Summa Theologica-Christian Ethics

8/19/2019 Summa Theologica-Christian Ethics

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Thomas Aquinas— Summa Theologica

Question 90: articles 1-4

OF THE ESSENCE OF LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the extrinsic principles of acts. Now the extrinsic principle inclining to

evil is the devil, of whose temptations we have spoken in the F, !"##$%. &ut the extrinsic

principle moving to good is 'od, Who (oth instructs us () means of *is +aw, and assists us ()*is 'race wherefore in the first place we must speak of law- in the second place, of grace.

oncerning law, we must consider /#0 +aw itself in general- /10 its parts. oncerning law in

general three points offer themselves for our consideration /#0 2ts essence- /10 The different

kinds of law- /30 The effects of law.

4nder the first head there are four points of inquir)

/#0 Whether law is something pertaining to reason5

/10 oncerning the end of law-

/30 2ts cause-

/$0 The promulgation of law.

Whether law is something pertaining to reason

O!"e#tion $% 2t would seem that law is not something pertaining to reason. For the Apostle sa)s/6om. 7130 82 see another law in m) mem(ers,8 etc. &ut nothing pertaining to reason is in the

mem(ers- since the reason does not make use of a (odil) organ. Therefore law is not something

pertaining to reason.

O!"e#tion &% Further, in the reason there is nothing else (ut power, ha(it, and act. &ut law is notthe power itself of reason. 2n like manner, neither is it a ha(it of reason (ecause the ha(its of

reason are the intellectual virtues of which we have spoken a(ove /!"97%0. Nor again is it an act

of reason (ecause then law would cease, when the act of reason ceases, for instance, while weare asleep. Therefore law is nothing pertaining to reason.

O!"e#tion '% Further, the law moves those who are su(:ect to it to act aright. &ut it (elongs

properl) to the will to move to act, as is evident from what has (een said a(ove /!";%, A"#%0.

Therefore law pertains, not to the reason, (ut to the will- according to the words of the <urist/+i(. i, ff., =e onst. rin. leg. i0 8Whatsoever pleaseth the sovereign, has force of law.8

On the #ontrar 2t (elongs to the law to command and to for(id. &ut it (elongs to reason to

command, as stated a(ove /!"#7%, A"#%0. Therefore law is something pertaining to reason.

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I answer that +aw is a rule and measure of acts, where() man is induced to act or is restrained

from acting for 8lex8 "law% is derived from 8ligare8 "to (ind%, (ecause it (inds one to act. Now

the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts, as isevident from what has (een stated a(ove /!"#%, A"#%, ad 30- since it (elongs to the reason to

direct to the end, which is the first principle in all matters of action, according to the hilosopher

/h)s. ii0. Now that which is the principle in an) genus, is the rule and measure of that genus for instance, unit) in the genus of num(ers, and the first movement in the genus of movements.

onsequentl) it follows that law is something pertaining to reason.

Repl to O!"e#tion $% >ince law is a kind of rule and measure, it ma) (e in something in two

wa)s. First, as in that which measures and rules and since this is proper to reason, it follows that,in this wa), law is in the reason alone. >econdl), as in that which is measured and ruled. 2n this

wa), law is in all those things that are inclined to something () reason of some law so that an)

inclination arising from a law, ma) (e called a law, not essentiall) (ut () participation as it were.And thus the inclination of the mem(ers to concupiscence is called 8the law of the mem(ers.8

Repl to O!"e#tion &% <ust as, in external action, we ma) consider the work and the work done,for instance the work of (uilding and the house (uilt- so in the acts of reason, we ma) consider

the act itself of reason, i.e. to understand and to reason, and something produced () this act. Withregard to the speculative reason, this is first of all the definition- secondl), the proposition-

thirdl), the s)llogism or argument. And since also the practical reason makes use of a s)llogism

in respect of the work to (e done, as stated a(ove /!"#3%, A"3%- !"7?%, A"#%0 and since as thehilosopher teaches /@thic. vii, 30- hence we find in the practical reason something that holds the

same position in regard to operations, as, in the speculative intellect, the proposition holds in

regard to conclusions. >uch like universal propositions of the practical intellect that are directed

to actions have the nature of law. And these propositions are sometimes under our actualconsideration, while sometimes the) are retained in the reason () means of a ha(it.

Repl to O!"e#tion '% 6eason has its power of moving from the will, as stated a(ove /!"#7%,

A"#%0 for it is due to the fact that one wills the end, that the reason issues its commands asregards things ordained to the end. &ut in order that the volition of what is commanded ma) have

the nature of law, it needs to (e in accord with some rule of reason. And in this sense is to (e

understood the sa)ing that the will of the sovereign has the force of law- otherwise the

sovereigns will would savor of lawlessness rather than of law.

Whether the law is alwas something *ire#te* to the #ommon goo*

O!"e#tion $% 2t would seem that the law is not alwa)s directed to the common good as to its end.

For it (elongs to law to command and to for(id. &ut commands are directed to certain individual

goods. Therefore the end of the law is not alwa)s the common good.

O!"e#tion &% Further, the law directs man in his actions. &ut human actions are concerned with particular matters. Therefore the law is directed to some particular good.

O!"e#tion '% Further, 2sidore sa)s /@t)m. v, 30 82f the law is (ased on reason, whatever is (ased

on reason will (e a law.8 &ut reason is the foundation not onl) of what is ordained to the



common good, (ut also of that which is directed private good. Therefore the law is not onl)

directed to the good of all, (ut also to the private good of an individual.

On the #ontrar 2sidore sa)s /@t)m. v, 1#0 that 8laws are enacted for no private profit, (ut forthe common (enefit of the citiBens.8

I answer that As stated a(ove /A"#%0, the law (elongs to that which is a principle of human acts,

(ecause it is their rule and measure. Now as reason is a principle of human acts, so in reason

itself there is something which is the principle in respect of all the rest wherefore to this principle chiefl) and mainl) law must needs (e referred. Now the first principle in practical

matters, which are the o(:ect of the practical reason, is the last end and the last end of human

life is (liss or happiness, as stated a(ove /!"1%, A"7%- !"3%, A"#%0. onsequentl) the law mustneeds regard principall) the relationship to happiness. Coreover, since ever) part is ordained to

the whole, as imperfect to perfect- and since one man is a part of the perfect communit), the law

must needs regard properl) the relationship to universal happiness. Wherefore the hilosopher, in

the a(ove definition of legal matters mentions (oth happiness and the (od) politic for he sa)s

/@thic. v, #0 that we call those legal matters 8:ust, which are adapted to produce and preservehappiness and its parts for the (od) politic8 since the state is a perfect communit), as he sa)s in

olit. i, #.

