Sydney Opera House Project Study

Project Management 722G20 Dr. Paol Canonico and Dr. Jonas Söderlund Februay 13, 2009 Word count: 9,944

The Sydney Opera House Stakeholder Management and Project Success

Group 5:

Vincent Anter Elin Hansson

Ollie McNaught-Reynolds Annabelle Tessard

The Sydney Opera House Group 5 Page 2

Contents 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 3

1.1 Background .............................................................................................................. 3 1.2 Aim of the Report ..................................................................................................... 4 1.3 Structure of the Report ............................................................................................ 4 1.4 Delimitations ............................................................................................................ 5 1.5 Methodology ............................................................................................................. 5

2. Theory / Frame of reference ..................................................................................... 6 2.1 Mitchell (1997), “Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts” ........................................... 6 2.2 Hobbs & Andersen, 2001, “Different alliance relationships for project design and execution” ............................................................................................................... 8

2.2.1 Traditional sponsorship.................................................................................................. 8

2.2.2 Partners in ownership .................................................................................................... 9

2.2.3 Partners in design and execution ................................................................................... 9

2.2.4 Relational development and execution ......................................................................... 10

2.3 Newcombe (2003), “From client to project stakeholders: a stakeholder mapping approach” ..................................................................................................................... 11 2.4 Olander & Landin (2005), Evaluation of stakeholder influence in the implementation of construction projects”................................................................... 12 2.5 Berggren, Söderlund & Anderson (2001), “Clients, Contracts and Consultants: The consequences of organization fragmentation in contemporary project environments” .............................................................................................................. 13

3. Empirics.................................................................................................................... 15 3.1 Goals of the Project................................................................................................ 15 3.2 Stakeholders and Partners..................................................................................... 16 3.3 Organization........................................................................................................... 17 3.4 Financials............................................................................................................... 18 3.5 Timeline.................................................................................................................. 20 3.6 Risks of the project ................................................................................................. 20 3.7 End Results............................................................................................................. 22

4. Analysis..................................................................................................................... 23 5. Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 33 6. Bibliography............................................................................................................. 34 7. Appendix................................................................................................................... 36


1. Introduction

1.1 Background

The Sydney Opera House is one of Australia’s iconic buildings and is recognized

around the world. It is has become a global symbol of Australia. The Danish architect

Jorn Utzon won the architecture competition set out by the NSW government for the new

building in 1957, and the construction started in 1959. The project was originally

scheduled for four years, with a budget of AUS $7 million. The project ended up taking

14 years to complete and cost AUS $102 million.

There appeared to be problems from the start of the project. Apparently Utzon

protested that he had not completed the designs for the structure, but the government

insisted that the construction get underway. In addition, the government changed the

requirements of the design after the construction was started, from two theatres to four, so

plans and designs had to be modified during construction.

The design created by Utzon was an architectural feat that had never been done

before. Even after four years of construction, Utzon still altered the geometry of his

design, which was to save time and cost of the construction. The project was subject to

many delays and cost over-runs that were unfortunately blamed on Utzon. During the

year of 1965 a new government was appointed in NSW and they withheld payments for

Utzon’s plans as they opposed to his building methods. This forced Utzon to resign from

the project in 1966 and a team of Australian architects were appointed to finish the

construction.


There are nearly 1000 rooms in the Opera House, including the five main

auditoria. It is approximately 185m long and 120m wide at its widest point. The highest

point of the building is 67m above sea level. The roofs are made up of 2,914 pre-cast

concrete sections; these sections are covered with exactly 1,056,056 Swedish ceramic

tiles. The entire building weighs over 161,000 tons. Considering that this construction

began in 1959, the building methods and design were nothing short of revolutionary and

it is no wonder that this building has become the marvel it is today.

1.2 Aim of the Report

In the project study of the Sydney Opera house, there were several important questions

that arose. This analysis focuses on the stakeholders and the key players in this project

that governed the decisions towards the events of this historical monument. The power

matrix and stakeholder influence are examined, and the problems of project coordination

and learning that caused the financial disarray are identified. These aspects of the project

will be analyzed to determine how the stakeholder management affected the outcome of

the project.

1.3 Structure of the Report

In order to adequately analyze stakeholders, a frame of reference must be established.

Therefore, the report begins with a summary of five articles relevant stakeholder analysis.

Next, the empirical project data is presented, which includes project goals, stakeholders,

financial data, organization and time management, project risks, and the end results and


evaluation. The empirical data sets the stage for the Opera House analysis, which is then

examined in light of the chosen articles.

1.4 Delimitations

As a management project, the Sydney Opera House had so many issues and fall backs

that nearly any aspect of the construction can be thoroughly analyzed. Time management

could also be identified as a big issue for the project and its completion. Monetary issues

were a main reason that Utzon was forced out of this project, which will be touched on

later in this paper. However, these aspects of the project were not analyzed as thoroughly

since they were not directly relevant to the focal point of this report, the stakeholders.

We chose this focus because stakeholder analysis allowed us to focus our report while

also encompassing the broadest range of issues.

1.5 Methodology

The Sydney Opera House is a historical project, the information gathered on the events

and statistics of the project were obtained entirely through secondary sources. Journal and

article databases were used as well as books documenting the subsequent events.

Websites were referred to in this analysis; they were however used at a minimum to

ensure that all sources were firmly credible. Several articles were used to aid in the

criticfal analysis of this project. The first by Mitchell, Agle, and Wood, provides three

criteria for stakeholder identification and classification in relation to stakeholder salience.

The next articles, by Newcombe, and Olander and Landin, realize potential risks within

stakeholders. Hobbs and Andersen’s article then assists with linking of customers and

suppliers and defining their relationships. Finally, the article by Söderlund, Berggren,

and Anderson identifies reasons for the breakdown of communication between clients

and stakeholders.


2. Theory / Frame of reference

2.1 Mitchell (1997), “Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts”

“Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the

Principle of Who and What Really Counts” is a thorough guide to identifying

stakeholders, and realizing what attention to give them. After extensive research of

existing theories and methodologies, the authors are able to contribute to their own

theories of stakeholder identification and theory of stakeholder salience.

