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27Citizenship Ethics in PublicAdministrationCamil la Stivers Cleveland State University, Cleveland, Oh o

The idea of ci tizenship has a long history in Western political philosophy, from the city-states of ancient times to the representative democracies of advanced capitalist societies.Citizenship connotes both a status and a practice. As status, it entails a set of formal relationships between individuals and the state, typically including important rights (the right to vote;freedom of speech, religion, and association) but few if any duties.Aspractice, citizenshipinvolves a range of capacities, activities, and obligations constitutive of political life, suchas participation in governance and the duty to consider the general good.As an ethical anchor for public administration, the concept of citizenship has notbeen widely employed in comparison to a number of other normative frameworks, including many of those treated elsewhere in this volume. The clear outlines of a citizenship-based ethic for public administrators are nonetheless evident in the li terature: preeminentlyin the work of Cooper (1991, 1984a, 1984b, 1980) but also in Frederickson (1991, 1982),Stivers (1996, 1991, 1990a, 1990b), and the articles in Frederickson and Chandler (1984).This chapter will set forth the major ingredients of a citizenship ethic in public administration, drawing mainly on authors within the field but amplifying the discussion with othersources as needed. The review proceeds by, first, rehearsing the ingredients of citizenshipas status and practice; next, briefly tracing the development of citizenship thinking inpublic administration; then outlining the major features of a citizenship ethic in publicadministration as reflected in its li terature to date; next, exploring the tension betweencitizenship and organizational values, especially as it has been heightened in recent yearsby calls to model administrative behavior after business practices (e.g., reinventing government); and finally, offering a few thoughts on the direction in which a citizenshipethic needs to develop in the future.

1. CITIZENSHIP AS STATUSCitizenship fundamentally connotes a formal relationship between the individual and thestate, one that grants the individual civil and political rights, such as those contained inthe Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution. T o the average person, these rights amount tothemeaning of citizenship. Y et as Rohr (1984) notes, virtually all the rights (and in modern

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584 Stiverstimes, most welfare-state benefits) commonly associated with citizenship are also grantedto noncitizens within the jurisdiction of the United States. Even the right to vote, whichis restricted to citizens, is looked on as a means of protecting private interests rather thanas a duty or opportunity to participate in governmental affairs. Perhaps because of thislack of substantive content, citizenship as status has not served as an important source ofinspiration for administrative norms. In the public administration and political scienceli terature, it is typically referred to as weak or low citizenship (e.g., Chandler 1984;Barber 1984; Flathman 1981) and contrasted with the strong or high citizenshipthat involves specific action opportunities and obligations. Cooper concludes that Thelegal forms are important . . . but only as a means of focusing attention on the morefundamental evolution of a stream of values and principles which give essential shapeand content to the role of citizen (1991:47).Y et if we are to have a full rendering of ci tizenships signif icance, its sense as legalstatus should not be set aside entirely as a source of ethical precepts. This is particularlytrue since over the course of U .S. history (indeed, Western history in general) the extensionof citizenship standing has raised important moral issues. For example, women have beena continuing anomaly in ci tizenship thinking over the centuries, generally treated as citizens in theory yet for long periods denied access to the most tangible distinction betweencitizens and others, the right to vote. The granting of citizenship status to A frican-A mericans has been even more equivocal, from the time of the Dred Scott decision, which heldthat blacks had no rights that U.S. citizens need respect, to the continuing struggle sinceEmancipation to turn rights accorded in theory into substantive opportunities.Shklar argues: The struggle for citizenship in America has . . .been overwhelmingly a demand for inclusion in the polity, an effort to break down excluding barriers torecognition, rather than an aspiration to civic participation as a deeply involving activity (1991:3). She reminds us that, by excluding people of color and women from the civiland political rights of citizenship, a society that professed to be democratic proved itselffalse to its own dearest principles. Shklar notes that historically the value of citizenshipfor white, property-owning men was derived primarily from the contrast between theirstatus and those of excluded groups, a view that was clearly reflected in nineteenth centurydebates over the extension of the franchise. For example, for the delegates to the V irginiaConvention of 1829-1830, the question of the vote was crucial because it meant thatthey were citizens, unlike women and slaves, as they repeated over and over again. Theirvery identity as free males was at stake (Shklar 1991:49; see also Morgan 1975). Thisperspective suggests that, even as u s t a legal status, citizenship is a more complex conceptthan might at first appear, since possession of it is so implicated in whether members ofsociety are able not only to engage in certain practices but to develop a rich sense of self-identity, one that is not stunted by the experience of exclusion from public l ife.On a related matter, Shklar and others have argued that a significant limitation onthe notion of legal citizenship is its restriction to the realm of the political. In li beralphilosophy, the idea of equality in citizenship does not extend to the economic realm,where liberty is thought to require the right to accumulate according to ones own interestsand talents, making economic inequali ty inevitable. Y et it is clear that politics and economics are intertwined. The state does enforce contracts. Political-that is, policy-decisionsenable and constrain market dynamics that directly affect citizens lives; at the same time,economic conditions shape political opportunities and priorities, including not only whichcandidates citizens support but whether they are likely to vote at all. Shklar observes that


