y i k ~ s . Later ~ a i ~ z ~ i k z s def ine Viruddha as t h a t Hetu

which proves t h e c o n t r a r y of t h e p r o p o g i t i o n which i t is p u t

forward t o prove, Th i s concept ion of Viruddha is found i n I

8 ~ z ~ a s ~ t r a v i ~ ~ ~ o n a . It i d i l l u s t r a t e d as 'Sabdah n i t y a h 1 krta- a.

ka tvz t ' . - +$ak.tv. here i n s t e a d of proving N i t y a t v a i n t h e ,

P a k ~ a a , . ' + , p.o&~ , , , . . . . . t h e . , , , kbaence , , . i f it. What i e proposed is t o p m v e .

I i the e t e r n a l i t y of Sabda w h i l e t h e Hetu proves t h e oppos i t e of

I t h e p ropos i t ion . It may be noted h e r e t h a t ~ z c a s p a t i Miora j has g iven an i n d i c a t i o n of t h i s development of the concept ion

of Viruddha w h i l e exp la in ing t h e ~ G r t i k a s ta tement 'Nanu t

p r a t i j $ virodha iti1 . v;faspati Mis~s sayrr

y - ~ s d z pxa t i j nays! h e t u virodha i t i t hetcrapyenya t a r a r i d d h a t a y g pra t i j % t u l y a tvgbhipray am. Yadi he tur- l i n f i a s iddho bhavati , tad: ahbto'rva p r a t i j 6 v i rodhs tva rn i t i . . . s b d a r y a u t p a t t i dhamma katvarn

CY

pramzna v i n i s c i t a m n i t y a t v a p r a t i j nlm bgdhate i t y a r t h a h . 3 0

Thus, t h e ear l ies t t r a c e of t h e l a t e r concept ion of

Viruddha l r found i n t h e ~ r r t i k a i n i t s a l t e r n a t i v e explana- I t i o n of t h e d e f i n i t i o n given i n t h e R t r a . ~%..aspati Misra

has h i g h l i g h t e d this a l t e r n a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n and has paved the

way f o r the L a t e r concep t ion of Viruddha.

3. Prakara ysama:

~ n k a r a n a s a m a ii def ined by Gautama as8 asmi mid p r a k a r 5 ~ a -

c i n t a n i rnayzr tham 6 a p e d i s t a h rn prakaranarama)' ( ~ ~ i ~ a s i t r a 1 ,2*7) , .. .

i.e., t h a t Probane which, being p u t 'forward t o e s t a b l i s h a

d e f i n i t e conclueion g i v e s rise t o suspense w i t h regard t o the

p o i n t a t issue i s c a l l e d Prakaranasema.

As ~ ~ t s ~ a ~ a na exp la ins Pra kara?a sama means Pra ka ranam

anativ.rta&nahV i .e . , t h a t which i s always remaining i n t h e

s t a g e o f a n unconeluded argument. On t h i s p o i n t , ~ C t a ~ p a t i

~ir't. gives 8 fine e luc ida t ion . Prakara?. ' s t ands f o r two

oppos i t e views on a doubtful quest ion. These a r e the view&

which a r e made the Probandum by t h e two par t ies . The Cinta

o r suspense about t hese views i s due t,o t h e f a c t t h r t the

r e a l t r u t h on t h e p o i n t i s not known. For i n s t ance , when it

11 ra id ' tabdo an i tyab nityadhanas'nupalabhdheh' it give. rise

t o a ruaprn6e i n the mind o f the hearer because he doel not

f i n d i n sound such p r o p e r t i e s a s a r e i nva r i ab ly concomitant

w i t h e t e r n a l i t y o r such p r o p e r t i e s a s are in sepa rab le from

non-eternal i ty . When such doubts a r i se , he t r i e s t o enquire

and i n v e s t i g a t e . Hence, t h e advancement of the Hetu l i k e

~ i tyadharmznupalabhdhi t o prove e t e r n a l i t y l eads on ly t o a

doubt regarding e t e r n a l i t y and non-eternal i ty . This cons t i -

t u t e s t he f a l l a c y ca l l ed Prakaxanasama. I t means. that both

sides would be equal . I n o t h e r words, j u s t as ~ i t ~ a d h a r m z n -

upalabhdhi would i n d i c a t e n o w e t e r n a l i t y , i n ' t h e same way

AnityadharGnupalabhdhi would i n d i c a t e e t e r n a l i t y . I t is

observed here t h a t t h e explanat ion of t h e term 'Prakaransrya

aamahl i s only by way of bringing o u t the etymological s i g n i f i -

cance. Lt does not mean s i m i l a r i t y t o the po in t of i saue .

