CASE BOOK II: SUPPLEMENTAL CASES

BILL OF RIGHTS

Section 1

Equal protection

Pagcor v. BIR, G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011:

In an older law, PAGCOR was given tax exemption. When this law was changed, PAGCOR was the only one who is no longer exempted from tax. PAGCOR contends that there was a violation of its rights under equal protection. The court held that PAGCOR was only given tax exemption under the old law because it requested to be given one. There is a substantial distinction existing between PAGCOR and the other GOCCs that were given tax exemption.

Section 2

Gamboa v Supt. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012.

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy.[49] It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.[50] It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:

Habeas data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

The right of the people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions.

The right of the State to protect its national security is heavier than the right of privacy.

Command responsibility

In re Rodriguez v. President Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805.November 15, 2011.

Command responsibility is the responsibility of superior military officials over the actions of their subordinates. The requisites must be: there must be an existing relationship (superior-subordinate) between accused and the perpetrator; the accused must have the knowledge that his subordinate will do an action; and the accused failed to guide/ stop it the illegal actions of its subordinate.

Searches and Seizures

US v. Jones

Attaching of GPS is already considered as search of the effects. A complementary rule of “reasonable-expectation of privacy” has been added to the common law trespassory test. Jones, in this case, was freed because the police attached the GPS on the 11th day and in a place outside the designated area in the search warrant.

Del Castillo v. People

There was a valid search warrant issued in this case. When the police arrived, the people in the house designated in the search warrant ran away and scattered all over. One person ran towards a nipa hut where they found shabu. The court held that the evidence obtained is inadmissible because the search warrant particularly described the place where the search will be conducted, which is the house and not in the nipa hut.

KMU v. Director

EO ordering the ID system is being contested for being unconstitutional. It limited the info to be gathered. (it is less intrusive compared to gathering of medical info and drug prescriptions in Whalen v. Roe) Furthermore, EO provides strict safe guards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected.

Right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities.

People v. Serrano, G.R. No. 179038, May 6, 2010.

In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credibility should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary.

Moreover, in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against the appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over appellant’s self-serving and uncorroborated denial.

Lucas v. Lucas, G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011

DNA testing and blood testing is considered as a search therefore there must be probable cause (prima facie evidence) before a compulsory DNA/Blood testing can be had.

Pollo v Chairperson David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011;

Government agencies, in their capacity as employers, rather than law enforcers, could validly conduct search and seizure in the governmental workplace without meeting the “probable cause” or warrant requirement for search and seizure.

Considering that this is a government issued computer, this must be used only for work purpose. Computer use policy foreclosed any inference of reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of its employees.

A government employer is entitled to conduct a warrantless search pursuant to an investigation of work-related misconduct provided the search is reasonable in its inception and scope.

Section 4

Miami v. Tornillo

Chief Justice Warren Burger's opinion, for a unanimous Supreme Court, found that Florida's “right of reply” statute violated the First Amendment. Justice Burger noted that changes had been made in the media since the First Amendment was ratified in 1791. It has become increasingly difficult and expensive to start a newspaper or to communicate a minority point of view to the public. Justice Burger concluded, however, that the First Amendment still prevents the government from ordering a newspaper to print something it did not wish to print.

Mr. Tornillo argued that the right of reply law did not restrict the Miami Herald's free speech because it did not prevent the newspaper from saying whatever else it wanted. Justice Burger noted, however, that the law “exacts a penalty on the basis of the content” of the paper. The penalty would be the time, materials, and newspaper space required to publish a candidate's reply. As a result, “editors might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy. Therefore…political and electoral coverage would be blunted or reduced.”

GSIS v. Villaviza et al, G.R. No. 180291July 27, 2010.

Citing Scott v. Meters, the court said that though the government’s right to impose reasonable restrictions is recognized, the court held that the NYTA’s rule was “unconstitutionally overboard.” Respondents’ wearing of red shirts did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass action rather it constituted speech on a matter of public concern and is protected by the constitution. (Non-speech like O’brien)

Recent analogous decisions in the United States, while recognizing the government's right as an employer to lay down certain standards of conduct, tend to lean towards a broad definition of "public concern speech" which is protected by their First Amendment. One such case is that of Scott v. Meters.17 In said case, the New York Transit Authority (NYTA), responsible for operation of New York City's mass transit service, issued a rule prohibiting employees from wearing badges or buttons on their uniforms. A number of union members wore union buttons promoting their opposition to a collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, the NYTA tried to enforce its rule and threatened to subject these union members to discipline. The court, though recognizing the government's right to impose reasonable restrictions, held that the NYTA's rule was "unconstitutionally overboard."

IBP v. Mayor Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010.

In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.

Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which "blank" denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.

