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Contributing to its OwnDefeat: The Luftwaffe andthe Battle of BritainWing Commander M. P. Barley RAFPublished online: 25 Nov 2006.

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Defence Studies, Vol. 4, No.3 (Autumn 2004), pp. 387411ISSN 1470-2436 print: ISSN 1743-9698 onlineDOI: 10.1080/1470243042000344812 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd

ARTICLE

Contributing to its Own Defeat: The

Luftwaffe

and the Battle of Britain

WING COMMANDER M. P. BARLEY, RAF

Taylor and Francis LtdFDEF040305.sgm10.180/14702430Defence Studies1470-2436 (print)/0000-0000 (online)Original Article2004Taylor & Francis Ltd43000000Autumn 2004

Much of the study of the Battle of Britain has concentrated on the militaryleadership, the conduct of the battle itself and the equipment used, focusingpredominantly on the British standpoint; little has been written about theGerman perspective on this important air battle, except perhaps by JamesCorum, from whom much information has been gathered. This articleseeks to redress this imbalance by analysing those aspects of Germanysbehaviour that contributed to its ultimate defeat over the skies of SoutheastEngland. Contrary to the popular British perception that this was a closebattle, which was won against all the odds by a small force of determinedBritish fighter pilots, it is contended that the

Luftwaffe

was never in a posi-tion where it was likely to gain the upper hand. In no way is it intended todiminish the part played by the aircrew of either side, more to provide anhistorical basis for understanding the wider implications of the Germanpreparations for the battle against Britain. It will be shown that the Germanpolitical leadership was indecisive, lacking the will to fight Britain and,therefore, failed to provide the German military with a coherent politicalend-state that could underpin the military planning process. It will bedemonstrated that the

Luftwaffe

planning process was incoherent, muddledand further, that the impact of the

Luftwaffe

leadership and German airintelligence on preparations for war was to have a disastrous effect. As aconsequence of these failures, the Germans neglected two key principles ofwar: first, know your enemy and yourself, but more importantly, select andmaintain your aim.

The article does not dwell on the British aspect of the Battle of Britain,but gives only a very brief overview of the interaction of the British politicaland military leadership, and British airpower doctrine. The

Luftwaffe

schnological development so as to provide a useful backdrop for the detailedanalysis of the German failings that contributed to their losing the Battle of

Wg Cdr M. P. Barley, RAF, Advanced Command and Staff Course.

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Britain. This is accomplished by examining the influence of the Germanpolitical leadership and then analysing key aspects of German air doctrinethat were developed during the interwar year. The

Luftwaffe

s experiencesin the Spanish Civil War are examined to ascertain how they affected theway in which the

Luftwaffe

fought the Battle of Britain, while matters asso-ciated with

Luftwaffe

planning and the impact of intelligence on both theplanning efforts and the conduct of the campaign are also assessed.

British Perspective of the Battle of Britain

Political manoeuvring by Neville Chamberlain, the British Prime Minis-ter from 1937 to 1940, had attempted to ensure peace in our time. Theimpression that this gave to the German political leadership was one ofweakness and an unwillingness to be drawn into a conflict in mainlandEurope. However, having agreed with Poland to guarantee her sover-eignty, Britain found herself at war with Germany in September 1939. InMay 1940, Chamberlain was replaced as Prime Minister by WinstonChurchill and this change of leadership was to prove crucial for thedefence of Britain. Although the early part of the war had seen onlylimited engagements (the so-called Phoney War), Churchill was defiant inthe face of Germanys aggression and resolved to fight for survival. This isperhaps best captured in his speech of 4 June 1940 in which he rouses thenation with the timeless words: We shall fight on the beaches; we shallnever surrender.

1

Churchill provided clear political leadership, he surrounded himselfwith a very capable team of political and military advisers with whom hedeveloped a close working relationship. However, Churchill was not averseto argument over an issue. Although he would argue his case forcefully,those who disagreed with him would receive a fair hearing, and if he werepersuaded of the wisdom of an alternative course of action, he wouldconcede the argument.

2

With regards to the use of airpower, Churchills first major argumentwas with Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding (Commander-in-Chief,Fighter Command) of the Royal Air Force (RAF) who opposed the sendingof fighter aircraft to reinforce those squadrons already fighting in defenceof France. Fortunately for Britain, Dowding won the argument and thestrength of Fighter Command was maintained in Britain.

What this demonstrates is a healthy balance between the political andmilitary leadership, which generally results in logical decisions based oninput from expert advice. The situation in Germany, as we shall discover,was somewhat different. Churchill was clearly impressed with Dowding

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CONTRIBUTING TO ITS OWN DEFEAT

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and supported him when the Minister for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair,attempted to have Dowding removed as the head of Fighter Command,writing:

Personally, I think he is one of the very best men you have got, and Isay this after having been in contact with him for about two years. Ihave greatly admired the whole of his work in the Fighter Command,and especially in resisting..the immense pressure to dissipate thefighter strength during the great French battle. In fact, he has my fullconfidence.

3

The most important element of the political / military relationship betweenChurchill and Dowding, was that Dowding was left alone to decide howbest to conduct the Battle of Britain.

British airpower doctrine in the interwar period was enshrined inAP1300 which had been developed from Trenchardian theories ofairpower. It focused mainly on the perceived ability of strategic bombing toshatter the will of the enemy by concentrating effect on the enemys indus-trial and economic infrastructure.

4

Consequently, the emphasis on aircraftproduction favoured the bomber force, since it was accepted that thebomber would always get through.

However, in the face of the growing strength of the

Luftwaffe

and withthe recent British development of both radar and capable monoplane fight-ers, such as the Hurricane and Spitfire, it was realised that some defenceagainst bomber attack was not only possible, but essential. Therefore, therewas a fundamental shift in the balance of forces and aircraft production inthe late 1930s, which would prove to be decisive in the forthcoming Battleof Britain. Dowding was instrumental in the development of the worldsfirst fully integrated air defence system, which maximised the synergisticbenefits of the detection capabilities of the Chain Home radar network,ground control procedures and the fighters capabilities. Again these werecapabilities, which the Germans did not appreciate either in their ownterms or in how they might themselves have benefited from this technol-ogy. So, if the British strengths were its political and military leadership,clear purpose and the intelligent use of technological development, whatwere the German failings that were to prove so devastating in the Battle ofBritain?

German Political Direction

In the few years prior to World War II, Hitler had made great overtures toBritain in an effort to ensure that British military power, which the

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Germans judged to be considerable, should not interfere with Germanplans in Eastern and Central Europe, leading ultimately to Neville Cham-berlains infamous peace in our time speech.

In the interwar period, the Germans believed that their greatest threatswere from Poland in the East and France in the West.

5

Consequently,German planners always expected to have to fight on two fronts. Wargamesin the late 1920s and early 1930s showed poor prospects for a Germanvictory in such circumstances. If the chances of defeating the French AirForce were considered remote, they would be worse if Britain were drawninto the conflict. From as early as 1935, Hitler had recognised this potentialsituation.