Their theory of stakeholder identification sets out to answer “who or what are the

stakeholders”(Mitchell, 1997; 853). Some analysts such as Freeman give broad

definitions of stakeholders (“any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the

achievement of the organizations objectives”)(Mitchell, 1997; 854), while Stanford

Research Institute gives a more narrow definition (groups “on which the organization is

dependent for its continued survival”). The authors of the article, Mitchell, Agle, and

Wood, strive for a balance of theories by giving each stakeholder a class as determined

by three characteristics: power, legitimacy, and urgency. Power is best defined by

Weberian; “…the probability that one actor within a social relationship would be in a

position to carry out his own will despite resistance” (Mitchell, 1997; 865). Etzioni also

further distinguishes power into three categories; coercive (use physical force or

restraint), utilitarian (use of monetary material resources), and normative (symbolic, such

as status). Any party that has and uses one of these can be seen as having power.

Legitimacy is often associated with power, which can be a mistake. Those who may have

legitimacy may not have power, while those who have power may not be legitimate. The

combination of legitimacy and power is defined by Weber as “authority”. Legitimacy

may be the hardest aspect to define, as it is variable within the context of a project.

However, the authors accept Suchman’s definition, summarized as a perception that the

actions of an individual or group are appropriate within social norms. The last attribute is

urgency, requiring two factors, according to the authors: when the aspect is time sensitive

and whether or not it is important to the stakeholder. While these three attributes are


variable among stakeholders, any party with one of these attributes can be seen as a

stakeholder. A non-stakeholder is one who posses none of the three attributes. Those

who do possess one or more of these attributes can be seen as part of one of 7 distinct

classes based upon all the combinations of the three attributes.

Through these seven classes, the importance and actions to be taken for each

specific class become clearer. The classes are broken into three types, the first being

latent stakeholders. These are stakeholders who possess only one trait and may be less

apparent stakeholders than the other two groups. The dormant stakeholder has only

power and little relationship to the firm, must be noted but usually not acted with.

However, if the dormant stakeholder gains legitimacy or urgency, he may become a

threat. The next type is a discretionary stakeholder who has only legitimacy. This

usually comes in the form of volunteers or nonprofit organizations, preaching corporate

social responsibility. Managers may choose weather to engage with these stakeholders.

Next is the demanding stakeholder, which is no more than a casual annoyance since they

hold only urgency. The example given is a picketer protesting that the end of the world is

near and that the company is to blame. The second group is expectant stakeholders.

These stakeholders hold two of the three attributes, and usually must receive attention.

Dominant stakeholders hold power and legitimacy. Because they have the power to act

on their legitimate claims, dominant stakeholders usually have a formal medium in place

that realizes their importance, such as a human resource department or a public affairs

office. They also are the reason for documents such as annual reports and environmental

reports. Next are dependent stakeholders, who hold both urgency and legitimacy. They

use others with power to carry out their will, possibly through acting alongside

government or top management. The last of this group are dangerous stakeholders, who

have urgency and power but no legitimacy. The title is indeed relevant, as usually these

stakeholders use coercive power to obtain their objectives, including terrorist attacks,

vandalism, kidnapping, and theft. Dangerous stakeholders must be identified without

acknowledgement. The last group of stakeholders is the most salient, and they are

definitive stakeholders. They posses all three traits and usually move from being a

dominant stakeholder by obtaining urgency. There is no question that this group must be

dealt with as quickly and efficiently as possible to avoid drastic repercussions. The


example given is stockholders who have power and legitimacy obtaining urgency through

the drop of stock prices.

The identification of stakeholders and the degree of salience of stakeholders so

identified allows managers to better understand where their focus should lie. The authors

stress that common practice ignores urgency and power while focusing on legitimacy.

Only through this realization of all three factors can managers “serve the legal and moral

interests of legitimate stakeholders” (Mitchell, 1997; 882).

2.2 Hobbs & Andersen, 2001, “Different alliance relationships for project design and execution”

During the second half of the 1990s, a study was performed by the IMEC program

among 60 large engineering projects. The aim of the study was to identify the best

practice of management of such projects. Hobbs and Andersen (2001) summarize the

alliance relationship aspect of these studies and propose a model in which they define

four different types of relationships. Distinction is made between traditional, arm’s-length

contracts and relational co-operations during the execution phase of the project and

between internalized and coalitional processes in the front-end phase. These four

configurations/ types of customer relations’ management all have their advantages and

disadvantages, depending on the nature of the project. We will list the four

configurations, describe some of their characteristics as well as advantages and

disadvantages.

2.2.1 Traditional sponsorship

This is the first type of arms-length contract, meaning that suppliers are awarded

contracts through a bidding process. They are expected to provide an already specified

good or service to the project owner, and have little opportunity to influence project

development or design, which is internalized. Here the owner maintains tight control, and

the cut-off point comes late in the project, after the design process. The cut off point is

where the suppliers are integrated into the project. This type of relation can be

advantageous to a firm that needs control over the whole project and has a specified need


concerning the design and functionality of the end product. However, it limits innovation,

requires extensive management efforts and puts most of the completion risk on the

owner.

2.2.2 Partners in ownership

Like in a traditional sponsorship, this configuration means that supplier

relationship is kept at arm’s-length distance. The main difference is that the supplier

enters the project early in the design process and thus has a greater possibility to

influence design. The completion risk is shifted largely to the supplier and a more limited

management effort is required from the owner.

2.2.3 Partners in design and execution

As opposed to the previous two configurations, these collaborations take on a

relational approach. One criterion for this configuration is that the project is characterised

by some form of relational contracting between a large owner and the firms it hires for

project design and execution. Another criterion is that it’s an experiment initiated by the

owner and that it springs from necessity.

The authors here distinguish between four different sets of practices. We will give

a very brief description of all four:

Partnering: “an arrangement between an owner and contractors after contracts

have been competitively bid” (Hobbs and Andersen 2001). Relatively close collaboration,

communication, team-building and good management of change requests are key

features. This practice has shown great improvement in cost reduction, more efficient

schedules, quality and litigation. However, the disadvantage is that it tends to leave

potential gains in design and construction unexploited.

Frame agreements: stands for long-term contractual relations that cover either a

number of projects or a range of products/ services. Trust is a very important feature as

the project owner seeks to use all resources available in the supplier organization and

reduce the number of suppliers. This practice leads to gains in operational efficiency and

helps avoid delays and cost overruns since the competitive bidding process is left out.


However, it leaves the owner heavily dependent on the supplier’s competencies and good

will.

One-off Integrated Project Teams: Here teams of suppliers come together for a

specific project and owners are large organizations with formal processes for selecting

projects. The suppliers are brought in at an early stage, sharing their ideas and knowledge

and a feasible design is decided upon commonly. The contract strategy often involves

fixed-price contracts or cost reimbursable contracts with a guaranteed maximum price.

This practice has often led to exceptional performance and technical innovation. It

requires a long period for the design phase and usually involves a great number of

participants which is costly and time-consuming, although it’s expected to give

outstanding results.

