volume20,no.14 may2020

The Arts of Action

C. Thi NguyenUniversity of Utah

© 2020 C.ThiNguyenThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/020014/>

T hetheoryandcultureoftheartshasbeenlargelyfocusedontheartsofobjectsandhaslargelyignoredtheartsofaction.Here,Iwishtodrawattentiontotheneglectedartsofaction.

Thesearetheartsintendedtoengenderagencyandactivityintheiraudience,forthesakeoftheaudience’saestheticappreciationofthatactivity. This includes their appreciation of their own deliberations,choices,reactions,andmovements.

Theaestheticsofourownactionsarealreadyanaturalpartoftherich experience of our lives. And the arts of action already exist inplenty;wearesurroundedbythem.Manyofourartifactsaredesignedforthesakeofencouragingandstructuringtheaestheticsofactions.Games, cities, food rituals, social dances, and more—all are formswhichsculptactivity,oftenforaestheticends.Buttheseartshavebeeninadequately appreciated in theoretical work on art and aesthetics,andoftenignoredinmuchpublicreflectiononthevalueofthearts.Theyarerarelycalled“arts”,but,Iargue,theydeservetobe.

Consider rock climbing. Rock climbing is a profoundly aestheticenterprise. Climbing culture is replete with aesthetic lingo. Climb-erstalkaboutthebeautifulmovementofaclimb,abouttheexquisitegracethataparticularlytrickysequencecalledoutofthem.Manypeo-pleclimbinorder toexperiencetheirowngraceful, interesting,dra-maticmovement.1What’smore,thequalityofaclimber’smovementissignificantlyconditionedbyanexternalobject.Eachclimbcallsforaparticularformofmotion.Oneclimbcallsforpowerful,direct,aggres-sivemovement;anotheroneforloose,monkey-likeswingingaround;another for dainty, precisely balanced, tiny steps. And climbs, andtheirimpliedmovement,canbedesigned.Inclimbinggyms,“setters”designclimbingroutes,creatingpuzzlestosolveinmovement.Andtheparticulardetailsofthosepuzzlesshapethenatureoftheresultingmovement.Similarly, someboardgamesaredesigned toencourageparticularturnsofmind.Forexample,thedesignofchessoffersacon-centratedaccesstoaparticularlyelegantformofcogitation.Thechessplayergets toexperiencetheemergenceofa lovelysolutionfroma

1. (Nguyen2017a).Forgeneraldiscussionoftheaestheticsofmovementfromthephilosophyofsport,see(Best1974;Cordner1984).

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in where the primary aesthetic properties emerge. In the arts of ob-jects,theartist imbuestheartifactitselfwithaestheticproperties.Intheartsofaction,theartistcreatestheartifactinordertocallforthaes-theticaction,wheretheintendedaestheticpropertieswillemergeintheactionsthemselves.(Imeanherean“artifact”intheloosestsense,whichincludesphysicalobjectssuchasrockclimbingroutes,plateddishesoffood,ritualssuchasthePassoverSeder,communalpracticessuchastangodancing,andentitiesasabstractastherulesforapartygame.)

By contrasting the arts of action with the arts of objects, I don’tmeantobedrawingadistinctionbetweenliveperformancesandstat-icphysicalartifacts.Formypurposes,Icountpaintings,novels,movies,musicalperformances,theatricalperformances,andstageddancesasexemplars of the traditional arts of objects. In all these cases, thereissomeworkwhichexistsindependentlyofanaudience,whichtheaudienceappreciatesandtowhichweattributeaestheticproperties.Inaliveperformanceasmuchasapainting,theaestheticpropertiesadheretosomeexternalartifact.ItisthisperformanceofKing Learthatcapturestheparticulartragedyofregretsowell;itisthealbumEnter the Wu Tang (36 Chambers) whichisfullofeerieauralspaceandsatis-fyinglyunhingedrhythm.Theartsofaction,on theotherhand,aremarkedbydistinctivelyself-reflectiveaestheticappreciation.Inthesearts, the focus of the appreciator’s aesthetic attention is on the aes-theticqualitiesoftheirownactions.

Theterm‘action’—thoughinsomewaysthemostevocativeofmyinterest—is philosophically fraught, and some of its colloquial con-notationsareabitnarrowformypurposes.Letmeswitchtoaslightlyless laden term. Let’s call the larger realm here “process aesthetics”andstipulatethattheterm‘process’refersspecificallytoactivityfromtheperspectiveof theactor.Processaestheticscoverstheaestheticsofmentalandphysicalprocesses,including,butnotlimitedto,one’sown investigating, thinking, perceiving, deciding, choosing, mov-ing,changing,andactinguponexternalobjects.Italsoincludestheaestheticsoftheworld,experiencedaspartoftheactivity.Partofthe

thousandtacticalminutiae,andtheygetitwithsomefrequency—farmorethantheyarelikelytogetfromgrindingawayattheactualprob-lems of the world (Osborne 1964). Rock climbing and chess, I willargue,areexamplesofthearts ofaction.Theyarepracticesorientedaround designing artifacts and procedures, which sculpt, encourage,andcallforthaestheticexperiencesofdoing.

1. Process art and object art

Let’stakeastepback.Thereisalargecategoryofhumanpractice:thearts.Speakingloosely,theartsarethepracticeofmanufacturingarti-factsforaestheticreasons.2Wehavebeen,Ithink,tooreadytothinkthatthispracticecanbefilledoutonlyinoneparticularway:Anartistcreatesanartifactandimbuesitwithaestheticproperties.Theartifactis theartworkandthebearerofaestheticproperties.Thentheaudi-encecomesalongandexperiences theartifact,appreciatingtheaes-theticpropertiesthatoccurintheartifact.Theartifactbridgesthegapbetweenartistandaudiencebyactingasakindofcarrierforaestheticproperties.Thisisthegeneralschemaoftheartsofobjects.

ButIamsuggestingthatthereisatleastonemore,verydifferentschemafor thearts: thatof theartsofaction. In thatschema,someperson (or persons) makes an artifact. (We might as well call themtheartist, thoughwecould justaseasilycall themsomethingelse.)Theartifactisintendedasapromptforfurtheractivity.Otherscomealongandengagewiththeartifact,lettingitpromptthemintoanac-tivity whose contours are partially determined by that artifact. Andthenthoseparticipantsappreciatetheaestheticqualitieswhichariseintheirownactions.Thisschemadifferssharplyfromthefirstschema

2. Many deny that all art is made for aesthetic reasons. I do not mean to beclaimingthatallartmustbemadeonlyforaestheticreasons.Ionlymeantobesuggestingthat,inthecategoryoftheaestheticallyorientedarts,therearetwosorts. I leavethenotionof“aestheticreasons”purposefullyvaguehere,andI intendmyaccounttobecompatiblewithanynumberofwaysoffill-ingthisout.ImyselffavorDominicLopes’recentaccount,whichfocusesonconsiderationsofaestheticvaluethatbearonaestheticactions(Lopes2018,32–36).Anotherusefulaccount,whichmydiscussioniscompatiblewith,is(GorodeiskyandMarcus2018).

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isgoodbecauseithasinducedandencouragedmetobegraceful,andhelpedtoshapetheformofmygrace.5

Iwillassume,fortheremainderofthispaper,thattherecanbeaes-theticqualitiesinone’sownactions—thatprocessaestheticsisreal.Ihavearguedforthispossibilityatlengthelsewhere,drawingespeciallyonrecentworkintheaestheticsofbodilymovement(Nguyen2019a;2020,especially101–120).6Furthermore,therecentconversationontheaestheticsoftheeverydayhasalsobeguntoexploretheaesthet-icsofactions,astheyemergeinordinaryactivity.Theconversationineverydayaestheticshaschartedtheaestheticqualitiesofsuchactionsasscratchinganitchordoinghousework(Irvin2008a,2008b;Saito2007,2015;Lee2010).

Crucially,thoughphilosophershavebeguntothinkaboutprocessaesthetics,theyhavelargelyignoredthepossibilityofprocessart.Ev-erydayaestheticshasfocusedontheaestheticsofmorespontaneous,agent-driven activities. It has ignored the possibility that we mightmake artifacts in order to shape experiences of process aesthetics.Theorists of everyday aesthetics seem to presume that process aes-thetics is somehow incompatible with the practices of art-making.Elsewhere, theoristshave investigatedart forms that seemrifewith

5. Iwillnotfilloutthenotionofan“aestheticproperty”,forIwishmyaccounttobecompatiblewithawidevarietyoftheories.Ihaveattemptedtoensure,attheveryleast,thatmyaccountiscompatiblewiththeviewsthataestheticpropertiesarerecognizedthroughjudgmentsoftaste;thatattributingthemrequiresfirst-personalacquaintance;thatrecognizingaestheticpropertiesinanobjectrequirescorrectlyperceivingfeaturesinthatobject;andthataes-theticpropertiesmerittheperceptionsofthem.

6. Much of this work has been made possible by earlier work on bodily per-ceptionandthepossibilityofanaestheticsofbodilysenses,includingworkon proprioceptive experiences of dance (Montero 2006). Also crucial hasbeen work rejecting the requirement that all aesthetic experiences be sen-sory,muchofitemanatingfromworkonconceptualart.(Schellekens2007)providesanexcellentoverviewofthatterrain,andaconvincingargumentforthepossibilityoftheaestheticexperienceofideas.Noticethatthecategoryof aesthetics of actions is a much larger one than, say, that of somaesthet-ics,whichconcentratesspecificallyontheinternalaestheticsofbodilymove-mentandexcludes,say,theinternalaestheticsofdoinglogicorplayingchess(Shusterman2012).

processaestheticsofrockclimbingliesinhowtherockclimberseestherock,whentheyarelookingtoitasobstacleandmeansforforwardprogress.

Processaestheticspermeatesourlives,oftenemergingasapartofournatural, spontaneous,andunsculptedeverydayactivity.When Iswerve around an unexpected obstacle in the road, I might delightintheeleganceandbeautiful,swiftprecisionofmyresponse.WhenIfinallyfigureoutthesolutiontoaphilosophicalpuzzlethathasbeenplaguingme,Icandosothroughclumsy,ugly,brute-forcereasoning,orImightalightdirectlyonthesolutionwithawonderfullypreciseturnofmind.Someactions,ofcourse,areaestheticallyevaluablefromtheoutsideandtheinside.Thegraceofadancer’smovementmaybeevidentbothtotheinnerkinestheticsenseandtotheoutsideobserv-er’seye.Butsomeaspectsofactingareprimarilyavailabletotheactingagentthemselves:whatitfeelsliketochoose,todecide,tooriginateanaction, torespondtoachangingenvironment.Thesenseof free-domorconstraintengenderedbyagameenvironmentoranurbanlandscape is one available primarily to the navigating agent. Thesevariousexperiencesofagencyandskillarethespecialprovenanceofprocessaesthetics.

But, Iwillargue,wecanalsoshapetheseexperiencesaspartofanintentionalartisticpractice.Theprocessarts,then,aretheartsinwhichartifactsaremadeforthesakeofbringingaboutfirst-personalaestheticexperiencesofmentalandphysicalprocesses.3Iwillcontrastprocessartwithobjectart,whichItaketobethedominantforminhighartculture—atleastintheartculturesdescendedfromtheWest-ernEuropeantradition.Inobjectart,theaestheticpropertiesadheretotheartisticartifact.Inprocessart,theaestheticpropertiesadherepri-marilytotheprocessesandactivitiesoftheactor,asinstigatedorinflu-encedbytheartifact.4Inobjectart,theartworkisgoodinvirtueofitsbeing,say,graceful.Inprocessart,itisIwhoamgraceful;theartwork

3. ThoughIfocusonaestheticallyorientedprocessart,Ihavewrittenthedefini-tionsoastobeopentothepossibilityofnon-aestheticprocessart.

4. IintendnoconnectiontoWhitehead’s“processphilosophy”.

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Thehistoricalinattentiontotheprocessartshasleftanumberofkeyquestionsunanswered.Whoistheartistinprocessart?Howdotheyimbueanartifactwiththecapacitytoshapearesultingactivity?Whoisresponsiblefortheaestheticqualitiesofaction—theartistortheactiveaudience? Inwhat follows, Ioffera theoryof theprocessartsandmakefirstattemptsatansweringthesequestions.Iarguethattheprocessartsareaviable,andimportant,categoryofthearts.Igivea general account of the basic difference between process arts andobject arts, in terms of the prescribed focus of aesthetic attention. Igiveanaccountoftheplaceoftheartistintheprocessarts,andarguethatwecanoftenattributesignificantresponsibilityfortheaestheticqualities of an audience member’s action to an artist. And I defendtheprocessartsfromvariousskepticalclaims.Finally,Itakethefirststepstowardsdiagnosingtheresistancetoprocessart.Thisanalysis,Ihope,willalsoexposesomebasicpresuppositionsengenderedbythelargelyobject-centeredhistoryofourartisticpractice.

