The September 11 attacks on New York andWashington and the ensuing U.S.-led war on ter-rorism have given Pakistan’s military dictator,Gen. Pervez Musharraf, an opportunity toimprove the relationship between Washingtonand Islamabad. That relationship had experienceda steep decline in the 1990s, as the end of both theCold War and the common struggle against theSoviet occupation of Afghanistan eroded the per-ception of shared strategic interests. Moreover,while it was losing its strategic significance to theUnited States, Pakistan was coming under thecontrol of an assertive military-religious nexusthat promoted anti-American radical Islamicforces at home and abroad.

Since September 11, General Musharraf,whose regime had been the main source of diplo-matic and military support for the terroristTaliban ruling neighboring Afghanistan, has por-trayed his regime as an ally of Washington in itscounterterrorism campaign. Musharraf, though,headed a military clique that brought an end tohis nation’s short democratic experience, assistedradical Islamic terrorist groups in Afghanistanand Kashmir, pressed for a war with India,advanced Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program,

and presided over a corrupt and mismanagedeconomy. Despite that record, he is being hailedby the Bush administration as a “courageous” and“visionary” leader who is ready to reorient hiscountry toward a pro-American position andadopt major political and economic reforms. Inexchange for his belated support, Musharraf hasbeen rewarded with U.S. diplomatic backing andsubstantial economic aid.

Musharraf’s decision to join the U.S. war on ter-rorism didn’t reflect a structural transformation inPakistan’s policy. It was a result of tactical consider-ations aimed at limiting the losses that Islamabadwould suffer because of the collapse of the friendlyTaliban regime in Kabul. Rejecting cooperationwith Washington would have provoked Americanwrath and placed at risk Pakistan’s strategic andeconomic interests in South Asia.

Some cooperation between the United Statesand Pakistan is necessary to wage the war againstterrorism, but that cooperation must not evolveinto a new long-term strategic alliance.Washington should view Pakistan, with its dicta-torship, failed economy, and insecure nuclear arse-nal, as a reluctant supporter of U.S. goals at bestand as a potential long-term problem at worst.

Pakistan in America’s Waragainst Terrorism

Strategic Ally or Unreliable Client?by Leon T. Hadar

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Leon T. Hadar is a research fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and the author of Quagmire:America in the Middle East.

Executive Summary

No. 436 May 8, 2002

Introduction: Allies Again?

Two months after the terrorist attacks inNew York and Washington, President Bushpraised Pakistan’s president, Gen. PervezMusharraf, for showing “ever greater courage,vision and leadership” in supporting the U.S.war against terrorism, including the militarycampaign to oust the Taliban regime inAfghanistan and capture the leaders of al-Qaeda. Musharraf’s “efforts against terror arebenefiting the entire world,” Bush said at aNovember 10 press conference withMusharraf at his side.1 His comment echoed astatement made by British prime ministerTony Blair on October 5, during a visit toIslamabad, in which he thanked the Pakistanileader for his “courage and leadership” incommitting his country to support the waron terrorism.2 In a joint U.S.-Pakistani state-ment issued during the Pakistani leader’s visitto the United States, Bush and Musharraf”reaffirmed the benefits of 50 years of friend-ship and close cooperation between Pakistanand the United States” and “welcomed therevival of this longstanding partnership” as a“vital element” in the construction of region-al and global stability and peace.3

The statements by Bush and other U.S.officials that followed the start of the U.S.-ledanti-terrorism campaign and the indicationsthat Pakistan was willing to join it marked asharp shift in the relationship betweenWashington and Islamabad, which had expe-rienced a steep decline during the last years ofthe administrations of George H. W. Bushand Bill Clinton. The Cold War and the com-mon struggle against the Soviet occupationof Afghanistan no longer cemented U.S.-Pakistani ties in the 1990s, leading a veterananalyst to conclude that, in the absence ofother “significant shared national interests,”tensions between the two nations werebecoming all too apparent.4

In fact, the growing consensus amongAmerican policymakers and lawmakers wasthat Pakistan was not only losing its strategicimportance to the United States; it was also

becoming an unreliable “failed state.” Therewere signs of the country’s “Talibanization,”that is, the growing strength of radical Islam.Pakistan also seemed to be a source of insta-bility in South Asia and to pose a challenge toAmerica’s nuclear nonproliferation policy.Worst of all, Islamabad seemed to be emerg-ing as a promoter of terrorism, not unlikesuch “rogue states” as Iran and North Korea.5

That perception was partly transformedafter September 11, when Pakistan became acritical theater in the U.S. effort to take thefight to the terrorists. Musharraf did aneffective job of realigning Pakistan withWashington’s policy. On the eve of the U.S.attack on Afghanistan, Islamabad offeredintelligence, air space, and ground facilitiesfor the U.S.-led operation to dislodgeAfghanistan’s Taliban regime and captureOsama bin Laden and his associates.

Pakistan not only allowed U.S. troops tobe based in key airfields near the Afghan bor-der; it agreed to freeze the bank accounts offour Islamist organizations with ties to al-Qaeda.6 Those moves were followed by the fir-ing of Ahmed Mahmoud, director-general ofthe military-run Inter-Services Intelligence;Muzaffer Usmani, deputy chief of the armystaff; and other senior generals who had beenkey players in Musharraf’s 1999 coup butwho were known to have radical Islamic viewsand were reputed to be staunch supporters ofthe Taliban regime. They were replaced bymilitary officers whose thinking was more inline with Musharraf’s new policy towardKabul. “The Taliban’s days are numbered,”declared Musharraf.7

Indeed, in various statements, Musharrafaccentuated Pakistan’s role as an ally of theUnited States and pledged to Washington hisnation’s “fullest cooperation in the fightagainst terrorism.” In an official statementissued on September 13, Musharraf con-demned the terrorist attacks, saying that the“carnage in New York and Washington hasraised this struggle to a new level.” And in ameeting with U.S. Ambassador WendyChamberlain, the self-appointed president(in June 2001 Musharraf added the presiden-

2

Islamabadseemed to be

emerging as apromoter of ter-

rorism, notunlike such

“rogue states” asIran and North

Korea.

cy to the list of military and civilian positionshe held) committed his government to sup-port the American-led antiterrorism cam-paign.8 In the October 10 press conferencewith Bush, Musharraf stressed that his gov-ernment had taken a decision “to be a part ofthe coalition, to be with the United States, tofight terrorism in all its forms wherever itexists.” He expressed his confidence aboutthe “dawn of a new era of a relationshipbetween Pakistan and the United States.”9

Helping to advance the Musharraf-is-acourageous-leader and Pakistan-is-our-allytheses perpetuated by Islamabad andWashington was the domestic backdropagainst which Musharraf adopted the newpolicy and made the statements advocatingcooperation with the United States. The con-ventional wisdom in Washington was thatPakistan’s current government could finditself struggling for survival if it were seendomestically as a lapdog of American infi-dels.10 Indeed, a Gallup poll of Pakistanispublished in October indicated that 83 per-cent of them sympathized with the Talibanrather than the United States, while 82 per-cent considered bin Laden a holy warrior, nota terrorist.11

The Pakistani press was saturated withconspiracy theories that suggested that Israelwas behind the September 11 attacks, whilethousands of Pakistanis demonstratedagainst the United States in Islamabad,Karachi, and other major cities. U.S. mediacoverage during the first few days of the cam-paign against al-Qaeda depicted “rabid anti-Americanism in daily protests in Pakistan,”contributing to the perception thatMusharraf’s pro-American tilt might costhim his power if not his life.12

Washington RewardsPakistan

It was not surprising therefore thatMusharraf’s statements and actions wererewarded not only by Washington’s officialpraise but, more important, by concrete steps

to demonstrate strengthening U.S. ties withIslamabad, including pledges of military andeconomic assistance. The Bush administra-tion and Congress moved to lift the sanc-tions that had been imposed after Pakistan(following in India’s footsteps) detonatednuclear devices in 1998 and afterMusharraf’s 1999 coup suspended democra-cy. Washington also agreed to reschedulePakistan’s outstanding debt to the UnitedStates of about $400 million and to supportloan rescheduling by various financial insti-tutions, including the World Bank, theInternational Monetary Fund, and the AsianDevelopment Bank, thus helping to alleviatePakistan’s $38 billion foreign debt.

Finally, Washington offered Musharraf anaid package of nearly $1 billion for bordercontrol, refugee assistance, and poverty alle-viation. (Pakistan claimed that the war inAfghanistan was costing it more than $2.5billion is lost trade, commerce, and tourism.)By the end of 2001, the IMF and the ParisClub of sovereign creditors pronouncedthemselves pleased with Pakistan’s “econom-ic progress,” rescheduled much of the coun-try’s debt, and extended fresh credits.13

To be sure, there were limits to U.S. conces-sions. The Bush administration rejectedPakistan’s request for delivery of 28 F-16s paidfor in the 1980s but never delivered because ofPakistan’s nuclear weapons program.Islamabad’s nuclear program caused succes-sive U.S. administrations to apply the PresslerAmendment (which required an annual certi-fication by the White House that Pakistan didnot posses nuclear weapons)14 and imposesanctions against Islamabad. And, facing pres-sure from U.S. textile and apparel manufac-turers, the administration was reluctant tosupport the request by Pakistan, whichexported $1.9 billion in textile products to theUnited States in the year ending July 2001, totemporarily suspend textile and apparel tariffsand quotas. Nevertheless, as one journalistnoted, “Pakistan has become the biggest bene-ficiary of economic aid in return for its sup-port of the U.S. antiterrorism campaignin Afghanistan.”15

3

WashingtonofferedMusharraf an aidpackage of nearly$1 billion for bor-der control,refugee assis-tance, and pover-ty alleviation.