Sticky Informal Networks: Relations are based on informal exchanges and

expectations instead of formal contracts. This type of practice is highly influenced by

history and culture and particularly common in France and Japan. It is therefore not

suitable for projects where the parties are from very different cultures.

2.2.4 Relational development and execution

In this configuration the same firms are involved in both front-end development

and the design and executions phase. Projects like this tend to either form separate

companies or joint ventures. It is the most common configuration today and often used in

infrastructure building projects, financed by the public. The owner’s role in these projects

is limited and the suppliers form groups who take on the responsibility for executing the

whole project. Superior performance is often required to give the project legitimacy in the

public eye. This configuration has a number of factors contributing to superior

performance. Among these are scrutiny by various pressure groups, pressure from peer

firms with similar knowledge, an integrated business perspective and efficiency in the

execution phase since the executing firms participated in the design process. These types

of projects can be very lucrative, but their magnitude also implies a great risk by putting

pressure on the owning firm to diversify risk on other projects. Otherwise they may find

themselves in a very uncertain position.


2.3 Newcombe (2003), “From client to project stakeholders: a stakeholder mapping approach”

In this paper, Newcombe begins by affirming that the concept of client is

obsolete, replaced by the idea of project stakeholders. Instead, there are sorts of “multiple

clients”, which involves taking into account not only the client but also the whole

community. These multiple clients have interest in the organization, thus it is important

that the project’s and stakeholders’ objectives match.

Newcombe defines the project stakeholders as “groups or individuals who have a

stake in, or expectation of, the project’s performance and include clients, project

managers, designers, subcontractors, suppliers, funding bodies, users and the community

at large” (Newcombe, 2003; p.3). Thus, they can be people inside or outside the project.

Stakeholders interact especially within two fields: the cultural arena, where they share

values and reinforce co-operation; and the political arena, which can be subject to

expectations’ and objectives’ and conflicts between stakeholders.

One of the main purposes of Newcombes article was to make an analysis of the

stakeholders through mapping. To assess the importance of stakeholders’ expectations,

one must answer three questions: how likely each stakeholder group is to enforce its

expectations on the project, his means, and the impact on future project strategies. Two

methods are developed: the power/predictability matrix and the power/interest matrix.

The power/predictability matrix The power/interest matrix

Source: Newcombe, 2003; p.5


Stakeholders of different zones may interact, and when a decision is made it can

have repercussions on the behavior of another group of stakeholders. Zones A and B,

even if they have less power, can influence the other zones. Managing them is very

important too because it helps avoid the tendency of re-positioning (especially from zone

C to D). Newcombe also mentions the fact that a group can change position during the

development of the project.

To sum up, these mappings allows the project manager to assess the cultural and

political context of a project, and address the question of repositioning and maintaining

the level of certain stakeholders or not. Project managers also have to deal with some

ethical issues. For instance, there is the problem of deciding whether to give in to some

stakeholders’ demands instead of staying impartial and logical. Moreover, to expedite

decisions, the project manager can resort to an alliance with outside stakeholders. The

more ethical Kantian approach states two principles: all the stakeholders should have

benefits in the project and the project manager should be the trustee interaction between

stakeholders and the project.

2.4 Olander & Landin (2005), Evaluation of stakeholder influence in the implementation of construction projects”

To complete the article of Newcombe, we used the article of Olander & Landin.

They give a definition of stakeholders and add that they can be a threat or a benefit. The

point is to identify “stakeholders who can affect the project, and then manage their

differing demands through good communication in the early stages of a project.”(Olander

& Landin, 2005; p.7)

Bonke and Winch also developed a stakeholder map, which includes proponent

and opponent stakeholders, problems identified by them, and their suggested solutions to

the problems.

Two examples are taken in the article, which deal with external stakeholders’

issues. The first project analyzed is the housing project in Lund. The main problems were

with residents in the vicinity because buildings affected their environment and with


groups for the preservation of the cultural and historical image of the city. The

municipality persisted in supporting the real estate developer. The second project was a

railroad project in Lund. All the alternatives for the location of the railroad track had not

been envisaged (the chosen option was to build it along the existing single track route)

and residents were strongly opposed to this solution as they would be affected by the

growing traffic.

Both projects were appealed in court because of such strong opposition. The main

consequences were delays and cost overruns. In both cases, the mapping of power and

interest evolved during the progress of the project.

2.5 Berggren, Söderlund & Anderson (2001), “Clients, Contracts and Consultants: The consequences of organization fragmentation in contemporary project environments”

The article ‘Clients, Contracts and Consultants: The consequences of organization

fragmentation in contemporary project environments’ highlights many issues that have

come across several companies during their respective projects. While management

issues have usually focused on the actual project team and their client, it has become

more and more apparent that in today’s competitive environment the focus needs to be on

the relationships between the parties involved in a project. It is now more common for

external consultants or engineers to be hired on behalf of the client. This methodology is

known as the Agency theory (Söderlund, Berggren & Anderson, 2001). Where a principle

hires an agent to perform tasks affecting the principle(for example a client hiring a lawyer

to govern the best decisions on their behalf). The method centres on the problem of

handling the risk of opportunistic behaviour of the agent as they are the ones who are

required to act. Another case theory cross referenced is that of the transaction cost

economics by Williamson. Transaction cost economics analyses the boundaries of a firm

and when activities should be performed in house or contracted out. This theory predicts

that if uncertainty and the degree of uniqueness are high, then activities should remain

within the firm to avoid opportunistic behaviour from an outside firm. These theories are

based on dyads, the case studies analysed in this article have a triad relationship. This


caused the problems of control, cooperation, and opportunism to become substantially

more difficult.

Upon viewing these triad relationships and the organizational fragmentation it

created with the three case studies in the article, three situations arose:

1. The problem of co-ordination

2. The problem of the absent customer

3. The problem of learning

Comprehensive contracts and plans are not enough to navigate and coordinate

large projects in this day and age. Complex engineering and interdependent activities will

most likely have a high degree of uncertainty and will require other forms of

coordination. This will often lead to a bureaucratization of communication that will in

turn increase the control costs. As more consultants and technical engineers are hired to

supervise a project, it becomes hard to distinguish who has the ability to give what orders.

This in turn introduces rigidities to the project and obstructs innovation in project

execution as the management flow is lost.

If the client or operator of a firm delegates all responsibilities to external

consultants, suppliers lose opportunities to reach tradeoffs between project cost and

operation benefits. When the communication from the client is cut, it becomes difficult to

identify what solution they might benefit from most, and the goal of the project may be

led astray from other firms representing the customer. The absence of the clients input

will complicate the relationships between the hired firm and delimit the possibility of

future transactions.

