A New Cold War or an Arctic Utopia?

How Institutionalism has influenced the Arctic Council’s Reactions towards Russia in the

Wake of the Ukraine Crisis

Sierra Wylie47033139

Professor Michael ByersPOLI 369:

Arctic Politics and International Law25 March 2015

Word count: 4,796

The history of Arctic diplomacy has been relatively peaceful, institutions and treaties

established in recent decades have been integral in maintaining successful diplomacy in the Far

North. However, the significant disruption in Arctic history concerning Russia’s recent

annexation of Crimea contrasts this stance of non-aggression towards its Northern neighbours.

Have the arguably illegal actions (in the context of customary international law) had a negative

impact on the effective diplomacy within the Arctic Council, and thus set a precedent for other

organisations that operate on an interstate level? In this essay, I will argue that although Russian

behavior in Ukraine has proved to be a significant challenge within the region, Arctic

cooperation is too beneficial for all member states that continued peaceful relations with Russia

are worth pursuing, especially as the latter party is willing to engage in diplomatic activity within

the Arctic.

I will begin by establishing the foundation and history of the Arctic Council and the

various international organisations it involves, such as NATO, the EU, and how it incorporates

complex relationships between old rivals such as Russia and the US. Next, I will explain the

Crimea Annexation in the context of the Arctic and Russia’s foreign policy, and how different

countries in the Arctic have responded to the Ukraine Crisis. I will then outline the positive

indications of diplomacy between Russia and the West, explain signs of Arctic cooperation, and

argue why the building of institutions between countries previously locked in conflict is the best

way to build towards tranquility. Finally, I will extrapolate from the Ukraine Crisis’ effect on

Arctic politics, and elucidate what can be gleamed about International Relations on a global

scale.

Arctic Nations and the Arctic Council

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In the easing of tensions after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Arctic Council was

officially established in 1996 to secure Arctic cooperation and build stronger diplomatic ties in a

region of increasing relevance.1 The eight permanent member states include Russia, Canada,

Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, the United States, and Denmark. There are also twelve

observer states that include other European countries and some economically influential

countries in Southeast Asia.2 Since its inception, the Council has sought a reputation of

inclusivity and recognition, maintaining numerous representatives of indigenous peoples, non-

governmental organisations, and global institutions. This wide scope of membership reflects the

diversity and goals of the Arctic Council in its effective regulation of Arctic governance,3 such as

the inclusion of various indigenous peoples as permanent observers, the implementation of the

2011 Search and Rescue Treaty, and cooperation in delegating task forces to create new

programs such as the Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Prevention (TFOPP).4 Although the current

scope of the Arctic Council is limited, there is significant potential for further collaboration

among Arctic states as the present institution allows for significant regional dialogue.

Annexation of Crimea, 2014

While Ukraine is not geographically linked to the Arctic, it is fatefully tied to Russia, and

therefore the Crimea Annexation has had a significant impact on Russia’s international

reputation. The Arctic countries it must work so closely with regarding regional concerns are

invested in Russian international behaviour, and thus have been incredibly concerned over the

Ukraine Crisis. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union (EU) and

many other independent state actors have condemned the recent territorial overstretch, citing it as 1 Stokke, O. S. (2014). ARCTIC COUNCIL. The Essential Guide to Global Environmental Governance, 7.2 "Observers." Arctic Council. N.p., 27 Apr. 2011. Web. 22 Feb. 2015.3 Stokke, O. S. (2014).4 Murray, Adam Patrick. "Arctic Law & Policy Year in Review: 2014." Available at SSRN (2015).