6

He had hoped that his respect for British imperial interestswould be rewarded by Britain who would tolerate Germanys excursionsinto Eastern Europe.

The impact upon the

Luftwaffe

of Hitlers ambivalent attitude towardsBritain was some confusion over the tactical and technical orientation thatthe

Luftwaffe

should adopt. This was exacerbated by the lack of clear militarytasks for which planning could take place. Consequently, the

Luftwaffe

embarked upon an equipment programme which concentrated on aircraftthat could be delivered quickly, rather than those which might provide thebest military capability should an attack on Britain be necessary.

7

Hitler appears to have taken little interest in the aerial campaign againstBritain, returning to his comfort zone of land operations, and this contrib-uted to the lack of coherency in the planning and execution of the campaignby the

Luftwaffe

. However, what is more important is that Hitler actuallyhad little understanding of a strategic plan which could neutralise Britainand force her to sue for peace. As John Ray points out, He never demon-strated wide awareness of the value of either air fleets or navies;subsequently the waters of the Channel proved too great an obstacle for hisland-based military thinking. The crossing of an unpredictable and boister-ous sea was too much for his vision, which therefore travelled elsewhereacross the map-table [Russia], allowing the impetus of attack on Britain tobe lost.

8

But was this lack of impetus really a result of Hitlers inability tounderstand the problem, or was it that he actually did not want a conflictwith Britain and was using the threat of invasion as a coercive attempt toneutralise Britain?

Although from 1939 onwards, the British fully expected a German inva-sion, within the German High Command, the issue was far less certain.Hitler held three meetings in July 1940 to discuss not the desirability ofattacking Britain, but the feasibility of doing so.

9

This tends to reinforce thenotion that Hitler was still unsure of how to treat Britain. At the same time,initial contingency planning by the German Army had concentrated on a

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CONTRIBUTING TO ITS OWN DEFEAT

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limited offensive against the Soviet Union, aimed at gaining German domi-nance of Eastern Europe. However, just as Germany was securing victoryin Western Europe against France, Russia annexed the Baltic States and theRomanian province of Bessarabia.

10

As a result of this, Hitler revised hisplans in the East and sought to deal a decisive blow to the Soviet Union. Itcould be argued that Hitlers reaction to the Russian moves into the BalticStates serves to demonstrate that he had no intention of attacking Britain,but by coercing Britain with the threat of invasion, was merely attemptingto lull the Soviets into a false sense of security prior to his expanded opera-tions in the East: Operation Barbarossa. However, this argument tends toignore the fact that Hitler was still unsure of how to keep Britain out of theconflict. He appears to have been uncertain about how to bring about eithera military or a political settlement with Britain.

11

In the few months leading up to the Battle of Britain, Hitler dithered;he hoped that the British would return to the conference table but he alsorealised that a successful invasion of Britain would be extremely difficult.Despite the recent conquest of Norway the German Army was not wellsuited to amphibious assaults either in terms of training, or in respect of itsequipment.

12

There were no dedicated landing craft and the German Navy,heavily depleted off Norway, had only 1 heavy cruiser, 3 light cruisers and9 destroyers to escort the invasion fleet in the face of 5 battleships, 11 cruis-ers and 43 destroyers of the Royal Navy, which were positioned at eitherend of the English Channel.

13

Consequently, both the German Army andthe German Navy were lukewarm about invading Britain.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty facing the Germans was that Hitler wasboth Head of State and head of the armed forces. Through his position inthe Nazi state, the Fhrer could be dictatorial in a way that Churchill neverwas. Whereas Churchill was more amenable to the advice of his Chiefs ofStaff, Hitler had surrounded himself with sycophants who would not ques-tion his views; there was no balancing force in the German decision-making process. Following the successes in Poland, Scandinavia andFrance, Hitler was persuaded by Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering thathis

Luftwaffe

could smash the RAF and create the conditions for aninvasion of Britain. The failures in the German political leadership weretherefore twofold. First, Hitler prevaricated and gave no firm strategic lead-ership; he gave no political end-state to which operational plans could bedirected. Second, Hitler allowed himself to be duped by an over-confident,sycophantic Goering into believing that the

Luftwaffe

, acting alone, coulddefeat the British.

What this serves to demonstrate is that the leadership in Germany didnot appreciate the limitations of its own armed forces capabilities, or the

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resolve of the British, but more importantly, it did not have a clear aim.Therefore, the seeds of potential defeat had been sowed. An examination ofGerman air doctrine, however, should provide an insight into what the

Luftwaffe

might have expected to achieve and how it would accomplish itsgoals in the Battle of Britain.

German Air Doctrine

Much of the development of

Luftwaffe

doctrine in early 1930s can beattributed to the leadership of Major General Walter Wever, Chief of the AirCommand Office. While he expressed a preference for strategic bombingas the primary use of air forces, perhaps his greatest contribution to

Luftwaffe

doctrine was his encouragement of its wider study.

16

Following his death ina June 1936 flying accident, few changes were made to the strategic airpowerdoctrine of the

Luftwaffe

. Experience in Spain, however, led to the develop-ment of Army cooperation tactics; lessons regarding the strategic use ofairpower, identified in Spain, would be ignored in the Battle of Britain.

Despite Wevers leadership, initial airpower development in Germanywas conducted by officers who had little practical experience of air opera-tions, as Germany had been denied an air force in the Versailles Treaty. Thedoctrine that was developed relied heavily on the study of foreign air-wartheory publications, including General Giulio Douhets seminal 1921work,

The Command of the Air

.

17

It was realised that airpower could carry thewar immediately to the innermost political, moral, economic, and militarysources of a states strength.

18

Wever believed, however, that the

Luftwaffe

should support both the Army and the Navy and should not conduct itsown war.

19

This had serious implications for the institutional ability of the

Luftwaffe

to create a strategic air campaign that was not in direct support ofthe Army or Navy and goes some way to explaining the problems theGermans were to experience in their campaign planning for the attack onBritain. The regulation on air warfare (Air Regulation 16) issued in 1936was based largely on Wevers ideas.

The following are extracts from Air Regulation 16, which illustrate thenature of German airpower doctrine that formed the basis of planning forthe Battle of Britain. Though they give an insight of the campaign thatshould have been planned, their greatest utility is in identifying weaknessesin the leadership, strategic and operational planning capabilities and theconduct of the Battle of Britain from the German perspective.

2. From the start of the conflict, the air forces bring the war to theenemy. Aerial assault affects the fighting power of the enemy and thefoundations of the enemy peoples will to resist.

20

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This is Douhetian in nature, a central theme being the weakening of theenemy populations resolve; it is no surprise that Douhets book was trans-lated into German during the interwar period. However, having conductedterror bombing of Madrid in the Spanish Civil War, the

Luftwaffe

carriedout an audit of the civil defence measures adopted by the defending Repub-lican forces to protect the civilians in Madrid from aerial bombing.

