STRATFOR Global Vantage Europe 12 05 - wikileaks.org · The Month in Review Meet the Merkel Government ... Last Tango for Paris? Europe as a whole has been in political limbo for

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A b o u t S t r at f o r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i i i

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E x e c u t i v e S u m m a r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 T h e M o n t h i n R e v i e w . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 K e y I s s u e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 F o r e c a s t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 E c o n o m i c F o c u s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 S e c u r i t y F o c u s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 N o t e w o r t h y E v e n t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8

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ith London’s turn at the EU presidency in its final month, stagnation and deadlock rule the day in Europe — just what anti-federalist British Prime Minister Tony Blair has been trying to achieve all along. Britain and France remain at loggerheads over the EU budget, which is hung up over the issues of agricultural

subsidies, budget rebates and development aid. Paris faces its own issues, as race riots have thrown a harsh light on France’s ever-weakening role as a driving force in the region. Meanwhile, after three months with no government, Germany finally confirmed easterner Angela Merkel as its new chancellor — ushering in leadership in a Berlin that is starting to think for itself again after six decades of foreign policy driven by the interests of other states.

T h i s M o n t h ’ s H i g h l i g h t s : I n E v e r y I s s u e : • Meet the Merkel government • Economic Focus • Blair and the Budget Deadlock • Security Focus • Schisms in Serbia • Noteworthy Events • Last Tango for Paris?

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he big news this month is that Germany finally has a government. As we predicted in the summer, Angela Merkel of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) took over the chancellorship and cobbled together a “grand” — that is to say, “fragile and divided” — coalition of the center-right CDU and the center-left (and formerly ruling)

Social Democratic Party. Merkel is the country’s first female chancellor, and also the first from the former East Germany. She, and a cadre of other eastern politicians, are taking the helm at a time when Europe’s keystone country is once again becoming self-aware and beginning to develop a foreign policy that goes beyond “we’re sorry about World War II.”

At the EU level, deadlock continues to reign supreme. The 2007-2013 budget — or lack thereof — remains at the center of debate. On one side is France, demanding to retain its agricultural subsidies from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); on the other is Britain — current holder of the rotating presidency — hoping to retain its yearly budget rebate and to eliminate the CAP. Caught in the middle are Europe’s new members, poorer nations in need of development aid that gets squeezed out by CAP payouts and the British rebate. British Prime Minister Tony Blair is offering a compromise proposal, but he faces intractable resistance from the other side of the English Channel — and from his own government, which recently handed him his first defeat in the House of Commons.

France, the architect of the European Union, is seeing its own influence wane. French dreams of a united — and Paris-led — Continent are slipping away as expansion waters down Paris’s voting power and the European Commission appoints new bureaucrats who do not share the French vision. Meanwhile, three weeks of race riots have hamstrung President Jacques Chirac, leaving the French ship of state likely rudderless until new elections in 2007.

Europe continues to struggle with the perennial issues of identity and integration. Older member-states are contending with (or trying to fight off) an influx of migrant workers from newer members, who in turn are calling for EU labor markets to open wide. Meanwhile, counterterrorism policies developed to deal with regional separatist movements such as the Irish Republican Army and the Basque ETA must now adapt to deal with the rising influence of international Islamist militants. And with bird flu now on its eastern doorstep, the union faces an economic hit, as its own birds are almost sure to catch the fever.

TE x e c u t i v e S u m m a r y


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T h e M o n t h i n R e v i e w M e e t t h e M e r k e l G o v e r n m e n tThe headline issue of November occurred in Germany, where Angela Merkel successfully cobbled together a “grand” coalition of her center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and her one-time rival, the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD). Immediately after being sworn in Nov. 22, Merkel set out for a whirlwind tour of partners past and future — at the time of this writing, she already has met in person with her French, Belgian, Polish and British counterparts as well as with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Her foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, has traveled to Washington and already the two countries’ rhetoric is as warm and friendly as it was cold and angry under the previous government.

Still, it remains to be seen how successful Merkel will be in charting a new course for her country. She comes into leadership, not with a mandate, but with a fragile and split government. For the next few months, she will be carefully evaluating options and striving to offend as few people as possible. F r a n c e G e t s B a c k t o ‘ N o r m a l ’In France, three weeks of race riots of late October and early November finally ended. Actually, perhaps “tapered off” is more accurate. Across France, about 100 cars continue to be firebombed nightly, a level that French authorities described as “normal.” The riots were not significant so much because they happened, but because they finally shone a light on the ongoing reality of French society. T u r n o v e r a t t h e C o m m i s s i o nElsewhere in Europe, events are progressing just as badly for the French. In Brussels, Irishwoman and economic liberal Catherine Day advanced to become the European Commission’s secretary-general, while Frenchmen Francois Lamoureux and Odile Quintin found themselves demoted from running transport and legal policies to largely advisory positions. The acceptance of 10 new — and relatively economically liberal — states into the European Union in 2004 is having a deep impact on the way the commission is run, and that “way” has very little to do with advancing French national interests. All of the French leaders who started and nurtured the entire EU project — in the hopes of creating a geopolitical vehicle for French

Merkel lacks a mandate and is striving to offend as few people as possible.