Onelastnote:Iusetheterm‘art’hereforlackofabetterterm,butI am not particularly attached to it. For my purposes, the importantclaims are that we humans engage in practices of making artifactsforaestheticpurposes;and that thereare twodistinctivecategoriesofthoseartifacts,oneofwhichhasbeentheoreticallyneglected.Andfurthermore,thatwehaveneglectedthepossibilitythatwecancreateartifactstointentionallybringaboutaestheticexperiencesofactivity.WhenIsaythatthesocialtango,games,andcitiesdeservetobecalled“arts”,Imeanthattheydeservetotakeupaplaceinthepantheonofhuman-createdartifacts,createdforaestheticpurposes.Mygoalistoinvestigateandgiveanaccountoftheseartifacts.Iwillmakeacasethat these artifacts are quite similar to the traditional object arts insome very important regards, and that some of the most cherishedfeaturesoftheobjectartsalsooccurintheprocessarts.ButIwillnotrigorouslydefendmyuseoftheterm‘art’beyondpointingoutthesesimilarities.Ifthereaderwishestoreservetheterm‘art’forwhatI’mcalling the “object arts”, and wishes to use some other term for the

process qualities. The academic discussion of videogames as an artform,aswewillsee,hastypicallyfocusedonobject-qualities,suchasfixedstory,graphics,andmusic,andignoredtheaestheticqualitiesofplayerchoiceandskilledplayeraction.Inordertorendersuchobjectslegible to theestablished termsofdiscourse,conventionalaesthetictheoryhaslargelyignoredtheirprocessaestheticqualities.

Philosophicalaesthetics,then,seemstobehaveasifthereareonlytwooptions:eithertherecanbeprocessaesthetics,butnotinart;ortherecanbeart,butdenudedofprocessaesthetics.Inotherwords,thediscussionseems topresumethat therecanbenoprocessart.Whymight that be? Yuriko Saito makes a compelling suggestion in heraccountofeverydayaesthetics.Withordinaryexternalobjects, saysSaito,wecanclearlydelineatewhatwearesupposedtofocusourat-tentionon.Butwithactions,theaestheticqualitiesaretoovariabletosupport any intersubjectively stable experiences. We can all look atthesameexternalobject,butweeachhaveourowndifferentactivi-ties.Itthusseemsverydifficulttohaveanysortofcriticaldiscourseormakeanysortofobjectiveaestheticjudgmentofourownactions.Andmakingsuchobjectiveaesthetic judgmentsandhavingsuchsharedexperiencesarethefoundationsofthepracticeofart.So,saysSaito,toembracetheaestheticsofaction,wemust,forthatspace,abandonthedemandsofart(Saito2007,18–26;Saito2015).

Hereiswheremyaccountdifferssharply.Ithinkwecanusearti-factstoshapeaestheticactivityinawaythatissignificantlylikethetraditionalarts. Furthermore, thoseartifacts help to stabilize certainexperiencesofactionandmakethemmoreintersubjectivelysharable.Theaestheticsofactionarenotsimplyconfinedtoeverydayactivity;they can be intentionally called forth and sculpted through artisticpractice.Therecanbeartsofaction.7

7. I don’t mean here to require that the purpose of an artifact align with thedesigner’sintent.A.W.Eatonprovidesausefulaccountofthe“function”ofanartifact,bywhichthefunctionissetbyetiologicalfactsaboutuseandtheproceduresbywhichartifactsevolve(Eatonforthcoming).

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fixednarratives.Indoingso,thetheoreticaldiscussionexcludespro-cessaesthetics,concentratinginsteadontheobject-aestheticqualitiesthatmightbefoundintheartifactitself.This,Isuggest,isduetothe-oreticalbaggage fromartculture’shistoricalemphasisontheobjectarts,andtherelativepaucityofdevelopedtoolsforthinkingabouttheprocessarts.8

A survey of various theoretical approaches to games will servehereasausefulcasestudy,tohelpustogetagriponthedominanceof theobjectartparadigm.Some theoristshave focusedon the rep-resentationalqualitiesof thegame.Forexample, IanBogostpraisesthosegamesthatmakeargumentsthroughproceduralrhetoric: thatis,gamesthatcommentonsocial,political,andeconomicsystemsbysimulatingtheminapointedway(Bogost2010). JohnSharphasar-guedthatvideogamescanbecomeartwhentheymovebeyondpro-moting mere player absorption in the instrumentalities of play, andstart,instead,torepresenttheworldinameaningfulway.Sharp,forexample,pointstoMaryFlanagan’sgameCareer Moves,whichrepro-ducestheoldfamilygameThe Game of Life,whileforcingplayerswithfemalepawnstomakestereotypicallygenderedcareerchoices.Flana-gan’sgame,saysSharp,isart,becauseitbringstheplayertoreflectongenderbiasesintheworld(Sharp2015).Flanaganherselfhasarguedthatgamescanbecomeartwhentheystarttoperformthefunctionsof much contemporary art—such as offering social critiques (Flana-gan2009).Thepatternofargumenthereisclear:forgamestobeanart,theremustbesomesortofvaluablerepresentationalcontentthatwe can attribute to the game itself. Notice that in all of these cases,thevaluablequalitiesthatmakethegameartareattributabletotheartifactitself—itsmechanics,itsrepresentationoftheworld,andthecommentary embedded in the rules of its simulation. Here, the art-status of videogames is defended by ignoring any process qualitiesandfocusingsolelyontheobjectqualities.Asimilarformofargumentalsooccursinthefast-growingliteraturewhichtreatsgamesasakind

8. ThisparagraphisabriefsummaryofanextendedaccountIhavedevelopedofgameaestheticselsewhere(Nguyen2019a;Nguyen2020).

higher-levelcategoryof“artifactsmanufacturedforaestheticreasons”,theymayfeelfreetosubstitutethetermoftheirchoicethroughout.

2. Games, tango, cooking, cities

Itwillbeusefultostepbackfromphilosophicaltheorizingforamo-ment and survey some representative process arts. First, games areclearexamplesofaprocessart.Imeangamesinthebroadsense,in-cluding board games, sports, videogames, and tabletop role-playinggames.Gamesareoftenmadeforthesakeoftheplayer’sexperienceoftheirownplay:theircontrollinganavatarthroughcarefullytimedse-quencesofdifficultjumps;theirthinkingthroughcomplexsequencesofmoves;andthegraceandprecisionoftheircomplexreactivemove-ments.Partoftheplayer’sexperiencealsoinvolvestheirpracticalex-periencesoftheobjectasitisrelevanttotheplayer’sactivity—likethespeedandshapeofobstacleshurtlingattheminavideogame.

Obviously,manygamesalsohavetraditionalobject-aestheticqual-ities.Whenwepraisethegraphicsofagamefortheirbeautyorgran-deur,weareattributingaestheticproperties toanobjectas itexistsindependentlyofouractivity.Butaverysignificantamountofgamedesigneffortgoesintoshapingtheplayer’sexperienceofactiveplay.Gamedesignerssculptachoicespaceandanactionspacewhichgiveplayers an opportunity for rich, interesting choices, for thrilling ac-tions, for graceful movement. Game designers often also neatly co-ordinatetheprocessandobjectqualities,asaclaustrophobicchoicespaceandadesperatesetofobstaclesmightbematchedtosimilarlyominousmusicandvisualdesign.Notethatthepracticeofgamede-signandgamecriticism,asitisfoundinthewild,islargelyfocusedontheexperientialelementsofactiveplay.Thediscoursethatnaturallyarisesinthepracticeofcreatingandappreciatinggamesofteninvolvesrichlyaestheticlanguage.Thenaturaltalkaboutgamesclearlytreatsgames as a process art. However, when we move to the theoreticaldiscussion of game aesthetics, and various attempts to demonstratethatgamesareavaluableformofart,thediscussionusuallyswitchestoobject-aestheticelements—likegraphics,sound,fixedscripts,and

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Gamesshouldalsodrawourgazetootherkindsofchoicespace—ofenvironmentsdesignedtosupportthefreemovementanddecisionofagents.Urbanplanningisalsoaprocessart,atleastinpart.Thinkofthedifferencebetweenthemiserableexperienceofnavigatingacer-tainkindofmodernAmericanmetropolitansprawl,fullofsamenessandrepetition,comparedtotherichandlivelyexperienceofnavigat-ing a city like Istanbul, full of lovely winding streets and delightfulmazes of back alleys and market paths. Some of this delight arisesfromobject-aestheticqualities,suchasthevisualqualityofthearchi-tectureandthestreet.ButadaywanderingthestreetsofIstanbulisalsoonerepletewithinterestinglytexturednavigationalchoices—ofnoticinganddiscoveringahiddenpassageway,ofdecidingtotakethebroad,curvingstreetortoenter,instead,thecool,darklabyrinthofanindoormarketplace.The layoutof thecity conditions thequalityofthesechoices.10

hand,non-philosophicaldiscussionofgamesoftenfocusesontheaestheticsof actions. We find such discussion in designers’ diaries and in online re-viewsofgames—thatis,inthenaturalpracticeoftheaestheticappreciationofgamesitself.Idiscussthosecriticalpracticesingreaterdetailin(Nguyen2019d).JonRobsondoes,infact,discusstheaestheticsofvideogameperfor-mances—thoughhisdiscussionisconfinedtothequestionofwhethersuchperformancesareaestheticallyevaluable,anddoesnotbroachthetopicofhowtheworkof thegamedesignermightshape theaestheticqualitiesofsuch performances (Robson 2018). Notably, some writers outside of philo-sophicalaestheticshavedirectedattentiontotheaestheticsofaction,mostnotably Jesper Juul (Juul 2004, 2013). Importantly, some work in the fieldofgamestudieshasstartedtoexploretheprocessaestheticsofgames.Forexamples,seeDanielVella’swork,whichoccursattheintersectionofliterarystudiesandcontinentalaesthetics(Vella2016),GraemeKirkpatrick’sdiscus-sionofvideogamesfromtheperspectiveofcontinentalaestheticsandcriti-caltheory(Kirkpatrick2011),andVeli-MattiKarhulahti’sworkontiminginvideogames,againfromacontinentalperspective(Karhulahti2013).Notably,allofthesediscussionsdrawheavilyontraditionsofcontinentalaesthetics.What’sparticularlyinterestinghereisthedegreetowhichphilosophicalaes-theticsintheanalytictraditionhaslargelyignoredprocessaestheticsentirelyinthediscussionofgamesasanartform.

10. The phenomenology of city walking has been the subject of much study,though most of it outside of analytic aesthetics. For an overview of conti-nental and phenomenological work on city strolling, see (Paetzold 2013).JonathanMaskitoffersaphenomenologicalaccountofurbanaesthetics,asconditionedbymobilityandtransportationtechnologies(Maskit2018).

offiction.Here,wearedirectedtofocusouraestheticappreciationnotonqualitiesinourownactions,butonfictionalqualitiesintheworkitself.InThe Art of Videogames,GrantTavinorclaimsthatvideogamesareartbecausetheyareakindoffiction.Hisaccountlocatesthepri-maryaestheticqualitiesofvideogamesinstablefeaturesintheartifact,suchasthenarrative,characters,andstory.Thesearefeaturesattribut-abletotheobject—thevideogameitself—ratherthantotheplayer’sactions. The player’s activity shows up in Tavinor simply as meansto further the ends of immersion in the fiction. A player’s struggleswith thechallengesof thegameare supposed tohelp theplayer toidentifywiththestrugglesoftheirin-gameavatar.Theplayer’sactiv-ityissupposedtoaidintheirabsorptioninthefiction(Tavinor2009).

DominicLopesoffersasimilarlyobject-orientedaccountoftheartofcomputergames.Ifcomputergamesareanart,saysLopes,theyareaformofinteractivecomputerart.Importantly,saysLopes,interactivecomputerartdoesnotprescribe that theuserpayattention to theirownactions.Instead,theuserisinteractinginordertoexploreapos-sibilityspace,tobringthealgorithmintoview.AsLopessays,theuserdoesattendtotheirownactivity,butonlyasameanstoappreciatingtheactualartwork.Theactualartworkisthealgorithmandthepossi-bilityspaceitcreates;welookthroughourownactionsinordertogetahandleon theproperobjectofaestheticappreciation.Andnoticethat thealgorithm isa stableobjectcreatedbyanartist. Interactingwiththecomputerartdoesn’tcreatetheobjectofaestheticattention;itissomethinglikeadigitalversionofwalkingaroundandthroughalargesculpture.Theyaretheactionsthatwe,theaudience,musttaketobringtheartist’sworkintoview(Lopes2010,36–52,67–84).Noticethat, in all these treatments, the discussion of the art of games hasavoidedanydirecttreatmentofprocessaesthetics.Itakethistobeaseriousomission,onedrivenbyanattempttosqueezegamesintoatheoreticalframeworkthathasbeenbuilttosuitobjectart.9

9. This discussion of the videogames literature is merely a sketch of a muchmore detailed discussion I’ve offered elsewhere (Nguyen 2017b; Nguyen2020).Foranothertakeonthatliterature,see(Tavinor2010).Ontheother

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spontaneousway,whereyou’refreetoinventandthey’refreetoinventandyou’reneitheronehamperingtheoth-er—that’s a very pleasant social form. (Kaltenbrunner1984,11)

Contact improvisation is also a practice primarily oriented towardstheinnerexperienceofthedancer,ratherthansomeoutwarddisplay.Thisiswhy,assomehavenoted,beginningcontactdancersoftencre-atespectacularperformances,butexperiencedcontactdancerscanbequiteboringtowatch.Experienceddancersaredancingforaninnersensationandafeltrelationship,andnotforanouterobserver.Infact,thecontactimprovisationcommunityhasfrequentlyspurnedthetra-ditionalperformer/audiencedivision,preferringtoholdopencontactjams,andtostageperformancessothataudiencememberscanfeelfreetojoinin(27,37–38).

