Strategies for Democratic Change: Assessing the Global Response

8/10/2019 Strategies for Democratic Change: Assessing the Global Response

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Strategies for

DEMOCRATIC CHANGE

Assessing the Global Response

Ted Piccone and Richard Youngs (eds)


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2006 Democracy Coalition Project1120 19th St., N.W., 8th Floor

Washington, D.C. 20036

2006 Fundacin para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dilogo Exterior (FRIDE)Goya 5 y 7 (Pasaje Comercial), Entreplanta superior28001 Madrid

Copyright All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be

reproduced without the joint permission of the Democracy Coalition Project and theFundacin para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dilogo Exterior.

To order this book contact:

Democracy Coalition ProjectPh. (+1) 202-721-5630 / Fax. (+1) [email protected]

Fundacin para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dilogo Exterior (FRIDE)

Ph. (+34) 91-524-1081 / Fax (+34) 91-522-7301 / [email protected]

All DCP and FRIDE publications are available at:www.demcoalition.orgwww.fride.org

Cover Design: Teresa Iniesta Orozco / Accedalia N.Y.

Strategies for Democratic Change: Assessing the Global ResponseTed Piccone and Richard Youngs, Editors

Year 2006

ISBN 0-9727299-9-2

Published in Washington, D.C., United States of America


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Contents

Preface: The Global Context for FosteringOpen Democratic Societies ..............................................................5

Overview: The Diverse Challenges of

International Democracy Promotion ...............................................8

Chapter 1: Burma..........................................................................21

Chapter 2: Togo.............................................................................49

Chapter 3: Turkey .........................................................................77

Chapter 4: Ukraine .......................................................................97

Chapter 5: Venezuela...................................................................123

Chapter 6: Yemen ........................................................................151

Chapter 7: Zimbabwe..................................................................177

Appendix: List of Contributors ...................................................203


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The editors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the OpenSociety Institute and Fundacion Grupo D in making this project possible.


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As the 20th century came to a close, many of us who have seen the horrorsof war and dictatorship up close were for good reason cheered by the steadyspread of open democratic societies taking hold throughout the world.Unfortunately, just six years later, there is much reason to see the glass ashalf empty rather than half full. This book, analyzing the strains and set-backs in the field of democracy promotion, helps illustrate why.

Internal forces pushing for democratic change are always the essentialdriver of a societys readiness to embark on the rocky path of democracy.

But the external environment can also play a critical role. At the dawn ofthe millennium, international circumstances tilted the playing field infavor of democratization. The end of the Cold War and the pull of glob-alization and new technologies were breaking the logjam of old conflictsand opening new doors to political and economic transformation.

In fact, the main threat to the democratic trend was not military dom-ination or the east-west conflict but rather the accelerated pace of change.The centrifugal force of globalization, and the neoliberal economic modelthat accompanied it, allowed autocrats to enrich themselves and left many

developing economies behind, greatly frustrating the high expectations ofso many citizens that democracy would deliver a better life. Moreover, thedispersal of the balance of power left the United States, already dominantin world affairs, a wide open field for seizing the advantage. It exploitedits superpower position, at great peril to itself and others, by launching aglobal war on terror that put Iraq at the new ground zero for a transfor-mational project to spread freedom around the world.

The widening gap between Washingtons rhetoric for democracy and its

actual record on protecting human rights and the rule of law has greatlyexacerbated the situation. As a result we are facing a much more troublinginternational environment for democracy, one which distorts what shouldbe a pro-democratization dynamic into an anti-American one. Groups

Preface

The Global Context for PromotingOpen Democratic Societies


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ardently working to pursue democratic change are burdened with a newwave of attacks by authoritarian leaders who accuse them of being pawns

of a foreign plot to seize power and oil.It is in this difficult context that the contributors of this volumeapproached the task of assessing how well members of the internationalcommunity concerned with consolidating democracy have fulfilled theircommitments to work together to promote and defend democracy, apledge made at the first meeting of the Community of Democracies in

Warsaw in June 2000. As the seven chapters attest, some constructive stepshave been taken, not only by traditional actors like the European Unionand the United States, but more importantly by some democratic states ofthe African Union and the Organization of American States. On balance,however, democratic states have a long road to travel before they can saythey have a real strategy to back up their rhetorical commitments to sup-port democratic transitions.

This book offers a thoughtful critique of what has been learned fromrecent experience with a variety of situations where opportunities haveopened for democratic change. The authors helpfully present a number ofconcrete recommendations for policy-makers to fix the diplomatic toolbox

so that reform is rewarded and, if necessary, denial of rights is punished.These ideas can work, but the essential task remains to create the political

will to work together, through the Community of Democracies and othermultilateral venues, to tilt the playing field in favor of democratic change.

Jos Mara Figueres Olsen Morton H. HalperinChief Executive Officer Director of U.S. AdvocacyGrupo D Open Society Institute

PREFACE


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What has the international community done recently to advance demo-cratic transition and consolidation in specific countries around the world?And how could it do better? These are the essential questions addressed bythis review of how the community of democratic nations has pursued thethorny challenges of promoting democratic change in seven countries Burma, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

A key reference point for this volume of case studies in democracypromotion is the Warsaw Declaration adopted in June 2000 by theCommunity of Democracies, a new global forum of more than 120 gov-ernments. The Warsaw Declaration commits participating governmentsto uphold a core set of democratic principles and to work together topromote and strengthen democracy.2 Since then, the internationaldebate over democracy promotion has intensified dramatically. TheUnited States under President Bush has promulgated a muscular strategyto spread freedom while member states of the European Union and arange of other donors and international organizations have resolved withless fanfare to continue to encourage democratic gains made since the

1980s. Indeed, as this book is being finalized, a new United NationsDemocracy Fund and a UN Democracy Caucus have been launched,breaking a long taboo at the world body against the d word. This grow-ing international concern and funding for democracy assistance is leadingto a backlash from certain authoritarian regimes determined to blockexternal resources for domestic groups pressuring for democratic change.Against this background, the collection of seven case studies offered hereprovides an extensive range of material designed to inform a judgment on

1 Theodore J. Piccone, DCP and Richard Youngs, FRIDE.

2 See Final Warsaw Declaration: Toward a Community of Democracies, Warsaw, Poland,June 27, 2000, http://www.demcoalition.org/2005_html/commu_cdm00.html; see also M.H. Halperin and M. Galic, eds., Protecting Democracy: International Responses, Lanham:Lexington Books, 2005.

Overview

The Diverse Challenges of InternationalDemocracy Promotion1


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how far the international community of democratic states is meeting itsown commitments to support democracy.

The book is the product of a joint venture between the DemocracyCoalition Project, based in Washington, and the Fundacin para lasRelaciones Internacionales y el Dilogo Exterior (FRIDE), based inMadrid.3 Over the last five years, each organization has been deeplyinvolved in monitoring the democracy promotion strategies of govern-ments and international bodies around the world.

This volume builds upon the foundation laid by an investigation car-ried out in 2002 by the Democracy Coalition Project entitled DefendingDemocracy: A Global Survey of Foreign Policy Trends, 1992-2002.4 This sur-vey of the foreign policies of 40 democratic governments from around the

world, all of which have pledged to defend and promote democracy,assessed how well these governments had lived up to their commitments ingeneral and in relation to 16 states in particular. The study concluded thatthe trend of state behavior favored the spread of democracy; as new democ-racies became entrenched internally they became more willing to lend sup-port externally to the establishment of constitutional democracies as neigh-bors. The survey documented how the foreign policies of democratic gov-

ernments were increasingly oriented toward widening the democratic cir-cle. This new approach to statecraft was grounded in the democracyadvantage, recognized by a growing body of scholarship,5 finding thatstates which function with transparency and accountability, with adequatechecks and balances on executive power, offer natural advantages. Whilethe impact of transition and of changes in political structures is complex,under the right conditions democracies are less likely to spawn famine, ter-rorism or war.

Along with this trend, both newer and more mature democracies aresigning more rhetorical commitments at the global and regional levels to

work together to defend and promote democracy. There are also some signsthat they actually mean it. Most democratic states are speaking out against

OVERVIEW

3 In addition to the two editors, research was undertaken by analysts at the two institutions:Ana Echage and Susanne Gratius at FRIDE; Jeff Stacey, Muthoni Kamuyu and ElizabethMarquez for DCP. We also benefited from the input of expert reviewers, to whom we wish

to express our gratitude (a full list can be found in the appendix). Angel Alonso Arroba ofDCP provided invaluable assistance as production coordinator.