A More Nuanced andCynical Perspective from

IslamabadWhile American officials were going out

of their way to applaud the new, improvedfriendship with Pakistan and portrayMusharraf as Pakistan’s version of Charles deGaulle, taking major risks in joining the Westand standing up to radical forces threateningto overrun his country and region,Musharraf adopted a more nuanced view.The Pakistani leader took a more ambiguousand restrained approach toward Islamabad’sties with Washington and expressed only aqualified backing for the U.S. position.

He did that in a lengthy televised addressto the Pakistani people on September 19, fol-lowing consultations with many of the coun-try’s opinion leaders. Musharraf referred tothe dilemma Pakistan was facing as it had tochoose between “two adversities”—con-frontation or cooperation with the UnitedStates (and the West). He concluded that insuch a case Islamic law requires that onechoose the lesser adversity (in this instance,cooperation with Washington). He com-pared his move to the temporary cease-firesthat Muslim leaders had signed with nonbe-lievers in the early stages of Muslim historyto provide the Muslims with an opportunityto gain strength and expand their influence.After a needed respite, those agreements wererepealed. The conclusion of such an agree-ment with the United States would likewiseensure that the interests of Islam would beprotected, explained Musharraf.

Although it is possible that his commentswere a cynical rationale purely for domesticconsumption, it is more likely that Musharrafwas applying the lessons of Muslim historyand teachings to make an argument in favor ofa short-term accommodation with the power-ful nonbelievers of the day, the Americans. Theimplication of his remarks was that such anaccord could be abrogated in the future whenthe balance of power would shift in favor ofPakistan and the Muslim community. Noting

that, as a result of the no-war pacts, Islam was“strengthened,” he emphasized that later on“when people saw enemies getting together,they made a new war pact.”16

What Musharraf was describing was notthe basis for the new strategic alliance withWashington, based on long-term interests andshared values, that American officials and pun-dits seemed to be demanding of him. Instead,he was proposing merely a tactical accord withthe United States, a nation whose interests andvalues were on many levels contrary to thoseespoused by Pakistan as a state and as a repre-sentative of Islamic aspirations. Such an agree-ment between Islamabad and Washingtonwould help advance Pakistan’s short-termstrategic interests, or at least not harm them.

Conversely, rejecting cooperation withWashington would provoke American wrathand place at risk Pakistan’s aid-dependenteconomy, the country’s ability to stand up toIndia, and perhaps its nuclear installations. Abreach with the United States might allowIndia to exploit the situation to isolate andhurt Pakistan and could lead to the installa-tion of an anti-Pakistan regime in Kabul.“Bad results,” Musharraf stressed in hisaddress, “could put in danger our territorialintegrity and our solidarity.”

Cooperation with Washington wouldprovide Pakistan with breathing space untilit was ready to secure its core national inter-ests, which included, as Musharraf pointedout, developing its nuclear weapons capabili-ty and defending the “Kashmir cause.” WhileAmerican leaders and commentators werehailing a metamorphosis in Pakistani poli-cies, Musharraf was expressing his hope thatworking with Washington would enableIslamabad to maintain the status quo, albeitmodified, in Kabul by helping to put in placea friendly Islamic government. Much as theTaliban regime had done during the 1990s,such a successor would help securePakistan’s twin policies: maintaining influ-ence in Central Asia and exerting pressure onIndia to settle the dispute over Kashmir, aMuslim-majority state divided between thetwo countries.

4

The Pakistanileader took an

ambiguous andrestrained

approach towardIslamabad’s ties

with Washingtonand expressed

only a qualifiedbacking for the

U.S. position.

Pakistani cooperation with Washingtoncould also lead to an adjustment in what wasseen as the tilt toward India by the Bushadministration. “It could even be, the wilyGeneral Musharraf may be dreaming, a repriseof Cold-War days, when an indulgent UnitedStates backed Pakistan for the sake of defeat-ing a common enemy in Afghanistan,” specu-lated The Economist. In any case, if it provedimpossible to prevent the fall of the Taliban,Pakistan was expecting to have a large say inwhatever order succeeded that regime, and per-haps even a less hostile U.S. attitude towardIslamabad’s efforts to develop a nuclearweapons capability.17 One Pakistani officialargued that the Americans were now “aware oftheir past mistakes” of maginalizing Pakistan.Pakistan, a “front line state” in the war againstterrorism, was telling the Americans that “youneed us again” and was expecting thatWashington would be willing to take into con-sideration Pakistan’s interests, including theneed to “engage” the Taliban regime in negoti-ations before taking military action against it.18

Pakistan’s Flirtation withRadical Islam

Although Musharraf hoped to extract asmuch as he could from Washington inexchange for his support in the war againstterrorism, he was bargaining with a very weakhand because his government was interna-tionally isolated and the Pakistani economywas bankrupt. In fact, in the months beforethe September 11 attacks, Pakistan was themost important diplomatic and political ally,not of the United States, but of the Talibanregime that harbored the al-Qaeda terrorists.

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were the onlygovernments that maintained formal diplo-matic relationship with the radical Islamicleaders in Kabul. (Saudi Arabia, another sup-posed “ally” of Washington, was the mostimportant channel of funds for the Taliban).Leading Pakistani political, military, and reli-gious figures and radical Islamic groups wereproviding direct support in the form of finan-

cial resources and military assistance andtraining, as well as thousands of volunteers tothe forces of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. At thesame time, such radical forces were thedomestic political and ideological backboneof Musharraf’s military dictatorship, whichwas also committed to the development ofthe country’s nuclear military power.

Musharraf, as head of Pakistan’s military,used his alliance with radical Muslim clericsto provide legitimacy to his dictatorship,forming a powerful and destructive “mili-tary-mosque” nexus. With Musharraf as itshead, that political nexus helped transformPakistan into a magnet for radical Islamicterrorists in the region and around the world.It was also the driving force behind the sup-port for Islamic insurgents, many of whomhad ties with Afghanistan-based guerrillas,who penetrated the Indian-controlled Kargilregion of Kashmir in May 1999, a move thatwas a major blow to the budding détentebetween Islamabad and New Delhi.19

That crisis, in turn, brought about Indianmilitary retaliation and U.S. diplomatic pres-sure that resulted in the withdrawal ofPakistani forces from Kargil, weakening thepower of the democratically elected govern-ment of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and cre-ating the conditions for his overthrow byMusharraf’s military coup in October 1999.20

The proverbial man from Mars viewingU.S. foreign policy after September 11 wouldprobably be astonished at the inconsistencyof the U.S. record. Washington attached thelabels “anti-American” and “war criminal” tothe former president of Yugoslavia, SlobodanMilosevic, a civilian politician elected in atleast quasi-democratic elections and whosemilitary had been at war in Kosovo andBosnia with Muslim forces that had links toIslamic radical movements.21 Yet Washingtonpraised General Musharraf as “courageous”and a “visionary leader” even though he was amilitary dictator in control of weapons ofmass destruction, was backed by radical anti-American forces, and was an ally of a regimethat helped inflict the worst terrorist attackever on the American territory and people.

5

Musharraf, ashead ofPakistan’s mili-tary, used hisalliance with rad-ical Muslim cler-ics to providelegitimacy to hisdictatorship.

Musharraf’s Self-ServingSwitch

It is hyperbole to portray Musharraf’sdecision to cooperate with the United Statesafter September 11 as a courageous, deGaulle–like gesture. Instead, Musharraf canbe compared to another military dictator,Hungary’s Adm. Nikolaus Horthy deNagybanya, a backer of Nazi Germany whohad come to power with support from a mil-itary-fascist nexus. In 1944, sensing that thebalance of power was shifting against theAxis powers, Horthy attempted to defectfrom his alliance with Adolf Hitler andswitch his support to the Allies. Like AdmiralHorthy in 1944, General Musharraf in 2001recognized that his fanatical ally wasdoomed and attempted to realign his coun-try with the victorious West. Horthy failed inhis gamble, whereas Musharraf has been suc-cessful (so far). But that success should notdiminish the significance of the historicalanalogy. Horthy and Musharraf were simplyswitching to the winning side, well aware thatthe alternative would bring about their ownpolitical destruction.22

There was no conversion to Western val-ues in either case. New York Times columnistThomas Friedman invoked SamuelJohnson’s quip, “There is nothing like theprospect of being hanged in the morning toconcentrate the mind,” to provide an expla-nation of Musharraf’s decision to abandonhis alliance with the Taliban and supportU.S. policy. Friedman suggested thatMusharraf’s moves were motivated byrealpolitik considerations, the diplomaticand economic pressure from Washington,and the lurking military threat of India.Because of the September 11 attacks, and thesubsequent attack on the Indian parliamentby pro-Pakistan Kashmiri terrorists, theUnited States and India “made clear thatPakistan’s foreign policy had to change—orAmerica would destroy it economically andIndia [would do so] militarily.”23 Thus,Musharraf found himself in the position of

having no choice but to abruptly endPakistan’s support of both the Taliban andthe militants seeking to “liberate” Kashmir.

Pakistan and America:The History of a Turbulent

RelationshipMost of Musharraf’s predecessors were

aware that Islamabad’s ties with Washingtonwere dictated by specific political-militaryinterests and lacked any deep historical andideological roots. As is Musharraf, those lead-ers were always more candid than theAmericans in evaluating their country’s tieswith Washington in realpolitik terms thatstressed the limitations of the relationship.