Knowledge building is a key component in building successful companies. It is

important to draw on previous experiences in order to move forward in the project.

Contractor outsourcing of on site management roles eliminates the possibility of

interpersonal feedback channels since the experience learned in a project will be taken

when the hired firm leaves. For example if an external firm is hired to collaborate with

another firm for a particular task, the work they do to complete a project would have been

split between them. When the project is to finish, the experience gained from the project


would have been shared between them, leaving the knowledge to be scattered when

communication channels break down.

With these points in mind, the future will require a more developed understanding

of project execution in order to avoid costly mistakes with organizational restructuring.

This means that project managers will have to have a more comprehensive assessment of

the risks and costs, not only on the financial level, but the impact of the relationship

between top management, organization structure and the client. These relationships are a

key component in maintaining a balance with the client between project completion and

client satisfaction.

3. Empirics

3.1 Goals of the Project

At the beginning of any project, goals and objectives have to be clearly defined by

the client to provide a guideline for what the project must complete. There are three main

factors, which constitute the iron triangle: time, cost, and quality.

In the case of the Sydney Opera House, no indication regarding time or cost limits

were provided for the competition. Thus, the architects were allowed total freedom in

their designs. So after Utzon was selected, he presented his “Red Book” in March 1958,

which consisted of the Sydney National Opera House report. It comprised some

indications such as plans, sections, reports by consultants, etc.

The cost restraint was set to AUS$7 million. The funds came almost entirely from

a dedicated lottery, so the project was not a financial burden for the government. Finally,

there were 400 contractual contributions gathered for the building and 165 companies

that took part in the project (Tombesi, 2004).

A goal concerning time was to complete the construction at the end of 1962 and

have the grand opening at the start of 1963. The project should have lasted four years.

However, the most important factor was quality because it was an almost


unrestricted goal of the project. It was the reason why it was launched, and it also

determined the time and cost objectives. There was the design quality, which comprised

the goal of building two halls. The first one needed a capacity of 3,500 to 4,000 persons

for orchestra and opera concerts and the other one, 1,800 to 2,500 for chamber music and

other shows (Murray, 2004). But the aim was also to make the new Sydney Opera House

one of the worlds architectural wonders, inspiring world recognition and admiration.

Another part of the quality concerned the logistical aspects; providing the basic facilities

like heating and ventilation, solid foundations and perfect acoustics in the rooms. In the

case of the Sydney Opera House, the goals set at the beginning proved to be quite

overoptimistic within the time and cost restraints (Murray, 2004).

3.2 Stakeholders and Partners

The main stakeholder, the one who did the design of the Sydney Opera House,

was the Danish architect Jørn Utzon. He won the 1957 international competition thanks

to his vision of the exterior of the building. But Utzon was much more concerned with the

design aspect rather than time and costs objectives, which proved problematic. When he

resigned in 1966, the architectural consortium Hall, Todd, and Littlemore replaced him.

During the project, Utzon collaborated with Ove Arup, who was in charge of the

structure and the engineering. With some other subcontractors, the team was in charge of

mechanics, electrics, heating and ventilating, lighting and acoustics. There was no real

project manager, but rather a collaboration between Utzon and Arup.

Another of the most important stakeholders is the client, the state of New South

Wales. This encompasses the Australian government, which launched the competition for

the project, and especially the Labor Premier, Joe Cahill. A part-time executive

committee was created by the client to provide project supervision but the members had

no real technical skills. The government eventually became an obstacle to the project

team by inhibiting changes during the progress of the operations and thus contributed to

cost overrun and delays. When a more conservative Liberal Party won the elections and a

new government was created, Davis Hughes was appointed Minister for Public Works


and eventually stopped paying Utzon.

Some other stakeholders were the external companies and consulting firms. The

construction of the project required the use of new techniques (computer-based three-

dimensional site positioning devices, geothermal pumps…) and it was outsourced to new

consulting bodies like such as Unisearch.

Finally, the public was an indirect stakeholder because they were concerned with

the projects success. And while only some citizens would be customers of the Opera

House, the Opera would also prove to be an integral part of Sydney and the country’s

history. In addition, the public contributed to the funding of the Opera through a lottery

set up by the Government. Utzon also became part of the public’s perception of the

project, and when he resigned, the Australians supported him and asked for his return

(Murray, 2004).

3.3 Organization

Regarding organization within the Sydney Opera House Case, it is documented

that there was no real project manager. Instead, Utzon and Arup both managed the

project. Utzon managed all architectural aspects while Arup and his partners were in

charge of all structural and civil engineering aspects. This included electrics, heating and

ventilation, and acoustics and theatrics. This strayed from the traditional model from the

50’s where the architect took on nearly the entire management role. The old way of

doing things involved the architect designing the building, taking it to the engineer and

asking if it would stand up (Murray, 2004). However, times were changing and the

complex modern buildings that dominated the time required the engineer to be part of the

design team. But the competition led to the selection of Utzon’s design before it could

have the input of an engineer. Therefore, while Utzon and Arup headed the project

together, there were eventual problems. The client, New South Whales (NSW), formed

an oversight committee to keep an eye on the project, which was known as the Sydney

Opera House Executive Committee (SOHEC). It is to be noted that this body was mostly

political with very little technical experience. There was also the construction team,

which was contracted very early in the process. In addition, Utzon and the team helped


organize a public lottery to assist in the funding of the Opera. The actual project was

divided into three stages. Stage 1 was the podium, stage 2 was the outer shells, and stage

3 was the interiors and windows (Murray, 2004). These stages proved later to be a large

problem, because the design team and the construction team would often work

simultaneously, which is difficult to do with a continually changing design.

3.4 Financials

The Sydney Opera House could probably be seen as one of the most financially

disastrous construction projects in history. The winning design from the competition was

originally meant to have a budget of AUS$7 million. Initially the cost of the Opera House

was estimated at AUS$3.6 million from the design entry. When Utzon submitted his

refined designs ‘the Red Book’, the estimates were then calculated by a quantity surveyor

at AUS$4,781,200 (Murray, 2004). The NSW Government decided not to invest any

money into the Opera House because they saw that their obligations lay with the support

of current public issues, and decided to donate no more than AUS$100,000. They then set

up the Opera House Lottery for the public, which ran through the course of the

construction and generated enough funds to keep the construction going. Stage one saw

the construction of the podium and the foundations for the building, the tender for this

work was set at AUS$1,397,878. This initial estimate was however drawn on incomplete

design drawings and site surveys which later lead to disagreements. The contractors for

this first stage successfully claimed additional costs of AUS$1,232,000 in 1962 due to the

loss of money from design changes (Murray, 2004). When stage one was completed in

1963, it had cost an estimated AUS$5.2 million and it was already 47 weeks over

schedule for the whole project.