4 R. G. Herman and T. J. Piccone, Defending Democracy: A Global Survey of Foreign PolicyTrends 1992-2002, Washington: Democracy Coalition Project, 2002.

5 See, e.g., A. Sen, Development as Freedom, New York, Alfred Knopf, 1999; M.H. Halperin,J. Siegle and M. Weinstein, The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Prosperityand Peace, New York: Routledge Press, 2005.


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coups, for example, while democratic donors are linking development andtrade assistance to benchmarks for democratic behavior. On the other

hand, the DCP survey also concluded that democratic states routinely puteconomic and security interests ahead of a desire to promote democracyand human rights when such interests were seen to be in conflict.

This same delicate balance between genuine and purely rhetorical com-mitment has also been uncovered through the detailed monitoring ofEuropean democracy strategies carried out by FRIDE. The first compre-hensive assessment of European democracy promotion policies reveals thatEU member states and the European Commission have increased resourcesavailable for political reform support; have in some cases used democracy-related conditionality; and have revised aspects of their conceptualapproaches to democracy-building. At the same time, it highlights exam-ples of persistent support for autocrats, institutional shortcomings and anacknowledged need to understand better how policies play out in relationto complex political trends in individual target states.6

This shared concern with deepening the study of concrete case studiesof democracy promotion against this rapidly changing backdrop was whatmotivated DCP and FRIDE to join forces to prepare this new volume.

The books overarching aim is to assess six years after the WarsawDeclaration and in the wake of more recent democracy commitmentsfrom individual governments and regional bodies such as the EuropeanUnion, the African Union and the Organization of American States how far the democratic community has fulfilled its own promise to accordthe goal of democratic change greater priority. What strategies of democ-racy promotion have been favored? How different have been theapproaches adopted by the various members of the Community of

Democracies? Are there clear cases of democratic states acting in a mannerinimical to democracy? In which circumstances has the international com-munity found it easiest to influence democratic development, and inwhich has it most struggled to gain traction?

Rather than taking a broad scope, the purpose here is to assess democ-racy promotion strategies in detail in relation to a selected number ofcountries supposedly on the receiving end of international democracypromotion efforts. By digging deeper into these dramatic stories of dem-ocratic development, we seek to draw some conclusions about the inherentchallenges democracy promoters face as they seek to influence events on

THE DIVERSE CHALLENGES

6 R. Youngs (ed), Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies 2000-2006, Madrid:FRIDE, 2006.


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the ground. There are some notable successes, but also a string of failuresthat demonstrate how difficult it can be for external actors to assist reform-

ers working for peaceful political change.As the seven cases illustrate, the policy dilemmas - for all the playersinvolved - are real and complex. Should the international community con-tinue humanitarian aid to Burma even if it means bolstering the autocratsin power? Should the EU continue to open the door for Turkeys accessioneven when European public opinion currently appears so opposed? Shouldthe United States take the lead in confronting Hugo Chvez, or GreatBritain in challenging Robert Mugabe, even though it gives these electedautocrats an excuse to rally their supporters against the hegemons of the

West? Should local civil society groups take aid from governments labeledas enemies of the state? The tradeoffs are messy, and getting messier. Withthe Bush Administrations full-bodied embrace of ending tyranny in ourtime as the centerpiece of its national security strategy, the very notion ofdemocracy promotion has become laden with the baggage of staring downthe superpower.

The volume approaches the topic from a transatlantic perspective inpart as a reflection of the DCP-FRIDE collaboration, but also because the

main actors driving international cooperation for democracy are theUnited States and the members of European Union. However, the chaptersalso look closely at the role of other actors, particularly those newer to thedemocracy promotion arena certain member states of the African Union,the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization of

American States and the United Nations to help us draw a more compre-hensive picture of the state of democracy promotion. While a criticalassessment of governmental behavior was the primary focus of the book, a

key concern was also to consider what role civil society can play in work-ing across borders to stimulate democratic change. The analysis then ledus to make a number of specific recommendations to policymakers onsteps they can take now to address the evident shortcomings of multilater-al responses to date.

The seven case studies were carefully selected to represent differenttypes of regime from different regions. In (arguable) order of democraticoptimism, these case studies are:

Ukraine, as a case of dramatic democratic revolution in 2004, close tothe heart of a unified and free Europe;

Turkey, as a case of less dramatic, protracted and still incompletedemocratization, intricately intertwined with the prospect ofEuropean Union accession;

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Yemen, as a case where some limited democratic gains have slowlystagnated and even been reversed, albeit with a continued formal gov-

ernmental commitment to reform; Venezuela, as a case of gradual democratic reversal, in which a

slide into soft authoritarianism has occurred with apparent electorallegitimation;

Togo, as a case where a new democratic opportunity in 2005 wasinterrupted by a military coup turned back through concerted inter-national pressure;

Zimbabwe, as a case of increasingly despotic strongman rule that

has turned up pressure on a vibrant democratic opposition; Burma, as a case of militarized authoritarian stasis, that has so far

resisted any meaningful opening of political space.

In short, the case studies chosen allow us to investigate the nature andefficacy of external actors democracy promotion policies in relation to arange of circumstances: in countries moving in both democratic and anti-democratic directions; in countries subject to both incremental change anddramatic rupture; and in countries both (geographically, strategically, eco-

nomically, socially) close to and more distant from key Western powers.Each of the seven states selected has been subject to an array of interna-

tional tools and mechanisms designed to support democratic transitionand consolidation, from funding of civic nongovernmental organizationsand election monitoring to more punitive measures like economic sanc-tions and visa bans. It is not our goal to evaluate in any mechanistic sense

whether these international efforts have succeeded or failed in their intend-ed result; to do so would presume that a cause and effect relationship could

be measured as in a scientific laboratory. That is most definitely not thecase when complex national historical processes are at work that wouldrequire years of in-country presence and expertise to understand.Moreover, it should be well-understood that democratic change, to be suc-cessful, must be led and owned by the body politic in each particular soci-ety, and not by external forces: this study of international actors is categor-ically not designed to imply that either the possible or rightful role of suchexternal forces is primary. Indeed we begin each chapter with a descriptionof the domestic actors leading or blocking democratic change and second-arily turn to the role of international actors.

Rather, we hope to evaluate whether those governmental actors thatclaim to care about the democratic evolution of other countries have actu-ally behaved in a way that favors democracy over the status quo. Given the



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policy options before them, have democratic states, alone and together,condemned fraudulent elections or accepted the results, or both? Have

they assisted democratic reformers through financial aid and training, orfocused their aid on other priorities? Have they seriously used the incen-tives of economic and trade packages to encourage democratic reforms orlet governments off the hook?

To assist comparison, the research carried out for this book was struc-tured around a common investigative framework for each case study. A setof questions was drawn up to guide research on each of the seven countries,at the level of both secondary source research and the collecting of primarysource material, in particular through interviews with policy-makers, ana-lysts and civil society representatives. The views expressed by the differentauthors were not necessarily fully shared by the entire research team orindeed the editors; but each case study was crucially made to conform tothe same structure, comprising:

a Backgroundoverview of recent political events in thecountry concerned;

a detailed factual account of the International Response tothese changing events;

a more analytical sectionAssessing the InternationalResponse;

and a final section of Recommendations for future policies.

Country Synopses

Burma: For over 15 years, a variety of efforts has been made to force themilitary junta to accept the results of elections they lost to a party led byNobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. Nonetheless, the regimeappears more isolated and entrenched than ever. More recently, however,a new dynamic is unfolding in which Burmas ASEAN neighbors are col-laborating to demand a transition to democratic rule. In addition, theUnited States, the United Kingdom and other countries are pushing foraction by the United Nations Security Council. To break the stalemate, aconcerted strategy is needed to authorize the UN Secretary General and hisenvoy to serve as a credible intermediary between the opposition and the

junta that would lead to a power-sharing agreement and the eventual

departure of the military from the scene, even if it means offering sometangible incentives. A tighter international sanctions regime, tolerated byChina and coupled with this kind of top-level intervention, would buildon ASEANs new-found voice and help spur the kind of collective actionneeded to find a negotiated transition package.