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Citizenship Ethics 585in the early daysof the United States the idea became established that citizenship activelyentailed a certain economic status:

Independent citizens acted in a republican economy in which each had an equal opportunity toget ahead. .. [T lhis vision of economic independence, of self-directed earning, as the ethical basis of democratic citizenship took the place of an outmodednotion of public virtue, and it has retained its powerful appeal. We are citizens onlyif we earn (Shklar 1991:70).Thus there is a further anomaly in the notion of citizenship: Our heritage is basedon a vision of citizen virtue as the industrious pursuit of self-interest, yet the restrictionof equal citizenship rights to the political sphere guarantees an economic system in whichthe accumulation of property on the part of some will inevitably restrict others-not onlytheir ability toattain a sense of full membership in society but, given the strong correlationbetween economic status and voting, their likelihood of engaging in the most fundamentaland important citizen right.Based on this brief review, then, citizenship as legal status appears to have at leasttwo significant moral questions to bring to the development of a citizenship ethic forpublic administration: (1) the idea of standing or inclusion, which arises from the gapbetween professed democratic principles and their actual enactment, and (2) the notionof full membership raised by the problematic relationship between economic security andpolitical enablement. T hese issues are discussed later in this chapter.

II. CITIZENSHIP AS PRACTICEAs a practice or set of activities and capacities, the idea of citizenship has been markedby four key attributes: the exercise of decisive judgment on public matters, devotion tothe public good, education or development, and community.The classic vision of active citizenship is Aristotles. He declared that mere residencein a place does not ensure citizenship nor does the possession of legal rights: W hateffectively distinguishes the citizen proper from all others is his participation in givingjudgment and in holding office (1981: Sec. 1274a22). Citizens are those who take partdirectly in some aspect of governance: they rule and are ruled, in turn. T heir authoritymay be limited, but with respect to the responsibility they are assigned, it is decisi ve. Forexample, in the Assembly of classical A thens, citizens had a right to decide about mattersof public policy; in fact, as Held (1987) notes, the Athenian demos, or people, held thesupreme authority in legislative and judicial affairs. A rendt has pointed out that the exercise of decisive judgment in public affairs distinguishes the citizen from the subject. Thelatter may have civil rights and attain the satisfaction of his or her private wants; but onlythe citizen is a participator in governing (Arendt, 1963: 127, 130).What sort of authority do active citizens exercise? Schaars treatment is instructive.He says that authority is legitimate power: A ll theories of legitimacy take the form ofestablishing a principle which . . . ocates or embeds power in a realm of things beyondthe wills of the holders of power: the legitimacy of power stems from its origin (1970:287)-in other words, authority can be justif ied by its grounding in a constitution, divinelaw, immemorial custom, or other external foundation. In addition, Schaar suggests thatauthority is interactive in addition to being structural: An authority is one whose counsels


