Fledgling Eagles - Luftwaffe Training Aircraft 1933-1945 (Luftwaffe Colours)

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In 1939 , ad van ced flying trainin g to re ady a pilot fo r o peration al se rvice in th e R oy al A ir Fo rce took sixm onths; b y 1 940 ,un de r the pre ssure o f e ven ts, it ha d be en red uce d to thre e m onths.

A t the he ight o f the Battle o f Brita in , early on M onday 2 Sept embe r 1940 , Fl yin g O f fic e r A. T . Rose-Price arrived at G ravesend on his first operational posting . This was to 501 Squadron, then flyingHurricanes. Late on the afternoon of that sam e day, 501 Squadron, along with several o thers, wasscram bled to in tercept a large incom ing force of Luftwaffe b om be rs , e sc orte d b y s om e 1 60 f ig hte rs .By 17.00, F lO R ose-P rice w as dead, having been shot down in his a ircra ft, L1578, som ewhere nearD ung en ess. H e re mains m issing to this da y.

H elm ut R ix m ade h is first solo fligh t on 1 5 July 1943 . F or th e n ext fourte en m on th s h e sp ent m uchtim e tra ining as a potentia l bom ber p ilo t by fly ing heavy aircraft such as the Junkers W 34 a nd tw in -en gin ed Ju nke rs Ju 88 a nd C au dro n C 445 ty pe s. In e arly S ep tembe r 1944 he w as p oste d to P retschfor re-train ing on s ing le-eng ine types. In la te October he was sent to A ltenburg where he wasin trodu ced to the F ocke -W ulf F w 19 0. T he re he m ad e thre e fligh ts in e arly N ove mbe r in th e ra re tw o-seat Fw 190 S. After less than five hours on the Fw 190, Fahnrich R ix then jo ined 8./JG 301 on12January 1945 , but d id not fly aga in until 27 February due to a shortage of airc raft. O n 28 February1945 he m oved to Stendal. F rom there he took off to intercept a ra id by U S Eighth A ir Force bom bersin Fw 1900 'Red 4', WN r. 5 00 11 1, a t 1 0.1 5 on 2 M arch o n his first ope ratio na l m issio n; a t 1 1.00 he w asbounced by two P-510 Mustangs of the US 352nd Fighter G roup. H is aircraft caught fire andh e w as force d to ab an don it ne ar A us sig in C zech oslova kia . D esp ite bu rns, R ix w as fo rtu na te , for h esurvived to live for many years afterwards in h is adopted home in England. He never sawh is a tt acke rs .

T he tw o U SA AF fig hter p ilo ts w ho sh ared th e victory o ver H elm ut R ix, n am ely C apta in L ee E . Kilgoin 4 4-1 53 90 P Z-K a nd t/l: Earl L . M undell in 44-14091 PZ-M , had each had a m inim um of 35 weekstraining as a sing le-seat fighter pilot. M undell had m ade his first victory cla im back in July 1944,u lt ima tel y c la im ing 3.5 . H elm ut R ix re pre se nte d K ilg o's firs t a nd o nly v ic to ry .



2 F L E D G L I N G E A G L E S

PrologueThe successful operation of military aircraft depends upon many factors, among themadequately trained air and ground crews, good aircraft in sufficient numbers, plus skilledleadership. Without these prerequisites an Air Force is little more than the keeper of some veryexpensive mechanical monuments. What the incidents related earlier tell us, is that properlytrained aircrew are one of the most crucial elements in the exercise of air power. In the casesabove, all the protagonists were flying state of the art aircraft, but the losers were only part-trained. Structured training of pilots, air and ground crews and the means to carry that out, isfundamental to the survival of an air force. Despite this, training is a subject that has beenlargely ignored by historians. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the case of the GermanLuftwaffe, where the astonishing achievements of some of the pilots and the exotic nature ofthe aircraft of that organisation have fascinated writers and modelmakers to the almost totalneglect of the supporting services, yet progressive failings in the training system from 1943onwards were among major factors which were ultimately to prove fatal for the Luftwaffe.

Even though the rewe re r es tr ic ti on s tof ly in g i n Ge rmanyu nd er t he T re at y o fVersail les dated28 June 1919 th et ra ining o f p i lo tsw as s ti ll c ar rie d o utc landes tinely. Here ,a rr an ge d in two n ea tro ws a re U de tU 12a 'F lamingos'wh ic h we re oper atedby the O VS a tSch le issheim nearMunic h a nd whi chf rom Apr il 1927 wereu se d t o t ra in n ewyoung p il ot s, whoa fter a y ea r' sins t ruc tion wou lde ar n t he ir B 2certi f icates indicatingt he y h ad p as se d t hecommerc ia l p i lo t 'scourse.

Until shortly before the official birth of the Luftwaffe on 1 March 1935, German air activitywas totally geared to training; effectively, there were no operational military aircraft. Forced tosecrecy by the terms of the Armistice following World War I, the covert military aviationorganisations which were formed in Germany could only function under the camouflage ofcivilian activities. This hampered the development of both aircraft and tactics, although it didprovide for large numbers of aircrew who had been semi-trained on a military basis. Whenthe Luftwaffe sprang into being, fully formed as it were, the sudden appearance of squadronafter squadron of fighters and bombers represented an apparently irresistible force which byand large deceived Hitler's potential enemies into acquiescing to his ever-more stridentpolitical demands. The reality, however, was rather different; the years of subterfuge andeconomic constraint had taken their toll. Despite the Nazi propaganda, German aircraft at thattime were neither as formidable nor as numerous as was claimed. Indeed, it has been arguedwith some validity that the Czechoslovak Air Force might well have been able to hold its ownagainst the Ltiftwaffe had the Czechs decided to resist in 1938. Be that as it may, Adolf Hitler'sblatant self-belief and his expedient approach to politics led directly to the recognition by themilitary staffs that there would simply not be the time to build up forces in depth to sustainlong campaigns before Germany found herself at war. In turn, this had great influence uponthe development of the Blitzkrieg theory - massive and overwhelming strikes with all theforces available upon the key points of an opponent's armed forces that would rapidlyovercome a numerically superior enemy. In this situation, therefore, it is easy to see how therequirements of a long-term training plan could be subordinated to the short-term need touse every available military asset, including reserves, in the first lightning assaults. Until thereverses in Russia, this great gamble appeared to have paid off, but once the war changed fromone of rapid movement to one of steady attrition, Germany's enemies were given time tore-arm and re-train. Consequently, despite some imaginative delaying stratagems, the Germanfailure to prepare for a long drawn-out struggle was to prove terminal. To more fullyunderstand the reasons for the failure at the end, however, it is necessary to go back tothe beginning.

A fte r th e s ig nin gthe T rea ty o f Rapabe tween Ge rmana nd Sov ie t R us sia16 April 1922 ami li ta ry agreemenwas made b etwe et he G erm an a ndRussian governmew hich w ou ld g iv eGermany secre tf ac il it ie s t o t es t t ha ir cr af t. A f te r s omdeb at e o n 25 Apri1925a clandestinef ly in g s ch oo l a ndf li gh t t es t c en tr eestab li shed nears pa to wn o f L ip tss it ua te d s ome 5 0(310mi les ) sou th -o f Mo sc ow Ext ent ra in ing was car rio u t be tween 19251933with 12 5 fighp ilo ts a nd 1 00nav iga to rs be ingt ra in ed . On e o f t hmost c ommon a iru se d w as t he F oko X III, a lin e-u p ow hic h is s ho wn ha t the a ir fi el d.



L U F T W A F F E T R A I N I N G A IR C R A F T

THE EAGLES IN THE EGGTraining - the accepted necessity

Evenbefore the Nazi Party came to power in Germany, the Reichswehr already had secretplans for an air force of 1,000 aircraft. This was accompanied by the development of asophisticated operational doctrine which envisaged a highly mobile combined army andwell-balanced air force, which was to include strategic bombers as a major element and a

modern air defence system. This was a far cry from the almost fossilised doctrines of theBritish and French military staffs of the time.By 1935, under the leadership of the brilliant Ceneralleutnant Walter Wever and

Generalmajor Helmuth Wilberg (who, incidentally, had a Jewish mother) the groundwork forthe massive and arguably, over-precipitate, expansion of the L~iftwciffe under Adolf Hitler hadbeen set in place. Here, in passing, it should be noted that the new Luftwaffe was far from aNazi puppet. The often incoherent Nazi ideology which envisaged war as the totalannihilation of enemies had little influence on Luftwaffe doctrine; indeed Lt,iftwaffe regulationsspecifically rejected 'terror' attacks on civilian populations and Luftwaffe Regulation 7:'Directions for the Training of the Luftwaffe' paid only lip service to political education. In fact,the officer training curriculum of the Luftwaffe General Staff College allowed only 2 per centof its time for such activity - and this was shared with military law, administration and publicrelations.With Adolf Hitler's rise to power in January 1933, the nascent Lliftwaffe was faced with itsfirst hurdle - training sufficient officers for the envisaged Air Force. Thanks to the efforts ofObers t Hans-Jiirgen Stumpff, however, this was expanded from 550 officers in 1933 to severalthousand by 1938. Many of these had a far broader appreciation of aviation and air power thantheir opposite numbers in the RAF and Armee de l'Air. These results were achieved by theestablishment of an Air Ministry in May 1933 which absorbed all the flying schools previouslyoperated by the DLV (Deu ts che Lu ft spor tv erband ) and DVS (Deu ts che Verkeh ri li egers chu le ) , plusthe secret training installations at Braunschweig, SchleiBheim, Wiirzburg, Jiiterbog andWarnemiinde as well as taking control over all civilian flying. On 1April 1934, an Inspectorateof flying schools was formed, under the command of World War I naval ace FriedrichChristiansen, and by summer it controlled a large and rapidly expanding infrastructureresponsible for training air and ground crews.Backed by the apparently bottomless purse of the Nazi Party and headed by a highlycompetent General Staff, the Luftwaffe would have been totally irresistible by the outbreak ofWorld War II, but on 3 June 1936 disaster struck; Walter Wever, the first Chief of Staff of theL11ftwqtfe,was killed in an air crash at Dresden while on a tour of inspection. Apart from the lossof a brilliant and well-liked officer with a clear vision of the role of air power, the accidentprompted a greater disaster still when the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, HermannGoring, began to assert direct control over the organisation. A World War I fighter ace, Goring

Gener al le u tnant Wa lter Wever , t he f ir stCh ie fof S taf f o f t he Lu ftwaf fe .

G en era lm ajo r H elm ut h W ilb erg w as th ef ir st o rg an is er a nd Gene ra l d er F li eg eri n Spa in .

F ri ed ri ch C h ri st ia ns en , aw ar de d t he Po urIe M erite in W W 1 , became Lu ftwaf feKommand eu r d er F lie ge rs ch ul en i n 1 93 7.