Indeed, even at the height of the Cold War—when U.S. officials, lawmakers, and commen-tators were hailing (and some conservativeswere even romanticizing) U.S.-Pakistani coop-eration in providing support to the Muslim“freedom fighters” in Afghanistan (includingone named Osama bin Laden) and Pakistanwas the recipient of the third largest amountU.S. aid (after Israel and Egypt)—Pakistanileaders seemed to have no illusions about theirrelationship with Washington. They recog-nized that the U.S.-Pakistani partnership inAfghanistan was a marriage of convenience, ifnot a diplomatic and military one-night stand,and that the two governments would eventual-ly have to deal with the reality of their divergingcore national interests and values.

Almost two decades before Musharraf, U.S.leaders embraced another Pakistani militarydictator, Gen. Mohammed Zia ul-Haq. Thegeneral played a pivotal role, putting in placethe policies of relying on the support of radi-cal Islamic groups at home. In late 1982 hecame to Washington to help coordinate sup-port for the anti-Soviet efforts in Afghanistan.The difference between the way the leaders ofPakistan and the United States have tended todepict their relationship was evident during aDecember 6, 1982, meeting in Washingtonbetween General Zia and Secretary of StateGeorge Shultz.

6

Almost twodecades before

Musharraf, U.S.leaders embracedanother Pakistanimilitary dictator,Gen. Mohammed

Zia ul-Haq.

After Shultz, reflecting the spin that dom-inated Washington at that time, expressedhis hope that Washington and Islamabadwould build a bilateral relationship that“grows over time and is strong enough tosurvive disagreements and problems whichinevitably occur,” Zia replied that the twocountries were a “union of unequals” and“incompatible” in terms of culture, geogra-phy, and national power, even though theyhad strong common interests.24

The cautionary remarks Zia made proba-bly still apply to the current Islamabad-Washington relationship. On one level Ziawas raising the first dilemma in the relation-ship, the fact that the United States is a glob-al superpower and Pakistan is what politicalscientists refer to as a “client state.” Theinequality of the relationship is highlightedby the disparities in economic power, mili-tary capabilities, and diplomatic influence.That reality is often glossed over whenWashington and such client states as Israel,Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan celebrate their“alliances” or “partnerships.” Such talk cre-ates the misperception that those relation-ships are products of “interdependence”(meaning that each side is dependent on theother for its survival). In reality, whileAmerican interests might be adversely affect-ed by the destruction of one or all of thosethree states (and other client states), theUnited States would nevertheless continue tosurvive as a leading world power. On theother hand, a decision by Washington towithdraw support from such client stateswould devastate their core national interestsand might threaten their long-term survival.

A client state such as Pakistan, dependentas it is for diplomatic, economic, and militarysupport on a global superpower, can helpsecure the support of its benefactor andincrease its leverage over that benefactor byaccentuating common strategic interests. Theclient state also tries to secure the backing ofAmerican interest groups and friends in thebureaucracy and Congress. Pakistan, whichgained independence in the same year, 1947,that the Cold War started, was able to advance

its position as a member of the U.S.-led anti-communist bloc in the strategic region ofSouth Asia and also as part of a “northerntier” of states helping to secure Western inter-ests in the oil-rich Persian Gulf region.

With India taking the road toward social-ism in domestic policy and neutralism in for-eign policy during the Cold War, Pakistancould play for the United States a role similarto the one that India once played in defend-ing imperial Britain’s interests against czaristRussia. The fact that the members ofPakistan’s political and military elite wereWesternized and British educated helped tostrengthen its ties with American politicalleaders and military officials as well as opin-ion makers. But the continuing politicalinstability and economic problems that ledto the weakening of its fragile democratic sys-tem, which was accelerated by (American-induced) military spending, tarnishedPakistan’s image in Washington and theAmerican media as a member of theWesternized pro-American club and con-tributed to the volatility of the relationshipbetween the two countries.25

Conflicting U.S. and Pakistani InterestsOn another level, Zia’s comments also

highlight the fact that, when it came to theirrespective core national interests, the UnitedStates and Pakistan were to discover that,Cold War rhetoric aside, they not only lackedcommon historical and cultural ties, theywere not operating on the same strategicwavelength. For Pakistan, containing com-munism was a secondary national interest.Its core national security interest centeredon containing the perceived threat of Indiaand India’s predominance of militarystrength and political influence, especially asit affected their dispute over the control ofdivided Kashmir.

Washington never regarded India as astrategic threat to its interests and, if anything,was interested in getting India, the world’slargest democracy, into the anti-communistcamp. The United States has also alwaysbacked a peaceful resolution to the Kashmir

7

The UnitedStates andPakistan were todiscover that theynot only lackedcommon histori-cal and culturalties, they werenot operating onthe same strate-gic wavelength.

conflict. The contrasting considerations ofU.S. and Pakistani national interests wereclearly demonstrated in the growing tiesbetween Islamabad and communist China inthe 1960s and by the disastrous decision byPakistan to launch a war against India overKashmir in 1965, which led to Pakistan’s mil-itary defeat when the administration ofLyndon Johnson refused to bail outIslamabad from the mess it had created.

The tensions between Pakistan and theUnited States were reflected in another devel-opment. Beginning in the 1970s Pakistanmoved to develop a nuclear weapons capabil-ity to offset India’s advantage in conventionalmilitary power and as a response to India’sdetonation of a nuclear device in 1974. ThePakistani nuclear program was also a form ofdiplomatic blackmail in Islamabad’s relation-ship with Washington. Pakistani officialsinsisted that only a sufficient supply ofAmerican conventional arms would preventPakistan from going nuclear. But Pakistan’seffort to become a nuclear power ran contraryto another core U.S. national security interest:working to block the proliferation of nuclearweapons and creating a stable internationalnuclear arms control regime (both duringand after the Cold War). The divergent goalsof the two countries on the nuclear issue ledto numerous diplomatic showdowns (espe-cially under pressure from Congress).

When one analyzes the relationshipbetween Washington and Pakistan before theSoviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, whatemerges is the normal pattern of relationshipbetween a great power and a client state. Eachside refrained from abandoning its commit-ments to its respective core national interests,but Pakistan was eventually forced to backdown from its aggressive pursuit of thoseinterests. Indeed, the limits of U.S. supportled to the partition of Pakistan and the estab-lishment of Bangladesh following India’smilitary victory in its 1971 war with Pakistan.

In those and other cases, Washington wasnot willing to provide Pakistan with the mili-tary and diplomatic support needed tochange in any dramatic way the balance of

power in South Asia in which India remainedthe leading military player. In fact, during thefirst three years of the Carter administration,the process of détente with the Soviet Union,as well as the focus on human rights andnuclear proliferation by the White House andCongress, meant that differences in nationalinterests and values significantly weakenedU.S.-Pakistani ties. Evidence that Pakistanwas accelerating the development of itsnuclear program, and Zia’s military coup thatousted the elected government of Zulfikar AliBhutto, brought relations to a nadir.

Pakistan’s Reemergence as a UsefulClient State in the 1980s

Even before Zia arrived in Washington in1982, however, there were indications thatnot only was Pakistan reasserting its positionas a useful client state for Washington butthat the normal pattern of relations betweenthe global power, the United States, and theclient state, Pakistan, which had been evidentduring most of the Cold War, was beginningto change in favor of the latter. The principalreason for that change was the Soviet inva-sion of Afghanistan and the decision, first bythe Carter administration and then byPresident Ronald Reagan and his advisers, touse Pakistan as a base to support themujahideen in Afghanistan as part of a strat-egy to oust the Soviets from that country.

That Pakistan was able to strengthen itsleverage over Washington was a result ofglobal and regional developments. Onedevelopment was increasing anti-Sovietcooperation between the United States andChina. Pakistan could be integrated into thatcooperation since it was a friend of bothcountries. Another development was theexpansion of ties between Pakistan and theArab countries, led by oil-rich Saudi Arabiaand bolstered by the rising global economicpower of the oil cartel, OPEC, that was exert-ing enormous pressure on U.S. foreign poli-cy. Many of the Arab states regarded Pakistannot only as a strategic ally (containing Sovietexpansionism toward the Middle East) butalso as a religious and cultural associate com-

8

The Pakistaninuclear program

was a form ofdiplomatic black-

mail inIslamabad’s rela-

tionship withWashington.

mitted to the spread of Islam in its more tra-ditionally strict forms.

Indeed, at the same time that the UnitedStates was strengthening its ties withPakistan, Zia was trying to enhance his polit-ical legitimacy in the Muslim world througha policy of Islamization at home, includingthe substitution of traditional Islamic pun-ishments for Western legal rules and the pro-motion of religious schools (madrassas).Those changes, however, also gave rise toanti-American forces and sentiments asdemonstrated in the burning of the U.S.embassy in Islamabad in November 1979.26

Afghanistan: The PakistaniTail Wags the U.S. Dog

It was in the context of transformingdomestic (the rise of the military-mosquenexus), regional (the 1979 Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan), and global circumstances (theemergence of OPEC and the changing trian-gular Washington-Moscow-Beijing relation-ship) that the ties between Pakistan and theUnited States (between a client state and itsbenefactor) seemed to evolve into what com-mentators began describing as a full-fledged“strategic alliance.”27 As Pakistani journalistRashid Ahmed said in his book, Taliban:Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in CentralAsia, the United States used Zia’s Pakistan as aconduit for close to $3 billion worth of covertaid to the mujahideen fighting to expel theSoviets from Afghanistan.28

There is no doubt that the two countriesshared common interests in dealing with theSoviet presence in Afghanistan, especially aconcern that the invasion of Afghanistanreflected a major change in Soviet conductand was part of a Soviet grand strategy to takeadvantage of instability in Iran (following thecollapse of the pro-American shah), gainaccess to the Arabian Sea, and control the oilresources of the Middle East. That concernexplained the Carter administration’s deci-sion to cooperate in a limited fashion with thePakistanis in Afghanistan, including covert

cooperation between the CIA and Pakistan’sInter-Services Intelligence.29

Pakistan’s Agenda in Supporting theAfghan Mujahideen

Beyond those common interests,Islamabad had its own separate reason forsupporting the anti-Soviet insurgency inAfghanistan: Pakistan’s traditional nationalinterest in maintaining a supportive regimein Kabul to provide Pakistan with strategicdepth in its conflict with India. That interestwas buttressed by the resentment of Zia’sIslamic supporters at home and in otherMuslim countries (led by the Saudis) at thefact that the atheist Soviets had seized con-trol of a neighboring Muslim state. Evenunder the Reagan Doctrine, which aimed atreversing Soviet gains around the world, theUnited States didn’t share those long-termPakistani goals. However, Washington lackeda coherent approach of its own to a post-Soviet Afghanistan.