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586 Stiverswe seek and trust . . . who starts lines of action that others complete (pp. 291-292).Schaars argument implies that the authority of active citizens is both externally groundedand acted out in relationships with others.Finleys analysis of A thenian democracy makes it clear that, in this one state atleast, ordinary citizens did exercise the kind of authority Schaar describes, that is, theymade binding decisions that were both lawful and the outgrowth of interaction amongpeers. Finley points out that most Athenian citizens, while poorly educated, understoodperfectly well the necessity for expert advice but still exercised final judgment themselvesabout what was tobe done. A lthough there were leaders such as Pericles who were starsin Assembly debate and might therefore be considered an elite, their preeminence waspersonal rather than institutional-i t was achieved and maintained by public performancerather than lodged in a formal status. Thus, as Finley says, citizen recognition of theneed for leadership was not accompanied by a surrender of the power of decision(198525).The judgment exercised by Athenian citizens was what A ristotle call edphronesis,or practical wisdom, which is the ability to deliberate rightly about . . .what is conduciveto the good li fe generally (1976: Sec. 1140a24). Practical wisdom is at once an intellectual and a moral capacity. T he element of deliberation i s crucial in distinguishing practicalwisdom from science (episteme),or necessary knowledge-that which is demonstratedrather than deliberated about. Aristotle emphasizes that nobody deliberates about thingsthat are invariable (1976: Sec. 1140b33 et passim). Thus the outcome of practical wisdomis knowledge that is relevant to the circumstances in which it is developed. It is also theresult of exercising udgment about justice or the good, rather than of technical ski ll , whichgenerates a tangible product. T he practical wisdom of citizens enables them to judgerightly (that is, with the public good in mind) on particular public issues. As Arendt pointsout, such judging takes place without the aid of what she called bannisters (unarguablegrounds) or yardsticks (firm measures such as we can apply to assess factual accuracy)(Beiner 1982).Concern for the public good rather than narrow private interests is amajor themdin the literature of active citizenship. A ctive citizens must be prepared to show that theirdecisions address the widest possible public interest. Wolin holds that the poli tical perse signifies that which is general to a society; a citizen is one who is obligated to considerthe common good. He observes that this capacity is crucial to integrating the multiple aqdconflicting demands that characterize pluralist societies (Wolin 1960:429ff.). Flathmanargues that in modem times the public interest replaced the classical notion of thecommon good as a result of liberalisms concern for strengthening the political prerogatives of individuals. From this perspective, the assertion of an apparently objective goodis a threat to individual interests. Y et the idea that a political authority (such as activecitizens) should decide in the face of conflicting interests implies that these interests canbe weighed in terms of some more general standard. Because policies are inevitably contextual, the public interest cannot be equivalent under all conditions to a single substantive value. Nevertheless, Flathman argues, a nonarbitrary meaning can be found in particular circumstances, through reasoned discourse that attempts to relate the anticipatedeffects of a policy to community values and to test that relation by formal principles(1966:82). Barber argues similarly that active citizenship is the starting point for workingtoward shared values, instead of needing such values as a prerequisite. He calls for apolitics of mutualism that can overcome private interests (Barber 1984:198).Another idea encountered in the literature is that by participating in governance


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Cit izenship Ethics 587citizens can develop capacities and skills important to the effective conduct of publicaffairs. The principle lines of argument have been, fi rst, that human beings need the experience of wrestling with problems larger than their own private concerns in order to becomefull human beings, and second, that this ability to develop is what will ensure that a staterun in some meaningful sense by citizens will be run well. M il l notes that even thoughmodern government does not make possible the intensity of experience that citizens ofAthens enjoyed, still such activities as serving on juries and in parish off ices must makethem nonetheless very different beings, in range of i deas and development of faculties,from those who have done nothing in their lives but drive a quill, or sell goods over acounter (1972:233). The key point for M il l is that public responsibi lities constitute amoral education. The citizen is called upon, while so engaged, to weigh interests nothis own; to be guided, in case of confl icting claims, by another rule than his private partialities; to apply, at every turn, principles and maxims which have for their reason of existencethe common good (M ill , 1972:233). Along the same lines, Tocqueville argued that localpolitical activity gave citizens an opportunity to practice what he call ed self-interest right1understood. They would attend tothe interests of the public, first by necessity, afterwardby choice (Tocqueville 1945:I I, 112), and through this educative process initially selinterested participation would be transmuted to something approaching classical virtue.1ne additional theme shapes the notion of active citizenship, and that is the ideaof community. In fact, proponents tend to view the communal aspects of participatoryactivity as important support for its moral, functional, and cognitive dimensions. In ancientAthens, interaction among citizens was relatively easy, because the society was of a scalethat facili tated face-to-face discussion and debate. The relationships that resulted fromdirect interpersonal experience generated consciousness of common destiny, shared mythsand traditions, all of which then reinforced public mutuality. The sense of communityunderlying A thenian politics was not dependent, however, on unanimity of opinion. Thefactions that came to loom large for the framers of the U.S.Constitution were well knownto the Greeks; but, as Finley points out, contention among factions has its good side aswell as its dangers, because confl ict combined with consent . . . preserves democracyfrom eroding into oligarchy (1973:72-73). A rendt goes even further: The inevitabilityof conflict is what makes the public realm viable. Public life depends on innumerableperspectives that have no common denominator. This is what makes being seen and heardby others-public speech and public action-significant: [The] family world can neverreplace the reality rising out of the sum total of aspects presented by one object to amultitude of spectators (195857).Tocqueville expresses a similar concern for binding members of asociety together.Without opportunities for public-spirited association, he believes, each individual is isolated wi thin the solitude of his own heart (1945:II , 106). By joining together in civi land political organizations for common purposes, citi zens come to understand and appreciate shared endeavor: The independence of each individual is recognized. , . . [AI11 members advance at the same time towards the same end, but they are not all obliged to followthe same track (19453, 205). Similarly, Barber makes the point that the essence of pol itics is not preventing conflict but facili tating it; only through strong democratic talkcan average citizens become capableof genuinely public thinking and political judgmentand thus able to envision a common future in terms of genuinely common goals (1984:197). From the foregoing review of theory on citizenship as an activity or practice, wehave extracted the following major elements:

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588 SfiversThe exercise of authoritative power, using sound judgment and relying on practicalknowledge of the situation at hand;Concern for the public interest, defined in particular contexts through reasoned discourse;The development of personal capacities for governance through their exercise inpractical activity;The constitution of community through deliberation about issues of public concern.In summary, active citizenship means participation in governance: the exercise ofdecisive judgment in the public interest, an experience that develops the political andmoral capacities of individuals and solidifies the communal ties among them.

111. CITIZENSHIP THINKING IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONThe first appearance of citizenship in public administration thinking came in the fieldsearliest days, during the Progressive reform era of the early twentieth century. M iddle-class reformers, concerned to rescue city governments from what they viewed as the depredations of machine poli tics, called for administrative practice based not on favoritism andparty loyalty but on sound values and real ski lls. What started as an effort to throw therascals out and replace them with good men-quickly became a campaign to professionalize public administration by making ik/s&ntific and efficient. A key element in theefficient citizenship The idea was that a morehetoric of this movement was an appeal tbe an important i n d i en t n good government.nowledgeable and active citizenry couldQ-,To solve municipal problems, citizens would have to understand their causes and line upbehind scientific and professional approaches. Municipal research bureau leaders such asFrederick A . Cleveland, Wil liam H. A llen, and others viewed an informed citizenry as avital resource in the municipal reform effort. A llen declared: Without . . . facts uponwhich to base judgment, the public cannot intelligently direct and control the administration of township, county, city, state, or nation. Without intelligent control by the public,no eff icient, triumphant democracy is possible (1907:ix).The citizenship rhetoric of the municipal reformers has to be understood in i ts context, however. Their talk of citizen participation and citizen cooperation with government can reverberate acentury later in a way they did not intend. The bureau mensfaith in efficiency, science, and businessli ke practices limited their understanding of who,practically speaking, could act as a citizen and what citizens should properly do. Progressives, themselves middle and upper-middle class educated people, understood thepublic not as the citizenry at large but as the third member of a troika that also includedbusiness and labor. The public consisted of social workers, journalists, lawyers, educators, and other middle-class opinion makers (Dawley 1991:154)-in other words,people like themselves who could speak on behalf neither of capitalists nor workersbut of the public interest. With few exceptions, municipal reformers believed thatordinary (that is, poor and working-class) people lacked, if not the intelligence, then certainly the time and energy to inform themselves about city government. If the commonfolk were to participate, bureau men expected them to line up behind scientifically demonstrated recommendations. They saw public opinion, properly guided by factual information, as a vast untapped resource to support municipal reform, professionally definedand led.