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power projection — have now been purged from the EU bureaucracy. Paris no longer defines the guiding vision of Europe. B l a i r a n d t h e B u d g e t D e a d l o c kBritish Prime Minister Tony Blair, current holder of the rotating EU presidency, is also working to entrench a very non-French vision of Europe into the system. Blair — and the British government at large — opposes the notion that the European Union is anything more than the sum of its parts. London historically has seen Europe as a glorified trade agreement, not a geopolitical entity. As president, Blair’s goals have been to eradicate the European Union’s expensive system of agricultural policies — which disproportionately benefit France — and slim down the EU budget, which supplies most development funding to the new Central European members. Instead of achieving either goal, he has created a deadlock in budget negotiations — which, ironically, are the next best thing. If the budget talks stall, then the United Kingdom does not need to pay much, thanks to the rebate that then-Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher forced through in 1984.

But this does not mean that all is well for the prime minister. On Nov. 9, defecting Labor members of parliament triggered Blair’s first-ever parliamentary defeat on an aspect of his proposed anti-terrorism legislation. In the United Kingdom’s parliamentary system, such failures generally indicate the beginning of the end for the political leadership.

S c h i s m s i n S e r b i aLast but not least, in Kosovo, U.N. representative Martti Ahtisaari arrived Nov. 21 for several days of talks about the province’s final status. Ultimately, the Kosovar Albanians agree on one thing: Kosovo must become independent from Serbia. Conversely, the Serbs agree that Kosovo must not become independent. Montenegro, another territory that is technically part of the Serbian state, is plowing ahead with an independence referendum in the spring, and something similar appears inevitable in Kosovo. There is another change of borders imminent in the Balkans; every time that has occurred in the past, there has been fighting.

Blair suffered his first-ever parliamentary defeat in November — usually the beginning of the end for a prime minister.


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K e y I s s u e s L a s t Ta n g o f o r P a r i s ?Europe as a whole has been in political limbo for six months, with Germany struggling to rebuild a government and the European Union squabbling over its own budget and constitution. Now a new source of instability is further pushing Europe into decline: France. France’s confidence of the last 60 years has been shattered by the European Union’s lack of a constitution, the British insistence on budget reforms, and riots across France that have resulted in a severely damaged French president. Paris always has been the center in all things EU and the leader in European Union’s decision-making. However, France’s role was greatly undercut by the addition of 10 members in May 2004, and then by British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s leadership during the United Kingdom’s turn at the EU presidency. The chief dispute currently threatening France is the EU budget, which subsidizes most of France’s farming industry through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This is more than simply an issue of cash for French President Jacques Chirac. Chirac’s political weakness means he critically depends on the support of French farmers to retain any influence. But budgeting for CAP subsidies will likely require the British to give up their treasured budget rebate, something that Blair will not agree to unless the French also lose their agricultural payments. In early December, however, Blair pitched to the union’s new Central European members that he would give up about 15 percent of the British rebate to help fund development programs in Central Europe in exchange for their support on budget reforms, if the Central European members would accept cuts in their total development aid. Under Blair’s proposal, France would receive substantially less of the CAP and the Central Europeans would receive the balance. The Central Europeans rejected the cuts in development funds, but warmed to the idea of CAP reform, knowing that they would be the ultimate beneficiaries.

Bulgaria and Romania, who are to join the European Union in 2007 and 2008 respectively, share the Central European view. Combine them with an

France has always been the leader in European decision-making, but EU expansion and the British presidency have undercut its role.


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awakening Germany and a European Commission that is slipping further from Paris’ control by the month, and France’s position as a leading policymaker and EU key player is rapidly diminishing.

In fact, the union is now institutionally arranged to minimize French influence. EU policies are broken into two broad categories: Issues of core national sovereignty — such as taxes, security and foreign policy — require unanimous agreement among the EU member-states; All other issues, involving the nuts and bolts of day-to-day policy — culture, energy, transportation and so on — require only a qualified majority. Both avenues are now problematic for France. The core sovereignty issues, which Paris always assumed it would dominate, can be blocked by any state on any policy. And on issues that determine the ins and outs of French life, France can be easily outvoted. Making matters even worse, smaller states — of which France is not one — have disproportionately greater power in qualified-majority votes. For France, this amounts to having extremely sensitive cultural and energy policies implemented over Paris’ objections, despite the fact that the EU has been its brainchild for 50 years. It is a situation that could give rise to further political erosion of French-EU ties and even begin to splinter the political coalitions within France itself. And it comes at the worst possible time for internal French politics. Unlike most European states — which have an elected prime minister but a figurehead head of state — the French president is popularly elected and then appoints the prime minister. Since Charles de Gaulle’s time, the power of the president has been repeatedly reinforced at the expense of the rest of the government. This office — the French presidency — has proven key not just in French developments, but also in broader European evolution.