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Togo: The stalled democratic transition in Togo presents a promisingexample of the influence the international community can have in revers-

ing a military coup while simultaneously offering a lesson in its abjectfailure to change the fundamental balance of power on the ground. Arare window of opportunity to move Togo toward democracy opened in2005 when the long-ruling dictator died suddenly of a heart attack.Taking a page from some bad Cold War script, the military seized powerand declared the rulers son as president. In one of the early tests ofAfrican governments commitment to reject such unconstitutionalmaneuvers, Togos neighbors, supported by Europe and the United States,roundly condemned the power grab and demanded new elections, onlyto watch the ruling elite manipulate these elections to its advantage. It isnot too late, however, for the international community to construct along-term strategy for the democratization of Togo through support forthe establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission, consistentassistance to civil society, repatriation of refugees, and security sector andconstitutional reforms.

Turkey:The carrot of EU membership has undeniably provided a key

external impulse to Turkeys democratization. Recognizing progress madein particular under the (nominally) Islamist-oriented government electedin 2002, the EU agreed to open entry talks with Turkey in October 2005.

At the same time, more nuanced lessons emerge from the Turkish example.Democracy promotion itself rarely seemed the primary goal of EU condi-tionality, while the USs policy consisted mainly of pushing European gov-ernments to admit Turkey largely regardless of whether democracy entrystandards had been met. Concerns remain on the part of some Westerngovernments over how far further democratization might undermine some

of the basic tenets of a pro-Western Kemalist state, and in particular therole of Turkeys army. And, of course, just as Turkey has made such signif-icant democratic progress, doubts have been raised more openly in somequarters in the European Union about whether the country should even beallowed to join the EU club regardless of how much progress it makes toconsolidate democracy. The EU needs to send more positive signals andoffer concrete rewards to Turkey as it moves down the long road towardspossible accession.

Ukraine: Ukraine represents one of the most successful cases of interna-tional democracy promotion, with the US and European states having pro-vided support for the Orange Revolution in 2004 and thereby helping toensure a democratic outcome to initially rigged elections. At the same



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time, international policies were subject to significant limitations bothbefore and after December 2004. External actors intervened decisively only

when a clear tipping point in democracys favor had already been reachedwithin Ukraine. While the EU acted as a factor broadly shaping Ukrainianpro-democracy identities, the concrete incentives offered by the EuropeanUnion prior to the Orange Revolution were not generous, and have notbeen meaningfully upgraded since the action plan negotiated with auto-cratic President Kuchma in 2004. Until very late in the day, states such asFrance and Germany were reluctant to intervene to back democracy forfear of upsetting relations with Russia. The EU role, played in particular bythe Polish and Lithuanian presidents, focused on mediating a negotiatedsolution that ensured the prospect of continued influence for the Russian-backed losers of the 2004 elections. The US role was felt more in activesupport for civil society organizations leading up to the revolutionarymoment. The limitations to international backing express themselves inthe depth of Ukraines post-transition travails, symbolized by the resur-gence of the anti-Orange Revolution camp in March 2006s legislative elec-tions. The international community needs urgently to step up its politicalreform assistance in Ukraine, while the EU should creatively design an

enhanced policy framework short of membership, as long as some memberstates are opposed the notion of Ukraine joining the EU.

Venezuela: Since the election of Colonel Hugo Chvez in 1998,Venezuelas corrupt and dysfunctional democracy has given way to a formof military-dominated semi-authoritarianism. Problematically for theinternational community, Chvez has dismantled democratic checks andbalances but has also gained several relatively genuine electoral mandates inrecent years. The strategy of the US in particular initially focused on the

issue of democratic elections and supported Venezuelas democratic oppo-sition but has grown more openly hostile towards Chvez. A failed coupattempt against Chvez in 2002, tacitly supported by the US, demonstrat-ed the limits to this approach, with Chvez subsequently succeeding inusing the electoral route to consolidate his power. More recently, anincreasingly prominent role has been taken on by the Organization of

American States and the Carter Center, focused rather on mediatingbetween the government and opposition. At the same time, Spanish poli-

cy has shifted dramatically away from confrontation towards engagementwith Chvez. The international community needs to work more assiduous-ly in tempering the polarization between chavistas and anti-chavistas, as aprecursor to reversing the undermining of democratic rights.

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Yemen:Formal democratic reforms implemented in the early and mid-1990s ensured Yemen a reputation as one of the most notably reformist

of Arab states. However, international support for such democraticpotential was limited and undercut by other strategic considerations.Indeed, the international community of democratic states has been rela-tively inactive as Yemens reform commitments have remained at therhetorical level. Intensified international attention has been paid toYemen as a result of post-September 11, 2001 counter-terrorist concerns.This attention has revitalized some European and US political reform ini-tiatives in Yemen, but has also imbued the perspective on democracy pro-motion with a strongly short-term security slant. On the verge of failedstate status, non-democratizing and desperately poor Yemen provides asalutary lesson to the international community of how an apparentlyencouraging case of formal reform commitment can slide into an acutelyworrisome situation. Western states should take advantage of possibleentry points to provide assistance on governance reforms, while ensuringthat security co-operation with the Yemeni government does not under-cut the prospects for democratization.

Zimbabwe:This once promising southern African state is mired in eco-nomic and political ruin thanks to the policies of Robert Mugabe, a formerhero of the independence movement now building a legacy of autocracyand despair for his country. While Europe and the United States havecomplained about Mugabes behavior, they have failed to win overZimbabwes African neighbors, a division which Mugabe has effectivelyexploited. With the opposition under threat and internally divided, thereis little hope at present that the international community, even if it were toget its act together, could move the 81-year old Mugabe out of power. His

reign will come to an end at a time of his choosing. Nonetheless, given thefinancial crisis, much more could be done to put pressure on Mugabe toease restrictions placed on independent media and civil society. In addi-tion, democracy promoters must turn their attention to a post-Mugabe eraby working closely with democracy and human rights advocates in andoutside of Zimbabwe to prepare themselves for a transition scenario.

General Conclusions and Recommendations

While each of the cases is unique and therefore is accompanied with itsown policy prescriptions, a set of general conclusions and recommenda-tions can also be extracted from the volume. A number of reflections andquestions of strategy emerge that could usefully inform debate amongst the



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international community of democratic states and all those concerned withadvancing democracy:

1. International democracy promoters must always follow the lead ofdomestic reformers when shaping strategies for democratic change. Whilethis is a rather obvious observation, it must be stated repeatedly in light ofthe mistakes made by the United States, United Kingdom and their alliesin Iraq. There are plenty of other examples, in this volume and elsewhere,that underscore how vital this prescription remains. The phenomenon ofrapid globalization has sharpened the appeal of nationalism as a force tocounteract the imposition real and perceived of external demands ondomestic actors. Autocrats are effectively using arguments couched in thelanguage of democracy and the mechanics of electoral legitimacy toreassert the doctrine of non-intervention in sovereign affairs. As a result,external actors genuinely committed to helping local democrats exercisetheir fundamental rights must step very carefully when setting a democra-cy assistance policy. At times, a more outspoken approach should betaken to protect local reformers; at other times a quiet strategy of dialogueand mediation may be more effective. In the end, the signals for if andhow to help must come from domestic actors genuinely committed to a

peaceful transition.2. Democracy promoters are under increasing attack from leaders

throughout the former Soviet Union, in parts of Africa and elsewhere. Toensure continued support for reform, a grand coalition led by democraticreformers in transitional states and supported by democracy promoters inmore consolidated countries is needed to develop international norms fordemocracy assistance. The starting point for such a discussion should bethe Warsaw Declaration which sets forth a clear statement in favor of inter-

national cooperation to support democracy. The Community ofDemocracies should host a forum for discussion and elaboration of normsand principles that would improve the international environment for dem-ocratic change.

3. Sanctions and other punitive tools are a mixed bag and should rarelybe employed in isolation. In some cases, as in a more vulnerable countrylike Togo, economic sanctions or the threat of them can influence thedirection of events, but only if economically important states take a coor-dinated approach. In general, however, experience shows that govern-ments will try to protect their own economic interests first and will rarelycoordinate an effective enforcement scheme. Targeted sanctions like visabans and asset freezes that seek to punish the transgressors are increasinglybeing utilized as the next best option; while their effectiveness requires fur-

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ther study, at least they offer an appropriate tool to deny certain privilegesto specific offenders without harming their victims.

4. Coordination of democracy assistance among relevant actors bothwithin and among governments remains highly underdeveloped. This is aconsistent theme in all the chapters and deserves more attention. The pri-mary locus of activity should be in the country of concern, whereembassies can coordinate action in real time, as in the case of Ukraine.