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Cit izenship Ethics 589Interestingly, despite the fact that women did not gain the vote until 1920, they weredeeply involved in municipal reform efforts and, like men, saw their work as a practiceof citizenship. Carrie Chapman Catts Ready for Citizenship argued, echoing Tocqueville, that involvement in municipal issues was educating women and helping them seethe relevance of city problems to their own concerns: C ity garbage collection is seen

quickly to be a multiplication of many house garbage cans (quoted in A ndolsen 1986:49). Along similar lines, Mary Ritter Beard declared: I n years gone by, women wouldhave stood by the tub or faucet and thanked bountiful providence for water of any amount IIor description; but now, as they stand there, their minds reach out through the long chain,/of circumstances that connect the faucet and tub with the gentlemen who sit in aldermanioconclave (1915206). i/In settlement houses established in poor neighborhoods, educated women-andsome men-lived where city problems were greatest and sought to translate their li vedexperiences and those of their neighbors into tangible projects and policy proposals. J aneAddams of Chicagos Hull House said that settlement residents saw their work not asphilanthropy but as fulfil ling the duties of good citizenship (1981[ 1910]:10). The settlement workers first-hand knowledge of neighborhood conditions made them somewhatless critical of machine poli ticians than were municipal researchers. They admired aldermen for the way they paid attention to the survival needs of the people of their districts:Neighborliness is at the basis of even bad poli tics, and sound goveinment can be builtupon no other foundation (Woods and Kennedy 1970[1922]:227; see also Addams 1902).Among the bureau reformers, the surge of interest and faith in the average citizenspotential usefulness to administrative practice was short-l ived. A s Waldo has wryly observed: Bliss was it in that dawn, etc! Gradually, in the public administration movement as a whole, research and facts have come to be regarded less and less as devices ofcitizen cooperation and control and more and more as instruments of executive management (1948:43n.). The advent of scientific management and efforts to professionalizethe public service transmuted facts from ammunition for eff icient citizenship to thebasis of increasingly specialized modes of publi c management. In addition, in the earlypart of the century male and female reformers interacted regularly and, though their activities differed, shared many of the same broad goals. But the professionalization processbifurcated the reform movement, with men clustering in public administration and womenin social work. The social reformers more participatory understanding of citizenship fellbetween the cracks of the two new professions (Stivers, 2000).With the post-World War I1 onset of the behavioral frame of reference in the socialsciences, it began to appear possible to many that scientific laws of administration mightreplace the rather naive precepts of earlier days, and writers like Simon (1945) arguedthat public administration should settle for no less. Notions like citizenship and the publicinterest fell into disuse if not disrepute on the basis that they could not be operationalizedand subjected to quantitative empirical study.

Not until the 1980s did citizenship thinking reappear in public administration. I tseems to have come about as one aspect of a general effort in the field to respond to twodecades of bureaucrat-bashing with a concerted attempt to defend the legitimacy ofthe administrative state. Poli ticians traded on the perceived failure of the War on Poverty,swollen budget deficits and a series of government scandals by promising to reduce thesize of the bureaucracy and clean up waste, fraud, and abuse. Public administratorsfound themselves in need of a convincing rationale for the existence, in a representativedemocracy, of what the public considered administrative monoliths populated by tenured,


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590 St iversunelected bureaucrats whose responsiveness could not be counted on. Numerous books,articles, special journal issues, and conference presentations aimed to validate public administration on such bases as the expertise of career public servants, the need for continuityof leadership in an eraof complexity and rapid change, and the commitment of administrators to the public interest.The fi rst reappearanceof the theme of citizenship came during this outpouring, inFredericksons essay, The Recovery of Civism in Public Administration. Fredericksons argument clearly reflects the sense of crisis in publ ic confidence that marked theearly eighties; it begins, Something is wrong. V irtually all our institutions seem to bein trouble (1982501). Frederickson suggests that effective public administration of thefuture should be intimately tied to citizenship, the citizenry generall y, and to the effectiveness of public managers who work directly with the citizenry.The next step in revivifying ci tizenship was the National Conference on Citizenshipand Publ ic Service in 1983, sponsored by the American Society for Public Administration,the CharlesF.Kettering Foundation, and the National Academy of Public Administration.The conference proceedings, which explored a wide range of issues, were published as aspecial issue of Public Administration Review (Frederickson and Chandler 1984). Thenotion that public administrators have a responsibili ty to educate citizens about government was prominent in the presentations; for example, Gawthrops call for professionaladministrators to make government interesting once again to the citizenry (1984:106)and the following suggestion from Rohr:

Let the career civil servant work at broadening the base of the elite by encouragingas many members of the public as possible . . . to change from citizen as consumerto citizen participating in rule. The means for doing this is public instruction, not inthe bookish sense of the schoolsbut in the daily interaction between the citizen andthe bureaucracy (1984: 139).A lso at this conference, Cooper introduced what has proven to be a major contnbution to the literature of citizenship in public administration, that is, the notion that administrators are themselves citizens and should use the citizen role specif ically as an ethicalanchor. Sounding most of the citizenship themes from classical political philosophy, Cooper argued:The ethical obligationsof the public administrator are to be derived from the obligations of citizenship in a democratic political community. These obligations includeresponsibility for establishing and maintaining horizontal relationships of authoritywith ones fellow citizens, seeking power with rather than power over the citizenry. This attitudeon the part of public administratorscalls for engaging in activitieswhich amount toan ongoing renewal and reaffirmationof the social contract (1984a:143-144).