The catch is that if the president is ever weakened — as Chirac is now, after the disasters of the EU constitution failure, the Luxembourg budget failure, and then three weeks of race riots — the French ship becomes rudderless. While the EU assaults French sovereignty, there is currently no power within

In fact, the union is now institutionally arranged to minimize French influence.

With Chirac’s presidency weakened, the French ship has become rudderless.


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France that can effectively fight back — and no one who will be able to do so until French presidential elections in 2007. It does not help that Chirac’s political opponent and interior minister, Nicolas Sarkozy, is publicly laying the blame for the whole mess at Chirac’s feet. The political damage inflicted on Chirac has essentially neutered his leadership capacity, leaving an unstable and unclear delegation of power to his successors. As French influence in the European Union wanes with future admissions of new member states, this presidential weakness — for which there is currently no contingency plan — combined with France’s lack of veto power, will only inflame Paris’ affiliation with the EU. G e r m a n y : T h e E a s t A s c e n d a n tOn the other side of the border, Germany’s recent political chaos has given way to a nascent left-right alliance that is attempting to enact mild market reforms without fracturing public support. But the behind-the-scenes evolutions arching across the entire German political system will prove far more critical to Germany’s — and thus Europe’s — development than the fate of this one freshman government. Germany’s core foreign policy since World War II can be summed up in three words: “sorry about that.” Germany’s foreign policy before World War II was that of a strong power at the heart of a continent that tried to extend its reach. Now that Germany is reunified, no longer occupied and thinking for itself, Berlin is bound to move back toward putting its own interests first — and while this may not mean there will be German troops marching into Warsaw any time soon, at the very least Germany is going to start having an opinion again. What that opinion looks like will radically change not just Germany, but its neighbors as well.

But what is most notable at the moment is who will be crafting those opinions. Germany’s political leadership for the past half-century has obviously come from the western parts of the country — but not anymore. On Nov. 15, the center-left Social Democratic Party chose easterner Matthias Platzeck to replace Franz Muentefering as its party chairman, while the center-right Christian Democratic Union has long sported Angela Merkel, another easterner. Notwithstanding Edmund Stoiber’s angry (and deeply divisive) campaign retort that the East should not be allowed to affect Germany’s national politics, eastern politicians are now running the country.

Germany is going to start having opinions again— and East German politicians will be cra�ing them.


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F o r e c a s t

H i g h l i g h t s • New Summit, Same Impasse • Bird Flu at the Gate

N e w S u m m i t , S a m e I m p a s s eDecember in Europe will be dominated by the soon-to-be-failed EU summit in Brussels on Dec. 15-16. As we have noted previously, the inability of EU member states to pool sovereignty effectively on even minor issues has forced them to deal with all issues at the head-of-government level. This creates a painfully clogged agenda that prevents them from effectively addressing the top-tier issues that presidents and prime ministers normally handle. Among the non-critical topics cluttering this summit will be headline issues such as exemptions to existing workweek regulations and the extension of value-added tax reductions to restaurants. Yet, in many ways European leaders should count their blessings. If they take advantage of the agenda to actually get some forward motion on these minor issues, then they will at least be able to rack up some successes. One such “guaranteed” success actually will require head-of-government action. On Dec. 7, European authorities captured war crimes indictee Gen. Ante Gotovina. Charges that the Croatian government was shielding him from international manhunts had stalled Zagreb’s EU accession negotiations. Now the Croatians will leap forward with the full support of all 25 EU member-states.

But the key issue on the EU’s plate is the budget, and it will go nowhere. There are four leading positions that will crash headlong into each other at the summit. First there are the French, who not only refuse to talk about reductions in their EU-paid agricultural subsidies — they are currently guaranteed one-fourth of all Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) payouts through 2013 — but refuse to even schedule a discussion of such reforms for another eight years.

Second, there are the new, poorer Central European states who want to get as much aid money for their internal development as possible.

EU leaders might move forward on minor issues, but the clash over the budget will go nowhere.


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Third, there is the United Kingdom. Former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher stalled European development in 1984 until she was able to secure a budget rebate, which has had the effect of refunding approximately two-thirds of all British pay-ins right back to the British Treasury. Under Prime Minister Tony Blair, the United Kingdom is willing to talk about reducing the rebate — or even eliminating it — but only if the CAP, particularly French exceptionalism within the CAP, is reformed.

