Sullivan and Driedgeron thè

Construction of Statutes

Fourth Edition

by

Ruth Sullivan

Professor of LawUniversity of Ottawa

LexisNexìs*

Table ofContents

Foreword to thè Fourth Edition viiForeword to thè Third Edition ixForeword to thè Second Edition xiiiForeword to thè First Edition xvTable of Cases xxxiii

CHAPTER 1 DRIEDGER'S MODERN PRINCIPLE 1

Analysis of Modern Principle 1Introduction 1Relation of modern principle to rules of statutory

interpretation 3The evolution of statutory interpretation 4

Current theory and practice 7The Modern Principle and thè Plain Meaning Rule 9

The plain meaning rule 9Incompatibility between thè modern principle and thè plain

meaning rule 9Problems with thè Plain Meaning Rule 12

Unacknowledged choices 12Faulty assumptions about language and communication 15Inconsistent reliance on plain meaning rule 17Rhetorical use of plain meaning rule 18

CHAPTER 2 ORDINARY MEANING 19

Introduction 19The multiple meanings of "meaning" 19The ordinary meaning rule 20

What is Meant by Ordinary Meaning 21Ordinary meaning defined 21Ordinary meaning is not dictionary meaning 22Ordinary meaning is not literal meaning 23

How Ordinary Meaning is Proven 24Judicial notice 24Linguistic intuition 25Dictionaries 26Other ways of proving ordinary meaning 31Primary versus secondary meaning 33

Applications of thè Ordinary Meaning Rule 34When ordinary meaning is binding 34Refusai to narrow generai terms 35

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When ordinary meaning is not binding 36Presumption is rebutted 37

CHAPTER 3 TECHNICAL AND LEGAL MEANING 39

Introduction 39Technical Meanings 39

The relation between ordinary and technical meaning 39Technical terms 40Presumption in favour of ordinary, non-technical meaning 41Qualification 42Governing principle 43Other relevant considerations 46Proof of technical meaning 46

Legai Meanings 47Legai terms of art 47Plain legai meanings 50Statutory definitions 51Application provisions 55Interpretation Acts 55"may'7 "shall" / "must" 56Discretionary vs. non-discretionary "may" 57Mandatory or directory "shall" / "must" 60"should" 65"and"/"or" 66Deems 69Use of "deem" (or "consider") to create legai fictions 69Use of "deem" (or "consider") to create presumptions 71

CHAPTER 4 BILINGUAL AND BIJURAL MEANING 73

Introduction 73

PART 1. BILINGUAL LEGISLATION 73The Constitutional and Legislative Framework 73

Legislation to be enacted in French and English 73Constitution Acts 74Equal authenticity rule 74Neither version has paramountcy 76Both versions must be read 77The 1985 revision 78

Overview of Interpretation 79Introduction 79The shared meaning rule 80

Reliance on Shared Meaning 81Shared meaning confirms ordinary meaning 81Shared meaning resolves ambiguity 82Shared meaning confirms ordinary or technical meaning 85Shared meaning creates meaning 86

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Shared Meaning is Not Decisive 87Shared meaning may be rejected 87Absence of shared meaning 90Other sources of meaning 92Legislative origin 93

The Interpretation of Bijural Legislation 94Theproblem 94Constitutional framework 95Respect for Quebec's civil law 96Approaches to drafting bijural legislation 96General terms applicable to either legai System 97Analogous legai terms 99Failure to provide clear civilian solution 101

CHAPTER 5 ORIGINAL MEANING 105

Introduction 105Theproblem 105Criticisms of thè originai meaning rule 106Conclusion 108

Coment of thè Originai Meaning Rule 108Formulation of thè rule 108Originai meaning rule distinguished from contemporanea

expositio 108Originai meaning rule distinguished from reluctance to overturn

established interpretations 109Dynamic vs. static interpretation 110

Application of thè Rule 112How thè rule is applied by thè courts 112Legislative intention 112Functional equivalence 113Discretion 114Specific and technical terms 115Courts avoid second-guessing thè legislature 116Courts avoid politicai choice 117

Obsolescence 118Introduction 118Obsolete application 118Reduced application 119Obsolete purpose 120Absurdity 121

