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THE BALKANS I
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1 I N OUR TIME S b
' %. r BY t I 4
i c Robert Lee Vjljlff I 9
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, Massachusetts
'974
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THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV DISPUTE
, pro-~ominform Serbo-Croatian newspaper, which regularly
denounced Tito, and the Czechs were replying blandly that freedom
of the press existed in their country, and that moreover they
considered the newspaper in question a "democratic anti-fascist
periodical which is fighting for the realization of the principle
of people's democracy." *'
I Hefore the end of 1948, the satellite states had expelled
members of the i of the Yugoslav Legations, including :he
"instructor of the General
political Administration of the Yugoslav Army attached to the
Political Ad- ministration of the Albanian Army."22 Frontier
incidents began: shootings, crossings of the border, and
"violations of airspace." All the Cominform countries enormously
increased the length and number of their Serbo-Croatian language
broadcasts to Yugoslavia. Though the pressures had by no means
reached their height by the end of 1948, the various forms which
pressure would take had emerged: "political warfare," economic
warfare, and the actual use of force.
POLITICAL WARFARE
By early 1949, all methods were being drastically stepped up.
Yugoslav exile groups under Cominform sponsorship appearetf in
every Cominform capital. Each had its own Serbo-Croatian newspaper.
When the Yugoslavs protested against the Soviet sponsorship of the
group in Moscow, the Russians replied on May 31, 1949 by drawing a
distinction between Yugoslav govern- ment and Yugoslav people. The
Yugoslav government, they maintained, had "pursued n hostile policy
towards the Soviet Union, . . . fell so low as to join the camp of
enemies of the Soviet Union," and "transformed the Yugoslav press
into a loudspeaker for the furious anti-Soviet propaganda being
dis- seminated by the fascist agents of imperialism. . . ."23
Therefore, the Soviet Government had decided "to receive and give
shelter to the Yugoslav patriot- exiles . . . true socialists and
democrats, faithful sons of Yugoslavia. . . ."'* The Bulgarians
used precisely the same language about their group of Yugo- slav
anti-Titoites. When the Tito government charged that the anti-Tito
Yugoslavs being sheltered in Albania had made a foray across the
frontier, the Albanians rejected the note of protest with a
countercharge that the Yugoslavs were violating the Albanian
frontier.
The Poles invited the dissident Yugoslav group in Warsaw to
participate
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THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV DISPUTE
wanted to draw up a final balance sheet and liquidate the
partnership by dividing the profits or losses according to the
shares put up by each partner. The Russians refused; and the
Yugoslavs, anxious to get the matter settled, agreed to pay the
freight on all Soviet property to the USSR, to compensate the USSR
for property which had worn out in the service of the companies, to
refund Soviet cash, to take over all but certain specified
liabilities, and to bear the expenses of liquidation. Thus
terminated the only two mixed com- panics which the Russians had
succeeded in establishing in Yugoslavia.
>f IL lWRY PRESSURES
As for acts of overt hostility, these took a variety of forms.
Soviet and satellite representatives in Yugoslavia allegedly
engaged in espionage, smuggled Yugoslav citizens out of the
country, and engaged in efforts to subvert the Hungarian and
Albanian minorities. An Albanian "terrorist" allegedly crossed the
frontier into Kossovo-Metohiya and killed seven and wounded three
Yugoslav officials on orders from Albanian authorities. According
to one of the gang, arrested and tried in Yugoslavia, the object of
the murders was to stir up revolution against the Tito regime, to
disrupt the machinery of gov- ernment, and to produce a flight of
the citizens (mostly ethnic A!banians) into Albania. A Bulgarian
captured crossing the Yugoslav frontier in March 1949 allegedly
confessed that he had been hired to preach discontent among the
population and to sabotage machinery in the factories. Others were
to engage in propaganda for the USSR and against Tito. According to
official Yugoslav figures, frontier incidents on the Albanian
frontier during the first six months of 1949 totaled forty-three,
on the Bulgarian frontier seventy-four, on the Rumanian frontier
sixteen, and on the Hungarian frontier forty-four.
THE YUGOSLAV COL'NTERMEASUW
This recital of the grave damage done to Yugoslavia by the USSR
and its eastern European satellites, however, should not be allowed
to create the im- pression that Yugoslavia was the only sufferer.
The economies of the satellites suffered considerably as the result
of the end of Yugoslav deliveries, which had been worth
$~oo,ooo,ooo annually. The quarrel also made trouble for the
Communists in Greece, whose dependence on Tito doubtless went a
long way to explain Stalin's lack of enthusiasm for the Greek
uprising. Perhaps because he was a kind of prisoner of the
Yugoslavs, Markos was relieved of his com- mand at the end of
January 19-19; the Greek Communists now proceeded to try to turn
the N O F from a pro-Yugoslav into a pro-Cominform organization.
The new N O F line called in March 1949 for a united autonomous
Macedonia. This meant both the subtraction from Yugoslavia of
Tito's Federal Republic, and the subtraction from Greece of Greek
Macedonia, hardly a proposal calculated to win the Communists the
support of many Greeks. Indeed, both the Greek government and the
Yugoslavs propagandized the NOF shift of line as a pro-Bulgarian
move. So N O F and the Greek Communists quickly
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Sovernment poised at the Albanian frontier, there was a very
real possibility $at the Greeks might be tempted to take advantage
of the situation to invade Albania and attempt to seize "northern
Epirus." The undeniable fact that the Albanian Communist government
of Hoxha had long assisted the Communist rebels against the Greek
government gave the Greeks a welcome excuse to attack.
If they attacked, the treaty would oblige Tito to come to the
aid of his old hiend and present enemy Hoxha. If Tito should honor
the treaty and send Iroops into Albania from the north, the
Cominform states could accuse him ,f violating the sovereignty of a
friendly state and plotting to divide Albania with the Greek
"monarcho-fascists." If he should ignore the Greek move, and not
send troops, the Cominform states could accuse him of violating his
treaty with Albania. In short, it was clear that whatever Tito's
response might be to a Greek attack on Albania, it would give the
Cominform states a pretext to attack him and precipitate a Balkan
war, with all its incalculable consequences.
The situation was dangerous indeed. As early as August 1949, the
Al- banians were complaining of Greek violations of their southern
frontier. The Yugoslavs called the attention of the British and
American Ambassadors in Belgrade to the dangers of these Greek
moves. Both Washington and London let the Greek government know
that they vigorously opposed any invasion of Albania, and the Greek
government launched no invasion. On November 2, 1949, the Yugoslav
government invited the Albanians to resume truly friendly relations
as implied by the treaty, and rehearsed 311 its grievances against
the Hoxha regime.39 The Yugoslavs clearly expected and hoped that
the Albanians would not respond favorably to this note, and .that
the treaty could then be broken, with the onus of breaking it
resting on Albania.
The Yugoslavs did not publish the Albanian response, but on
November 1% declaring it unsatisfactory, they notified Albania that
they no longer con- sidered themselves bound by the treaty. They
reviewed at length their relations with Albania, emphasizing
economic and cultural aid: it now appeared, for instance, that more
than 1,500 Albanian students had studied in Yugoslav agricultural
and technical schools, and that Yugoslavia had sent to Albania
thirty teachers for elementary and secondary schools. The Yugoslavs
also sum- marized Albanian hostile acts against Yugoslavia
following the Cominform resolution, and accused them of reviving
the old "fascist" slogan of "ethnic Albania," and thus reopening
the ancient Kossovo dispute. The danger in- herent in the Albanian
treaty was thus averted by its abrogation. But the last even
nominally. friendly tie binding Yugoslavia to its neighbors had
been