Finally, there are the other rich Western European states such as Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany. These states want the overall EU budget capped so they are not left to pay for the development of the Central European states as well as the British rebate and French CAP subsidies. All of the hot air in the European press comes down to the clash of these four positions. The media — due to the vast unpopularity of the British rebate (outside of the United Kingdom, where it is considered sacrosanct) — has focused on the rebate and the “isolation” of London. But the reality is much more balanced — and therefore much more intractable. This is going to be one angry — and very failed — summit. In its immediate aftermath the discussion will break into two parts. First: hopeful talk that there will be progress after the first of the year, when Austria takes over the EU presidency. Do not take this seriously. All 25 EU members have full veto power over the budget. Ultimately they all — and in particular the French and the British — will have to come to common ground. Austria lacks the diplomatic heft to force that to happen; indeed, Vienna’s turn as president likely will be little more than a placeholder. The second line of discussion will be more realistic: talk of what to do in the likely circumstance that no budget deal is reached.

According to existing EU law, in such a circumstance the 2005 budget will simply be repeated in 2006 (and if a year later no progress is made, 2007) with any outlays made one month at a time. Such a “budget” would torpedo any long-range or large-project financing because of the jerkiness and uncertainty of funding disbursements — which would in turn grind most

Rich nations want the budget capped, limiting the payouts received by France, the United Kingdom and Central Europe.

If there is no compromise, the 2005 budget will carry forward, assuming member-states keep paying the bills.


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EU-funded development in the newer EU states to a halt. And even that is assuming that all 25 members individually decide that such a “budget” is good enough and keep paying the bills that Brussels sends out.

B i r d F l u a t t h e G a t eIn the meantime, mind the bird flu. While we are not a medical authority — and certainly we are not predicting the eminent outbreak of a human pandemic — we must note that the states to Europe’s immediate east are not nearly as tightly controlled as those in East Asia, where mass cullings of suspected infected flocks are commonplace. Bird outbreaks of the H5N1 virus that occur in locations such as Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus will not be eradicated as quickly as they are in East Asia, where governments have more experience and capacities for dealing with what has become an endemic issue for them.

At this point the danger to Europe is not a human health issue, but instead an economic one. Various strains of bird flu have forced mass cullings of domesticated bird flocks in Europe before, at the cost of billions of euros. November witnessed tens of thousands of birds slaughtered in Ukraine. Mass avian outbreaks so close to Europe are almost guaranteed to pass into Europe. The outcome could be similar to the effects of the hoof-and-mouth outbreak of 2001, except this time there could well be a human health component to deal with as well.

E c o n o m i c F o c u s

T h e W e d g e o f L a b o r R e s t r i c t i o n sUnder EU law, any citizen of an EU country can reside anywhere in the Union and have full access to the labor market and social security system of that country. Nonetheless, 12 of the European Union’s 15 older members (the EU-12) imposed labor restrictions on eight Central European countries that joined the bloc in 2004 (the EU-8), preventing citizens of the EU-8 from gaining access to the labor markets and social security systems of members of the EU-12. (No restrictions were placed on the nationals of Malta and Cyprus.) These restrictions will expire in 2006 unless each state that wishes to maintain its restrictions sends a request for an extension to the European Commission by April 30.

Mass outbreaks among birds in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus are almost certain to pass into Europe.


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Finnish Labor Minister Tarja Filatov said Nov. 28 that she hopes Finland’s Parliament will not renew the country’s labor restrictions. Her statement caused several media outlets to predict that Finland, along with other EU members such as Spain, will do away with its labor restrictions next year. However, Filatov’s announcement should not be seen as a firm indication of how Finland will eventually decide. Finland is currently governed by a very broad coalition government strongly influenced by rural voters, who are wary of competition from immigrant labor. Only a small handful of government officials have come out in favor of doing away with the labor curbs — not enough to firmly predict what the government will do in April.

The European Commission is very worried that these early reports of countries dropping their restrictions might result in a backlash from immigration opponents and a last-minute policy reversal by the member states. Early in 2004, many countries maintained that they would put no restrictions on their Central European neighbors when the European Union expanded May 1, 2004, but as the deadline approached, pressure on governments mounted and most reversed their positions and imposed restrictions. In the end, only Ireland, the United Kingdom and Sweden maintained open labor markets with the EU-8.

Diverse factors such as geography, unemployment rates, and existing immigrant populations will play a large role in whether countries decide to lift labor curbs. Here is a rundown of the issues facing individual states as they decide:

Austria - Austria borders more Central European states than any other EU-12 country, and would become a prime destination for immigrant workers if Vienna dropped its restrictions. Far-right and nationalist parties have increased their influence over government decisions in recent years and will put their weight behind keeping Central European workers out. Though no official announcement has been made, Austria is widely expected to keep its labor restrictions for the full seven years allowed, and likely lobby for an extension when that time elapses.