Now in ever) genus, that which (elongs to it chiefl) is the principle of the others, and the others (elong to that genus in su(ordination to that thing thus fire, which is chief among hot things, is

the cause of heat in mixed (odies, and these are said to (e hot in so far as the) have a share of

fire. onsequentl), since the law is chiefl) ordained to the common good, an) other precept inregard to some individual work, must needs (e devoid of the nature of a law, save in so far as it

regards the common good. Therefore ever) law is ordained to the common good.

Repl to O!"e#tion $% A command denotes an application of a law to matters regulated () thelaw. Now the order to the common good, at which the law aims, is applica(le to particular ends.And in this wa) commands are given even concerning particular matters.

Repl to O!"e#tion &% Actions are indeed concerned with particular matters (ut those particular

matters are refera(le to the common good, not as to a common genus or species, (ut as to a

common final cause, according as the common good is said to (e the common end.

Repl to O!"e#tion '% <ust as nothing stands firm with regard to the speculative reason except

that which is traced (ack to the first indemonstra(le principles, so nothing stands firm with

regard to the practical reason, unless it (e directed to the last end which is the common good and

whatever stands to reason in this sense, has the nature of a law.

Whether the reason o+ an man is #ompetent to ma,e laws

O!"e#tion $% 2t would seem that the reason of an) man is competent to make laws. For the

Apostle sa)s /6om. 1#$0 that 8when the 'entiles, who have not the law, do () nature those

things that are of the law . . . the) are a law to themselves.8 Now he sa)s this of all in general.Therefore an)one can make a law for himself.





O!"e#tion &% Further, as the hilosopher sa)s /@thic. ii, #0, 8the intention of the lawgiver is to

lead men to virtue.8 &ut ever) man can lead another to virtue. Therefore the reason of an) man is

competent to make laws.

O!"e#tion '% Further, :ust as the sovereign of a state governs the state, so ever) father of a

famil) governs his household. &ut the sovereign of a state can make laws for the state. Thereforeever) father of a famil) can make laws for his household.

On the #ontrar 2sidore sa)s /@t)m. v, #D0 8A law is an ordinance of the people, where()something is sanctioned () the @lders together with the ommonalt).8

I answer that A law, properl) speaking, regards first and foremost the order to the common

good. Now to order an)thing to the common good, (elongs either to the whole people, or to

someone who is the viceregent of the whole people. And therefore the making of a law (elongseither to the whole people or to a pu(lic personage who has care of the whole people since in all

other matters the directing of an)thing to the end concerns him to whom the end (elongs.

Repl to O!"e#tion $% As stated a(ove /A"#%, ad #0, a law is in a person not onl) as in one that

rules, (ut also () participation as in one that is ruled. 2n the latter wa) each one is a law tohimself, in so far as he shares the direction that he receives from one who rules him. *ence the

same text goes on 8Who show the work of the law written in their hearts.8

Repl to O!"e#tion &% A private person cannot lead another to virtue efficaciousl) for he can

onl) advise, and if his advice (e not taken, it has no coercive power, such as the law should have,in order to prove an efficacious inducement to virtue, as the hilosopher sa)s /@thic. x, ;0. &ut

this coercive power is vested in the whole people or in some pu(lic personage, to whom it

(elongs to inflict penalties, as we shall state further on /!";1%, A"1%, ad 3- >>, !"?$%, A"3%0.

Wherefore the framing of laws (elongs to him alone.

Repl to O!"e#tion '% As one man is a part of the household, so a household is a part of the

state and the state is a perfect communit), according to olit. i, #. And therefore, as the good of

one man is not the last end, (ut is ordained to the common good- so too the good of onehousehold is ordained to the good of a single state, which is a perfect communit). onsequentl)

he that governs a famil), can indeed make certain commands or ordinances, (ut not such as to

have properl) the force of law.

Whether prom-lgation is essential to a law

O!"e#tion $% 2t would seem that promulgation is not essential to a law. For the natural law a(oveall has the character of law. &ut the natural law needs no promulgation. Therefore it is not

essential to a law that it (e promulgated.

O!"e#tion &% Further, it (elongs properl) to a law to (ind one to do or not to do something. &utthe o(ligation of fulfilling a law touches not onl) those in whose presence it is promulgated, (ut

also others. Therefore promulgation is not essential to a law.



O!"e#tion '% Further, the (inding force of a law extends even to the future, since 8laws are

(inding in matters of the future,8 as the :urists sa) /od. #, tit. =e lege et constit. leg. vii0. &ut

promulgation concerns those who are present. Therefore it is not essential to a law.

On the #ontrar 2t is laid down in the =ecretals, dist. $, that 8laws are esta(lished when the)

are promulgated.8

I answer that As stated a(ove /A"#%0, a law is imposed on others () wa) of a rule and measure.

Now a rule or measure is imposed () (eing applied to those who are to (e ruled and measured ()it. Wherefore, in order that a law o(tain the (inding force which is proper to a law, it must needs

(e applied to the men who have to (e ruled () it. >uch application is made () its (eing notified

to them () promulgation. Wherefore promulgation is necessar) for the law to o(tain its force.

Thus from the four preceding articles, the definition of law ma) (e gathered- and it is nothingelse than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made () him who has care of the

communit), and promulgated.

Repl to O!"e#tion $% The natural law is promulgated () the ver) fact that 'od instilled it into

mans mind so as to (e known () him naturall).

Repl to O!"e#tion &% Those who are not present when a law is promulgated, are (ound to

o(serve the law, in so far as it is notified or can (e notified to them () others, after it has (een

promulgated.

Repl to O!"e#tion '% The promulgation that takes place now, extends to future time () reasonof the dura(ilit) of written characters, () which means it is continuall) promulgated. *ence

2sidore sa)s /@t)m. v, 3- ii, #D0 that 8lex "law% is derived from legere "to read% (ecause it is

written.8

Question 91: articles 1-3

EF T*@ A62E4> G2N=> EF +AW />2H A6T2+@>0

We must now consider the various kinds of law under which head there are six points of inquir)

/#0 Whether there is an eternal law5

/10 Whether there is a natural law5

/30 Whether there is a human law5

/$0 Whether there is a =ivine law5

/90 Whether there is one =ivine law, or several5

/?0 Whether there is a law of sin5



Whether there is an eternal law5

O!"e#tion $% 2t would seem that there is no eternal law. &ecause ever) law is imposed on

someone. &ut there was not someone from eternit) on whom a law could (e imposed since 'od

alone was from eternit). Therefore no law is eternal.