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a historical act of military aggression with no place in the 21st century, particularly as Russia

declared in 1994 to respect Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty.5 The annexation can perhaps be

explained by the cultural and historical connection of the peninsula to Russia, and as a comfort to

the “Russian people [that] are tired of the permanent crisis that has been shaking Ukraine more

than 20 years”.6 As the full implications of the annexation are still unfolding, it has yet to be seen

if this strategic decision made by Putin at an opportune time will have a significantly negative

impact on diplomatic ties with Arctic states. This paper will seek to elucidate if the

institutionalism of the successful treaties and declarations in the history of the Arctic Council are

sufficient to overriding the overstepping the breaking of customary international law in the

Crimea Annexation.

Whereas countries like Canada are far removed from their Arctic coasts, a significant

amount of economic activity takes place along Russia’s coastline.7 With mining on Svalbard and

Chinese-financed oil operations (most significantly pertaining to the Siberia-Chinese pipeline of

2010), the Arctic has become incredibly lucrative for Russia.8 Putin will not slow down with

expanded industrialization of the North when the country maintains such a strong influence in

the area, and especially when it holds such a strong weight as an element of national pride. In a

declaration of policy goals for the next decade, Russia has sought strengthened ties with its

neighbours in the Arctic that would encourage increased diplomacy and treaties, as well as future

cooperation with the Arctic Council.9 As these aspirations were agreed upon before the

annexation of Crimea, what can be concluded about measures taken in Ukraine as they relate to

5 Dews, F. (2014, March 19). NATO Secretary-General: Russia's Annexation of Crimea Is Illegal and Illegitimate. Retrieved February 23, 2015.6 "Russia Takes Crimea Back." English Pravda.ru. March 18, 2014. Accessed March 19, 2015.7 Byers, M. (2013, August 12). The (Russian) Arctic is open for business. Retrieved February 23, 2015.8 ibid9 Medvedev, D. (2009, September 18). Russian Federation Policy for the Arctic to 2020. Retrieved February 23, 2015.

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Russia’s goals in the Arctic? If nothing else, Russia’s imperialist behaviour in Ukraine

demonstrates at least a certain fear of NATO expansionism in the East. This is grounded in the

fear of returning to Cold War geopolitics that would fortify borders between a 21st century

“Soviet Bloc” and the ever-growing influence of NATO and the EU in Eastern Europe. Putin

claims that “if you stand alone you can’t survive in the Arctic”,10 but why is a similar perspective

not shared in the more contested and violent region of Crimea? In the aftermath of the Ukraine

crisis, member states of NATO and the EU face international pressure to omit Russia from

further Arctic Council meetings. Are Arctic Council members willing to work together with

Russia after the annexation? In the next section, I will outline the empirical evidence to conclude

the responses of different member states.

The Arctic Council in Response to the Ukraine Crisis

As the different member states of the Arctic Council are each in unique political

situations, in terms of various binding treaties and alliances and historical relationships with

Russia, each country has had a varied response. Simultaneously, there are a considerable amount

of joint interests in the Arctic that foster a chance for cooperation and further agreements to work

towards common goals for regional development. Norway, for example, shares both a land

border and a maritime boundary on the Barents Sea with Russia, and the two countries have a

history of collaboration. The Svalbard Treaty of 1920, for example, has allowed long-term

Russian coal mine operations on the Norwegian owned Svalbard.11 In the modern Arctic context,

it is advantageous for the Norwegian government to support joint resource control and

10 Harding, Luke. "Vladimir Putin Calls for Arctic Claims to Be Resolved under UN Law." Guardian. September 23, 2010. Accessed March 19, 2015.11 Byers, Michael, and James Baker. International Law and the Arctic. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law, 2013., 18

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environmental protectionism with Russia.12 As global warming and glacial melt are critical issues

for the Arctic, Norway has advocated substantial cooperation with Russia while simultaneously

expressing a measure of concern regarding the question of adherence to human rights and

international legal precedence about the freedom of expression. The Norwegian Government

stipulates that their neighbour “will be followed closely and measures adapted accordingly. We

will maintain a candid dialogue with Russia and will be clear about Norway’s views on human

rights”.13 Norway is pursuing the right road by advocating cautious but symbiotic cooperation

that will set forth an example of favourable diplomacy with Russia that does not cripple Western

values.

