SUPPORTSECOND DIVISIONEDWARD V. LACSON,G.R. No. 150644Petitioner,Present:PUNO,J., Chairperson,-versus-SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,CORONA,AZCUNA, andGARCIA,JJ.MAOWEE DABAN LACSONandMAONAADABANPromulgated:LACSON, represented by theirmotherand guardianad-litem,LEA DABAN LACSON,August 28, 2006Respondents.x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xD E C I S I O NGARCIA,J.:Petitioner Edward V. Lacson, father of the respondent sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson and husband of their mother and guardianad-litem,LeaDaban Lacson, has come to this Courtviathis petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to seek the reversal andsetting aside of the Decision[1]dated July 13, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) inCA-G.R. CV No. 60203,as reiterated in its Resolution[2]of October 18, 2001 denying his motion for reconsideration.From the petition and its annexes, the respondents reply thereto, and otherpleadings, the Court gathersthe following facts:The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea DabanLacson.Maoweewas born onDecember 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else.For a month, they stayed with Leas mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Leas) mother and then with her brother Noel Daban.After some time, they rented an apartment only to return later to the house of Leas mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their own.It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband Edward for support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in a note datedDecember 10, 1975to give support to his daughters. As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on his promise of support, despite Leas efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would admit, though, that Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school expenses. Through the years and up to the middle part of 1992, Edwards mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to help in the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom eventuallytookupnursing atSt. Pauls College inIloiloCity. In the early part of 1995 when Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against Edward for support before the Regional Trial Courtof Iloilo City, Branch 33, Maowee was about to graduate.In that complaint datedJanuary 30, 1995, as amended,[3]docketed as Civil Case No. 22185, Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that their father Edward, despite being gainfully employed and owning several pieces of valuable lands, has not provided them support since 1976. They also alleged that, owing to years of Edwards failure and neglect, their mother had, from time to time, borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban.As she would later testify, Lea had received from Noel, by way of a loan, as much asP400,000.00toP600,000.00.In his Answer, Edward alleged giving to Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to meet their needs. He explained, however, that his lack of regular income and the unproductivity of the land he inherited, not his neglect, accounted for his failure at times to give regular support. He also blamed financial constraint for his inability to provide theP12,000.00monthly allowance prayed for in the complaint.As applied for and after due hearing, the trial court granted the sisters Maowee and Maonaa supportpendente liteatP12,000.00 per month, subject to the schedule of payment and other conditions set forth in the courts corresponding order of May 13, 1996.[4]Following trial, the RTC rendered onJune 26, 1997judgment finding for the plaintiff sisters, as represented by their mother. In that judgment, the trial court, following an elaborate formula set forth therein, ordered their defendant fatherEdwardtopay them a specific sum which represented 216 months, or 18 years, of support in arrears. Thefalloof the trial courts decision[5]reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:1)Ordering defendant to compensate plaintiffs support in arrears in the amount of TWO MILLIONFOUR HUNDRED NINETY-SIX THOUSAND (P2, 496,000.00) PESOS from which amount shall be deducted ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR (P124,000.00) PESOS that which they received from defendant for two years and that which they received by way of support pendent lite;2)Ordering defendant to pay TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00)PESOS as attorneys fees; and3)Pay costs.SO ORDERED.Therefrom, Edward appealed to the CA whereat his recourse was docketed asCA-G.R. CV. No. 60203.Eventually, the CA, in the herein assailed Decision datedJuly 13, 2001,[6]dismissed Edwards appeal, disposing as follows;WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the appealed Decision in Civil Case No. 22185 is hereby AFFIRMED.Double costs against the defendant appellant [Edward Lacson].SO ORDERED. (Words in bracket added.)In time, Edward moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the appellate court in its equally assailed Resolution ofOctober 18, 2001.[7]Hence, EdwardspresentrecourseonhissubmissionthattheCA erred -I.XXX WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE GRANT OF SUPPORT IN ARREARS FROM 1976 TO 1994.II.XXX IN AFFIRMING THE ALLEGED ADVANCES OF SUPPORT BY RESPONDENTS UNCLE NOEL DABAN.III.XXX IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF SUPPORT EVEN IF PETITIONER IS NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE OF PROVIDING THE SAME TO RESPONDENTS.IV.XXX WHEN IT ORDERED PETITIONER TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO XXX RESPONDENTS EVEN IF PETITIONERS OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE SUPPORT HAD ALREADY BEEN COMPLETELY SATISFIED BY THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE OF HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY WHICH WERE ALL APPROPRIATED BY THE RESPONDENTS.The petition lacks merit.Petitioner admits being obliged, as father, to provide support to both respondents, Maowee and Maonaa.It is his threshold submission, however, that he should not be made to pay support in arrears,i.e., from 1976 to 1994, no previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand having been made by the respondents. He invokes the following provision of the Family Code to complete his point:Article 203 The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.To petitioner, his obligation to pay under the aforequoted provision starts from the filing of Civil Case No. 22185 in 1995, since only from that moment can itbesaid that an effective demand for support was made upon him.Petitioners above posture has little to commenditself. For one, it conveniently glossed over the fact that he veritably abandoned the respondent sisters even before the elder of the two could celebrate her second birthday. To be sure, petitioner could not plausibly expect any of the sisters during their tender years to go through the motion of demanding support from him, what with the fact that even their mother (his wife) found it difficult during the period material to get in touch with him. For another, the requisite demand for support appears to have been made sometime in 1975. It may be that Lea made no extrajudicial demand in the sense of a formal written demand in terms and in the imperious tenor commonly used by legal advocates in a demand letter. Nonetheless, what would pass as a demand was, however, definitely made. Asking one to comply with his obligation to support owing to the urgency of the situation is no less a demand becauseitcameby way of a request or a plea.As it were, the trial court found that a demand to sustain an award of support inarrearshadbeen made in this case and said so in its decision, thus:From 1976, [respondents] mother now and then went to their [paternal] grandmothers house by their father and asked for support; this notwithstanding their fathers commitment for this purpose which the latter embodied in a note datedDecember 10, 1975. For twenty-one years that they needed support, [petitioner] complied with his obligation for only two (2) years.xxxxxxxxxLast December 10, 1975, [petitioner] committed self for the support of his children, the [respondents] herein but failing, plaintiffsmother asked extrajudicially for her childrens support since 1976, when she went to her mothers house. .[8](Words in bracket and underscoring added.)The appellate court made a parallel finding on the demand angle, formulating the same in the following wise:We could not confer judicial approval upon [petitioners] posture oftryingtoevade his responsibility to give support to his daughters simply because their mother did not make a formal demand therefor from him. [Petitioners] insistence on requiring a formal demand from his wife is truly pointless, in the face of his acknowledgment of and commitment to comply with such obligation through a note in his own handwriting. Said note [stating that he will sustain his two daughters Maowee and Maonaa] alsostatedas requested by their mother thus practically confirming the fact of such demand having been made by [respondents] mother. The trial court thus correctly ruled that [petitioners] obligation to pay support in arrears should commence from 1976.[9](Words in bracket added).The Court finds no adequate reason to disturb the factual determination of the CA confirmatory of that of the trial court respecting the demand Lea made on the petitioner to secure support for the respondents. As a matter of long and sound appellate practice, factual findings of the CA are accorded respect, if not finality, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons.[10]Not one of the well-recognized exceptions to this ruleonconclusivenessof factual findings appear to obtain in this case. Accordingly, the Court cannot grant the petitioners plea for a review of the CAs findings bearing on the actuality that, as basis for an award of support in arrears, an extrajudicial demand for support had been made on the petitioner as evidenced by the December 10, 1975 note adverted to. Lest it be overlooked, the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review, as here, is generally limited to correction of errors of law. Complementing that postulate is the rule that the Courtis not bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below,[11]except when, as earlier indicated, compelling reasons demand a review of the factual conclusions drawn from such evidence.Petitioners second specification of error touches on the CAs affirmatory holding that respondents uncle, Noel Daban, advanced the money for their support. Again, petitioners lament on the matterisaveritable call for review of factual determinations of the two courts below. It need not, accordingly, detain us long. Suffice it to state in that regard that, of their close relatives, the respondents appeared to have stayed longest with their uncle, Noel Daban.Noteworthy also is the fact that petitioner, from 1976 to 1994, only gave Maowee and Maonaa token amounts for schooling when support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance and education,[12]or, in short, whatever is necessary to keep a person alive. Logically, the sisters would, thru their mother, turn to their uncle (Noel Daban) for their sustenance and education when petitioner failed to give the same, a failing which stretched from their pre-schooling days to their college years. Since such failure has been established, it is not amiss to deduce, as did the trial court and the CA, that NoelDabanwho, owing to consideration of kinship, had reasons to help, indeed lent his sister Lea money to support her children.Pursuant to Article 207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement from the petitioner. The provision reads:When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support.Mention may also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridical relationship between the petitioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-contract,[13]an equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching himself at the expense of another.As for the amount of support in arrears, there is also no reason to disturb the absolute figures arrived at by the two courts below, appearing as they do to be reasonable and proper. Arbitrariness respecting the determination of the final numbers cannot plausibly be laid on the doorsteps of the CA, and the trial court before it, considering that they fixed such amount based on the varying needs of the respondents during the years included in the computation and to the financial resources of the petitioner, as proved by the evidence adduced below. As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationshipisgenerallyobliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient.[14]Petitioner closes his petition by urging the Court, as it did the CA earlier, to consider a transaction that transpired after the trial court had rendered judgment. We refer to the sale by Lea of half of what petitioner claims to be his exclusive or capital property. As the petitioner would have this Court believe, Lea and the respondent sisters appropriated theP5 Million proceeds of the sale for themselves. Pressing on, he alleged that the amount thus received from the sale is more than enough to fully satisfy thus release him from complying with-the underlying judgment for support,assumingex gratia argumentihis obligation to pay support in arrears.Petitioners above submission is flawed by the premises holding it together.For firstly, it assumes as a fact that what was sold forP5 Million was indeed his exclusive property.But, as the CA aptly observed, there is no showing whether the property subject of the transaction mentioned by [the petitioner] is a conjugal property or [his] exclusive property, as in fact [respondents] mother asserts that she and [petitioner] had separately sold their respective shares on said property.[15]Secondly, the respondent sisters were not party to the sale aforementioned. Petitioners suggestion, therefore, that part of the proceeds of the sale went to them and may be set off for what petitioner owes them by way of support in arrears is unacceptable, being at best gratuitous and self-serving.Petitioner, unlike any good father of a family, has been remiss in his duty to provide respondents with support practically all throughout their growing years. At bottom, the sisters have been deprived by a neglectful father of the basic necessities in life as if it is their fault to have been born. This disposition is thus nothing more than a belated measure to right a wrong done the herein respondents who are no less petitioners daughters.WHEREFORE, the instant petition isDENIEDand the appealed CA decision and resolution areAFFIRMED.Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