He rmann Go ri ng s co red 22 v ic to rie s i nF irs t W orld W ar a nd w as a lso aw ard edPo ur I e Me rit e.



had neither the temperament nor the ability to run such a technical service as theLl,iftwcif[e, but he did have well-honed political skills and much ambition. Theimmediate result was the appointment of a number of Goring's cronies to seniorpositions and subsequently much in-fighting among the new leadership. Some, suchas Ernst Udet, were manifestly incompetent. Others, such as Erhard Milch, wereempire-builders. As a consequence, the harmonious and skilled leadership developedbeforeWever's death was lost and the seeds of ultimate defeat were already sown.One aspect of air doctrine which had of necessity been largely neglected bythe L~iftwcif[e was night-fighting operations. This shortcoming was, however,

recognised by one of the most capable of the new appointees, Albert Kesselring.Under his direction and following extensive night exercises in June 1936, theLuftwaffe's first manual of night fighting was published in April 1937. Kesselringwas also a staunch supporter of long-range strategic bombing and wasinstrumental in securing the further development of such aircraft after they hadearlier been abandoned due to lack of suitable engines. By late 1937, however, thehiftwaffe leadership was already beginning to fragment, thanks to the machinationsof Milch and Udet's incompetence. Wilhelm Wimmer and Wolfram vonRichthofen, both highly regarded and capable technical officers, soon fell out withUdet and asked for re-assignment. Kesselring himself found it impossible to workwith Milch and was given command of the Air District around Dresden. Evenmore significantly, Hans-jiirgen Stumpff, who had been in charge of the L~iftwaffePersonnel Office since 1933, fell out with Milch over the issue of lack of clarityin the chain of command. Stumpff proposed that command and operations, warplanning and training be the responsibility of the Lliftwcif[e Chief of Staff(Stumpff), while production and all other matters remained with Milch. Milch forhis part disagreed, being reluctant to relinquish control and counter-proposed anew Inspector-General who would be the 'eyes and ears' of the LuftwaffeCommander-in-Chief i.e. Goring. Stumpff was further undermined by a proposalsent directly to Goring by Oberst Hans Jeschonnek, chief of the operations staff ofthe Ll,iftwcif[e, in which Jeschonnek argued that the General Staff should concernitself only with operations and planning. Disheartened by the constant bickering,Stumpff gave up his post and was replaced by Jeschonnek in 1939.Despite being regarded as a brilliant officer,Jeschonnek's youth (only 40 at the

time of his appointment) and lowly rank made it difficult for him to deal with older and moreexperienced officers such as Kesselring and von Richthofen. Not only was he regarded aswrong in his view on the extent of the General Staff's responsibilities, he was not helped byhis uncritical obedience to, and support for, Adolf Hitler. Jeschonnek's influence upon theLl,iftwalfe was almost totally negative. Not only did his vision of air power prove to be deeplyflawed, but his over-emphasis on the concept of Blitzkrieg blinded him to any necessity to planfor anything other than short and violent campaigns. If this meant concentrating on combataircraft to the neglect of training and transport and reconnaissance assets, so be it. In refusingto countenance anything other than the brief and victorious campaigns envisaged by his

4 F L E D G L IN G E A G L E S

Genera lobers t Erhard Mi lch .

Genera lleutnan t Ernstikiet, w ho in 7939becameGeneralluftzeugmeister.

Genera lfe ldmarscha l l A lber tK es se lr in g b ec ame Che f o fLuftflotte 7 .

Genera l der F l ieger Hans-Ji lrgenS tump ff , Chef der Luf twehr .

G en era l d er F li eg er Wol fr am v onRichthofen.

Gen era l d er F li eg er W ilh em W immerw as K omman de ur d eros tp reu13 ischen Lufts tre itk ri if te andl at er F eld zu ge s Kommande ur d erLu ft fl ot te 7 .

G en er al d er F li eg er H an sJescbonnek, Genera ls tabschder Gro13deutschen Luftwa ff



leader, Hitler, Jeschonnek effectively made the Lujtwaffe a hostage tofortune. In 1943, his realisation that his unquestioning adoration ofHitler had placed the L"iftwaffe in an impossible position prompted hisignominious suicide, but by then, irremediable damage had been done.

L U F T W A F F E T R A I N I N G A IR C R A F T

Training - the neglected necessityMter Munich in 1938 Hitler had directed that the number ofoperational squadrons should be expanded fivefold. Given thisoverriding priority following on a reorganisation of the hiftwaffeGeneral Staff in early 1939, the training element of the Ltiftwaffe,Branch 3, was restricted to tactical training in order to perfect thestriking power of the new force. Longer-term pilot training washanded over to the newly created office of Chief of Training, whoreported directly to the Inspector General of the hiftwaffe, ErhardMilch. A further reorganisation of the Ll,iftwaffe in April 1939 into whatwas to become a war footing led to the creation of Lufiflotten(Air Fleets), each occupying a specific area of the Reich.

From 1938 the relationship of the German training system to theoperations structure developed flaws. Incredibly, the Chief of Trainingdid not control the training units. The commander of each Lufiflotte wasresponsible for the training schools and equipment in his area.Naturally, under the influence of Hans Jeschonnek, the operational commanders were farmore interested in the fighting force rather than the training system which only offered long-term benefits. Following the outbreak of war, the pressing need to sustain the Blitzkrieg rapidlyled the Lufiflotte commanders to pluck the highly-skilled flying instructors and their aircraftfrom the schools to serve as transport or courier units. Continued requisitioning of skilledinstructors to meet the demands of a desperate shortage of transport pilots led to a greatweakening in both the quality and number of trained aircrew leaving the schools. From 1942,the effects of fuel shortages began to make themselves felt. Operational needs came first, andthe training schools were at the end of a very long queue. Protests to the Luftwaffe Chief ofStaff, by now Ceneralobers; Hans Jeschonnek, brought the reply 'First we've got to beat Russia,then we can start training!'

Throughout its existence, the Ll,iftwqfJe suffered from a high rate of landing and take-offaccidents, compounded by the natural tendency of young men to take risks. In the early days,the rapidly expanding hiftwa_ffe was not as disciplined a force as might have been desired; over-confidence and showing-off led to many, too often fatal, accidents. Reuhsmarschall Goringreferred to it as 'a plague'. Those who survived often became highly skilled through acombination of natural ability and the German system of war service which meant that aircrewcould operate for years without ever being rested. As a result, individuals could become superblyskilled, but their expertise and experience was not passed on properly to the newer crews.

To some extent, the failures of the training system were offset by the application of tacticswhich sometimes demonstrated a brilliant ability to improvise, but as the war progressed thepressures mounted. Shortages of equipment could be made up to a degree by expanding thenumber of production centres. Shortages of skilled personnel were not so easily rectified.There was little purpose in expanding the number of training schools when to produce agood fighter pilot needed one year of training, and a bomber crew up to two.

During 1943 the training programmes were just about adequate, but by 1944, ironically justas aircraft production was reaching an all-time high, the effectiveness of the pilots was fallinghopelessly behind. By this time the average German fighter pilot was receiving about 160 hoursof flying training before being hurled into action, while the opposing British and Americanpilots were completing about 360 and 400 respectively. Little wonder then that the losses amongGerman pilots began to escalate rapidly. The RAF had early recognised the dangers of enemyaction over England interfering with aircrew training. As a result, most training was quickly

ReichsmarschallHe rmann Go ri ngs ha ke s h ands w ithA do lf H itle r d urin gpre-war ce lebra t io




Men and MethodsWould-be aircrew recruits in the Luftwaffe quickly found out that the way to the stars requiredhard work. From 1935 onwards, the usual precursor to the Luftwaffe was a preliminary period ofroad-building and ditch-digging with the paramilitary RAD (Reichsarbeitsdienst) labour service.Alternatively, many of the more keenly air-minded opted for a period of training andindoctrination, which offered some basic flying training on gliders, with the NSFK(Nationa lsoz ia li st iches F l iegerkorps), a civilian but Party-controlled organisation.Mter induction into the L~iftwaffe proper, all young recruits, including officer candidates andground personnel, were sent to an FEA (Fliegerersatzabteilung), later FAR (Flieger-Ausbildungsregiment), for basic training in military discipline and physical culture lasting somesix - twelve months. The only air aspects to be introduced were in the form oflectures on radioand map reading. Later in the war these courses were abbreviated to two or three months only.

On passing out from the FAR, those recruits deemed to be suitable for flying training wouldbe sent to a pool known as a Fluganwiirterkompanie for about two months where they studiedgeneral aeronautical subjects. Officer candidates would be sent to a Luftkriegsschule (LKS).At this point some explanation should be made of the various types of pilot licences issuedby the L~iftU!affe.Apart from the three grades of glider pilot licence issued by the NSFK, thebasic powered aircraft Al certificate required that the trainee complete a loop, three landingswithout an error, an altitude flight to 2,000 m, and a 300 km triangular flight course. All ofthese were to be accomplished in 1-2 seat aircraft weighing up to 500 kg.A2 certification was similar except that it was for aircraft with at least two seats. Most

pilots in the L~iftwaffe trained on dual-control machines, therefore this was the usual starterqualification. Following on from this was the B 1 certificate. To obtain this, the student hadto show that he had already achieved at least 3,000 km of flight experience, a 600 kmtriangular course in nine hours, an altitude flight to 4,500 m, and at least 50 flights inaircraft in the B1 category. (Single-engined 1-3 seater with a maximum weight of 2,500kg). On top of this experience, the pilot had to carry out three precision landings, two nightlandings and a night flight of at least 30 minutes.The B2 certificate was progressively more difficult, requiring 6,000 km of flightexperience, including at least 3,000 km on B1 class aircraft. In addition 50 further night flightswere necessary, which had to include several difficult night landings.To fly the larger multi-engined aircraft demanded the C licence. This required a minimum

of 20,000 km flown in B-class aircraft (single-engined, 1-6 seats, weighing up to 2,500 kg),6,000 km of which had to have been flown as first pilot. Not only this, the student had tocomplete a further 30 flights in C 1 class aircraft (single-engined, 6 seats weighing over 2,500kg) and display a good general knowledge of aviation communications,Ultimately, the most difficult certificate to acquire was the C2 which demanded the Cllicence as a prerequisite, plus an additional 30 training flights, several 800 km triangular flights,two flights on one engine only, and a 200 km night flight.From the above, it is self-evident that good quality pilots, especially those flying the multi-engined bomber and transport types, were not to be found quickly. Instructors capable ofteaching up to these standards were even rarer, especially after the constant plundering of thetraining schools to supplement military operations. The shortage of qualified instructors leddirectly to inefficient training and a high wastage rate amongst the students, possibly as high as25 per cent.Back to the new student, however, who after being accepted for flight training would beposted to a Flugzeugfiihrerschule AlB (FFSAlB) for 100 to 150 hours of primary training onA-2 and B-ll2 aircraft. At least, this was the theory - by the end of the war this was down to40 hours, giving the teenage pilots no chance against the seasoned Allied pilots. The first fivehours were dual, followed by another 25 hours or so practising circuits and bumps, take-offsand landings and simple turns. Usual mounts for this were forgiving Bucker and Klemmtypes.As the pupil gained experience, he was closely observed to determine what his aptitudeswere, as these determined the next stage of training after he first gained his pilot's badge.