I n r e a l i t y , it denotes t h a t t h e Hstu I s being neu t r a l i s ed i . e . ,

having an opponent equa l ly strong:

, t I I Vimerseh, aamsayah tasya visayou anavas t i t ou an i r - nrtou, . . . ' t id,pavhe;a pak!a pratipak?a v i c y a t v ' t praki iy i te s tdhya tvenzdhikriya t e i t i vyutpatya prakan?am.. . c inta I vimarditprabl; lr t i p5pnirnay;t

I

samik!a?am ;locanam jiG&a, ra khalu tsttvaritipalabhdhya kr tan naiva khalvayam nityadharmsnnitya tva avina- *'I bhavina? a n i t yadhannznva a ni tya t v ~ v l n ~ b h ~ v i ~ upa-

1 labhamznah t a t r a sandighdhe tada j i g n a s a t e ea lva ni tya- dhadnup ; l abhdh ih anityadhaxm~nupalabhdhirva v i c i trzbhi- randhl teys v b i n a m nir?a$ya apadiiyysm~n; prakur;?a~amo h e t v z b h ~ s a h . . . ya thz ni tyatvapakse a n i tyadharm%n- upalebhdhl? warn ani tyapa k t e p i nityadharm~nupalabhdhi) rgyam t a t t v inupa labhdh i d t r a vivaksay; ubhayapak5asama'.

~ r a ~ a r a n a s a d t u y a t h t prakara?am at&c~yatam eva; iyam rp~tyatyar~hah. Vyutpa t t i m ' a tram cpitat. Prakara?asama-

padasya p rav r t t i n i rn i t t amtu satpra t ipaksa tvam, 4 I a

It may be observed h e m t h a t the l a te r term, Sakprati-

pakra which i s a p p l i e d to t h i s ~ e t v & h g s a i s a l r e a d y made I ..

use o f by v;carpati Misra i n h i s ~ g t p a r ~ a t i k a . .

~ ~ d h ~ a s a m s i s def inad by Gautama a s ' ~ ~ d h y a v i e l s t ah

s idhya t< t s ~ d h y a e a r n a ~ ' ( ~ y ~ ~ a s ~ t r a 1.2.8) i . e . , t h a t which

i s not d i f f e r e n t from t h e probandum because of i t s being st i l l

t o be proved ( ~ g d h ~ a t v s t ) . The 0hZsyak&a i n d i c a t e s t h a t it

can be cal led Asiddha when he says:

Ayam .pi eaiddha t v z t rridhyavat p r i & m y i t a v y a h . 5

He g i v e s 'Drawam c i y a gatimatvat ' a s an example of ~ ~ d h ~ a r a m a .

4. ~ y t y a v r r t i k g t a t p a y a t i k a , p.235.

I ~ e r e , ~ h s ~ a t i Misra shows t h a t t h i s example g iven by the

~ h i r y a k i r a re rves as a common ins t ance of ~ v i t u p ~ ~ i d d h a , - I ~ s r a ~ g s i d d h a and ~ n y a t h k i d d h a . Following the ~ C r t i k a G r a ,

he shows t h a t it re rves a8 a n example of ~ v a r u ~ z s i d d h a when

we take it a s 'Yathiva dravyatvarn c%yeyam srdhyam tath; gati-

matvamapi'. When someone t r i e s t o prove gatimatva of cgya . by ref e r r i n g t o ~e:;ntaradarhna, then , t h e ~ e $ g n t r t a d a t t a n r - 8 i t s e l f would be a case of ~ s x a y ~ i d d h a because '8aty.v.

I dr svyr tve ciya'yrh desan ta re da'rhnam s y z t dravy;bh~vastu

a ~ i d d h a ) ' . Anyath<siddhi can also be shown thus: ' ~ p e t y c p i

d d a n t a r e dars'.narn t a sya anyathxsiddhib ' . ~ h i y a f i h yad

de&ihterr d a r k a m t a t g a t i m a t v h anyathzpi b h f i i . Atah

Atra bbs,yakbrena rvar$a8iddha$ray~siddh;nyath% i d d h h t n ti'dhGanam u d ~ h i r a n a m uktam dravyam cFya p i t m a t v h i t ~ , t a d v i b h a j a t e vz r t i kakz rah , dravyam cgyet i . At ra svariipi(r1ddha t'im ta'vedzh ;a t h a l v ' t i . ' iibrhyasiddh.t&n a v a t & a y i tun g a t imatva.' cayaygh p a n ~ v a y a v e n a sidhaya ti