However, a number of Arctic countries have expressed worry regarding Russian

diplomacy. Icelandic Prime Minister Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson and former U.S. Secretary of

State Hilary Clinton are concerned over Russia’s expansionist policy and the increased military

presence in the Arctic.14 The EU and the US have enacted economic sanctions while Iceland

and Canada have issued warnings and have become more reluctant to participate in International

conferences including Russia.15 Gunnlaugsson claims that “it creates a sense of insecurity and

maybe lack of trust. If what we see in Ukraine turns out to be an exception and Russia goes back

to friendly relations with its neighbours, then it shouldn't have an effect”.16 This statement

effectively summarizes most of the shared sentiment among the Arctic Council regarding Russia.

No country wishes to return to the state of affairs during the Cold War, but as demonstrated

12 "The Norwegian Government's High North Strategy." Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed March 22, 2015.13ibid14 Weber, Bob. "Russian Actions in Ukraine Could Cause Problems for Arctic Council: Iceland PM." CTVNews. March 9, 2014. Accessed March 19, 2015.15 Østhagen, A. (2014, April 30). Ukraine Crisis and the Arctic: Penalties or Reconciliation? The Arctic Institute - Center for Circumpolar Security Studies. Retrieved February 23, 2015.16 Weber, Bob. "Russian Actions in Ukraine Could Cause Problems for Arctic Council: Iceland PM." CTVNews. March 9, 2014. Accessed March 19, 2015.

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historically, it has been critical for world leaders to treat the situation carefully with an approach

that does not appear as overly reactionary or inhibiting of Russian economic development in the

Arctic and continued regional collaboration.

NATO Expansion Eastwards and the Curious Case of Finland

Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the world has seen an extension of western

influence eastward into the former satellite republics of the USSR. In this geopolitical change, a

supposedly bilateral agreement between NATO and Russia was broken when NATO added 12

Eastern European states to its membership.17 While tensions between Russia and the West are not

quite as high as they were during the Cold War, mutual fear and mistrust are allowing old

sentiments to resurface. Foreign Affairs journal author Marie Elise Sarotte argues that “Russian

President Vladimir Putin’s aggressive actions in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 were

fueled in part by his ongoing resentment about what he sees as the West’s broken pact over

NATO expansion”18. If two opposing ideological blocs are standing ground on the blossoming

battleground in Eastern Europe, what has kept the fighting at bay?

The Arctic Ocean coastal state and NATO member Norway maintains a functional

relationship with Russia on a more regional level in the Arctic, but has certain obligations as a

western power to adopt similar economic sanctions that the U.S. and the EU have placed on

Russia.19 With Russian military presence growing on its western borders, Arctic Council and

NATO allied countries must react carefully and strategically. Finland, a country poised between

17 Sarotte, Mary Elise. "A Broken Promise?" Foreign Affairs. October 1, 2014. Accessed March 21, 2015.18 Sarotte, Mary Elise. "A Broken Promise?" Foreign Affairs.19 Østhagen, A. (2014, April 30). Ukraine Crisis and the Arctic: Penalties or Reconciliation? The Arctic Institute - Center for Circumpolar Security Studies. Retrieved February 23, 2015.

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Russia and the West, has a curious and complex relationship with its eastern neighbour that will

be further explored below as a case study for a potential solution to Arctic tensions.

In an offshoot of the Second World War, Finland fought with the Soviet Union in a two

year long conflict known as the “Winter War”, from 1939 to 1940.20 Since this belligerency, the

two countries have maintained a relatively symbiotic relationship, as Finland serves as a buffer

zone between Russia and NATO. Even though Finland does not have territory along the Arctic

Ocean, it maintains a permanent seat in the council and relies heavily on Russian economic and

political stability, and would suffer greatly from the effects of trade restrictions on its larger

neighbour.21 Russia’s most militarized Arctic zone, the Kola Peninsula, is currently being

refurbished with submarines, more troops, and extended military exercises along the Finnish

border.22 Even as this is happening, Finland remains at ease by not committing to a full alliance

with NATO, even though it is part of the Western-oriented EU. It can be beneficial to be

integrated into an international economic and even political force as influential as NATO, but for

Finland’s geographic position, not fully committing to either side is the most advantageous route

to maintaining political stability.