CHAPTER 6 PLAUSIBLE MEANING, MISTAKES AND GAPS 123

Introduction 123The Plausible Meaning Rule 123

Judicial formulation of thè rule 123Paraphrase vs. amendment 124

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Plausible meaning as constraint 125Strained Interpretation 126

Theproblem 126Jurisdiction to adopt a strained interpretation 127

Drafting Mistakes 129Presumption of perfection 129Jurisdiction to correct mistakes 131Unacceptable absurdity 132

Gaps and Oversights 134Theproblem 134Absence of jurisdiction to fili gaps 136Courts sometimes fili gaps 138Courts may supplement legislation 139

Avoidance Schemes 142Introduction 142Avoidance defined 142Evolution of anti-avoidance jurisdiction 142Lord Tomlin's principle 143Values favouring restraint 144Values favouring judicial control 144Type of legislation 145Interpretation to promote compliance 145Illustration 146Setting aside avoidance measures 147Illustrations 148Conclusion 150

CHAPTER 7 TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 151

Introduction 151Legislation as a literary genre 151Legislative drafting conventions 151Interactions of drafting conventions and statutory interpretation... 152Overview 154

PART 1. PRESUMPTIONS ABOUT HOW LEGISLATION ISDRAFTED 154

Presumed Knowledge and Competence 154Presumed knowledge of everything 154Presumed linguistic and drafting competence 155Presumption of straightforward expression 156Presumption of orderly and economical arrangement 157

The Presumption Against Tautology 158Governing principle 158Rebuttai 161

The Presumption of Consistent Expression 162Same words, same meaning 163Different words, different meaning 164Recurring pattern of expression 165

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Factors affecting weight of presumption 166The Presumption of Coherence 168

Governing principle 168

PART 2. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS AND THE MAXIMS OFINTERPRETATION 169

Introduction 169Textual Analysis 170

Basic technique 170Collocation 172

Associated Words 173The associated words rule (noscitur a sociis) 173

Limited Class 175The limited class rule (ejusdem generis) 175Specific items must belong to a single identifiable class that is

narrower than thè generai class 177Alistofone 179General words precede specific words 180Reasons not to apply limited class rule 182Grammatical structure 184

Implied Exclusion 186Failure to mention comparable items 187Failure to follow a pattern of express reference 189The role of policy 191Rebuttai 192Relation to overlap 194

CHAPTER 8 PURPOSIVE ANALYSIS 195

Introduction 195Propositions underlying purposive 195

Evolution of Purposive Analysis 196Heydon'sCase 196Doctrine of equitable construction 196Modern purposive analysis 197Purposive analysis distinguished from purposive approach 198Legitimacy of purposive analysis 199Reform legislation 201Program legislation 201Purposive approach in Charter interpretation 203

What is Meant by Legislative Purpose 204Introduction 204The "mind" of thè legislature 204Purpose versus motive 205Aimor object 205Principles and policies 205Balancing competing purposes 207

How Purpose is Established 209Direct and indirect evidence 209

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Legislative statements of purpose 210Non-legislative statements of purpose 210Norms of plausibility 211Purpose inferred from text alone 213Purpose inferred from legislative scheme 215Purpose inferred from external context — thè mischief to be

cured 216Purpose inferred from tracing legislative evolution 218

Uses of Purposive Analysis 219Introduction 219Resolving ambiguity 220Determining scope 221Purpose may justify a restrictive interpretation 223Purpose may justify a large, liberai interpretation 225Scope of powers 228Guiding discretion 229

Some Limitations of Purposive Analysis 230The purpose is indeterminate 230The problem of limited means 232Conclusion 234

CHAPTER 9 CONSEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS 235

Introduction 235Relevance of consequences in interpretation 235Propositions comprising consequential analysis 236Evolution of thè presumption against absurdity 237Questions raised by thè presumption against absurdity 237

Evolution of Consequential Analysis 238"Objective" absurdity 238"Subjective" absurdity 239The current view of absurdity 239The judicial response to absurdity 240Governing principle 241Justification 242

Currently Recognized Categories of Absurdity 243Purpose is defeated 243Irrational distinctions 244Misallocation and disproportion 246Contradictions and anomalies 247Inconvenience 248Interference with thè efficient administration of justice 249Consequences that are self-evidently irrational or unjust 251