1 . . . a$rayisiddharniha r d a y ; a i d d h a t v ~ t iti r a t ya eva ciyPyrh diia-ntntrre d a r l a n ~ d ya? clryz! gatlmatvam anuminzti jam p i t i i$rey%iddham deaan ta re dardanaa. 6

I It is to be noted here t h a t & a s p a t i Misra shows t h a t

m

Gautarna's d e f i n i t i o n of Asiddha i s meant t o include f o u r + kinds

of it viz. , (1) ~ v a r u f i s i d d h e , ( 2 ) ~ k a d r . b i i d d h a , ( 3 ) K&aya-

~ i d d h a h and (4) ~ n ~ e t h g s i d d h a . The d e f i n i t i o n give'n i n t h e

' ; , , '

5Gtra is a ign i f i c a n t . I t i s not s imply stated as ~gdhyarama.

If it wire 8 0 , t h e r e would no t be t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of including

i n it t h a t Probans which i s unknown t o only one of the p a r t i e s ,

Since there i s t h e term ' ~ ~ d h ~ a v i s i s t a h " it is a o s s l b l r t o . i nc lude such a Probans. If on the o t h e r hand, we had on ly

the term ' ~ ~ h ~ a v i r i 8 t a h ' then it would apply on ly t o ~ n ~ a t h s -

s iddha , because it is t h i s alone t h a t i s exac t ly s i m i l a r t o

the ~;dhyr. The ~ r t r a has &hyetvat i n t h e srn$r t h a t t h e

Probans is c a l l e d Asiddha because it i s s t i l l t o be provedt

Atra ridhyamm;ti l a k ~ y a n i r d 6 ~ s h , i l ~ d h y s v i : i r t a iti l a ksanam I trdan3na s v a r u p ~ s i d d h a ikade:&iddha$ryz-

aiddh8nya t h r 8 i d d h a r h rangraha! e m t%rn a ~ i d d h a t v i n a ~ ~ d h ~ a v i s i s t r t v ~ t . Atra asiddhah iidhyasarnah itl vaktavye s z d h y a v i a i s t a grahanam I ; nya th&iddhasy~p i

s iddheh p f i g a he tu tva j?fp.naftham, anyatha a tyanta-

s iddha iev r srdhyaramah nanyataxis iddha) t a sya kadZ5i t r i d d h k r i t i b h r i n t i h s y i t . ~ c d h y a v i s i s t h e t u sopi p5hyatrti. hlanv~vkn r fdhyavi l ' i s ta tvens inyutar&iddha

eva r$t , n r k a r i , trhm r r iddha tv&a 8ahyrvi$r!a- bhzvad i t y a t a uktam 8:dhyatv~d iti. Yadihi sidhyam nasiddham b h a v h sQhyatvad&a cyaveta , nakhalu riddham

7 s:dhya te.

L a t e r writers have however l e f t o u t ~kade!ifatvislddha.

~ n y a t h E e i d d h i has been l a t e r cal led a s v y a ~ ~ a t v t s i d d h i . '

~&a>l?a i s def i n r d by Gautama 1~ ;1ayayapgd i8 tah

kila>lCa?' t t h a t Hetu which a8 adduced is behind time.

The b h ~ s y a k ~ x a r x P l a i n s t h a t when'one factor of a t h ing is

found t o be e f f e c t i v e by lapse of t ime, i t is sa id to be 1 adduced behind t ime, For ins tance , 'Sabdonityah samyzga-

vyancjatvzt r;pavatl. Here Rupa i s manifested by the Samyoga

of l i g h t with e jug. Likewise, sound is manifested by the

Samyoga of the Bheri and the Danda or of the ~e'ru and the I

Para.u. Now the Rupa t h a t i s manifested by ~ r a d ~ ~ a ~ h a t a e a m y ~ ~ a

was i n ex is tence before and a f t e r i t was manifested. S imi la r ly 4 I

Sabda which is manifested by Bha'ridandasamyoga o r ~ a f c u ~ a r a s u

samyoge was i n ex i s t ence before and after i t s manifesta t ion.