L U F T W A F F E T R A IN IN G A IR C R A F T

Prospective fighter pilots were passed on to a Waffenschule for three to four months wherethey carried out SOlTle50 hours of flying on different types, eventually leading to training onsemi-obsolescent operational types. By the time they were posted to an operational squadron,still without any combat experience, they would have flown for some 200 hours.Dive bomber pilots were posted to the appropriate S tuka V orsch ule for a course lasting four

months during which they carried out about 15 dual practice dives before going solo. Thephysical strain imposed on the body during this limited the maximum number of solo divespermitted in a day to fifteen. The main purpose of the course was to achieve bombingaccuracy; navigation and tactics were secondary.Bomber and reconnaissance pilots were sent to FFS C schools where the training was ontwin-engined aircraft. Lasting from three to six months, the course allowed for about 60 hoursof flying by day and night, including cross-country and some blind flying. On completion ofthis stage on obsolescent types, the pilot went for a further six weeks to a specialistBlindjlugschule where there would be another 50-60 hours of blind-flying practice. The finalstage was about three months at a specialist bomber or reconnaissance school where completecrews were trained on current operational aircraft types. Having passed through some 250hours' flying during a course lasting anything between 18 months to two years, the crews wereeventually posted to an operational squadron.The special requirements of marine pilots demanded a rather different approach in so far

as their training, right up to 'C' certificate level, usually took place at the same base.Consequently, a much larger variety of aircraft could be seen at the F lugzeug[ahrer schul en ( See ).A glaring omission from this training schedule was that for transport pilots. Notwithstandingthe preoccupation of the L"iftwajJe High Command with offensive operations, the logistics needsof modern war were grossly underestimated. It should be noted, however, that the Luftwaffe wasnot alone in this misapprehension; the RAF did not form Transport Command until 1943.As aresult of this oversight, apart from having to remove skilled instructors from the flying schools,until 1943 transport units were classifiedasK am pjgeschw ader xur beso nderen V erw endung (K G zb T ;j-literally 'Bomber Unit on Special Duties'! Belated recognition of the need for specialist trainingonly took place in July 1942 when KGr zbV 300 was formed as a training unit. It lasted untilMay 1943 when a specialistErganzungstral1sportgruppe was set up.This existed for about a year untilit had withered away to little more than Stc!IJelstrength by late 1944.One other aspect of aircrew training should be mentioned here. In a direct link with theconventions of the First World War, the observer of a German bomber was to be the captainof the aircraft, the pilot being a mere chauffeur. Consequently, the observer had to be the mostexperienced mem.ber of the crew and capable of taking over the duties of other members inan emergency. His training was therefore both varied and comprehensive. Trained up to'C' certificate standard as a pilot with 150 hours under his belt, he then attended a specialobservers school for intensive training in navigation, night and blind flying, bomb-aiming,radio operation and gunnery! Needless to say, the pressures of war soon brought about areassessment of the duties of these paragons, and from 1942 onwards the amount of trainingan observer received began to decline. His status as aircraft captain was also removed andeventually a 4-6 month course was the norm.As previously noted, once war began, training for the Luftwaffe began to fragment.Relatively efficient and well organised at the beginning, the system was geared specifically to

the needs of short and sharp campaigns. Experience of the rasp of war quickly led tomodifications. For instance it was soon recognised that there was a need for further training intactics and familiarisation with the particular type of aircraft and unit the pilot was to be postedto.The result was the formation of numerous Erganzungsgruppen (Operational Training Schools)which were linked to operational units, and numerous ad hoc specialist training courses suchas anti-shipping. A major omission had been night fighting, which most definitely requiredspecialist training, and typified the lack of foresight shown by the High Command (who haddismissed the idea of a prolonged night bombing campaign by the enemy as fantasy), while thedevelopment of new aircraft, weapons and tactics led to further proliferation.



8 f l E D G L I N G E A G L E S

50AlB flying schools in existence, many of which shared the same bases and names as therelated FAR training regiments. In January 1940 many of these schools were redesignated bya number, presumably for increased security. (At this point it is worth noting that the flyingschools frequently occupied more than one airfield. For example, AlB 8 based inCzechoslovakia used fields at Marienbad, Vilseck and Karlsbad). Subsequently, as fortuneturned against Germany, many were merged to form Doppelschulen or were closed prior tothe general collapse of the training system in 1943-44. Table 1 includes brief details of thoseAlB flying schools known from their designation date as such, but not in their earlier orassociated basic training guise as Sch/FARs.

T ab le 1 : Lu ftw af fe E lemen ta ry F ly in g T ra in in g Schoo lsSchoo l F irst F orm ed As AlB Schoo l M a in B ases Comments

FFSA/B 1 January 1935 January 1940 Gorlitz A 1 from October 1943.FFSAlB 2 October 1939 Magdeburg-SLid Closed December 1939.FFS AlB 2 June 1941 June 1941 Luxeuil, Strasbourg New formation. October 1943

became A 2. Closed March 1945.FFSA/B 3 1935 April 1939 Guben FFDS A 3 October 1943 with AlB 113. Closed

February 1945.FFSAlB 4 October 1939 January 1940 Prague/Gbell As A 4 from October 1943. Closed February 1945.

To N eudorfl Oppeln September 1941.FFS AlB 5 November 1939 January 1940 Seerappen March 1941 merged with AlB 33.FFSA 5 June 1944 Gablingen Closed February 1945.FFSAlB 6 October 1939 January 1940 Danzig-Langfuhr Became Sch/FAR 52 September 1940.FFSA 6 January 1944 January 1944 Rosenborn Closed September 1944.FFS AlB 7 1936 January 1940 Plauen/Chemnitz June 1943 with AlB 10 as FFDSA/B 10.FFSA 7 July 1944 Schweinfurt Operational until March 1945.FFS AlB 8 October 1939 January 1940 Marienbad/Vilseck To Sch/FAR 63 October 1940.FFS AlB 9 July 1939 January 1940 Grottkau A 9 from October 1943.January 1944

with A32 as FFDS A 9. Closed February 1945.Sch/FAR 10 January 1936 April 1939 Neukuhren Merged with AlB 125 January 1941.FFS AlB 10 January 1941 Warnemi.inde With AlB 7 as FFDS from October 1943.A 10

from December 1944. Closed May 1945.FFS AlB 11 January 1936 October 1941 Schonwalde August 1943 with AlB 125 at

Neukuhren as FFDS AlB 125.FFS AlB 12 November 1938 October 1941 Konigsberg/N eurnark A 12 from October 1943. With A 71 December

1943 as FFDS A 12. As FFS A 12 fromDecember 1944. Closed February 1945.

FFSA/B 13 January 1936 October 1941 Neubiberg, Pilsen Closed June 1943.FFSAlB 14 November 1938 October 1941 Klagenfurtl Aigen Closed March 1945.Sch/FAR 21 January 1934 Magdeburg-Ost, Split May 1941, part asAlB 124, part asAlB 2.

Deblin-IrenaSch/FAR 22 November 1939 Neustadt/Glewe Closed end October 1940.FFS AlB 23 September 1935 October 1941 Kaufbeuren A 23 in October 1943. Closed April 1945.FFS AlB 24 November 1939 October 1941 ParndorfOlornouc To Kitzingen January 1943. With AlB 121 July

1943 as FFDS A 121.Sch/FAR 31 April 1939 Posen/Schroda Closed June 1941. To AlB 126.FFSAlB 32 January 1934 October 1941 Pardubitz A 32 from October 1943.

Absorbed by A 9 January 1944.FFSAlB 33 December 1938 Ingolstadt To AlB 123 March 1941.FFSA/B 33 March 1941 October 1941 Ingolstadt Part of AlB 5 until October 1941,

then to Altenburg. Became BFS 10 atQuakenbri.ick, May 1943.

FFS AlB 41 January 1934 October 1941 Frankfurt/Oder A 41 from October 1943.Closed February 1945Sch/FAR 42 October 1935 Salzwedel, Prenzlau To AlB 120 November 1940.AlB 42 November 1940 October 1941 Neustadt-Glewe, Re-formed as Sch/FAR 42. Langensalza

October 1943, became A 42 Helmstedt.Closed January 1945.



L U F T W A F F E T R A I N I N G A I R C R A F T

School Firs t Form ed As AlB School Main Bases Comments

FFSAIB 43 August 1937 October 1941 Crailsheim, Prossnitz, From November 1943 with AlB 124Deiningen, N eliingen, as FFDS A 43. Closed April 1945.Magdeburg.

FFSAlB 51 1935 October 1941 Weimar-Nohra, December 1941 to Elbing. March 1943Heiligenbeil became FFS C1.Sch/FAR 52 August 1935 Halberstadt, J i.ierbog August 1940 to AlB 119.

AlB 52 September 1940 October 1941 Danzig-Langfuhr A 52 from October 1943. January 1945 toCelie. Closed March 1945.

Sch/FAR 53 April 1939 Straubing, Gutenfeld N ovember 1939 merged with AlB 5.To AlB 122 March 1941.

FFSAlB 61 January 1936 October 1941 Oschatz, WerderlHavel From October 1943 asA 61. Closed March 1945.FFSA/B 62 1936 October 1941 Quecllinburg, Closed July 1943. Some personnel to JG 300.

Bad VoslauFFSAlB 63 November 1939 October 1941 Marienbad, Eger AbsorbedAlB 8 October 1940.ClosedJuly 1942.FFSAlB 71 January 1934 October 1941 Konigsberg, Guben December 1943 with FFS AlB 12 to Breslau,

Prossnitz to form FFDS A12.FFSAlB 72 January 1936 October 1941 Detmold, Fels am 1944 Became A 72 October 1943 at Wagram. ToSchwerin Markersdorf. Closed March 1945.FFSAlB 82 1936 October 1941 Quakenbri.ick, Cottbus, Closed July 1942.

PretzschFFSAlB 110 December 1939 January 1940 Stubendorf July 1943 became BFS 11.FFSAlB 111 December 1939 January 1940 Oels, Roth Closed February 1942.FFSAlB 112 November 1939 January 1940 Tulln, Ingolstadt, With LKS 7. October 1941 to Boblingen.

Boblingen, Nellingen October 1943 became A12.FFSA 112 October 1943 N ellingen Closed December 1944.FFSAlB 113 March 1940 March 1940 Brunn September 1943joined to AlB 3 to form FFDSA 3.FFSAlB 114 January 1940 January 1940 Zwolfaxing- Wien, To October 1943 as A 114. Closed April 1945.