Techniques Relied on to Avoid Absurdity 251Resolving ambiguity 252Justifying a restrictive interpretation 253Justifying an expansive interpretation 254Determining scope of power or discretion 255Other uses 256

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CHAPTER 10 WORDS IN TOTAL CONTEXT AND THEPRINCIPLE OF COHERENCE 259

Introduction 259The Contextual Principle 259

Meaning depends on context 259Categories of context 260Conclusion 262

The Presumption of Coherence 262Governing principle 262Overview of strategies for achieving coherence 263Overlapping provisions are presumed to apply 264Defining conflict 265Exhaustive provisions 266Reliance on interpretation to establish priority 268Strained interpretation 269Fundamental humanrights law is paramount 271Statutes are paramount over regulations 272Implied exception (generalia specialibus non derogant) 273Implied repeal 275Simultaneously enacted provisions 277Implied exception preferred to implied repeal 277Legislative solutions 278

CHAPTER 11 THE ACTAS AWHOLE 281

Introduction 281The governing principle 281Amendments 281Regulations 282

Other Provisions in thè Act 283Related provisions 283The legislative scheme 284

The Components of an Act 288Introduction 288Internai versus external components 288Recommended rule 290

Titles 290General 290Usesoflongtitle 291Refusai to narrow scope 293Uses of short title 294Weight to be accorded titles 295

Preambles 296General 296Preambles reveal legislative purpose 296Preambles as source of legislative values 297Other uses 298Weight of preamble 299

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Purpose Statements 300Definition of purpose statement 300Function of purpose statement 301Purpose statements define limits of discretion 302Weight of purpose statements 303

Headings 305General 305Uses of headings 306Grouping of provisions under headings 307Weight ofheading 308

Marginai Notes 309General 309Reliance on marginai notes 310Weight 311

Punctuation 312General 312Reliance on punctuation 312Weight 313

Schedules 314Types of scheduled material 314Schedules are internai to Act 314Scheduled materials incorporated into Act 315Scheduled materials not incorporated but validated 316Scheduled materials included for convenience only 317Classifying scheduled materials 318Forms 319

CHAPTER 12 THE STATUTE BOOK AND RELATEDLEGISLATION 323

Introduction 323The Statute Book as a Whole 323

Governing principle 323Statutes on thè same subject {statutes in pari materia) 324Integrated scheme 324Defined terms 326Same subject matter 327Departure from a pattern 328

Related Statute Law of Other Jurisdictions 330Governing principle 330Cross-jurisdictional comparison 331Cross-jurisdictional policy analysis 333

Reliance on Interpretations of Related Legislation 334Governing principle 334Case law 335Legislative history 336

Weight 337

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CHAPTER 13 RELATIONTOCOMMONLAW 339

Introduction 339

PART 1. GOVERNING PRINCIPLES 340Legislation is paramount 340Presumption against changing thè common law 341Area of law dealt with 341Adequacy of thè legislation 342

PART 2. USE OF COMMON LAW IN INTERPRETATION 343Reliance on Common Law to Interpret Statutory Language 343

Incorporation of common law concepts or terms 343Provisions that codify thè common law 344Provisions that modify thè common law 345Interpreting an "exhaustive code" 347

The Use of Common Law to Supplement Legislation 348Introduction 348Considerations governing resort to common law 349Express indication of legislative intent 350Legislation offers comprehensive scheme 350Legislation implements specific policy choice 352Legislation duplicates or supersedes thè common law 352Common law is unsatisfactory 353Legislation offers inadequate solution 354Specific provision displaces generai common law 355Implied exclusion 355Mix of considerations 356

Common Law Evolution Precluded by Legislation 357Courts may change common law 357Common law is expressly preserved 358Timing 359

CHAPTER 14 PRESUMED LEGISLATIVE INTENT 361

Introduction 361Legitimacy of presumed intent 363Legai effect of presumptions 363

Jurisidictional Limitations and thè Entrenched Constitution 366Presumption of compliance with limits on jurisdiction 366Presumption of compliance with constitutional norms 367Rebuttai 369Presumption of validity 369Reading down 370Reading down as a constitutional remedy 372

Human Rights and Other Quasi-Constitutional Legislation 373Special status of human rights legislation 373Liberai and purposive interpretation of human rights legislation... 374Defences and exceptions in human rights legislation 375Dynamic interpretation of human rights legislation 376

