The Battle of Kasserine Pass: Defeat is a Matter of Scale

A Monograph

by

MAJ Eric G. Evans United States Army

School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

2016

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14. ABSTRACT The Battle of Kasserine Pass is marked by history as an embarrass ing defeat of Ameri can s oldiers during thei r first major act i on a ga inst Germany in World War II ; some historians even go so far as to anticipate defeat in the first battles of all major Ameri can wars. Martin Blumenson wrote much of the publi shed history of the battle . He blames inexperience, i nferior equipment, and poor doctrine for the defeat at Kasserine Pass . Blumenson ' s characteri zation of the battle is incorrect. The battle of Kasserine Pass is similar to the battle of St . Vith when v iewed at the same scale . Kasser ine Pass and St. Vith s hould be classified in the same ma nner . The d eclassification of t h e ULTRA p rog r am occu rred after muc h of t h e written hi s t ory was publishe d . The lac k of data from the ULTRA intercepts requ ires further study to de t ermine the effect of maintaining t he ULTRA secret on the recorded history of World War II .

15. SUBJECT TERMS Kasserine Pass, St . Vi th , World War II , ULTRA

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Monograph Approval Page

Name of Candidate: MAJ Eric G. Evans Monograph Title: The Battle of Kasserine Pass: Defeat is a Matter of Scale Approved by: , Monograph Director Peter J. Schifferle, PhD , Seminar Leader Dyrald J. Cross, COL , Director, School of Advanced Military Studies Henry A. Arnold III, COL Accepted this 26th day of May 2016 by: , Director, Graduate Degree Programs Robert F. Baumann, PhD The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.) Fair use determination or copyright permission has been obtained for the inclusion of pictures, maps, graphics, and any other works incorporated into this manuscript. A work of the United States Government is not subject to copyright, however further publication or sale of copyrighted images is not permissible.

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Abstract Kasserine Pass: Defeat is a Matter of Scale, by MAJ Eric Evans, 45 pages. The Battle of Kasserine Pass is marked by history as an embarrassing defeat of American soldiers during their first major action against Germany in World War II; some historians even go so far as to anticipate defeat in the first battles of all major American wars. Does the battle of Kasserine Pass prove the conventional wisdom that America is doomed to defeat in its first battles? Martin Blumenson, a prominent military historian, characterizes the battle of Kasserine Pass as a crushing defeat. He cites inexperience, inferior technology, and poor doctrine as causation. This monograph challenges Blumensons thesis. Scientific study of the battle of Kasserine Pass, inspired by Hans Delbruck, focuses on relevant technologies, the organization of opposing units, US doctrine, and the effects of the ULTRA program. Conclusions from the scientific analysis carry forward to a comparison of contemporary battles. There are many similarities between the battle of Kasserine Pass and other battles, such as the Battle of the Bulge, which history characterizes as victories. To determine why, an in-depth study of the battle of Kasserine Pass is necessary to identify errors in the current history. This study uses Clausewitzs method of critical analysis and the application of historical scale to compare the battles of Kasserine Pass and St. Vith. When viewed at a similar scale, the results of Kasserine Pass are similar to the results from the actions around St. Vith during the Battle of the Bulge. Surprise, rapid penetration and isolation of friendly units, breakdowns in command, the eventual surrender of terrain, and successful Allied counter attacks characterize both battles. The similarities in outcome require similar classification. Much study of the battle of Kasserine Pass has been done since Martin Blumenson wrote the original history in 1966. The ULTRA and MAGIC intercepts have been declassified and organizations such as the Combat Studies Institute have analyzed the battle thoroughly, adding information that was unavailable to Mr. Blumenson at the time of his writing. The need to keep the ULTRA program secret profoundly affected the historical narrative of each battle. Conclusions from this study recommend the application of critical analysis of historical examples to identify lessons learned. The aggregation of ULTRA intercepts to determine why misinterpretations occurred is a worthy topic for future study.

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Contents

Acknowledgments ...........................................................................................................................v

Acronyms .........................................................................................................................................vi

Figures ............................................................................................................................................vii

Introduction .......................................................................................................................................1

Background to the Study 3

Purpose of the Study ................................................................................................................6

Theoretical Framework 7

Research Question (Hypothesis) 9

Section One: The Battle of Kasserine Pass .....................................................................................11

The United States 1st Armored Division 17

The German 10th Panzer Division 18

Technology 19

US Army Doctrine 23

Rebuttal of Blumensons Argument 26

Section Two: Overview of the Battle of the Bulge, St. Vith ..........................................................30

Section Three: Comparison of Kasserine Pass and St. Vith ...........................................................36

Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................41

Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................44

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my