PARENTAL AUTHORITYG.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995DAISIE T. DAVID,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR,respondents.MENDOZA,J.:Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife.After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family.In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year.On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition forhabeas corpuson behalf of Christopher J.After hearing, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58 at Angeles City, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondent:1. the rightful custody of the minor Christopher J. T. David is hereby given to the natural mother, the herein petitioner Daisie T. David;2. respondent is hereby ordered to give a temporary support of P3,000.00 a month to the subject minor Christopher J. T. David, Christine David and Cathy Mae David to take effect upon the finality of this decision; and3. to pay the costs of this suit.SO ORDERED.On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding:We agree with the respondent-appellant's view that this is not proper in ahabeas corpuscase.Law and jurisprudence wherein the question of custody of a minor child may be decided in ahabeas corpuscase contemplate a situation where the parents are married to each other but are separated. This is so because under the Family Code, the father and mother have joint parental authority over their legitimate children and in case of separation of the parents there is need to determine rightful custody of their children. The same does not hold true in an adulterous relationship, as in the case at bar, the child born out of such a relationship is under the parental authority of the mother by express provision of the law. Hence, the question of custody and support should be brought in a case singularly filed for the purpose. In point of fact, this is more advisable in the case at bar because the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the other minor children of the petitioner-appellee and respondent-appellant and, therefore, cannot properly provide for their support.Admittedly, respondent-appellant is financially well-off, he being a very rich businessman; whereas, petitioner-appellee depends upon her sisters and parents for support. In fact, he financially supported petitioner-appellee and her three minor children. It is, therefore, for the best interest of Christopher J that he should temporarily remain under the custody of respondent-appellant until the issue on custody and support shall have been determined in a proper case.WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE, and a NEW ONE ENTERED dismissing the petition forhabeas corpusin Special Proceeding No. 4489.Daisie in turn filed this petition for review of the appellate court's decision.Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ ofhabeas corpusshall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation. For example, in the case ofSalvaa v.Gaela,1it was held that the writ ofhabeas corpusis the proper remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a third person of her free will because the parents were compelling her to marry a man against her will.In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him.2Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ ofhabeas corpus.Indeed, Rule 1021 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."3Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her own since they were born. Petitioner is a market vendor earning from P2,000 to P3,000 per month in 1993 when the RTC decision was rendered. She augments her income by working as secretary at the Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly income of P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her employer so that she can personally attend to her children. She works up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to make up for time lost during the day. That she receives help from her parents and sister for the support of the three children is not a point against her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for every member of the family are characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it what it is.Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent promises if the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her children according to her means.The Regional Trial Court ordered private respondent to give temporary support to petitioner in the amount of P3,000.00 a month, pending the filing of an action for support, after finding that private respondent did not give any support to his three children by Daisie, except the meager amount of P500.00 a week which he stopped giving them on June 23, 1992. He is a rich man who professes love for his children. In fact he filed a motion for the execution of the decision of the Court of Appeals, alleging that he had observed his son "to be physically weak and pale because of malnutrition and deprivation of the luxury and amenities he was accustomed to when in the former custody of the respondent." He prayed that he be given the custody of the child so that he can provide him with the "proper care and education."Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in this case is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed willingness to support the minor child. The order for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to give support can fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed by the court or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who is entitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto."In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him (private respondent).WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and private respondent is ORDERED to deliver the minor Christopher J. T. David to the custody of his mother, the herein petitioner, and to give him temporary support in the amount of P3,000.00, pending the fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate action.SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992.]

CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI,Petitioners, v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG,Respondents.

Alex Y. Tan, forPetitioners.

Mario D. Ortiz and Danilo V. Ortiz forPrivate Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; QUASI DELICT; LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIMINAL OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THEIR MINOR CHILDREN; RULE. The parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.

D E C I S I O N

REGALADO,J.:

One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow is sometimes a touchstone of love. A tragic illustration is provided by the instant case, wherein two lovers died while still in the prime of their years, a bitter episode for those whose lives they have touched. While we cannot expect to award complete assuagement to their families through seemingly prosaic legal verbiage, this disposition should at least terminate the acrimony and rancor of an extended judicial contest resulting from the unfortunate occurrence.

In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the stages whereof were alternately initiated by the parties, petitioners are now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment of respondent court promulgated on January 2, 1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69060 with the following decretal portion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiffs complaint is hereby reversed; and instead, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendants, jointly and solidarily, to pay to plaintiffs the following amounts:chanrobles.com : virtual law library

1. Moral damages, P30,000.000;

2. Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;

3. Attorneys fees, P20,000.00, and costs.

However, denial of defendants-appellees counterclaims is affirmed." 1

Synthesized from the findings of the lower courts, it appears that respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from which she died on January 14, 1979, was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents, and who also died in the same event on the same date.

For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso, at the corner of Maria Cristina and Juana Osmea Streets, Cebu City, from January 7 to 13, 1978.

On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the scene of the crime inside the residence of private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets of the same city.

Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the death of both minors, their parents, who are the contending parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn from their interpretation of circumstantial evidence, available reports, documents and evidence of physical facts.

Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell caused her death by shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. On the other hand,Petitioners, puzzled and likewise distressed over the death of their son, rejected the imputation and contended that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendells death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification.

As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No. R-17774 in the then Court of First Instance of Cebu against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latters vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After trial, the court below rendered judgment on October 20, 1980 as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiffs complaint for insufficiency of the evidence. Defendants counterclaim is likewise denied for lack of sufficient merit." 2

On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of therein plaintiffs-appellants was set aside and another judgment was rendered against defendants-appellees who, as petitioners in the present appeal bycertiorari, now submit for resolution the following issues in this case:

1. Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court in accordance with established decisional laws; and

2. Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability. 3

In the proceedings before the trial court, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Police Medico-Legal Officer of Cebu, submitted his findings and opinions on some postulates for determining whether or not the gunshot wound was inflicted on Wendell Libi by his own suicidal act. However, undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. It should be emphasized, however, that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of whether it was suicide or not.

It is true that said witness declared that he found no evidence of contact or close-contact of an explosive discharge in the entrance wound. However, as pointed out by private respondents, the body of deceased Wendell Libi must have been washed at the funeral parlor, considering the hasty interment thereof a little after eight (8) hours from the occurrence wherein he died. Dr. Cerna himself could not categorically state that the body of Wendell Libi was left untouched at the funeral parlor before he was able to conduct his autopsy. It will also be noted that Dr. Cerna was negligent in not conducting a paraffin test on Wendell Libi, hence possible evidence of gunpowder residue on Wendells hands was forever lost when Wendell was hastily buried.

