Strategic Metals and National Defense: Tungsten in World War II (and Beyond)

By Ronald H. Lin1baugh

Tungsten in Peace and War

T ungsten, a heavy, s teel-gray element with th e highes t m elting po in t o f an y metal, was known to scientists 150 years before it became commerc ially ''aluable. ~lost of the world's sup­ply comes from deposits in North ~ \merica and ~-\s ia, particularly Canada, Russia, Kazahks tan, and China. In t·he U.S., the primary deposits­now mostly depleted-are in Nevada, Califor­nia, Colorado, and ~ \rizona.1

The modern era of high-speed industrial tech­nology began with th e Paris Exhibit·ion in 1900, at which machinists firs t dem onstrated the su­periority of tungsten-hardened steel cutting tools over o rdinary carbon-steel products. O ver the next several decades, new technologies and new industrial and domes tic applications continued to stimulate tungsten production and use. \Var and its preparation also played a role in tungs ten's rise. T he enormous mili tary demands fo r heavy equipment, steel tools and weapons, armor plate, ~mel armo r piercing shells in the first half of the twe ntieth cen tury made tungs ten o ne o f th e world's strategic metals, an clemen t with politi­cal as well as economic importance2

Strategic Metals in World War II

For mos t domestic producers of tungsten and o ther strategic minerals, the interim between th e First and Second \\forld \\Iars was one of frus­tratio n and fa ilure . The tungs ten market had boomed during \\forld \\far I, but the industry collapsed in 1919 after the government abruptly

canceled wartime contracts, and the dom estic building boom that fo llowed took years t·o ab­sorb surp lus reserves. • \ government relief bill approved in the early twenties to compensate aggrieved contract ho lders paid only a fractio n of th e claims submitted, and the tariffs of 1922 and 1930, which, am o ng other du ties, add ed nearly eight dollars to foreign tungsten imports, were counterproductive in the general collapse of markets and prices after 1929.3

Tungs ten demand in the Uni ted States re­mained low during the early depressio n years, and for mos t of the thirties isolationist sentimen t stymied efforts to increase the U.S. military bud­get in respo nse to rising fasc ist challenges around the world. G lobal tung"S ten prices beg(l n to climb after 1938, as war talk gt·ew in E urope, but large ore reserves in the United States and th e linger­ing effects o f recessio n on steel plan ts kep t a lid on dom estic demand. Even the outbreak of war in September 1939 did not immediately stimu­late domestic production, in part because o f price instability in th e tungs ten market. \\fith th e ~-\merican econom y still recuperating and isola­tionist resistance still strong, mine owners feared that foreign producers might clump tungsten on the ~-\merican market, furth er eroding prices and hurting domestic producers:'

Everything changed with the fall o f France in June 1940. Even though the Uni ted States would not become an o fficial belligerent fo r an­other eighteen months, mobilizatio n was in full fo rce after the N azis marched into Paris. ~-\s re­armament mushroomed, the Roosevelt .-\dmin­istration devised new strategies to m eet wartime

Strategi~· M.eta!J a11d Natio11ai Deje11Je 39

production needs. E nsuring an adequate and steady supply of

strategic raw materials was the fi rst priori ty o n the wartime productio n agenda. D espite the proximity of i\Iexico and other mineral-rich hemispheric nations, .-\merica faced glaring sho rt­ages o f strategic materials after 19-J.O. D efense industry co nsum p tio n in t·he war years mush­roomed two o r three times over that o f the 1919-..J.O base period. During the critical years 19..J.2-..J...J., 90 percent o f chromium supplies came from abroad, 86 percen t o f manganese, 100 percent o f nickel, and 61 percent of tungsten. _-\t least a third o f all co pper, lead, and zinc- metals abundant in the United States- also came from fo reign suppliers in these years, although the rea­so n fo r that had mo re to do with "a lack o f o rga­nization and n1anpower," as one congressman put it, than a lack of domestic deposits.5

Fear o f shortages in wartime led to increased calls fo r stockpiling stra tegic metals. Bernard Baruch, .-\merica's eco nomic "cz~1r" in \\'o rld War 1, had first raised the idea o f a s trategic stockpile in 1919. T he disarmament mood o f the flapper age, however, ended serious consid­eration until the late 1930s, when Congressman James G . Scrugham, a 1 evada D emocrat and mining inves to r, secured a $3.5 millio n naval ap­propria tion fo r purchasing s trategic minerals to meet current co nstruction needs. T he Scrugham bill was fo llowed, in 1939, by the first signifi­can t national stockpile legislation. Sponsored by Senator E lbert Tho mas o f Utah and Congress­man _-\ndrew Jackson ;\fay of [(entucky, the "Tho mas .-\ c t" autho rized $100 millio n to be spent over a four-year perio d.6