Stage two became the most controversial stage of the entire construction. As costs

were rising a new government stepped in and monitored all payments being requested by

the Opera House. By the end of stage one, Utzon submitted an updated estimate of the

projects total cost as AUS$12.5 million, and by March 1964 he submitted another

estimate totaling AUS$17.4 million. It was at this time that the government decided to

take more firm action towards the expenditure of the Opera House, and on July 17 they


issued a statement declaring that the costs be reduced to Utzon’s original estimate of

$12.5 million (Murray, 2004). As more payments were being delivered and no visible

progress was seen, the government began withholding payments to Utzon. Stage two was

beginning to slow down and in 1966 Utzon felt he was forced to resign from the project

as his creative freedom was restricted, and therefore could not bring his perfect idea to

fruition. The project was taken over by the three Australian engineers as mentioned

earlier, and stage two was completed in 1967. The cost of stage two came to a total of

AUS$13.2 million, which pushed the cost of the project beyond Utzon’s last estimate to a

total of AUS$18.4million.

When Utzon walked out of the project, he did not leave any designs or

sketches to work with, he was convinced that he would be called back to the project once

the new team failed. This was not so, and due to the lack of designs to work with, new

ones had to be created. The new architects had to design the interiors based on the current

structure of the Opera House and they encountered many unforeseen complications.

Evidently this caused a huge increase in the estimate of the total cost of the project, which

came to AUS$85 million. This came as a shock and nearly an insult to Utzon who had

been fending off the Government from rising costs for years. The news that they had

agreed to this cost, which was more than four times Utzons original estimate was

evidence that he had been unjustly treated. Stage 3 ended up costing AUS$80.4 million,

which brought the grand total to $98.4 million. In May 1974, the minister for Public

Works announced that the final bill for the Sydney Opera House was AUS$102 million

(Murray, 2004).

The lottery system that was created to help fund the Sydney Opera House, was

largely responsible for the prompt reimbursement of the construction bill. According to

Jahn (1997), the construction bill was fully paid for by 1975 only two years after it

opened.


3.5 Timeline

The timeline of the project was dramatically altered throughout the project. After

the decision was made to build the opera house, the design competition was held in 1956

to find an architect. After selecting Utzon in 1957, the original schedule was made. The

estimated completion was 1962, with the grand opening in 1963. In 1958 Arup was

selected as the structural engineer, and by January 1959, the design team was well

underway and the construction team was contracted. In 1961 the reinforced concrete

foundation was completed. Arup completed the design for the roof in 1962, about the

same time the project was originally intended to be finished. Instead of 1963 acting as

the grand opening year, portions of the foundation had to be demolished in order to

support the new roof design. However, February 1963 marked the end of stage one and

the beginning of stage two of construction, which was the building of the shells. In 1965,

the project was still far behind, and the client decided, specifically David Hughes (the

Public Works Administrator), to reclaim payment responsibilities (Ramroth, 2006). He

used his new power to stop meeting Utzon’s funding requests. In 1966, Utzon quit the

project and the replacements were announced. There were protests on the State

Parliament House for Utzon, but Utzon was never again to return to this phase of the

project. In 1967, stage two of the project was finally completed. By 1972, there were

test performances in the house, and finally, in 1973, the project was finished. The

opening occurred on October 20th, 1973 and even included Queen Elizabeth II. In 1999,

Utzon was reinstated as a design consultant to prepare the Opera House for the new

millennium (Murray, 2004).

3.6 Risks of the project

The Sydney Opera House encountered a multitude of risks and delays throughout

the project. The design competition was a great incentive to find new talent by many

international architects, but it also failed to review how much experience the entrants had

with large scale projects. Utzon was later found to have not enlisted the assistance of any

engineers for their approval of his design before submitting it in the competition.


The internal risks of this project were seen within the management and

organization of the construction. There was no project manager appointed to the job, and

it was assumed that Utzon was to take the role for all decisions regarding any design,

construction or development. In actuality, it was Arup who was in charge of construction

and development, even though Utzon usually had the final decision. So while the

responsibilities should have been 50/50 between Utzon and Arup, Utzon strived for more

control than he had. In addition, since Utzon was unquestionably the leading professional

in the team, the other members expected that he would control the program and produce

the drawings for construction. The power given to Utzon saw many re-designs and re-

builds of several aspects of the Opera House, this caused many delays and cost overruns

that eventually caused the distrust of the Government. The formation of SOHEC was

used as a way to guide the process and design of the Opera House. However they never

really had much input, they mostly agreed to Utzon’s requests and never had any

problems with the issues that were coming up. However after two full years of

construction, the appointed committee wanted to increase the number of rooms inside the

building, showing that they tried to have input, but lacked the technical knowledge to do

so. To change the design of the building so late cost the project a lot of time and money

as a lot of re-structuring was required. This lack of knowledge of what was required and

how it should be handled was a large pitfall in the management of the Sydney Opera

House.

A great external risk was the general failure of the project, since it was so deeply

rooted with the public of Sydney. If the project were to fail, it would reflect on the ability

of the Australian work force in construction. On top of this, the NSW government had a

large impact on the construction. While Utzon largely controlled the initial stages, by the

middle of the second stage the government thought it was best to step in and control the

budget of the construction.

There were numerous technical/quality/performance risks involved in this project.

The construction techniques that were required for many parts of the construction had

never been done before, and while Utzon was breaking new ground in architecture, the

process for completing his design was unclear. For the first time in construction,

computers needed to be used to calculate stress points within the roof of the Opera


House. With all these new technological advancements in construction, it is no wonder

the cost estimates were understated. Another risk was the fact that Utzon was required to

start the construction of the project before his design was even close to finalization.

While the groundwork was taking place, he still had to design the interior of the building,

and the way in which the roof was going to be supported. He also had to ensure the

design of the interior space was adequate to accommodate the number of seats for a large

audience (up to 3,500). One of the main problems faced in the project was the

construction of the outer shell. The initial design never would have been structurally

sound. To make matters worse, the design of the interior rooms kept changing, which

constantly meant that the outer shell design had to change with it (Murray, 2004).