Weimar-Nohra August 1943.FFSAlB 115 Late 1939 January 1940 Wels Closed as A 115 in March 1945. Personnel asground troops in Graz.FFSAlB 116 Late 1939 January 1940 Neudorf-Oppeln, As FFDS A 116 October 1943.

Goppingen, Werder. AsA 116 December 1944. Closed April 1945.FFSAlB 117 March 1940 March 1940 Kamenz, Bad Aibling September 1941 joined with Stuiea-vorschule

Bad Aibling.FFSAlB 118 January 1941 January 1941 Stettin-Altdamrn, AsA 118 from October 1943.

Braunschweig. Closed March 1945.FFSAlB 119 August 1940 August 1940 J i.ierbog- DanID1, To Kassel, I May 1941. Closed April 1945.

Kassel-RothwestenFFSAlB 120 November 1940 November 1940 Prenzlau May 1942 merged with FFS AlB 2 in France.

CO until close wasWWI ace von Beaulieu-Marconnay.FFSAlB 121 July 1940 July 1940 Straubing July 1943 joined byAlB 24 to form FFDS A 121.End January 1945 to LKS 11.

FFSAlB 122 March 1941 March 1941 Gutenfeld, Jena Closed July 1942.FFSAlB 123 March 1941 March 1941 Elbing, Agram Trained Croatians. May 1943 moved to Graz as

(Zagreb), Graz- Thalerhof A 123. Closed January 1945.FFSAlB 124 June 1941 June 1941 Diedenhofen, November 1941 to Metz. FFDS A 43 from

Metz-Frescaty November 1943.FFSAlB 125 January 1941 January 1941 Neukuhren, Elbing, August 1943 absorbed AlB llas FFDS AlB 125.

Fassberg, Prowehren, October 1943 as FFDS A 125 from December 19Magdeburg Closed March 1945.

FFSAlB 126 June 1941 June 1941 Gotha From Sch/FAR 31. Closed June 1942.FFS (See)1 May 1935 January 1940 Warnemi.inde, Parow Closed December 1940.FFS (See)2 April 1936 January 1940 Piitnitz Renamed FFS (C) 17 in January 1941 as a

land-based unit.FFS (See)3 April 1936 January 1940 Stettin Founded as DVS Stettin. January 1941 absorbed

by AlB 118.




The MachinesAt the time of the declaration of the existence of the Luftwaffe in 1935, the training aircraftin use ranged from single-seat gliders to heavy aircraft weighing over 2,500 kg. These wereclassified with Germanic thoroughness into different groups which corresponded to thedifferent pilot certificates. With but a few notable exceptions the civilian registrations carriedby these land-based aircraft served to identify the class, as shown below.

T a b le 2 : Ge rma n C iv il ia n A irc ra ft C l as sific atio ns a nd Reg is tra tio nsClass Personnel All-up Weight Engines Registration GroupAl 1-2 Up to 500 kg 1 D-YAAA to D-YZZZA2 1-3 Up to 1,000 kg 1 D-EAAA to D-EZZZBl 1-3 Up to 2,500 kg 1 D-IAAA to D-IZZZB2 4-6 Up to 2,500 kg 1 D-OAAA to D-OZZZCl over 6 Over 2,500 kg 1 D-UAAA to D-UZZZC2 over 6 Over 2,500 kg 2+ D-AAAA to D-AZZZClassifications for marine aircraft were similar except for weight differences as below:Class Personnel All-up Weight Engines Registration GroupAl 1-2 Up to 600 kg 1 D-YAAA to D-YZZZA2 1-3 Up to 2,200 kg 1 D-EAAA to D-EZZZB 1-4 Up to 5,000 kg 1 D-IAAA to D-IZZZC over 6 Over 5,500 kg 2+ D-AAAA to D-AZZZ

As previously noted, there were a few well-chosen anomalies within the system. With theNazis' well-developed taste for subterfuge, those aircraft carrying registrations beginning D-Iwere supposedly 'experimental'. In reality these were most often military aircraft, andfrequently not even seaplanes. An example is a Heinkel He 45, registered D-ISES, which wasin service as a reconnaissance aircraft with Aujklarungsgruppe 24 based at Kassel-Rothwestenduring 1935.

With the development of more sophisticated and inevitably heavier machines, theclassifications were changed several times during the war. By 1944 they looked like Table 3:

T a b le 3 : G erm an A irc ra ft C la ss ific atio ns 1 9 4 4Class Code Personnel Land-based Marine typesAl D-Y 1-2 Up to 500 kg Up to 600 kgA2 D-E 1-3 500 to 1,000 kg 600 to 2,200 kgBl D-I 1-4 1,000 to 2,000 kg 2,200 to 5,500 kgB2 D-O 4-6 2,500 to 5,000 kg 2,200 to 5,500 kgC-l D-U over 6 Over 5,000 kg Over 5,500 kgC-2 D-A over 6 Over 5,000 kgBy the summer of 1939, the OKL (High Command of the Ltiftwaffe) and the RLM (Air

Ministry) had agreed upon a basic establishment of aircraft for the AlB schools. In theory eachA2 school was to have 45 aircraft, B1 schools to have 21 and the B2 schools to have 30.



l U F T W A F F E T R A I N I N G A IR e RAFT

meant that production of new trainer aircraft was slow, in many cases taking place in occupiedcountries, primarily Czechoslovakia and France. Apart from the sometimes dubious quality ofthe final product, with liberation these production centres were lost, creating yet morepressure upon the training system. In most cases training schools were forced to function witha bewildering variety of machines, including captured enemy aircraft, in a bid to stayoperational. An indication of the diversity of machines in use for primary and basic trainingin the early war years is given below.

T a b l e 4 : Germ a n E lem en ta ry a nd B as ic T ra in er A irc ra ft T yp esAZ Land: Bli 131, Bli 133, BLi181, Fw 44, He 72, Kl 25, Kl 35Bi Land: Ar 65,Ar 66,Ar 68,Ar 76,Ar 96, Fw 56, Go 145, He 45, He 46, He 51, Bf 108ni Sea: He 42W, He 60W, He 114BZ Land: Fw 58, He 70,Ju F13BZ Sea: Ju W33 w,Ju W34 WIn addition, odd examples of obsolete types such as the Albatros L101 survived to carry

the swastika. Later still in the war the need for specialist trainer versions of combat aircraft wasbelatedly recognised and this led to production of two-seat versions of the Focke- WulfFw 190, Messerschmitt Bf 109 and Messerschmitt Me 262.

Apart from the German-produced types there were many captured aircraft to be seen onLuftwaffe airfields. Prominent among these were Czech Praga and Avia machines. Numerousexamples of the US-built North American NA 57, (the fixed undercarriage version of theTexan), which had been in service with the Arm ee de [}A ir in France, were also used.In addition, many French fighters were utilised as advanced trainers, particularly theDewoitine D 520. Generally speaking, any reasonable captured enemy aircraft could find itselfin the Ll,iftwaffe training inventory, even some Soviet-designed machines such as the TupolevSB-2 (FFS (C)2 being one known user) and Yakovlev UT-2 were found useful employment.A good example of the range of exotic types used by the hiftwaffe can be found in an RLMorder dated 16 March 1943 which listed types from eight countries apart from Germany tobe scrapped or withdrawn from service. These included a number of ex-civilian models, somein service in extremely limited numbers. See Table 5 (below).

It is not possible to list every aircraft type ever used in the AlB schools here, but briefdescriptions of all the major machines designed for primary and basic training follow,roughly in the order in which a student might encounter them. Data refers to the mainproduction versions.

T a b le 5 A irc ra ft ty pe s to b e w ith dra w n from L uftw a ffe s erv ic e 1 6/3 /1 94 3Czech:Zlin XIIZlin 212Benes-Mraz Be 51Aero 100

British:Airspeed EnvoyPuss MothTiger MothMoth MajorLeopard MothGloster GladiatorVega Gull

French :Morane-Saulnier MS 230Caudron 635

Ital ian:Caproni Ca 135RWD8

Belgian:Tipsy B

Dutch :Fokker G 1

Pol ish:PWS 26

G erm an ty pe s a ls o to b e w ith dra wn :

Bucker BLi180Bucker Bu 182

Arado Ar 95Arado Ax 195

Blohm &Voss Bv 141 Arado Ar 231JunkersJu 46 Dornier Do 17 J, R, S,V

BELOW T hispho tog raph showsj us t o ne e xample ot he many a ir cr af t of ore ign manufac turt ha t was s ec ondedint o Lu ftwaf fe se rvIt show s aYugos lav ian F izi r Ftra in er a nd w as tain M ay 1941 i n Semnear Be lg rade .T he a ir cr af t h a s bec ru de ly p ai nt ed w it he German na ti onmark ings. TheYugos lav personnea re b ein g o bs erv eda Luf twa ff e a rmedg ua rd . N ote th e taa Ju 8 7 in th ebackg round ca rr yi nth e s ta nda rd y el lowr udder ma rk in g o ftused on Lu ftwaf fea ir cr af t o pe ra ti ngt he Ba lkans .



1 2 F L E 0 G L I N G E A G L E S

Klemm L 25A small two-seater open cockpit monoplane produced by Klemm Leichtflugzeugbau GmbHat Boblingen. Of rugged all-wood construction, with a fixed spatted undercarriage, the firstexamples flew in 1928 powered by 20 hp Mercedes engines. Later versions used a variety ofengines, both in-line and radial, of progressively greater power. Fifteen were exported toBritain before the war where they used several different British engines, including the 75 hpPobjoy R. Another 28 were built under licence in Britain by the British Klemm AeroplaneCo. as the B.A. Swallow. Some 600 were built in Germany between 1929-1935 and sawservice with all the different Nazi paramilitary flying training organisations such as the DVS,DLV,NSFK and Luftdienst as well as the Ll1ftwaffe. Used on float and ski undercarriages as wellas wheels, they were not particularly aerobatic; their 13 m wingspan gave them admirablegliding characteristics which, however, made them prone to 'float' on landing, to thediscomfiture of many a student pilot. At least one, D-ENAA, survived until the end of the warto be captured at Stuttgart-Echterdingen by the American 324th Fighter Group, still in itsoriginal pre-war silver finish.