The s tockpiling momentum started slowly, bu t accelerated as na tio nal defense took o n in­creasing urgency. In the summer of 1940, Con­gress revised the s tockpile law o f '1939, result­ing in a much larger ~mel more co mprehensive program. The new law gave H oover's old co r­pora te lending agency, the Reconstruction Fi-

nance Corpo ration, broad authority to purchase and co ntro l stockpil ed ma terials. Pres ident Roosevelt fo llowed w ith an executiYe order es­tablishing two RFC subsidiaries: the ~ fetals Re­serve Company, and the D efense Contracts Com­pan r First used to build stockpiles of rubber and tin, these lending and spending fi rms saw bo th their fund ing and functions rapidly ex­panded .-

Building a stnltegic stockpile during a mili­tary crisis-with defense indus tries competing w ith domes tic manufac turers fo r limited sup ­plies- was nex t to impossible w itho ut both prio ritiza tion and conserva tio n. Tn l94'1, through the ne\v Office of Price ;\fo bili7.a tion, the feds began a systematic effort to conserve strategic ma terials, with consumer p ro duc1·s taking t·he biggest hit. To sa,re tungsten, fo r example, OP~ f

first urged, then ordered the natio n's domestic s teel producers o utside the defense industries to find substitutes fo r tungs ten. ;\[o lybdenum was the gm·ernment's recommended substitute, based o n studies begun by the _ \rmy Ordinance De­part-men t in the ea rl y t·hirties sugges ting that tungs ten's " twin" co uld be used for most appli­catio ns. Tung"Sten rationing began three mon ths before the U.S. entered the war.8

Strategic planning also meant den ying vital materials to enemies, real o r potential. In war­time that s trategy might be pursued llggress ively through blockades and bombing raids, but com­merce and diplomacy played equally importan t roles, bo th before and during the war. Soon af­ter G ermany invaded Poland, the State Depar t­ment imposed a " mo ral embargo" o n molybde­num and o ther domestic metals scheduled fo r delivery to _-\.xis powers. \\'hen some mining of­ficials protested, Cordell Hull sugges ted they mollify their stockho lders with a newsletter ex­plaining that the embargo applied to " those who had bo mbed open cities killing women and chil­dren."9

Outside o f the United Sta tes, Hull's moral

-+0 2006 i\ii11i1~~ HiJto~y .Jo!lrllcrf

suas1on had little impac t. S1n1tegic ores pro­duced elsewhere went to the highest bidder.

During the thirties Germany was the eigh t hun­dred pound guerrilla that dominated the inter­

natio nal tungsten m~trket. I lowe\·er, the com­petition changed after '19-+0, when the govern­

ment-backed ;\(e ta ls Resen "e Com pan y un ­leashed the power of the almigh ty _-\merican

dollar.10

To supply the stockpile program as well as keep Chinese o re o ut o f enem y hands, RFC bought eight thousand tons of Chinese concen­

tra te, and con tinued buying after the Japanese blocbded Jiong Ko ng. Despite enormous trans­

po rtatio n costs, shipments came overland via the

Burma Road un til the Japanese also cut o ff d1a t route. l'or a few despent te mo nths in 19-+2, some . \merican airmen risked thc i1· li\' CS fl ying Chi­

nese tungste n over the Himalayas to freighters waiting in the Indian O cean .11 Keeping s tL·a te­

gic metals from enemy hands was expensive, but na tio nal security jus tified the cost. O verall, dur­

ing the war years RFC bid from ten to twenty times the normal market price fo r the most criti­

cal metals.12

\'l'ithin the mining industry, pro minent

spokesmen welcomed the governmet1t''s empha­sis o n building strategic reserves, bu t no t at the

expense of do mes tic producers. The early talk o f scarcity alarmed n1i l it~try planners, however,

and preliminary studies of domestic miner~tl sup­plies were not encouraging. 0(any _-\merican o res

seemed too marginal to provide a steady and re­liable source o f strategic minerals, but do mestic n1ining men though t differently. .-\t the annual meeting o f the :\meric(ln ;\{ining Congress in

September 19-+0, they sought to reassure _-\meri­cans there would be no shortages o f lead, mer­

cury, copper, tungsten, and o ther metals in case of war.13

1\'ot o n the agenda o f the .-\;\(C meeting, but

clearly o n the minds o f mining representatives, were the acl,'erse consequences of fo reign o re

purchases 0 11 domestic productio n <1 11d profits.

These were o ld econo mic fears, re flec ted in bo th testimo ny <1nd legisla tive language elating back

to the tariff debates o f the la te twenties, but old wine cou ld be p,.ckaged in new bo ttles. Corpo­

rate \'iabili ty was no longer the primary ra tio ­nale fo r pro tecting the natio n's mining industry fro m "low cost and low priced foreign co mpeti­

tio n." The new justificatio n was na tional secu­

rity. In the words of tl1e pre,.mble to the 1939 T homas bill- language provided by the mining

lo bby- the natio n in wartime faced a "d~mger­

ous and cos tly dependence" on fo reign supplies unless .-\meric7t 's mines were healthy and pro­cluc tive .11

N,. tio nal security gave new meaning to the mining industry's call for military and industry procuren1en t agen ts to "buy .-\merican." The

phrase came from depressio n-era eco nomic­stimulus legisla tio n requiring goYernment agen­cies to purchase do mestic co mmodities, but· two

glaring loopholes made the law virtuall y unen­forceable. _ \.ny departmen t head could demur if

he decided that the purchase was too expensive o r "inconsis tent with the public interes t."