Belgium - Resentment toward a large African immigrant population could color the debate over the Central Europeans.

Denmark - Denmark has a reputation for enacting liberal, free market policies. Dropping its labor curbs would fit this pattern. Denmark already allows citizens from the EU-8 to enter Denmark for six months to look for


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work, and grants work permits for those who are successful. Fully opening up its labor market is only a short step away. However, nationalism plays a larger role in Danish politics than it does in other Scandinavian countries, and could stir up resistance to open immigration by other nationalities.

Finland - The Finnish were among the biggest supporters of EU expansion, particularly to their ethnic cousins in Estonia. Unsurprisingly, many Estonians already work in Finland illegally. The Finnish government, by legalizing their presence, would be able to keep better tabs on these workers. Yet the senior party in the government coalition, the Center Party, previously the Agrarian Party, still draws much of its support from a rural base that likely would oppose more liberal labor rules.

Italy - Italy has a rapidly aging population and one of the lowest growth rates in Western Europe. A need for workers could soon force the Italians to liberalize their labor market.


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France - France has high unemployment and a weak economy. The French will not be happy about giving jobs to foreigners that might otherwise go to Frenchmen. Although racism will be less of an issue with Central Europeans than it is with North Africans, the recent rioting by France’s large North African population has left France ill-disposed to invite more immigration.

Germany - Germany’s problems with chronic unemployment — now hovering around 11 percent — leave most Germans in a protectionist mood when it comes to their labor market. Germany also borders Poland and the Czech Republic, making it susceptible to an influx of Central European workers.

Ireland - Ireland already allows free immigration of workers from the EU-8. So far, about 85,000 have found work in Ireland.

Spain - Spain’s shortage of young workers is even direr than Italy’s. Pressing labor needs, in fact, already have pushed the country to offer broad amnesties to immigrants of North African origin. Accepting workers from Central Europe would likely be much easier.


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Netherlands - After the 2004 murder of filmmaker Theo Van Gogh by a Muslim immigrant, nationalism has played a starkly greater role in Danish politics, stirring up resistance to open immigration by other nationalities. Ongoing problems with the North African and Muslim immigrant communities have spoiled the Dutch appetite for foreigners. While the current Dutch government is lead by liberal reformers who would like to push to open up the Dutch labor market, they are extremely sensitive to the “Van Gogh” effect.

Sweden - Sweden already has an open labor market. So far, 22,000 workers from the EU-8 have come to work in Sweden.

United Kingdom - The United Kingdom has received the most EU-8 immigrants of any country that has opened its labor market. 290,000 have immigrated so far.

There is a broader issue at stake here. If labor restrictions are maintained, they will only increase the division between old and new members of the EU. Many Central European countries see the labor restrictions as arrogance on the part of the EU-12. The current discussion, in EU budget negotiations, of reducing development aid to the new members is not helping matters either. Central European countries do not feel they are getting the help that was promised them when they joined. With a nationalist party now governing Poland, confrontations between the EU and Poland are likely to occur with greater frequency — something likely to be replicated throughout Central Europe should the older members not prove more amenable to accepting Central European labor. Prolonging the labor restrictions will only add fuel to the fire.

S e c u r i t y F o c u s

W h e r e h a v e a l l t h e t e r r o r i s t s g o n e ?On Dec. 13, a timer-detonated bomb on the back of a stolen motorcycle exploded at Syntagma Square, Greece, the intended target being the nearby National Economy Ministry. It was the second attack against a Grecian ministry this year. There were no fatalities, and no claim of responsibility — only a phone call warning an Athens newspaper 30 minutes before the blast. Greek separatist group November 17 — a radical leftist group that first made its appearance with the assassination of CIA station chief Richard Welch in 1975 — was blamed for the incident. The style of


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the attack, with a relatively low-cost target, few to no civilian casualties, and advanced warning of the explosion, has become a standard approach of European-based militant groups.

Homegrown European militant organizations now pose less of a threat to European national security than they did in the days when the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was assassinating British lords and bombing pubs. The decline in intensity from these native groups can largely be attributed to European governments’ choice to engage them, both by negotiating directly with the groups and by tightening down on internal security policies such as immigration and deportation laws. As a result, the threat to European security now comes more from incoming militants associated with al Qaeda and offshoots of the more prominent European militant outfits.

Many of the internationally known European militant groups such as Basque-separatist ETA of Spain and the IRA have followed this pattern, having demonstrated early on their potential to mobilize and carry out crippling attacks against their ruling governments. ETA has been campaigning for independence in seven regions in northern Spain and southwest France since the 1960s. Although ETA previously attacked and killed political figures — with one of the last being Spanish Judge Jose Maria Lidon in 2001 — the Spanish government has taken the offensive in dealing with the group. In June, ETA announced that it would no longer attack Spanish politicians, after Madrid offered negotiations under the condition of disarmament.