It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption – especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place – is

that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place."

Notably, respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or explanation for his action. It smacks of whim and caprice for respondent to just impose a change of venue for an assembly that was slated for a specific public place. It is thus reversible error for the appellate court not to have found such grave abuse of discretion and, under specific statutory provision, not to have modified the permit "in terms satisfactory to the applicant."18

Re Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Ampatuan, A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, June 14, 2011,

Generally, television coverage of cases are not allowed because the Judge might be subjected to various outside forces that might influence his decision. It is also violative of the rights of the accused (presumption of innocence). However, this case was granted an exemption because there were a lot of families involved in the case. The court room will not be able to accommodate everyone hence the exemption is granted. However, certain guidelines have been given such as the camera should not change focus (prevent sensationalizing); it has to be in a fixed position.

Facial invalidity

Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Concil, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010.

1. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of “terrorism” in RA 9372 is legally impossible absent an actual or imminent charge against them.

a. The doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane.i. A statute or acts suffers from the defect of vagueness when:

1. It lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in 2 ways:

a. Violates due process for failure to accord fair notice of conduct to avoidb. Leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and

becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.ii. The overbreadth doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent

activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means, which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.

b. A “facial” challenge is likewise different from an “as applied” challenge.i. “As applied” challenge considers only extant facts affecting real litigants.ii. “Facial” challenge is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not

only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.

1. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. If facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible.

Letter of UP Law Faculty, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.

It is worth discussing here that the legal reasoning used in the past by this Court to rule that freedom of expression is not a defense in administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperate speech in open court or in court submissions can similarly be applied to respondents’ invocation of academic freedom. Disciplinary actions against lawyers are sui generis in nature.

Garcia et al v Manrique, G.R. No. 186592, October 10, 2012.

The court ruled that every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers and such right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at judicial authority. It is, however, crucial that such criticisms be decent and proper.

Manrique’s article no longer partakes of an adverse criticism of an official act but an indecent attempt to malign the petitioners which ultimately brought equal harm to the reputation of this Court. Malicious publications cannot seek the protection of the constitutional guaranties of free speech and press.

Section 5

United Church v. Bradford United Church, G.R. No. 171905, June 20, 2012.

The Court owes but recognition to BUCCI’s decision as it concerns its legal right as a religious corporation to disaffiliate from another religious corporation via legitimate means—a secular matter well within the civil courts’ purview.

Long vs. Basa involved a church’s sole prerogative and power to expel its individual members. Similarly, the case at bar concerns BUCCI’s sole prerogative and power as a church to disconnect ties with another entity. Such are decisions, that may have religious color and are therefore ecclesiastical affairs, the Court must respect and cannot review

According to BUCCI, UCCP adopted a “Congregationalist” system where a local church has the right to govern itself by its own laws, rules and regulations. This “Congregationalist” system was shown in the Basis of Union, the Declaration of Union and UCCP’s Constitution and By-laws.

From the foregoing it can be gleaned that: UCCP’s control and authority over its local churches is not full and supreme; membership of the local churches in the UCCP is voluntary and not perpetual; local churches enjoy independence and autonomy and may maintain or continue church-life with or without UCCP.

Section 7

Guingona, Jr. v Comelec, G.R. No. 191846, May 6. 2010.

Right to information; The coming May 10, 2010 elections is a matter of great public concern. Not only is it an exercise that ensures preservation of our democracy, the coming elections also embodies our people’s last ounce of hope for a better future. The wanton wastage of public funds brought about by one bungled contract after another, in staggering amounts, is in itself a matter of grave public concern

In sum, petitioners’ prayer to compel COMELEC to explain fully its preparations finds overwhelming support in the Constitution (Sec. 7, Art. III and Sec. 28 of Art. II on the people’s right to information and the State’s corresponding duty of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interests), the jurisprudential doctrines and other Republic Acts and Codes.

COMELEC cannot shirk its constitutional duty to disclose fully to the public complete details of all information relating to the May 10, 2010 elections without violating the Constitution and relevant laws.

Section 9

Apo Fruits v. Land Bank, G. R. No. 164195, April 5, 2011.

NPC v Heirs of Macabankit, G.R. No. 165828, August 24, 2011.

Section 12

People v. Lauga y Pina, G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010.Section 14Marcos, Jr v Republic, G.R. No. 189434, April 25, 2012.

Del Castillo v People, G.R. No. 185128, January 20, 2012

Section 15

Habeas data

Meralco v. Lim, G.R. No. 184769, October 5, 2010.

In re Saez, G.R. No. 183533, September 25, 2012.

Section 21

Ivler v. Judge San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, November 17. 2010.

People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. NO. 164577, July 5, 2010.