Threats to Arctic Tranquility

One of the main reasons for the annexation itself was a strategic move to reclaim the

Crimea as a historical part of Russia, indeed “in the Crimea, everything is literally permeated

with common history and pride”.23 If Russia is by nature an Arctic state with 70% of its land in

the “northern region”, and the country’s history is so closely linked with Arctic culture (as 20 Byers, Michael. "Why Finland Doesn't Fear the Growling Russian Bear next Door." The Globe and Mail. March 2, 2015. Accessed March 22, 2015. 21 ibid22 Byers, Michael. "Why Finland Doesn't Fear the Growling Russian Bear next Door."23 "Russia Takes Crimea Back." English Pravda.ru. March 18, 2014. Accessed March 19, 2015.

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proclaimed by Vladimir Putin), could there be an Arctic territorial seizure in the near future?24

Even though the Cold War ended decades ago, tensions between the western NATO and the

former Soviet Bloc remain alive. Russia has increased its military operations in the North, in

establishing a military base near the Finnish border on the Kola Peninsula and refurbishing its

submarine operations along the Northern Sea Route.25 This evidence does not necessarily

promote the idea that Russia will act in a similar manner to overstep the bounds of customary

international law in the Arctic, but it does pose certain credible threats to the relatively stable and

productive relations in the region. Despite the current cautious diplomatic behaviour with Russia,

there are positive signs of cooperation that can arguably override the existing tensions to foster

stronger diplomatic ties.

Positive Diplomacy for Russia

Cooperation in the Arctic thus far has allowed Russia to somewhat balance the Crimea

Annexation in terms of maintaining a measure of diplomatic stability. Russia used its military to

effectively occupy and annex Crimea through hybrid warfare, while in the Arctic; its government

maintains strong ties with NATO and the West. The former Soviet Union conducted effective

diplomacy during the Cold War with its Arctic Ocean neighbours, as illustrated by the

Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears in 1973, signed by the five Arctic Ocean

countries.26 The largest country in the world, with the most significant Arctic Ocean coastline,

Russia was the first of the Arctic Council to claim extended continental shelf sovereignty to the

CLCS, and has been incredibly proactive in the push for the High North.27 The policy in regards

to Ukraine concerned mostly domestic politics and national identity, whereas behaviour in the 24 Harding, Luke. "Vladimir Putin Calls for Arctic Claims to Be Resolved under UN Law."25 "Not so Cool." The Economist. January 31, 2015. Accessed March 19, 2015.26 Byers, M. (2013). International law and the Arctic (Vol. 103). Cambridge University Press.27 Weitz, R. (2011, February 12). Russia: The Non-Reluctant Arctic Power | SLDInfo. Retrieved February 23, 2015.

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Arctic is about preserving Russia’s future of successful resource extraction, commercial shipping

routes, and overall economic development.28 Despite these aspirations for a militarized and

industrially strengthened North, the Crimean annexation has had a substantial impact on the

tranquil history of the Arctic Council.