The result was that Pakistan, led by Zia’smilitary-mosque nexus, with the ISI as one ofits manifestations, was able to advance itsparochial interests through cooperation withthe United States, a power that was promotinga broader and somewhat blurry global agenda.While the two players could find a commonstrategic and ideological basis for cooperationin Afghanistan, Washington found itselffalling into the trap of permitting the Pakistani“tail” to wag the American “dog.” (That sce-nario has occurred in other client state–super-power relationships, such as the ones betweenthe United States and Israel and the SovietUnion and Cuba. The dangerous 1962 and1973 showdowns between Washington andMoscow occurred as a result.)30

In the case of the Pakistani-U.S. relation-ship, however, there was a long intervalbetween the peak of U.S.-Pakistani coopera-tion and the manifestation of the dangerousoutcome of the tail-wags-the-dog scenario.The latter transpired on September 11, 2001,12 years after the Soviets had withdrawn fromAfghanistan and at a time when the relation-ship between Washington and Islamabad had

9

In Afghanistan,Washingtonfound itselffalling into thetrap of permittingthe Pakistani“tail” to wag theAmerican “dog.”

already waned. The outcome was not really a“blowback,” to use the term pundits fre-quently use to describe unintended conse-quences of certain policies. The United Statesintentionally groomed Pakistan, despitebeing aware of its client’s increasing radicalIslamic orientation, as the leading regionalpower in Afghanistan. It was a myopic policy.

The same militant anti-Western and anti-modern environment, nourished by theSaudi-backed military-mosque nexus inIslamabad and its satellites in Afghanistanand elsewhere, was responsible for such bar-baric acts as forcing religious minorities towear distinctive badges and smashingancient Buddhist monuments. It had alreadypromoted terrorism against American citi-zens around the world. U.S. leaders shouldhave taken that record into consideration.

The Reagan Doctrine, which relied onlocal military powers to counter the Soviets,made it possible for the Pakistanis to becomethe dominant force in the anti-Soviet Islamicinsurgency in Afghanistan and allowed themto support their favorite guerrilla groupsthrough the ISI. The ISI also coordinated theflow of other foreign aid, including therecruitment of foreign Muslim volunteersand graduates of the local madrassas.31 All ofthat, of course, was instrumental in achievingthe American goal of bogging down theSoviets in Afghanistan. But it also helped tostrengthen the power of the ISI and the otherelements of the destructive military-mosquenexus in Pakistan.

One can argue that the “tail” started towag the “dog” sometime in 1986 when therewere clear indications that the Soviets want-ed a face-saving formula for withdrawal fromAfghanistan. It was then that Zia, whose orig-inal stated goal was to reduce the threat ofSoviet expansionism, started advancing amore ambitious agenda. “Victory by the resis-tance, he believed, could produce for the firsttime an Afghan regime genuinely friendly toPakistan, which in turn could enablePakistan to gain ‘strategic depth’ againstIndia, long a goal of Pakistani Islamic plan-ners,” according to Dennis Kux, a former U.S.

diplomat who served in Pakistan. Zia alsohoped that a new government in Kabulwould “reflect his own Islamic leanings farmore than any previous regime had, and farmore than the Pakistani president had beenable to impose on his own country.”32

The pressure to advance that ambitiousagenda in Afghanistan, as well as to developPakistan’s nuclear military program, contin-ued after Zia’s death and the Soviet with-drawal from Afghanistan. The ISI and themilitary took the lead, aided by support fromradical Muslim groups. That trend persisteddespite frequent U.S. objections and someresistance from the civilian governments ofprime ministers Benazir Bhutto and NawazSharif. Islamabad’s efforts led, first, to thetemporary control of Kabul by the Islamicradical leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar andthen to the 1994 victory of the Taliban, dom-inated by Pashtuns, the largest ethnic groupin Afghanistan, whose members also controla large area across the border in Pakistan. TheTaliban defeated a coalition of Uzbek, Tajik,and Hazara opponents (the NorthernAlliance), which had ties to outside players,including Russia and Iran (and, to someextent, India and China). Alongside binLaden, Pakistan was the main sponsor of theTaliban as it marched to Kabul.33

Pakistan Backs the TalibanSome experts and journalists have suggest-

ed that the Taliban and the terrorism thatarose in Afghanistan occurred because theUnited States “neglected” and “turned itsback” on Afghanistan at the end of the ColdWar, which supposedly led to the chaos inthat country. The fact is that the UnitedStates did make an effort to cobble together aunited front following the Soviet withdrawaland did consider helping with economicreconstruction. But that effort failed largelybecause of deliberate interference on the partof the Pakistani intelligence establishment.There was a “Pakistani-instigated chaos, butthe U.S. contribution to it was not central,”argues Afghanistan watcher Robert Kaplan.Out of the Pakistani-instigated chaos came

10

The United Statesintentionally

groomedPakistan, despite

being aware of itsclient’s increasing

radical Islamicorientation, as

the leadingregional power in

Afghanistan.It was a myopic

policy.

the Taliban. “The problem has not been U.S.neglect but Pakistani interference, under bothdemocratic and military regimes.” Why didthe Pakistanis interfere in Afghanistan?“Because they require an Afghan puppet stateto supply them with strategic depth for theirconflict against India,” explains Kaplan.34

In retrospect, one can raise serious ques-tions about aspects of the U.S. involvement inAfghanistan, especially the willingness to per-mit the Pakistani military and the ISI to con-trol the assistance to the insurgents and thedecision, under the pressure of cold warriorsand a pro-mujahideen Congress, to continuefunneling arms to the mujahideen even afterthe Soviet withdrawal. The American supportthrough Islamabad tipped the balance ofpower in the Afghan civil war in favor ofPakistan and its allies among the Pashtuns,while weakening the military and politicalinfluence of other ethnic groups allied mostlywith Iran, Russia, and some Muslim republicsin Central Asia. But lack of support inWashington and abroad would have made itimpossible for U.S. policymakers to work out acompromise solution with Russia and Iranand their allies in Afghanistan, and withPakistan, to form perhaps a decentralizedpolitical structure with spheres of influence foreach outside power. The only other alternativeswould have been direct military interventionby the United States or permitting thePakistanis to establish control over most of thecountry. The latter alternative, a Pax Pakistanain Afghanistan, became the policy by default.35

Despite denials by Musharraf and his aides,Pakistan’s ISI continued to provide militaryand financial assistance to the Taliban inAfghanistan even after September 11, 2001.36

Islamabad still regarded Afghanistan as astrategic ally and ideological associate. Afghantraining camps and Afghan recruits helped toprepare the next Pakistani-instigated insur-gency against the Indians in Kashmir and tospread radical Islamic ideas and institutionsaround the world, through “jihad-internation-al” brigades, some of which were tied to the al-Qaeda network.

It is doubtful that the Taliban’s control of

Afghanistan and its policy of turning the coun-try into the center of international terrorismcould have occurred without the support ofPakistan. “We are fighting a jihad and this isthe first Islamic international brigade in themodern era,” bragged Gen. Hamid Gul, theformer head of the ISI, to a journalist in 1999.“The communists have their internationalbrigades, the West has NATO, why can’t theMuslims unite and form a common cause?”37

Two years later, members of that Pakistani-backed jihad international hit the World TradeCenter and the Pentagon, killing thousands ofAmericans and others. On December 13 othermembers of those brigades attacked India’sparliament in a plot to kill its leadership.

Musharraf Pursues“Talibanization”

with a Human FaceIn a January 12, 2002, televised address to

the Pakistani people, a confident Musharrafseemed to be taking more dramatic steps in thedirection of once again aligning his countrywith the United States and the West, rejectingterrorism and theocracy, and criticizing thosewho “pervert” Islam to advance their interests.He announced the banning of five of the mostradical Islamic groups and ordered hundredsof their members rounded up. Many of themadrassas were to be closed down or broughtunder government control, and other religiousinstitutions, including mosques, would bemonitored and warned not to promote terror-ism. “The day of reckoning has come,” heannounced. “Do we want Pakistan to become atheocratic state? Do we believe that religiouseducation is enough for governance? Or do wewant Pakistan to emerge as a progressive anddynamic Islamic state?” He added that radicalIslamists “did nothing but contribute tobloodshed in Afghanistan,” leading to “disrup-tion and sowing seeds of hatred.” And heasked, “Does Islam preach this?”38

This much-analyzed address was hailed byofficials and commentators as an indicationthat, after reorienting his foreign policy

11

Despite denials byMusharraf andhis aides,Pakistan’s ISIcontinued to pro-vide military andfinancial assis-tance to theTaliban inAfghanistan evenafter September11, 2001.

toward the United States, Musharraf was nowgoing to take dramatic steps to Westernizeand secularize Pakistan à la Turkey. Indeed,several analysts went so far as to compareMusharraf to modern Turkey’s founder,Kemal Ataturk,39 and to argue that his address“set a new course for the Muslim world.”40

But Musharraf is no Ataturk dedicated todemolishing the religious and expansionistfoundations of the ancient regime and estab-lishing a new nationalist and secular identityfor his country. If anything, one can compareMusharraf to some of Turkey’s last Ottomanrulers, who tried to accommodate domesticand outside forces that aimed either to changethe status quo or to secure the ambitiousintertwining of the nationalist and religiousgoals of the empire. Indeed, Musharraf’s riseto power marked what can be regarded as themost recent attempt by members of the mili-tary-mosque nexus to preserve the achieve-ments of Zia and his successors: veto power ofthe military, ideological supremacy of the rad-ical Islamic groups, control of Afghanistanthrough the Taliban, mounting pressure onIndia in Kashmir, and development of anuclear weapons capability.