More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body of Wendell Libi about eight (8) hours after the incident or, to be exact, eight (8) hours and twenty (20) minutes based on the record of death; that when he arrived at the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, the body of the deceased was already on the autopsy table and in the stage of rigor mortis; and that said body was not washed, but it was dried. 4 However, on redirect examination, he admitted that during the 8-hour interval, he never saw the body nor did he see whether said body was wiped or washed in the area of the wound on the head which he examined because the deceased was inside the morgue. 5 In fact, on cross-examination, he had earlier admitted that as far as the entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound are concerned, it is possible that Wendell Libi shot himself. 6

He further testified that the muzzle of the gun was not pressed on the head of the victim and that he found no burning or singeing of the hair or extensive laceration on the gunshot wound of entrance which are general characteristics of contact or near-contact fire. On direct examination, Dr. Cerna nonetheless made these clarification:

"Q Is it not a fact that there are certain guns which are so made that there would be no black residue or tattooing that could result from these guns because they are what we call clean?

A Yes, sir. I know that there are what we call smokeless powder.

ATTY. ORTIZ:

Q Yes. So, in cases, therefore, of guns where the powder is smokeless, those indications that you said may not rule out the possibility that the gun was closer than 24 inches, is that correct?

A If the . . . assuming that the gun used was .. the bullet used was a smokeless powder.

Q At any rate, doctor, from . . . disregarding those other matters that you have noticed, the singeing, etc., from the trajectory, based on the trajectory of the bullet as shown in your own sketch, is it not a fact that the gun could have been fired by the person himself, the victim himself, Wendell Libi, because it shows a point of entry a little above the right ear and point of exit a little above that, to be very fair and on your oath?

A As far as the point of entrance is concerned and as far as the trajectory of the bullet is concerned and as far as the angle or the manner of fire is concerned, it could have been fired by the victim." 7

As shown by the evidence, there were only two used bullets 8 found at the scene of the crime, each of which were the bullets that hit Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, respectively. Also, the sketch prepared by the Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, 9 shows that there is only one gunshot wound of entrance located at the right temple of Wendell Libi. The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Cerna states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw libraryxxx

"Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4 cm., with contusion collar widest inferiorly by 0.2 cm., edges inverted, oriented upward, located at the head, temporal region, right, 2.8 cms. behind and 5.5 cms. above right external auditory meatus, directed slightly forward, upward and to the left, involving skin and soft tissues, making a punch-in fracture on the temporal bone, right, penetrating cranial cavity, lacerating extensively along its course the brain tissues, fracturing parietal bone, left, and finally making an EXIT wound, irregular, 2.0 x 1.8 cms., edges (e)verted, parietal region, left, 2.0 cms. behind and 12.9 cms. above left external auditory meatus.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.phxxx

"Evidence of contact or close-contact fire, such as burning around the gunshot wound of entrance, gunpowder tatooing (sic), smudging, singeing of hair, extensive laceration or bursting of the gunshot wound of entrance, or separation of the skin from the underlying tissue, are absent." 10

On cross-examination, Dr. Cerna demonstrated his theory which was made of record, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q Now, will you please use yourself as Wendell Libi, and following the entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound, and measuring yourself 24 inches, will you please indicate to the Honorable Court how would it have been possible for Wendell Libi to kill himself? Will you please indicate the 24 inches?

WITNESS:

A Actually, sir, the 24 inches is approximately one arms length.

ATTY. SENINING:

I would like to make of record that the witness has demonstrated by extending his right arm almost straight towards his head." 11

Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of defendants witnesses Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan, the first being a resident of an apartment across the street from the Gotiongs and the second, a resident of the house adjacent to the Gotiong residence, who declared having seen a "shadow" of a person at the gate of the Gotiong house after hearing shots therefrom.

On cross-examination, Lydia Ang testified that the apartment where she was staying faces the gas station; that it is the second apartment; that from her window she can see directly the gate of the Gotiongs and, that there is a firewall between her apartment and the gas station. 12 After seeing a man jump from the gate of the Gotiongs to the rooftop of the Tans, she called the police station but the telephone lines were busy. Later on, she talked with James Enrique Tan and told him that she saw a man leap from the gate towards his rooftop. 13

However, James Enrique Tan testified that he saw a "shadow" on top of the gate of the Gotiongs, but denied having talked with anyone regarding what he saw. He explained that he lives in a duplex house with a garden in front of it; that his house is next to Felipe Gotiongs house; and he further gave the following answers to these questions:chanrobles.com : virtual law library

"ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS).

Q What is the height of the wall of the Gotiongs in relation to your house?

WITNESS:

A It is about 8 feet.

ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS)

Q And where were you looking from?

WITNESS:

A From upstairs in my living room.

ATTY. ORTIZ (TO WITNESS)

Q From Your living room window, is that correct?

WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A Yes, but not very clear because the wall is high." 14

Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with respondent court that the same do not inspire credence as to the reliability and accuracy of the witnesses observations, since the visual perceptions of both were obstructed by high walls in their respective houses in relation to the house of herein private respondents. On the other hand, witness Manolo Alfonso, testifying on rebuttal, attested without contradiction that he and his sister, Malou Alfonso, were waiting for Julie Ann Gotiong when they heard her scream; that when Manolo climbed the fence to see what was going on inside the Gotiong house, he heard the first shot; and, not more than five (5) seconds later, he heard another shot. Consequently, he went down from the fence and drove to the police station to report the incident. 15 Manolos direct and candid testimony establishes and explains the fact that it was he whom Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan saw as the "shadow" of a man at the gate of the Gotiong house.

We have perforce to reject petitioners effete and unsubstantiated pretension that it was another man who shot Wendell and Julie Ann. It is significant that the Libi family did not even point to or present any suspect in the crime nor did they file any case against any alleged "John Doe." Nor can we sustain the trial courts dubious theory that Wendell Libi did not die by his own hand because of the overwhelming evidence testimonial, documentary and pictorial the confluence of which point to Wendell as the assailant of Julie Ann, his motive being revenge for her rejection of his persistent pleas for a reconciliation. Petitioners defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family, hence they should not be civilly liable for the crime committed by their minor son, is not borne out by the evidence on record either.

Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelitas key is always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. 16 We, accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was.

The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of Wendells death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and that Cresencios gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their children who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as being drug informers, 17 or even drug users. Neither was a plausible explanation given for the photograph of Wendell, with a handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof, 18 holding upright what clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he was in possession of that firearm.

In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding petitioners civilly liable, as explained at the start of this opinion, respondent court waved aside the protestations of diligence on the part of petitioners and had this to say:

". . . It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children who may be engaged in this dangerous activity involving the menace of drugs. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of their son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his reach, they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides:

The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by their minor children who live in their company.

"Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from having access to said gun which was allegedly kept in a safety deposit box, defendants-appellees are subsidiarily liable for the natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was living in their company. This vicarious liability of herein defendants-appellees has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in many cases, prominent of which is the case of Fuellas v. Cadano, et. al. (L-14409, Oct. 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 361-367), which held that: The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.

The subsidiary liability of parents arising from the criminal acts of their minor children who acted with discernment is determined under the provisions of Article 2180, N.C.C. and under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, because to hold that the former only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damages caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. (3 SCRA 361-362).

". . . In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-appellees, Wendell Libi somehow got hold of the key to the drawer where said gun was kept under lock without defendant-spouses ever knowing that said gun had been missing from that safety box since 1978 when Wendell Libi had) a picture taken wherein he proudly displayed said gun and dedicated this picture to his sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong; also since then, Wendell Libi was said to have kept said gun in his car, in keeping up with his supposed role of a CANU agent . . ."xxx

"Based on the foregoing discussions of the assigned errors, this Court holds that the lower court was not correct in dismissing herein plaintiffs-appellants complaint because as preponderantly shown by evidence, defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise all the diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their minor son from committing this crime by means of the gun of defendants-appellees which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi for they have not regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock, but learned that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime had been committed." (Emphases ours.) 19

We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners should be held liable for the civil liability based on what appears from all indications was a crime committed by their minor son. We take this opportunity, however, to digress and discuss its ratiocination therefor on jurisprudential dicta which we feel require clarification.

In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent court cites Fuellas v. Cadano, Et. Al. 20 which supposedly holds that" (t)he subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses," followed by an extended quotation ostensibly from the same case explaining why under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary liability for damages caused by their minor children. The quoted passages are set out two paragraphs back, with pertinent underscoring for purposes of the discussion hereunder. Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding, the parents liable, but the categorization of their liability as being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard second look considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which warrant comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our readings that if the liability of the parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. On the other hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is considered direct and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid and substantial defense.

We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in case of his death of incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that" (t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages." We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies committed by their minor children is likewise primary, not subsidiary. Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

"ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. xxx

First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by . . . a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part." (Emphasis supplied.) 21

Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the foregoing provision the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family.

That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond with his own property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil Code states that" (i)f the minor causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor . . . shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed." For civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

"Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said . . . minor shall respond with (his) own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with civil law."

The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor children contemplated in the aforesaid rule in Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code has, aside from the aforecited case of Fuellas, been the subject of a number of cases adjudicated by this Court, viz.: Exconde v. Capuno, Et Al., 22 Araneta v. Arreglado, 23 Salen, Et. Al. v. Balce, 24 Paleyan, etc., Et. Al. v. Bangkili, Et Al., 25 and Elcano, et al, v. Hill, Et. Al. 26 Parenthetically, the aforesaid cases were basically on the issue of the civil liability of parents for crimes committed by their minor children over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acted with discernment, and also of minors 15 years of aye or over, since these situations are not covered by Article 101, Revised Penal Code. In both instances, this Court held that the issue of parental civil liability should be resolved in accordance with the provisions of Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the reasons well expressed in Salen and adopted in the cases hereinbefore enumerated that to hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would apply only to quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would result in the absurdity that in an act involving mere negligence the parents would be liable but not where the damage is caused with criminal intent. In said cases, however, there are unfortunate variances resulting in a regrettable inconsistency in the Courts determination of whether the liability of the parents, in cases involving either crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children, is primary or subsidiary.

In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double homicide through reckless imprudence, in a separate civil action arising from the crime the minor and his father were held jointly and severally liable for failure of the latter to prove the diligence of a good father of a family. The same liability in solidum and, therefore, primary liability was imposed in a separate civil action in Araneta on the parents and their 14-year old son who was found guilty of frustrated homicide, but on the authority of Article 2194 of the Civil Code providing for solidary responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict.

However, in Salen, the father was declared subsidiarily liable for damages arising from the conviction of his son, who was over 15 but less than 18 years of age, by applying Article 2180 but, this time, disregarding Article 2194 of the Civil Code. In the present case, as already explained, the petitioners herein were also held liable but supposedly in line with Fuellas which purportedly declared the parents subsidiarily liable for the civil liability for serious physical injuries committed by their 13-year old son. On the other hand, in Paleyan, the mother and her 19-year old son were adjudged solidarily liable for damages arising from his conviction for homicide by the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since this is likewise not covered by Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, in Elcano, although the son was acquitted in a homicide charge due to "lack of intent, coupled with mistake," it was ruled that while under Article 2180 of the Civil Code there should be solidary liability for damages, since the son, "although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence," but "is now of age, as a matter of equity" the father was only held subsidiarily liable.

It bears stressing, however, that the Revised Penal Code provides for subsidiary liability only for persons causing damages under the compulsion of irresistible force or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear; 27 innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments; 28 employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in industry; 29 and principals, accomplices and accessories for the unpaid civil liability of their co-accused in the other classes. 30

Also, coming back to respondent courts reliance on Fuellas in its decision in the present case, it is not exactly accurate to say that Fuellas provided for subsidiary liability of the parents therein. A careful scrutiny shows that what respondent court quoted verbatim in its decision now on appeal in the present case, and which it attributed to Fuellas, was the syllabus on the law report of said case which spoke of "subsidiary" liability. However, such categorization does not specifically appear in the text of the decision in Fuellas. In fact, after reviewing therein the cases of Exconde, Araneta and Salen and the discussions in said cases of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, this Court concluded its decision in this wise:

"Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of evidence submitted therein by both parties, independent of the criminal case. And responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the present action was instituted, is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault or negligence under the Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore stated, any discussion as to the minors criminal responsibility is of no moment."

Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 31

Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. 32 However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. 33 For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.

In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding modifications of the premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal imperatives herein explained, we conjoin in its findings that said petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA MASAUDING,respondents.This case concerns a seemingly void marriage and a relationship which went sour. The innocent victims are two children horn out of the same union. Upon this Court now falls the not too welcome task of deciding the issue of who, between the father and mother, is more suitable and better qualified in helping the children to grow into responsible, well-adjusted, and happy young adulthood.Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met sometime in 1976 in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. In 1977, Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. She was able to acquire immigrant status sometime later. In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On August 16, 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. On October 7, 1987, while they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on January 12, 1988.The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in 1990. Teresita blamed Reynaldo for the break-up, stating he was always nagging her about money matters. Reynaldo, on the other hand, contended that Teresita was a spendthrift, buying expensive jewelry and antique furniture instead of attending to household expenses.Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. She claims, however, that she spent a lot of money on long distance telephone calls to keep in constant touch with her children.Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo filed a criminal case for bigamy against her and she was afraid of being arrested. The judgment of conviction in the bigamy case was actually rendered only on September 29, 1994. (Per Judge Harriet O. Demetriou, Branch 70, RTC, Pasig, pp. 210-222,Rollo). Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and on December 8, 1992 and filed the petition for a writ ofhabeas corpusagainst herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court.On June 30, 1993, the trial court dismissed the petition forhabeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court.On February 16, 1994, the Court of Appeals per Justice Isnani, with Justices de Pano and Ibay-Somera concurring, reversed the trial court's decision. It gave custody to Teresita and visitation rights on weekends to Reynaldo.Petitioners now come to this Court on a petition for review, in the main contending that the Court of Appeals disregarded the factual findings of the trial court; that the Court of Appeals further engaged in speculations and conjectures, resulting in its erroneous conclusion that custody of the children should be given to respondent Teresita.We believe that respondent court resolved the question of custody over the children through an automatic and blind application of the ageprovisoof Article 363 of the Civil Code which reads:Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure.and of Article 213 of the Family Code which in turn provides:Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age unless the parent chosen is unfit.The decision under review is based on the report of the Code Commission which drafted Article 213 that a child below seven years still needs the loving, tender care that only a mother can give and which, presumably, a father cannot give in equal measure. The commentaries of a member of the Code Commission, former Court of Appeals Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, in a textbook on the Family Code, were also taken into account. Justice Diy believes that a child below seven years should still be awarded to her mother even if the latter is a prostitute or is unfaithful to her husband. This is on the theory that moral dereliction has no effect on a baby unable to understand such action. (Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1988 Ed., p. 297.)The Court of Appeals was unduly swayed by an abstract presumption of law rather than an appreciation of relevant facts and the law which should apply to those facts. The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial function to be determined by a simple determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child's interests. Discretion is given to the court to decide who can best assure the welfare of the child, and award the custody on the basis of that consideration. InUnson III vs.Navarro(101 SCRA 183 [1980]), we laid down the rule that "in all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents", and inMedina vs.Makabali(27 SCRA 502 [1969]), where custody of the minor was given to a non-relative as against the mother, then the country's leading civilist, Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained its basis in this manner:. . . While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that "in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount" (Civil Code of the Philippines. Art. 363), and that for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered separated from the mother (do). This is as it should be, for in the continual evolution of legal institutions, thepatria potestashas been transformed from thejus vitae ac necis(right of life and death) of the Roman law, under which the offspring was virtually a chattel of his parents into a radically different institution, due to the influence of Christian faith and doctrines. The obligational aspect is now supreme. As pointed out by Puig Pena, now "there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights (of parents) but a sum of duties; no sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor."As a result, the right of parents to the company and custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of parental duties to provide the children with adequate support, education, moral, intellectual and civic training and development (Civil Code, Art. 356).(pp. 504-505.)In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into accountallrelevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven years of age. Rosalind celebrated her seventh birthday on August 16, 1993 while Reginald reached the same age on January 12, 1995. Both are studying in reputable schools and appear to be fairly intelligent children, quite capable of thoughtfully determining the parent with whom they would want to live. Once the choice has been made, the burden returns to the court to investigate if the parent thus chosen is unfit to assume parental authority and custodial responsibility.Herein lies the error of the Court of Appeals. Instead of scrutinizing the records to discover the choice of the children and rather than verifying whether that parent is fit or unfit, respondent court simply followed statutory presumptions and general propositions applicable to ordinary or common situations. The seven-year age limit was mechanically treated as an arbitrary cut off period and not a guide based on a strong presumption.A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least, her counsel are more intent on emphasizing the "torture and agony" of a mother separated from her children and the humiliation she suffered as a result of her character being made a key issue in court rather than the feelings and future, the best interests and welfare of her children. While the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration.We are inclined to sustain the findings and conclusions of the regional trial court because it gave greater attention to the choice of Rosalind and considered in detail all the relevant factors bearing on the issue of custody.When she was a little over 5 years old, Rosalind was referred to a child psychologist, Rita Flores Macabulos, to determine the effects of uprooting her from the Assumption College where she was studying. Four different tests were administered. The results of the tests are quite revealing. The responses of Rosalind about her mother were very negative causing the psychologist to delve deeper into the child's anxiety. Among the things revealed by Rosalind was an incident where she saw her mother hugging and kissing a "bad" man who lived in their house and worked for her