While Russia has not upheld a complete diplomatic, western-defined “peace” by actions

committed in Ukraine, Putin’s stipulation of how important it is to work together in the Arctic is

not an empty media ploy to simply quell fears of a 21st century imperialist. In all practicality,

countries with Arctic coastlines cannot successfully operate without Russia’s willingness to

cooperate, from legal, security, military and even energy standpoints. Russia’s numerous deep

water ports along the Northern Sea Route (which fortify its military and commercial capabilities

but also Search and Rescue ability) are critical to establishing a positive Arctic presence. The

U.S. and Russia, enemies for a significant amount of the past century, must effectively cooperate

in the Bering Sea to regulate fisheries and commercial expenditures in the area.29 The 1990

Bering Sea Agreement established the maritime boundary between the USSR and the US, and set

an important precedence of successful diplomacy between the two hegemons. All Arctic interests

depend on successful collaboration with Russia, and therefore further sanctions levied by any

country of the Arctic Council would be mutually destructive. Until further illegal imperialist

behaviour is counter the Eastern push of NATO, the most significant Northern state should be

able to expand its economic stake in the Arctic Ocean without endangering international

cooperation.

28 Medvedev, D. (2009, September 18). Russian Federation Policy for the Arctic to 2020. Retrieved February 23, 2015.29 Medvedev, D. (2009, September 18). Russian Federation Policy for the Arctic to 2020

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The Arctic Council adopted its first successful international treaty in 2011, the

“Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic”.30

While limited to the delegation of territorial responsibility concerning lost ships or planes, the

treaty sets an important precedent for Arctic diplomacy. The effective negotiations between

Norway and Russia concerning fisheries in the Barents Sea have also set a model for peaceful

relations in the North31. The crisis in Ukraine may have encouraged the idea that Russia could

not conduct diplomacy with the West, but behaviour in the Arctic may arguably negate this Cold

War fantasy. Each member of the Council maintains an important relationship with Russia, in

military, economic, and legal ways. To increase trade restrictions as a reaction to the Crimean

annexation would cripple positive development on the Arctic stage, and as Russia has a stronger

Arctic military presence, no Arctic country would be willing to risk further disruption of

democratic proceedings in Northern politics. The EU and NATO may have condemned Russia’s

actions in Ukraine, but media statements are more about maintaining a positive domestic

political atmosphere, and in all practicality, Russia is too economically important in the North

(especially with the successes of the Northern Shipping Route with sea ice reduction) for long-

term, widespread embargoes to be effective.

Post-Cold War security has been a primary concern for the global hegemon that is the

United States, and thus its allies in NATO. The rest of the Arctic may need Russia’s cooperation

in Northern affairs, but Russia needs to pursue collaboration with its powerful neighbours as

well. In the last few decades, Russian military spending has shrunk to be about one-tenth of the

American military budget, and military officials in North America agree that military

30 Murray, A. P. (2015). Arctic Law & Policy Year in Review: 2014. Available at SSRN.31 Østhagen, A. (2014, April 30). Ukraine Crisis and the Arctic: Penalties or Reconciliation? The Arctic Institute - Center for Circumpolar Security Studies. Retrieved February 23, 2015.

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cooperation is integral to preventing conflict in the region.32 As the founding document of the

Arctic Council, the Ottawa Declaration already pertains to military alliances, a treaty

demilitarizing the Arctic would be “relatively easy to negotiate, implement, and verify”, and

could build towards an stronger sense of unity and cooperation for the region.33 With the

escalating effects of climate change and glacial melt, the Arctic will very likely become a more

popular and lucrative region economically, which inevitably requires stronger military presences

from world powers. A changing Arctic needs a changing council that is willing to readjust the

extent to which northern countries conduct effective diplomacy, generally meaning that the

American military would need to work with its former enemies to stabilize the region.