O!"e#tion &% Further, promulgation is essential to law. &ut promulgation could not (e from

eternit) (ecause there was no one to whom it could (e promulgated from eternit). Therefore no

law can (e eternal.

O!"e#tion '% Further, a law implies order to an end. &ut nothing ordained to an end is eternal

for the last end alone is eternal. Therefore no law is eternal.

On the #ontrar Augustine sa)s /=e +i(. Ar(. i, ?0 8That +aw which is the >upreme 6eason

cannot (e understood to (e otherwise than unchangea(le and eternal.8

I answer that As stated a(ove /!";D%, A"#%, ad 1- AA"3%,$0, a law is nothing else (ut a dictate of practical reason emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect communit). Now it is evident,

granted that the world is ruled () =ivine rovidence, as was stated in the F, !"11%, AA"#%,1,

that the whole communit) of the universe is governed () =ivine 6eason. Wherefore the ver)

2dea of the government of things in 'od the 6uler of the universe, has the nature of a law. And

since the =ivine 6easons conception of things is not su(:ect to time (ut is eternal, according to

rov. I13, therefore it is that this kind of law must (e called eternal.

Repl to O!"e#tion $% Those things that are not in themselves, exist with 'od, inasmuch as the)

are foreknown and preordained () *im, according to 6om. $#7 8Who calls those things that are

not, as those that are.8 Accordingl) the eternal concept of the =ivine law (ears the character ofan eternal law, in so far as it is ordained () 'od to the government of things foreknown () *im.

Repl to O!"e#tion &% romulgation is made () word of mouth or in writing- and in (oth wa)s

the eternal law is promulgated (ecause (oth the =ivine Word and the writing of the &ook of +ife

are eternal. &ut the promulgation cannot (e from eternit) on the part of the creature that hears or

reads.

Repl to O!"e#tion '% The law implies order to the end activel), in so far as it directs certain

things to the end- (ut not passivel)JJJthat is to sa), the law itself is not ordained to the endJJJ

except accidentall), in a governor whose end is extrinsic to him, and to which end his law must

needs (e ordained. &ut the end of the =ivine government is 'od *imself, and *is law is not

distinct from *imself. Wherefore the eternal law is not ordained to another end.

Whether there is in us a natural law5

O!"e#tion $% 2t would seem that there is no natural law in us. &ecause man is governed

sufficientl) () the eternal law for Augustine sa)s /=e +i(. Ar(. i0 that 8the eternal law is that ()

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which it is right that all things should (e most orderl).8 &ut nature does not a(ound in

superfluities as neither does she fail in necessaries. Therefore no law is natural to man.

O!"e#tion &% Further, () the law man is directed, in his acts, to the end, as stated a(ove /!";D%,

A"1%0. &ut the directing of human acts to their end is not a function of nature, as is the case in

irrational creatures, which act for an end solel) () their natural appetite- whereas man acts for anend () his reason and will. Therefore no law is natural to man.

O!"e#tion '% Further, the more a man is free, the less is he under the law. &ut man is freer than

all the animals, on account of his freeJwill, with which he is endowed a(ove all other animals.

>ince therefore other animals are not su(:ect to a natural law, neither is man su(:ect to a natural

law.

On the #ontrar A gloss on 6om. 1#$ 8When the 'entiles, who have not the law, do () nature

those things that are of the law,8 comments as follows 8Although the) have no written law, )et

the) have the natural law, where() each one knows, and is conscious of, what is good and whatis evil.8

I answer that As stated a(ove /!";D%, A"#%, ad #0, law, (eing a rule and measure, can (e in a

person in two wa)s in one wa), as in him that rules and measures- in another wa), as in that

which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so far as it partakes of the

rule or measure. Wherefore, since all things su(:ect to =ivine providence are ruled and measured

() the eternal law, as was stated a(ove /A"#%0- it is evident that all things partake somewhat of

the eternal law, in so far as, namel), from its (eing imprinted on them, the) derive their

respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational creature

is su(:ect to =ivine providence in the most excellent wa), in so far as it partakes of a share of

providence, () (eing provident (oth for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the

@ternal 6eason, where() it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end and this

participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law. *ence the

salmist after sa)ing /s. $?0 8Effer up the sacrifice of :ustice,8 as though someone asked what

the works of :ustice are, adds 8Can) sa), Who showeth us good things58 in answer to which

question he sa)s 8The light of Th) countenance, E +ord, is signed upon us8 thus impl)ing that

the light of natural reason, where() we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the

function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the =ivine light. 2t is

therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creatures participation of

the eternal law.

Repl to O!"e#tion $% This argument would hold, if the natural law were something different

from the eternal law whereas it is nothing (ut a participation thereof, as stated a(ove.

Repl to O!"e#tion &% @ver) act of reason and will in us is (ased on that which is according to

nature, as stated a(ove /!"#D%, A"#%0 for ever) act of reasoning is (ased on principles that are

known naturall), and ever) act of appetite in respect of the means is derived from the natural


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appetite in respect of the last end. Accordingl) the first direction of our acts to their end must

needs (e in virtue of the natural law.

Repl to O!"e#tion '% @ven irrational animals partake in their own wa) of the @ternal 6eason,

:ust as the rational creature does. &ut (ecause the rational creature partakes thereof in an

intellectual and rational manner, therefore the participation of the eternal law in the rationalcreature is properl) called a law, since a law is something pertaining to reason, as stated a(ove

/!";D%, A"#%0. 2rrational creatures, however, do not partake thereof in a rational manner,

wherefore there is no participation of the eternal law in them, except () wa) of similitude.

Whether there is a human law5

O!"e#tion $% 2t would seem that there is not a human law. For the natural law is a participation

of the eternal law, as stated a(ove /A"1%0. Now through the eternal law 8all things are most

orderl),8 as Augustine states /=e +i(. Ar(. i, ?0. Therefore the natural law suffices for the

ordering of all human affairs. onsequentl) there is no need for a human law.

O!"e#tion &% Further, a law (ears the character of a measure, as stated a(ove /!";D%, A"#%0. &ut

human reason is not a measure of things, (ut vice versa, as stated in Cetaph. x, text. 9. Therefore

no law can emanate from human reason.

O!"e#tion '% Further, a measure should (e most certain, as stated in Cetaph. x, text. 3. &ut the

dictates of human reason in matters of conduct are uncertain, according to Wis. ;#$ 8The

thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain.8 Therefore no law can emanate

from human reason.