Consider, too, theneglectedaestheticsofactivity in culinary life.Thereisanaestheticsofmovementinandaroundfood,asconditionedbythephysicalityofthedish.Somedishesareuncomfortablyplated,likemanyofthoseteeteringfoodtowerssopopularinthefancydiningofrecentlybygonedays,whichlookedstunningbutwerephysicallyannoyingtoeat(Nguyen2018).Theprocessofcooking,too,isfullofaestheticdelight,fromthegorgeousaromasofasimmeringbraisetothelovelysizzleofvegetableshittingoil.Andmanyoftheseaestheticexperiencesaredistinctivelyagential.Thereisaninteractionbetweenone’ssensualawarenessoftheingredients—howtheysmellandlookandsoundastheysimmerandfry—andone’scookingchoices,asin-formedbythatawareness.

FoodwriterJohnThornesuggeststhatmodernfoodculturesepa-ratestheprocessoffoodcreationfromtheeatingitself,andsocializesustothinkthatthefoodcreationisjustachore—amereinstrumenttothecentralaestheticexperienceofthefinishedproduct.

However, cooking at its most primal is not consciouslyinstructed labor but a flowing, attentive reverie. Spearachunkofmeatonaskewerandhold itoverabedof

Otherprocessartscenteronadesignedsocialpractice.Consider,forexample,theinwardaestheticsofrapportinthesocialtango.Im-portantly,saysBeatrizDujovne, the theatricalstage tango,whichsomanyofusarefamiliarwithfromthemovies,issomethingofamis-leadingimitation.Thetruetango,shesays,isthesocialtango,whichisimprovisedandintimate.Inthesocialtango,thedancersaren’tdanc-ingfortheeyesofanaudience.

They improvise. They dance for themselves, introspec-tively. Shunning the external world, their eyes turninward. This circumspect dance comes from a differ-entheartandculturethanthestagetango.….Atsocialdancesweseeneithersexualpassionnorviolence.Thedance’sformisdifferentaswell.Legworkisminimal;feetarekeptonthefloor;thesizeofthestepsissmall.Peopledancecloselyembracedtooneanother,bodiesconnect-ing,chestsclosetogether,heavingandretreatingwithev-erybreath,heads restingdelicately together,movingasone,immersedintotalimprovisationthatforbidsthemtohide behind choreographed steps. Beauty radiates fromthe emotions inside the dancers, not from external dis-playsofskill.(Dujovne2011,5–6)

True tangodancersdance for themselves.Theyappreciate their rap-portwith theirpartner, thesenseofconnectionandresponsiveness,theabsorptioninthecollectiveimprovisationofmovement.

Similarly, considercontact improvisation,adance form inwhichthe dancers play with gravity by putting their weight—and theirtrust—on another person, rolling around each other’s bodies andperpetuallyfallingtowardseachother(Bigé2017).StevePaxton,thedancerwhooriginatedthepractice,explains:

Just the pleasure of moving and the pleasure of usingyour body is, I think, maybe the main point. And thepleasureofdancingwithsomebodyinanunplannedand

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detailsofthepot,andtheimplicitrulesofitsuse,thatstructurethoseinteractions.(RuthVanWaerebeekrecalls,inherlovelyBelgiancook-book,herchildhoodfamilyritualofhavingBelgianwafflesfordinner.Thepart she rememberswith themost fondnessandnostalgia, shesays,was thehours-longargumentamongst the twelvemembersofherfamily,allgatheredaroundtheirsinglewaffle-maker,aboutwhohad the rights to thenextwaffle[Waerebeek1996].) Ifone thoughtthattherecouldbeanaestheticexperienceofsocialinteraction,thenthis, too, is surelyaprocess-aestheticexperienceconditionedbyanartifactanditsrulesforusage.11Andsurelythesocialinteractionsareconditioned,insignificantpart,bytherulesofthepractice,andbytheparticularpreparationandlayoutofthedishesandmaterial.

Obviously,inmanyofthesecases,processandobjectaestheticsaredeeplyintermingled.PartofthequalityofaTurkishbreakfastiscer-tainlyinthegustatoryqualityoftheingredientsthemselves.However,criticalandaesthetictalkintheculinaryrealmseemsentirelyfocusedontheobject-aestheticqualities—thetasteandaromaofthefoodit-self—andnotontheprocess-aestheticqualities.Butalifewithfoodisalifefullofprocessaesthetics.Andmanyofthesequalitiesarisefromintentionallydesignedfeatures.Ourcriticalpractice,however,largelyelidestheprocess-aestheticfeatures.Inreviewingrestaurants,weusu-allytalkaboutthefood’staste,smell,andappearance,butalmostnev-ertalkabouthowthephysicalarrangementofthefoodmadeourownmanipulationofitpleasingorawkward—thoughhowthatmovementgoesisclearlytheresultofthekitchen’sattentivenessor inattentive-nesstotheformsofmovementwhichwillbecalledforthbyhowtheyarrangeandplatethefood.Inreviewingcookbooks,weoftentalkoftherecipe’sresultingdeliciousnessorappearance,butrarelytalkabouthowfunorannoyingitwasforustocookthedish—aboutwhethertheprocessesdescribedwereelegant,wherethetimesandactivitiesfitjustright;orwhethertheywerejumbledmesses,wherewewererequiredtodosixthingsatonceandjumpfreneticallybetweenthem.

11. Fordiscussionoftheaestheticsofsocial interactions,see(Bourriaud2002;Bishop2004,2012;Finkelpearl2013).

smolderingcharcoal.It’snotconsciousthoughtbutacon-tinual tension between the fire’s hunger and your ownthat directs the sharp-eyed turning, keeping sear fromturningaltogetherintocharasthefatbubblesandpops,the juicessizzleandcrust,andtheodorsofsmokeandmeatswirlaboutyourhead.(Thorne1992,29–30)

Thisrealization,suggestsThorne,mightbringyoutochangehowandwhy you cook. Following a good recipe with painstaking precisionmightleadtoabetterfinishedproduct,butthatsubserviencealsorobsthecookingprocessofmuchofitsrichness.Cookingmoreimprovisa-tionallymaysacrificeabitofqualityintheendproduct,butitoffers,intrade,amuchmorerewardingexperienceofone’sownagencyincooking.

Other foodpracticesarebuiltaroundthepleasuresof theeater’sagency. Take, for example, the joys of Turkish breakfast. TraditionalTurkishbreakfastisacomposedarrangementofsmalldishes,meanttobefreelycombined:smallblocksoffetacheese,olives,jams,spreads,freshbread,eggs,andperhapsabitofsausage.Oneofthekeyplea-sures of the meal lies in the experience of culinary free choice—ofgettingtodecideandconstructeachnextbiteaccordingtothewhimofthemoment.Butthatexperienceoffreeculinaryactivityiscondi-tionedbythedetailsofthelayoutofthebreakfast.Whenthespreadhasbeenwell-assembled,theprocessofassemblyisfullofsmallde-lights:thecubesofcheesearetherightsizetohavewithabitofbread;thespreadsarejusttherightdensitytoscoop.

What’s more, many food rituals structure, through their physical-ity and the surrounding social norms, a set of movements, a social-ity,andachoicespace.Considerthefamiliarritualsofhotpotsandraclettemachines,inwhichlargegroupsofcheerfuleaterscooktheirmealatthetable,swishingslicesofmeatthroughliquid,orpouringabitofsizzlingmeltedcheeseovercubedpotatoes.Duringtheprocess,theyrubshoulders,argueaboutwhosepieceiswhose,orwhoseturnitistograbaparticularpieceofcookingrealestate.It’sthephysical

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representanddepict,andsoacquiremeaningfulness(Korsmeyer1999,103–145).Suchattemptsdoindeedsurveysomevaluableaestheticter-rain.Buttheoverallapproachalsodistractsus.Theyfocusonfittingtheprocessartswithinanobjectartparadigm,andpullourattentionawayfromtheseforms’uniquepotential.Ignoringprocessaestheticsandprocessartisapooruseoftheaestheticresourcesoftheworld.Itismyhopethatthefollowingaccountwillhelpuscometoplainertermswiththeprocessartsandtheirvalue.

Finally, I focus largelyonpureexamples—artifactsandpracticesthatarealmostentirelyobjectartorprocessart.Butthis focusis in-tendedonlytohelpusstarttogetagriponthesecategories.Actualartisticpractice is fullofall sortsofhybridsbetween the two forms.Manyvideogamesinviteprocess-aestheticappreciationoftheplayer’sown actions, but also object-aesthetic appreciation of the graphics,themusic,andpre-generatedelementsofstoryline.Andsuchfeaturescanharmonizeandblendinfascinatingways,aswhenavideogame’ssoundtrack dynamically adjusts to the player’s actions, emphasizingthedramaanddangerof thesituation.And I suspect that therearemanyartisticpracticesthat,thoughobject-centric,alsohavesubstan-tial process-aesthetic qualities. For example: our involvement withdetective novels typically involves not only appreciation of object-features like character and plot, but a self-reflective appreciation ofourownprocessofpuzzlingthroughthemystery.Andwhenwetrytounderstandtheaestheticvalueofsuchahybridworkwithinatheorybuiltonly for theobjectarts, thenwewill inevitablymisunderstandkeyfeaturesofthatwork.

3. Process art: A theory

First, I define process aesthetics as the aesthetics of activity from theperspectiveof theactors.This includes theovertlyself-reflectiveex-periencesofeachactor’sownactivity.Processaestheticsalsoincludesthoseexperiencesof theoutsideworld thatarerelatedto thatactiv-ity—suchasacookmonitoring thesmellsandsoundsandcoloroftheir sautéing vegetables, to determine when they’re ready. Process

Buttheactivityofcookingisitselfpartofthecontentofacookbook.Theactivityofcookingisaproductofintentionaldesign,attributableto a cookbook’s author. One might then protest that the object-aes-theticqualitiesare thegenuinely importantones,while theprocessqualitiesarejustaside-show.Butthissimplybegsthequestionofwhywefavortheobjectartsovertheprocessarts—ofwhy,insomanyoftheartifacts thathavebothobjectandprocessartqualities,wecon-centrateourcriticaldiscourseontheobjectqualities.

All of my examples lie at the periphery of what is normally con-sideredart,andbelongtopracticesthatarerarelygrantedtherespectgenerallyaccordedto the traditionalarts.This ispartof thepoint. Ithinkthehistoricalfocusontheobjectartshasinducedarelativene-glect, in official attention and valuation, to the process arts. This iswhywecannotproceedmerelybyinterrogatingourintuitionsabouttheuseoftermslike‘art’,forthosehavebeenshapedbytheverycul-turalpatternswhichImeantoquestion.12Ifreelygrantthatthenormsandpracticesoftheartworld,atpresent,usuallyennobletheobjectarts and marginalize the process arts. I grant, furthermore, that ourintuitions about the use of the term ‘art’ often support the primacyoftheobjectarts.Iwishtoquestionthebasisoftheseintuitionsandpractices.

Muchofthepreviousworkonthisterrainhasarguedfortheworth-whileness of these various process arts by attempting to assimilatethemtomorefamiliarobjectarts.Consider,forexample,MichaeldeCerteau’saestheticanalysisofwalkinginthecityasakindoftextualcreation,byarguingthatvariouswalkscouldbeinterpretedasakindofexpressivespeech(Certeau1984,91–95);Bogost’sandFlanagan’sdefensesoftheworthofgamesintermsoftheirabilitiestomodel,cri-tique,andcommentonsociety,economics,andmorality;andCarolynKorsmeyer’saccountofthemeaningoffoodintermsofitscapacityto

12. For a more robust defense of moderate skepticism towards the usefulnessofinterrogatingourintuitionsabouttheterm‘art’,see(Zangwill2007,1–35).RichardWollheim’sworkis,inmyeyes,anexcellentexampleofcarefultheo-rybuildingwhichtakes,asitsstartingpoints,intuitionsaboutartworkswhichimplicitlyexcludetheprocessarts(Wollheim1980).

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refertotheenactor’sactivitiesinresponsetosuchanartifactastheir‘engagement’withit.Noneofthesenotionsaremeanttobeexclusive;manyartworkshavebothprocess-andobject-aestheticqualities,andanindividualcanappreciatebothatonce.16

Process art involves a more distanced relationship between art-istandenactorthanobjectartdoesbetweenartistandaudience.Inthe object arts, the artist creates a work which the audience experi-ences.Theaudienceexperiencesaestheticpropertiesasinoradhering to that work, and makes aesthetic judgments about that work. Pro-cessartinvolvesanextrastage.Thedesignercreatesanartifact.Theenactors interactwiththeartifact,whichconditionstheenactors’ re-sultingactivity.Theenactorsexperienceaestheticpropertiesintheirown actions (“That was a graceless serve”; “We were so beautifullyinsynchwitheachotherinthatdance”).Theartifactinfluenceswhatandhowaestheticpropertiesemergeintheenactor’sactivity,buttheprimaryaestheticpropertiesemergeintheenactor’sactivityitself.Wemay also make secondary judgments about the quality of the workbasedonitsfunctionalcapacitytoencourageaestheticallyvaluableac-tions.Wemightjudgethisboardgamegoodbecauseittendstocreatesituationsthatareinteresting,thrilling,fascinating,andtendstocre-ateopportunitiesforourownbrilliant,dramatic,andelegantmoves.Butthegoodnessofprocessartassuchcomesdowntoitscapacitytoencouragevaluableaestheticqualitiesintheenactor’sownactivity.17

16. I originally introduced the terms ‘object art’, ‘process art’, ‘enactor’, ‘artist’swork’,and‘attentivefocus’inaverybriefsketchinmybook,Games: Agency as Art(Nguyen2020,142–144).ThoughGamesbearsasimilarpublicationdatetothepresentarticle,duetothecomplexitiesofbookpublishing,thosepartsof the book were actually written several years prior to the writing of thepresentarticle.Intheinterim,I’vegrappledwithawidervarietyofprocessarts.Thepresentaccountdepartsfromtheearlieroneinmanydetails.ItakethepresentaccountofprocessarttobemuchimprovedfromthepreliminarysketchIgaveinGames.Furthermore,Itakemyselftohaveanswered,inthepresentarticle,someoftheopenquestionsandpuzzlesImentionedinGames aboutthenatureofprocessart,andthequestionsconcerningitslowlyplaceintheculture.