In that context, Musharraf can bedescribed as a new and improved Zia adapt-ing an ambitious agenda to changing cir-cumstances. Starting in the early 1990s, therewere indications that changes in the regionaland global balance of power were threateningthe achievements gained by the military-mosque nexus. The power of OPEC had beeneroded, weakening the economic and diplo-matic status of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s bene-factor and its top lobbyist in Washington.Worsening relations between Beijing andWashington made it difficult for Islamabadto accentuate Pakistan-China ties in bargain-ing with the United States. The strengthen-ing of the human rights lobby in Congressproduced growing criticism in Washingtonof the rising influence of anti-democraticand radical Islamic forces in Pakistan and, ofcourse, its fundamentalist ally in Kabul.

The preoccupation of the Clinton admin-istration and Congress with enhancing the

nuclear nonproliferation regime spurred newmoves to punish Pakistan for developingnuclear weapons (as well as purchasing relat-ed technology from China). Pakistan’s sup-port for the Muslim insurgents that attackedthe town of Kargil in Kashmir in May 1999;Islamabad’s backing of the despicableTaliban regime, which Washington accusedeven then of harboring bin Laden’s terroristnetwork;41 and Islamabad’s decision to deto-nate a nuclear bomb in May 1998 led to enor-mous U.S. pressure (in form of diplomaticand economic sanctions) on Pakistan. That,in turn, led to a reaction by Pakistan’s mili-tary-mosque nexus.

The October 1999 military coup byMusharraf brought an end to the fragiledemocracy in Pakistan and strengthened thehands of the Taliban’s allies in Islamabad,including the ISI, the radical religious groups,and forces pushing for the expansion of tieswith the jihad international, the “liberation”of Kashmir, and the acceleration of thenation’s nuclear program. The latter goal wasthe development of an “Islamic bomb” thatwould not only enhance Pakistan’s positionvis-à-vis India and the United States but wouldalso provide the Muslim world with an answerto the Western, Hindu, and Jewish (Israeli)bombs.42 According to U.S. sources, one of themajor reasons Musharraf and the militarydecided to oust Sharif was “the fear that hemight buckle to American policy and reversePakistan’s policy toward the Taliban.”43

Musharraf and his allies were not callingfor the “Talibanization” of Pakistan, but thepolicies they were advancing (either directlyor through the use of political and militarysubsidiaries and “rogue” operations) werebased on using the Taliban’s Afghanistan asboth a strategic and an Islamic backyard,where training camps and arms depots couldbe used to promote the Pakistani-Islamiccause in Kashmir and around the world.According to recent news reports, that effortincluded cooperation between Pakistaninuclear scientists and the al-Qaeda network—although it is not certain whether Musharrafknew personally of that collaboration.44

12

Musharraf can bedescribed as a

new andimproved Zia

adapting anambitious agenda

to changing cir-cumstances.

There were no signs that Musharraf’s pol-icy was strengthening Pakistan’s position inWashington in the months precedingSeptember 11. President Clinton gaveMusharraf’s regime a diplomatic cold shoul-der; during a South Asia tour, Clinton spentfive days in India and only five hours inPakistan.45 The new Bush administrationcontinued the process of marginalizingPakistan and establishing more solid ties withIndia, as part of a strategy to contain Chinaand expand ties with India’s huge democracyand emerging market. All this occurredagainst the backdrop of growing U.S. ten-sions with radical Islam and Washington’sstrengthening of ties with Israel and secularTurkey, which only helped to highlightPakistan’s pariah status. There was no indica-tion—strategic considerations, economic ties,ideological commitment, cultural bonds—that Washington needed to continue to main-tain Pakistan as a client state. Conversely,Pakistan seemed to be losing its leverage overU.S. policy, a clear reversal of what occurredduring Zia’s years. The relationship betweenAmerica and Pakistan was being normalized.The dog was in control. In fact, the dog wasdiscovering that it had no need to regularlywag that particular tail.

The Pakistani Tail Tries toWag the American Dog

AgainFollowing September 11 and

Washington’s pressure on Pakistan to backthe United States in the war against al-Qaedaand the Taliban, Musharraf and otherPakistani officials complained that theUnited States had “abandoned” them afterthe withdrawal of Soviet forces fromAfghanistan in 1989. “We were left high anddry, and it started to settle on the people thatwe were ditched,” Musharraf told anAmerican group. That was an exaggeration. Aclear U.S. realpolitik position, based on anaccurate reading of U.S. interests at the time,should have led to adoption of a policy of

“constructively disengaging” from Pakistan,while trying to advance in South Asia a newstrategic agenda based on strengtheningAmerica’s ties with India.

In that context, Pakistan, as a client state,should have been presented with a clearchoice: adapt your policy to the goals of yourAmerican benefactor or end up paying thecosts of your refusal—being truly “ditched”by Washington. Instead, Washington’s inter-ests were sabotaged by an uncontrollableclient state, ruled by a military dictatorshipin the process of establishing a theocracy andmismanaging its corrupt economic system.That client state was spreading terror toKashmir; strengthening the Taliban, theworld’s most anti-Western regime; andacquiring weapons of mass destruction.

Such developments pointed to a majordilemma that the United States faces when ithas to manage its relationship with a clientstate in a unipolar international system.During the Cold War, the bipolar system pro-duced systemic pressures on the two super-powers to restrain their respective clientstates. The United States and the SovietUnion sent signals to each other that helpedto set diplomatic and military “red lines,”which forced each superpower to placerestrictions on its client states. For example,the United States, facing Soviet pressure,stopped Israeli military advances in Egypt in1973. Similarly, the Soviets, during theCuban missile crisis in 1962, acceded to thepressure of the Kennedy administration.

If the Soviet Union hadn’t collapsed in1991, it is quite conceivable that it wouldhave set similar “red lines” on U.S. supportfor the Pakistani-backed insurgents inAfghanistan, leading perhaps to the creationof a neutral regime in Kabul or to the divi-sion of the country into spheres of influence,which would have given Islamabad no choicebut to abandon its grand strategic designs. Inshort, in a unipolar system, a client state maybe able to exert more influence on its globalbenefactor in the short term and themidterm, as Pakistan did for a while, creatingconditions for the Taliban victory in Kabul.

13

Pakistan wasspreading terrorto Kashmir;strengthening theTaliban, theworld’s mostanti-Westernregime; andacquiringweapons of massdestruction.

From this perspective, September 11should have accelerated a process of margin-alizing Pakistan. The Bush administrationdecided, not only to target Pakistan’s strate-gic and ideological ally in Kabul, but todestroy the entire jihad-international net-work that Pakistan’s military-mosque nexus(in cooperation with its allies in SaudiArabia) was nourishing. At the same time, theU.S. offensive against terrorism should havestrengthened the hands of regional playersthat opposed Pakistan’s strategic goals andreligious mission, including the NorthernAlliance (fighting the Taliban) and Russia,the Central Asian republics, India, and Iran.Washington’s goal turned out to be theouster of the Pakistan-backed government inKabul and its replacement by a broad-basedgovernment that would be acceptable tothose other powers as well as the UnitedStates. Ironically, that outcome was more orless what the Soviets had been pushing forafter their withdrawal from Afghanistan—and the United States and its “ally,” Pakistan,had resisted. (Bin Laden and his associateswould not have found a refuge in such a“neutral” Afghanistan.) After September 11,Pakistan seemed to be the big loser with noother choice but to accept that outcome.

The alternative would have been to irrevo-cably alienate the United States, thusenabling India to formalize its position as thedominant power in the region and perhapseven provoking the Americans to give NewDelhi a green or yellow light to unleash itsmilitary power on Pakistan (with only Chinabalancing India). From a systemic perspective,September 11 helped to form a new balanceof power, reestablishing the “red lines” thathad disappeared after the collapse of theSoviet superpower and impelling Washingtonto restrain its Pakistani client state.

Pakistan Invokes Frightening SpectersHence, it is not surprising that

Musharraf’s policies since September 11have been aimed at resisting those pressuresand at trying to maintain the status quo thathad benefited Pakistan. Musharraf didn’t

have at his disposal any assets that wouldhelp him to strengthen his leverage on U.S.policy, and he certainly had no militarypower to prevent the United States fromattacking Afghanistan and using Pakistan’sairspace and territory to do so. His onlyremaining option was to warn the Americansthat their interests could be damaged if theyrefused to accept his demands.