Therefo re, despite the concerns o f do mes tic mining men, unti l _-\merica entered the war and

natio nal securit·y became the o verriding issue, procurement o fficers could safely ignore " buy _-\merican" s tipulatio ns.15

The failure o f "buy .-\merican" laws to pro ­

tect the domestic mining industry made the tar­iff the las t bulwark against fo reign competitio n .

D omes tic producers had many allies in Wash­ingto n, but the '1932 election altered the po liti­

cal landscape. D emocrats had carried the ball fo r free trade ever since Grover Cle,,eland's firs t

term in o ffice; now they were in power again after a lo ng hiatus and clamo ring for tariff re­

form. Retaliatory rate hikes by trading partners in the wake o f high Smoot-H awley duties made reform ,.]] the mo re imper,. tive.16

E ncouraged by Secre tary o f State Cordell

Strategit· i\lletals and National Difenie 4 1

Hull, the lead ing free trader in the Roosevelt

"-\dministration, the Democratic majority pushed a reciprocal trade bill thm ugh Congress in 1934. It revolutionized tariff policy by authorizing the president to negotiate reciprocal rate changes up

to 50 percent either way from then-existing lev­els. ~ [oreover, it paved t·he way fo r what was

later called the "fast track," by giving the presi­dent power to implement rates without additional legislation. Soon trade harriers began to ease

under Hull's vigorous leadership. Up to 1938, some eighteen treaties had been negotiated .17

Rearmament and the emphasis on natio nal

security complicated tmiff red uction efforts.

Metal sho rtages and rising prices after '19-J.O in ­

creased the demand for iimports, !Jut free traders made little headway during the crit·ical war yea rs. \\lhile State Department officials opposed any "special in t·erest" legisla1tion that· tended to un ­

dermine the expansion of trade, the tungsten

duty remained intact: un til the shooting stopped. Indeed, as foreign trade routes reopened later in the war, at least one congressman called for in­

creasing the tariff to protect horne industry fro m cheaper minerals pouring into the coun try. 18

Despite the tariff protection, domestic mine owners clamored for more government aid to

stimulate the nation's stntegic minerals indus­try. In the summer of 1941, they found a new champio n in Secretary of the Interior J-brold

Ickes, one of several progressive Repu blicans in Roosevelt's cabinet. In testimony before a con­

gressional committee, he spoke in favor of an accelerated program to discover, develop, and process new domestic deposits. Even low-grade

ores, he argued, should be investigated, even if no t mined until they wet·e needed. 19

Congress and the Roosevelt .--\dmin istration

soon responded with ftworal>le legislation and new executive orders, us.ing the Reconstruction Finance Corporation as the governmen t's prin­cipal fiduciary link with corporate .·\merica. \\'ith

expanded powers and ~111 enormous l>uclget, RFC

soon begtln pumping money into domestic stra­

tegic production, first by purchasing domestic minerals at a premium over fo reign supplies of similar ores, next by raising the ceiling prices the government paid fo r tungsten and other strate­

gic metals, then by subsid izing major mines to expand production and development, and later

hy using low-cost loans to help even marginal producers open and develop lmv-gt·ade depos­its. To encourage smaller producers, the govern­

ment also lowered the t<l.'.: on excess profits and eased red tape by simplifying reporting proce­dures.20

Federal subsidies to the domestic mining in­

dustry did not end with financial support. ~ lin ­

ers h~1d always welcomed government help in

locating o re bodies and figuring out the best min­ing and milling methods-provided, of course, t·hat· government did not become a competitive

threat to private industry. The 1939 T ho mas bill reflected this traditio n in a clause providing

special funds for federal research and develop­

ment of strategic deposits. Bolstered by periodic funding supplements,

field crews from the Bureau of Mines and the Geological Survey investigated nearly every min­

eral district, mountain range, surface deposit, and likely outcrop in the United States. T hey built pilot plants, conducted beneficiation studies, dis­

covered new milling processes, aided and ad­vised thousands of private operators, and wrote hundreds of reports. Focusing initially on seven

cri tical metals-an timony, chromium, manga­nese, mercury, nickel, tin, and tungsten- the bureau enlarged its mandate over the years to

include twen ty-six additional metals and miner­als-an indication of shifting defense needs and

technologies as the war continued . i\ [any new

deposits proved vital to the war industries, and private industry was quick to exploit them 2 1

Even these federa l benefits, however, were not enough to sustain a vigoro us domest·ic min­

ing industry, at least in the eyes o f mining men

42 2006 i\lfi11i11g f-IiJiory .Jo11r11ctl

who faced wartime shortages and an unpredict­able future. They placed much of the blame on New Deal labor laws, especially the imposition of collective bargaining and the minimum wage.22