17. IamrelyinghereonJaneForsey’saccountoftheaestheticsofdesign(Forsey

aestheticsthusincludesexperiencesofsensoryandaestheticqualitiesinexternalobjectsastheyarecognizedaspartoftheactivity.Consider,forexample,theaestheticsofarockclimb.Process-aestheticqualitiesinclude the climber’s aesthetic experiences of their own movement,butalsotheaestheticexperiencesinvolvedinperceivingtherockasobstacleformovementandasmeansforaidingmovement.Iattendtothoseexternalqualitiesthatarerelevantformyactivity,andIattendtothemaspartofan investigativeandpracticalprocesswheretheyfunctionas,amongotherthings,thebasisforfurtherdecisionsandac-tions.Thereisanaestheticquality—aperceptionofakindofpracticalharmony—thatarisesfromrecognizingthatthislittlenubbinofrockisexactlyintherightplacetore-balanceyourfoot.13

Process artreferstothoseartifactswhosefunctionistobringaboutprocess-aestheticexperiences.Imean‘artifacts’looselyhere—Imeantoincludemanufacturedphysicalobjects,rituals,instructionsets,andevensocialpractices.TherulesofthepartygameWerewolfareanar-tifact,inthissense;asaretheconventions,traditions,andpracticesofsocialtango;aswellasthephysicalapparatusoffondues,alongwiththesocialnormsfortheirappropriateuse.Iwillrefertothecreatorsofprocessartasthedesigners.Thedesignerherecanbeanythingfromasingleindividual,suchasaboardgamedesigner,toamulti-gener-ationalcommunity, suchas theone thatoriginated thesocial tangopractice.14 Iwillcall ‘theenactor’ thepersonorpersonswhoengagewithsuchanartifact,whoseactionsareappropriatelyguidedorinsti-gatedbyit,andwhoaestheticallyappreciatetheirownactivity.15Iwill

13. Forafurtherdiscussionofpracticalharmony,see(Nguyen2020,107–110).

14. Foradiscussionofhowgroupscanbeartists,see(BacharachandTollefsen2010;Nguyen2019c).

15. IintendnoconnectiontoAlvaNoe’senactiveaesthetics.Furthermore,thoughIwillusuallyspeakofsingle-personenactors,Iamentirelyopentothepos-sibilityofgroupagentperspectives—though Idonotwant to litigatehereforthepossibilityofmulti-personperspectivesforaestheticexperience.Notethat(Himbergetal.2018)arguesthatthepointofcollectivedanceimprovisa-tionistoinduceacollectiveperspectivefromwhichcollectiveself-reflectiveaestheticexperiencescanbehad.Seealsomydiscussionofcollectiveaudi-encesin(Nguyen2019c).

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thespectator.Achessplayermakesacomplexdecision;theeleganceoftheirsolutioncanbegraspedbyanobserverwhounderstandsthestateofplay.Certainly,someprocess-aestheticqualitiesareavailableto the spectator.Butmanyprocess-aestheticqualitiesarenot.Whatit feels like to react,howexactly thepiecesof thesolutioncome toyou—these are qualities to which the agent themselves has specialaccess.

Moreimportantly,however,myclaimisnotthattheattentivefocusintheprocessartsmustbeprivate.Myclaimisonlythattheprocessarts are aimed primarily at an agent’s experience of their own activ-ity.Thismeansthatthereisnorequirementforexternalizabilityandnodemandforpublicityfortheaestheticqualities—though,ofcourse,someaspectsofthatactivitymightturnouttobepubliclyaccessible.Let’sreturntorockclimbing.Somerockclimbsarequiteaestheticallypublic,withspectacularlarge-scalegymnasticmovement.Otherrockclimbs—liketheclassicbalanceproblemThe Angler—involveminuteshiftsofbalanceanddelicateadjustmentsininnertorsion,invisibletotheoutsideeye.The Angler isfascinatingtoclimb,butmind-numbinglyboringtowatch(Nguyen2017a).Myclaimhereisonlythatrockclimb-ingisprimarilyorientedtowardstheaestheticqualitiesofclimbingfortheclimberthemselves;thus,The Angler isnoaestheticfailurebecauseoftherelativeabsenceofaestheticpayoffforthespectator.Consider,also, the differences between a more object-art dance practice, likeballet, and a more process-art dance practice, like the social tango.Thoughtheremaybeprocess-aestheticqualitiestoballet,thepracticeisorientedprimarilytowardsproducingaestheticqualitiesavailabletothenon-dancingspectator.Thisiswhy,underthecurrentsocialprac-tice, itdoesn’tseemaviableaestheticcriticismofaparticularballetperformancethatitwasthoroughlyunpleasantforthedancers.Andthoughtheremaybesomeobservableaestheticqualitiesinthesocialtango, the practice is freed from the demand that it must primarilyaimatproducingsuchobservablequalities.Thepracticeisdesignedprimarilyforthesakeofproducingthesubtlefeelingsofconnection

Withprocessart,thereisasignificantgapbetweentheworkandthe aesthetic experience—much more so than with object art. Thisrequiresmakingaconceptualdistinctionbetweentwoaspectsofart-worksthatareusuallymerged.Inobjectart,weaestheticallyattendtowhattheartistproduces.MelvillewritesthetextMoby Dick,and weaestheticallyattendtothatverysametext.Tounderstandprocessart,wemustdissolvetheexpectationforsuchasingularlocusofaestheticeffort. Let’s distinguish between the designer’s work and the attentive focus.Thedesigner’sworkisthestableartifactcreatedbythedesignerfor thepurposeofengenderingaestheticexperiences.Theattentivefocusistheprescribedfocusofaestheticattention.Inobjectart,thedesigner’sworkandtheattentive focusareoneandthesamething,orveryclose to it.Thepaintercreatesapainting,and theaudienceattendstothatpainting.Inprocessart,thedesigner’sworkandtheat-tentivefocuscomeapart.Thedesigner’sworkistheartifact:thegame,therecipe, thecity, therulesof thetango.Theattentivefocus is theenactor’sownactivity,whicharisesinresponsetothedesigner’swork.Inprocessart,therearetwodistinctgenerativeprocesses:firstthede-signergeneratesthework,andthentheenactorgeneratesanactivityin response to the work. And in process art, it is that latter activitywhichisprescribedastheattentivefocus.18

OnemightworrythatIampresumingsomespecialprivateinteri-orityofagency—someinaccessiblefirst-personalperspectivefortheagent.Thismightstrikesomeasproblematic.At thevery least,onemight protest, aesthetic qualities of agency are sometimes availabletoanoutsideviewer.Thebasketballplayerdodgesandweaves,andthegracefulnessoftheirmotionisavailablebothtothemselvesandto

2013)andGlennParsonsandAllenCarlson’saccountof functionalbeauty(ParsonsandCarlson2008).

18. Onemightthinkthatthedividebetween,say,composerandperformercanbemappedontothedividebetweenartistandenactor.Thisturnsoutnottowork;seeAndrewKania’sexcellentdiscussion(Kania2018).Notethatevenwhenperformanceartontologiesaredividedintomultiplestages(thescript,theperformance),thereisstillsomefurtheraudience,beyondtheperformer,whoattributeaestheticpropertiestoanexternalwork.

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recalcitrant texts, suchasThomasPynchon’s famouslycrypticnovelGravity’s Rainbow,mayalsohighlight thereader’sownstrugglesandtheexperientialqualitiesofsostruggling.Butthatisjusttosaythatfictionssometimescrossthelinebetweenobjectartsandprocessarts.Itmayturnout,oncewehaveperformedouranalysis,thatmanyofthetraditionalartsactuallypartakemoreofprocessaestheticsthanwemighthavethought.

Finally,theobjectandprocessartsoccuronacontinuum.Forex-ample,therearecertainintentionalprocessqualitiesinthetraditionalarts.Frommyownexperienceplayingpiano,IsuspectthatBeethovencarednotawhitabouttheexperienceofthepianoplayer.Hisinterestwassolelyonthefinishedproduct.ButChopin’spianoworkshaveal-waysseemeddifferenttome.Thephysicalmovementsthateachpiecerequireshaveanexpressiveresonancewiththemusicitself.Boldpas-sages require athletic leaps of the pianist’s hands; elegant melodiesareoftenpairedwithmovementsthat,whenexecuted,feelphysicallyelegant;agonizedchordsforcethefingerstotwistinagrotesqueandagonizingmanner.Ifthisisright,thenBeethoven’spianosonatasareobjectart,butChopin’spianoworksareamixture—theyhavesomeclearprocessartqualitiesthatareaccessibleonlytothepianoplayer.20 Similarly,considersomeofthedifferencesbetweenvariouspracticesofdance.Somepracticesofdance, suchasballet, are largely in thedomainofobjectart,whereothers, like thesocial tango,are largelyinthedomainofprocessart.Butsurelythereareballetdancerswhodanceprimarily for theirown innerexperienceofdance,andsocialtangodancerswhodancefortheoutsideeye.I’mclassifyingballetasanobjectartandsocialtangoasaprocessartfromwhatseemliketheoverallaimsofthepractice.Buttheboundariesarefluid,andindividu-alsmayenterintothepracticesfordifferentreasons.Myintentionisnottoshowthattheobjectartsandtheprocessartsarealwaysdistinctfromeachother.Rather,itistoshowthattheprocessartsideofthe

20.Forafurtherdiscussion,see(Willard2018).

andimprovisationalresponsivenessthatareprimarilyappreciablebythedancersthemselves.

Alternately, one might attempt to refuse the distinction betweentheobjectandprocessartsbypointingtothefactthatanaudience’sappreciationofanobjectartworkinvolvesasubstantialamountofac-tivity.Audiencesforthetraditionalartsarenotpassive,ashasbeenoftenpointedout.Wechoosewhattoattendto;wequestionandinter-pret.Forexample:experiencingfictioninvolvesasubstantialdeploy-ment of the active imagination. Note, however, that no matter howactivetheroleoftheimagination,criticaltalkoffictionusuallyattri-butesaestheticpropertiesandjudgmentstothetextitselfandnottoone’simaginationofit.Furthermore,ifonelosesoneselfinone’sownimagination, that attention is usually directed towards the fictionalworldasimagined,andnotself-reflectivelytowardsthementaleffortsof imagining.Inotherwords, inmanyencounterswithfiction,evenif theaudienceparticipates inthemanufactureofanattentivefocus,they still grapple with it as something produced. Their appreciativefocusisontheworldproducedbytheirimagination,andnotontheirownprocessofcomingtoimagineit,norontherelationshipbetweenthatworldandtheprocessofimaginingit.19

Consider,too,theprecisetargetofourcriticaldiscourse.WhenwepraiseJaneAusten’snovels,wepraisethemfortheirwonderfullyex-actdescriptionsofcharacters.This isanobject-aestheticattribution;thequalityofprecisionisattributedtothenovelandnotone’sownmentaleffortsinresponse.Thisisnottrueofallfiction,however.Con-sider, for example, more game-like fictions, such as mystery novels.There, it seems, the structure of the fiction encourages attention tothereader’sownstruggles.Whenwepraiseagoodmysterynovel,weoftenpraiseitforgivingusajuicypuzzletosinkourteethinto.Other

19. Iamconfiningmydiscussionheretothosetheoriesoftheobjectartswhichpresumethattheworkofart issomeexternalartifact. I takethistobethedominantview,and themostplausibleone.Someotheraccounts,suchasthat of R.G. Collingwood, claim that the work of art is constructed in theimaginationoftheviewer(Collingwood1938).Spacedoesnotpermitmetoaddressthatfamilyofviewshere.

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However,thereisaverydifferentsortofrelationshipbetweenthesetterofarock-climbingrouteandtheaestheticqualitiesthatemergeinaclimberofthatroute.Theroutesettercanaimatinstigatinggrace-fulmotion;theycansetthesizeanddifficultyoftheholdstoencour-agedelicacyintheclimber.Inmanycases,processartistsdohavepar-ticularartisticqualitiesorvaluesinmind,andtheyimbuetheirworkwithfeaturesthatplaysomedirectroleinshapingtheaestheticqual-ityoftheenactor’sactivity—eveniftheprocessartistdoesn’tentirelydetermine that aesthetic quality in its full specificity. The designersof Microsoft Word had nothing like wildness or hilarity in mind. Aclimbing-routesetter,ontheotherhand,maysetaclimbspecificallyforthepurposeofencouraginggraceful,delicate,aestheticallypleas-ingmotion—thoughthepreciseformofgraceisfinalizedonlybya particularclimber.

