T5 B64 GAO Visa Docs 1 of 6 Fdr- 5-21-03 FTTTF-Tanner Letter to GAO-Brummet Re Revoked Visas

8/14/2019 T5 B64 GAO Visa Docs 1 of 6 Fdr- 5-21-03 FTTTF-Tanner Letter to GAO-Brummet Re Revoked Visas

1/5

U.S. Departmentof Just ice si , ;* j< "- -

Federal Bureau of Investigation

W ashington, D. C. 20535-0001May 21, 2003

Mr. John BrummetAssistant DirectorU.S. General Accounting Office441 G Street, N.W.Washington, B.C. 20548Dear Mr. Brummet:

In your letter to me dated February 4, 2003, youstate that the Senate Judiciary Committee and the HouseGovernment Reform Subcommittee on National Security, VeteransAffairs and International Relations, have asked the GeneralAccounting Office (GAO) for more information about 105 visasrevoked by the Department of State (DOS) on July 19, 22 and24, 2002, and the role of the Foreign Terrorist Tracking TaskForce (FTTTF) in the development and conveyance of derogatoryinformation to DOS about those 105 visas.

As you may know, I assumed the position of Directorof the FTTTF in October 2002. The FTTTF did not receive newVisa Condor cables for processing after June 26, 2002. TheFTTTF did agree to assist in the processing of 19,194 visaSecurity Advisory Opinions (SAO) requests to eliminate thebacklog and did so between April and June, 2002. Theresponses to your questions are based upon the reconstructionfrom electronic files and master lists.

The FTTTF's assistance to the FBI regarding VisaCondors, temporarily helped the FBI eliminate a largeprocessing backlog of SAO requests that accumulated during thefirst quarter of 2002 concerning visa applications thatoccurred because those FBI Headquarter components responsiblefor the review of the SAOs were focused on the ongoinginvestigations and threats. Once the visa requests wereobtained with results of searches against the FBI's centralindex system, and checked by the FTTTF against its


2/5

Mr. John Brummet

internal data base of derogatory terrorism informationobtained from a variety of government sources, the FTTTFelectronically (by e-mail) notified the DOS that the FBI had"no objection" to issuance of each such visa. In those fewcases where a tentative match could not be conclusivelydispelled, the DOS agreed to resubmit those visa requests asecond time to the FBI for regular visa SAO processing. Thedelays inherent in the temporary processing of this largebacklog resulted in 105 visas being revoked by DOS out of anabundance of caution until each of the necessary SAO's, nearlyall of which turned out to be negative, were addressed.

In addition, the records reflect that only 88 of the105 visa applicants who had their visa revoked and about whichyou are now inquiring appear on the 19,194 master name list ofvisas processed by the FTTTF. The 17 visa applicants on yourlist who do not appear on the FTTTF master processing listare, as identified by the numbering system employed on the GAOlist attached to your letter: Nos. 5, 10, 12, 19, 38, 42, 49,53, 65, 69, 70, 75, 79, 94, 100, 104 and 105. As a result, wehave located no information in the relevant FTTTF files aboutthese applicants. Nevertheless, based on the identificationof these visa applicants in your letter, we have determinedthat eight of them (Nos. 12, 19, 38, 49, 65, 69, 94 and 105)are not referenced in applicable records that we or the FBIutilize and would have resulted in a "no objection" responseby the FBI to their visa application. As to the other nineindividuals whose visa applications were never forwarded tothe FTTTF, a more detailed SAO would have been necessarybefore a tentative name match could be confirmed or "cleared,"i.e., rejected.Question 1. What was the process for, and extent of, theFTTTF's Condor checks for these applicants? For example, didthe task force complete name checks? If so, what databasesand indices did it use?Answer: After the FBI's National Name Check Unit (NNCU)processed a cable by searching the information in the FBI'scentral index system, the result (either "no record" or apossible matching record in FBI files) was passed to the FTTTFwith the original DOS cable information. With regard to eachof the 88 visa requests in this group of 105 that were passedto the FTTTF, the applicant's data was searched againstdatabases available to the FTTTF. The various FTTTF databasesand indices used have been described more fully in FTTTF'sclassified congressional briefings. FTTTF personnel reviewedthe context of any possible matching records in FBI files to


3/5

Mr. John Brummet

determine if, in fact, the name was identical to a filereference, and further, whether or not the file referencesupported an SAO that the visa applicant was risk to thesecurity of the United States if a visa were to be issued.The result of these additional checks and the accompanyinganalytical follow up that either "clears" or confirms anytentative match, is that the FTTTF has concluded that therewas "no objection" to 82 of the 88 names on the list. Of thesix remaining applicants, given the time that had elapsed, andin view of the newly-established procedures in place for SAOprocessing within the FBI, DOS representatives agreed in ameeting with me on January 24, 2003, to resubmit those namesto the FBI under the current procedure. Those applicant namesappear on the GAO list as Nos. 4, 16, 45, 50, and 74.