21

Itconcluded that the provision of air raid shelters had two distinct affectsupon the civilian population: first it did indeed provide a high degree ofprotection from all but a direct hit and second, it served to maintain themorale of the populace. In short, the experience in Spain had upheld theusefulness of strategic attack against industries and transportation centresbut had also provided strong evidence that terror bombing was unlikely toseriously demoralise a population provided with adequate civil-defenceshelters and training.

22

Despite having concluded that terror bombing would not be effective,Hitler, supported by Goering and Major General Hans Jeschonnek, theChief of the

Luftwaffe

General Staff, would later direct the

Luftwaffe

to bombLondon, rather than continue with attacks on the RAF airfields. The inabil-ity to learn this important lesson was caused to some extent by the verynature of the German High Command that Hitler had created; he hadsurrounded himself with sycophants and it was incapable of making criticalstrategic and planning decisions on its own.

6. Only one who fully understands the demands of aerial warfarecan be an air force leader. True leadership demonstrates trust andgives the troops an irresistible power to achieve goals that seemunreachable.

24

How well does Goering fit in with this requirement? Goering was keenlyinterested in historical heroes who were both military and political lead-ers, such as Charlemagne and Napoleon. From this he developed a needfor military distinction, which he viewed above all other as the epitome ofthe national socialist ideal. As Richard Overy points out, Goerings roleas Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe served a number of differentpurposes at the same time. It provided the [Nazi] Party with a direct rolein military affairs, through building up what was popularly regarded asthe Nazi Service [the

Luftwaffe

]; it provided the means of circumventingthe traditional military leadership and reducing its influence on strategy;and it gave the Nazis an opportunity of parading the union between theParty and military life.

25

Through these roles, Goering had a dramaticeffect upon the strategic planning process in the lead-up to the Battle ofBritain.

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Suchenwirth provides a useful description of the impact of Goeringscharacter on the

Luftwaffe

: As far as the

Luftwaffe

was concerned, there weretwo aspects of Goerings character which were destined to play a major rolein bringing about the collapse of Germanys air forces. The first was hisinner compulsion to take everything personally, just as he refused tosubmit to authority, except that of Hitler himself, and his refusal toacknowledge any obligation unless it was likely to be useful to him in hisdesire to dominate or unless it fulfilled a personal need. He was unable toface sobering or sceptical reports dealing with actual facts and situations. Inconsequence of his desire to hear only what was favourable, he oftenrefused to face reality, and in the end he really believed that his

Luftwaffe

was an invincible force, whose commitment was alone capable of decidingthe outcome of the war. The second aspect of Goerings nature whichproved so disastrous for the

Luftwaffe

was his growing tendency to make adistinction between himself and his colleagues by demanding uncompro-mising devotion to duty from them, while his own zeal in this respect wasno more than a pretence.

27

Thus, compared to Dowdings leadership of Fighter Command, Goer-ing was more of a liability to the

Luftwaffe

. Goering did not try to shapeGerman air doctrine and was surprisingly ignorant about modernairpower, but he still interfered at the tactical level, often reducing the effec-tiveness of his own forces.

9. The mission of the armed forces in war is to break down the willof the enemy. The will of the nation finds its greatest embodiment inits armed forces. Thus, [destruction of] the enemy armed forces istherefore the primary goal in war.

29

The derivation of this element of German air doctrine is clear; it is pureClausewitz. However, since Clausewitz provides merely the principle andnot advice on the means to achieve the desired end (the proverbial cook-book), the focus on the enemys armed forces must be viewed within thecontext of the following section of Regulation 16:

10. The mission of the

Luftwaffe

is to serve these goals by command-ing the war in the air within the framework of combined operations.By battling the enemy air force, the enemy armed forces are weak-ened and, at the same time, our own armed forces, our people, andour homeland are protected.

30

Crucially, this paragraph reinforces Wevers view that the

Luftwaffe

shouldoperate in concert with Land and Maritime forces, thereby fostering a reli-ance on joint planning, rather than the independent planning of an air

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campaign that the

Luftwaffe

would be called upon to conduct for the Battleof Britain. In terms of undermining the will of the enemy, it draws fromDouhetian theory, but develops this notion further by identifying theenemy military as the key to enemy resolve, again more Clausewitzian innature. What it does not reflect is the ability of airpower to conduct opera-tions at all levels simultaneously and does not reflect the ability of airpowerto conduct operations for strategic effect. Where German air doctrinediffered from Douhets theory was that the Germans expected air defenceagainst their bomber force. It was for this reason that the Messerschmitt 110escort fighter was developed.

13. Targeting in aerial war must take into account the enemyscentre of gravity. In the framework of operational possibility, the airforce has many missions, and will normally have enough forces tocarry out only some of them. Dividing up the force to carry out manysimultaneous missions is to be avoided, as are constant changes intargeting.

32

This section of Regulation 16 is especially important. It introduces thedoctrinal concept of the centre of gravity, revealing once more its Clause-witzian pedigree. More importantly for the employment of airpower,however, it introduces the issues of the competing nature of the manymissions to which airpower can contribute. The principles of economy ofeffort, concentration of force and the selection and maintenance of the aimare plainly articulated; each of these elements are still contained in currentair doctrine.

33

From the confusing political direction discussed earlier, it seems likelythat Hitler had, in fact, identified Russia as the strategic centre of gravity forhis aspirations in Europe and that was where his main focus rested, ratherthan against Britain. However, perhaps this is a further indication thatneither Hitler, nor the German armed forces ever really intended to drawBritain into the war in the first place. It also reinforces the notion thatinvading Britain was not a serious proposition. The issue of centre of grav-ity will be analysed in more detail when discussing German planning.

From paragraphs 10 and 13 of

Luftwaffe

Regulation 16, it can be surmisedthat the

Luftwaffe

s plan to destroy the RAF was rooted in doctrine, and yetsuch doctrinal leading of the target set does not sit well with the need toidentify the centre of gravity; theoretically, the strategic centre of gravitymight be attacked without the need to engage enemy air forces.

18. The battle against the enemy air force in enemy territory doesnot stop when, during the course of the war, a period of air superiority

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is gained. During such a period of air superiority, one should reckonwith the possibility that the enemy may rebuild his strength byreplacements or technological improvements. By such means, theenemy can quickly regain his effectiveness in the air if given a respitefrom attack.

34

This paragraph calls into question the decision to change from attacking theRAF and in particular, the sector stations, and focusing on the bombing ofLondon. Was this a failure of intelligence? Did the

Luftwaffe

believe that theRAF had been beaten? If this is the case, according to its own doctrine, itshould have maintained the offensive against the RAF to ensure that itcould not be rejuvenated.

34. An essential factor is knowing ones own intention.

35

It is not obvious that the

Luftwaffe

had identified a clear operational end-state when it set about the aerial campaign over Britain.