On the #ontrar Augustine /=e +i(. Ar(. i, ?0 distinguishes two kinds of law, the one eternal,the other temporal, which he calls human.

I answer that As stated a(ove /!";D%, A"#%, ad 10, a law is a dictate of the practical reason. Now

it is to (e o(served that the same procedure takes place in the practical and in the speculative

reason for each proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated a(ove /=e +i(. Ar(. i, ?0.

Accordingl) we conclude that :ust as, in the speculative reason, from naturall) known

indemonstra(le principles, we draw the conclusions of the various sciences, the knowledge of

which is not imparted to us () nature, (ut acquired () the efforts of reason, so too it is from the

precepts of the natural law, as from general and indemonstra(le principles, that the human reason

needs to proceed to the more particular determination of certain matters. These particular

determinations, devised () human reason, are called human laws, provided the other essential

conditions of law (e o(served, as stated a(ove /!";D%, AA"1%,3,$0. Wherefore Tull) sa)s in his

6hetoric /=e 2nvent. 6het. ii0 that 8:ustice has its source in nature- thence certain things came

into custom () reason of their utilit)- afterwards these things which emanated from nature and

were approved () custom, were sanctioned () fear and reverence for the law.8

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Repl to O!"e#tion $% The human reason cannot have a full participation of the dictate of the

=ivine 6eason, (ut according to its own mode, and imperfectl). onsequentl), as on the part of

the speculative reason, () a natural participation of =ivine Wisdom, there is in us the knowledge

of certain general principles, (ut not proper knowledge of each single truth, such as that

contained in the =ivine Wisdom- so too, on the part of the practical reason, man has a natural

participation of the eternal law, according to certain general principles, (ut not as regards the particular determinations of individual cases, which are, however, contained in the eternal law.

*ence the need for human reason to proceed further to sanction them () law.

Repl to O!"e#tion &% *uman reason is not, of itself, the rule of things (ut the principles

impressed on it () nature, are general rules and measures of all things relating to human conduct,

whereof the natural reason is the rule and measure, although it is not the measure of things that

are from nature.

Repl to O!"e#tion '% The practical reason is concerned with practical matters, which are

singular and contingent (ut not with necessar) things, with which the speculative reason isconcerned. Wherefore human laws cannot have that inerranc) that (elongs to the demonstrated

conclusions of sciences. Nor is it necessar) for ever) measure to (e altogether unerring and

certain, (ut according as it is possi(le in its own particular genus.

Question 92: article 1

EF T*@ @FF@T> EF +AW /TWE A6T2+@>0

We must now consider the effects of law- under which head there are two points of inquir)

/#0 Whether an effect of law is to make men good5

/10 Whether the effects of law are to command, to for(id, to permit, and to punish, as the <urist

states5

Whether an effect of law is to make men good5

O!"e#tion $% 2t seems that it is not an effect of law to make men good. For men are good through

virtue, since virtue, as stated in @thic. ii, ? is 8that which makes its su(:ect good.8 &ut virtue is in

man from 'od alone, (ecause *e it is Who 8works it in us without us,8 as we stated a(ove

/!"99%, A"$%0 in giving the definition of virtue. Therefore the law does not make men good.

O!"e#tion &% Further, +aw does not profit a man unless he o(e)s it. &ut the ver) fact that a man

o(e)s a law is due to his (eing good. Therefore in man goodness is presupposed to the law.

Therefore the law does not make men good.

O!"e#tion '% Further, +aw is ordained to the common good, as stated a(ove /!";D%, A"1%0. &ut

some (ehave well in things regarding the communit), who (ehave ill in things regarding

themselves. Therefore it is not the (usiness of the law to make men good.



O!"e#tion .% Further, some laws are t)rannical, as the hilosopher sa)s /olit. iii, ?0. &ut a

t)rant does not intend the good of his su(:ects, (ut considers onl) his own profit. Therefore law

does not make men good.

On the #ontrar The hilosopher sa)s /@thic. ii, #0 that the 8intention of ever) lawgiver is to

make good citiBens.8

I answer that as stated a(ove /!";D%, A"#%, ad 1- AA"3%,$0, a law is nothing else than a dictate

of reason in the ruler () whom his su(:ects are governed. Now the virtue of an) su(ordinate

thing consists in its (eing well su(ordinated to that () which it is regulated thus we see that the

virtue of the irasci(le and concupisci(le faculties consists in their (eing o(edient to reason- and

accordingl) 8the virtue of ever) su(:ect consists in his (eing well su(:ected to his ruler,8 as the

hilosopher sa)s /olit. i0. &ut ever) law aims at (eing o(e)ed () those who are su(:ect to it.

onsequentl) it is evident that the proper effect of law is to lead its su(:ects to their proper

virtue and since virtue is 8that which makes its su(:ect good,8 it follows that the proper effect of

law is to make those to whom it is given, good, either simpl) or in some particular respect. For if the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on true good, which is the common good regulated

according to =ivine :ustice, it follows that the effect of the law is to make men good simpl). 2f,

however, the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on that which is not simpl) good, (ut useful or

pleasura(le to himself, or in opposition to =ivine :ustice- then the law does not make men good

simpl), (ut in respect to that particular government. 2n this wa) good is found even in things that

are (ad of themselves thus a man is called a good ro((er, (ecause he works in a wa) that is

adapted to his end.

Repl to O!"e#tion $% irtue is twofold, as explained a(ove /!"?3%, A"1%0, viB. acquired and

infused. Now the fact of (eing accustomed to an action contri(utes to (oth, (ut in different wa)s-

for it causes the acquired virtue- while it disposes to infused virtue, and preserves and fosters it

when it alread) exists. And since law is given for the purpose of directing human acts- as far as

human acts conduce to virtue, so far does law make men good. Wherefore the hilosopher sa)s

in the second (ook of the olitics /@thic. ii0 that 8lawgivers make men good () ha(ituating them

to good works.8

Repl to O!"e#tion &% 2t is not alwa)s through perfect goodness of virtue that one o(e)s the law,

(ut sometimes it is through fear of punishment, and sometimes from the mere dictates of reason,

which is a (eginning of virtue, as stated a(ove /!"?3%, A"#%0.