The other applicant on your list, No. 85, involvesan alien who, prior to issuance of the Visa Condor,unsuccessfully appealed the loss of his permanent residentalien status on account of a "sham marriage" in the FederalCourts. After losing and then abandoning his appeal to avoidbeing deported, he traveled to Canada from whence he filed hisrequest for a nonimmigrant visa that was transmitted to us asa Visa Condor. Thereafter, in late March 2002, he wasidentified as an "absconder" and stopped trying to cross intothe U.S. at the Canadian border. His visa was revoked at thattime. I am informed that he has been the subject ofImmigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now the Bureauof Immigration and Customs Enforcement, attention both beforeand after the issuance of his Condor visa, and INS informationavailable to us reflects that he was not able to use that visato successfully enter the U.S. during the short time periodthat the visa was valid.2. What information did the FTTTF develop on each applicant?Why did the task force recommend that the State Departmentdeny visas to these individuals? Please provide thederogatory information on each applicant for our review.Answer: The FTTTF operated on the assumption that when DOSboth issued and later revoked the 105 visa requests, none ofthese 105 names had finished being processed. As explainedabove, of the 88 applications processed by the FTTTF, 82 werecleared by the FTTTF, and DOS agreed to resubmit to the FBIthe 5 others that could not be cleared or confirmed by theFTTTF. No derogatory data was passed along by the FTTTF inany of these 87 cases, other than that they had not yet beencleared. The other case on the list, No. 85, involves analien involved in a sham marriage whose situation was known tothe INS, which both refused him admission into the U.S. and


4/5

Mr. John Brummet

cancelled his visa, shortly before the revocation of hisCondor visa. While this derogatory information was noted bythe FTTTF, it was not new information to the alien's file andit was not developed by the FTTTF.3. On what date, and how, did the FTTTF transmit thisderogatory information to the State Department? Pleaseprov ide documenta tion of the transmittal. To what extent, andon what date, did the task force share this information withother U.S. government agencies, including the INS and otherFBI departments?Answer: As noted in answer to question 2, no new derogatoryinformation was transmitted.4. State Department officials told us that the FTTTF hassubsequently cleared a number of individuals on the attachedlist of applicants. They said that the task force no longerbelieves these individuals pose a security risk. Whichindividuals on the list, if any, has the task force cleared?When, and through what means, was the State Departmentnotified of this information?Answer: As explained above, FTTTF record checks reflect thatthere is "no objection" to visas for 82 of the 105 individualson the GAO list. In addition and as noted above, 17 personson the list do not appear to have had their informationsubmitted to the FTTTF (Nos. 5, 10, 12, 19, 38, 42, 49, 53,65, 69, 70, 75, 79, 94, 100, 104 and 105, however at least 8of them would have been quickly cleared). DOS has agreed toresubmit 5 of the 88 visa applications to the FBI forprocessing under its regular procedures (Nos. 4, 16, 45, 50,and 74); and we understand that 1 individual (No. 85) has hadhis visa revoked by the INS. During the last half of 2002,DOS was notified of this information by means of electronicmessages listing thousands of visas applicants as to whom theFTTTF had "no objection," among whom many of the applicants onthe GAO's list of 105 names were included.5. When, if at all, did the State Department notify the FTTTFthat these individuals had already been issued a visa? Whatactions did the task force take to ensue that holders of therevised visas did not enter the United States and toinvestigate, locate, and, if appropriate, remove those whoalready had entered?Answer: No records have been located that identify the dateswhen DOS first notified the FTTTF that each of these 105individuals had been issued a visa. However, after this


5/5

Mr. John Brummet

information became known to the FTTTF, the FTTTF ensured thatthe INS members of the FTTTF were made aware of the issue, forwhatever action would be appropriate by the INS, incoordination with the DOS, in accordance with all applicablelaws and regulations. In this regard, we are informed thatthe appropriate lookouts were and still remain posted for allthe uncleared persons described in this letter. At this time,the FTTTF is not in possession of investigative caseinformation that would associate any of these eight personswith terrorism activity, or otherwise indicate that they posea specific threat to the security of the United States. Inthese circumstances and consistent with their overallresponsibilities, I understand that the law enforcementofficials most directly affected have concluded that thelookouts posted with border authorities are the appropriateactions to be taken, absent the development of any derogatoryinformation.

Sincerely yours,

Mark A. TannerDirectorForeign Terrorist Tracking Task Force

Documents

T5 B64 GAO Visa Docs 1 of 6 Fdr- 5-21-03 FTTTF-Tanner Letter to GAO-Brummet Re Revoked Visas