ItwillbeusefulheretoconsiderSondraBacharachandDeborahTollefsen’s discussion of artistic collaboration. Some artworks, likemovies,aremadebyagroupartist.Butwhataretheouterboundariesof thatgroupartist?Onemight thinkthatanybodythatcontributedatalltotheaestheticqualityoftheendproductwaspartofthegroupartist.Butthisistoobroadacriterion;itdoesnotdistinguishbetweengenuineartistic collaboratorsandmerecontributors.Obviously, sayBacharach and Tollefsen, the directors, script-writers, cinematogra-phers,actors,andsetdressersarepartofthegroupartist,buttheon-setcaterersarenot.Howdowedrawthat line inaprincipledway?Theiransweristhatthegroupartistisconstitutedbyitsmemberstak-ingona jointcommitment tocollaborativelyfixparticularaestheticqualitiesinthework.Theyintentionallycooperatetomakeafilmdeli-cateorspooky.Thecaterer’stacosmayhavehelpedthedirectormakegoodartisticchoices,butthetacos’cookdidn’tplayaroleinintention-allyfixingtheparticularaestheticqualitiesofthefilm(BacharachandTollefsen2010).

Theiranalysishelpsustoidentifywhotheprocessartistis,exact-ly—andhowthatdesignationmayfallindifferentplacesfordifferentprocessarts.ThedesignersofMicrosoftWorddon’tplayacollaborative

spectrumhasbeenneglected,ashavetheprocessaspectsofmanytra-ditionalarts.

4. Who is the process artist?

Whoistheartistofaworkofprocessart—thedesignerortheenactor?Onemightbetempted,atthispoint,tosuggestthatI’veputthelabelsinthewrongplaces.Perhapsthedesignersofgames,cities,andTurk-ish breakfasts are simply creating the background and the tools forartistry.Thedesignersaren’tanysortofartistsatall.Instead,itistheenactors—theplayers,walkers,anddiners—whoarethetrueartists.

This does seem quite apt for some cases. It seems precisely therightcharacterizationof,forexample,thesocialtango.There,theso-cialpracticesimplyenablesakindoflive,artistic,creativeprocess.Thedancersthemselvesseemprimarilyresponsiblefortheaestheticquali-tiesthatemergeinthedance.Thedesignersofthesocialpractice,suchastheyare,areresponsibleforcreatingafertilegroundforaestheticcreation,butnotfortheaestheticcreationitself.Itwouldseemstrangetothinkofthosedesignersasanysortofartistsorartist-analogues.

Buttheviewthattheenactorsaretheartistsseemsquiteinaptforothercases:forinstance,manyboardgamesandcomputergames.Forexample,theenactors-as-artistsviewdoesn’thavetheresourcestoac-count for thedifference inaesthetic responsibilitybetween,say, thedesignersofacomputergameversusthedesignersofaword-process-ingprogram.Theteamthatdesignsawordprocessorismakingthetools for other artists to write their various artistic masterpieces on.Butsurelythedesignerofthewordprocessorisn’tanartist.Theydon’thave anything like particular artistic values or aesthetic qualities inmindastheydesignthesoftware.Theyarenotactiveparticipantsintheactofartisticcreation.SupposethatPaulBeattywrotehisnovelThe SelloutusingacopyofMicrosoftWord.TheaestheticqualitiesofThe Sellout arewildness,bleakhilarity,andexpressivebitterness.NoneofthesespecificaestheticqualitiescanbeattributedtoMicrosoftWordoritsdesignteam.

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therelationshipbetweenafilm’sscriptwriteranditsproductionteam.Thescriptwritercreatesadocumentandpassesittoaproductionteam,whoare inspiredby thatdocument tosomefurtheractivity.Superfi-cially,thismightseemlikethesamekindofmulti-stageaffairaswithprocessart.However,infilm-making,thescriptwriterandproductionteamarebothfocusedongettingaestheticqualitiesintothesameend-stageartifact—thefilm—forappreciationbysomefurtheraudience.Theprimaryaestheticqualitieshereoccurinthatfinishedworkitself.Thescriptwriterisn’tfocusedonstructuringandinfluencingtheaes-theticqualitiesof theproductionteam’sactivityofcreation.Agamedesigner,ontheotherhand,isdesigningpreciselyforthesakeoftheaestheticqualitiesoftheplayer’sactivityofplay.

Second, an artistic collaboration usually involves both collabora-torsaimingata sharedgoal—theproductionofanaestheticobjectwithcertainaestheticqualities.Butthegoalsofthedesignerandenac-torareoftenquitedivergent.ThedesignerofPortal mightbedesigningforthesakeofimbuingtheplayer’sexperiencewiththeseparticularaestheticqualities,whiletheplayerthemselvesmight,duringplay,bewhollyaimedatwinning.Often,theplayergeneratesthoseaestheti-callyinfusedactionswhentheirmindisbentwhollytothepracticalconsiderations of the game-task; the aesthetic qualities are uninten-tionalby-productsoftheirattemptstowin.22Similarly,thecity-walkermaysimplybe intendingtofindsomething toeat for thenight; theaestheticqualitiesintheiractivityarisefromaninteractionbetweentheirlocalgoalandthenavigationalqualitiesofthecity.Inmanycasesofprocessart,itisthedesignerwhoaimsatbringingaboutaestheticexperiences.Theenactor pursues someother aim, likewinning thegameorfindingalate-nightsnack.Fortheenactor,theaestheticquali-tiescanarise indirectly,asa resultofactivityaimedat some locally

22. Insomecases,theplayermayhaveinitiallydecidedtoplaythegameforthesake of aesthetic experience, but during game-play, they are not choosingtheir particular action in order to generate those particular aesthetic quali-ties.Rather,thoseaestheticqualitiesariseoutofwhollyinstrumentalinten-tionsandactions,asconditionedbytheirgamingenvironment.See(Nguyen2019a)foradetaileddiscussionofaestheticqualitiesandagentiallayering.

roleinfixingtheaestheticqualitiesofThe Sellout.Furthermore,noele-mentsinWordplayasignificantroleinfixingtheparticularaesthet-icqualitiesofThe Sellout.Wordmayhavecontributedtothatwork’squalitybymakingBeatty’sartisticcreativelifeeasier,buttheparticularaestheticpropertiesofThe Selloutaren’tsignificantlyexplainedbyanyparticularaspectsofWord,norbyanychoicesofWord’sdesignteam.

Consider,ontheotherhand,thebelovedcomputerpuzzlegamePortal. Inthatgame,theplayerisgivenasingleprimarytool:aworm-holegun.Thewormholegunfirstfiresanorangeportal,whichstickstowhereveryouaimedit,andthenablueportal.Onceyou’veattachedthesetwoportalstotheworld,thegameconnectsthemwithaworm-hole.Youcangoinoneportalandyou’llinstantlyexitouttheother.Manipulationoftheportalplacementsletsyoumanipulatethetopol-ogyofthevirtualenvironment.Thegamethenplacesanincreasinglydifficult set of obstacles in your virtual path, which you must solvewithonlyyourwormholegun.Solvingthesepuzzlesisafascinating,mind-bendingdelight,inwhichgorgeoussolutionsfinallyemergefortheplayeroutof frustrateddespair.Notice, though, that theaesthet-icqualityoftheplayer’sactivity inPortalarepartiallyattributabletodesignelementsinthegameandtothegamedesigner’s intentionalefforts.Theastonishingfeelofone’smindfinallyunlockingapuzzlearises in response to the counterintuitive physics and the details ofeachparticularpuzzle.And thesepartsof thegameweresurelyde-signed,atleastinpart,tobringabouttheparticularexperientialquali-tiesofthatmentalunlocking.

We might be tempted, then, to instead claim that the artist of apieceofprocessartandtheenactorareactuallyartisticcollaborators.21 Andwhilethismaybetrueinsomeparticularcases,Idonotthinkweshouldsoreadilysubsumetherelationshipsofartistandenactorintheprocessartstothekindsofrelationshipswefindintraditionalobjectartcollaborations.First,ifitisakindofcollaboration,thenitisoneofaverydifferentsortfromtraditionalartisticcollaborations.Consider

21. Such a view is advanced by Paul Crowther, who says the digital arts areuniqueinthattheirusersalsocountasco-creators(Crowther2008).

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Itakeitthat,inthecaseoftango,theaestheticinsightishadbytheenactor.Itisthedancerwhounderstands,onsomelevel,thatmovinglikeso,andrespondinglikeso,willleadtogracefulmovementandawonderful, sensitive sense of connection. The creators of the socialpracticehavenothadtheaestheticinsightsthemselves;theyhavecre-atedabackgroundagainstwhichsuchaestheticinsightsmightmorereadilyflourish.Inthatcase,Ithinkwecansaythattheprimaryartististhedancer.Thedesigner’swork—thesocialpracticeoftango—con-stitutesabackgroundandenvironmentforencouragingthedancer’sprocessartistry.

Inthecaseofmanycomputergames,ontheotherhand,theaes-theticinsightislargelyheldbythedesigner.ItisPortal’sdesignerswhorealizedthatsuch-and-suchlinesofcode,andsuch-and-suchvirtualphysics,willcreatesuch-and-suchphysicspuzzle,whichwillmakeitsignificantlylikelythatagameplayerwill,insolvingthepuzzle,haveanaestheticexperienceoftheirmind’sownelegance.Thegameplayermayhaveaninsightaboutthesolutiontothepuzzle,butthatisnotanaestheticinsightinZangwill’ssense.Duringtheirabsorptioninthegame, the players’ attention is devoted to the instrumental calcula-tionsofplay.Itisthegamedesigner’sinsightthatacertainvarietyofinstrumentalcalculations,asguidedbyparticulargoalsandrulesofphysics,willresultincertainaestheticqualitiesintheplayer’sactivity.23 Theprimaryartistinthiscaseisthegamedesigner.

Therecanalsobenestedaestheticinsights.Forexample,considertheeaterofaTurkishbreakfast.Theymayhaveaculinaryaestheticinsight:thatacertainbitoffetawouldtastegreatwhenbalancedwithaverysmalldollopofbergamotjam.Theythenbringthatinsightintobeing,intheformofaparticularmorseloffood.Theyaretheartistofthatmorsel,whichisitselfapieceofobjectart.Buttheprocessofcre-atingthatmorselalsohasaestheticqualities,andtheaestheticnatureof thatcreativeprocesswasconditionedbytheaesthetic insightsof

23. Forafurtherdiscussionofthefocused,goal-orientednatureofplay,anditsrelationto theemergentaestheticexperiencesofplay,see(Nguyen2019a;2020).

non-aestheticgoal,asitbringsthemintointeractionwiththeprocessartist’sdesign.

Whoexactly is theartist, then, inagivenpieceofprocessart? Itwill be useful here to consider Nick Zangwill’s account of aestheticcreation.Theartist,saysZangwill,isthepersonwhohasanaestheticinsight—aninsightthatcertainaestheticpropertieswoulddependoncertainnon-aestheticproperties—andwhoimbuessomeworkofartwiththoseaestheticpropertiesinvirtueofthosenon-aestheticproper-ties.Forexample,anartistmighthavetheinsightthatacertainarrayofcolorsandshapeswouldcreateadelicioustensioninapainting.Theythen,basedonthatinsight,createapaintingwiththatarrayofcolorsandshapes,andsogive itdelicious tension(Zangwill2007,36–58).Noticethatthedefinitionaswrittenexcludesdesignersofprocessart,sincetheydonotimbuetheworkitselfwithaestheticproperties.Rath-ertheydesignaworkwiththecapacitytotriggeraparticularrangeofaestheticqualities,astheywillemergeindownstreamengagements.ButletmesuggestanexpansionofZangwill’saccount:

Expanded conception of the artist:Theartististheper-son who has an aesthetic insight—which is an insightthatcertainaestheticpropertieswoulddependoncertainnon-aesthetic properties—and who imbues some workofartwithaestheticpropertiesor the power to bring about those aesthetic properties in virtue of those non-aestheticproperties.

IhaveemphasizedtheadditionIhavemadetoZangwill’saccount.Theexpandedconceptionseemsutterlyreasonabletome.Itcapturessomethingessentialaboutwhatitistobeanartistengagedinanactofaestheticcreation.Theartisthassomeparticularinsightintohowaestheticpropertiesmightemergefromnon-aestheticproperties;andtheymanipulatesomenon-aestheticmediuminordertogiverisetothose aesthetic properties. The expanded conception only relaxesZangwill’simplicitdemandthatthoseaestheticpropertiesemergeintheworkitself.

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rulesandmethodsofthesocialtangoaspartoftheexplanationoftheaestheticqualitiesthatemergeinthefinaldance.AndMicrosoftWordisnoprocessartatall.ThedesignersofWorddidnotdesignspecificpartsofWordinordertobringaboutspecificaestheticqualitiesofthevariousnovels,plays,essays,andphilosophyarticlesthatarewrittenwithit.

5. The frame around the process

Itwillbeusefultocomparemyanalysisofprocessartwiththerecentdiscussionof“everydayaesthetics”.YurikoSaitocontraststheformalpracticesofart-makingandartappreciationwitharangeoflessstruc-tured, more freeform aesthetic experiences—ones unconstricted bytheprescriptionsfoundinthetraditionalarts.

Says Saito: in the standard practice of art, there is a prescriptiveframearoundworksofart.Thatis,thereareprescriptionsforaproperencounter, inwhichwemustapproachanartwork ina certainwayandincludeonlycertainpropertiesinouraestheticattention.Inordertoexperienceapainting,Iamsupposedtoviewitfromthefrontandnottheside.Whenwediscussandjudgeanovel,wearesupposedtodosobyconsideringthemeaningsandsoundsofthewords,andnotthesmelloftheinkandpapertheyareprintedon.Suchprescriptionsareclearlycentraltoourartpractices.Simplyimagineourreactiontosomeonebreakingthem—say,bypronouncingontheaestheticquali-tiesofDiegoRivera’spaintingFlower Seller bylickingthecanvasandcommentingonitsflavor.