S eci f icat ion

Loaded we igh t:M ax sp ee d:

1 3.0 0 m (4 2 ft 73/4 in )7 .50 m (24 ft 7 '/4 in) (L 2 5d V IIRwith H irth H M 60 R engine)7 20 kg (1 ,5 87 Ib )1 60 km /h (1 00 m ph)

Span:Length:

R IGH T: S no w d id n ot h old u p tra in in g. C lo se v ie w of t he fo rwa rdfuselage of a K le mm L 25 w ith a no th er o n s kis ta kin g o ff in th ebackg round . La rge numbe rs of t he se K lemm t ra in er s s aws er vi ce w it h FFSAl B 8, f ly in g f ro m t he f ie ld a t M ar ie nb ad d urin gw in te r 1 94 0- c od e le tte rs f or a t le as t s ev en te en a re k no wn .T h e c r os s f la g ma rk s t he a ss emb ly p oi nt f or w a it in g s tu de nt s.IAMC)

A l in e -up of c ap tu re d Ge rman c ommuni ca ti on a nd li ai so n a ir cr af t c ap tu re d b y Ame ri ca n f or ce s a nd g at he re d t og et he r o n S tu tt ga rt -E c ht er di ng en a ir fi el d j us t a ft er t he e nd o f h os ti li tie s. N e ar es t t he c ame ra , a lr ea dy in f ull V SAAF s ilv er f in is h a nd ma rk in gs , is whatappears to b e a p re -w a r C ze ch Z li nn X II , mo di fi ed to h av e o pe n c oc kp it s a nd a W alt er e ng in e, p os sib ly b y t he Americ an s. N ex t is aK lemm L25 , p ro ba bly O -ENAA. s ti ll i n p re -w a r s il ve r f in is h, w h ic h h as m ir ac ul ou sl y s ur vi ve d u nt il 1945 . Behi nd t he K lemm is a B i ic ke rBi i 181 , c od ed KH+VE . L u rk in g b eh in d t he B ii ck er is a H ein ke l H e 72 , a nd rig ht a t th e re ar is a S iebe l Si 204.



L U F T W A F F E T R A I N I N G A IR e RAFT

Klemm Kl35Probably the most important product of the Klemm company, the Kl 35 was a rather moreelegant gull-winged younger brother to the L 25. Designed for the private owner, like the restof the Klemm stable, the fixed undercarriage Kl 35 first flew in 1935 powered by aHirth HM 60 R in-line engine of 80 hp. Built both with and without enclosed cockpits, theKl 35 was constructed from wood with a combination wood and fabric covering; substantialnumbers were produced as the Kl35 A and Kl 35 AW floatplane with the Hirth 60 R engine.With the 105 hp Hirth HM 504 A engine it was known as the Kl 35 Band Kl 35 BWfloatplane. Three of the landplane models served with the pre-war Lithuanian National Guard( Su al iu S a ju ng o s A v ia cij a) .In 1938 the Kl 35 D flew, powered by a 105 hp Hirth HM 504 A-2 engine and with astrengthened undercarriage which could also be fitted with skis or floats.This was destined tobe the main production version, about 2,000 being built and intended from the outset forservice as a L1!ftwciffe trainer, subsequently seeing considerable service throughout World War II.Several were exported to Hungary and Rumania. Twenty-five were purchased by the Slovakair force.Mter importing several KI 35B and D types, the Swedes acquired a production licencein 1941-42 to build about 74 examples of the Kl 35 D for use by the Flygvapnet, SOl11.ef whichserved until 1951.

Specif icat ionSpan :Length:Loaded we igh t:M a x s pe ed :

Two Klemm 3 5s o f F FSA lB 4d is pl ay the twa ma in camouf lages ch em es a n d t he t wa ty pe s o funde rc ar ri age found an the t ype .Od dly ,t he n ea re r ma ch in e in t hel at er d ar k g r ee n c amouf la ge i s a ne ar li er K I3 5 B made l, w hi le t heg rey v ersio n to the re ar is a K I3 5 Dw ith r e in fo rc ed unde rc ar ri age bu il ts peci fi ca ll y f or Luf twa ff e use . Da tei s u n kn own, b ut p ro ba bly i n 1942 atNeudorfOppeln.

10.40 m (34f t 1 1 / 2 in )7.50 m (2 4 ft 71/4 in )7 5 0 k g (1 ,6 5 3Ib )2 10 krn /h (1 30 m ph)

FFS AlB 4 Badge

G ro un d c re w w ereab le to physica l lyma nh an dl e a nd p uth is K I35 D , W Nr.c od ed DL+UK to tht ak e- of f p ai nt . T hi sm ac hin e h as b ee nheavi ly aver -sprayew ith w hite p ain t. Ty el lo w f us el ag e b aa nd co de h av e b eerough ly pa in teda ro un d le av in g s ofedges.



14 F L E0 GL I NG EAGLES

FFS AjB 52 Badge

TwoK l emm K I3 5 t ra in er s of LK S 2 await t hen ex t f li gh t. T he l oc at io n is p ro ba bl yGU te rf el de n ea r Po ts dam , s ome time in 1 94 2.T h e a i rc ra ft in t he b ac kg ro un d a pp ea rs toc ar ry a n e xc ep ti on all y w id e y el lo w f us el ag eb an d w hic h e xte nd s o ut t o t he v ertic al b ar ofthe le tte r P.

Klem m KI 35 B coded SG+QC o f FFS A/B 52 , April 1942This KI 35 B was used as an aerobatic trainer during April 1942. It was painted overall in RLM Grey 0with sprayed patches of RLM 66 and carried a yellow fuselage band RLM 24 in front of the Balkenkreu

C lose -up v iew of t he n os e of a g ul l- wi ng ed K lemm K I3 5 t ra in er c ar ry in g t he s ho rt -l iv ed'w e c od e, w hic h w as o ffic ia lly u se d b y L uf tw aff e tra in in g a irc ra ft fo r le ss th an a y ea r,b etwe en J an ua ry t o O ct ob er 1 9 3 9 . N ote h ow c ro wd ed th e r eg is tra tio n a pp ea rs w he re t hef us ela ge c ro ss h as b ee n c rammed in b et we en t he le tt er s. T he p ic tu re is b elie ve d to h av eb ee n ta ke n a t G ro ttk au , w he re t he a ir cra ft w as in s erv ic e w it h A lB 9 , s om etim e in 1 94 0.

A p ilo t e njo ys a n ap in th e su n in fro nt of a n R LM 0 2 G ra u K le mm 35 B, SF+I I. Un fo rtunau nit, d ate a nd lo ca tio n a re a ll u nk no wn , a lth ou gh th e p ic tu re s ho ws g oo d d et ail of th efuselage.




Biicker Bii 131]ungmamtBucker Flugzeugbau was founded in 1932 at Berlin-Johannisthal, and quickly established itselfas a major supplier of training aircraft to the embryonic L"iftwaJfe. Jointly designed byCarl Clemens Bucker and his Swedish chief design engineer, Anders Andersson, the BuckerBLi 131 was the first product from the company and flew for the first time in 1934. A neatbut conventional biplane, (the last such type to be built in Germany) the BLi 131 had twoopen tandem cockpits and a fixed, sprung undercarriage. Construction was a combination ofrugged steel tubing for the fuselage and tail covered with a mixture of metal and fabric, whilethe wings were fabric-covered wood. Powered by the popular Hirth HM 60 R in-line engineof 80 hp, early deliveries of the Bii 131 A went to the paramilitary DLV (DeutscheLujtsportvetband), forerunner of the Ll1ftwaffe. In 1936, the Bii 131 B, powered by the 105 hpHirth HM 504 A-2 engine, began to enter service with the elementary flying training schoolsof the LliftwaJfe. In service with virtually all the AlB schools throughout World War II,although in declining numbers as training and obsolescence took their toll, the need foraircraft to equip hastily formed night ground-attack squadrons led to quite a few jungmanndonning warpaint. Prominent amongst these Nachtschlachigruppen were NSGr 2, formed in1942 and NSGr 11 and 12 in Estonia and Latvia, manned by crews from those countries.Equally successful in the primary training role in other countries, 315 examples found

their way to the Air Force of Hungary, while Czechoslovakia built 10 under licence as theTatra T 131 before the war. Most wartime versions for the Ll.iftwaffe were later produced byAero in Prague. CASA in Spain licence-built a further 530 or so, while Switzerlandstandardised its training on the Bu 131 and used 94, 88 of which were licence-built byDornier. 1,037 examples with Japanese Hatsukaze engines were built for the Imperial JapaneseArmy Air Force as the Kokusai Ki 86, and a further 339 for the Imperial Japanese Navy as theKyushu K9W1 Cypress, as their standard primary trainer.

In total, 1,910 BLi 131s were built in World War II.Many Swiss and Spanish examples stillfly today, albeit with more modern engines, ~hile in an astonishing rebirth work commencedin 1994 on twenty new-build Jungmann and J ungme is te r known as the BP 131 and BP 133 byBucker Prado SL in Spain. These used CASA jigs and some original parts.

SpecificationSpan:Length:Loaded weightMax speed :

740 m (24 ft 3 in)6.62 m (21 ft 8'/2 in)680 kg (1,500 Ib )18 3 krn/h (11 4 mph)

T ra in in gc arrie d o n w ha te ve r t he w ea th er. T wo o ve ra ll g re y B uc ke r B i! 1 31t ra in er s w a rm in g u p t he ir e ng in es o n a s now- co ve re d L uf tw af fe t ra in in g b as e.Bot h a ir cr af t a pp ea r t o c ar ry c od es b eg in nin g PE+?? L oca tion m ay b e inC ze ch os lo va ki a in w in te r 1 93 9- 40 .N ot e t ha t t he ma ch in e o n t he l ef t h as t heea rl y s ty le ex tended c ranked engi ne exhaust .

A B ucker B u 13 1 .o f t he w ork ho rs esthe Lu ftwaf fe p rimf ly ing t ra inings ch oo ls . I n t hi s cKF+KT b elo ng s t o2 b as ed a t R ein sdn ea r J ute rb og in(AMe)



16 Fl E 0 G LI N G EA G l ES

The b eg in ni ng o f f li gh t t ra in in g. Buc ke r Bu 131, GD+ON , o f F FSA lB 6 3( no te b ad ge ju st b elow f ro nt c oc kp it ), Ma rie nb ad 1941. FA R 63 wa ses tab li shed on 1 December 1938 a t Eger . FFSA lB 8 was e st ab lis he d inDecember 1939 i n Ma ri en ba d. I n F eb ru ar y 1 94 0, FAR 63 mov ed toM arie nb ad a nd t oo k o ve r A /B 8 in O cto be r 1 94 0, at th e s am e t im et ak in g t he s it tin g t en an t u ni t's n umber . Sub se qu en tly t he s ch oo l w asr enumbe red FFSA lB 63 from 1 October 1941. T he HQ w as atMa rie nb ad , b ut o pe ra tio ns a ls o t oo k p la ce a t Ka rls ba d a nd V ils ec knear Gre ienwtih t:

A B u 1 31 0 ro llin g o ut fo r t ak e-o ff o n a tra in in g f lig ht. T he in stru cto r inth e fron t sea t ha s con tro l of T A+F E, which m ay b elon g to A lB 1.

FFS AlB 63 Badge

The l it tl e B ii 13 1 a ls o f ou nd fa vo ur w it h G erm an y's a llie s. H ere is alin e-u p o f fo urt ee n o f th e ty pe d eliv ere d t o B ulg aria in 1 94 0, allwear ing c iv il ia n and m i li ta ry ma rk ings.