What is lacking is a counterpart mechanism in capitals that would facili-tate greater collaboration. The European Union by its nature is ahead ofother multilateral organizations in this regard. Other regional organiza-tions concerned with democracy promotion need to develop in-houseexpertise and other tools both to respond to and prevent crises or backslid-ing in democratic governance. Where no regional organization is relevant,as in Asia or the Middle East, the Community of Democracies should stepin to provide guidance and support to countries which have chosen thedemocratic path. As for policymaking within governments, much more

work needs to be done to convene regular inter-agency meetings with allrelevant agencies, including defense, finance and law enforcement depart-ments, to ensure a unified approach.

5. The timeliness of international responses can be a critical factor intipping the balance in favor of democratic reformers. Democracy promot-ers should engage, therefore, on two levels: first, with an eye to the long-term work of patiently helping to build the values and infrastructure ofdemocracy, and second on the shorter timeframe needed to react when a

window of opportunity opens for historic change, e.g., the sudden deathof a leader, flawed elections, or the eruption of street protests. In order forthe latter to function effectively, the infrastructure for the former must be

in place, i.e., democratic states need to have a cadre of experienced profes-sionals and technocrats available to seize the opportunities with discretion,speed and skill.

6. In most cases of political stalemate and inertia, the internationalcommunity can play a useful role as a third party guarantor of dialogue andnegotiation among competing factions. Often this is best done quietly,though there may be occasions that demand more overt efforts. The inter-national community, including seasoned experts in conflict prevention andmediation, needs to take more initiative to offer political actors a forum fordemocratic dialogue before fighting erupts.

7. Key importance in many cases lies in moving away from a primaryfocus on direct US and European efforts towards a greater engagement ofregional actors. The case studies offered here demonstrate the potential



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that exists for Latin American states to play a more influential role in rela-tion to Venezuela, ASEAN states in relation to Burma, southern African

states in relation to Zimbabwe and West African states in relation to Togo.Some changes have been forthcoming in such regional actors erstwhilestances of non-intervention, although significant caution remains on theirpart. It is unlikely that without efforts to strengthen such regional action,

Western governments will themselves have significant impact in manychallenging cases of democratic shortfalls. Efforts at this level remain anunder-developed dimension of international democracy promotion andshould receive greater attention within multilateral bodies, such as theCommunity of Democracies.

8. International reactions have often been strong in times of dramaticchange, and useful support has often been provided where political devel-opments have clearly begun to move in a democratic direction. Responseshave been less effective to incremental reversals in democratic rights, or inrelation to the vexed question of carving out credible strategies where(semi-) authoritarian leaders are able to gain (even flawed) electoral legiti-macy as a base for their subsequent dismantling of democratic checks andbalances. The election of Hamas in the Palestinian elections is just one of

many examples that point to the urgent need for greater vigilance of anti-democratic actions of nominally legitimate rulers. The international com-munity of democracies needs to be more alive to such cases to complementthe traditional focus on dramatic points of rupture or media-targetedinstances of egregious human rights abuses.

9. The international communitys response to post-transition chal-lenges remains less than impressive. The cases studied here of Ukraine andTurkey, in particular, suggest that the much-repeated warning that interna-

tional actors should not scale down their efforts once formal transition has or has largely taken place is one that still needs to be fully heeded. Atendency persists to mark down as success stories cases where challengesto democratic quality remain acute, and even sometimes more difficult toaddress in the fractured domestic political landscapes that commonly besetthe aftermath of democratic transition. At such junctures, intensifiedefforts are urgently required at just the moment when some internationalactors begin moving their focus away from democracy support. The factthat so many countries can labor for many years after transition withoutapproaching the consolidation of stable and high quality democracy callsfor this salutary lesson to be incorporated more systematically into interna-tional democracy promotion planning.

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10. Much more could be done to link development assistance to stan-dards of democratic accountability and transparency in the receiving coun-

try. The trend is, finally, moving in the right direction, as evidenced by theincreasing demands from the multilateral development banks for progressagainst corruption and other good governance benchmarks. TheMillennium Challenge Account promulgated by the current US adminis-tration is another positive example of the way in which development aidcan be used as an incentive to mobilize support for improvements in ruleof law, civil society consultation and political reforms. A global approachalong these lines would be the logical next step to engender support for agrand bargain in which development assistance is dramatically increased inexchange for tangible progress on democratic governance.

11. While debates amongst the international community of democrat-ic governments have rightly focused on the macro-level questions of diplo-macy and political dialogue, the case studies here reveal that much remainsto be done in fine-tuning democracy assistance projects at the micro-level.

While these are rarely the subject of high-profile attention, the shortcom-ings of existing on-the-ground support can undermine the efficacy of over-all international democracy promotion efforts. The cases offered here high-

light a number of such weaknesses in democracy assistance aid projects:their limited funding levels; the fact that they often come on stream toolate in the day to impact on finely balanced domestic political dynamics;their overly technical nature in many contexts; and their failure to embracea broad range of actors that include those groups with strongest local legit-imacy. More rigorous debate is warranted on these questions within mul-tilateral bodies.

The case studies that follow offer a range of recommendations related

to each of the seven individual countries. The general observations suggest-ed here represent cross-cutting concerns pertinent to the broad design ofdemocracy promotion strategies. As the international debate for andagainst democracy promotion intensifies, this volume seeks to contributeto and inform the elaboration of policies better able to give substance tothe founding spirit of the Community of Democracies.



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Crippled for years by a military junta that refuses to accept the results of

elections won by Aung San Suu Kyis National League for Democracy(NLD) in 1990, Burma represents one of the worlds most difficult democ-racy promotion challenges. After years of international condemnation,sanctions, and ineffectual special envoys, hardliners remain in control,leaving the international community searching for new options for effect-ing a genuine transition to democracy. Suu Kyi remains an internationalicon of the freedom movement, even as her ability diminishes to wrestBurma free of the juntas increasingly desperate maneuvers to stay in con-trol. This chapter charts the extensive array of measures adopted by the

international community against the Burmese regime since 1990, andargues that a new approach should be adopted by the community of dem-ocratic nations. This should build on the momentum of the 2005 Havel-Tutu Report,2 and tackle the controversial issue of a transitional power-sharing arrangement as a realistic way out of the current stalemate.

Background

After a 1962 military coup, economic and political conditions in Burma

steadily deteriorated until March 16, 1988, when students led protests inthe capital city of Rangoon. These began as a small riot in a tea shop, butsoon metastasized into a full-blown protest against the status quo. Thegovernment responded with force, killing dozens and inadvertently spark-ing sustained protests throughout the spring. The calls for regime changeculminated in a massive uprising on August 8, with the movement finding

1 Principal author, Dr. Jeffrey Stacey, Political Science Department, Tulane University.

2 Threat to the Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma, September 20,2005. Commissioned by Vaclav Havel and Bishop Desmond Tutu; prepared by DLA PiperRudnick Gray Cary LLP (hereafter Threat to the Peace). Jared Genser, the reports coordina-tor, argues that recent UN Security Council activity regarding Burma has opened up a newwindow of opportunity absent for 15 years. J. Genser, Burmas Road to Peace, Far EasternEconomic Review, December 2005, p. 2.

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a leader in Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of former nationalist leaderGeneral Aung San. Suu Kyi became famous after speaking to a rally of

nearly half a million democracy supporters at Shwedagon Pagoda inRangoon on August 26.On September 18, a military junta deposed General Ne Wins Burmese

Socialist Program party and established the State Law and OrderRestoration Council (SLORC). The SLORC declared martial law andused the armed forces to impose control throughout the country, a process

which left 3,000 dead and caused 10,000 to flee into the hills of the bor-der with Thailand. This coup merely replaced one set of military officers

with another.3

The SLORC would bring a number of changes to Burma, includingopening up the resource-rich country to foreign direct investment (FDI)and altering the name of the country to Myanmar.4 However, the new

junta remained as oppressive as its predecessor, and committed a numberof human rights abuses including torture, forced labor, abuse of women,enforced disappearances, and summary execution. Seeking to quell thepossibility of further uprisings, the army placed Suu Kyi under house arreston July 20, 1989.