Recent attacks by ETA resemble the Athens explosion. On Dec. 6, five small bombs were detonated along roads around Madrid, with no civilian injuries and an advanced warning. Such attacks, like the one in Greece, are meant to illustrate the militant groups’ continued existence without provoking a serious military reaction from the government.

The dampening of regional military outfits is evident with other European groups, although their activity can be classified as more gang- than militant-related. Groups such as the Federazione Anarchica Informale in Italy and the Fronte di Liberazione Nazionale di a Corsica in France have been credited in the past with pursuing government targets, but now engage more in armed robberies, extortion and sporadic acts of violence against policemen. Although they may pose some regional threat, the likelihood that these militant outfits continue to be a serious concern to civilian safety and to the government has shifted, with more focus now being given to threats from foreign-based militant groups.


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The current terrorist threat against European nations comes from outside its own borders, with jihadist group al Qaeda at the forefront. The presence of Islamist groups affiliated with al Qaeda, such as Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade, responsible for attacks in the United Kingdom and threats in Italy, has increased substantially. In 2001, British Prime Minister Tony Blair published a list of foreign organizations banned from the country, the majority of which were Islamist. Up to that point, the United Kingdom had not maintained a designated list of foreign organizations for this purpose.

Events like the Sept. 11 attacks have called the attention of Islamist militant groups worldwide to the radical Islamist cause. Islamist militants claimed responsibility for the Atocha Station bombings in Madrid in 2004, with coordinated explosions that killed 200 people. The Spanish government initially publicly blamed ETA, but a videotaped confession was sent from an al Qaeda spokesman, acknowledging responsibility for the bombings and blaming the Spanish government for aiding U.S. initiatives after Sept. 11.

In July 2005, operatives of Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade carried out a devastating series of attacks against the London transport network, detonating bombs in three underground train lines and a double-decker bus, killing close to 60 people and injuring more than 700 others. Al Qaeda No. 2 Ayman al-Zawahiri issued a videotape to Al Jazeera in August, saying that attacks of this nature would continue if Blair remained supportive of the United States.

The rise in Islamist militant activity has several implications for European nations. Primarily, nations have taken steps to counteract future terrorist activity within their borders. Blair has been pushing stricter anti-terrorism and deportation laws, and calling for both a crackdown on radical Islamist clerics and followers within the country. In Spain, the government arrested seven individuals Dec. 9 for sending money and giving logistical support to the al Qaeda-affiliated Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, an Algerian-based Islamist organization.

However, the Islamist threat to Europe is not confined solely to al Qaeda-linked outfits. Danish authorities charged two members of local Muslim group Al-Aqsa Association with providing funds to Palestinian militant group Hamas. Clearly, the increased level of foreign militant attacks has put European nations on the offensive. The question moving forward is: Will the Europeans pursue the same path of engagement against this new threat that they did against the old?


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N o t e w o r t h y E v e n t s

Nov. 8, WTO: EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson warns against decreasing the scope of a new World Trade Organization agreement after another failed meeting in London of trade ministers from Brazil, India, the United States, the European Union and Japan.

Nov. 8, FRANCE: The French Cabinet authorizes local officials to impose curfews under a state of emergency as social unrest continues for a 12th night. The order comes under government powers granted by a 1955 law that has only been used twice: once in French Algeria during the Algerian war of independence and once during racial riots in New Caledonia (a French territory in the South Pacific) in 1985.

Nov. 9, U.K.: British Prime Minister Tony Blair loses a vote in the House of Commons on plans to allow police to hold terrorist suspects without charge for up to 90 days, his first defeat in the chamber.

Nov. 9, MACEDONIA: The European Commission recommends that the EU accept Macedonia as a candidate for full EU membership.

Nov. 9, FRANCE: A state of emergency goes into effect as rioting enters its 13th day. The laws allow authorities to place civilians under house arrest, ban or limit the movement of people and vehicles, confiscate weapons and close public spaces to assembly. Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy issues orders for the deportation of non-French rioters, including those with current French residency visas.

Nov. 10, IRELAND: Catherine Day of Ireland is named secretary-general of the European Commission (EC), the commission’s top civil service job.

Nov. 14, GERMANY: The Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union and Social Democratic Party vote to approve a “grand” coalition deal.

Nov. 15, GERMANY: The Social Democratic Party (SPD) overwhelmingly elects Matthias Platzeck as party chairman. Platzeck, the first person from the former East Germany to lead the SPD, ran unopposed for the position.