Repl to O!"e#tion '% The goodness of an) part is considered in comparison with the whole-hence Augustine sa)s /onfess. iii0 that 8unseeml) is the part that harmoniBes not with the

whole.8 >ince then ever) man is a part of the state, it is impossi(le that a man (e good, unless he

(e well proportionate to the common good nor can the whole (e well consistent unless its parts

(e proportionate to it. onsequentl) the common good of the state cannot flourish, unless the

citiBens (e virtuous, at least those whose (usiness it is to govern. &ut it is enough for the good of

the communit), that the other citiBens (e so far virtuous that the) o(e) the commands of their



rulers. *ence the hilosopher sa)s /olit. ii, 10 that 8the virtue of a sovereign is the same as that

of a good man, (ut the virtue of an) common citiBen is not the same as that of a good man.8

Repl to O!"e#tion .% A t)rannical law, through not (eing according to reason, is not a law,

a(solutel) speaking, (ut rather a perversion of law- and )et in so far as it is something in the

nature of a law, it aims at the citiBens (eing good. For all it has in the nature of a law consists inits (eing an ordinance made () a superior to his su(:ects, and aims at (eing o(e)ed () them,

which is to make them good, not simpl), (ut with respect to that particular government.

Question 94: articles 2, 4, & 5

EF T*@ NAT46A+ +AW />2H A6T2+@>0

We must now consider the natural law- concerning which there are six points of inquir)

/#0 What is the natural law5

/10 What are the precepts of the natural law5

/30 Whether all acts of virtue are prescri(ed () the natural law5

/$0 Whether the natural law is the same in all5

/90 Whether it is changea(le5

/?0 Whether it can (e a(olished from the heart of man5

Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or onl) one5

O!"e#tion $% 2t would seem that the natural law contains, not several precepts, (ut one onl). For

law is a kind of precept, as stated a(ove /!";1%, A"1%0. 2f therefore there were man) precepts of

the natural law, it would follow that there are also man) natural laws.

O!"e#tion &% Further, the natural law is consequent to human nature. &ut human nature, as a

whole, is one- though, as to its parts, it is manifold. Therefore, either there is (ut one precept of

the law of nature, on account of the unit) of nature as a whole- or there are man), () reason of

the num(er of parts of human nature. The result would (e that even things relating to the

inclination of the concupisci(le facult) (elong to the natural law.

O!"e#tion '% Further, law is something pertaining to reason, as stated a(ove /!";D%, A"#%0. Now

reason is (ut one in man. Therefore there is onl) one precept of the natural law.

On the #ontrar The precepts of the natural law in man stand in relation to practical matters, as

the first principles to matters of demonstration. &ut there are several first indemonstra(le

principles. Therefore there are also several precepts of the natural law.



I answer that As stated a(ove /!";#%, A"3%0, the precepts of the natural law are to the practical

reason, what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative reason- (ecause (oth are

selfJevident principles. Now a thing is said to (e selfJevident in two wa)s first, in itself-

secondl), in relation to us. An) proposition is said to (e selfJevident in itself, if its predicate is

contained in the notion of the su(:ect although, to one who knows not the definition of the

su(:ect, it happens that such a proposition is not selfJevident. For instance, this proposition,8Can is a rational (eing,8 is, in its ver) nature, selfJevident, since who sa)s 8man,8 sa)s 8a

rational (eing8 and )et to one who knows not what a man is, this proposition is not selfJevident.

*ence it is that, as &oethius sa)s /=e *e(dom.0, certain axioms or propositions are universall)

selfJevident to all- and such are those propositions whose terms are known to all, as, 8@ver)

whole is greater than its part,8 and, 8Things equal to one and the same are equal to one another.8

&ut some propositions are selfJevident onl) to the wise, who understand the meaning of the

terms of such propositions thus to one who understands that an angel is not a (od), it is selfJ

evident that an angel is not circumscriptivel) in a place (ut this is not evident to the unlearned,

for the) cannot grasp it.

Now a certain order is to (e found in those things that are apprehended universall). For that

which, (efore aught else, falls under apprehension, is 8(eing,8 the notion of which is included in

all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstra(le principle is that 8the

same thing cannot (e affirmed and denied at the same time,8 which is (ased on the notion of

8(eing8 and 8notJ(eing8 and on this principle all others are (ased, as is stated in Cetaph. iv, text.

;. Now as 8(eing8 is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simpl), so 8good8 is the first

thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action since

ever) agent acts for an end under the aspect of good. onsequentl) the first principle of practical

reason is one founded on the notion of good, viB. that 8good is that which all things seek after.8

*ence this is the first precept of law, that 8good is to (e done and pursued, and evil is to (e

avoided.8 All other precepts of the natural law are (ased upon this so that whatever the practical

reason naturall) apprehends as mans good /or evil0 (elongs to the precepts of the natural law as

something to (e done or avoided.

>ince, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrar), hence it is that

all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturall) apprehended () reason as

(eing good, and consequentl) as o(:ects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and o(:ects of

avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts

of the natural law. &ecause in man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with

the nature which he has in common with all su(stances inasmuch as ever) su(stance seeks the

preservation of its own (eing, according to its nature and () reason of this inclination, whateveris a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its o(stacles, (elongs to the natural law.

>econdl), there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more speciall), according to

that nature which he has in common with other animals and in virtue of this inclination, those

things are said to (elong to the natural law, 8which nature has taught to all animals8 "Kandect.

<ust. 2, tit. i%, such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdl), there is in

man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him



thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth a(out 'od, and to live in societ) and in this

respect, whatever pertains to this inclination (elongs to the natural law- for instance, to shun

ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things

regarding the a(ove inclination.

Repl to O!"e#tion $% All these precepts of the law of nature have the character of one naturallaw, inasmuch as the) flow from one first precept.

Repl to O!"e#tion &% All the inclinations of an) parts whatsoever of human nature, e.g. of the

concupisci(le and irasci(le parts, in so far as the) are ruled () reason, (elong to the natural law,

and are reduced to one first precept, as stated a(ove so that the precepts of the natural law are

man) in themselves, (ut are (ased on one common foundation.

Repl to O!"e#tion '% Although reason is one in itself, )et it directs all things regarding man- so

that whatever can (e ruled () reason, is contained under the law of reason.

Whether the natural law is the same in all men5

O!"e#tion $% 2t would seem that the natural law is not the same in all. For it is stated in the

=ecretals /=ist. i0 that 8the natural law is that which is contained in the +aw and the 'ospel.8

&ut this is not common to all men- (ecause, as it is written /6om. #D#?0, 8all do not o(e) the

gospel.8 Therefore the natural law is not the same in all men.

O!"e#tion &% Further, 8Things which are according to the law are said to (e :ust,8 as stated in

@thic. v. &ut it is stated in the same (ook that nothing is so universall) :ust as not to (e su(:ect to

change in regard to some men. Therefore even the natural law is not the same in all men.