Let’s call anything that has such an attentional frame a “framedwork”. Framed works involve prescriptions for appreciation. Manyoftheseprescriptionsarisethroughpracticeandtradition.Weknowwhattodowithabookandwithapaintingfromthewaytheirappear-anceandthecontextoftheirpresentationdeclaretheirmembershipin some prescription-bound class. In other cases, prescriptions areovertly declared by the artist, such as when a contemporary avant-garde artist instructs their audience to roll around in their museuminstallation’s ball-pit as part of their experience of the work (Irvin

thepersonwhosetuptheTurkishbreakfast.Thoseinsightsmightbe,forexample,thatthissizeoffetacubewouldbemorepleasanttohan-dlethanthatsize,andthatthisarrangementofplateswouldgeneratethemostelegantmovementforaneaterintheprocessofassemblingtheirvarioustastymorsels.ThepersonwhosetsouttheTurkishbreak-fastspreadcanimbueaestheticqualitiesintheprocessoftheeater’sownparticularprocessofaestheticcreation.Inotherwords,Turkishbreakfastisanobjectartnestedinsideaprocessart,wheretheprocessartistisarrangingaspreadinordertodesignanaestheticallyvaluableprocess—wherethatprocessistheeater’sactivityofmakingobjectart.

I suspect that there will turn out to be many other examples ofsuchnestedarts.Consider,forexample,tabletoprole-playinggamesandimprovisationaltheater,wheretheactorsorplayersarecreatingapieceofobjectart—aperformednarrative—butdoingsoinsidearulesetwhichmakestheirprocessofcreationitselfaestheticallyinterest-ing.Role-playinggamesand improvisational theaterproceduresareprocessartworks,builtaroundtheprocessofcreatingobjectart.

Letmesuggest,then,ataxonomy.Withregardstothelocationoftheartist,thereare,loosely,threetypesofprocessarts.

Designer process arts:theartswherethedesignerhastheprimaryaestheticinsights.

Enactor process arts:theartswheretheenactorhasthepri-maryaestheticinsights.

Hybrid process arts: theartswherethedesignerandenac-tor share the primary aesthetic insights (either throughcollaborationorthroughamulti-stagenesting).

Portalisadesignerprocessart.Thedesignerhadtheinsightstocre-atethegame-physicsandgame-environmentinacertainway,inordertoimbuetheenactor’sactivitywithcertainaestheticproperties.Social tangoisanenactorprocessart.Theweightof theaesthetic insightsisbornebytheenactor.Itisaprocessartbecause,whenwewishtoexplaintheseaestheticqualities,wewillneedtomakereferencetothe

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forourselveshowwewillspendit,asweplease.Wecanconstitutetheaestheticobjectinanywaywewish(Saito2007,18–19).

Let’sacceptthisanalysisforthemoment.Itgets,Ithink,atsome-thingcrucialaboutwhatwecareaboutinartinparticular—somethingaboutwhytheaestheticsofartaredistinctivefromeverydayaestheticexperiences.Artinvolvesartifactsandsocialpracticeswhichprescribeparticularapproachestothoseartifacts.Thepointofallthatrigmaroleistoproducecertainsculpted,stable,repeatableexperience—tocap-tureanaestheticproperty inanobject, totie itdownsothatothersmaysee.

So:whataboutprocessaesthetics?ForSaito,allprocessaestheticsiseverydayaesthetics.Thereisnosuchthingasaframedexperienceof process aesthetics. There is, in other words, no process art. Whyrejectthepossibilityofprocessarts?Saito’ssuggestionisinteresting.Theartworld,saysSaito,wantstogiveuscontrolledandoptimalex-periencesofart,whichrequireadegreeofphysicaldistanceandphysi-caldisengagement.Theparadigmaticexperienceofart is,accordingtoSaito,passive:westandstillinfrontofthepainting;wesitstillataconcerthall(20).Thus,theessentialactiveparticipationofprocessaestheticsmightseemintensionwiththecontrollednatureofart.

Saito is surely right that our everyday experience is full of un-framedmomentsofprocessaesthetics.But Idonot think it is righttothinkthattherecanbenoprocessarts.Processes,Iargue,canalsobeframed.Andartistscanexertsomedegreeofcontrolovertheaes-theticsofactivities,evenwhenthereisnophysicaldistancebetweentheaudiencememberandtheirownactivity.Thisiseasiesttoseeinthepracticeofgamecriticism.Onecannotpronounceacriticaljudg-mentofavideogamemerelyfromsmellingthedisc.WhenIplaythevideogameShadows of the Colossus, Iamsupposedtoformajudgmentofthegamebyaestheticallyattendingtothechallengesofmovingmyavatarinandaroundthebodiesofmassivegiants.Iamnotsupposedtoinclude,inmyevaluation,howsatisfyingitwasformetoeatpop-corn between battles. Other forms of process art also involve someform of frame. The prescriptions involved with these practices may

2005;Davies2004,50–79).24Importantly,thenormativeforceofthese prescriptionsisentirelyhypothetical;thereisnoreasontofollowtheprescriptionsfor“readinganovel”unlessoneintendstobeengagedinthepracticeofnovelreading.Theprescriptionsonlyspecifywhattheworkis,byspecifyingwhatonemustdoinordertocountasengagingwiththework.Oneisperfectlyfreetoenjoythesmellofone’scopyofMoby Dickbyburningitinafire,butoneisnottherebyappreciatingMoby Dick. TheseprescriptionsonlyfixthenatureofwhatMoby Dick is:itisnotapieceofphysicalmaterialtobeappreciatedinallitsphysi-cality.Norisitacollectionofwordstobeaccessedatanyorder,likeadictionary.Theworkconsistsofasetofwords to be read in a particular order.Those instructions frame thework, specifyingwhat it is,overandaboveaparticularsetofmaterial.Everydayaesthetics,ontheoth-erhand,isaestheticexperiencewithoutofficiallyprescribedframes.Ineverydayaesthetics,saysSaito,wewanderthroughtheworldframingandre-framingasweplease.

Whydoweframe?Theprescriptiveframehelpsstabilizetheobjectofattention.Itispartofwhatmakesitpossiblefordifferentaudiencememberstohavesomethinglikethesameexperience.Therulethatanovelshouldbereadinacertainorder—allthewords,fromfronttoback—helpstoensurethatallthereadersarelookingatthesameba-sicnarrativeobject,andareallstartingfromapproximatelythesameexperientialplace.Butthatmeans,saysSaito,thatthereisatrade-offbetweenartaestheticsandeverydayaesthetics.Withart,wehaveaprescriptiveframe,andarelativelystabilizedandrelativelysharableformofexperience.Butwitheverydayaestheticsthereisnoframe,sowelosethestableobjectandthesharableexperience.Whatwegain,instead,isaestheticfreedom.Ineverydayaesthetics,wecanexerciseour imaginationandcreativityasweseefit.Ratherthanlettingcon-vention or social practice dictate our aesthetic attention, we choose

24. Note,asIrvinexplains,thattheseclaimsdonotviolatetheintentionalfallacy,sincetheydon’tdependonreferencetoprivateinternalstates,butonlyonpublicactionsanddeclarations.

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agency,ratherthantowards,say,certainselectperceptualqualitiesofaphysicalobject.Theexistenceofframedprocessartsiswhatpermitsthesculptinganddelineationofparticularactivities,and their trans-missionfromartisttoaudience.It’swhatpermitsustohaveprocess-aestheticexperiencesthataresomethinglikeshared—likewhenweascendthesamerockclimb,performingsimilarpatternsofmotioninresponsetopreciselythesamephysicalchallenges.

Notallprocessart involvesframes.Aprocessartwork,accordingtomyaccount,issomeartifactmadeforthepurposeofshapingtheaestheticqualitiesoftheenactor’sengagement.Wecaneasilyimagineartifactsmadewithsuchaestheticintentbutwithnoframe.Isuspectthatcitiesaresuchunframedworksofprocessart.Itishardtothinkofaway toattend to thewrongsortsof features inaestheticallyap-preciatingacity.Solongasoneisaestheticallyappreciatingthecity,anyformofrovingaestheticattentionandactionseemspermittedinforminganaestheticjudgmentofthecity.Anartifactcanbemadeforthe sake of conditioning the aesthetic quality of actions, even for afreely roving,unframedaestheticattention.Butmostof theprocessartsI’vedescribed—games,cookbooks,tango,contactimprov—seemtoinvolveframes.

Interestingly, much of the aesthetic frame in traditional worksarisesfrompractice-basedprescriptions.Weknow,throughfamiliaritywiththesocialpractice,thatwearesupposedtoattendtothewordsof the novel and not to its smell. However, some process arts offerwhatwemightcalla functional frame.That is, theenactor’sattentionis guided by the specification of some goal. Consider, for example,fly-fishing,whichisaplausiblecandidateforaprocessart.Manyfly-fishersdescribeakindofaestheticexperiencethatarisesfromsomegestaltbetweentherhythmsoftheircasting,theirattentiontothewa-ter,andtheparticularmentalstateofscanningforsignsofthetrout.Noticethatwedon’tneedtoteachafly-fishermansocialprescriptionsthattellthemtoattendtothesethings—thatattentionarisesthroughtheinstrumentaldemandsofthegoalofcatchingfishinthismanner.

besofamiliarthatwemayforgettheirexistence,buttheyareeasytobringintoview.Consider,forexample,ifIweretopronounceonthepoor texture of a restaurant’s broth after trying to eat it with a fork.Thisisanillegitimatejudgment,preciselybecauseIhaven’tattendedtotheworkwhilefollowingtheappropriateprescriptions.Thesepro-cessartsareappreciativepracticeswherebyweframeprocesses.Thesocialpracticecontainsprescriptionswhichseektofocusvariouspar-ticipants’aestheticattentiononthesamesetoffeatures,toregularizeandfocusthatattentionincontrolledandrepeatableways.Thesepre-scriptionsusuallyaccompanyartifactsthathavebeenintentionallyde-signedforthesakeofsuchaestheticattention.Anditisthecoordina-tionoftheprescriptionsandtheartifactdesignthatcangivetheartistsomemeasureofcontrolovertheaudience’sexperience,andprovideforsomestabilitytohowtheaudienceinteractswiththeartifactandtotheexperienceswhichitgenerates.WhenweallclusteraroundaViet-namesehotpottodipourvariousmeatsandvegetablesinthebowl,itisnoaccidentthatweenduphavingtheseveryparticularexperiencesofdippingfood,droppingfood,searchingdesperatelyaroundforourlostshrimp,bumpingelbows,andlaughing.Theconventionsofthepractice,andthephysicalnatureoftheartifactsinvolved,reliablygiverisetothosesortsofexperiences.25

The existence of framed process art is crucial to allaying certainworriesaboutthestatusoftheprocessartsasgenuinearts—oratleasttheirhavingart-likevalue.Theframeiscrucial tohowart functionsandwhyitisvaluable.Thefactthatweshareaframehelpstocontrolandstabilizehowdifferentpeopleattendtothematerialsubstrateoftraditionalartobjects.Itdirectsourvariousattentionsalongasimilarcourseandtowardsawell-definedrangeofaspects;itbringstheap-pearanceofapaintingorthenarrativeofanoveltothefore.Inprocessart,theframefunctionsinthesameway—butinthiscase,ouraesthet-icattentionsaredirectedtowardsparticularaspectsofouractionsand

25. Thediscussionofframesandframedworksinthissectionisanextensionof(andimprovementon)myearlierandmuchnarrowerdiscussionofframingprescriptionsingames(Nguyen2019d;2020,124–133).

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Lopes’accountissurelyrightaboutcertainsortsofcomputerart,especiallytheinteractiveartinstallationsinmuseums,whicharehisprimary focus. In many cases, interacting with the artwork is effort-less.Thereislittleinthedesignorcontexttodrawtheuser’sattentiontotheirownactivity.Theirattentionisdirected, instead, toavirtualenvironmentoraspaceofchoices.Comparethesesortsofobjectto,say,anarcadegamesuchasSuper Mario Brothers,wherethecenterofthe experience is my skilled navigation of the challenges. The coreelementsofthesesortsofgamesarefailure,thedevelopmentofskill,and the deployment of skill during repeated attempts to overcomeobstacles (Juul 2013). When I play Super Mario Brothers, I encounterthesamesimpleenvironmentsandvisualandmusicalelementsoverandoveragain;whatchangesaremyskillandmychoices.Infact,thesimplicityandtherepetitiousnessofthevisualelementsareusefulfordrawingattentiontowardsplayeractivity;thevisualcontentoftheseelementsrecedesfromattention,thusfocusingtheplayer’sattentionon their environment’s practical aspects—its existence as challengeandobstacle.28This,inturn,foregroundstheenactor’sactivepresence.Itforegroundstheirskill—andletsthem,overtime,aestheticallyap-preciatetheirjourneythroughskilldevelopment.Thatjourneybeginsintheir lackofskill,movesthroughstagesofdelightfulskillacquisi-tion,andclimaxesinahighlyskilledachievement.Infact,theappre-ciativeheartofmuchgamingpracticeisintheexperienceofbringingyourself,overtimeandthroughmucheffort,intogreaterandgreaterpracticalharmonywithasetofchallenges,peakingwiththatperfectlyexecutedvictory.