Hence the Hetu ~ a r n ~ o ~ a v ~ a n ~ ~ a t v ~ t t o prove the e t e r n a l i t y qf

sound 80 adduced is behind t ime,

The conception of t h i s ~ e t v g b h a z a has undergone a complete

change i n t h e hands of the l a t e r ~ a i ~ z ~ i k z s who regard t h i s

a s a Probans which i s opposed t o tho well a sce r t a ined f a c t .

I n accordance with t h i s l a t e r view, t h e ~etv2bha'sa i s c a l l e d

'8;dhitat. The main source of t h i s development is t h e I

~ ~ t ~ a r ~ a t ~ k a of vZtaapati Misra. According to the view o f the

~ g t ~ a r y a t a a , the term 'A r tha ' i n t he ~ h z s y a s ta tement I

' ~ ~ l a t ~ a ~ ~ a yukto yadartharyaikadeso. . . ' e t c . stands for

the aiubject of t h e pmpor ' i t ion i n which Probans should exist:

The s u b j e c t her two f sc to re . The th ing itself and its qual i -

ties. When one of theee f a c t o r s , t he q u a l i t y , is found t o be

affected by lapse of time i t i s c a l l e d ' b%ih i t aV . . , For

InatanCe, when we say f ire is e te rna l because it is c o o l ,

we f i n d t h a t coolness which i s adduced as a q u a l i t y of the

subject fire is belated because i t s opposi te has been already

e s c e r t a ined t

Atrr k i l a t i t k i l r k ? y a n i r d ~ b a ? k a ' l ~ t y a y a p r d i a t ~ t i I

laksanam.. . Bh&yak&ah s t t r a m svaparasl is tam m I

v y ~ c a s t e . . . Dharma v i s i s t o h l dharmi, hetorapadisya-

rn&;sya ar tha) , s a h i a r t h y e t e he tuna , tat3ysikad($ab sEdhya dharmah sah i dharml?i belavat; praJnena t a d v i p a r i t a dhar;a nirnayam kurva t a randeya k ~ l i m a t i - $tit+ rr t h r l o I a h i t u b , k i lkbyayapadis tab k i l s t h e t i s v a m a t h acyartha?. . . Yatra ca c pratyakt8numanggarna v i rodho anutno a g n i r d r a v y a t v i d i t i . .. ssrvah pramanato

v ipar ' l t an i rnaye?a sendahs vit!l)ia tam kglam a t i f i t r t i t i $$an kg13sya atyayena aprdis;am~nam k d a t r t a iti. 8

I t should be remarked here t h a t t h e l a t e r view of t h i s

I ~etvzbhbhaZa has been f o r c i b l y brought o u t by ~ r c a s p a t i Mlsra L

from the I3h=sya and t h e ~ a " r t i k a .

CHALA - JATI - NItiHHHASTtiHNA

Chala and J a t i a r e t h e two forms of improper answers

pu t forwafd by one who t r i e s t o sna tch v i c t o r y t o himself when

he f i n d s h imsel f i n a despara te s i t u a t i o n on h i s argument

being shown as v i t i a t e d by a f a l l a c y . Here, Chala appears t o

be v e r b a l l y r i g h t wh i l e J a t i i s absurd involving a8 it does

the con t r ad i c t ion o f one1 s own a s s e r t i o n s ,

Chala is three-fold a s ~ g k c h a l a , ~a'ma'nyachala and

~ p a c i b a c h a l a , c o n r i l t i n g i n r e s p e c t i v e l y , ( 1) t h e assumption

of a .meaning o t h e r t han what is intended by a ward a s i n

l~avakarabal~yarn mznavakeh', * (2) t h e urging of an absurd

s i g n i f i c a t i o n a. f o r i n s t ance , i n IYadi b A h m a n ~ vidyzcarana I .

sampat rambhavati , vr: tycpi sambhavzt , v s t y o p i br:hmanah,

sdpyas tu vidy;carana sampanna?' , and ( 3) dependence on the

f i g u r a t i v e s ense of words as i n ' ~ a n c z h krg8!anti1. On the I t o p i c of Chsla, v;csspsti Misra gives an e l u c i d a t i o n of the

k4htsya and the ~ c r t i k a and c o n t r i b u t e s a few po in t s t o the

d iocur aion.