Luftflotten

2 and 3each produced different plans for the campaign and received no guidancefrom Goering who ultimately followed neither plan, providing only ad hocdirection which actually restricted the capabilities of his fighter force.

36

48. Careful analysis of all intelligence on the enemy, as well as acorrect appreciation of the enemys objectives and his method of waris necessary to overcome the enemy.

37

The shortcomings of the

Luftwaffe

s intelligence section will be discussed indetail in a separate section. What is significant here is that despite thisdoctrinal direction, the Germans still lacked understanding of contempo-rary British airpower doctrine. That the RAF embarked upon an offensiveagainst German cities is in keeping with the British doctrine of 1940. Thedoctrine which Trenchard developed, encapsulated within AP1300, calledfor the attack of industrial targets with the aim of demoralising the work-force and, by association, demoralising the population as a whole. Conse-quently, the RAFs bombing of Berlin was a rational expression of Britishairpower doctrine and not merely a direct result of the German bombing ofLondon. Major Josef Beppo Schmid, the head of

Luftwaffe

Intelligence andhis team failed to make accurate assessments of British capabilities or inten-tions. They failed to understand how the British would employ airpower;they did not know their enemy. Moreover, they failed to appreciate that warin the air is part of a dynamic contest.

186. Attacks against cities made for the purpose of inducing terrorin the civilian populace are to be avoided on principle. If the enemyshould initiate terror attacks against defenceless and open cities,

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however, then retaliation attacks may be the only means of stoppingthe enemy from continuing this brutal method of aerial warfare. Thetiming of retaliation attack depends upon the timing of the enemyterror attack. In every case, the attack must clearly be recognised as aretaliation.

38

187. The retaliation attack requires exact knowledge and under-standing of the thought patterns and moral attitudes of the enemypopulation. Selection of the wrong time, combined with a poor esti-mate of the desired effect upon the enemy, can in some circumstancesresult in an increase in the enemys will to resist, rather than a reduc-tion of that will. In general, the retaliatory attack will have a greatereffect if the population has been demoralized by defeat at the front.

39

The doctrinal direction regarding terror bombing of civilians is clear; it isto be avoided and may not create the intended reaction. That terror bomb-ing was tried by the

Luftwaffe

in Spain was to some extent due to the specificnature of that campaign and the Germans support for the Nationalistforces of General Francisco Franco. However, one of the two

Luftwaffeplans drawn up before the Battle of Britain identified the civilian popula-tion of London as a key target. That it was subsequently attacked has oftenbeen put down to Hitlers retaliation for British bombing of Berlin.However, this ignores the fact that it was planned much earlier than thatand, more importantly, German bombing of London preceded Hitlersspeech promising retaliation against London by over a week. It iscontended that the switch from bombing the RAF sector stations to bomb-ing London had more to do with failed intelligence and a flawed plan thanwith retaliation.

Much of the preceding doctrine relates to offensive action, but what wasthe doctrinal position of Germanys air defences? By studying the develop-ment of Germanys air defence doctrine and capability, an understanding ofthe Germans appreciation of the British radar defence capability can beassessed. The Luftwaffe had realised the need for an adequate air defencecapability as early as 1936. This was further reinforced by the experience ofthe Condor Legion in Spain. In 1937 and 1938, the Luftwaffe shifted theemphasis of aircraft production from bombers to fighters such that produc-tion plans for 1938 called for the delivery of 335 fighters per month but only282 bombers.40

Although fighter tactics were developed throughout the late 1930s, theGerman air defence system still relied heavily on anti-aircraft artillery(flak). Again, the German experience in Spain had demonstrated the effec-tiveness of flak. As a result, by 1939, the Luftwaffe had 100,000 personnel

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assigned to flak batteries with a total of 7,873 air defence guns.41 However,what is not generally appreciated is the significant advances in radartechnology that the Germans had achieved prior to World War II.

As early as 1936, the Luftwaffe had tested a prototype radar with a detec-tion range of 80km.42 This was further developed and by 1938, an improvedversion was fielded with a detection range of 120km.43 Perhaps what is moreremarkable is the fact that the Germans created a chain of coastal radardefences in 193739, over the same period as the British deployed theChain Home radar system. But what the Luftwaffe had failed to do, was tointegrate this capability into a coherent defensive system which couldincrease the effectiveness of the defensive fighters and flak batteries. Mostof the German air defence system was decentralised and based on thedefence of point targets, especially vital industries and military targets.Some rudimentary steps were made to create a central air defencecommand, but the core of the Luftwaffes air defence doctrine remained theoffensive campaign to defeat the enemy air force on the ground.44 Hitlerwas confident of achieving a quick victory and never considered the possi-bility of enemy attacks against targets in Germany. Defence was, therefore,relegated within the conceptual thinking of the Luftwaffes hierarchy. Theimpact of this was that it was unable to appreciate the capability that hadbeen created by Dowding in Britain: the worlds first fully integrated airdefence system. This fundamental oversight goes some way to explainingthe inadequacies of German intelligence about the British defensivecapabilities, which will be discussed later.

In essence, German airpower doctrine championed by Wever wassound and consistent with that being developed elsewhere (Britain and theUSA). It contained much which can be identified in current air doctrineand should have provided a sound basis for the planning of a campaignagainst Britain. The key point is that the Luftwaffe did not adhere to itsdoctrine. Following Wevers death, the strategic elements of doctrineappear to have been sidelined, partly due to experience gained in Spain,which was more tactical in nature, and perhaps due to the exigencies of therapid provision of equipment.

Lessons from the Spanish Civil War

The Spanish Civil War represented the first opportunity for the newlyformed Luftwaffe to test its equipment and to develop new tactics. AsCorum explains, much of the Luftwaffes success from 19391942, andsome of its failures, can be traced to lessons that were learned, or notlearned, during the Spanish Civil War.45

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In the early stages of the Spanish Civil War, the Germans provided theNationalist forces with transport aircraft (Junkers 52) and a small detach-ment of fighter aircraft (Heinkel 51). Initially, these proved highly effectiveand provided air superiority over the Straits of Gibraltar, enabling maritimeresupply of the Nationalist Army. By the summer of 1936, it appeared thatthe Nationalist victory would be secured within a few months, and yet thewar continued for a further 21/2 years. The reason for this was that theRussians, like the Germans and Italians, also sought to exert influence overthe region, and had deployed SB-2 bomber aircraft, I-15 and I-16 fighteraircraft in support of the Republican Army, each of which was superior incapability to the He-51. The Republicans wrested air superiority from theNationalist forces but ultimately a stalemate situation developed. TheGerman force in Spain, the Condor Legion, was gradually re-equippedwith a variety of more modern aircraft including the Heinkel 111 bomberand the Messerschmitt 109 fighter.46

Besides the testing and development of new aircraft, the Condor Legiondeveloped new fighter tactics. Initially, the fighter tactics used reflected thetactics of World War 1; the vic formation of three aircraft. HauptmanWerner Moelders is acknowledged as being instrumental in the develop-ment of the Rotte (two aircraft formation) and the Schwarm (two Rotteformations spread out in a finger-four formation).47 These tactics proved tobe highly flexible and enabled each pilot in the formation a greater degreeof freedom to scan the sky for enemy aircraft. In 1938 Moelders wrote atactics manual, which was adopted throughout the Luftwaffe.48 It was thesetactics which the Luftwaffe would use successfully in the Battle of Britainagainst the RAF, which was still reliant on the rigid vic formation.