Nov. 16, HUNGARY: Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany refuses to cut expenditures on social welfare and infrastructure, despite calls from the European Commission for Hungary to reduce its budget deficit or face the possible withholding of EU development funds.

Nov. 17, POLAND: Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz says he would


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like to discuss with the public the opportunity to host a U.S. missile base, and believes it is an “important issue for Poland” with an “important ally.”

Nov. 22, BOSNIA: Bosnia’s three major ethnic groups reach an accord that will reform the government’s constitution by creating a single presidency instead of the current three-president arrangement.

Nov. 22, GERMANY: The German Parliament elects Christian Democratic Union leader Angela Merkel as the country’s first female chancellor by a 397-202 vote with 12 abstentions.

Dec. 6, GERMANY: U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice meets with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin to discuss the controversy over alleged secret CIA flights transporting prisoners for interrogation. Merkel says that her foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, must divulge to parliament any information that the previous government had concerning an alleged kidnapping of a German citizen by the CIA, following a report by German newspaper Sueddeutsche Zeitung that, under the previous government, Steinmeier knew about the kidnapping. Dec. 6, ROMANIA: U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signs a deal allowing the United States to use military bases in Romania, marking the first such deal between the United States and a former communist country in Eastern Europe.

U p c o m i n g Dec. 13-18, WTO: The sixth World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference to be held in Hong Kong, China. This is the highest decision-making meeting in the WTO and occurs once every two years. The sixth conference will be vital for moving the four-year-old Doha Development Agenda negotiations forward sufficiently to conclude the round in 2006. Dec. 15-16, EC: European Council to meet in Brussels. This is a periodic meeting of one of the EU’s main lawmaking bodies comprising all of the heads of state in the EU. Dec. 18, POLAND: Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Meller to visit Washington. Dec. 20, U.N.: U.N. General Assembly to end. It is expected that a series of


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reforms will be considered, as well as extensions to expiring programs, such as many U.N. peacekeeping missions around the world. Dec. 23 POLAND: Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski to conclude his term in office; new Polish President Lech Kaczynski to assume office. Dec. 31, U.N.: U.N. Security Council’s non-permanent members Algeria, Benin, Brazil, Philippines and Romania to complete their two-year term. Jan. 1, U.N.: U.N. Security Council’s new non-permanent members Congo, Ghana, Qatar and Slovakia to begin a two-year term. Non-permanent members Argentina, Denmark, Greece, Japan and Tanzania will begin the second half of their two-year term on the council. Jan. 1, EU: Austria to begin a six-month term as president of the European Union Jan. 3, GERMANY/RUSSIA: German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. Jan. 11, GERMANY: German Chancellor Angela Merkel to visit Washington to meet with U.S. President George W. Bush. The visit will be the first to the United States for the newly elected chancellor. Jan. 15, FINLAND: First round of presidential elections to take place between current President Tarja Halonen of the Social Democratic Party, Prime Minister Marri Vanhanen of the Center Party, and European Investment Bank Vice President Sauli Niinistoe of the National Coalition Party. Finland currently has a coalition government made up of the Center Party, the Social Democrats and the Swedish People’s Party. Jan. 16, GERMANY: German Chancellor Angela Merkel to visit Russia to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin — Merkel’s first visit to Moscow since taking office. Germany and Russia are also planning a weeklong bilateral meeting in March in the city of Tomsk. Jan. 16, SWEDEN: Prime Minister Goran Persson to visit Thailand, stopping en route in Sri Lanka, to inquire about the response of the government after the tsunami and thank the government for its hospitality to Swedish citizens vacationing in Thailand during the disaster.


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Jan. 22, PORTUGAL: Presidential elections to be held between former center-right Prime Minister Abibal Cavaco Silva, Socialist lawmaker Manuel Alegre, and founder of the Portuguese Socialist Party and former President and Prime Minister Mario Soares. Soares is returning to politics and seeking a third term as president, which is against Portuguese law. Jan. 25-29, WEF: World Economic Forum to hold its annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland. Jan. 29, FINLAND: Second round of presidential elections to take place if needed.

January TBA, ITALY: Italian Defense Ministry to begin planning its withdrawal of troops from Iraq for the year. Italy wants to withdraw its 3,000 troops by the end of 2006.

C h a n g e s

GermanyEconomic Development Minister Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, a former teacher and leftist within the Social Democratic Party (SPD), began her political career as deputy party leader in 1993. In 1998, she assumed her current position as minister of economic development and has been a key player in negotiating development-aid issues with EU countries. Known as a respected and effective minister, Wieczorek-Zeul will keep her position under the Merkel administration. Environment Minister Sigmar Gabriel, a former teacher and party centrist, has a long history within the SPD. While he lost his position as premier of Lower Saxony in 2003, Gabriel is known as a young up-and-comer in the party. He became a national parliamentarian in September, after 15 years as a parliamentarian in Lower Saxony. Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck started his career in government service as a civil servant in the ministry for construction in 1974. He has held numerous positions in administrative and political offices since then. He has worked as the finance minister for the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, and in 2002 assumed the role of premier there. His loss in the state elections in May triggered the early national election in September. Known as close friend of former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and a conservative within the party, Steinbrueck is a staunch supporter of subsidy cuts.