Similarly to Arctic security, Russia’s ability to expand its Arctic Exclusive Economic

Zone (EEZ) and pursue commercial expenditures along its northern coast is closely linked to

successful diplomacy and cooperation with fellow members of the Arctic Council. In the

aftermath of the Crimea Annexation, the U.S. and the EU placed economic sanctions on Russia

as a punishment for the breeching of customary international law.34 Russia’s largest trading

partner is the European Union, and therefore any further breeching of international law would

inflict even heavier costs than the Ukraine crisis did, and thus acting rashly in the Arctic would

be more than disadvantageous. The Northern Sea Route has only increased in commercial traffic,

and when the Arctic will only see more economic development in the coming years of a warming

Earth, Russia would only be endangering its own economic interests to negatively engage its

partners. For these reasons outlined above, it is difficult to determine the clear consequences of

the Crimea annexation, as the relationship between Russia and the West is multidimensional.32 Byers, Michael, and James Baker. International Law and the Arctic. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law, 2013. (248)33 Byers, Michael, and James Baker. International Law and the Arctic.34 Østhagen, A. (2014, April 30). Ukraine Crisis and the Arctic: Penalties or Reconciliation? The Arctic Institute - Center for Circumpolar Security Studies. Retrieved February 23, 2015.

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One of the clearest signs of Arctic cooperation is shown through the successful legal

negotiations conducted between different members of the Arctic Council with Russia. As

previously stated, treaties signed such as the 2010 Barents Sea Boundary agreement have

illustrated a certain willingness on Russia’s part to collaborate with Arctic states. Even during

the Cold War, a time when NATO and the Soviet Union were in fundamental political and

military opposition, Russia supported the Canadian legal position on the internal waters status of

the Northwest Passage by relating it to Russia’s position on the Northeast Passage along Russia’s

northern coastline.35 While the country’s economic capabilities and military strength have been

severely adjusted since the 1990s, continued Russian support of Canada in this isolated legal

matter shows a certain demonstration of progress in terms of international cooperation in the

Arctic region.

Russia’s involvement and willingness to ratify treaties has actually enhanced its ability to

economically develop Arctic territories and seas. For example, negotiations on a united “Polar

Code” to regulate shipping policies in the Arctic have involved the entire Arctic Council,

including Russia, in the aftermath of the Ukraine Crisis, and the code is expected to take effect in

2017, unimpeded by the current state of international tension.36 In the century since this

ratification, there have been significant developments in international law, especially regarding

the idea of territorial seas and economic access to another country’s EEZ which have shaped

Russia’s ambitions regarding its goals for economic development in the Arctic.37 Ignoring the

fact that all members of the Arctic Council have not accepted the Crimea Referendum of 2014,

and that many (except notably Iceland) instituted economic sanctions as a result, Russia has kept

35 Byers, Michael, and James Baker. International Law and the Arctic. (151)36 Murray, Adam Patrick. "Arctic Law & Policy Year in Review: 2014." Available at SSRN (2015).37 Byers, Michael, and James Baker. International Law and the Arctic. (19)

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its “2013 promise to make the Arctic a priority, with significant 2014 military, territorial, and

marine shipping activities”.38 The sanctions do not appear to be hampering Russian pursuits of

extended sovereignty in the Arctic, as demonstrated by the fact that in October 2014, the country

started conducting cartographic surveys of a newly discovered Arctic island that could extend

Russia’s jurisdiction further into the Arctic Ocean by adding an area of almost 2,000 square

kilometers to the territorial sea.39 Nevertheless, each country by nature of the principle of self-

interest is bound to pursue objectives strengthening its economic, military, and political position

if financially and institutionally capable. Heightened military and industrial presence on Russia’s

northern coastline may indeed prove advantageous in expanding the country’s Search and

Rescue capabilities, which as suggested by the 1979 International Convention on Maritime

Search and Rescue, may help Russia meet the growing potential for accidents in the Arctic

region.40 Russia’s projection of its foreign policy until 2020 has included a stipulation that

encourages the “maintenance of a mutually advantageous bilateral and multilateral cooperation

treatment of the Russian Federation with the sub-Arctic states on the basis of international

treaties and agreements to which the Russian Federation is a party”.41 Thus, although Russia is

advancing its own interests in the Arctic, it does so within the context of international

cooperation.