3.7 End Results

As mentioned, the Sydney Opera House opened in 1973 by Queen Elizabeth II,

after 17 years of redesigns, underestimates and cost overruns (sydneyoperahouse.com).

By 1975, the building had paid for itself, its total cost amounting to over AUS$102

million. The building holds over 3000 events per year and more than 200 000 come only

to attend the guided tour (Architecture Week, 2009). It encompasses over 4.5 acres of

land, and uses the power equivalent to a town of 25,000 people. The seating capacity of

the main concert hall is 2,679, while the Opera Theatre holds 1,507 (Sydney, 2009). The

construction consists of three groups of interlocking shells roofing two main performance

halls and a restaurant. Terraces that function as pedestrian concourses surround the shell-

structures. The building is one of the architectural wonders of the world, and included in

the UNESCO World Heritage List. Some performing groups that utilize the Opera House

are Opera Australia, Sydney Symphony, Sydney Theatre Company, The Australian

Ballet, Australian Chamber Orchestra, Bangaraa Dance Theatre, Sydney Philharmonia

Choirs, and many others.

Today, more than being a world-class performing arts centre, the Opera House

represents Sydney and even the whole nation the same way as the Eiffel tower represents

Paris. It’s known not only for its outstanding architecture, but also for exceptional

engineering and technological innovation. Moreover, it has had a continuing influence on


architecture around the globe. However, there are still complaints from some parties on

the acoustical properties as well as on the inadequacy of support spaces (UNESCO,

2009). Steps were taken and completed in 2004 towards the correction of the acoustics,

but the hall still may undergo changes in the future. Utzon created a set of design

principles in 1999 that guide how changes are to be implemented to the structure.

Utzon was never to return to Australia, never to see the final result of his work.

His work was recognized as an incredible feat of architecture, and in 2003 Utzon was

honored with the Pritzker Prize for architecture, the most renowned architectural prize in

the world. On November 29th, 2008, Utzon passed away at 90 years of age.

4. Analysis

Mitchell’s article, “Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience:

Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts” can assist with the analysis of

the Sydney Opera House stakeholders. By determining which potential stakeholders hold

which of the three stakeholder attributes, one can identify stakeholders. Next,

stakeholders can be grouped and analyzed within their salience. In classifying the

stakeholders of the Sydney Opera House case, it is important to remember the definitions

of the three attributes. Power enables one to act despite resistance of others, legitimacy is

being seen as acting appropriately within context norms, and urgency relates to time

sensitivity and importance to the stakeholder (Mitchell, 1997). And while the

interpretation of the Sydney Opera House stakeholders may not coincide completely with

Mitchell’s interpretations of stakeholder class, analysis is always dependent on the

context of a project, and all stakeholders are variable. That being said, 13 primary

stakeholders have been identified within the three groups of the “Theory of Stakeholder

Identification and Salience”.


Stakeholder Classification Power Legitimate Urgent Type

NSW Government P L U Definitive

Public Works, David Hughes P U Dangerous

Utzon P U Dangerous

Arup P L Dominant

SOHEC P L Dominant

Design Team L U Dependent

Engineer Team L U Dependent

Consultants L U Dependent

Suppliers L U Dependent

Contractor L U Dependent

Hall, Todd, Littlemore L U Dependent

Construction Workers L U Dependent

Public L Discretionary

Definitive stakeholders are easiest to recognize, and in this case there is only one:

the New South Wales Government. They retain both utilitarian and normative power,

and demonstrate it through their appointment of subordinates (the Sydney Opera House

Executive Committee (SOHEC), Utzon, etc.), and their ability to withhold funds. They

have legitimacy because their normative status is upheld through law, and they have

urgency because of their dedication to the project’s completion. Indeed, the NSW

Government’s requests should have always been held in top priority. Utzon failed to

recognize this.

The next set of stakeholders, which are by far the largest group, are the expectant

stakeholders. This includes dangerous, dominant, and dependent stakeholders. The two

dangerous stakeholders, holding power and urgency, are Public Works Administrator

David Hughes and Utzon. There is no question that both had power: while Utzon was

part of the project he was able to push for whatever project design and monetary requests

he desired, and Hughes was eventually able to use his power to overthrow Utzon. The

project was urgent to Utzon because of its importance to his career and reputation, while

Hughes was urgent due to his time constraints and restraints pushed on him by the NSW

government. What truly made these parties dangerous was their lack of legitimacy.


Within the eyes of the definitive stakeholder, Utzon was not legitimate, as demonstrated

in his loss of power: “In the long run, those who do not use power in a manner which

society considers responsible will tend to lose it (Mitchell, 1997; 866)”. And while

Hughes was seen as legitimate at the time of the project, in retrospect it is clear that his

actions tainted the integrity of the project. Both Hughes and Utzon can be described as

jeopardizing the success of the project. The next set of stakeholders are the dominant

stakeholders, who hold legitimacy and power, and include SOHEC and Arup. SOHEC

was sanctioned by the government, therefore legitimate, and had power to enforce their

will. However, because they rarely used their power, especially while Utzon was part of

the project, they lacked urgency. And while the project was no doubt important to Arup,

his actions spoke differently. He allowed Utzon to take control, and sometimes appeared

to be in the project only for the recognition, rather than time and cost focused completion.

The final group within the expectant stakeholders are the dependent stakeholders, who

retain urgency and legitimacy. This includes the design team, the engineer team, the

consultants, the suppliers, the contractor, the construction workers, and Hall, Todd, and

Littlemore. All these groups lacked the power to address their urgent and legitimate

concerns without the assistance of Utzon, Arup, SOHEC, Hughes, or the NSW

Government. They were therefore dependent on those with power. These stakeholders

relied on the management to remain employed and content, which is why they were also

urgent.

The last class are the latent stakeholders. Many of these are difficult to identify

because the possibilities of latent stakeholders are almost infinite. However, within the

empirical data provided, we can recognize one discretionary stakeholder, meaning they

hold only legitimacy. This is the public. The public served primarily as an indirect

stakeholder, acting as more of a watchful eye than an involved participant. While the

public primarily held only legitimacy throughout the project, they easily obtained

urgency, such as when they protested for the return on Utzon after he left. This shows the

unpredictable nature of the stakeholders involved in this project, which will now be

classified.


In the first stage of development, before the replacement of Utzon, the matrixes can be

identified as such:

Period 1: 1959 – 1966

Predictability

High Low

Low A - Few problems

The consultants, design team, and

engineering team

Construction workers

B - Unpredictable but manageable

Public

High C - Powerful but predictable

“Lottery”

Government

Arup

D - Greatest danger or opportunities

Utzon

SOHEC

The first group identified is stakeholders with few problems. They have minimal

influence on the project, which means they have a high predictability and low power.