In response to growing international pressure and believing it wouldwin, in May 1990 the SLORC held national parliamentary elections.Although Suu Kyi herself was unable to participate in the elections, herNational League for Democracy (NLD) party won 392 of the 485 seats upfor election. The SLORC, however, refused to call the parliament into ses-sion and jailed several activists, including many of those elected to parlia-ment. Some elected members of parliament fled the country, establishinga government in exile that continues to work for restoration of democracy

in Burma.Suu Kyi won international acclaim in 1991 when she was awarded the

Nobel Peace Prize, an event that raised her profile as a leading championfor democracy and human rights and helped provide a substantial boost tothe legitimacy not only of her leadership of the Burmese opposition, butalso to the cause for which she has labored incessantly since the mid 1980s.The SLORC has remained intransigent in their view that Suu Kyi and herparty lack legitimacy.

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3 D. Steinberg, Burma: The State of Myanmar, Georgetown University Press: Washington,2002, p. 1.

4 The regimes opening up to FDI was not immediate, as Japan at the time was providing halfof all economic support for the regime.


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In January 1993 the SLORC established a National Convention todraft a new constitution and plan new elections. The 700-member body,

including 120 elected members of parliament and chaired by a fifteen-member military commission, was divided into eight groups based onbackground and occupation. Each group was chaired by a military officer.The body met at intervals during the year and by September had produceda constitution giving power to the military. The constitution was approvedby six of the eight subgroups; members of parliament and the representa-tives of political parties rejected the document. The National Conventioncontinued to meet, serving as a quasi-legislative body, locked under thefirm control of the military government.

In 1995 Suu Kyi was released from house arrest with certain restrictionson her movement and the activities of the NLD. The government made itclear that were she to leave the country she would not be allowed to re-enter. Many NLD members were forced to withdraw from the party andNLD offices were closed. In March 1996 the National Convention wasadjourned following the withdrawal of the NLD in protest of the undemo-cratic proceedings.

Throughout the 1990s the regime focused intently on brokering cease-

fire accords with nearly 30 ethnic groups. Signatories to the ceasefire havebeen allowed to keep their weapons and some of their territorial controland business activities, although renewed ethnic tensions may suggest thatthis alleged achievement of the regime is unraveling.5 The military gov-ernment views this development as an indicator of its ability to be reason-able and statesmanlike, and also something that has fed its self-professedsavior of the nation status.

The junta, now known as the State Peace and Development Council

(SPDC), once again placed Suu Kyi under arrest in September 2000 aftershe traveled outside Rangoon, in violation of government-imposed travelrestrictions. From October 2000 until 2002, Suu Kyi conducted some-thing of a dialogue with the SPDC, which often consisted of little morethan the regime calling her in and lecturing her. In conjunction with pres-sure from the international community, however, this process led to SuuKyis release from house arrest in May, 2002. At the same time the regimereleased several hundred political prisoners and re-opened 90 of the 400

BURMA

5 More recently, the Mon state ethnic group has pulled out from the National Conventiontalks and the regime arrested Hkun Htun Oo and other Shan leaders on February 9, 2005.Fighting flared again in April 2006 between the military and the Karen ethnic group.


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closed NLD offices. Suu Kyi was also granted permission to travel aroundthe country.

The tenuous understanding between Suu Kyi and the SPDC ended inMay 2003 when a group of government-sponsored paramilitaries attackedher caravan of supporters outside the northern village of Depayin. In thebloodiest confrontation in the country since 1988 what has come to beknown as Black Friday scores of Suu Kyis supporters were injured andover one hundred killed (most estimates range between 75 and 150).

While Suu Kyi herself managed to escape the massacre, she was detainedand imprisoned at Insein prison. Many NLD offices were forcibly closedthat day, and over 100 democracy activists were arrested. Universities, col-leges, and schools were also closed to prevent protest. Although theregime released Suu Kyi from prison for medical reasons, she remainsunder house arrest.

In August 2003 General Khin Nyunt, formerly in charge of Burmasintelligence community, became the prime minister, with the official titleof Secretary One. Khin Nyunt was widely seen as a quasi-moderate with-in the regime, a soft hardliner, and in the eyes of the international com-munity, someone with whom better relations could be conducted. In pro-

ducing a new regime plan, Khin Nyunt promised to hold a NationalConvention in 2004 to draft a new constitution as part of a road map forconstitutional and political reform. In May 2004 the NLD decided toboycott the convention due to the SPDCs refusal to release Suu Kyi. Theconvention continued without the NLD but debate was severely restrictedand the ruling junta demanded a continued leadership role for the militaryin any constitution.

In October 2004 Khin Nyunt was removed from office in a power play

by a rival faction led by junta leader General Than Shwe. He was thenreplaced by Lieutenant General Soe Win, part of the younger generationof hardliners, who was involved in the May 2003 attack on Suu Kyi. KhinNyunt had been viewed as a threat, especially once he expanded the pow-ers of military intelligence and shifted control of cross-border trade fromregional military commanders to a group of border security agents that hecontrolled. Than Shwe sided with the regional military commanders andsucceeded in consolidating his power. In order to ensure that there wouldbe no repercussions from Khin Nyunts supporters, the military intelli-gence organization that he commanded was also dismantled.

Despite removing Khin Nyunt from office, the SPDC claims to be con-tinuing to pursue his road map. After suspending the NationalConvention in March 2005, the junta announced plans to reconvene the

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body in October; by spring 2006 this had still not occurred. Additionallythe SPDC continues to organize public rallies for junta-sponsored groups

such as the War Veterans, the Fire Brigade, and the Union Solidarity andDevelopment Association (USDA) - each of which regularly denounces theinternal and external destructionists and praises the juntas policies.

In perhaps its most bizarre and foreboding move yet, in November2005 the SPDC surprised the world and its Southeast Asian neighbors byannouncing the relocation of Burmas capital from Rangoon to Pyinmana,a small, remote underdeveloped town nearly 400 miles to the north.

Apparently, the move was based in part on the astrological inclinations ofthe top generals, while some speculated that it was part of the regimesattempt to inoculate itself from an American invasion as well as to keep alid on future ethnic rebellions. The SPDC ended 2005 by announcing it

was extending the terms of Suu Kyis house arrest for another year.With civil society quiescent if barely extant, ethnic groups almost co-

opted (via the recent ceasefires and their participation in the NationalConvention), and NLD members constantly harassed and imprisoned (ifnot killed or run out of the country), a hollowing out of Burmese societyhas been achieved by the regime.6 The military is effectively the only game

in town. With ongoing violence, increased drug trafficking, the spreadingof disease, and growing numbers of internally displaced persons andrefugees, Burma represents an acute case of authoritarian stasis.

The International Response

The international responses to Burmas ongoing political crisis have variedconsiderably.7 The United States (US), Canada, Japan, the EuropeanUnion (EU), and the United Nations Secretary General have declared

three aims: the release of Suu Kyi, the return of refugees to their homes,and meaningful steps toward democratic rule in Burma. The aims of the

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) are similar, but thisbodys time horizon is longer and preferred pace of change slower. China,India, and Thailand share a desire broadly to maintain the status quo, and

BURMA

6 D. Steinberg, Civil Society and Legitimacy: the Basis for National Reconciliation inBurma/Myanmar, mimeo, October 10, 2004, p. 6.

7 This narrative section detailing the various international responses draws liberally from foursources, in addition to news reports: Myanmar: The Military Regimes View of theWorld International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 28, Brussels, December 7, 2001; Threatto the Peace, op. cit.; Burma Briefing: Issues and Concerns, Volume 1, Altsean Burma,November 2004; and Ready Aim Sanction, Special Report, Altsean Burma, November2003.


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to ensure that if some sort of transition is to take place it be gradual so asnot to invite external intervention or send additional refugees across their

borders. The responses of these various actors can be ranked from the mostintense response to the most meager: from the US to ASEAN to the UNand finally to China, India and Thailand as the weakest.

Reactions to the Coup and Denial of Election VictoryIn the wake of the 1988 coup, the US imposed graduated sanctions onBurma, suspending all economic aid with the exception of humanitarianaid and withdrawing trade preferences. The US also initiated a full-fledgedarms embargo and decertified Burma as a cooperating state in effortsagainst narcotics, thereby denying the country anti-narcotics assistance.Furthermore, the US adopted a policy of opposing multilateral aid andloans, using its influence to block any assistance to Burma from interna-tional institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and

World Bank. Japan also quickly suspended development aid and econom-ic cooperation until Burma attains liberty and democracy. It further-more instituted a comprehensive arms embargo. However, Japan was alsothe first government officially to recognize the regime in February 1989,

coupling this move with a resumption of aid disbursement on a case-by-case basis (although no new aid programs were created).8

The international community reacted negatively to the SLORCs repu-diation of the 1990 elections. The US failed to confirm two nominatedambassadors, in effect downgrading its diplomatic representation from

Ambassador to Charge d Affaires, and Congress passed the US CustomsTrade Act of 1990 requiring the imposition of economic sanctions if spe-cific conditions on human rights and narcotics suppression were not met.