But Luftwaffe tactical developments were not confined to fighter tactics.It became apparent that more aircraft were being lost in flying accidentsthan in combat. Consequently, an intensive instrument and night flyingtraining programme was adopted which was superior to any training inother air forces.49 This was facilitated partly by the German aircraft engi-neering industry, which had made great efforts to develop blind flyinginstruments and a moderately sophisticated landing aid. Moreover, theLuftwaffe developed the worlds first blind bombing navigation system -codenamed Knickebein (dog leg) - in which radio pulses would guide[an aircraft] to its target.50 For many pilots of the Luftwaffe, perhaps thegreatest tactical lesson to emerge from the Spanish Civil War was purelythat of operational experience, something which RAF pilots would lack atthe outset of World War II.

But what is the significance of these tactical lessons? The flexibility ofthe loose Rotte formation enabled each fighter to bring its weapons to bear

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rather than two aircraft merely having to follow their leader. In essence thiswould, initially, multiply the relative effectiveness of German fighterscompared to the RAF.

The bombers of the Condor Legion conducted interdiction sortiesagainst ports, railways, industrial complexes and airfields. However, theLuftwaffes experience of Republican attacks against its airfields was thatlimited damage was caused while the flak defences proved their effective-ness by shooting down 59 Republican aircraft.51 This calls into question thewisdom of the Luftwaffes plans in the Battle of Britain for attacking theRAFs airfields.

The nature of the Spanish Civil War dictated that the main effort wasthe ground offensive and it was in support of this that the Luftwaffe devel-oped its close air support (CAS) tactics. The key problem which theGermans had to overcome, was that of communication between the landforces and the supporting aircraft. Initially, ground signals were used, buteventually a system was devised whereby a commander placed in a forwardobservation position with a landline to the German airfield would thenrelay messages to the aircraft via radio. This was a clumsy but effectivemethod of coordinating CAS and was only superseded when more reliableradio communications could be established with the ground forces.52 Thiswas perhaps the first use of the forward air controller that would be recog-nised by modern air forces. The successful development of this system wasa major contributing factor to the development of Blitzkriegand goes someway to explaining why some commentators have suggested that theLuftwaffe was a tactical air force.

However, it is incorrect to assume that the Luftwaffe had ignored strate-gic bombing during the Spanish Civil War.53 On the contrary, the Luftwaffehad learned some important lessons regarding the bombing of strategicindustrial targets and enemy cities. The nationalist leader, General Franco,perhaps influenced by his Italian allys Douhetian doctrine, decided to usebombers to demoralise the civilian population of Madrid and to break thestalemate which had developed. The bombing of Madrid in November1936 resulted in relatively light civilian casualties and did not break civilianmorale, but the appearance of new Russian fighters necessitated the escort-ing of the bomber force by large numbers of fighters, a lesson not wastedon the Luftwaffe.54

As we have seen, during the interwar period, the German military devel-oped doctrine for the strategic use of airpower. But more importantly, thefirst tentative steps were made to put into effect that doctrine through tech-nical developments in navigation and instrument flying. Although the Luft-waffe was aware of the need for strategic bombing, it was not able to deliver

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the equipment it needed in time the Heinkel 177 heavy bomber was atechnological disaster and was cancelled in favour of more readily availablemedium bombers such as the He-111.55 As Bewley points out, the Luft-waffe, as developed by Goering in 1939, was the perfect instrument forBlitzkrieg; for a longer campaign, however, it was not sufficient. 56 Thistends to support the assertion that the Luftwaffe was in essence a tactical airforce equipped largely for cooperation with the army and which, during theBattle of Britain, was forced to fight a strategic air campaign for which it wasill-prepared.57 Despite this, however, having gained valuable operationalexperience and an insight into the ineffectiveness of terror bombing andairfield attacks, the Luftwaffe should have been able to employ its doctrineto produce a competent plan for the campaign against Britain.

German Planning

Planning must start with a clear aim, which articulates a well-defined end-state. The change from appeasement under Chamberlain to stout resolveunder Churchill indicates that the true strategic centre of gravity was theBritish political leadership. The Luftwaffes plans focused on the ports andsupply lines implying that a long drawn-out conflict with Britain wasexpected in which the strangulation of supplies would have an effect uponthe morale and warfighting capability of Britain. However, this does not sitwell with the Germans expectation of a quick, decisive battle to prepare forthe invasion of Britain. Significantly, there was no political direction givinga strategic end-state which was to be achieved, so the identification of theoperational centre of gravity (the focus of military action) and its associatedcritical vulnerabilities were not clearly recognised.

It is contended that the operational centre of gravity (the one thing thathad to be destroyed to enable a successful German invasion of Britain) wasthe Royal Navys forces protecting the English Channel because they werevastly superior to the German Navy and could prevent the German inva-sion. Fighter Command would have had to be defeated first to enable thedestruction of the Royal Navys assets from the air, and air superioritywould have been needed over the beach-head following the invasion.Consequently, Fighter Command was a decisive point on the road todefeating the operational centre of gravity; it was not an end in itself. Theformal planning process (now known as the Estimate) was not adequatelyfollowed by Luftwaffe planners. Such a lack of adequate analysis can lead toonly one thing: a flawed plan.

From the analysis of the political direction to the Luftwaffe, it was iden-tified that there was no clear political end-state with respect to Britain and

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that this was compounded by an unwillingness among the military leader-ship to question the plans developed by Hitler. Moreover, Goering, buoyedby his Luftwaffes recent successes in Poland, Scandinavia and France,convinced Hitler that Britain could be defeated by the use of airpoweralone. The lack of clear political guidance resulted in a plan described byBoog as being improvised strategically and tactically against an air defencesystem that had been strengthened and refined over the proceeding 4years.58

Despite the worsening relations between Britain and Germany in themid to late 1930s, it was not until 1938 that initial contingency planning wasconducted to investigate the feasibility of preventing Britain from interven-ing in a conflict in Western Europe. In autumn 1938, Luftwaffe GroupCommand two produced a report which concluded that any air war withBritain would be of nuisance value only and under no circumstances exer-cise any decisive effect on the course of a war.59 It was noted that only afterthe introduction of a long-range heavy bomber, the He-177, could acampaign against British industry be effective.60 However, this aircraft wasnot due to enter service until 1942 and was ultimately cancelled anyway.