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Language rights legislation 378The Canadian Bill of Rights 380Other quasi-constitutional legislation 380

Strict and Liberai Construction 381Traditional distinction 381Modern approach 382

Penai Legislation 384The strict construction rule 384Strict construction is rebuttable 387Strict construction as last resort 389

Presumptions of Fault 390Criminal and regulatory offences distinguished 390Degrees of fault distinguished 391The presumptions ofmens rea and of strict liability 392The presumptions are rebuttable 393Impact of thè Charter on common law presumptions 394

Legislation that Derogates from Established Law 395Presumption against implicit alteration of law 395Exceptions are strictly construed 396Ousting jurisdiction of court 398

Legislation That Takes Away Rights 399Introduction 399Rights of action 399Property rights 400

Social Welfare Legislation 404Governing principle 404

CHAPTER 15 ABORIGINAL LAW 409

Introduction 409Legislation relating to Aboriginal peoples 409

Liberai interpretation 409Liberai interpretation as last resort 411

Interference with Aboriginal rights 412Presumption against interference 412Modern treaty rights 414Presumption against extinguishment 415

Treaties with Aboriginal peoples 416Governing principles 416Use of extrinsic materials 419Implementing legislation 420

CHAPTER 16 INTERNATIONAL LAW 421

Introduction 421Presumed Compliance with International Law 421

Governing principle 421Interpretation to ensure compliance 422

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International law as legai context 425Materials consulted 427Presumption is rebuttable 429

Implementing Legislation 430Domestic effect of international conventions 430Incorporation by reference 431Implementation through harmonizing legislation 434Reliance on underlying convention to interpret harmonizing

legislation 435Express reference to convention not required 436Ambiguity in implementing legislation not required 437Legislation prevails over convention 438

CHAPTER 17 FISCALLAW 441

Fiscal Legislation — The Traditional Approach 441Introduction 441Literal construction 441Justification for literal approach 442Strict construction 443Avoidance schemes 444The role of Iiteralism and formalism in avoidance 445

Modern Approach to Interpreting Fiscal Legislation 446Rejection of literal construction 446The legacy of Iiteralism and strict construction 447The role of purposive interpretation 448Presumption in favour of thè taxpayer 450Anti-avoidance after Antosko 450The ineffective transaction test 451The sham test 452The bona fide business purpose test 452Purposive transaction analysis 453Statutory provisions 454Judicial attitudes toward avoidance 455

CHAPTER 18 THE EXTERNAL CONTEXT 457

Introduction 457Background information 458The mischief addressed by thè legislature 460Use of social facts to confront cultural misunderstanding 463Proving external context 464

CHAPTER 19 EXTRINSIC AIDS 467

Introduction 467Reasons to Consult Extrinsic Aids 468

Legai context 468

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Evidence of external context 468Authoritative opinion 469Materials noticed by legislature 469Must thè legislation be ambiguous? 470

Legislative Evolution 471Legislative evolution distinguished from legislative history 471Reliance on legislative evolution is permitted 471Presumption that change is purposeful 472Substantive change is intended 473Successive substantive changes reveal evolving policy 475Formai change only is intended 475Contemporaneous interpretation 477Use of legislative history in tracing legislative evolution 478Subsequent evolution 479Limitations on thè use of legislative evolution 480

Legislative History 481Definition 481Issues to be addressed 482Commission reports — thè partial exclusion rule 483The exclusionary rule 485Reasons justifying thè exclusion of legislative history 486Reasons to reject exclusionary rule 489

The Evolving Demise of thè Exclusionary Rule 490Constitutional cases 490Charter cases 492Statutory interpretation cases 495British approach 496

The Current Position 497Categories abolished 497Regulations 499

Summary 500Professional and Academic Publications 500

Introduction 500Reliance on academic material as evidence of external context 500Reliance on academic materials as evidence of legai context 501Use of academic materials as authoritative opinion 502

Administrative Interpretation 502Introduction 502Reasons to consult administrative interpretation 503Need for caution 504Admissibility and use of administrative interpretation 505Detrimental reliance on administrative opinion 507

Judicial Interpretation 508Introduction 508Interpretations of re-enacted legislation 510Judicial interpretations as precedent 512Interpretations give meaning to vague terms 513Reluctance to overturn established interpretation 514