father. Rosalind refused to talk to her mother even on the telephone. She tended to be emotionally emblazed because of constant fears that she may have to leave school and her aunt's family to go back to the United States to live with her mother. The 5-1/2 page report deals at length with feelings of insecurity and anxiety arising from strong conflict with the mother. The child tried to compensate by having fantasy activities. All of the 8 recommendations of the child psychologist show that Rosalind chooses petitioners over the private respondent and that her welfare will be best served by staying with them (pp. 199-205,Rollo).At about the same time, a social welfare case study was conducted for the purpose of securing the travel clearance required before minors may go abroad. Social Welfare Officer Emma D. Estrada Lopez, stated that the child Rosalind refused to go back to the United States and be reunited with her mother. She felt unloved and uncared for. Rosalind was more attached to her Yaya who did everything for her and Reginald. The child was found suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother's infidelity. The application for travel clearance was recommended for denial (pp. 206-209,Rollo).Respondent Teresita, for her part, argues that the 7-year age reference in the law applies to the date when the petition for a writ ofhabeas corpusis filed, not to the date when a decision is rendered. This argument is flawed. Considerations involving the choice made by a child must be ascertained at the time that either parent is given custody over the child. The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was given custody suffers a future character change and becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always be re-examined and adjusted (Unson III v. Navarro,supra,at p. 189). To be sure, the welfare, the best interests, the benefit, and the good of the child must be determined as of the time that either parent is chosen to be the custodian. At the present time, both children are over 7 years of age and are thus perfectly capable of making a fairly intelligent choice.According to respondent Teresita, she and her children had tearful reunion in the trial court, with the children crying, grabbing, and embracing her to prevent the father from taking them away from her. We are more inclined to believe the father's contention that the children ignored Teresita in court because such an emotional display as described by Teresita in her pleadings could not have been missed by the trial court. Unlike the Justices of the Court of Appeals Fourth Division, Judge Lucas P. Bersamin personally observed the children and their mother in the courtroom. What the Judge found is diametrically opposed to the contentions of respondent Teresita. The Judge had this to say on the matter.And, lastly, the Court cannot look at petitioner [Teresita] in similar light, or with more understanding, especially as her conduct and demeanor in the courtroom (during most of the proceedings) or elsewhere (but in the presence of the undersigned presiding judge) demonstrated her ebulent temper that tended to corroborate the alleged violence of her physical punishment of the children (even if only for ordinary disciplinary purposes) and emotional instability, typified by her failure (or refusal?) to show deference and respect to the Court and the other parties (pp. 12-13, RTC Decision)Respondent Teresita also questions the competence and impartiality of the expert witnesses. Respondent court, in turn, states that the trial court should have considered the fact that Reynaldo and his sister, herein petitioner Guillerma Layug, hired the two expert witnesses. Actually, this was taken into account by the trial court which stated that the allegations of bias and unfairness made by Teresita against the psychologist and social worker were not substantiated.The trial court stated that the professional integrity and competence of the expert witnesses and the objectivity of the interviews were unshaken and unimpeached. We might add that their testimony remain uncontroverted. We also note that the examinations made by the experts were conducted in late 1991, well over a year before the filing by Teresita of thehabeas corpuspetition in December, 1992. Thus, the examinations were at that time not intended to support petitioners' position in litigation, because there was then not even an impending possibility of one. That they were subsequently utilized in the casea quowhen it did materialize does not change the tenor in which they were first obtained.Furthermore, such examinations, when presented to the court must be construed to have been presented not to sway the court in favor of any of the parties, but to assist the court in the determination of the issue before it. The persons who effected such examinations were presented in the capacity of expert witnesses testifying on matters within their respective knowledge and expertise. On this matter, this Court had occasion to rule in the case ofSali vs.Abukakar, et al. (17 SCRA 988 [1966]).The fact that, in a particular litigation, an NBI expert examines certain contested documents, at the request, not of a public officer or agency of the Government, but of a private litigant, does not necessarily nullify the examination thus made. Its purpose, presumably, to assist the court having jurisdiction over said litigation, in the performance of its duty to settle correctly the issues relative to said documents. Even a non-expert private individual may examine the same, if there are facts within his knowledge which may help, the court in the determination of said issue. Such examination, which may properly be undertaken by a non-expert private individual, does not, certainly become null and void when the examiner is an expert and/or an officer of the NBI.(pp. 991-992.)In regard to testimony of expert witnesses it was held inSalomon, et al.vs.Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (185 SCRA 352 [1990]):. . . Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study and observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which reserve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect (20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058). The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that discretion.(p. 359)It was in the exercise of this discretion, coupled with the opportunity to assess the witnesses' character and to observe their respective demeanor that the trial court opted to rely on their testimony, and we believe that the trial court was correct in its action.Under direct examination an February 4, 1993, Social Worker Lopez stated that Rosalind and her aunt were about to board a plane when they were off-loaded because there was no required clearance. They were referred to her office, at which time Reginald was also brought along and interviewed. One of the regular duties of Social Worker Lopez in her job appears to be the interview of minors who leave for abroad with their parents or other persons. The interview was for purposes of foreign travel by a 5-year old child and had nothing to do with any pending litigation. On cross-examination, Social Worker Lopez stated that her assessment of the minor's hatred for her mother was based on the disclosures of the minor. It is inconceivable, much less presumable that Ms. Lopez would compromise her position, ethics, and the public trust reposed on a person of her position in the course of doing her job by falsely testifying just to support the position of any litigant.The psychologist, Ms. Macabulos, is a B.S. magna cum laude graduate in Psychology and an M.A. degree holder also in Psychology with her thesis graded "Excellent". She was a candidate for a doctoral degree at the time of the interview. Petitioner Reynaldo may have shouldered the cost of the interview but Ms. Macabulos services were secured because Assumption College wanted an examination of the child for school purposes and not because of any litigation. She may have been paid to examine the child and to render a finding based on her examination, but she was not paid to fabricate such findings in favor of the party who retained her services. In this instance it was not even petitioner Reynaldo but the school authorities who initiated the same. It cannot be presumed that a professional of her potential and stature would compromise her professional standing.Teresita questions the findings of the trial court that:1. Her