These are the consultants, design team, and engineering team, who depend on the

executive committee SOHEC; and construction workers, who are a labor force, executing

the construction. Next is the unpredictable but manageable public. They support the

project since it will become part of their country’s culture and history, but they have no

real power and are quite unpredictable at this early stage. The next group contains, among

others, the “lottery”. They are funding entities, which have the power to give funds or

not. Thus, they are predictable and very important for the progress of the project. The

government and Arup also fall under these restrictions because their lack of urgency

allows them to be predictable. The government also gives directions to Labor Premier Joe

Cahill, who was largely responsible for the prompt start of the construction and was a

Power


particular supporter of the project; and Arup and his team, are responsible for all

engineering aspects. Finally, the stakeholders representing the greatest danger or

opportunities are Utzon and the SOHEC. Utzon had a high power since he was in charge

of the whole design of the project, but he was also very unpredictable because he often

added things or instilled changes without considering other opinions or additional

difficulties (costs, delays, realization…)

Level of interest

Low High

Low A – Minimal effort

Public


B – Keep informed


engineering team

High C – Keep satisfied

“Lottery”

D – Key players

Utzon

Arup

Government

SOHEC

The second matrix concerns the level of interest and the power. In this matrix,

public and construction workers are categorized as needing minimal effort from

management. The public is not really interested in the project at this stage and have no

power to influence it. The construction workers also require a minimal effort since their

interest in the project is limited to employment. The consultants, design team, and

engineering team have to remain informed because they do not really have power in the

project but their interest is high. This is because they see the project as a financial

income, but if it is a success, it would also benefit their reputation. Funding entities which

took part in the lottery have to be kept satisfied because they hold the power to give more

or less money to the Opera House, but have also low interest as long as they do not have

Power


return on investment; thus they have the potential to become dangerous and have to be

carefully managed. Finally, we distinguished four key players, Utzon, Arup, the NSW

Government, and the SOHEC. Utzon and Arup are powerful as we said earlier, but they

have a high level of interest in the project since Utzon could become one of the greatest

architects of his century, propelling his reputation to new heights. The same holds true

for Arup. The government wants to prove to the world they can make a world marvels

with the Sydney Opera House, and the SOHEC was involved to make sure the project

went smoothly.

Utzon resigned in 1966, thus, we then focused on the new matrixes since some

stakeholders changed position, and others appeared.

Period 2: 1966 - 1973

Predictability

High Low

Low A - Few problems


engineering team

Hall, Todd, & Littlemore


B - Unpredictable but manageable

Public

High C - Powerful but predictable

SOHEC

“Lottery”

Arup

Government

D - Greatest danger or opportunities

Public Works Minister, David Hughes

Power


In this predictability/power matrix of the second period, Utzon was replaced by Hall,

Todd and Littlemore; but contrary to Utzon in the first period, we cannot consider them

as “greatest danger or opportunities”. They had low power and high predictability,

because they had less power than Utzon since they were appointed and under the

restriction of SOHEC. SOHEC has also been repositioned in the category of “powerful

but predictable” stakeholders because they gained predictability with the election of the

new government, which set a stricter frame. Finally, the new greatest danger or

opportunity for management became the Public Works Minister, David Hughes. He is

very powerful but also unpredictable since he is the one who decided to stop paying

Utzon and could make decisions unquestioned.

Level of interest

Low High

Low A – Minimal effort

Public


B – Keep informed


engineering team

Hall, Todd, & Littlemore

High C – Keep satisfied

“Lottery”

D – Key players

Government

Public Works Minister, David Hughes

Arup

SOHEC

New stakeholders, which appeared in 1966, have been categorized in this matrix too. The

first one is the architectural consortium Hall, Todd and Littlemore. As previously

explained, they do not really have power; nevertheless, they have a high level of interest

Power


and thus have to be kept satisfied. Their interest relies on the financial incentive that the

project provides and the reputation they can get from the accomplishment of it. The other

additional stakeholder is David Hughes, the Public Works Minister. He can be considered

as a key player since he is very powerful and his interest is very high, as he represents his

country.

Being a stakeholder Hughes and the government can now be analyzed by their

relationship to other key players within the construction. Following the Hobbs &

Andersen model for owner-supplier relations, the Sydney Opera House project seems to

fit best into the “Partners in design and execution” configuration. One of the criteria was

“contracting between a large owner and the firms it hires for project design and execution

(Hobbs & Andersen 2001. The state of New South Wales sure is a large owner, who

contracted Utzon to carry out the designing work, the subcontractors led by Arup for the

engineering part and other external firms and consulting companies. The project was

initiated by the NSW government on request from the conductor of the Sydney

Symphony Orchestra, Eugene Goossens. The orchestra had developed into one of the

most renowned symphony orchestras in the world and they needed a new arena for their

concerts. The Sydney Town Hall lacked proper acoustics and basic facilities such as

heating (Murray, 2004). Necessity was thus the mother of invention, just like one of the

other criteria for the mentioned configuration.

Hobbs & Andersen distinguish between four different sets of practices within the

“Partners in design and execution” configuration. The one that best applies to the SOH

project is “One-off Integrated Project Teams”. The suppliers came together for this

specific project and were brought in at an early stage. Though the initial design was

decided upon by Utzon solely, the whole team collaborated on the implementation of it

from the very beginning and had the opportunity to share their ideas and knowledge

before starting off the project. Projects of this kind are normally very time and cost

consuming but tend to result in exceptional performance and technological innovation.

The immense cost overruns, AUS$102 million instead of AUS$7 million, and the 10 year

long delay confirm this statement. The project was also very much before its time

regarding technological innovation. The distinctive roof shells and the use of computers


for structural calculations are two good examples of technological innovation in the

Sydney Opera House project.

This type of project requires a long time for the design phase usually involving a

great number of participants. One of the major problems in the building of the Opera

House was that Utzon wasn’t given enough time to complete his design before the

construction work begun. If Utzon and Arup would have had a chance to work together

long enough to come up with a perfectly feasible design before the construction team was

hired, a significant part of the additional costs and time could probably have been

avoided.

While studying the Sydney Opera House it became apparent that it was one of the

most unplanned and mismanaged stories in history. In light of the article by Söderlund,

Berggren & Anderson (2001), it can be seen that there were many issues between clients

and project teams. The nature of the Opera House required the NSW government to

acquire an agent for their task at hand. In this case the agent was Utzon and all

managerial privileges were given to him to ensure the successful completion of a new

Opera House. This caused very opportunistic behavior in Utzon since he actually had

most of the management power, instead of the NSW government.