Someinteractiveart,then,isobjectart.There,ourfocusisonthestable object which our activities reveal—on the algorithm, the vir-tual environment, the possibility space. Other interactive art is pro-cessart.There,ourattentionisonouractivityitself,whichmayvary

wouldbetotreatarchitectureasaprocessart—wherewetakethemovementitselfastheprimaryfocusofouraestheticattention.

28.SimonDorprovidesausefuldiscussionofhowrepetitivevisualelementsinStarCraft IIfocustheattentiononnon-visualstrategicelements(Dor2014).

6. Aren’t we really just looking at the artifact, in the end?

Finally, one might insist that the process arts are not really distinctfromtheobjectarts.Perhapswhatwearedoing,withallofouractiv-itywithgamesandfood,issimplyawayforustocometotermswiththe object itself. Lopes explores such a possibility in his account ofinteractivecomputerart.SupposeIamusinga joystick toexploreavirtual spaceona computer installation.My interactiongeneratesasequenceofdisplays.Crucially,saysLopes,theartworkisn’tthepar-ticularsequenceofdisplaysthatIgenerated.Iamnottheartist,andmyparticularvoyagethroughvirtualspaceisnotanartwork.Therealartworkconsistsofstablefeaturesthataresharedbetweenallusersofthework: thealgorithm,theprogram,andthepossibilityspacethattheseotherfeaturescreate.Inthiscase,saysLopes,Iamnotprescribedtoaestheticallyattendtomyownactivity.Rather,myactivityissimplythemeansthroughwhichIappreciatethestableartwork.Maneuver-ingthroughavirtualspaceandparticipatinginvirtualeventsis,then,somethinglikeaverycomplexversionofwalkingaroundasculpture.Mymovementsandchoicesaresimplymymethodforbringingthewholeoftheworkintoview.ThisaccountpermitsLopestoassimilatecomputerarttothetraditionalobjectartparadigm.26Similarsugges-tionshavebeenmadeaboutarchitecture,aswemightmovethroughandaroundapieceofarchitectureforthesakeofstudyingitsmove-ment-independentshapeandstructure.Suchaninstrumentalview,asJenefer Robinson says, treats movement as merely a means for con-structing“amentalrepresentationoftheformofabuildingconsideredasastaticstructure”(Robinson2012,343).27

26.This discussion of Lopes is drawn from my discussion in (Nguyen 2020,145–146).

27. Consider,ontheotherhand,Robinson’sownaccountoftheplaceofmove-ment in architecture. She insists that we must not only look or imagine apieceofarchitecture,butmovethroughit.But, inRobinson’saccount, it isstillthearchitecturethatistheprimaryfocusofaestheticappreciation.Shewishesustouseourproprioceptivesensestoappreciatethearchitecture,butmovement,here,ispartoftheprocessthroughwhichwediscoverandappre-ciateaestheticqualitiesinthearchitectureitself.Thisisdifferentfromwhatit

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object-revealing.Underthetransparencythesis,thatmovewouldthusbehighlyfavored.Ontheotherhand,underthetransparencythesis,thoseactionsthataremoredistantfromstablefeaturesoftheobjectwould be less important. The transparency thesis renders aestheti-callyunimportantthoseactionsprimarilyattributabletotheenactor’sown special creativity or ability, since they would be not be object-revealing. But this runs against core features of the actual practiceswe’vebeenlookingat.Inmanyofthesepractices,participantspraiseparticularartifactsbecause theyserveasenvironments for fosteringcreativity.Goischerished,asagame,becauseitservesassuchanintri-catebackgroundforthewonderfulexperienceofprofoundintellectualcreativity.Portalcreatestheconditionsforaveryparticulartypeofso-lution,butleavesmuchroomfortheplayertofillinthedetailsoftheirown solution. Turkish breakfast is wonderful because the eater hasaluxurioussenseoffreedom,astheycantweakeverybitetomatchexactlytheirheart’sdesireinthemoment.Thesocialtangoisbelovedfor giving rise to particular intimacies that are unique to each pairof dancers, and to their creative coordinated response to the music,themoment,andthemood.Ofcourse,theexistenceofthosedistantprocess-aestheticqualitiesdorevealtheobject’scapacitytoencouragesuchqualities—butthatsimplydrivesusbacktothesortsofevalua-tionsoftheobjectwhicharesecondarytoaestheticevaluationsoftheinspiredactions.

The process arts are distinct from the object arts because theyaestheticallycenterontheactivityoftheenactor.Intheprocessacts,theseactivitiesaren’tusedasameanstoattendtotheobject.Nordoweself-attendpreferentiallytothoseactivitieswhicharemorelikelytorevealthetruefeaturesoftheobject.Wesimplyself-attendtotheaestheticqualitiesofouractivity,andthenwesecondarilyevaluatetheobjectintermsofitscapacitiestoencourageandfosterthoseaestheti-callyrichactivities.

fromencountertoencounterandfromenactortoenactor.Andmanyinteractiveartworksarehybrids,suchasmostfirst-personcomputerrole-playing games, which provide both beautiful environments forthe player to freely explore, and frequent challenges that focus theplayer’sattentionontheirownactivity.

Suppose, then, that we accept that in the practices I’ve de-scribed—games, social tango, cooking—I am, in fact, orienting myaesthetic attention towards myself, and to the world as it relates tomyactivity.Still,anopponentmightresistmyclaimsthat there isadistinctivecategoryofprocessart.Theymightinsistthatthisself-ori-entedaestheticattentionisonlyanintermediary—ameanswhichweusetocometogripswiththeaestheticpropertiesandaestheticvalueof theunderlyingstaticobject.That is,wemight think that, inplay-ingSuper Mario Brothers,Iattendtomyownexperienceofagencyasawaytoattendtotheaestheticqualitiesofthegameitself.Let’scallthisthetransparencythesisaboutprocessaesthetics,sincewearelookingthrough our processes just in order to get a better aesthetic handleon the object beyond them. The transparency thesis, if true, wouldrevealthatallthisso-calledprocessaestheticswasbutapeculiarsub-categoryofobjectaesthetics.

Butthetransparencythesisseemstogettheorderofexplanationthe wrong way around. Attributions of process-type aesthetic quali-tiestogamesaregroundedinattributionsofaestheticqualitiestotheemergentactivity.Wepraisegamesasaestheticallygoodpreciselybe-causetheybringaboutaestheticallygoodplay.Furthermore,thetrans-parencythesiswouldconfineouraestheticattentiontothoseaspectsofouractionswhichrevealfeaturesintheobject.Thatis,underthetransparency thesis, reflectiveattention toourownaction ispartofaestheticappreciationonlyinsofarisitrevealsaestheticpropertiesofthe object. Thus, in appreciating an object through our activity, weshould look primarily to the object-revealing features in our action.Take,forexample,arockclimbinwhichaparticularmovementwasforced by the climb as the only movement that would allow prog-ress. That forced move is closely tied to the object and thus highly

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willbeexperiencingexactlythesameaestheticpropertyasitarisesinexactlythesameactivity.29

There is, of course, a sliding scale. The more rigidly delineatedthespaceofactions, thecloser thoseexperienceswillbe.Somevid-eogames, such as Dragon’s Lair, offer simple reflex challenges in afixedsequence.Similarly,somerockclimbingproblemsrequiresuchspecificandprecisemovements tosucceed that rockclimbersoftenfind themselves performing nearly identical sequences.30 But this iscertainlynotthecaseacrossalltheprocessarts.Manyoftheprocessartsoffertheenactorsignificantfreedomofchoice,wherevariousen-actors’differingdecisionswillhelpshapeverydifferentengagementsforeachofthem.Thisiscrucial,sincemanyoftheprocessartsseemdesignedtosupportthoseaestheticqualitieswhicharisefromgivingtheenactorgenuinechoices.Perhaps thedeepestpleasuresofTurk-ishbreakfastareinconstructingformyself,ateachmoment,whatmynextmostpleasurablebitewillbe. (Onemightnotea certain trendinhigh-endrestaurants,whichoffercarefullyconstructedsinglebites.Thisstrategytradesawaydinerautonomyinfavorofthechef’scontroloftheexperience,presumablyinthenameofbringingthediningex-periencetowardsthestabilityofobjectart.)Manygamesarepraisedpreciselybecausetheyaffordtheirplayersgenuinefreedom—becauseaplayer’schoiceswillhelpformthenarrativeorshapethesimulatedworld.Infact,somegamesseemtoofferusanaestheticexperienceofourownfreedom(Gingerich2018)—whichwouldbeinaccessibleifthedesignerseliminatedchoiceinthefavorofacontrolled,repeatableexperience.

29.Alternately, one might reject the claim that we can ever be in touch withthesameaestheticproperties,evenintheobjectarts.Onemightthinkthataestheticpropertiesdependsubstantiallyonanapplicationoftheskillsandabilitiesoftheobserver.(MaryMothersill’saccountmightbereadtosupportsuchaview[Mothersill1984]).Thatmaybetrue,butsuchaviewwouldonlyfurthererode thereasonsonemighthave thoughtelevated theobjectartsovertheprocessarts.

30.Monterodiscusseshowdancersmayapproximateasharedexperienceofmo-tionthroughcarefultalk(Montero2006).

7. The status of process art: On sharing experiences

Why have we traditionally emphasized the object arts over the pro-cessarts?Acompletediagnosis,Isuspect,willdrawsignificantlyontheresourcesofculturalandintellectualhistory,sociology,economics,and more. Here, I will examine a few philosophical sources for thehistoricalpreferencefortheobjectarts,andthengivesomedefensesof theprocessarts.Thesefinalsectionsof thispapershouldbecon-sideredanopeningsalvoon this topic; Ihaveselectedahandfulofskirmishestohelpilluminatemypositiveaccount.

Onephilosophicalexplanationforthehigherstatusoftheobjectartsisthattheymakeavailablearelativelystableappreciativefocus.Theattentivefocusisonashareableobject.Wecanallreadthesameworkandtalkaboutit.Welosethis,tosomedegree,withprocessart.Thereisanartifactwecanshare—thegame,therecipe,thecity—buttheenactor’sagencyintervenesbetweenthedesigner’sworkandtheattentivefocus.Obviouslythis is truewithenactorprocessarts, liketango,butitisalsotrueforartistprocessarts,likegames.Evenwhenthe designers have tightly constrained the choice space to give theplayer’sactivityveryspecificaestheticqualities—still,differentgameplayershavedifferentskillsandmakedifferentchoices.Theprecisecontent of the attentive focus, and the precise form of its attendantaestheticproperties,variesfromoneenactortothenext,evenwhentheyareengagingwiththeverysameprocessartwork.

Whydidwewantastableattentivefocusinthefirstplace?Thereareafewreasons.First,thepracticeoftheobjectartsmakesitpossibletohavesharedexperiences,orsomethingthatapproachesthem.Onemight think,ofagracefuldrawing, that thegracefulnesswas in thedrawing itself. Thus, we different appreciators can all be in contactwiththeverysamegracefulness.Withtheprocessarts,ontheotherhand,wecannothavesuchmutuallysharedcontactwithoneandthesameaestheticproperty.Since,intheprocessarts,thefocusofappre-ciationiseachenactor’sownseparatelygeneratedactivity,noenactors

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8. The status of process art: Cognitively, merit, and uniqueness

Finally, one might worry that something about the appreciation ofprocessesessentiallyconflictswiththenatureoftheaestheticandofart.Accordingtosomepopularaccountsofartisticandaestheticvalue,aestheticexperiencesmusthaveaspecialrelationshiptosomeinde-pendentstatesofaffairs.31

First, it has been suggested that aesthetic experiences, by theirnature, must involve some form of cognition of a distinct state of af-fairs.Loosely,thethoughtisthataestheticexperiencesaren’tjustfree-floatingpleasuresorsomeothermentalstatewhosevalueisderivedwhollyfromitsinternalcharacter.Rather,aestheticexperiencesmustinvolveanaccurateperceptionorappraisalofsomeindependentstateofaffairs.Iintend‘stateofaffairs’heretoincludeanythingthatcouldbe theobjectofanexperience, includingphysicalobjects,activities,internalstates,andevents.32Thereareatleasttwoversionsofthere-quirementforcognitivity.Dependingontheaccount,eitheraestheticexperiencemustinvolvethecorrectcognitionofparticularaestheticfeaturesintheindependentstateofaffairs,oritmustinvolvethecor-rectcognitionofthatstate’saestheticmerit.33Suchtheoriesareusuallydrivenbytheneedtoexplainourrationaldiscourseaboutaesthetic

31. I am using ‘aesthetic experience’ here for the sake of brevity; some of thetheoriesIamdiscussingspeakintermsofadistinctivecharacterto“aestheticappreciation”or“aestheticjudgment”.NothingIsayhereturnsonthediffer-ences between thinking of the aesthetic primarily in terms of experiences,appreciations,orjudgments.

32. Notethatmywayofputtingthingsheredepartsfromthetypicallanguageintheacademicliterature,whichisusuallyofrelationshipsbetweenaestheticexperiences and their objects. ‘Objects’ is meant in these cases to refer to‘objectsofexperience’,andissoidenticalinmeaningtomyuseoftheterm‘statesofaffairs’.Iusetheterm‘stateofaffairs’onlytoavoidanypotentialcon-fusionbetweenthenotionofanobjectofexperience(whichcouldincludeactivities)andthenotionofaphysicalobject(whichexcludesactivities).

33. Forexample,MonroeBeardsley’saccountofaestheticvaluemakessuchcog-nition a key component of valuable aesthetic experience (Beardsley 1979,728).MalcolmBuddmakesasimilarclaim(Budd1996).Morerecently,JamesShelley’saccountandKerenGorodeisky’sandEricMarcus’accountinvolvecrucialreferencetosuchaprinciple(Shelley2010;GorodeiskyandMarcus2018).Forafurtherdiscussion,see(Nguyen2019b).