He demonstrated his ability to advancethat strategy by using various signals tothreaten the Americans that unless theymodified their goals in the war on terrorism,including the attack on Afghanistan, theywould have to deal with two nightmare sce-narios: (a) a political backlash from the angry“street” in Pakistan (and across the entireMuslim world) that would lead to the col-lapse of the “moderate” and “pro-Western”Musharraf and his replacement by a radicalIslamic regime and (b) a Pakistani version ofIsrael’s “Samson Option,”46 in which aPakistani regime, facing unacceptable pres-sures from the United States and India thatthreatened its core national interests and sur-vival, would have no choice but to flex itsnuclear military power, even if that led to anuclear confrontation in South Asia. The lat-ter nightmare scenario also suggested that ifMusharraf resisted the pressure to threatento use nuclear weapons, he would be oustedby in a coup by more radical Islamic elementsin the military who would do so, or the coun-try might collapse into a civil war with vari-ous competing warlords getting access to thenuclear arsenal. Some of it might even fallinto the hands of the Taliban and al-Qaeda.47

At a minimum, Musharraf proved to bean opportunistic politician advancing hisinterests vis-à-vis the Americans as they tookthe first steps in their war on terrorism. Hesucceeded in exploiting the unrest inPakistan and the terrorist acts by anti-IndianMuslim groups. The latter probably hadsome assistance from elements in thePakistani military and political establish-ment (with some level of “deniability,”although the spin advanced by Musharrafand his supporters was that the ISI and some

14

Musharrafproved to be an

opportunisticpolitician advanc-

ing his interestsvis-à-vis the

Americans as theytook the first

steps in their waron terrorism.

“cells” in the military were out of control andacting like “rogue” institutions).48

Moreover, the nuclear scenario seemed tobe an outgrowth of the new Pakistani nucleardoctrine toward India that was adopted byPakistan’s military-political leadership andbased on pressuring Washington to tilt theregional balance of power back in favor ofPakistan. The Pakistanis needed to persuadeWashington that any Indian attack, even alimited one, on Pakistan could turn into amajor war, a notion that “intends to keep theIndians off balance and to keep the UnitedStates worrying that there will be a major warbetween the two nuclear-armed adversariesin South Asia if Washington does not stayIndia’s hand.”49

The Indians clearly have an advantage overPakistan in conventional weapons; India hasmore than 1.3 million active-duty soldierscompared to barely 600,000 in Pakistan, andIndia also has more than a two-to-one advan-tage in combat aircraft as well as more tanks,artillery, and ships.50 Since India could defeatPakistan in any conventional war, Pakistan’sthreat to use nuclear weapons (again, similarto some extent to the Israeli “Samson Option”)was intended to send the message to theIndians and the Americans that once a conflictstarts it is difficult to confine it. Moreover,while the Indians might try to confine the con-flict to a conventional war, “it is the other side’sdecision about how to respond” that willdetermine the final outcome.51

Musharraf Fails to Achieve His GoalMuharraf’s strategy of resisting the U.S.

policy (backed by Russia and India) aimed atbringing an end to the Pakistani-supportedpower arrangements in Afghanistan seemedto be producing some results in the earlystages of the U.S. military effort. The Bushadministration initially responded positivelyto Islamabad’s calls for using diplomaticmeans to capture bin Laden and his associ-ates. Even after the United States attackedAfghanistan, reports from Washingtonreflected a willingness to suspend militaryoperations during the holy month of

Ramadan and devise restrictive war aims inAfghanistan based on Pakistan’s insistenceon not eliminating the Taliban presence.

Islamabad advocated only weakening theregime and destroying al-Qaeda while leavingin place “moderate” Taliban forces, consist-ing of “defectors” from the movement, thatwould play a role in a new postwar govern-ment in Kabul.52 It seemed as though U.S.officials were once again permitting thePakistani tail to wag the American dog.Washington flirted with permitting a govern-ment that was indirectly responsible for theterrorism inflicted on America to impose aveto power on U.S. decisions, thereby ensur-ing that Pakistan would not end up with aregime in Kabul dominated by the unfriend-ly Northern Alliance.

But the Bush administration decided tocontinue pursuing the war during Ramadanand gave a green light to Northern Allianceforces to move toward Kabul. Musharrafagain tried to reduce his losses by demandingthat Kabul be “demilitarized” and that theNorthern Alliance forces “must not” holdit.53 Moreover, as revealed in reports in theNew York Times and elsewhere (includingSeymour Hersh’s exposé in the New Yorker),Islamabad continued to provide help to theTaliban forces fighting against the UnitedStates and its allies in Afghanistan.

U.S. officials admitted that “one monthafter the Pakistan government agreed to endits support of the Taliban, its intelligenceagency was still providing safe passage forweapons and ammunition to arm them.”54

According to those reports, hundreds ofPakistani military officers and ISI agents pro-vided support to the Taliban forces andhelped to evacuate 5,000 Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters from Afghanistan toPakistan. Many of them were airlifted out ofthe northern Afghan city of Kunduz justbefore it fell to the Northern Alliance.55 Atthe same time, contrary to the nightmare sce-narios floated by Musharraf, the Pakistani“street” did not erupt following the defeat ofthe Taliban, and there were no indicationsthat Musharraf’s hold on power was in dan-

15

Islamabad advo-cated only weak-ening the regimeand destroyingal-Qaeda whileleaving in place“moderate”Taliban forces.

ger. So much for his implied threats of apotential “radical implosion” of Pakistan.

After failing in that rearguard effort to pre-serve Pakistan’s dominant influence inAfghanistan and prevent the elimination ofIslamabad’s Taliban ally, the Pakistanis nextturned to securing their interests vis-à-visIndia. Even if one doesn’t accept Indian allega-tions that some of the al-Qaeda fighters evac-uated from Afghanistan by the Pakistaniswere infiltrated into Kashmir, or thatPakistani agents assisted the December 13attack on the Indian parliament, there is nodoubt that a lack of response by India to thecontinued terrorism in Kashmir and theattack in New Delhi would have been per-ceived as a major blow to Indian national secu-rity interests and as a victory for Pakistan. Itcertainly would have created the impressionthat U.S. diplomatic pressure, driven by con-siderations of Pakistani concerns, had made itimpossible for the Indians to react to a terror-ist attack in New Delhi in the same way thatthe United States responded to similar attacksin New York and Washington. In short, bythreatening a nuclear escalation, Islamabadwas pressing Washington to veto possibleIndian military action against Pakistan.

Pakistan: A DiminishedClient State

But India’s powerful reaction to the terror-ist attack in New Delhi, including moving itsaircraft and nuclear-capable short-range bal-listic missiles toward its border with Pakistan,shifting infantry divisions from the borderwith China to the western frontier withPakistan, and activating more than 1,000tanks and armored vehicles, sent a clear mes-sage to the world. India was promising, notbluffing, and calling Pakistan’s bluff on itsassumption that the Pakistani nuclear arsenalacts as a strategic “equalizer” that ensured thatIslamabad’s support for terrorism againstIndia would not escalate into an all-out war.56

But India’s military strategists are confi-dent that their country’s conventional mili-

tary superiority, coupled with the fact thatIndia could survive a nuclear first strike(Pakistan might not survive such an attack)would permit them to fight a limited warwith Pakistan while deterring that countryfrom launching a nuclear attack on India.57 Itwas that demonstration of India’s militarymight, aimed at deterring Pakistan fromlaunching a nuclear strike while Indiaexploited its conventional advantage, notMusharraf’s sudden conversion to anAtaturk-like reformist agenda, that persuad-ed Pakistan’s military dictator to pledge thathis country would not be used as a base forterrorism and to announce a broad ban onmilitant groups accused of fomenting vio-lence in Indian-held Kashmir.58 India’s hard-line position may have also persuaded theBush administration to toughen its positionon Pakistan-based terrorist groups, includ-ing those operating against Indian rule inKashmir.59

The Dispute with India and Pakistan’sDecline

The outcome of the Indian-Pakistanistandoff, highlighting Islamabad’s precari-ous position, was the last stage in a processthat had been accelerating since September11, during which time Pakistan had seen itsstrategic position badly erode. Also, with theTaliban gone, Pakistan has lost a key surro-gate in its covert support for Islamic funda-mentalist guerrillas in Kashmir. These devel-opments took place against the backdrop ofa major U.S. assault against the jihad-inter-national terrorism network, which includedmany groups with close ties to Pakistan andits financial benefactor, Saudi Arabia.

More generally, the counterterrorismoffensive against radical Islamic terroristgroups and the growing hostility toward mil-itant Islam in the United States and the West,coupled with growing cooperation betweenthree leading foes of Pakistan—India, Israel,and Turkey—have been major strategic blowsto Pakistan. Add to that the political instabil-ity and the economic and social problemsthat continue to beset Pakistan, and that

16

By threatening anuclear escala-

tion, Islamabadwas pressing

Washington toveto possible

Indian militaryaction against

Pakistan.

country has to be regarded as one of thestrategic and economic losers in the interna-tional system that has evolved sinceSeptember 11.

Yet the Bush administration and itsWestern allies have continued to portrayIslamabad as a “friend” and a “partner” of theUnited States, have hailed Musharraf as a“courageous” leader and a “reformist,” andhave provided Islamabad with economic andmilitary assistance on the basis of the promisesby Pakistan to back the American anti-terror-ism efforts and to take the road toward politi-cal reform. “In the 1980s, Pakistan got a blankcheck from the U.S. to combat the Russians,and spent much of the check in building upthe Taliban,” argues journalist ChristopherHitchens. “Now it is getting another check andbrand-new interest-free mortgage in order topretend that the Taliban is its enemy. It doesn’tget any better than this.”60

As noted, American policymakers, byassigning the role of strategic ally to Pakistanduring the Cold War (and especially duringthe anti-Soviet insurgency in Afghanistan),provided incentives to Pakistan through mil-itary assistance and economic subsidies toabuse its position as a client state of theUnited States and to adopt policies that rancontrary to core U.S. national interests. Withthe collapse of the Taliban regime and its ter-rorist allies, the conflicting national interestsof Washington and Islamabad shouldbecome more obvious.