This lack of long-range capability would force the Luftwaffe planners toconstrain their activities to the south-eastern part of Britain, unless airfieldscould be secured in Belgium and Holland. At first glance this might appearto provide a reason for the invasion of these countries, however it belies thefact that the greatest perceived threat to Germany in the West was fromFrance. That the Low Countries were invaded was as a consequence of theplan to defeat France rather than any wish to provide airfields for the attackon Britain.

Further evaluation by the Luftwaffe Operations Staff declared that therewas no possibility of success by attacking the British war economy;although Britain relied on imports, the Western ports were beyond therange of the Luftwaffes bombers. Perhaps more importantly, it was identi-fied that because of the increasing strength of the air defences, no decisioncould be hoped for by terror attacks on London. On the contrary, suchattacks [are] more likely to produce the opposite effect and undesirablystrengthen the national will to resist.61 Clearly, the lessons of Spain wereappreciated at the lower command levels, but, in keeping with its flawedcharacter, the Higher Command did not apprise the political hierarchy ofthis issue. It was decided, therefore, that the British aircraft industry, portsand harbour facilities would offer the best targets for attack, but with littlethought for the desired operational end-state.

Having received little guidance from the political leadership, theLuftwaffe commanders might reasonably have expected some guidance

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from their Commander-in-Chief, Goering; none was forthcoming. Therewas a practical reason for Goerings apparent ambivalence following thevictory against France. The Luftwaffe had lost 30 per cent of its bombers, 30per cent of its twin-engine fighters and 15 per cent of its single-enginefighters in the battle for France and needed time to recuperate.62 However,this also allowed the RAF to recover and restore its frontline strength. It wasnot until 21 July 1940 that the newly elevated Reichsmarschall Goeringpersonally met his commanders to discuss the problem of how to gain airsuperiority over England, the essential prerequisite for an invasion. He gaveonly general guidelines for a variety of targets to be attacked in addition toachieving the primary objective of gaining air superiority.

On 30 July 1940, Hitler directed Goering to prepare immediately for thegreat air battle of the Luftwaffe against England.63 Goering tasked thecommanders of both Luftflotte 2 (Kesselring) and Luftflotte 3 (Sperrle) withdevising plans to create the conditions necessary for the invasion of Britain.The consequence of this dual tasking was that two incoherent plans werecreated which concentrated on differing target sets. While Luftflotte 2 aimedto achieve air superiority by destroying the British aero-industry, providingclose air support to the invading army, destroying harbours and ports todeny re-supply, Luftflotte 3 intended to attack industrial targets in GreaterLondon and to draw British fighters into the air where it was confident thatit would achieve a quick and decisive victory.64

What was lacking from both plans was a clear understanding of theenemys and their own capabilities and the importance of the Royal Navy.The outcome of this confused planning process was that the Luftwaffenever appears to have decided the aim it was pursuing. Its attacks seem tohave been aimed variously at defeating Fighter Command and attaining airsuperiority to facilitate the invasion; defeating the whole of the RAF anddestroying the aircraft industry simultaneously, with the same object; thestrategic bombardment of cities to break morale and force FighterCommand to commit all its resources to defending one vital target London.65 Thus an incoherent and flawed planning process contributedsignificantly to the ultimate German defeat in the Battle of Britain. A majorfactor in this disorganised planning process was German air intelligence.

German Air Intelligence

The German intelligence system of the late 1930s was characterised bydisorganisation, duplication, competition and inefficiency.66 Poor officersand personal jealousy would ensure that there would be a lack of coopera-tion between the various agencies.67 Intelligence from different sources

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only came together at the highest level (Hitler) because none of the manyGerman intelligence agencies was prepared to share information, and thuspower, with their internal competitors. Consequently, the Germans had noorganisational equivalent to the British Joint Intelligence Committeewhich could coordinate intelligence efforts.68

Two intelligence organisations were superior to the Luftwaffe intelli-gence department: the Abwehr, commanded by Admiral Wilhelm Canarisand the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) under Heinrich Himmler.69 Both these agen-cies provided intelligence information for the armed forces. The Abwehr wasstaffed by officers with little technical ability and the SD was preoccupiedwith German internal affairs, often investigating the other German intelli-gence agencies. It is within this context that the Luftwaffe established its ownintelligence cell within the General Staff Headquarters, commanded byMajor Josef Beppo Schmid who had been recommended to Goering byJeschonnek.70 Schmid was shrewd, calculating and ambitious, but was moreinterested in his own position than in the provision of useful intelligence.71

Although Schmid established some order of activities in the Luftwaffeintelligence cell, he replaced those staff he considered a threat to hispersonal progression with personnel of his own choosing individuals whowould not challenge his position.72 Consequently, the competency ofSchmids team was generally fairly poor. This would have far-reachingimplications for the provision of intelligence prior to and during the Battleof Britain.

Schmid saw an opportunity to enhance his own standing by manoeu-vring such that all sources from which air information was obtainedshould come under his command, although he was never fully successfulin this ambition.73 It is indicative of Schmids sponsorship by Goering thatby 1939, his standing within the General Staff had risen such that he waschairing intelligence meetings attended by Hans Jeschonnek, Field MarshalErhard Milch, the Secretary of State for Aviation and Ernst Udet, the Chiefof Luftwaffe Supply and Procurement.

Perhaps Schmids most enduring contribution to the Luftwaffes plan-ning process for the invasion of Britain was the study he and his staffproduced of Britain, known as Study Blue. This study was based on a bookabout British industry, which had been ordered directly from a Londonbookshop, and on press cuttings from British newsarticles. However, thisinformation was supplemented by reconnaissance photographs collectedclandestinely from a modified civilian He-111C operated from Berlin onroute-proving flights.74

It was Schmids major failing that he underestimated the potential andefficiency of the RAF, perhaps as a sop to Goering whom Schmid would

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not want to upset for fear of alienating his mentor. In his study of foreignair forces, Schmid concluded that:

the English and French air fleets are still out of date. British air defenceis still weak..England will not be able to avoid a conflict with theGerman Luftwaffe. German aircraft are superior in view of theiradvantage in armament, armoured fuel tanks and flying instruments.In Germany alone has an overall view been taken of air warfar.75

Schmid further calculated that the strength of RAF Fighter Command wasa mere 200 frontline nt fighters and that Bomber Command could muster500 frontline bombers. His estimation of bomber numbers was not farfrom the mark, there were in fact 536, the estimate of fighters waswoefully wide of the mark, there being 608.76 Clearly, the RAF was a morecapable and better-equipped opponent than German intelligence hadrealised. It is within this context that Schmid issued his Proposal for theConduct of Air Warfare against Britain. Within the modern context, onemight say that this represented an intelligence-led Campaign Estimateprocess. However, with the inaccuracy of the intelligence data on RAFfighter numbers and capabilities, the plan was likely to be suspect. Schmidwrote:

From Germanys point of view, Britain is the most dangerous of allpossible enemies. The war cannot be ended in a manner favourable tous as long as Britain has not been mastered. France, on the otherhand, ranks in the second class for unlike Britain she would not becapable of carrying on a war without her allies. Germanys war aimmust therefore be to strike at Britain with all available weapons,particularly those of the navy and air force Furthermore, economicassistance from the British and French colonial empires and fromneutrals, particularly the USA, and the encirclement of Germany,must not be permitted to come fully into operation.77

The theme of his plan was the strangulation of Britains supply lines andharbour facilities. Having assessed that Britains centre of gravity was itsreliance on imported food, fuel and raw materials, he advocated the simul-taneous attack of ports, warships under construction/repair and secondaryports as a lower priority. Significantly, Schmid noted the proximity of resi-dential buildings to the ports, especially of London, asserting that this wasno reason not to attack these targets.78 This gives an insight into the target-ing strategy that would eventually lead to the attack of London itself andtends to question the notion of the German bombing of London being inretaliation for British bombing of Berlin.

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Following the fall of France, Schmids assessment of the French AirForce was proved correct. Consequently, the Luftwaffe intelligence unitsconfidence in its assessment of British capabilities and vulnerabilities wasreinforced. However, they had made several important miscalculations,which would affect the outcome of the battle. First and foremost, theyfailed to recognise the importance of the Chain Home radar system despitehaving radar capabilities of their own. What the Germans failed to realisewas the potential of radar, in that they did not integrate it into an air defencesystem. It is perhaps a reflection of the nature of the Luftwaffes experiencesin Spain and its role in supporting ground offensive operations that thiscapability was overlooked.

Their understanding was further hampered by the fact that ten separateagencies in Germany were involved in analysing radar capabilities, none ofwhich shared their information.79 Consequently, what was missing fromthe intelligence assessment of the Chain Home radar system was exactlythat: it was a system. According to Schmid, the British were:

inflexible in [their] organisation and strategy. As [fighter] formationsare rigidly attached to their home bases, command at medium levelsuffers mainly from being controlled in most cases by officers nolonger accustomed to flying. Command at low level is generallyenergetic but lacks tactical skill.80

Though it could be argued that RAF fighter tactics at the beginning of theBattle of Britain were rigid and inflexible, this could really only be appliedto the vic formation flown, rather than the manner in which fighters weredirected to the battle. Schmids assessment is interesting as it suggests a fail-ing of the RAF in that its commanders lacked recent flying experience.Compare this with the fact that many of the Luftwaffe commanders weredrawn from the German Army and were not professional aviators at all(Kesselring was an ex-artilleryman, Goering had not flown since the early1920s) and this comment can be put into perspective. Although, it is fair tosay that German frontline pilots had gained valuable operational experiencein Spain, which the British pilots had not. Schmid concluded his report asfollows:

the Luftwaffe is clearly superior to the RAF as regards strength,equipment, training, command, and location of bases. In the event ofan intensification of air warfare, the Luftwaffe, unlike the RAF, will bein a position in every respect to achieve a decisive effect this year if thetime for the start of large-scale operations is set early enough to allowadvantage to be taken of the months with relatively favourableweather conditions [July to the beginning of October].81

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Within this context of an over-assessment of German capabilities and RAFweaknesses, the Luftwaffe drafted its plans for the invasion of Britain. Intel-ligence assessments during the battle itself were no better than earlierpredictions; unlike the British intelligence services, the Germans did notlearn from their mistakes.82 Relying purely on post-flight reports fromaircrew, the Luftwaffes intelligence cell struggled to draw any useful conclu-sions as to how the RAF was conducting its defence.

Consequently, there was little chance of specific weaknesses being iden-tified which could be exploited as the following intelligence summary fromAugust 1940 shows:

As British fighters are controlled from the ground by radio-tele-phones, their forces are tied to their respective ground stations and arethereby restricted in mobility, even taking into consideration theprobability that the ground stations are partly mobile. Consequently,the assembly of strong fighter forces at determined points and at shortnotice is not to be expected. A massed German attack on a target cantherefore count on the same conditions of light fighter opposition asin attacks on widely scattered targets. It can, indeed, be assumed thatconsiderable confusion in the defensive networks will be unavoidableduring mass attacks, and that the effectiveness of the defences maythereby be reduced.83

This misunderstanding on the part of the Germans serves to illustratefurther the lack of comprehension of the use of radar within an integrateddefence system. That German aircrew, especially the fighter pilots, werenot predisposed to using radios may account for the German notion that aforce so reliant on radio communication must be inferior to themselves.The themes that run throughout the German intelligence effort prior to,and during, the Battle of Britain are those of failing to understand theenemy and over-stating German capabilities through over-confidence anda personal need on the part of Schmid to impress Goering. Moreover, theplanning effort of the Intelligence staff was not focused and did not identifya single aim.

Conclusion

Contrary to the popular British belief that the Battle of Britain was a close-run fight, German failings before and during the battle conspired to ensurethat they would not win; the Germans contributed to their own defeat inseveral ways. There was little political direction due to the lack of a will toengage in a conflict with Britain, and that which was forthcoming was

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confused and incoherent. There was neither a clear political end-state withrespect to Britain nor coherent military tasks on which to make equipmentdecisions or upon which to build a campaign plan. The German politicalleadership did not know their enemy, nor did they have a clear idea of theirown intentions.

Yet, doctrinal development was sound and was in line with that beingdeveloped in other nations although it included an element of tactical armycooperation, which was certainly different from British doctrine of thetime. Following its experience in Spain, the Luftwaffe realised that terrorbombing and attacking airfields were not effective and yet, under the direc-tion of Hitler and Goering, these tactics were still employed in the Battle ofBritain. Moreover, the tactical lessons of army cooperation learned by theLuftwaffe in Spain tended to overshadow the further development of strate-gic airpower doctrine, which had been championed by Wever until hisdeath. The emphasis in German air doctrine on offensive action wouldcontribute to the Germans failing to develop their own integrated airdefence system and to not appreciating the significance of that developed byDowding in Britain. Again, they did not know their enemy. The GermanArmy and Navy had never realistically been in a position to conduct aninvasion of Britain. The German chances of a successful invasion weresummarised by the German Vice Admiral Kurt Assmann as follows: Hadthe Luftwaffe defeated the RAF I am sure Hitler would have given theorder for the invasion to be launched - and the invasion would, in all prob-ability, have been smashed.84

Goering was over-confident due to the successes in Poland, Scandinaviaand France and yet his ability as a commander was undoubtedly poor, hishaving little understanding of the use of modern airpower. Moreover, theGerman High Command organisation was predisposed to supporting thedecisions from Hitler and Goering, rather than taking its own decisions.Therefore, planning was given no direction and, having failed to identifythe Royal Navys forces in the English Channel as the operational centre ofgravity, disparate and incoherent planning was conducted by severalLuftwaffe formations, with no clear aim.