A n o ve rt urn ed B uc ke r B u 131, BX+ AR , WN r. 4 207 a ft er a f orc ed -l an din g a cc id en t n ea r N ie de r- El lq ii ti : N o te t he i ns cr ip tio n u nd er t het ai l, w hic h g iv es i nf orma tio n c on ce rn in g t he own ers .




A ero ba tic s w ith a B uc ke r B il 131, c od ed K F+SZ , be lo ng in g to A lB 3 2,t ak en f rom an acc ompanyin g mach in e , s omewhe re o ve r Cz ec ho sl ov akD ec em be r 1 94 0. T he m ac hin e h ad a rema rk ab ly lo ng life w ith th is u nit,h av in g firs t b ee n d eliv ere d in A pril 1939 a nd s till b ein g o n s tre ng th inO c to ber 1 941 .B ritis h tro op s m an ha nd lin g a c ap tu re d B il 1 33mm , GD+OH , w h ic h w eath e v es tig es o f temp or ary w in te r c am o ufla ge . N ote th e la te -w ar w hiteo utlin e w in g c ro ss es a nd th e e arlie r s ty le o n th e fu se la ge . T he u nit towh ic h t hi s a ir cr aft b e lo nged is n ot kn ow n, a lth ou gh G D+OJ w as b ase dMarienbad.

FFSAlB 14 Badge Bilcker 13 1 'J un qm en n' c od ed BD+AO , fitte d w ith s kis , p ho to gr ap he d in G ov iz ic e in th e w in te r o f 1 94 1/4 2.

Bucker 131, coded TB+BF,of FFS A/B 14, Klagenfurt, 19411942This Bu 131 was fitted with skis and carries the badge of FFSA/B 14 which was basedat Klagenfurt during 1941/1942. The aircraft was painted light grey allover with yellowfin and rudder, lower wing, wing-tips and front engine cowling.



Bucker Bu 133 JungmeisterThe success of the company's Bii 131 naturally led to a logical development for more advancedtraining. The result was the Bu 133, a single-seat aerobatic and advanced trainer, which usedmany components from the Bii 131 but in a slightly smaller airframe. Flown for the first timein 1935 - incidentally by Germany's first woman works pilot, Luise Hoffmann - the prototypeBii 133V1, D-EVEO, was powered by a Hirth HM 506 in-line engine of140 hp. Demonstratedpublicly for the first time at the International Aerobatic Championships in Rangsdorf in 1936,the astonishing agility of the little biplane quickly attracted the attention of the leading aerobaticpilots of the day.No production of the Bu 133 A followed, and two aircraft only with 160 hpSiemens-Bramo Sh 14 A radial engines known as the Bii 133 B were built, before beingsuperseded by the main production version, the Bii 133 C. Powered by the same engine as theprevious model, but with a distinctive helmeted cowling and a 13 cm shorter fuselage, theoutstanding lying qualities of the Bu 133 C soon led to a string of aerobatic championship wins.By 1938 the Jungmeister had become the standard aerobatic trainerof the NSFK and Ll,iftwaJfe. A three-man aerobatic team drawnfrom the Ltiftwa:.ffe was so impressive at Brussels in 1938 thatGoring ordered that a nine-aircraft team be formed. This made atremendous impression when it appeared at the InternationalFlying Meeting at Brussels in July 1939. Unfortunately, theLuftwaffe's display team was to have only a brief existence beforethe outbreak of war in September that year. The quality of thebasic design was such that about fifty Bii 133 A andBu 133 C machines were built under licence in Spain. A further52 Bii 133 Cs were also

licence-built by Dornier inSwitzerland as the standardSwiss Air Force aerobatictrainer, where they remainedin service until 1968. TheJungmeister was so good that itwas a genuinely competitiveaerobatic aircraft until wellinto the 1960s.


Tak en f rom t he a lb umo f 16-v ic tory experteGunther Lo id l, th isshow s tha t the B i) 13 3c ou ld s ti ll b e a h an df ul .The camouflagedaircraft is ben t a ft erth is c ra sh a t R he im s inF rance i n 1 9 4 3 , b ut t hep il ot , Ob it J osefMenapace , appear su nd amage d. Sad ly h ew as to b e kille d inRuss ia i n Oc tober .

Bucker 133, 'Black 6' of 1./ JG107Bu 133 painted in RLM Grey 02 overall with a yellow fuselage bandand distinctive green and white marking on forward fuselage.

Th e e o 1 3 3 C in i tse lement. JungmeisD -QOA is s hownb ei ng d emons tr at eR ud olf L oc hn er oB uck er's h om e b aRan gs do rf in 1 93L oc hn er w on b ot hGerman a nd Dut caerobaticc hampionsh ip s i na ir cra ft in t ha t y e

Specif icat ionSpan :Length:L oa ded we ig h t:M ax sp eed:

6 .60 m (2 1 ft 8 in)6 .02 m (1 9 ft 9 in )5 85 kg (1 ,2 90 lb ]2 20 km /h (1 37 m ph)



S ecification

L U F T W A F F E T R A I N I N G A I R e RAFT

Bucker Bii 181 BestmannThe outstandingly successful biplanes produced by the company did not blind Bucker tomodern developments, and the next design was a neat high-wing monoplane, the Bu 134,inspired by the American Piper Cub. The sole example, D-EQPA, flew in 1936 but did notprove to possess particularly pleasant handling. Not only this, but by then the Germanlightplane market was firmly enamoured with the low-wing monoplane concept.Consequently, the next design, the Bu 180 Student, was of this configuration. With tandemseating for two people, the Bii 180 pioneered new construction techniques for Bucker,comprising all-wooden wing structure and a steel tube, metal covered forward fuselage witha wooden monocoque aft. About 20 were built, both with and without cockpit canopies,before wartime conditions forced a halt to production.Derived from the Bu 180, the single-seat Bu 182 Kornett , preceded the Bu 181 into limitedproduction. Intended for military training, the little Bu 182 flew in late 1938, but as the RLMdisplayed little interest only three more were completed before the design was abandoned infavour of a two-seat cabin trainer. Built in direct response to an urgent RLM request for suchan aircraft, the result was Bucker's last and most modern design, the Bu 181.Originally designed for sports and touring use, the Bestmann largely replaced the earlierBucker designs in Luftwaffe service. Following the same general constructional principlesestablished by the Bii 180, the undercarriage was a sturdy fixed cantilever type with singlelegs. The cabin offered side-by-side seating for two with a capacious baggage compartmentbehind. The first prototype, D- ERBV, flew in early 1939 and the superb flying qualitiesdisplayed by the aircraft led quickly to its selection as the Luftwaffe's latest (and last) primarytrainer. First deliveries of the Bu 181 A, powered by a 105 hp Hirth HM 504 engine, beganin late 1940. Demand for the new trainer was such that the factory in Rangsdorf was unableto cope. As a result, the Fokker Company in Holland was allocated the task. Beginning in1942,718 examples of the Bu 181 A and slightly modified Bu 181 D were produced there.Most aircraft served with the Luftwaffe, although 24 were delivered to the Hungarian AirForce from 1942 onwards. Swedish experience with the earlier Bucker types led to thelicence-building of 121 examples of the Bu 181 B as the Sk 25, while the Czech Zlin factorycommenced manufacture just before the end of the war. Many more were produced therepost-war under the Zlin label. There were even licence-built versions of the Zlin in Egypt.Total wartime production, including some 200 from the Zlin plant, was 2,730.

In a desperate attempt to halt the flood of Allied armour roaming across Germany in early1945, a number of provisional anti-tank squadrons, manned by volunteers and equipped withBii 181s jury-rigged with Panzetiaus: anti-tank rockets under the wings, were formed. Oneaircraft in particular, PU +BN, had previously seen service with FFS AlB 14 in Klagenfurt.These Panzerjagdstaffeln saw action near Kaufbeuren,Grossenbrode, Magdeburg and Berlin. In almost every casethe result was the loss of both aircraft and pilot. Several ofthese machines later defected to Switzerland and sixsubsequently served in the Swiss Fliegertruppe until 1956.Span:Length:Loaded we igh t:M a x s pe ed :

A BOe ke r BO 18 1 in amos t u n us ua l RLM 0 2Grau overal l f in ish.NF+IR is probablyone o f the earl iestproduct ion models ,as a lmost a ll versionso f the Bestmannwere f in ished w ithdark greenuppersurfaces.

10.60 m (3 4 ft 9 in)7 .85 m (2 5 ft 9 in)7 50 kg (1 ,6 50 Ib )2 15 km /h (1 33 m ph)



2 0 F L E 0 G L I N G E A G l E S

Unte ro ff iz ie r Werne r K losch insky de fec tedw ith th is B u 18 1 B -1 , WN r. 1 10 27 3to neutralSw itz er la nd . K lo sc hi ns ky bec ame the f ir stG erm an d efe cto r w ho fle d w ith a n a irc ra ftto Switz erla nd . H e w as in te rn ed fo r th eremainder of th e w ar. Th e B u 18 1 B- 1rema ined in Sw it ze rl and and subsequent lys aw s ervice w ith th e S wiss A ir F orce a sA -2 51 . It w as stru ck o ff ch arg e o n 1January 1956 and sc rapped . (Hans -He ir iStapfer)

This e o 18 1 B -7 , WN r. 7 70 27 3c od ed S J+ SS b elo ng in g to th eF lugzeugf li ege rschu le A l2 a tS tr as sbur g, l an ded on 7 7 A ug usin a m ea do w a t B en ke n n ea r B(Swi tze rl and ). The Bestmann ct he S tammkennz ei ch en S J+SSto ge th er w ith th e u nit b ad ge p aon t he eng in e c ow li ng .(Hans-Heir i S tapfer)

FFS AlB 2 Badge

Biicker B L i 181, coded SF+WR, of FFSA/B 23, early 1943This BO181 was painted dark green, either RLM 70 or 71, and was operated by FFS A/B23 during early 1943. It also carried the distinctive unit badge on the nose.

FFS AlB 23 Badge



l U F T W A F F E T R A I N I N G A I R e RAFT 2

Focke-Wulf Fw 44 Stieglitz (Goldfinch)Under the leadership of the legendary Kurt Tank, the first really successful aircraft from theFocke- Wulf Company flew in late summer 1932. Known as the Fw 44, a neat radial-enginedbiplane seating two people in tandem open cockpits, the design displayed numerousfaults. Extensive testing and redesign, led by Tank, eventually eradicated these and the resultwas a sturdy machine with excellent flying characteristics. It was a conventional single-baybiplane constructed with a steel tube fabric-covered fuselage and wooden wings, also fabriccovered, whose most distinctive visual feature was probably the large streamlined fairings tothe fixed undercarriage legs. The first smail production batch, known as the Fw 44 B, waspowered by a 150 hp Siemens Sh 14A radial engine, followed by the similar Fw 44 D.A smailquantity was built as the Fw 44 E with the 120 hp Argus in-line engine, but the bulk of themachines built were of the military Fw 44 F type. These were powered by the reliable SiemensSh 14 A radial engine.Aerobatic pilots of the calibre of Ernst Udet and Gerd Achgelis quickly helped establisha reputation for both the aircraft and the manufacturer. The result was a massive influx oforders, which established Focke- Wulf Flugzeugbau GmbH as a major aircraft manufacturer.Before the war the Stieglitz formed the initial equipment of many of the early DVS, DLVand LI,iftwaJfe units. In service in large numbers throughout the war with many of the AlBschools, several examples survived until the 1950s. Apart from overseas buyers in Bolivia,Chile, China, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Rumania, and Switzerland, five countries producedthe type under licence, namely Austria,Argentina, Bulgaria, Brazil and Sweden. In total, over900 examples were built.