A year later the US denied the renewal of a bilateral textile agreement andin 1993 suspended munitions export licenses under the Arms ExportControl Act. In 1994 the US placed Burma on a list of outlaw states,

which mandated that US funding for any UN agency be automaticallyreduced if the agency were to conduct programs in Burma; despite this theUN in fact continues to fund programs inside Burma.

The EU likewise imposed an arms embargo in 1990, and the year afterinstituted a range of measures, which included: the suspension of defense

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8 Japan was the only country to officially recognize the SPDC, though in part because it was away out of a diplomatic hard place viz. at the Japanese emperors funeral not recognizingthe new regime would have placed the SPDC next to the PLO in the seating arrangements(other countries did not need to re-recognize the regime).


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cooperation, the expulsion of junta military personnel from its memberstates, a visa ban against top regime officials related to important govern-

mental functions and their families, the suspension of high-level bilateralgovernment visits to Burma, and the suspension of all non-humanitarianbilateral and multilateral aid. Japan also (re-)suspended aid in 1991 andfurthermore created a set of guidelines known as Fundamental Principlesof ODA, which tied its foreign policy more broadly to conditions relatingto weapons procurement, military spending, democratic governance, andeconomic and environmental issues. After Suu Kyis release from housearrest in 1995 Japan responded by re-establishing foreign aid on a case-by-case basis. The year before it had provided new humanitarian aid to Burmaas a reward for what Tokyo viewed as the regimes progress in the form ofits meeting personally with Suu Kyi.

When the National Convention was adjourned in 1996 following theNLDs withdrawal to protest the undemocratic nature of the proceedings,the US Congress responded by blocking all assistance to Burma, with theexceptions of relief and anti-narcotics aid, and by suspending entry to itsterritory of any persons who formulate, implement, or benefit from poli-cies that were impeding the transition to democracy in Burma. In 1997

President Clinton signed an executive order banning new investment inBurma; this measure, however, allowed pre-1997 investment to continueand even increase.9Washington also suspended all forms of non-humani-tarian bilateral assistance.

In 1996 the EU agreed on a Common Position on Burma. This for-malized the arms embargo, expulsion of Burmese military personnel fromEU capitals, and suspension of economic aid; widened the visa ban onBurmese officials; imposed a freeze on the funds of those affected by the

visa ban; added an export ban on any equipment that might be used forinternal repression; and suspended high-level governmental visits toBurma. Two years later the visa ban was extended to prohibit entry andtransit visas to senior officials and to extend the ban to include thetourism administration. In addition to its Common Position the EUremoved its General System of Preference trade privileges from Burma,citing forced labor practices, and made a statement that tourist visits toBurma were now seen as inappropriate. Apparently offsetting these puni-tive measures, a year later the EU stated a desire to establish meaningfuldialogue with the SPDC.

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9 Executive Order 13047 Prohibiting New Investment in Burma, May 20, 1997.


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Contrary to these efforts to isolate the regime, ASEAN moved in 1997to invite Burma to join the organization, most likely in an attempt to curb

Chinas influence over its neighbor, but in no small part also to rebuff USmeddling in the region. The decision also reflected more traditional con-siderations. Burma was already a major trading partner with ASEAN,offered a bevy of energy-rich resources, had potential for outsourcing labor,and was gaining an upper hand on secessionist movements and violence.

After inviting Burma to join, ASEAN governments defended the SPDC ininternational forums, thus failing to live up to their professed commitmentto deal with Burma once it is in the family.

The UN first took concerted action in 1998 when the GeneralAssembly empowered the Secretary General to appoint a UN SpecialEnvoy.10 After the SPDC once again placed Suu Kyi under arrest inSeptember 2000, the UN sent a new Special Envoy, Malaysian diplomatTan Sri Razali Ismail, to promote dialogue between the SPDC and theopposition.11 Prior to this the UN member states had staked out a posi-tion vis--vis Burma, having annually adopted resolutions in the General

Assembly and Human Rights Commission for fourteen years that callednot only for the release of Suu Kyi but also for a cessation of SPDC repres-

sion and a tripartite dialogue between the government, the NLD, andethnic group leaders. In 2005 the Human Rights Commission alsoappointed a Special Rapporteur on Burma.12

Over the course of twelve trips to Burma, Razali brokered secret talksbetween the SPDC and Suu Kyi that led to the release of a number ofpolitical prisoners and a modicum of increased freedom for the NLD although it would take two years until Suu Kyi was released. However, theascendance of hardliners in the junta and the Depayin Massacre proved a

major setback for Razali. In March 2004 the SPDC banned him fromentering Burma. This and other inactions led the Secretary General to pro-

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10 UN mediation efforts began with the appointment in 1998 of Special Envoy Alvaro DeSoto. De Sotos mission, however, proved stillborn when a U.S. newspapers disclosure ofhis efforts prompted a considerable backlash from the SLORC. De Sotos plan was totrade aid to Burma through the World Bank for dialog with the NLD, release of politicalprisoners, and access for the Red Cross.

11 The basis was a UN General Assembly resolution that authorized the Secretary General to

appoint a second Special Envoy. UN General Assembly, Situation of Human Rights inMyanmar, A/RES/59/263, December 23, 2004.

12 UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights (61st Session, AgendaItem 9), Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in AnyPart of the World Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, E/CN.4/2005/L, April 29,2005.


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nounce that there were serious doubts as to whether the UN would be ableto play a productive role and facilitate the reconciliation consistently called

for in various UN resolutions. Razali resigned in January 2006.Under continued pressure from the international community, Suu Kyiwas released from house arrest in May 2002. Several international delega-tions visited Burma in the aftermath, including Professor Paulo SergioPinheiro, the UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur onMyanmar, and the International Labor Organization (ILO) High LevelTeam. Pinheiro has achieved little in the way of dialogue (though perhapsminimal success in the area of access for the Red Cross) and his saga inbroad terms mirrors Razalis in its result. Than Shwe refused to meet withPinheiro on a number of his trips, and on a visit during April 2003Pinheiro left promptly after finding listening devices while he was inter-viewing prisoners at Insein prison. The SPDC imposed an active banagainst further visits in November 2003. Pinheiros report concludedhuman rights had deteriorated even further and called for reduced restric-tions on political parties and early prisoner release.

International pressure on Burma continued with the EU extending itsexisting sanctions to target more people linked to the economic and polit-

ical activities of the SPDC. The EU responded to Suu Kyis re-arrest bypublishing the list of 153 persons affected by its visa ban, freezing the assetsheld abroad by those on the list, and banning the export of equipmentfrom the EU that could be used for internal repression or terrorism. Othercountries, such as Thailand, called for greater efforts to support the SPDCif it were to begin to move toward reconciliation with the NLD.

The International Labor Organization (ILO) has adopted a vigorouslycritical stance against the regime. ILO efforts to eliminate the SPDCs

forced labor practices including through various restrictions on businessactivities have achieved a modicum of success. In late 2000 the SPDCmade public a stiffer ban of forced labor in response to threatened sanc-tions from the ILO, specifically a boycott by international trade unions(beyond the official review Burma had been placed under). Two yearslater, the regime permitted an ILO Liaison Officer to begin working inRangoon and steadily thereafter marginal additional progress has beenachieved, notably just ahead of ILO Governing Body meetings. The ILOagain threatened action against Burma when the regime sentenced threepeople to death in early 2004 for seeking contacts with the ILO, succeed-ing in having one sentence commuted to life imprisonment and three-yearsentences imposed for the other two individuals.

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Black FridayThe event that spurred the most negative international response was Black

Friday in May 2003. The harshest reaction came from the US, whichpassed the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act after the SPDC refusedto engage in talks with the opposition and once again imprisoned Suu Kyi.The act placed an import ban on Burmese products, froze all assets of theSPDC and senior SPDC officials, expanded the visa ban on SPDC offi-cials, prohibited any remittances to Burma, and pledged support fordemocracy activists. Later the law was changed to allow educational mate-rials and works of art to be taken into Burma.