Although a full-blown war between Indiaand Pakistan may have been avoided (at leastfor the moment), Kashmir remains a flash-point. Pakistan argues that Kashmir, with itsMuslim majority, should become part ofMuslim Pakistan, while India stresses that aMuslim Kashmir can and should remainpart of a secular and multiethnic India.Although both countries have supported anegotiated solution to the conflict, theIndian government under Prime MinisterAtal Behari Vajpayee, resisting oppositionfrom the more nationalist forces in his coun-try and party, initiated efforts to engagePakistan, first, during talks in Lahore,

Pakistan, in February 1999 and again inAgra, India, last year.

The response from Musharraf’s military-mosque nexus in Pakistan has been hostileand violent. After the Lahore summit, thePakistanis provided support to the insurgentsthat crossed the line of control in Kashmirand attacked the Kargil region inside Indian-controlled territory. And last OctoberPakistani-backed insurgents attacked theJammu and Kashmir state legislature, anattack that was followed by several more ter-rorist incidents in Indian-held Kashmir aswell as inside India itself. Moreover,Musharraf’s insistence on placing Kashmir atthe center of the negotiations between NewDelhi and Islamabad led to the collapse of theAgra talks last summer. Hence, while bothsides have legitimate interests in Kashmir, it isPakistan’s military-mosque nexus, in cooper-ation with radical Islamic groups trained bythe Taliban and al-Qaeda, that has been try-ing to destabilize the status quo and prevent aresolution based on direct negotiationsbetween India and Pakistan.

Musharraf, who in a major address to thenation stressed that “Kashmir runs in ourblood,” is interested in internationalizing thedispute and getting the United States andother countries, including other Muslimstates and China, involved in the negotia-tions over Kashmir.61 Indeed, internationaliz-ing the Kashmir conflict is supposed to serveas an “equalizer” for Pakistan, helping tocounter India’s enormous diplomatic power.

Pakistani leaders and intellectuals, evenmoderate ones, regard the future of Kashmiras a core national interest of Pakistan. “ForPakistan, the belief that the province shouldhave been part of Pakistan at the time of par-tition is as forcefully felt as the Palestinianbelief in its rightful ownership of Jerusalem,”explained analyst David Rieff. “From thePakistani perspective, the Kashmiri fightersare not terrorists, they are freedom fighters(echoes, again, of the Arab-Israeli conflict)whose cause is sacrosanct.”62

Although that is the way many Pakistanisrelate to Kashmir, Pakistan’s political, intel-

17

Internationalizingthe Kashmir con-flict is supposedto serve as an“equalizer” forPakistan, helpingto counter India’senormous diplo-matic power.

lectual, and military leaders should considerthe current balance of power in South Asiaand the world, including Pakistan’s relation-ship with Washington. They need to realizethat continuing support by their country’smilitary-mosque nexus for anti-Indian ter-rorism in Kashmir and elsewhere is going toweaken Pakistan’s national security andeconomy and isolate it internationally andmight even result in another military defeatby India. Islamabad would be making a mis-take were it to count on its nuclear capabilityor its ties with Washington to change suchcalculations. To put it differently, thePakistanis have to realize that supporting theso-called freedom fighters of Kashmir couldthreaten their own survival as a nation.

The Right U.S. ResponseIt is in this context that American policy

toward Pakistan can make a difference.Indeed, the post–September 11 efforts by theBush administration to get Pakistan to aban-don its alliance with the Taliban should beregarded as nothing more than a play-it-by-ear damage-control operation aimed atreversing U.S. policies (including support forPax Pakistana in Afghanistan) adopted dur-ing the 1980s and early 1990s. But if thoseefforts are understood as the beginning ofsome sort of new, long-term strategic alliancebetween Washington and Islamabad,Washington is sending the wrong signals toboth Pakistan and India. Such a policy wouldstrengthen the hands of the military-mosquenexus in Pakistan by suggesting thatIslamabad can count on the United States totilt the balance of power in its favor in its rela-tionship with India.

The perception that America hasembraced Musharraf since September 11 hasemboldened Pakistani hawks to step up theirpressure in Kashmir, according to a veteranSouth Asia watcher, Selig Harrison. He sug-gests that the United States should make itclear now that Washington regards India,some seven times bigger than Pakistan, “asthe focus of U.S. interests in South Asia.”63

Such a statement of U.S. policy would have

nothing to do with any need to placate Indiaor pander to its domestic lobby in the UnitedStates. Nor would it stem from “anti-Pakistani” or “anti-Muslim” sentiments. Itwould reflect consideration of genuineAmerican national interests at the end of theCold War and in the aftermath of September11. The United States has a clear interest inestablishing strong ties with India, one of therising political, economic, and military pow-ers in Asia and a strategic counterbalance toChina.64 India also happens to be the world’slargest democracy as well as an importantemerging economy and an expanding marketfor U.S. goods and investment.

Moreover, secular and Westernized Indiais a reliable and important partner in the waragainst terrorism. Pakistan, with its dictator-ship, a failed economy, and an insecurenuclear arsenal, is at best a reluctant sup-porter of U.S. goals and at worst a potentiallong-term adversary. It remains under theinfluence of radical Islamic forces hostile tothe United States. Although the UnitedStates should remain committed to a peace-ful, negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dis-pute, and should not take steps that wouldbe construed as support for the more hawk-ish nationalist Hindu forces in New Delhi, itshould recognize that triumph by radicalMuslim terrorists in Kashmir would amountto a defeat in the global war against terror-ism. Hence, pressing the Indians to notrespond to terrorist acts and resisting Indiancalls for America to condemn anti-Indian ter-rorism in Kashmir reflect more than morallydubious “double standards.” Such a policyruns contrary to U.S. national interests and isjust the latest demonstration of the way thePakistani tail can wag the American dog.

Conclusion

The United States should take the oppor-tunity offered by the changing internationalrealities and the developments in Asia notonly to strengthen its ties with India but alsoto study the idea of “constructive disengage-

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The perceptionthat America has

embracedMusharraf since

September 11 hasemboldened

Pakistani hawksto step up their

pressure inKashmir.

ment” from Pakistan, now that that nationhas lost its strategic value to Washington andhas become more of a burden than an asset asfar as long-term U.S. interests (and values) areconcerned. U.S. policymakers should certain-ly reject any idea of establishing permanentAmerican military bases in the hostile politi-cal environment of Pakistan.65 Washingtonshould also recognize that any effort to propup the Pakistani military involves a majorlong-term risk—that the powerful militarymachine of Pakistan will fall one day into thehands of a radical Islamic regime bent ongoing to war with India and exporting its ide-ology to other parts of the world.

Direct U.S. economic assistance to thegovernment of Pakistan only helps to sustaina corrupt, statist economic system anddiverts funds to support the militarybuildup. That is not to say that the UnitedStates should isolate Pakistan. To the con-trary, the Bush administration and Congressshould stress a commitment to integratingPakistan into the global economy, includingelimination of U.S. tariffs on Pakistani textileexports and encouragement of economiccooperation between India and Pakistan.66

Americans and Westerners shouldapplaud a course leading to the moderniza-tion of Pakistan and its transformation into asecular and open society, but there isn’t muchthat Washington can do to promote such achange. Americans should not be required to“reward” Pakistan for taking steps that are inits own interest, such as reforming its politicaland economic system, ending anti-Americanand anti-Semitic propaganda, arresting ter-rorists, or reducing tensions with India.67

Pakistan’s “rewards” for doing all of thatwould be considerable: growing diplomatic,economic, and cultural ties with the UnitedStates; integration into the global economy;and peace and prosperity. American taxpayerscertainly should not “reward” a nation thatallies itself with regimes and groups thatencourage terrorists to kill Americans.

By permitting Islamabad to “wag”Washington and squeeze rewards from it,Washington has helped to prop up one of the

world’s most anti-American states. Evenworse, Pakistan’s status as an unruly clientstate has fostered anti-American sentiment.Indeed, as Hitchens suggests, the pervasiveanti-Americanism that he found in Pakistan“springs exactly from this mendicant’s-beg-ging-bowl arrangement. Pakistanis know thatthey are bought and paid for, and so the way toassert pride is to spit in the face of those whohave owned and used them.”68 It’s time forAmericans and Pakistanis to bring a sense ofnormalcy and dignity into their relationship.That means cutting Pakistan loose from itsstatus as a U.S. client.

Notes1. Quoted in Carolyn Lochhead, “Bush Insists onU.S. Resolve; U.S. Pledges Boost in Aid to Pakistan,”San Francisco Chronicle, November 11, 2001.

2. Quoted in Christopher de Bellaigue, “ThePerils of Pakistan,” New York Review of Books,November 15, 2001, p. 44.

3. U.S. Department of State, “Joint U.S.-PakistanStatement for President Musharraf’s Visit to NewYork, November 10, 2001,” www.state.gov/p/sa/rt/index.cfm?docid+6060.

4. Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies (Baltimore: JohnsHopkins University Press, 2001), p. 320.