InsuchcasesIthinkwemustgiveuponthehopeofsharingpre-ciselythesamecontentinourengagementswithprocessart.Hereiswheretheprocessartsdifferessentiallyfromtheobjectarts.Thevalueofmuchprocessart is that itmakessignificantroomfor theagencyof theenactor.Havinggenuineagency ingenerating thecontentofone’saestheticexperienceisatoddswithsharingpreciselythesamecontentwithothers.

Ontheotherhand,theprocessartsmaybringtodifferentpeopleexperiences of agency with very much the same character. Playerstypicallycomeupwithverydifferentparticularsolutionstoparticularpuzzles, but the character of the experience—of coping with thesepuzzleswithsuchaparticularandpeculiaraffordance,ofhaving tolearntothinkintermsofmanipulatingthetopology,offiguringoutparticulartricks—issharplysimilar.Thatiswhatwegainbyputtingattentionalframesaroundouractiveprocesses.Differentenactorsarechanneled intoasimilarsituationwhen theyengagewith thesameprocessartwork,andsowhentheyact,thequalitiesoftheiractionscanbequitesimilar.Butwemustsacrificethepreciseshareabilityofaestheticcontentinordertohaveparticularlyaestheticallyinfusedex-periences of our own free choice. What having framed process artsgets us is not precise shareability, in these cases, but some near ap-proximation—far nearer than we would get otherwise. There willlikelybelittleoverlapintheexperiencesofprocessaestheticsthatyouandImighthaveaswegoaboutour incrediblydifferentdays,withourwidelyvaryingpracticalstruggles.Butinagame,wecanfixthegoals,fixtheabilitieswehave,andfixtheenvironmentalchallenges.EvenifyouandIdon’tmakepreciselythesamemovementtogetoverthisjumpingchallengeinSuper Mario Brothers,weareusingtheexactsamefixedabilities,whileconfrontingtheexactsamechallenges,andpursuingexactlythesamegoal.Andthiswillputouraestheticexperi-encesincloseproximityandgivethemamarkedlysharedcharacter,evenifwearen’tfixedonexactlythesameaestheticobject.

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value by eating, say, sautéed liver instead—and the liver would bejustasvaluabletome,andvaluableinexactlythesameway.AsJamesShelleyputsit,theparticularvalueofanartworkisinseparablefromtheartworkitself.35

Let’sgrant,forthemoment,thatartworksmustbeuniqueinthisway. Perhaps the problem with process art is that its artworks lackuniqueness.Ifthevalueofaprocessartworkisnotintheartworkit-self,but intheactivity that it inspires, thenwemightthinkthat thevalueisdetachablefromthespecificartwork.Perhapsaparticularoc-currenceofanactivity—likeoneparticularsessionofchess—mighthaveauniquevalue,inseparablefromthatparticularactivity.Buttheartifacts—thegames,therecipes,thecities—aretoodistantfromthatuniquevalue, their features tooseparable fromtheaestheticproper-ties,whichoccurfardownstreamoftheartifact.Thus,wemightcon-clude,therecanbenosuchthingasprocessartworks.

But I do think process artworks can often have a sort of unique-ness,thoughonethatcomesviaamorecomplexseriesofstagesthanwithobjectartworks.Theparticularqualitiesofaprocessartworkcanuniquely inform the aesthetic activities they inspire. The activity ofsolvingachesspuzzlecannotbehadoutsideofchess.Anyaesthet-ic value that we find in the player’s chess activities, insofar as theyareuniquetothatenactor’sengagementwithchess,isalsouniquetochess.Andtheexactnatureofthataestheticvalueisinformedbytheparticularities of chess’ design. Let’s call this feature aesthetic depen-dence.Anactivity isaestheticallydependentonanartifactwhenthepreciseaestheticcharacterof thatactivity isdependenton itsbeingevoked by that particular artifact. In this way, the process arts havetheir own distinctive form of uniqueness. An enactor’s activity canbeuniquelyvaluable in thesamewayapieceofobjectartcan.Butalso,inmanycases,thatactivityalsoaestheticallydependsuponthe

35. (Shelley2010)alsooffersanexcellentoverviewofdiscussionsoftheunique-nessrequirement,includingversionsbyMalcolmBudd,StephenDavies,andJerrold Levinson. Budd offers a particularly clear statement of the view in(Budd1996,4–11).

experiences—howweseem tocorrecteachother’s aestheticexperi-encesbypointingoutfeatureswe’vemissed,orgivereasonsinsupportofagivenevaluationofaestheticmerit.Aestheticlifeofteninvolvesgettingthingswrongandthencomingtoseethingsrightly.Featuresofouraestheticpracticeseemtoindicatethataestheticexperiencesarenotfree-floating;rather,theymustarisefromaccuratecomprehensionofsomeindependentstate.Thatrequiresaseparationbetweentheex-perienceitselfandwhatitisof.34Perhapstherecanbenosuchasepa-rationwithprocessartworks,sincetheaestheticexperiencesaren’toftheartist’swork,butoftheenactor’sownactivity.

Supposewegrantsuchademandforaseparationbetweenexperi-enceandtheindependentstatethatexperienceisof.Eventhen,thispresentsnoparticularproblemfortheprocessarts.Suchindependentstatesneednotbeexternal,physicalartifacts.Thatis,weneednotbelimitedinouraestheticexperiencestoexperiencesofphysicalobjects.Tosatisfythecognitivityrequirement,wesimplyneedourexperiencestobeofstatesofaffairsdistinctfromthoseexperiences.Intheprocessarts, that independent stateofaffairs is theenactor’sactivity,whichisdistinctfromtheenactor’sexperienceofthatactivity.Doingsome-thingisdistinctfromone’sexperienceofdoingit.

Next, let’s turn to the requirement for theuniquenessofaestheticvalue.Accordingtosome,thevalueofanartworkmustbeuniquetothatartwork—unlike,say,thevalueofmoneyornutrition.Accordingtothisview,thevalueofaparticularartworkcannotbeachievedviaadifferentartwork.There isno substitute for theexperienceof theWu-Tang Clan’s rap masterpiece Enter the Wu Tang (36 Chambers); itsvalueisinextricablyspecifictoitsexactcontentandaestheticproper-ties.Anotherwork,likeBillEvans’Sunday at the Village Vanguard,mightalsobeamasterpiece,butitdoesnotofferanalternateroutetotheverysamevalueofferedbyEnter the Wu Tang (36 Chambers).Artworkvaluesaren’tfungible.Ontheotherhand,ifIameatingthisspinachsaladstrictlyforitsVitaminKcontent,Icouldalsoachieveexactlythat

34. Itakesuchobject/experienceviewstobeexpressedby(Shelley2010)and(Zangwill2007,127–159).

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without reference to the particular rules of the game in which theyoccurred.Aleapisnotnecessarilyagameaction,andthebeautyofa leapnotnecessarilydependent for itsexistenceonbeingsituatedwithinaparticulargame.On theotherhand, theactionsofmakingabasketorperforminganassistare,by theirnature,actionswithinthegameofbasketball.Theactionsthemselvesareconstituted,inpart,by the game rules. If a particular game-action is beautiful as a game action, then that aesthetic activity is aesthetically dependent on thegame.Ifthelovelinessofmydunkshotarisesnotfromthemovementsthemselves,butfromthemovementsunderstoodasmoveswithinthegame—from the fact that they are elegant solutions to challengesbroughtintobeingbytherulesofthegame—thenthatbeautifuldunkshotisaestheticallydependentonthegameofbasketball.Whichisnottosaythattherulesofbasketballentirelyfixtheaestheticpropertiesofeachparticulardunkshot.Thisistheessentialdifferencebetweentheobjectartsandtheprocessarts.Mydunk,inbasketball,ismine.Butbasketballcreatestheconditionsforthatdunkanditsbeauty,andtherulesofbasketballplayasignificantandinextricableroleintheforma-tionofthatparticularoccurrenceofbeauty.

Theprocessarts,then,offertheirownpeculiarversionofunique-ness.Inmanycases—butcertainlynotall—theaestheticqualitiesoftheenactor’sactivityareinseparablefromaparticularworkofprocessart.Thisdoesnotmeanthatparticular,finalizedaestheticqualitiesaretobefoundintheprocessartworkitself.Buttheprocessartworkcre-ates thespecialbackgroundconditionsunderwhichthoseaestheticqualitiescanarise.Aprocessartworkdoesnotentirelydeterminetheaestheticqualities thatarise from it,butmanyof thosequalitiesde-pend,fortheirexactnature,ontheparticularprocessartworkwhichenablestheirexistence.

9. Conclusions

Ihaveofferedthebeginningsofadiagnosisofthetraditionalprefer-encefortheobjectarts.Intheobjectarts,wecanhaveasharedobjectofattention.Furthermore,intheobjectarts,itisfairlystraightforward

particular process artwork that inspired it. In those cases, the valueof the activity is dependent on the process artwork which providesthe unique condition for its existence. Notice that the structures oftheuniquenessrelationshipsaredifferentbetweentheobjectandpro-cessarts.Theuniquenessrelationshipinobjectartsis,conceivably,aone-to-onerelationship.Hereisonepair:theworkEnter the Wu Tang (36 Chambers) and itsvalue.Eachuniquelybelongs to theother.Butuniquenessrelationshipsintheprocessartshaveatree-likestructure.ThegamePortalcangiverisetomanydifferentaestheticallyvaluableactivities,buteachof thoseaestheticallyvaluableactivitiesdependsonPortalastheuniqueconditionofitsexistence.

Not all process arts will give rise to aesthetic dependence, butmanydo.Themostobviouscasesofaestheticdependencearegames.InBernardSuits’ influentialanalysis,gamesturnout tobeactivitiesconstituted by the specified constraints and goals—the rules of thegame.Inotherwords,asetofgamerulesbringsintobeingnewsortsofactionsandactivities.What it is to“makeabasket”, inagameofbasketball,isn’tmerelytopassaballthroughametalhoop.Tomakeabasketistopasstheballthroughthehoopwhileobeyingthedribblingruleandalltheotherconstraints,andwhilefacingopponents.Thereisnosuchthingas“makingabasket”separatefromthosevariousrules.36 When the game uniquely constitutes the activity, and the aestheticqualitiesoftheactivitydependonuniquefeaturesoftheactivity,thenwehaveaestheticdependence.

SupposeIamplayingbasketballandperformanabsolutelybeauti-fulfake-out, followedbyaperfectbehind-the-backpasstomyteam-mate,justastheyarejumpingintoplaceforadunk.Thevariousaes-theticpropertiesof thoseactionscannotbedescribedwithout refer-ences to the specific rules and constraints of basketball. This is nottrueforallactionandmovement.Icouldleapwitheleganceandflair,and, in somecases, thateleganceandflair couldbecomprehended

36. (Suits2005).I’vegivenaslightlysimplifiedsummaryforthepurposesofthisargument.I’veofferedadetailedanalysisofSuits’viewanditsimplicationsin(Nguyen2020,5–11,52–73).

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Beardsley,MonroeC.1979.Indefenseofaestheticvalue. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association52(6):723–749.

Best,David.1974.Theaestheticinsport. British Journal of Aesthetics14(3):197–213.

Bigé,Romain.2017.Tonicspace:Stepstowardanaestheticsofweightincontactimprovisation. Contact Quarterly42(2).

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Bogost,Ian.2010. Persuasive Games: The Expressive Power of Videogames.Cambridge,MA:TheMITPress.

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Budd,Malcolm.1996. Values of Art: Pictures, Poetry and Music.London:PenguinBooks.

Certeau,Michelde.1984. The Practice of Everyday Life.Trans.StevenF.Rendall.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.

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tolocatetheaestheticvalue.Ifthevalueofanartworkliesinitsaes-thetic properties, then the value of the object arts is fairly self-con-tained.Wecould,atleast,actasifwecouldarriveatacollectivesharedjudgmentofanobjectartwork’spropertiesandvalue.

It isnotsowiththeprocessarts.There,thevalueisfarmoredis-tributed.Theaestheticvalueofaworkliesinitscapacitytoinstigateaestheticallyvaluableactivity.Thisisdiametricallyopposedtomanytraditionalaccountsofaestheticandartisticvalue.MalcolmBudd,forexample,hasdemandedthatwefindanaccountinwhichanartworkisvaluableinitself,andnotmerelyasatoolforsomefurtherexperi-ence(Budd1996).Withtheprocessarts,wemustadmitthattheart-workis,infact,oftenmerelyaninstrument.Inmanycases,theprimaryaestheticvalueattachestotheinstigatedactivityandnottotheworkitself.Theworkcanplayanindispensableroleinbringingabouttheparticularaestheticqualitiesoftheactivity,buttheaestheticqualitiesare not finalized until the enactor has played their own active role.That is not something I think we can get past. It is essential to theverynatureoftheprocessarts.Ofcourse,thisdoesn’ttellusthatthepracticeofengagingwithprocessartshaslessaestheticvalue.Itonlyshowsusthatinordertocopewithit,wewillhavetodistributethelocusofaestheticvaluebetweenartworkandenactor’sactivity.Thisis,infact,exactlywhatmakestheprocessartsspecial.Theartifactsofprocessartcanparticipatesubstantiallyintheaestheticendproductanditsparticularvalue—withoutfinalizingthatvalue.37

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