Roosevelt's re-election in 1940 disappointed most industrial leaders, and the imposition of wage and price controls as the economy heated up was a mixed bag. i\fine owners, for example, welcomed efforts to hold wages in line, but con1-plained loudly about price ceilings for commodi­ties d1at d1ey produced. From their perspective, commodity prices still reflected depression con­ditions, while production costs soared in the red­hot wartime economy.23

As Roosevelt's po in t man in the Office of Price ~-\dministration, Leon Henderson tried to keep a tight lid o n inflation pressures after 19-H. But there were exceptions, especially in the dif­ficu lt months of 19-l-2, with "\ merica on the de­fensive and mobilization just beginning to reach its stride. Skyrocketing demand for base met­als, coupled with a steady drain of mine and smelter workers, complicated OPA's effort to cap domestic prices for copper, lead, and zinc while holding down wages at d1e same time. In the Rocky i\foun tain \\fes t, base-metal mines lost men underground to higher-paying and less-dif­ficult defense jobs on d1e \'\lest Coast, despite government decrees closing all "non-essential" precious metal operations, pressuring former gold miners to take base-metal jobs, placing a "freeze" on workers already in strategic industries, and expanding the strategic workweek to -l-8 hours.24

The draft also took its toll on mining employ­ees. f'rom its inception in 19-l-0, the Selective Service system had the difficu lt task of decid­ing how to apportion the nation's limited workforce to meet the accelerating needs of both the military and industry. The first peacetime draft in ~-\merican history authoril:ed deferrals for men needed in agriculture and industry, but up to 19-l-2 miners, especially single males under thirty-five, were fair game for local draft boards.25

Easing the shortages of meta ls and mineworkers took nearly a year of pragmatic tink­ering. In January 19-l-2 d1e i\fetals Reserve Com­pany announced it would pay up to 58 percent above 19-l-1 prices for copper, lead, and zinc . When production still lagged, the War ;\ fan power Commission, under Paul i\IcNutt in the Depart­ment of Labor, recommended an increase in the pay of copper, lead, and zinc miners by one dol­lar a clay, and a raise in wages for _-\S_-\RCO smelter workers by a smaller amount. Some cop­per mines began recruiting women for surface work in repair shops and concen trators, adding a sign ificant new dimension to "Rosie the Riv­eter," but the low numbers involved did not ma­terially ease the labor shortage.26 Skilled under­g round workers remained in short supply, and it took too long to recruit and train able-bodied civil ians.

Copper productio n continued to slide until October 1942, when the army stepped in . Un­der pressure from industry, agriculture, d1e Se­lective Service, an d critic s of the War Department's concept of total mobilization, it agreed to furlough four thousand enlisted or drafted miners for temporary duty. ;\lost went to underground copper mines, but tungsten, lead, zinc, and mo lybdenum o pera6ons got furloughed men as well _27

By en1phasizing labor efficiency; by mobiliz­ing women, students, the elderly, prisoners of war, and other "labor reserves;" by shifting work­ers from low- to high-priority positions; and by working wid1 d1e Mexican government to devise a "temporary" alien work program that actually lasted n•ore than twenty years, administration officials eased the labor crises in the mines, fields and facto ries. By the sp ring of 19-l-3, Charles \\/ilson, vice-chairman of the \\far Production Board, assured a congressional subcommittee that labor shortages could no longer be used as an excuse for scarcity of strategic metals. "1\fin­ers required in producing these metals," he said,

Strategi~· MetalJ tllld NatioNal Difeme 43

"will be made available fron1 some source."28

Iron ically, just ~t s domestic production gained momentum it began to wind down. Soon after _-\merican military operations shifted from de­fensive to offensive, \\fashington policy-makers

shi fted gears. Remembering the post-war eco­nomic consequences of the First World War, they warned of surpluses instead of shor tages in stra­tegic materials. By mid--1943 the same agencies that had stimulated domestic production began canceling con tracts, eliminating subsidies, low­

ering priorities, and forcing marginal producers to face real market conditio ns. \\fith two years of in tense warfare still to come, _ \merica n mili­

tary and industrial planners were already antici­pating the problems of postwar economic recon­version.29

Conclusion

For nearly two decades federal mineral poli­cies hinged on two ideas the domestic mining industry had b een advocating since th e early

1920s : that domestic mines have strategic as well as economic importanc,e; and that the nation's

strategic mineral producers must be protected from cheap foreign competitio n. The tungsten duty was lowered in 1948 at the Geneva trade talks as a concession to C hina, but was soon re­imposed after China fell to the Communists.30

D o mestic m ineral producers continued to usc

national security as a justification for federal eco­nomic interventio n on rtheir behalf. From the fall of Paris through the Korean War, assump­tions about stockpil ing strategic materials and

protecting the na tion's mineral industry were important components of military planning. By reiterating national defense needs, by intensify­ing th e exploration and development of domes­tic ores, and by continuing to pay premium prices for dom estic copper, lead, zinc, tungsten, and other strategic m etals, federal programs offset the lower prices of foreign metals and helped

subsidize do mestic producers:'1

That domestic mining became so dependent on federa l support was ~tn ironic outcome for mining executives, traditionally hostile to the political and social implications of big govern­men t. But the disrup tive decades of war and depression had forced it to forsake ideology in favor of the practical needs of an industry in trouble.