O!"e#tion '% Further, as stated a(ove /AA"1%,30, to the natural law (elongs ever)thing to which

a man is inclined according to his nature. Now different men are naturall) inclined to different

things- some to the desire of pleasures, others to the desire of honors, and other men to other

things. Therefore there is not one natural law for all.

On the #ontrar 2sidore sa)s /@t)m. v, $0 8The natural law is common to all nations.8

I answer that As stated a(ove /AA"1%,30, to the natural law (elongs those things to which a man

is inclined naturall) and among these it is proper to man to (e inclined to act according to

reason. Now the process of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated in h)s. i. The

speculative reason, however, is differentl) situated in this matter, from the practical reason. For,

since the speculative reason is (usied chiefl) with the necessar) things, which cannot (e

otherwise than the) are, its proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth

without fail. The practical reason, on the other hand, is (usied with contingent matters, a(out

which human actions are concerned and consequentl), although there is necessit) in the general

principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequentl) we encounter defects.

Accordingl) then in speculative matters truth is the same in all men, (oth as to principles and as





to conclusions although the truth is not known to all as regards the conclusions, (ut onl) as

regards the principles which are called common notions. &ut in matters of action, truth or

practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, (ut onl) as to the general

principles and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equall) known to

all.

2t is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether of speculative or of practical

reason, truth or rectitude is the same for all, and is equall) known () all. As to the proper

conclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, (ut is not equall) known to

all thus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles,

although it is not known to all. &ut as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason, neither is

the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is the same, is it equall) known () all. Thus it

is right and true for all to act according to reason and from this principle it follows as a proper

conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should (e restored to their owner. Now this is true for

the ma:orit) of cases (ut it ma) happen in a particular case that it would (e in:urious, and

therefore unreasona(le, to restore goods held in trust- for instance, if the) are claimed for the purpose of fighting against ones countr). And this principle will (e found to fail the more,

according as we descend further into detail, e.g. if one were to sa) that goods held in trust should

(e restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such a wa)- (ecause the greater the

num(er of conditions added, the greater the num(er of wa)s in which the principle ma) fail, so

that it (e not right to restore or not to restore.

onsequentl) we must sa) that the natural law, as to general principles, is the same for all, (oth

as to rectitude and as to knowledge. &ut as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions, as

it were, of those general principles, it is the same for all in the ma:orit) of cases, (oth as to

rectitude and as to knowledge- and )et in some few cases it ma) fail, (oth as to rectitude, ()

reason of certain o(stacles /:ust as natures su(:ect to generation and corruption fail in some few

cases on account of some o(stacle0, and as to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted

() passion, or evil ha(it, or an evil disposition of nature- thus formerl), theft, although it is

expressl) contrar) to the natural law, was not considered wrong among the 'ermans, as <ulius

aesar relates /=e &ello 'all. vi0.

Repl to O!"e#tion $% The meaning of the sentence quoted is not that whatever is contained in

the +aw and the 'ospel (elongs to the natural law, since the) contain man) things that are a(ove

nature- (ut that whatever (elongs to the natural law is full) contained in them. Wherefore

'ratian, after sa)ing that 8the natural law is what is contained in the +aw and the 'ospel,8 adds

at once, () wa) of example, 8() which ever)one is commanded to do to others as he would (edone ().8

Repl to O!"e#tion &% The sa)ing of the hilosopher is to (e understood of things that are

naturall) :ust, not as general principles, (ut as conclusions drawn from them, having rectitude in

the ma:orit) of cases, (ut failing in a few.



Repl to O!"e#tion '% As, in man, reason rules and commands the other powers, so all the

natural inclinations (elonging to the other powers must needs (e directed according to reason.

Wherefore it is universall) right for all men, that all their inclinations should (e directed

according to reason.

Whether the natural law can (e changed5

O!"e#tion $% 2t would seem that the natural law can (e changed. &ecause on @cclus. #7;, 8*e

gave them instructions, and the law of life,8 the gloss sa)s 8*e wished the law of the letter to (e

written, in order to correct the law of nature.8 &ut that which is corrected is changed. Therefore

the natural law can (e changed.

O!"e#tion &% Further, the sla)ing of the innocent, adulter), and theft are against the natural law.

&ut we find these things changed () 'od as when 'od commanded A(raham to sla) his

innocent son /'n. 1110- and when he ordered the <ews to (orrow and purloin the vessels of the

@g)ptians /@x. #1390- and when *e commanded Esee to take to himself 8a wife of fornications8

/Esee #10. Therefore the natural law can (e changed.

O!"e#tion '% Further, 2sidore sa)s /@t)m. 9$0 that 8the possession of all things in common, and

universal freedom, are matters of natural law.8 &ut these things are seen to (e changed () human

laws. Therefore it seems that the natural law is su(:ect to change.

On the #ontrar 2t is said in the =ecretals /=ist. v0 8The natural law dates from the creation of

the rational creature. 2t does not var) according to time, (ut remains unchangea(le.8

I answer that A change in the natural law ma) (e understood in two wa)s. First, () wa) of

addition. 2n this sense nothing hinders the natural law from (eing changed since man) things for the (enefit of human life have (een added over and a(ove the natural law, (oth () the =ivine law

and () human laws.

>econdl), a change in the natural law ma) (e understood () wa) of su(traction, so that what

previousl) was according to the natural law, ceases to (e so. 2n this sense, the natural law is

altogether unchangea(le in its first principles (ut in its secondar) principles, which, as we have

said /A"$%0, are certain detailed proximate conclusions drawn from the first principles, the

natural law is not changed so that what it prescri(es (e not right in most cases. &ut it ma) (e

changed in some particular cases of rare occurrence, through some special causes hindering the

o(servance of such precepts, as stated a(ove /A"$%0.

Repl to O!"e#tion $% The written law is said to (e given for the correction of the natural law,

either (ecause it supplies what was wanting to the natural law- or (ecause the natural law was

perverted in the hearts of some men, as to certain matters, so that the) esteemed those things

good which are naturall) evil- which perversion stood in need of correction.

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Repl to O!"e#tion &% All men alike, (oth guilt) and innocent, die the death of nature which

death of nature is inflicted () the power of 'od on account of original sin, according to # Gings

1? 8The +ord killeth and maketh alive.8 onsequentl), () the command of 'od, death can (e

inflicted on an) man, guilt) or innocent, without an) in:ustice whatever. 2n like manner adulter)

is intercourse with anothers wife- who is allotted to him () the law emanating from 'od.

onsequentl) intercourse with an) woman, () the command of 'od, is neither adulter) norfornication. The same applies to theft, which is the taking of anothers propert). For whatever is

taken () the command of 'od, to Whom all things (elong, is not taken against the will of its

owner, whereas it is in this that theft consists. Nor is it onl) in human things, that whatever is

commanded () 'od is right- (ut also in natural things, whatever is done () 'od, is, in some wa),

natural, as stated in the F, !"#D9%, A"?%, ad #.