The EU called for the immediate release of Suu Kyi, the prosecution ofthose responsible for the attacks, and further reconciliatory dialogue, andurged the UN and ASEAN to continue to exert influence on the situation.Moreover, it moved to extend the scope of the visa ban and asset freeze,strengthen enforcement of the arms embargo, reiterate the suspension ofnon-humanitarian aid, suspend development programs, and withdraw allmilitary personnel of EU member states. Japan, which prior to 2003 hadbeen moderately engaged with the SPDC and had been providing signif-icant amounts of aid, toughened its rhetorical opposition to the holding ofpolitical detainees and placed a moratorium on new bilateral aid (exceptfor humanitarian projects), although existing aid projects were continued.

In the only country-specific statement of its kind, the Community ofDemocracies Convening Group called for Suu Kyis immediate release afterthe Depayin Masacre and appealed to the military authorities to re-estab-lish democracy.13 This followed earlier efforts to give Burma a special placeon the Community of Democracies agenda at the latters Warsaw andSeoul meetings when foreign ministers heard a direct videotaped appeal

from Suu Kyi to use your freedom to defend ours.14

ASEAN, which rarely criticizes its members internal affairs and has nodemocracy mandate, issued a sharp rebuke of Suu Kyis detainment and

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13 Declaration of the Convening Group of the Community of Democracies on the Situationin Burma, June 17, 2003, available at http://www.cdemo.cl/cdemoing/pdf/BURMA.pdf.

14 In her videotaped appeal presented in Warsaw, she said: We would like to urge the peo-ples of the free world to work harder towards bringing true democratic progress every-where. We would like to see action, rather than words. There have been many words sup-porting democracy, and we are duly grateful for them, because we do not underestimatethe power of words. But words need to be backed up by action by action that is unitedand that is focused on essentials. Only by such action will we be able to realize our demo-cratic aspirations. Available athttp://www.ncgub.net/Daw%20Aung%20San%20Suu%20Kyi/Community%20of%20Democracies%20Conference%20-%2026%20June%202000.htm.


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called for the latters release during its annual meeting. Additionally thenine foreign ministers in attendance at the meeting informed their

Burmese counterpart Win Aung that they wanted Suu Kyi released as soonas possible. In the lead up to the October 2003 ASEAN summit, ThaiForeign Minister Surakiart Sathirathai and Indonesian Special Envoy Ali

Alatas visited Burma for talks with the junta to press for the release of SuuKyi. These two parties were concerned that the upcoming summit wouldbe overshadowed by Burmas domestic issues. In June 2004 Malaysian par-liamentarians also formed a committee of members of parliament to pressfor democracy in Burma (Malaysia had been the prime sponsor of Burmasentry into ASEAN). The committee was composed of both governmentand opposition members, including several individuals close to PrimeMinister Abdullah Badawi. Announced less than a week after KhinNyunts visit to Malaysia, the committee urged Burma to hold free and fairelections and release all political prisoners.

Burmas first official participation in an Asia-European summit(ASEM) was scheduled for October 2004. Prior to this meeting some EUleaders, and particularly Tony Blair, threatened to boycott the summit ifBurma sent a representative. EU foreign ministers agreed to Burmas par-

ticipation at a level below head of state/government; they further agreedthat additional sanctions against Burma would be put into effect if theSPDC failed to release Suu Kyi and open the National Convention toNLD participation in advance of the ASEM meeting. When this did nottake place, Blair sent a deputy in protest, and French President JacquesChirac, while in general opposed to further sanctions, did not attend a

welcoming ceremony for the Burmese representative. In late October, theEU Council revised the Common Position to extend the visa ban to all

those in the Burmese military holding the position of brigadier general orhigher and prohibiting EU companies from investing in Burmese state-owned enterprises.

Although not as influential as events under UN and ASEAN auspices,the decision of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malariato cancel an $87 million program in Burma was a notable measure. The

August 2005 decision, made without engaging the regime in discussion ornegotiation, was a direct response to the SPDCs new restrictions on trav-el and the import of medical supplies (direct pressure from the US alsoplayed a prominent role). Although members of the democracy promo-tion NGO community were supportive of this move, diplomats inRangoon and humanitarian NGOs opposed it, arguing that they continueto be able to operate usefully and independently of the government.

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The UN decided to search for replacement funds for fighting the threediseases, and in December the EU decided to quadruple its humanitarian

assistance to Burma (to roughly $10 million). This aid was to target pri-mary health care and malaria control, as well as water and sanitation serv-ices in the central dry zone of Burma. Officially, the EUs humanitarianarm ECHO (European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office) claimedthat the decision was unrelated to the Global Funds contrary decision tocancel funding; however, this claim was widely disbelieved. ECHOopened an office in Rangoon better to assess needs and monitor projects.

Burma was scheduled to assume the rotating chair of ASEAN in 2006.The EU and US promised to boycott the ASEAN summit if Burma didnot make efforts to transition to democracy and release Suu Kyi. Fearinga Western boycott, and concerned about worsening relations with the EUand US, many member nations of ASEAN, including Singapore, Malaysia,Indonesia and the Philippines, expressed discomfort over Burma taking theorganizations chair. Burma bowed to pressure from these nations andrelinquished the chair in July 2005. The alphabetically rotating chair thenpassed to the Philippines, although ASEAN released a statement sayingthat once Burma was ready to take up its turn as ASEAN chair, it would

be allowed to do so.It was unclear how relinquishing the ASEAN chair affected the SPDC.

On one level, SPDC officials argued that the United States and EU hadplayed right into our hands, by giving them the option of deferring the

ASEAN chair instead of releasing Suu Kyi. Additionally, turning down thechair prevented the SPDC from having to confront the foreign press who

would be covering ASEAN meetings. Conversely, there was evidence thatthe regime was looking forward to the high profile role so as to garner

greater regional and international respect; government investment hadalready commenced to prepare for the summit, including a considerableamount of work at the capitals airport.

The final months of 2005 witnessed ASEAN adopting an even morecritical posture. Ahead of the 2005 summit in Kuala Lumpur, MalaysianPrime Minister Abdullah publicly called for an ASEAN delegation to visitBurma, while Philippine President Arroyo made similar suggestions.

ASEANs chairman, Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid, expressed aneed to visit Suu Kyi and see direct evidence of reform in Rangoon, whileMalaysian cabinet minister Nazri Aziz compared the SPDC to the Hitlerand Stalin regimes. In addition, a group of parliamentarians in the

ASEAN Parliamentary Caucus called for ASEAN to expel Burma if its

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human rights situation had not improved after a year, further demandingthe Secretary General to report back regularly to ASEAN members.

Although the December 2005 summit itself did not include Burmaon its formal agenda, the gathered heads of government discussed thecountrys situation for an hour over an informal dinner on the eve of thesummit. What resulted came as a surprise to some: demands that theSPDC begin taking real steps toward democracy, fully implement its roadmap, and release Suu Kyi and all other political prisoners. Various lead-ers spoke candidly to Prime Minister Soe Win of the SPDC. Indeed,Burma acted with surprising alacrity by inviting ASEANs chair,Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid, to visit Rangoon, leaving openthe possibility of a meeting with Suu Kyi. Syed Hamid was quoted byReuters as saying The road map must have not only the road; there mustbe some signs along the way. There must be a timeline that they mustwork on. Three months later, Syed Hamid arrived in Rangoon and metwith junta officials but was denied a visit with Suu Kyi and left a day ear-lier than scheduled.15 He was scheduled to brief ASEAN foreign minis-ters on his findings during their April 2006 summit in Bali. At the EastAsian summit immediately following the ASEAN summit, a Korean for-

eign ministry official said Korea told Burma directly that good relationsdepended on further democratization.16 And Kofi Annan announcedafterward that the UN welcomed the invitation to Rangoon and that hewould personally be in touch with Syed Hamid.

Burmas other neighbors China, India and Thailand have consis-tently operated as enablers of the regime. China is the SPDCs staunchestally, although at times it has encouraged reforms. China supplies theregime with arms, conducts significant trade with Burma, and protects it

in international forums, while maintaining a substantial on-the-grounddiplomatic presence in the country. Thailand also has regional interests inBurma, particularly in quelling unrest and other problems across thesprawling border the two states share. Thailand has supplied the SPDC

with substantial trade and aid, while tightening its border against displacedpersons and refusing to interfere in the regimes internal affairs. India hasrecently embraced the SPDC to protect its regional interests in Burma, not

BURMA

15 Hamid noted that Burmas neighbors can only continue to defend the regime internation-ally if they can report back that there is progress towards reform. BBC News, MalaysianFM Cuts Off Burma Trip, March 24, 2006.