Epilog ue

The formative years of the stockpile program ended in the late 1950s, but· issues invo lving "strategic and critical m aterials" still trouble us today. During the cold war, political and eco­nomic issues frequently got in the way of ratio­nal strategic planning. Disputes over the nature,

cost, extent, and even justification fo r stockpil­ing plagued every administration from Truman's

to that of the first Geo rge Bush . _-\ journalist in the 1970s called stockp il ing the "mother lode for mining industry representatives and lobby­is ts." 32

D irect government subsidies and price sup­ports for domestic mineral producers ended af­ter 1958, but indirect aid co ntinues through Buy .American laws and othe1r federal and state legis­lation. Defense contractors and the Pentagon must now warrant that a t least SO percent of the

materials and labor that go into products made

for national defense-illtcluding food, clothing, metals, and tools-are produced within our bor­ders. Offsetting the impact of such restrictio ns, however, arc exceptions built into the legisla­tion due to domestic scarcity or for strategic, dip­lomatic, economic, or other reasons. _-\s a re­sult, "Buy .-\merican" is m ore of a ho llow slo­gan than a practical guidleline.33

Though amended many times since its New Deal origins, "strategic and critical materials" leg­islatio n is still a key component of the U.S. Code. • \ s of 2002, fifty-eight varieties of minerals were

2006 Mi11i11g J l iJ"tory .Jo11ma/

still being added to the natio nal stockpile, in­cluding three types of tungs ten. Over the years, the list of stockpiled materials changed as stra­tegic concepts changed, but the rationale for those code provisions reminds us that strategic stockpiles are still necessary to protect ~-\merica from a "dangerous and costly dependence" on foreign sources in times of emergency.3·'

\\'hat long-range impact the "global war on terro rism" will have o n the na tio n's s tra tegic thinking is anyone's guess, but it seems safe to suggest that few politicians will advocate elimi­nating or seriously reducing our in ventory of "strategic and critical materials" an)rtime soon. That may be little comfort to the domestic min­ing industry, howe\·er. Despite legislation to "Buy

. \merican," most of our strategic metals now come from abroad, and that situation is not likely to change in the foreseeable future . ~

D1: Ro11a/d H. Umba11gb iJ ProjeJJor of T-liJtory

(emeJitiiJ) at U11it-e1Ji(J• of tbe Pcu!fl~; a11d a jreq11e11t ~·o11t1ibutor to the ;\lining History Journal. Hispre­

l'iouJ· a~tideJ· iJJd11de a st11rfy of Net'Clda mi11i11g ellgi­

mer 1171/licwl I Loli11g, a11 CHC!J OJJ Hcrbc1t Hoot-er~·

formatit-e yecuY as a mi11i11g e11g,illeeJ; and all cutide a/Jo11t

.fobJJ l\tf11ir a11d tbe mi11i11g iJJdt!J'try. He baJ' mud 011

tbe 1'.1illillg Histo~y AHodatio11s C..\.'et'/ttiu coiiJJd/, a11d

iJprm11tfy a IJ/em/Jerof tbe Mining History Journal's edit01ia/ board. '1 'bis paper 1/'tiJ' jiJ"J't prcmJted at tbc

CIJSOdatiOII ~· CIIIIIIICI/ 1J1eeti11g ill .f1111C 200../..

Notes:

1 Charles II. Segerstrom, "Operations in l\(iJford District," J\1iningtmdConlmt1ing Re1iei/I(Salt I .ake City) -1-1 (31 i\ lay 19-12): 22-7, Segerstrom Collection, Holt-.-\therton Library, Uni\·ersity of the Pacific. Cornelis Klein :mel Cornelius S. Hurlbut, Jr. , Mt11mal of Mi11emlogy (qjier }tlllles D. Da/1{1, 21" Rditio11 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1977),430- 1. L. P. Larson,ct al. , " .-\vailabilityof Tungsten at Various Prices from Resources in the United States," U.S. Bmeau o f t\lines Jnjomltllioll Cimtlar8500 (\\ 1ashington D.C.: U.S.G.P.O, 1971), 3-7 . • \ nthony P. D. \Verner,et al., "lntemational StrMegic i\fineral Issues, Summary Repo rt-Tungsten," U.S. Geological Survey Cimtlar 930-0 (\Vashington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., '1998), 12-3, at http:/ /pubs.usgs.gov.

Colin G Fink, " Review of the Strategic l\[etals," 1HetaLr tmd Allf!p 12 (Oct. 19-10): -11 9-20. Frank L.I-Iess, " Rare i\ (etals fmd i\linemls," Mi11ing a11d Metallml.Y '19 (hm. '1 938): 5-9. Nathan Robertson, "Nazi Deal Kept Tungsten Rare," unidentified clipping, c. 15 .-\pr. 19-12, Segerstrom Collection.