Thus, fo r i n t t a n c ' r , the t)hhsya s ta tement on ~ & c h a l a i s I

c a r e f u l l y examined by ~ T c a s p a t i Misra, The ~ h z s y a I r ays t h a t

when one assigns t o one ' s opponent 's word t h e meaning which

it cannot p o ~ s i b l y convey, one's a t t a c k muat be regarded a$

t o t a l l y f r u i t l e s s . A t th is po in t , t h e ~ ; t ~ a r ~ c l t i k a m y 8 t h a t

when t h e speaker haa used genera l term on a p a r t i c u l a r occar ion

under p r r t i c u l a r circumstance^, h i s exact meaning cannot be . . .

and t h a t t he word has a vague generic sense i s not

his f a u l t . The f a u l t l i e s with t h e o r i g i n a l convention which

is f ixed by persons o t h e r than the p a r t i c u l a r speaker who makes

use of t h e word. Blaming him f o r t h a t i s a l t o g e t h e r unfair :

TZISJC n a i h p r a t i p ~ d e y i t ~ a p a r ~ d h + , y a d e b viiea? I

dabdaiti v i l ' e t n na p ra t ip idaya t i ; k in tu sanketarya- par:dhse, yo vi$.?arn apah;p s6naiiye abbdham v a r t r t e , tarmzt yetha rranketam bodheyan na apargdhyah prayokte ,

1 iti aiddham.

Next a s regards ~ p a c z r a c h a l a , the Gtra de f in ing it is not

very c l ea r . According t o t h e ~ Z r t i k a , t h e term ' ~ r t h a s a d b h f v a

pratibandha' meano the d e n i a l of t he presence o f t h e th ing ,

The ~ G t x a accord ingly should mean - when t h e s ta tement is made

i n regard t o t he dharma of a thing, i f t h i s is opposed by the

den ia l of t h e t h ing i t s e l f , we have t h i s s h i f t i n g Chala.

This statement is found to be not i n keeping with t h e inter-

p r a t a t i o n o f t h e ~h;r~a. Yet, the ~ c t ~ a r ~ a t s a exp la ins t h e

meaning of this ~ h r a i n t h i s way and twists it t o mean oome-

thing t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t . Following t h e s ta tement of ' t he t

~ & t i k a r 'Ekatra dhaxw? p r a t i s l d h y a t e , rkatra dharmi l , I

~ z c ~ a ~ a t i Miara e x p l a i n s t h e d i f f e r e n c e between ~ z k c h a l a where-

i n the D h e m i s denied while i n upaczrachala t h e Llharmin is

denied. For. exampla, in the in s t ance of ~ r k c h a l a l i k e

'Neva kambalo m h v a kah ' , the ~&ia'tvadharma i s denied. While

i n the instance of upac;rachala l i k e 'Mancih k r%dan t i l , the I

~ ~ ~ n a d h a r m a v i s i s t a m a n c a ' s a r e denied. ' this i r d i f f e r c n t

from t h e conception of Upacsrachala according t o Bhgsyat I

DharmB vika lpo anyatra ciistasya anya t ra pra yzqah , t esya nirdd? e dhorma vikalpa n i rdgsc , yatha m a n h . k r & f a n t i t i , ar tha sadbh~vena prati;6dhah mancastah

2 krodPnt i natu rnans5h k r o l a n t i .

The ~ g t ~ a r ~ a t r k a has taken t h e words of ' the ~ G t r a t o mean

Tena dharrnavikalp~na nird;:a v;kye '. Thus t h e meaning i~

when t h e r e i s s ta tement i n accordance w i t h the secondary 0

meaning as noted l a t e r by Par isuddhi ; The t w i s t i n g of t h e 8

words of the. ~ha"aya by ~ s a s p a t i Misra i s w i t h the purpose of

r econc i l i ng t h e t)hZtye with the ~ S t i k a . But a s Ganganath J h a

remarks [ ~ a u t a m a ' s ~ ~ ~ ~ a s i i t r a l 8 , t r a n s l a t e d i n t o English by

Ganganath Jhe , p.192 foo tnote] there seems t o be no d i f f e r e n c e

between t h e Bhqyaka ra and the v ; r t l kak~ra .

J a t i i s def ined as:

J a t i i s t h a t o b j e c t i o n which i s taken on t h e b a s i s of mere'

s i m i l a r i t y and di8sirnilarity. The Bhiitya says i n conclusion

t h a t J a t i is t h a t which comes up as a n opponent t o the or ig ina l

reasoning, It i s an opposi t ion t o s t a l l the appos i t e view

j u s t on t h e basis of s i m i l a r i t y and d i s s i m i l a r i t y i r r e s p e c t i v e

of any idea of invar iab le concomita ncfa.

2. ~ y % ~ a b h 3 ( ~ a , pp. 196-197 3. Ny3yaalItra, 1.4.18.