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Reliance on administrative decisions 515Persuasive authority distinguished from deference 516Case law as source of legai scholarship 516

CHAPTER 20 APPLICATION RULES 519

PART 1. TEMPORAL OPERATION 519Introduction 519

Defining events 519Sources of law 520Temporal operation distinguished from temporal application 520Unit of analysis 521Overview 521

Enactment 521Effect of enactment 521Use of legislation not in force 522

Commencement 523Rules governing commencement 523Delayed commencement 524Deemed commencement 526

Repeal 527Rules governing repeal 527Repeal techniques 528Implied repeal 529

Re-Enactment 531Re-enactment defined 531Consolidation 532Revision 533Legai effect of statute revision 534Interpretation of revised statutes — thè problem of change 535Codification 537Declaratory provisions 537

Amendment 538Amending legislation 538The temporal operation of amendments 539Doctrine of merger 540

PART 2. TEMPORAL APPLICATION 542Introduction 542

Sources of law 542The challenges of transitional law 543Principles underlying transitional law 544Ways of applying legislation in time 545Summary of generai application rules 546"Retroactive" and "retrospective" 547Situating facts in time 550

The Presumption Against thè Retroactive Application of Law 553Retroactivity 553

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Principle-based analysis 554Retroactive versus prospective effect 557How to deal with retrospective applications 559Provisions "designed to protect thè public" 559Techniques to rebut presumption 562Reasons for enacting retroactive legislation 563Declaratory provisions 564

Survival of Repealed Law 565The common law rule 565Statutory survival 565Relation of survival provisions to common law presumptions 568

Interference with Vested Rights 568The common law presumption 568Reasons for presumption 569Recognizing vested or accrued rights 570Accruing rights 574Weight of thè presumption 576Rebutting thè presumption 578Purposive analysis 581

Procedural Legislation 582Procedural legislation is presumed to have immediate

application 582Defining "pure" procedure 583Limitation of actions 585Rules of evidence 585Suppression of evidence is not a protected interest 587Presumption against retroactivity applies to procedural law 587Rebutting presumption of immediate effect 588

Beneficiai Legislation 589Regulations 589Summary 590

PART 3. TERRITORIAL APPLICATION 591The international law principle 591The common law presumptions 592Constitutional constraints 592Penai legislation 594Difficulties in applying presumption 595Conflictoflaws 595International comity 598Interprovincial comity 599Summary 601

PART 4. APPLICATION TO THE CROWN 602The Presumption of Crown immunity 602Formulations of thè presumption 603Modern dislike of presumption 603Scope of thè presumption 604Federai and provincial Crowns 604

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Rebutting thè presumption 605Waiver 607Crown agents may claim immunity 610Agents must act within scope of agency 611

APPENDIXI DRAFTING CONVENTIONS OF THE UNIFORMLAW CONFERENCE OF CANADA 613

Introduction 613I. General 613

Logicai organization 613Style 613Sex-specific references 614

II. Divisions of an Act 614Required elements 614Optional elements 614Subdivisions of sections 615Definitions 615Form of sections and their subdivisions 615

III. Arrangement 616Preamble 616Definitions 616Interpretation or application provisions 616Regulation-making powers 616Transitional or temporary provisions 616Repealing and amending provisions 617Commencement provisions 617Schedules 617Forms 617Marginai notes and table of contents 617

IV. Drafting Principles 617Title 617Preamble 617Statement of purpose 618Parts 618Definitions 618No substantive content 618Artificiality 618"Means" and "includes" 619Consistency 619Content of section 619Single sentence 619Short sentence 619Use of clauses and further subdivisions 620"Clause sandwiches" 620Parallelism 620Connecting words 620Verbs in present indicative 620

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Passive undesirable 621Duties and prohibitions 621Powers rights and choices 621Internai references 621Derogations and restrictions 621Placement of new provisions 621Designation of new provisions 622Changes to originai structure 622Tables and mathematical formulas 622Regulation-making powers 622

V. Language 622Ordinary language 622Intended audience 622Redundancies and archaisms 622Neologisms 623Other languages 623Consistency 623Substance 623Linguistic quality 624Structure 624Acceptable differences 624

Index 625