Repl to O!"e#tion '% A thing is said to (elong to the natural law in two wa)s. First, (ecause

nature inclines thereto e.g. that one should not do harm to another. >econdl), (ecause nature did

not (ring in the contrar) thus we might sa) that for man to (e naked is of the natural law,

(ecause nature did not give him clothes, (ut art invented them. 2n this sense, 8the possession ofall things in common and universal freedom8 are said to (e of the natural law, (ecause, to wit,

the distinction of possessions and slaver) were not (rought in () nature, (ut devised () human

reason for the (enefit of human life. Accordingl) the law of nature was not changed in this

respect, except () addition.

Question 95: article 2

EF *4CAN +AW /FE46 A6T2+@>0

We must now consider human law- and /#0 this law considered in itself- /10 its power- /30 its

muta(ilit). 4nder the first head there are four points of inquir)

/#0 2ts utilit).

/10 2ts origin.

/30 2ts qualit).

/$0 2ts division.

Whether ever) human law is derived from the natural law5

O!"e#tion $% 2t would seem that not ever) human law is derived from the natural law. For the

hilosopher sa)s /@thic. v, 70 that 8the legal :ust is that which originall) was a matter of

indifference.8 &ut those things which arise from the natural law are not matters of indifference.

Therefore the enactments of human laws are not derived from the natural law.

O!"e#tion &% Further, positive law is contrasted with natural law, as stated () 2sidore /@t)m. v, $0

and the hilosopher /@thic. v, 70. &ut those things which flow as conclusions from the general

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principles of the natural law (elong to the natural law, as stated a(ove /!";$%, A"$%0. Therefore

that which is esta(lished () human law does not (elong to the natural law.

O!"e#tion '% Further, the law of nature is the same for all- since the hilosopher sa)s /@thic. v,

70 that 8the natural :ust is that which is equall) valid ever)where.8 2f therefore human laws were

derived from the natural law, it would follow that the) too are the same for all which is clearl)false.

O!"e#tion .% Further, it is possi(le to give a reason for things which are derived from the natural

law. &ut 8it is not possi(le to give the reason for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers,8 as the

:urist sa)s "Kandect. <ustin. li(. i, ff, tit. iii, v- =e +eg. et >enat.%. Therefore not all human laws

are derived from the natural law.

On the #ontrar Tull) sa)s /6het. ii0 8Things which emanated from nature and were approved

() custom, were sanctioned () fear and reverence for the laws.8

I answer that As Augustine sa)s /=e +i(. Ar(. i, 90 8that which is not :ust seems to (e no law at

all8 wherefore the force of a law depends on the extent of its :ustice. Now in human affairs a

thing is said to (e :ust, from (eing right, according to the rule of reason. &ut the first rule of

reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has (een stated a(ove /!";#%, A"1%, ad 10.

onsequentl) ever) human law has :ust so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the

law of nature. &ut if in an) point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law (ut a

perversion of law.

&ut it must (e noted that something ma) (e derived from the natural law in two wa)s first, as a

conclusion from premises, secondl), () wa) of determination of certain generalities. The first

wa) is like to that () which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the

principles while the second mode is likened to that where(), in the arts, general forms are

particulariBed as to details thus the craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to

some particular shape. >ome things are therefore derived from the general principles of the

natural law, () wa) of conclusions- e.g. that 8one must not kill8 ma) (e derived as a conclusion

from the principle that 8one should do harm to no man8 while some are derived therefrom ()

wa) of determination- e.g. the law of nature has it that the evilJdoer should (e punished- (ut that

he (e punished in this or that wa), is a determination of the law of nature.

Accordingl) (oth modes of derivation are found in the human law. &ut those things which are

derived in the first wa), are contained in human law not as emanating therefrom exclusivel), (uthave some force from the natural law also. &ut those things which are derived in the second wa),

have no other force than that of human law.

Repl to O!"e#tion $% The hilosopher is speaking of those enactments which are () wa) of

determination or specification of the precepts of the natural law.



Repl to O!"e#tion &% This argument avails for those things that are derived from the natural

law, () wa) of conclusions.

Repl to O!"e#tion '% The general principles of the natural law cannot (e applied to all men in

the same wa) on account of the great variet) of human affairs and hence arises the diversit) of

positive laws among various people.

Repl to O!"e#tion .% These words of the <urist are to (e understood as referring to decisions of

rulers in determining particular points of the natural law on which determinations the :udgment

of expert and prudent men is (ased as on its principles- in so far, to wit, as the) see at once what

is the (est thing to decide.

*ence the hilosopher sa)s /@thic. vi, ##0 that in such matters, 8we ought to pa) as much

attention to the undemonstrated sa)ings and opinions of persons who surpass us in experience,

age and prudence, as to their demonstrations.8

Question 96: articles 1 & 2

EF T*@ EW@6 EF *4CAN +AW />2H A6T2+@>0

We must now consider the power of human law. 4nder this head there are six points of inquir)

/#0 Whether human law should (e framed for the communit)5

/10 Whether human law should repress all vices5

/30 Whether human law is competent to direct all acts of virtue5

/$0 Whether it (inds man in conscience5

/90 Whether all men are su(:ect to human law5

/?0 Whether those who are under the law ma) act (eside the letter of the law5

Whether human law should (e framed for the communit) rather than for the individual5

O!"e#tion $% 2t would seem that human law should (e framed not for the communit), (ut rather

for the individual. For the hilosopher sa)s /@thic. v, 70 that 8the legal :ust . . . includes all

particular acts of legislation . . . and all those matters which are the su(:ect of decrees,8 which

are also individual matters, since decrees are framed a(out individual actions. Therefore law is

framed not onl) for the communit), (ut also for the individual.

O!"e#tion &% Further, law is the director of human acts, as stated a(ove /!";D%, AA"#%,10. &ut

human acts are a(out individual matters. Therefore human laws should (e framed, not for the

communit), (ut rather for the individual.



O!"e#tion '% Further, law is a rule and measure of human acts, as stated a(ove /!";D%, AA"#%,10.