3 U.S. House Committee on Rules, 69'h Congress, 2r.d Session, lf.Var Mi11emls Reliif Q1earings on proposed amendment S.36-11), 21 Feu. 1927 (\Vashington D.C.: U.S.G.P.O ., 1927), 2-12. U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Histo1imt Statistit'S of tbe U11ited States, Colo11iaL Times to 1970, Bicentennial edition (\\ 'ashington D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 1975), 200 (online at http: / I www2.census.gov.). U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Wholesale Commodity Price Index, as quoted in 1\'e/11 } 'ork Times, 1929-33.

J David t.I. Kem1edy, Freedo111 From Fear: TbeAme1iam People i11 DepressioN a11d lf.Vm; 1929-19-15 (New York: Oxford University Press, '1999), 158-9. New )-o,k Times, 1l l'ov. 1938. Charles H. Segerstrom to Gco. l. Emery, lO Oct. 1939, Segerstrom Collection.

5 Alan ,\[. Bateman, "Foreign and Domestic Production, Critical i\linerals, 19-l2--l-l" (chart presented at a hearing before the Subcommittee on Surplus Property of the Senate Committee on t\li litary Affairs, 30 Oct. '19-15), reprinted in Stmtegit' and Ditiml Minem/s a11d Metals: T-lemi11g.r before tbe SllbtYJI!IIIIillee 011 Mi11es & Mi11i11g of tbe Commillee 011 PnMi· LondJ, House of Representatives, 80'h Congress, 2"d Session, .. . Committee Hearing No. 38 (\\lashington D.C.: U.S.G.P.O ., 19-18), 'l'l35-6 Q1ereafter J letlliiiJ,J). Statement of John .-\. Church before the Subcommittee on i\ lines and ~lining,

House Committee on Public Lands, 7 .-\pr. 1947, J-Iemi11gs, 1300- l.

6 ( hades H. Segerstrom to Edw. R. I-Iagenah, 23 _·\ug. 1938; Segerstrom to.J.J. 1-Iaesler, 23 :\ug. 1938; Haesler to Segerstrom, teletype, 20 Oct. 1939; Segerstrom to George I. F.mery, 26 Oct. 1939; Segerstrom Collection. "Bids on Strategic l\ linerals O pened by Treasury; Offerings of O res of !\[anganese, Chromium, :mel Tungsten for Emergencr Stockpile," E11ginem'ng rmd Mini11g }o11mal 1-10 (Nov. 1939): 29-30. IVa/1 Street ]o11mal, 28 Oct. 1939, 26 Sep. 19-10. Charles H. Segerstrom, "\Var's Effect on Tungsten," 11li11ing Co11gn!JS }o11mal 27 (Feb. 1941): 38--10. 'l D. Conover Holds Stockpiling as \'ita! to Nation:1l Securitr,"

S tnttegic i\tfetct!r and National Difeme .fS

Amelitmu\Ieta! Market (}:-Jew York), 18 .-\pr. 19-1-1, 1, 7. ".-\ Report to the Congress on Strategic i\ laterials" (submitted 2 Jan. 19-15 to the President and Congress by the .-\nny and N;wy i\ !unitions BoMd, pursuant to sec. 22 (d) of Surplus Property .-\ct of 19-1-1), reprinted in 1-lemi11gs, 987-8. The T homas bill (Public No. 117, 76th Congress, 1st Session, Senate 572) is reprinted in the appendix to this clocumentar~· collection, 88 1-2.

7 Hnni11gs, 98-1-'i. lll'a!/.'ltll'P.f]nllmal, 19 and ?.5 Sep, and 3 Nm-. 19-1 1, 31 ~da r. 19-13.

s S. B. Ritchie, "i\fol~·bdenum in High-Speed Steel: The E limination of Tungsten, a Strategic Material," AmQ' Ordilltlllt'l! XI (luly-. .-\ug. 1930): 12-9. Wai!Stmt }olfma!, 25 1\lar., 13 June, 2 Sep., lmd 6 Dec. 19-fl.

9 i\!arx Hirsh (president, 1\ lolybdenum Corp. o f . \me rica) to Charles H Segerstrom, 26 Dec. 1939, Segerstrom Collection.

lu .J. W. Furness, "The i\larketing of Tungsten O res and Concentnltes," U.S. Bureau of Foreign Rnd Domestic Commerce Trade T'!f'ommtioll B11llettil No. 6-13 (\\lashing­ton, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 1929), ii . .J. .J. Haesler to Geo. I E mery, 9 i\lar. 1937; .J. J. Haesler to Charles H. Segerstrom, '!July 1937 lltlcl19 Feb. 1938; Segerstrom to Geo I E mery, 10 Oct. 1939; all in Segerstrom Collectjon. lfYaft Jrm1 }olfmtll, 11lmd 1-11\fay 19-10, 13 Feb. 19-11. j\ifimm!T!Idlfsll)' -19 ( 19-10): 605-20.