N ea r m iss fo r a p ilo t a s t he H e 72 A in th e b ac kg ro un d trie s to ea t F w 44 O-EVYM,WNr. 345{?} , which is p ro ba bly b ein g u se d b y t he O LV . T he u pp er d eck in g o f th e fu se la geappears to b e p a in te d b lu e o r g re en . T he e xa ct d at e a nd lo ca tio n is u nk no wn , b ut m ay b eSch le iBhe im in 1936-37.

O ri gin al ly re gi st er ed a s O -E IPa, t hi s Fw 44 0 or J n ow c arrie s t he 'w e m il it ar y p re fi x a ndB alk en kre uz w he re a h yp he n h ad p re vio us ly b ee n. A pa rt fro m th e f ac t th at th is p ro ba blyda te s the p ic tu re to s ome time in 1939 , n ot hin g e ls e is k nown .

Specif icat ionSpan :Length:L oa ded we ig ht :M ax sp eed:

9 .00 m (29 ft 6 '/4 in )7 .30 m (23 ft 113 /a in )8 70 k g ( 1, 91 9Ib )1 85 km /h (1 15 m ph)

LEFT:A ir -t o- ai r v iew o f a n i n- li ne e ng in edFw 44 E ,O - ERDa, p ro ba bl y in s er vi ce w it h t heD LV b efo re t he w ar.




A g ro up o f s ilv er -f in is hed Focke -Wu l fFw 4 4s , n e a re st CA+SG ,about to set off for af li gh t f rom t he g ra ssa ir fi el d o f S ch /FAR 13based a round P il sen ,Czechos lovakia , 1940 .On 1 October 1 9 4 1 thisb eca me F FS A lB 1 3.

A ve ry cle ar p ictu re onan unidentif iedL uft wa ffe b as e w it h al in e -up o f p ri st in e s il ve rF oc ke -Wu lf Fw 4 4s .The near es t machi ne ,WNr. 2 33 , a pp ea rs t oc ar ry a c od e b eg in ni ngw it h CO .Mar kin g s ty leand co lou rs s uggestmid -1940 on.

O ne o f th e ra re r v ers io ns o f th e F oc ke -W ulf F w 44 e lementar y t ra ine r, t heFw 4 4 E , p ow ere d b y a n in -lin e A rg us e ng in e. V aria nt s fitt ed w ith t his e ng in ew ere k no wn in th e L uft wa ffe a s th e 'lit te r-S tie glitz ' - S ha ky S tie glitz - o na cc ou nt o f t he v ib ra ti on . PS+NG , ( po ss ib ly WN r. 376 ) , w as s erv in g w ith F FSAl B 13 based a round P il sen , Czechos lo v ak ia , 1940 .

An un ident if ie d p il ot i n the i ns tr uc to r' sco ckp it o f a F w 44 , OA + ?? N ote th e fu elg au ge p ro je ctin g u p f ro m th e f us ela ge ju sta he ad o f t he f ro nt w in ds cr ee n.



L U F T W A F F E T R A I N I N G A I R e R A F T 2

A s ilv er F oc ke -Wu lf F w 44 , PS+NV , b el on gin g t o S ch /F AR 13 o r t he la te r F FSA lB 13 comesin lo w o ve r th e b ou nd ary fe nc e to la nd a t P ils en in C ze ch os lo va kia .

ABOVE: F ou r F oc ke -Wu lf F w 44 trainea ll fin is he d in d ar k g re en u pp ers ur fa ce s, a nd so t he y p ro bably d at ef rom about 1941 on. V is ib le c od es , f roto b ac k, a re K P+NJ , K P+NF , K P+NX ,K P+ ND . T he u nit m ay b e A lB 11 9 in1 94 2, t o wh ic h KP+ND is kn ow n to h abeen al located.

An a ll -s il ve r Fw 44 of a n u nkn ow n u nit ta xie s o ut fo rtake-off on a r ou tin e t ra in in g f li gh t p ro babl yimmed ia te ly p re -w a r. D a te a nd l oc at io n u nk nown.

Thewreckage of F oc ke -Wu lf F w 4 4, DD+CR, poss ib lyfrom FFSAlB 13 . N ote th e p atch y d ark g re en fin ish a ndt he whi te o ut lin ed b la ck l et te rs . DD+CR had as ur pr is in gly l on g c ar ee r f or a t ra in er , h av in g e ar li ers er ve d w ith th e J FS a t S ch le if3 he im in O cto be r 1 93 3andJFS 2 a t W er ne uc he n in 1 94 0. B oth o cc up an ts o ft he a ir cr af t w hen it c ra sh ed her e a ppar en tl y e sc apedseriousinjury.




A flight of Fw 44 s fromunidentified 'I .d I, ylng schoemons trat e t he iriormeti 'I'n I, y lng sk il ls .

L:, . , . , . -

An Argus .CW +BO ~ nglned Fw 44 E ,' .. Nr. 425, seenon an unidentiti ..probabl 'eo airfield,yearly In t he war .

P '1hUPI a nd i ns tr uc to r ineir p la ce s in a n

Unidentified B " 1pupil in t h U 31 . Thee r ea r sslightlyapp h eat looksre e ns tv e.



TwoFw44 s o f A lB 71 a t P ro ssn itz a fte r a ty pic al ta xy in g a cc id en t, p ro bs blv s om et im e in 1 94 0-4 1. B o th a re f in ish edo ve ra ll s ilv er a nd d is pl av t he u ni t's ma gn if ic en t w in ge d g ri ff on embl em .

A n e x am ple o f th e F oc ke - W ulf F w 44 F , workhorseo f t he Lu ftwaf fe p rimar y t lv it u; t ra in ing s chool s.PT+NF,WNr. 2554, in se rvice w ith F FS A lB 13 ,c ar rie s a d ul l s il ve r f in is h a nd a v el /ow f us ela gebandand is seen a t P il sen , Czechos lo vak ia ,s ome time b e tw ee n 1 94 0 an d 1 94 2.

S tu de nt pilo t H an s II le , w ho la te r fle w w ith J G 2 6,p os es i n fro nt o f a F w 44 'S tie gli tz ' c od ed BO+CCwhi le u nd er go in g t he f in al p ar t o f h is p il ot t ra in in g.

L U F T W A F F E T R A I N I N G A IR e R A F T

FFSAlB 71 Badge

V ie w to p ort fro m th e fron t se at o f a F ocke - W u lf F w 44 a s iton the fligh t line w ith tw o o th ers. T he ne xt a ircra ft, ? ?+BM,a n u nu su al s tv le o f l et te rin g.




Heinkel He 72 Kadett (Cadet)Another of the numerous two-seat German sports and training biplanes of the 1930s, theprototype Heinkel He 72 A, D-2574, first flew in 1933 and was powered by a 140 hp ArgusAs 8 B in-line engine. A totally conventional biplane of fabric-covered metal construction,with tandem seats in open cockpits, machines of this type equipped several NSFK units. Aftera short production run of He 72 As, most aircraft were built with the more powerful 160 hpSiemens Sh 14 A radial engine, which often made it difficult to distinguish them from thesimilarly powered Fw 44. In this configuration it was known as the He 72B and subsequentlysaw service at many Luftwaffe training schools. A single experimental example with floats, theHe 72 HW, was built but was not proceeded with; the earlier and bigger He 42 was consideredto be more efficient in this role. 30 He 72 B-3 Edelkadetts with spats over the mainwheelswere built for civilian use. Final development of the He 72 family was the sole He 172,D-EEHU, which differed mainly in the use of a cowling for the Siemens engine.In the event only 235 He 72s were built as production priority was required for the far moreimportant He 111 bomber.Robust, but with performance verging on the modest side, the He 72 seems to have beenovershadowed by the more modern Bucker types, yet it had its moment of glory when ex-Slovak Air Force examples were used by the Slovak insurgent combined squadron forreconnaissance during the abortive uprising at Tri-Duby in summer 1944.

Specif icat ionSpan:Length:L oa de d w eig htM a x speed:

9 .00 m (29 ft6 l/4 in) .7 .5 0 m (2 4 ft 7 '/4 in )8 65 k g (1 ,9 07 Ib )1 85 k rn /h (1 15 m ph )

FFS A/B 71 Badge

ABOVE : T his H e 72 B 'K edett' was w ith FFS AlBs ta ti on ed a t O lm ilt z, C ze ch os lo va kia d ur in g Ma

Thi s H e 72 'K ed et t' c od ed C P+ AH w as u se dfo r s tu nt fly in g b y th e a ero ba tic a ceHe inr ich Fa lderbaum.



l U F T W A F F E T R A I N I N G A I R e R A F T

A l ine -up of He 72 Cs f it te d w ith A rgus 8 B e ng in es, a t th e H ein ke l w orks inRosto ck . T he y c ar ry s ome of t he l as t b a tc h of c iv il n umber c odes a ll oc at edbe fo re t he int roduct ion of th e n ew all- le tte r c od es in tro du ce d a fte r 2 0M a rc h1934 . The f ir st a ir cr af t c oded 0 -3 248 is WN r. 5 62 .

A tra in ee p ilo t w ith F FSA lB 11 9 m akin g a s olo flig ht in a H e 72 B fitte d w ithS iemens Sh 14 A engi ne .

FFSAjB 119 Badge

Ano the r l ine -up of He 72 Cth e H ein ke l w ork s in R os tow hic h n ow c ar ry th e a ll-lec iv il c od es w hic h w erein tr od uc ed a fte r 2 0 M arc h

A g ro up of s ix b ra nd n ewHe 72 Bs ca rr yi ng a l l- le tt erc ivil co de s w hic h w ere u sthe 1934 Oeu tschland fl ug a



28 F L E 0 G L IN G E A G L E S

A H ein ke l H e 72 D 'K ad ett ' c od ed 0 -3 33 1 b ein g u se d a sa sp orts -p la ne w hile a t t he sa me tim e b ein g u se d a s ac landes ti ne t ra ine r fo r t he Lu ftwaf fe .

T his p ho to gra ph o f a lin e-u p o f t hre e H e 728s wa st ak en a t O lomoc a ir fi eld i n C ze ch os lo va ki a d ur in g 1 94 1.T he f irs t a irc ra ft s till h as th e fiv e a ll-le tte r c iv il c od e a ndth e tw o b eh in d h av e h ad a 8 alk en kr eu z a dd ed ju st inf ro nt o f t he f ro nt c oc kp it , i nd ic at in g t ha t t he se ma ch in esw e re u se d b y t he L uf tw a ff e in t he ir t ra in in g p ro gr amme .