As mentioned earlier, Utzon had a lot of power and urgency within this project, so

as a stakeholder he was able to govern most of the decisions of construction. This led to

many design changes and cost overruns which can be blamed on the absence of the

customer. Utzon made very erratic decisions with suppliers, and contracts were made too

early in the project which lead to many transaction costs that did not contribute to the

progress of the Opera House. This can be seen by the fact that there were over 400

contractual contributions and 165 companies involved. While they all contributed there

were many costly issues. For example the case with Civil and Civic engineers for the

construction of Stage 1 saw them claim additional costs of AUS$1,232,000 to reimburse

their money lost from design changes brought on by Utzon.

The year that Utzon resigned created the biggest problem for the Sydney Opera

House; this was of course during stage two. The difficulty of communication with the

hired consultants lead to many disputes and the designs for the interior were never

properly accomplished.


“He was dealing with three acoustics consultants - the Danish Jordan and two

Germans, Cremer and Gabler complicated by the fact that Cremer, although he could

speak English, would only write his reports in German. To make matters worse, Jordan

did not agree with Cremer and Gabler in their overall approach” (Murray, 2004: 66)

It became apparent that within this stage of the project the coordination of the

design and consultant efforts became too conflicted, leading to arguments over the

desired end result. They didn’t actually consult the client for any input on the final

design. The client was simply happy with hired consultants’ opinions since they had no

technical involvement what so ever. When Utzon resigned he left a series of incomplete

drawings that were not comprehensible for the next architect to pick up. The problem

here deals with the basis of learning. It cannot only be blamed on the number of

consultants that were involved in this project, but that Utzon was also very particular

about which of his designs he let other people see.

“Over lunch, the Minister [for Public Works] explained some of his concerns on

the progress of Stage 3. The previous month, the quantity surveyors had submitted a new

estimate but had reported that they had been unable to obtain proper information to work

from - they could only access 'preliminary and not working drawings'.” (Murray, 2004:

80)

Utzon had only discussed issues and techniques with the consultants based on

drafts, and he kept the rest of the designs in his head. While this was an issue that could

not have been foreseen by the client, it is a reflection on their first decision to allow so

much freedom in the designs. This led to the issues outlined by Söderlund, Berggren &

Anderson (2001), with the problem of learning. Utzon never felt the need to submit a full

design to the SOHEC until he himself thought it appropriate. This not only delayed

construction, but it inhibited Todd and Hall to design an interior that would never

compliment the aesthetics of Utzon’s architecture.


5. Conclusion

This analysis has thoroughly investigated the effect of stakeholder management in the

Sydney Opera House project. Through this examination, the following conclusions can be

drawn. A main issue that lasted throughout the project was the fact that the construction

work was ordered to start before the design work was completed. On the other hand, if

Utzon, in cooperation with the engineering team, would have had the chance to finish the

design, the estimation of the project cost would probably been so high that the project

would never have been implemented. The involvement of engineers and suppliers at an

early stage in the process was a criteria for the successful outcome of the project.

Utzon’s delay and withholding of the designs he created, caused a problem of

learning for the next architect who took over. For these reasons, and more, Utzon was

seen to be a dangerous stakeholder, and his power in the project led to erratic decisions

and many re-designs. Utzon’s ability to oppose his will without having legitimacy was a

direct consequence of SOHEC’s lack of urgency. While the NSW government was absent

in a lot of the management decisions, it was ultimately Utzon’s responsibility to monitor

his own actions and focus on the goal in respect to the client. His lack of self control gave

the definitive stakeholder, the NSW government, an opportunity to remove him from

power. If stakeholders throughout this project were managed properly, cost over runs and

re-designs could have been minimized. Through this analysis, it has shown the

importance of identifying stakeholders, and how their influence can affect the outcome of

the processes of such a project.


6. Bibliography

ArchitectureWeek. “Postcard from Sydney.” ArchitectureWeek - Culture -Postcard from

Sydney - 2006.1108 . 2006. 10 Feb. 2009 <http://www.architectureweek.com/

2006/1108/culture_1-1.html>.

Hobbs, Brian, and Bjørn Andersen. “Different alliance relationships for project design

and execution.” International Journal of Project Management 19 (2001): 465-469.

Jahn, Graham. Sydney Architecture . Balmian, N.S.W.: Watermark Press, 1997.

Mitchell, Ronald K., Bradley R. Agle, and Donna J. Wood. “Toward a Theory of

Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What

Really Counts.” Academy of Management Review 22.4 (1997): 853-886.

Murray, Peter. The Sage of the Sydney Opera House. New York, New York: Taylor &

Francis , 2004.

Newcombe, Robert. “From Client to Project Stakeholders: A Stakeholder Mapping

Approach.” Construction Management and Economics 21 (Dec. 2003): 841-848.

Olander, Stefan, and Anne Landin. “Evaluation of Stakeholder Influence in the

Implementation of Construction.” International Journal of Project Management 23

(2005): 321-328.

Ramroth, Jr., William G. Project Management for Design Professionals . Chicago, Illinois

: AEC Education, 2006.

Sydney Opera House. “House History Proudly Sponsored by Baulderstone Hornibrook.”

Sydney Opera House. 10 Feb. 2009 <http://www.sydneyoperahouse.com/about/

house_history_landing.aspx>.

Söderlund, Jonas, Christian Berggren, and Christian Anderson. “Clients, Contractors, and


Consultants: The Consequences of Organizational Fragmentation in

Contemporary Project Enviroments.” Project Management Journal 32.3 (2001):

39-48.

UNESCO. “Sydney Opera House.” Sydney Opera House - UNESCO World Heritage

Centre . 13 Feb. 2009. 10 Feb. 2009 <http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/166>.


7. Appendix

Source: Mitchell 1997


Source: Different alliance relationships for project design and execution (Hobbs and Andersen, 2001)


Stakeholder Map: 1959-1966

New South Wales Government

SOHEC

Utzon Arup

Design Team

Public

Contractor, Dundas Corbet Gore

Engineer Team

Consultants

Lottery

Suppliers

Construction Workers


Stakeholder Map: 1966 - 1973

New South Wales Government

Engineer Team Arup Hall, Todd, & Littlemore

Public

Consultants

Lottery

Public Works Minister, David

Hughes

SOHEC

Suppliers

Construction Workers

Contractor, Dundas Corbet Gore


Documents

Sydney Opera House Project Study