11 Charles I I. Segerstrom, Sr. , "\\far's Effect on Tungsten" (l!ddress before the .-\merietu\ !\lining Congress, 19 Sep. 1940), MiHiHg ()mgreJ'S }o11mal 27 (Feb. 19-11): 38-40. Fink, " Review of 1·he Strategic f-ler:ds," -11 9-20. fiYall Street]omual, 26 Sep. and 22 Oct. 1940, 17 Dec. 1942. "The Tungsten Situation," Metat7i'(l(/c, 11 Feb 19-11 , clipping, Segerstrom Collection. "Conover Holds Stockpiling," 'I, 7.

12 "Tungsten !\ liners E njored Big Boom and Did Fine J ob," j\1imi~g Heron/ (Denver) 55 (18 i\ lar 19-1-1): 1-2. Statement of Dr. .-\Jan i\L Bateman, Consultant on l'oreign i\fetrus lUld Minerals, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, before Subcommittee on Surplus Prop­erty of SenHte Committee on 1\ ulitar~· _ \ffairs, 30 Oct. '1945, f-feaJiHg.t·, 11%-7.

u E. R. Hagenah to Charles H. Segerstrom, Wash., D.C. 11 i\[ar. p939], Segerstrom Collection. Ne111 York T1il!es, 29 Sep. 1939. Hess, " Rare i\letrus and i\uHerals," 9. lfYa!! Street .Jo11mal, 20 Sep. '19-10. Segerstrom, " \Var's Effect on T uHgsten," 38--10.

1" The "low cost and low priced" phrase comes from the mining lobby's 1933 ~·pescript document, "Tungsten lU1d Tungsten Products Industries 'Code o f Fair Competition'," Segerstrom Collection.

15 "The Buy .\Jllerican .\ ct o f 'l933, .\ct of 31\lar 1933" (-17 Stat. 1520); and Public :\lo. 117 (the Thomas bi ll), 6'h Congress, 1 '' Session, Senate 572 (1939); both reprinted

in He(Jiil{gS, 98'1-2, 1235-6. Charles H. Segerstrom to Geo. I. E mery, 25 Feb. 1938, Segerstrom Collection.

16 Charles .-\ . and i\ larr R. Beard, Tbe Rise rf Alllelim/1 Ci1ili::;ption, rev. eel. (:\lew York: i\facmillan, 1935), 315-6. Stephen Haggard, "The Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: E xplaining the Reciprocal Trade .\ g1·eements Act of 1934," llltemariolltil Q,gtmizatioll 42 (\\ 1in. 1988): 91-119.

1' Paul H Douglns, AJJmim 1i1 the 1Hmket Pl11te: Tmde, Tmijfi·

rmd !be Balallt'e rf Pr!)'IJ/ei/IJ' (NY: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966), 88-91 . :\rthur t\L Schlesinger, Jr., Tbe Comi11g rf tbe Ne111 Deal (Boston: Houghton Mif£Iin, 1959), 253-9. U.S. Congressman Chaka Pattah at www.house.gov.

!s J J Haesler to Charles H. Segerstrom, teletype, 21 !\ fay 1941; Segerstrom (as president) to the members of the • \merican Tungsten :\ssociation, telegram, 6 June 1941; Segerstrom, "Statement ... made on behalf of all hmgsten miners and htngsten producers in .-\me rica to be used in connect·ion with trade ngreemetH negotia-tions with ... :\rgentina," 9 June 19-11; Segerstrom, 'Statement ... on Behalf of Tungsten i\ finers Rncl Tungsten Producers in the United States ... 20 .Jan. 19-12, to Committee for Reciprocity fnfonnation, Wash DC," 20 .Jan.19-12;J C. Trimble to Segerstrom, 1.July 19-11; U.S. State Dept., "Trade .-\greement Between the United States ;U\d :\rgentina Signed October 14, 1941. .. text o f agreement including related notes," Press release #-19'1; "Trade-.\ greement Negotiations with Bolivia; public no tice -1 :\pr 1942," Press release# 138; Segerstrom to Geo. I. F.mery, 22 Oct. 19-11; :\merican Tariff Leag·ue, "Trade .\greement Negotiations with Pe ru," 31 Dec.l9-11; all in Segerstrom Collection. !Walt Stmt]o11mal, 7 Sep. 19-13.

19 l..:..ennedy, Frtiedomfrom Fem; 127. Ickes' 1941 testimony is reported in "Testimony of the Secre tary of the Interior on s tock piling and the conduct of the minerals procurementprogrrun to_lrumnry 1943. Hearing before U.S. Senate, Speciru Committee to Study and Survey Problems of Small Business Enterprises, l3 Jrul. 1943, flemi11gs, 1-150-63.