S till in c iv il m a rk in gs w ith t he a ll- le tte r c od e D -EH YZi nt ro du ce d a ft er 2 0 Ma rc h 193{ t his H e 728-3' Ed el ke de tt ' ( Le ad in g C a de tl w a s a n imp ro ve d v ar ia nth av in g m a in wh ee l e nc lo se d s pa ts a nd a n e ng in ec ow lin g. O nly t hirt y o f th is v aria nt w er e b uilt.

T he tr ain ee p ilo t in t his H e 728 is w aitin g fo r t he s ig na l to t ako ff o n a s olo f lig ht w hile h is in st ru ct or, h av in g r em ov ed h isp ara ch ute w hic h lie s n ea r th e ta il o f t he a irc ra ft, lo ok s o n.T he o ff ic er s ta nd in g b es id e th e a irc ra ft , is w aitin g to a ss es s tp er fo rm a nc e o f t he s tu de nt, w hile t he g ro un d c re w lo ok o n winterest.



L U F T W A F F E T R A I N I N G A I R e R A F T

Arado Ar 66One of the halI-dozen or so small biplane types used as primary trainers by the Lviftwa_fJe, theAr 66 followed a similar formula of fabric-covered mixed wood and metal construction.An entirely conventional trainer, probably the most notable difference between the Ar 66 andother trainers was the use of a distinctive Arado-shaped rudder without a fin. Designed byWalter Rethel and first flown from Arados Warnemunde factory in 1932, the prototypeAr 66a was powered by an Argus As 10C in-line engine of 240 hp. An essentially similarsecond landplane prototype was preceded by the Ar 66b floatplane which was fitted with twinfloats attached to numerous struts. Ten of these were produced as the Ar 66 B in 1933 butfailed to find favour and did not reach operational service. Production of 1,425 examples ofwhat was probably the hiftwaJfe's least known biplane primary trainer, began in 1933 as theAr 66 C. Powered by the same Argus As 10C engine as the prototypes, the Ar 66 C wasassigned to most of the AlB schools and performed well in steady, if unspectacular, fashion.Two examples used for instrument flying, DA+PI and SD+KV, served with AlB 71.The unpleasant and irritating nocturnal activities of Soviet Polikarpov U-2 biplanes on theEastern Front prompted the Germans to respond in kind. Casting about for a suitable vehicle,large numbers of sturdy and tractable Ar 66 C and Go 145 trainers were consequently selectedto see action. Formed initially into StorkampJstaJfeln (Night-harassing squadrons), these aircraftwere reorganised in late 1943 into Nachtschlachtgruppen (Night Ground-Attack Groups), wherethey saw extensive service behind the Russian front lines dropping booby traps and light anti-personnel bombs. Numerous Ar 66 trainers were modified for this role with underwing bombracks and operated on dark nights at treetop level, often fitted with ski undercarriages. SixteenStaJfeln were formed using these aircraft, including one manned by Estonians, two by Latviansand one by Russian volunteers.

SpecificationSpan :Length:Loaded we igh t:M a x s pe ed :

10 .00 m (3 2 ft 93 /4 in )8 .30 m (2 7 ft 23/4 in )1 ,3 3 0 k g ( 2, 93 3 Ib )210 km/h (130 mph)

A n u nid en tifie d A ra do A r 66 , B?+?M , poss ib lyof LK S 2 ba sed a t Re in sdor f, n e ar Zw ic kau ,fin is he d o ve ra ll in R LM G re y 0 2 w ith y ello wt ip s to t he under sid e of th e lo we r w in gs .

A ra do A r 66 , ??+NW , t ic ks o ve r as thein stru cto r w aits fo r h is n ex t s tu de nt w ho isapproach ing t he a ir cr af t.



3 0 F L E D G L I N G E A G L E S

Ove ra ll R LM 02A r ad oAr 66 , SE+RA,WNr. 2165 , of FF SA/ B 8 in f li gh t o ve rK arls ba d in J un e 1 94 1.

A ra do A r 66 OK+?J,WN r. 2 08 7, ofSch/FAR 13 b as ed a tP il sen i nCzechoslovakia,p ro ba bl y s ome time i n1940.

A tra in ee scra mble s ab oard a n A ra do A r 66 of SchAl B 13 fo r a flig ht fro m th e airfie ld a t P ilse n inCzechos lovakia . The a i rc raf t is u nr ema rk ab le e xc eth e v ery u nu su al n am e 'B erta ' ju st a bo ve th e c ro ssfro m o ne o r t wo o th er e xamp le s s ee n o n o th er a irt hi s un it , t he p ra ct ic e of g iv ing t ra in ing machi nesin div id ua l m ark in gs w as p ra ctic ally u nk no wn in thL uf tw aff e - a nd p ro ba bly m os t o th er a ir f orc es .




A ir -t o- ai r v iew o f a n a ll -g re y A ra do A r 66 , RT+NX,poss ibo f S ch /FAR 73 , in fl ig ht o v er t he c o un tr ys id e s om ewh er en ear B ay reu th . N o te h ow th e letters o n th e fu se la ge h avb ee n p ain te d o ve r a n e arlie r la rg er m ar kin g. T he c od eie tte rs h av e a ls o b ee n p ain te d o n th e u pp er w in g s ur fa ca fa ir ly u nc omm o n p ra ctic e. I AMC )

A ra do A r 66 , C T+B Z, be lie ve d to b e fro m S ch /F AR 73 inP ils en . T he s ch o ol d id n o t b ec om e F F S Al B 73 untilO c to b er 7 94 7 .

A ra do A r 66 tra in er s tie d d ow n a nd w ith c oc kp it c ov ersp la ce . N ea re st is W N r. 477, c o de d ? ?+BB.Oa te , u nit a nl oc at io n a re u nk nown .

I n a p re -w ar w in te r, th is A ra do A r 66 , w it h a c iv il c o deD - IXULa nd nati o na l ta il m a rk in g, h as t he s tu de nt r un n inu p th e e ng in e w hile w aitin g fo r th e p ilo t to j oin th e a ir cr



3 2 F L E D G L I N G E A G L E S

T he c ock pit o f a re ala er op la ne ! N ot e t hep rom inen t gun f ir in gb ut to n o n t he c on tr olc olumn whi ch w ou ldh av e e nc ou ra ge d a nybudd ing f ig hter p il ot .

A ra do A r 76 , D-/uSE,in u se a s a fig hte rtra iner , probablybe fo re the ou tb reako f W orld W ar II.T he f us el ag e s pin e i spai nted , p robab ly i nd ar k b lu e, b ut t her eg is tr at io n i s a puzz leas i t s hou ld i nd ic ateth at t he a irc ra ft is ama rin e C la ss 'B ' t yp eo f 5 ,0 00 k g ! T heloca t ion is uncer ta in,b ut c ou ld p os sib ly b eBe rnbur g. IAMC)

Arado Ar 76Originally designed as a lightweight single-seat advanced fighter-trainer capable of being usedas an 'emergency home defence fighter' in response to a request from the still-secret RLM in1934, the Ar 76 was just one of four designs considered for the purpose. Competing proposalswere also prepared by Focke- Wulf, Henschel and HeinkeL The specification indicated amarked preference for a monoplane to be powered by the Argus As 10 C liquid-cooledengine and with an armament of two 7_9 m111MG 17 machine guns and three 10 kg bombsin the fighter role, As a trainer, the only armament required was a single MG 17.

Arado's prototype was a strongly-built parasol with a simple tubular steel fuselage with acovering of alloy and fabric, while the wings were constructed from fabric-covered wood. Theelegant but heavy little machine had provision for the two required guns in the classic noseposition, with a small bay just behind the engine to hold three bombs. D-ISEN, the firstprototype, was lost early in the test programme and was followed by two other prototypeswhich had modified tail surfaces. In the evaluation of the competing designs, Focke- Wulf'sFw 56 Stosser gained first place, although the Ar 76 came such a close second that a smallproduction batch of 182 of the type was ordered as a backup. These were delivered to theLl,iftwaffe as trainers in the spring of 1936. Some are known to have later served with FFS AlB8 at Vilseck, FFS AlB 23 at Kaufbeuren and with LKS 1 at Kamenz.

S eci f icat ionSpan :Length:L oa ded we ig ht :M ax sp eed:

1 0.8 8 m (3 5 ft 8 1 /2 in )10 .30 m (3 3 ft 9 1 /2 in )2 ,1 25 k g (4 ,6 84 Ib )3 49 km /h (2 17 m ph)



A h elp in g h an d f or t hep il ot o f t his A r 76 codede FtA I, a s h e ta xie s o utfo r take-of f Or ig ina l lyallocated to LKS Berl in -Gatow in Apr il 1936, thea ir cr af t w as w it h t ha ts ch oo l w he n i t b ec ameLKS2 in J an ua ry 1 94 0.BVlate 1942 it w as still ins er vi ce w it h J FS 6 .I t i s u nk nown whic hsc ho ol it w as w ith w he nthi s p i ctur e was tak en .


The small s iz e o f t hebandy -legged Ar 76 isshown we ll i n thi s p ic tu reo fKX tNp, pos si bl y a tG i ir li tz . Despi te the we ll -wo rn f in is h, t he sun s ti llr ef le ct s s tr ong ly f rom thetai l. O ri gi na ll y w it h FFSA lB P la ue n in la te 1 93 9,the a ir cr af t l ater s er vedwi th AlB 1 and AlB 7.

A ra do A r 76 , OHtGF, tai n. P robab ly s ti ll p a in teove ra ll RLM 63 Greu,t he a ir cr af t r et ai ns t heswa st ik a in t he e ar lyc en tr al p os it io n o n t hea nd ru dd er. A tin yW Nr. can just be m adeout on the tip of ther udder . The mach ine iss ervice w ith e ith er L KSo r FFSA lB 117, b oth ow hich w ere a t K am enz1940-41 when th is p ictuw as t ak en . l AMe )



34 FLEDGLING EAGLES

T hre e v ie ws o f a nAr 76 coded D -IRASb ei ng t es te d a t t heA ra do f ac to ry inB r andenbur g nearBer lin . Th is a i rc raf tw as u se d a s a s in gles ea t ra in er f or p il ot sre ac hin g th e e nd o ft he ir t ra in in g f or s oloflights.

Arado Ar 76 coded RU+NA of FFS A/B 23 , May 1942This Ar 76 was painted in RLM Grey 02 allover with a yellow tail band around the centre of the fuselage. It alsocarried an inverted red triangle outlined in white between the engine and pilot's cockpit position.

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Documents

Fledgling Eagles - Luftwaffe Training Aircraft 1933-1945 (Luftwaffe Colours)