Russia was the first Arctic country to make a serious claim to the CLCS in regards to

increasing its Exclusive Economic Zone in the High North in 2001, with the next considered

claim not occurring until 2013 with Canada’s partial submission for an extended continental

38 Medvedev, D. (2009, September 18). Russian Federation Policy for the Arctic to 2020.39 Murray, A. P. (2015). Arctic Law & Policy Year in Review: 2014. Available at SSRN40 Byers, Michael, and James Baker. International Law and the Arctic. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law, 2013.,(274)41 Medvedev, D. (2009, September 18). Russian Federation Policy for the Arctic to 2020.

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shelf42. Denmark proposed a rather controversial submission in late 2014, claiming a boundary

beyond the North Pole across the entirety of the Lomonosov Ridge, and thus overlapping

Russian claims43. Scientific research conducted regarding the Lomonosov Ridge currently

suggests that under the Extended Continental Shelf Regime, Russia, Canada, and Denmark could

each have valid claims to an expanded EEZ in the Arctic Ocean. Despite this evidence, Russia

has not chosen to update its claim by extending the area of continental shelf beyond the North

Pole into Canadian or Danish claim territory, while Denmark recently has.44 Arctic international

politics have arguable seen a much more cooperative Russia, despite the recent case of foreign

policy in Ukraine, willing to negotiate and follow global protocol of customary international law

when concerning the High North.

Recent Arctic Politics in a Global Context

The effective regulation and control of the Arctic Ocean is critical on a global level with

the environmental concerns regarding glacial melt and sea level rise. Also, the effective regional

diplomacy is of implicit importance as it involves developed western democracies negotiating

with a former enemy. As the Arctic Council moves forward with further treaties and declarations

to foster joint administration and protection of the region, an important precedence is set

internationally. The Arctic is still far away from being an exemplary demonstration of some

Northern Utopia, due to the limited amount of binding treaties or practices that have been able to

be implemented region-wide. Nonetheless, the ability of former Cold War enemies to

successfully negotiate maritime boundary agreements, collaborate in a search and rescue

capacity, manage international fisheries, and collaborate on environmental concerns illustrates a

42 Murray, A. P. (2015). Arctic Law & Policy Year in Review: 2014. Available at SSRN.43 ibid44 Jacobsen, Marc, and Michael Byers. "High North Dialogue 2015." The Arctic Institute - Center for Circumpolar Security Studies. October 9, 2014. Accessed March 25, 2015.

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substantial degree of institutional achievement. With the fortified constructive relationships that

exist in an economic and political capacity in the Arctic, it becomes more difficult for crises like

the Crimea Annexation to permanently dismantle cooperation.

The idea of the “democratic peace theory” suggests that countries that are bound together

by democratic tradition are less likely to engage in conflict.45 Since the Arctic Council functions

as an interstate forum of democratic action, this theory has arguably shaped the non-violent

nature of cooperation in the Arctic. It is important to note that the majority of the countries

involved in the Arctic Council are highly developed, wealthy states that have a history of

institutional collaboration, as the various states are involved to varying degrees with the EU,

NATO, the WTO (World Trade Organisation) and even NAFTA (North American Free Trade

Agreement).

While the Ukraine Crisis has disrupted Arctic diplomacy, the benefits overshadow this

event and the countries that have placed economic sanctions on Russia should look further than

punishing an isolated case of border restructuring to pursue a unified goal of Arctic development,

so long as actions in Crimea remain an anomaly. Arctic states have expressed concerns over

Russia’s behaviour in Ukraine, but are nonetheless working together to manage security

concerns, develop Arctic industrial capabilities, and pursue environmental sustainability goals.

Overall, the world can look to the Arctic as an example of non-reactionary diplomatic forum, as

continued collaborative efforts with a country with which another state shares common resources

and security region are beneficial in working towards peace.

45 Ray, James Lee. "Does Democracy Cause Peace?" Annual Reviews, Political Science. January 28, 1998. Accessed March 24, 2015. 

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17

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