16 Korea has provided some $120 million in aid since President Kim Dae Jung reinitiatedKorean aid to Burma.


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least for border security reasons, naval interests, and a growing sense ofcompetition with Chinese influence in the region. India has supplied sub-

stantial trade and aid to the regime, including arms, and despite being theworlds largest democracy, has not been supportive of the pro-democracymovement in Burma.

Numerous individuals and groups, frustrated by the inefficacy of dis-parate efforts to influence the SPDCs behavior, have been calling on theUN, and particularly the Security Council, to take more concerted action.Support for specific action in the Security Council has come not only fromthe NLD and the Burmese government in exile, but also from various par-liamentarians from around the world and several Nobel laureates.Momentum since 2005 has in particular coalesced around the Havel-Tutureport, Threat to the Peace, which in turn has galvanized even greatersupport at government (US, EU, Australia) and UN levels. The Havel-Tutu report asserts that Burma clearly meets the threat to internationalpeace and security criterion for Security Council action.17

Further suggesting that the tide appears to have begun turning againstBurma at the UN, in December 2005 the US delegation lined up the nec-essary nine votes, and in fact even a tenth, in favor of placing Burma on

the Security Councils agenda. US Ambassador Bolton opted to wait topush for formally placing Burma on the agenda in deference to Chineseand Russian willingness to accept a proposal for the Security Council tohear an informal report on Burma behind closed doors. The briefing tookplace, with the Secretary General present, on December 16, 2005.

By early 2006 all eyes were on ASEAN and the UN. At the UN thereis wide expectation that the US will push for a formal Security Councildebate on Burma by mid-2006. If this were to succeed without sustaining

a veto from one of the permanent members, the ground would be laid fora Security Council resolution; overcoming Chinese and Russian oppositionis the key in this regard. Momentum at the UN positively affected

ASEANs recent movement on Burma, including the March 2006 ASEANdelegation visit to Rangoon. A positive development in either of thesesupranational bodies will likely have a similarly positive effect on the other.

In sum, the international community has undertaken a wide range ofactivities in recent years in response to the political crisis in Burma, partic-ularly in the wake of an intensified internal crackdown in 2003. The UShas taken the lead, with Canada and the EU also active in adopting criti-

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17 See Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.


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cal measures. Japan has been somewhat less active and critical. Most sig-nificant has been ASEANs recent, if cautious, move beyond its traditional

staunchly non-interventionist approach. The willingness of several statesto take the Burma issue to the UN Security Council is also noteworthy.However, much like the special envoys to the SPDC, such efforts still needmuch further development before they have any prospect of putting signif-icant pressure on the Burmese regime.

Assessing the International Response

The international response to the stalled democratization process in Burma

is best described as mixed. The intentions of key members of the interna-tional community of democratic states to press for change have firmed up,but the measures so far adopted have been ineffective in terms of out-comes. Key democracies like the US, Canada, and the EU have taken thevery actions that Suu Kyi and the NLD have called for. Indeed, Suu Kyispecifically made a plea for international sanctions against Burma so as toprovide the NLD something to bargain with in its negotiations with theregime. It would thus appear that by supporting the Burmese oppositions

wishes the international community has bolstered the position of Suu Kyi

and the NLD, and given them a substantial international platform whoselegitimacy was cemented when Suu Kyi won the Nobel Peace Prize in1991. Even though SPDC leaders have continually viewed Suu Kyi withdisdain and bereft of domestic legitimacy, they have refrained from whatcould have been even worse attacks against her, because of both her fatherslegacy and the immense importance the international community hasplaced on her well-being.

In 1988 the international community, with the reactions of Japan,

Canada, and the US at the forefront, began to take action over the crisis inBurma. Over the course of the next fifteen years these states graduallyratcheted up pressure on the regime, never directly in sync but certainly

with a shared sense of the strong need to take a meaningful stand againstthe juntas oppression. The specific intention of these early efforts was toapply enough pressure on the regime, using symbolism and particularlysanctions, to persuade the junta to release Suu Kyi and implement theresults of the 1990 elections. The fact that in the early 2000s the juntas

top leaders engaged in secret talks with Suu Kyi seemed to confirm thatthis approach was having some modest desired effect. While not all impor-tant governments around the world took this stand, and while those thatdid can be faulted for often reacting slowly, from the standpoint of intentthe international community has been fairly successful in living up to its

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commitments to work together to promote and strengthen democracy, asset forth in the Warsaw Declaration.

From the perspective of efficacy, however, the picture of the interna-tional communitys response is dismal. Events inside Burma have nottranspired as intended by those who have sought to come to Burmas aid.If anything the SPDC has tightened repression partly in response to west-ern sanctions. Suu Kyi remains under house arrest; NLD members areharassed, in hiding, or in prison; the legitimacy of the 1990 elections haslost its practical utility; the best hope for a positive role by the SPDC former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt was removed by the hard line juntaleader Than Shwe; and the National Convention has atrophied and is nolonger even scheduled to be convened. In terms of efficacy the quality ofresponse, to date, has been poor.

In evaluating the international response, one must take into accountthe particular mindset of the current regime. The SPDC appears dug intoits position of power as deeply as ever.18 Indeed, one can safely concludethat the SPDC has actively and successfully thwarted external efforts topressure it into negotiating with the opposition, let alone voluntarily giv-ing up power.19 In the eyes of Than Shwe and his contemporaries, Suu Kyi

and the NLD are almost completely lacking in legitimacy. All indicationsare the SPDC intends to keep her bottled up for the foreseeable future.The SPDC generals in fact view themselves as Myanmars wholly legiti-mate leaders, evidenced inter alia by a penchant for snubbing outsiders

whenever they see fit.20 Believing quite literally that the country will dis-integrate without them is perhaps their greatest motivation for holdingonto power. This self-image of the regime is staunch enough that the gen-erals and their families and associates are not even as traditionally corrupt

as one might expect. Further complicating the international response isthat the ruling junta is unique among the worlds remaining undemocrat-ic governments in its collective lack of education. Unlike Cuba,

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18 Sanctions or Engagement, op. cit., p. 7.

19 [S]anctions freeze a situation that does not appear to contain the seeds of its own resolu-tion. The military, despite its many policy failures, has stayed in power since 1962, andthere are no indications that external pressure has changed its will or capacity to do so for

the foreseeable future. On the contrary, sanctions so long as they are not universallyapplied confirm the suspicion of strongly nationalist leaders that the West aims to dom-inate and exploit Myanmar, and strengthen their resolve to resist. Sanctions orEngagement, op. cit., p. ii.

20 Sanctions or Engagement, op. cit., pp. 10-11; Regimes View of the World, op. cit.,pp. 4-8.


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Zimbabwe, and North Korea whose educated leaders have deftly playedtheir weak hands against the international community Than Shwe and

his cadre have merely grade school educations. Being ill informed to thisdegree is precisely what makes the regime not only unfathomable but alsounpredictable. It is thus incumbent on the international community tofind a way to relate to the regime on its level.

While the international democracy community is fairly united andefforts related to bringing Burma before the UN Security Council havebeen extensive, building up significant diplomatic momentum in theprocess, prospects for the success of traditional pressure approaches lookbleak. Even if the regimes critics, for instance, were to gain all they seekin the UN forum - including a strong resolution, unanimity on theSecurity Council, punitive sanctions, and an active diplomatic role for theSecretary General - it is unlikely that this would suffice to kick-start a tran-sition to democracy in Burma. Indeed, it would seem that current effortsby the active members of the international community are on somethingof a road to nowhere.

On this level it would appear that efforts of local reformers, Suu Kyiand the NLD have been somewhat hindered by the international commu-

nitys response. US influence has waned.21 In response to the 2003 tight-ening of sanctions, Than Shwe and his cadre have turned away from the

West and concentrated on promoting ties and friendship with China andothers in the region. In essence Americas punitive measures have back-fired, engendering nearly the diametrically opposite effect of what wasintended. Even among lower-ranked, more pragmatic

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Strategies for Democratic Change: Assessing the Global Response