5. See Douglas Jehl, “Pakistan Is Facing TerroristListing,” New York Times, April 25, 1993.

6. Richard Beeston, “Pakistan Will Let US Forces UseBorder Airbases,” Times (London), September 20, 2001.

7. Quoted in “Pakistan and the Taliban: AboutTurn,” The Economist, October 6, 2001.

8. Quoted in “U.S. Relations with PakistanRevived,” Stratfor Commentary, September 13,2001, www.startfor.com/home/010912310.htm.

9. U.S. Department of State, “President ofPakistan Reaffirms Commitment to FightTerrorism,” November 10, 2001, www.gov/p/sa/rt/index.cfm?docid=6056.

10. Michael Cabbage, “Pakistan’s Leaders RiskStrife by Backing US,” Orlando Sentinel, October 4,2001. See also Pamela Constable, “Attacks on USDrive Pakistan to a Crossroads,” Washington Post,October 8, 2001.

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U.S. policymak-ers should rejectany idea of estab-lishing perma-nent Americanmilitary bases inthe hostile politi-cal environmentof Pakistan.

11. Bellaigue, p. 44.

12. Hugh Clifton, “Coverage Varies on Scope ofAnti-US Sentiment in Pakistan,” PR Week,October 29, 2001, p. 14.

13. “The Saving of Pakistan?” The Economist,January 19, 2002, p. 11.

14. Paul Leventhal, “Cut Off Aid to Pakistan,”Washington Post, October 8, 1990; R. Jeffrey Smith,“Administration Unable to Win Support forContinued Aid to Pakistan,” Washington Post,October 10, 1990; and Robin Wright and WilliamOrme, “Bush Vows $900 Million for Pakistan,” LosAngeles Times, November 11, 2001, p. 1. For moredetails, see Barbara Leitch LePoer, “Pakistan-U.S.Relations,” CRS Issue Brief, IB94041, updatedNovember 1, 2001.

15. Evelyn Iritani, “Aid Plan May DispleasePakistan,” Los Angeles Times,November 10, 2001, p. 1.

16. “Remarks by Pakistani President PervezMusharraf to the Pakistani People,” Major LeaderSpecial Transcripts, Federal News Service,September 19, 2001.

17. “Pakistan and the United States: Caught inthe Middle,” The Economist, September 22, 2001.

18. Pakistan‘s interior minister MoinuddinHaidar, quoted in Jamal Halaby, “Pakistan-U.S.Relations Had Their Ups and Downs, ButWashington Had Learned from Past Mistakes,Interior Minister Says,” Associated Press,November 22, 2001.

19. Stephen Kinzer, “The World Takes Notice:Kashmir Gets Scarier,” New York Times, June 29, 1999.

20. Constable, “Attacks on US Drive Pakistan to aCrossroads.”

21. On post–September 11 revelations of linksbetween Balkan Muslims and bin Laden, see IanFisher, “Al-Qaeda Suspect’s Bosnian Wife SaysHe’s No Terrorist,” New York Times, January 28,2002; Nikolaos A. Stavrou, “Balkan Branches ofthe Terror Network,” Washington Times, October21, 2001; and Maria Christoff Kurop,”Al Qaeda’sBalkan Links,” Wall Street Journal, Europe,November 1, 2001.

22. For a historical analysis of Horthy’s strategy,see Ian Kershaw, Hitler (1936–45): Nemesis (NewYork: W. W. Norton, 2000), pp. 734–35.

23. Thomas L. Friedman, “Pakistan’sConstitution Avenue,” New York Times, January20, 2002, p. WK13.

24. Quoted in Kux, p. 268. The quotes are takenfrom a State Department memorandum andtalking points for Secretary Shultz’s meeting withZia that Kux obtained through the Freedom ofInformation Act.

25. See ibid. Other interesting analyses include DiegoCordovez and Selig Harrison, Out of Afghanistan (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Paula R.Newberg, Double Betrayal, Repression and Insurgency inKashmir (Washington: Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, 1995).

26. See Michael Kaufman, “Body of SecondAmerican Is Found in Islamabad Embassy,” NewYork Times, November 23, 1979.

27. That was certainly the impression given by for-mer CIA director Robert Gates in his book, Fromthe Shadows (New York: Simon and Schuster,1996). See also Bernard Weinraub, “Zia Says U.S.-Pakistani Ties Based on Strategic Concerns,”Washington Post, December 3, 1982.

28. Most of this paper’s account of the coopera-tion between Pakistan and the United States inthe struggle against the Soviets in Afghanistan isbased on Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oiland Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven,Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000).

29. Terrence Smith, “Carter Embargoes Technologyfor Soviets and Curtails Fishing and Grain,” NewYork Times, January 5, 1980; Stuart Auerbach,“Pakistan Is Reluctant to Accept Limited U.S. ArmsPledge,” Washington Post, January 6, 1980; andWilliam Branigan, “Pakistan Seeks Billions in U.S.Aid, Washington Post, January 23, 1980.

30. Those two crises are analyzed in Richard NedLebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).

31. See, in addition to Rashid, Steve Coll, “TheAnatomy of Victory: CIA’s Overt War inAfghanistan,” Washington Post, July 20, 1992.

32. Kux, p. 282.

33. See Rashid, who provides an overview of therelationship between Pakistan, the Taliban, andbin Laden.

34. “The War on Terror, Exchange betweenRobert Kaplan and Robert Wright,” Slate.com,posted January 16, 2002, slate.msn.com/?id=2060741&entry=2060748&device=.

35. Barbara Crossette, “Kabul Falls to IslamicMilitias; Afghans Accuse Pakistan,” New YorkTimes, September 27, 1996.

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36. According to Human Rights Watch, “Crisis inImpunity: The Role of Pakistan, Russia and Iranin Fueling the Civil War,” Special Report 13, no. 3(July 2001), quoted in ibid.

37. Quoted in Christopher Hitchens, “On the Frontierof Apocalypse,” Vanity Fair, January 2002, p. 86.

38. Quoted in Eric Eckholm, “Pakistan Pledges toBar Any Groups Linked to Terror,” New YorkTimes, January 13, 2002.

39. “The Saving of Pakistan?”

40. Rod Norldland and Zahid Husain, “Pakistan’sStriving Son,” Newsweek, January 28, 2002, p. 18.

41. Pamela Constable, “U.S. Strike Is Blow toPakistan’s Rulers,” Washington Post, August 26, 1998.

42. On the concept of an “Islamic bomb,” seeSteve Weisman and Herbert Krosney, The IslamicBomb (New York: Times Books, 1981).

43. Douglas Frantz, “Pakistan Ended Aid toTaliban Only Hesitantly,” New York Times,December 8, 2001.

44. Kamran Khan and Molly Moore, “2 NuclearExperts Briefed Bin Laden, Pakistanis Say,”Washington Post, December 12, 2001; and DouglasFrantz, James Risen, and David Sanger, “NuclearExperts in Pakistan May Have Links to Al Qaeda,”New York Times, December 9, 2001.

45. Celia W. Dugger, “In Charmed India, ClintonWooed, and Maybe Won,” New York Times, March31, 2000; and Barry Bearak, “A Little Shop inPakistan Tunes in to Clinton on TV,” New YorkTimes, March 26, 2000.

46. See Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option:Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy(New York: Random House, 1999).

47. See Seymour M. Hersh, “Watching theWarheads,” New Yorker, November 5, 2001, pp. 48–54.

48. See, for example, Douglas Frantz, “The Rogueto Fear Most Is the One Following Orders,” NewYork Times, January 13, 2002, p. WK1.

49. Michael R. Gordon, “Kashmir Threat Eases,But U.S. Still Sees Dangers,” New York Times,January 29, 2002.

50. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “For India,Deterrence May Not Prevent War,” WashingtonPost, January 17, 2002.

51. Pakistani official quoted in Gordon.

52. “Steadying Nerves,” The Economist, November3, 2001, p. 22.

53. “Now for an Equally Hard Part,” The Economist,November 17, 2001, p. 15.

54. Frantz, “Pakistan Ended Aid to Taliban OnlyHesitantly.”

55. See Seymour M. Hersh, “The Getaway,” NewYorker, January 28, 2002, pp. 36–40.

56. Celia W. Dugger, “Behind India’sBrinkmanship: Ominous Preparations to FollowThrough,” New York Times, January 12, 2002.

57. See Hersh, “The Getaway.”

58. Eckholm.

59. David Sanger and Kurt Eichenwald, “Reacting toAttack in India, U.S. Aims at Pakistan Groups’Assets,” New York Times, December 21, 2001; andPeter Slevin, “Pakistan Groups Called TerroristOrganizations,” Washington Post, December 27, 2001.

60. Hitchens, p. 153.

61. Quoted in John F. Burns, “Pakistani Trying toRedefine the Nation,” New York Times, January 13,2002.

62. David Rieff, “Pakistani President MusharrafCaught in Political Quagmire,” San FranciscoChronicle, January 6, 2002.

63. Selig S. Harrison, “If Pakistan Is an Ally of theUnited States of America, Good Luck to theUnited States of America,” Los Angeles Times,January 27, 2001.

64. As analyst Victor M. Gorbarev argued in arecent policy paper, “India could become a strate-gic counterweight to China and a crucial part of astable balance of power in both East Asia andSouth Asia.” Victor M. Gobarev, “India as a WorldPower: Changing Washington’s Myopic Policy,”Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 381, September11, 2000, p. 2.

65. Kamran Khan and Thomas E. Ricks, “U.S.Military Begins Shift from Bases in Pakistan,”Washington Post, January 11, 2002.

66. See Lael Brainard, “Textiles and Terrorism,”New York Times, December 27, 2001.

67. Jim Hoagland, “No Rewards for Pakistan,”Washington Post, January 17, 2002.

68. Hitchens, p. 153.

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