The failings of the German intelligence system both mirrored andcontributed to a fatal over-confidence throughout the German HighCommand. Given the National Socialist nature of the Luftwaffe and itssycophantic leadership, it is unsurprising that Hitlers own opinion thatBritain was weak and would capitulate in the face of an invasion, wouldinfluence Luftwaffe planning for the Battle of Britain. Whereas the delaybetween the fall of France and the Battle of Britain was partly due to poorweather, Cox sums up the situation well: the Luftwaffes planners seem to

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have lacked all sense of urgency, continuing with a series of planningconferences to settle aspects which should have been confirmed during thelong interim after victory in France, particularly as the first outline orderswere issued a month before the real offensive opened. 85

Thus, indecision and over-confidence by the political and military hier-archy combined with poor intelligence contributed to the incoherentplanning of a campaign which failed to follow the key war principles: selectand maintain the aim, and know your enemy and yourself. It is not clearthat the Luftwaffe had ever decided upon an operational end-state againstwhich its actions could be directed. But this is not surprising given thatthere was no clear political end-state either.

The outcome of these failures was a campaign that meandered betweenvarious objectives and target sets, enabling the RAFs Fighter Command tomaintain the advantage, even when most stretched by resource issues.Thanks to their own failings, it might be said that the Germans placedthemselves in a position where winning the Battle of Britain was impossiblefrom the outset.

NOTES

1. Winston Churchill, The Retreat from Flanders speech before the House of Commons, 4 June1940. Sourced from www.churchillonline.org.uk/speeches, accessed 7 March 2004.

2. Williamson Murray, The Battle of Britain: How Did The Few Win?, The QuarterlyJournal of Military History 2/4 (Summer 1990) p.12.

3. Ibid.4. Philip Meilinger, Air Warfare An Historical Perspective, The Royal Air Force Air Power

Review 6/3 (Autumn 2003) p.3.5. James Corum, The Development of Strategic Air War Concepts in Inter-war Germany,

19191939, Air Power History 44/4 (Winter 1997) p.23.6. Klaus Maier, Horst Rohde, Bernd Stegeman and Hans Umbreit, Germany and the Second

World War, Vol.2, translated by Dean McMurray and Ewald Osers (Oxford: ClarendonPress 1991) p.41.

7. Ibid. p.42.8. John Ray, The Battle of Britain New Perspectives (1994; London: Arms & Armour Press 1996)

p.43.9. Richard Overy, The Battle of Britain - The Myth and the Reality (New York: W.W. Norton

2000) p.24.10. Ibid.11. Ibid. p.25.12. Murray, How Did the Few Win? (note 2) p.10.13. Alfred Price, Myth and Legend, Aeroplane Monthly (Nov. 1997) p.14.14. Ray, New Perspectives (note 8) p.43.15. Lauran Paine, German Military Intelligence in World War 2 The Abwehr (New York: Military

Heritage Press 1984) p.96.16. Corum, The Development of Strategic Air War Concepts (note 5) p.135.17. Maier, Germany in the Second World War (note 6) p.34.18. Ibid.19. Ibid. p.35.

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20. Luftwaffe Regulation 16 in James Corum and Richard Muller, The Luftwaffes Way of War:German Air Force Doctrine 19111945 (Baltimore, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishing1998) p.119 [hereafter LR16CM].

21. James Corum, The Luftwaffe and Lessons Learned in the Spanish Civil War in SebastianCox and Peter Gray (eds.) Air Power History: Turning Points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo(London: Frank Cass 2002) p.80.

22. Ibid.23. Murray (note 2) p.10.24. LR16CM (note 20) p.120.25. Richard Overy, Goering (1984; London: Phoenix Press 2000) p.164.26. Ibid. p.165.27. Richard Suchenwirth, Command and Leadership in the German Air Force (New York: Arno

Press 1969) p.137.28. Corum (note 5) p.27.29. LR16CM (note 20) p.20.30. Ibid.31. Corum (note 5) p.25.32. LR16CM (note 20) p.121.33. British Air Power Doctrine AP 3000, 3rd edn. (Directorate of the Air Staff, MoD 1999)

p.1-2-9.34. LR16CM (note 20) p.122.35. LR16CM (note 20) p.124.36. Murray (note 2) p.17.37. LR16CM (note 20) p.125.38. Ibid. p.141.39. LR16CM (note 20) p.142.40. Corum (note 5) p.240.41. Ibid.42. Corum (note 5) p.242.43. Ibid.44. Ibid p.243.45. Corum, Luftwaffe and Lessons Learned (note 21) p.66.46. Ibid. p.68.47. Ibid. p.70.48. Ibid.49. Ibid. p.71.50. Murray (note 2) p.11.51. Corum (note 21) p.73.52. Ibid.53. S. Mitcham, Men of the Luftwaffe (Novato, CA: Presidio Press 1988) p.51.54. Corum (note 21) p.79.55. Murray (note 2) p.11.56. Charles Bewley, Hermann Goering and the Third Reich (USA: Devin-Adair 1962) p.305.57. Derek Wood and Derek Dempster, The Narrow Margin (London: Hutchinson 1961)

p.409.58. Horst Boog, The Luftwaffe and the Battle of Britain in Henry Probert and Sebastian Cox

(eds.), The Battle Rethought (Shrewsbury, UK: Airlife 1991) p.19.59. Karl Lee, The Battle of Britain in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Jrgen Rohwer (eds.), Decisive

Battles of World War II: A German View, translated by Edward Fitzgerald (London: AndreDeutsch 1965) p.76.

60. Corum (note 5) p.258.61. Lee, The Battle of Britain (note 59) p.76.62. Murray (note 2) p.10.63. Boog, The Luftwaffe (note 58) p.19.64. Ibid. p.20.

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CONTRIBUTING TO ITS OWN DEFEAT 411

65. Sebastian Cox, A Comparative Analysis of RAF and Luftwaffe Intelligence in the Battle ofBritain, 1940 in Michael Handel (ed.), Intelligence and Military Operations (London: FrankCass 1990) p.438.

66. Wood and Dempster, Narrow Margin (note 57) p.101.67. Paine, German Military Intelligence (note 15) p.13.68. Cox , Comparative Analysis (note 65) p.426.69. Wood and Dempster, Narrow Margin (note 57) p.101.70. Ibid.71. Horst Boog, German Air Intelligence in the Second World War in Handel, Intelligence (note

65) p.352.72. Wood and Dempster (note 57) p.102.73. Ibid.74. Ibid. p.103.75. Ibid. pp.1034.76. Ibid. p.104.77. Ibid.78. Ibid. p.105.79. Cox (note 65) p.427.80. Murray (note 65) p.11.81. Ibid.82. Cox (note 65) p.437.83. Murray (note 2) p.16.84. Price, Myth and Legend (note 13) p.15.85. Cox (note 65) p.438.86. Ibid.

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