:.:· J17a!L Street]oHrnrtl, '10 Aug. 1940, 13 Feb., 25 Sep., and 3 Nov. 19-11, 13.June, 31 Oct., and23 Nov. 19-12. Nell' 1·ork Times, 3 Sep. 19-12. Statement o f Donald H Nelson, Chairman of tl1e \\far Production Board, to tl1e President, '17 .\pr. 1943; Sratementof.John A. Church, Consulting i\J:injHg Engineer, Washington, D.C., 7 Apr. 194 7, 1-lcmil{gS, 1300-1, 146-1-7.

-1 IJYall Street }olfmal, 31 l\far. 19-11. " . \ctivities iUld

.\ccomplishments o f the Uni ted States Bure11u of !\Lines during World \\'ar II ru1d \\ 'ork Proposed under the Stock Piling .-\ct .... In formation Submitted to the Subcommittee on National Resources o f the Senate

2006 i\tfi11i11g l-liJtory jo11mttl

Public Lands Committee, t\ lay 19-47," HemiJ!f,J', 1471-94. S. H. \Villiston, "Testimony before the Subcom­mittee on l\lines & l\lining," 20 l\lay 1948, HemiJ!f,S, 895.

22 J. J. Haesler to Charles H. Segerstrom, teletrpe, 10 June 1940, Segerstrom Collection.

23 Wall Street joHmal, 28 i\lar. 1942. Kennedy, hl•edom jivm I~em; 637-41.

2" f17ai1Sttl!et jolfmal, 17 Feb., 17 .-\pr., 2 June, 12 :\ug., and 10 Dec. 1941, 13 Jan., 15 i\ !ay, Hnd 16 .July 1942, and I I Feb. 1943. Ne1v Y01k TimeJ8, '13 and 17 Sep., and 24 Oct.

1942. J J. llaesler to Charles 1-1. Segerstrom, 21 .\lay 1941,Segerstrom Collection.

2 ~ See Sec. 5 (e) of the \Var and National Defense Selective Training and Service_ \ct of 19-10, 16 Sep. 1940, 58 Stat. 885. New} 'o1k Ti111es, 15 Sep. 1940, '17 t\lay 1941, 'IOJan. 1942. IW'ali Stmt }olfmal, 3 Sep. 1942. Charles H. Segerstrom to Geo. F. Sawyer, 23 Sep. 1942, Segerstrom

Collection. 26 Ne11' York Ti111eJ, 13 Sep., 17 m1d 24 Oct. 1942. f17all Str11et

.foHmal, 7 Julr 1942. 27 David Hinshaw, Tbe Ho111e Front (New York: G .P.

Put11m11's Sons, 1943), 62--1. Ne1v} 'o1k Ti111es, 17 Sep., 21 Nov. 19-12. fl7all Stmf ]oHmPI, 2'1 Oct., 2 '1 Nov., and 8

Dec. 1942, 1 t\ lar 1943. 28 Chas. E. Wilson to Senator .James E. t\lurray, 1-1 i\lay

1943, as reported in F-/e(llings, 1-16-1-7. 29 Hinshaw, Tbe llo111e FJVnt, -16-59.

3'·' L' .S. Tariff Commission, Till!f,Sien Oll!S and ConcentmteJ. Repo11 to the Pn!Jidelll 011 JnreJiigatioll 1\ 'o. 120. . . .

(\\ 'ashington D.C., Feb. 1958), -1. 31 !Wall Stmt.Joumal, 29 .July, I! 6 .-\ug., m1d 2 NO\·. 1950, 5

.Jm1. 1951, 23.July 1953, 16July 1956. New} 01k Ti111es, 22 : -\ug. 1956.

Jl II/' all Stlvt•t}ollmfll, 31 Dec. 1965.1\'ell' } -01k TimeJ, 28 ~0\'.

1976. See also Charlotte Twight, "The Political Economy of the National Defense Stockpile," Polio· S111dieJ Re1ie1J1 8 (Sum. 1989): 77-1-99. Peter Harben, "Srnnegic 1\ [inerals," Earrb 1 (I ul r 1992): 36--1-1.

JJ foor Bur .·\meric1m provisions :mel political repercussions

see -11 U.S.C. lOa; http:/ /www.bxa.doc.gov. Paul Gessing, ~ational Ta.xpay.ers' Union website at http:/ I www.ntu.org. PR NeiiJJ'II'il•l!, II 0Jov. 2003, at website

http:/ /goliath.ecnext.com. Ironically and perh:tps intentionally undercutting Bur .-\mericm1 laws is the

State Department's diplomatic proviso known as the t\lemorandum of Understmlding (t\IOU). : \n i\ IOU,

110\\' applied to at least twenty-one countries, regards defense materials produced in those countries as essentially ":\merican made." Criticism of t\lOUs can be found on the Intemational Brotherhood of

Electrical Workers website~ at http:/ /www.ibew.org. 3

" For current stockpile statultorr provisions see 50 U.S. Code 98. See also U.S. !Department of Commerce, Bureau of lndustr)' ;mel Secmity, Press Release Oct 29, 2002, on website http: / /www.bxa.doc.gov.