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Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier is largely unknown in Germany, even though he served as chief-of-staff for Schroeder. A former university lecturer in law and politics, Steinmeier began his career in politics with Schroeder in the early 1990s. He is known as Schroeder’s right-hand man, and Schroeder has even referred to him as one of the three people he most trusts. His nomination to the foreign ministry is problematic; while Steinmeier has a good reputation as an advisor and manager, he has an extremely low international profile, is not an international affairs expert and speaks very little English. Health Minister Ulla Schmidt began her current position in 2001. She is noted for her competency and resoluteness in negotiating with the opposition and the health lobby. Schmidt is also responsible for a health reform that established, among other things, a co-pay for doctor’s visits. Known for her commitment, Schmidt is keeping her position under the new government. Justice Minister Brigitte Zypries, formerly a lawyer, started her political career in Hesse. Shortly after, she moved to Hanover, working for Schroeder. She then became the deputy minister in the Berlin Interior Ministry. In 2002, she became the justice minister and is currently remaining in this position in Chancellor Angela Merkel’s new government. Labor Minister and Vice Chancellor Franz Muentefering, a long-time supporter of Schroeder, has worked extensively in national politics. He has served as the SPD manager and secretary-general. A key player in Schroeder’s successful re-election bid in 2002, Muentefering became the parliamentary leader of the SPD. In 2004, he took Schroeder’s place as the party leader. Known for his grassroots tendencies, Muentefering is a moderate leftist within his party. Transportation Minister Wolfgang Tiefensee, mayor of Leipzig since 1998, has been a reluctant player in national politics. While he has been recognized for the economic successes of Leipzig, he has turned down opportunities in national politics, including a 2002 ministry position for eastern German reconstruction. During his tenure as mayor, Tiefensee was criticized for mismanagement after Leipzig’s failed bid to host the Olympics. Additionally, his new portfolio includes shipping issues within Germany, an area in which Tiefensee has no experience.


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Minister of Education and Research Annette Schavan, of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), has been a member of the Bundestag since October. The vice-chair of the CDU, Schavan formerly was a member of the Land Parliament of Baden-Wuttemberg and the Federal manager of the CDU’s women’s organization Frauen-Union. Head of Federal Chancellery Thomas de Maizière, of the CDU, has held several key government positions in Saxony, including member of the State Assembly in 2004, Minister of the State for Justice from 2002 to 2004, minister of state for Finance in Saxony from 2001 to 2002, and adviser and leader of the State Chancellery in 1999. Federal Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, appointed in November, has had a long party affiliation with the CDU. He served as vice chairman of the CDU-Christian Social Union (CSU) parliamentary group in the Bundestag for foreign policy, security policy and European policy from 2002 to 2005, chairman of that group from 1991 to 2000, and CDU federal chairman from 1998 to 2000. Minister of Economics and Technologies Michael Glos is a high-ranking member of the CSU who stepped in to take the place of party leader Edmund Stoiber, who decided not to join Merkel’s government. Glos was first elected to the Bundestag in 1976 and has led several committees within his party and the Bundestag dealing with finance and economics. The German Chamber of Commerce welcomed his appointment as minister of economics and called him a friend of business while other business groups called him too inexperienced. Minister of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection Horst Seehofer has been a member of the Bundestag since 1980. He joined the CSU in 1971 and worked in several of his party’s committees and working groups on social policy. Seehofer is a trusted political ally of Stoiber, leader of the CSU, with whom Merkel has clashed in the past. Merkel resisted Seehofer’s appointment due to his fierce critique of conservative proposals to reform the healthcare system. Federal Minister for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth Ursula von der Leyen, of the CSU, is a gynecologist with seven children. She attended the London School of Economics and has a master’s degree in public health.


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PolandLaw and Justice Party’s Lech Kaczynski was elected president of Poland, replacing Aleksander Kwasniewski. Defeating Civic Platform’s Donald Tusk, Kaczynski will rule together in a coalition with Tusk’s Civic Platform Party. Kaczynski promised that he would weed out corruption and shore up welfare in the European Union’s biggest new member. Kaczynski is to be sworn in Dec. 23.


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STRATFOR Global Vantage Europe 12 05 - wikileaks.org · The Month in Review Meet the Merkel Government ... Last Tango for Paris? Europe as a whole has been in political limbo for