morality is questionable as shown by her marrying Reynaldo at the time she had a subsisting marriage with another man.2. She is guilty of grave indiscretion in carrying on a love affair with one of the Reynaldo's fellow NSC employees.3. She is incapable of providing the children with necessities and conveniences commensurate to their social standing because she does not even own any home in the Philippines.4. She is emotionally unstable with ebullient temper.It is contended that the above findings do not constitute the compelling reasons under the law which would justify depriving her of custody over the children; worse, she claims, these findings are non-existent and have not been proved by clear and convincing evidence.Public and private respondents give undue weight to the matter of a child under 7 years of age not to be separated from the mother, without considering what the law itself denominates as compelling reasons or relevant considerations to otherwise decree. In theUnson IIIcase, earlier mentioned, this Court stated that it found no difficulty in not awarding custody to the mother, it being in the best interest of the child "to be freed from the obviously unwholesome, notto say immoral influence, that the situation where [the mother] had placed herself . . . might create in the moral and social outlook of [the child] who was in her formative and most impressionable stage . . ."Then too, it must be noted that both Rosalind and Reginald are now over 7 years of age. They understand the difference between right and wrong, ethical behavior and deviant immorality. Their best interests would be better served in an environment characterized by emotional stability and a certain degree of material sufficiency. There is nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is an "unfit" person under Article 213 of the Family Code. In fact, he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and care which the mother is not in a position to extend.The argument that the charges against the mother are false is not supported by the records. The findings of the trial court are based on evidence.Teresita does not deny that she was legally married to Roberto Lustado on December 17, 1984 in California (p. 13, Respondent's Memorandum; p. 238,Rollo; pp. 11, RTC Decision). Less than a year later, she had already driven across the continental United States to commence living with another man, petitioner Reynaldo, in Pittsburgh. The two were married on October 7, 1987. Of course, to dilute this disadvantage on her part, this matter of her having contracted a bigamous marriage later with Reynaldo, Teresita tried to picture Reynaldo as a rapist, alleging further that she told Reynaldo about her marriage to Lustado on the occasion when she was raped by Reynaldo. Expectedly, Judge Harriet Demetriou of the Pasig RTC lent no weight to such tale. And even if this story were given credence, it adds to and not subtracts from the conviction of this Court about Teresita's values. Rape is an insidious crime against privacy. Confiding to one's potential rapist about a prior marriage is not a very convincing indication that the potential victim is averse to the act. The implication created is that the act would be acceptable if not for the prior marriage.More likely is Reynaldo's story that he learned of the prior marriage only much later. In fact, the rape incident itself is unlikely against a woman who had driven three days and three nights from California, who went straight to the house of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh and upon arriving went to bed and, who immediately thereafter started to live with him in a relationship which is marital in nature if not in fact.Judge Bersamin of the courta quobelieved the testimony of the various witnesses that while married to Reynaldo, Teresita entered into an illicit relationship with Perdencio Gonzales right there in the house of petitioner Reynaldo and respondent Teresita. Perdencio had been assigned by the National Steel Corporation to assist in the project in Pittsburgh and was staying with Reynaldo, his co-employee, in the latter's house. The record shows that the daughter Rosalind suffered emotional disturbance caused by the traumatic effect of seeing her mother hugging and kissing a boarder in their house. The record also shows that it was Teresita who left the conjugal home and the children, bound for California. When Perdencio Gonzales was reassigned to the Philippines, Teresita followed him and was seen in his company in a Cebu hotel, staying in one room and taking breakfast together. More significant is that letters and written messages from Teresita to Perdencio were submitted in evidence (p.12, RTC Decision).The argument that moral laxity or the habit of flirting from one man to another does not fall under "compelling reasons" is neither meritorious nor applicable in this case. Not only are the children over seven years old and their clear choice is the father, but the illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values, at least in Rosalind. This is not to mention her conviction for the crime of bigamy, which from the records appears to have become final (pp. 210-222,Rollo).Respondent court's finding that the father could not very well perform the role of a sole parent and substitute mother because his job is in the United States while the children will be left behind with their aunt in the Philippines is misplaced. The assignment of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh is or was a temporary one. He was sent there to oversee the purchase of a steel mill component and various equipment needed by the National Steel Corporation in the Philippines. Once the purchases are completed, there is nothing to keep him there anymore. In fact, in a letter dated January 30, 1995, Reynaldo informs this Court of the completion of his assignment abroad and of his permanent return to the Philippines (ff.p. 263,Rollo).The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the second paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming that the presumption should have persuasive value for children only one or two years beyond the age of seven years mentioned in the statute, there are compelling reasons and relevant considerations not to grant custody to the mother. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside, and the decision of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Quezon City and presided over by the Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin in its Civil Case No. Q-92-14206 awarding custody of the minors Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu to their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No special pronouncement is made as to costs.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995LEOUEL SANTOS, SR.,petitioner-appellant,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA,respondents-appellees.In this petition for review, we are asked to overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals1granting custody of six-year old Leouel Santos, Jr. to his maternal grandparents and not to his father, Santos, Sr. What is sought is a decision which should definitively settle the matter of the care, custody and control of the boy.Happily, unlike King Solomon, we need not merely rely on a "wise and understanding heart," for there is man's law to guide us and that is, the Family Code.The antecedent facts giving rise to the case at bench are as follows:Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987.From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter's parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that they paid for all the hospital bills, as well as the subsequent support of the boy because petitioner could not afford to do so.The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States in May 1988 to work. Petitioner alleged that he is not aware of her whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in the United States proved futile. Private respondents claim that although abroad, their daughter Julia had been sending financial support to them for her son.On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent.2After anex-partehearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.3Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals.4In its decision dated April 30, 1992, respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court'sorder.5His motion for reconsideration having been denied,6