&ut a measure should (e most certain, as stated in Cetaph. x. >ince therefore in human acts no

general proposition can (e so certain as not to fail in some individual cases, it seems that laws

should (e framed not in general (ut for individual cases.

On the #ontrar The :urist sa)s /andect. <ustin. li(. i, tit. iii, art. ii- =e legi(us, etc.0 that 8lawsshould (e made to suit the ma:orit) of instances- and the) are not framed according to what ma)

possi(l) happen in an individual case.8

I answer that Whatever is for an end should (e proportionate to that end. Now the end of law is

the common good- (ecause, as 2sidore sa)s /@t)m. v, 1#0 that 8law should (e framed, not for an)

private (enefit, (ut for the common good of all the citiBens.8 *ence human laws should (e

proportionate to the common good. Now the common good comprises man) things. Wherefore

law should take account of man) things, as to persons, as to matters, and as to times. &ecause the

communit) of the state is composed of man) persons- and its good is procured () man) actions-

nor is it esta(lished to endure for onl) a short time, (ut to last for all time () the citiBenssucceeding one another, as Augustine sa)s /=e iv. =ei ii, 1#- xxii, ?0.

Repl to O!"e#tion $% The hilosopher /@thic. v, 70 divides the legal :ust, i.e. positive law, into

three parts. For some things are laid down simpl) in a general wa) and these are the general

laws. Ef these he sa)s that 8the legal is that which originall) was a matter of indifference, (ut

which, when enacted, is so no longer8 as the fixing of the ransom of a captive. >ome things

affect the communit) in one respect, and individuals in another. These are called 8privileges,8 i.e.

8private laws,8 as it were, (ecause the) regard private persons, although their power extends to

man) matters- and in regard to these, he adds, 8and further, all particular acts of legislation.8

Ether matters are legal, not through (eing laws, (ut through (eing applications of general laws to

particular cases such are decrees which have the force of law- and in regard to these, he adds 8all

matters su(:ect to decrees.8

Repl to O!"e#tion &% A principle of direction should (e applica(le to man)- wherefore

/Cetaph. x, text. $0 the hilosopher sa)s that all things (elonging to one genus, are measured ()

one, which is the principle in that genus. For if there were as man) rules or measures as there are

things measured or ruled, the) would cease to (e of use, since their use consists in (eing

applica(le to man) things. *ence law would (e of no use, if it did not extend further than to one

single act. &ecause the decrees than to one single act. &ecause the decrees of prudent men are

made for the purpose of directing individual actions- whereas law is a general precept, as stated

a(ove /!";1%, A"1%, E&<"1%0.

Repl to O!"e#tion '% 8We must not seek the same degree of certaint) in all things8 /@thic. i, 30.

onsequentl) in contingent matters, such as natural and human things, it is enough for a thing to

(e certain, as (eing true in the greater num(er of instances, though at times and less frequentl) it

fail.



Whether it (elongs to the human law to repress all vices5

O!"e#tion $% 2t would seem that it (elongs to human law to repress all vices. For 2sidore sa)s

/@t)m. v, 1D0 that 8laws were made in order that, in fear thereof, mans audacit) might (e held in

check.8 &ut it would not (e held in check sufficientl), unless all evils were repressed () law.

Therefore human laws should repress all evils.

O!"e#tion &% Further, the intention of the lawgiver is to make the citiBens virtuous. &ut a man

cannot (e virtuous unless he for(ear from all kinds of vice. Therefore it (elongs to human law to

repress all vices.

O!"e#tion '% Further, human law is derived from the natural law, as stated a(ove /!";9%, A"1%0.

&ut all vices are contrar) to the law of nature. Therefore human law should repress all vices.

On the #ontrar We read in =e +i(. Ar(. i, 9 82t seems to me that the law which is written for

the governing of the people rightl) permits these things, and that =ivine providence punishes

them.8 &ut =ivine providence punishes nothing (ut vices. Therefore human law rightl) allowssome vices, () not repressing them.

I answer that As stated a(ove /!";D%, AA"#%,10, law is framed as a rule or measure of human

acts. Now a measure should (e homogeneous with that which it measures, as stated in Cetaph. x,

text. 3,$, since different things are measured () different measures. Wherefore laws imposed on

men should also (e in keeping with their condition, for, as 2sidore sa)s /@t)m. v, 1#0, law should

(e 8possi(le (oth according to nature, and according to the customs of the countr).8 Now

possi(ilit) or facult) of action is due to an interior ha(it or disposition since the same thing is

not possi(le to one who has not a virtuous ha(it, as is possi(le to one who has. Thus the same is

not possi(le to a child as to a fullJgrown man for which reason the law for children is not thesame as for adults, since man) things are permitted to children, which in an adult are punished

() law or at an) rate are open to (lame. 2n like manner man) things are permissi(le to men not

perfect in virtue, which would (e intolera(le in a virtuous man.

Now human law is framed for a num(er of human (eings, the ma:orit) of whom are not perfect

in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not for(id all vices, from which the virtuous a(stain, (ut

onl) the more grievous vices, from which it is possi(le for the ma:orit) to a(stain- and chiefl)

those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohi(ition of which human societ) could not (e

maintained thus human law prohi(its murder, theft and such like.

Repl to O!"e#tion $% Audacit) seems to refer to the assailing of others. onsequentl) it

(elongs to those sins chiefl) where() ones neigh(or is in:ured and these sins are for(idden ()

human law, as stated.

Repl to O!"e#tion &% The purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not suddenl), (ut

graduall). Wherefore it does not la) upon the multitude of imperfect men the (urdens of those

who are alread) virtuous, viB. that the) should a(stain from all evil. Etherwise these imperfect



ones, (eing una(le to (ear such precepts, would (reak out into )et greater evils thus it is written

/s. 3D330 8*e that violentl) (loweth his nose, (ringeth out (lood8- and /Cat. ;#70 that if

8new wine,8 i.e. precepts of a perfect life, 8is put into old (ottles,8 i.e. into imperfect men, 8the

(ottles (reak, and the wine runneth out,8 i.e. the precepts are despised, and those men, from

contempt, (reak into evils worse still.

Repl to O!"e#tion '% The natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law while human

law falls short of the eternal law. Now Augustine sa)s /=e +i(. Ar(. i, 90 8The law which is

framed for the government of states, allows and leaves unpunished man) things that are punished

() =ivine providence. Nor, if this law does not attempt to do ever)thing, is this a reason wh) it

should (e (lamed for what it does.8 Wherefore, too, human law does not prohi(it ever)thing that

is for(idden () the natural law.


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Summa Theologica-Christian Ethics