Thus public administrators as citizens are expected to use their authoritative experti seonbehalf of their fellow citizens and to see themselves as operating under the sovereigntyof the citizenry. Cooper and others, including the present author, have subsequently expanded on these ideas.During the 1990s,however, relationships between the citizenry and public agenciesapparently worsened. A 1993 opinion poll showed that only 25% of A mericans believedthey could trust government all or most of the time (Roper 1993),while a 1994surveyfound that two-thirds of Americans picked big government as the countrys gravest peril


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Citizenship Ethics 591(Zinsmeister 1995).Newspaper accounts regularly documented sporadic attacks on government workers.There have been two types of responses to this new wave of anti-government feeling.A pervasive one has been the impulse to privatize government functions and generally tomake government run more like a business. This impulse took on something li ke the statusof a civi l religion with the publication of Reinventing Government (Osborne and GaebleA1992). The reinventing idea emphasized entrepreneurialism on the part of bureaucrats,based on the idea that what citizens want is not big policy changes or active involvementbut results. In much the way that early 20th-century reformers advocated scientif icmanagement in the name of efficiency, reinvention touted making government run morelike abusiness in the name of getting things done. Reinventing and similar ideas suggested that public administrators could be ethical by treating citizens as taxpayers and

stomers. The Clinton administration set in motion a reinventing effort at the federali5level, and stat and localities mobilized similar projects.The second type of response had a specific genesis. On A pril 19, 1995, a tragicwatershed in negativism toward government was reached with the bombing of the A lfredP. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. A few days later, the American Federationof State, County, and Municipal Employees published an advertisement in newspapersaround the country, showing rescue workers carrying the dead and wounded from thebuilding. The ad said: I snt it time to end the constant attacks on the people who serveus? . . .Next time you hear someone viciously attack our government, and the Americanswho work for it, tell them-STOP IT . TH IS I S OUR GOV ER NM EN T. Inspired by thebombing, a group of public administrators and academics published Government is Us(K ing et al. 1998), a dialogue in the citizenship ethics tradition promoting collaborativerelationships between active ci tizens and active administrators.To date, citizenship ethics continues to vie with customer service as the normative

anchor for public administration. The fol lowing sections will attempt to suggest what isat stake in such a contest.

IV. THE INGREDIENTS OF A CITIZENSHIP ETHICGeneralizing from the writings since 1982, in the following sections I outline what theliterature suggests should constitute citizenship ethics, organizing the ideas according tothe themes previously identified in this chapter.A. Autho ritative JudgmentAdvocates of a citizenship ethic in public administration agree that citizenship thinkingstrongly implies as non-hierarchical and non-eli tist an attitude as possible toward the exercise of whatever discretionary authority the administrator has. This emphasis is consistentwith the classic idea that citizens areequals with one another, having equal access to thedecision-making process and an equal right to speak and to be heard. Coopers idea ofhorizontal authority, or power with relations, captures this theme: I t promotes a collaborative rather than a chain-of-command approach to agency decisions. Both Frederickson(1982)and Stivers (1990a) have argued that horizontal authority relations are congruentwith the complex tasks of modem agencies, which are poorly sui ted to the command andcontrol mode of comprehensive rationality and instead require decentralization, tentative


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592 Stiverssolutions, frequent feedback, and an artistic or creative process. Timney suggests that anygain in efficiency achieved by processes controlled by administrators in the name of efficiency is short-term at best. In the long run, building consensus on policy goals is farmore efficient than the ongoing conflict and dissensus that can result from controlledadministrative decisions (1998: 100).As Cooper (1991) notes, the details of horizontal authority asa public managementstrategy have yet to be worked out; i t threatens to undercut the responsiveness to legislativeoversight that agency hierarchy more clearly supports. Citizenship thinking would suggest,however, that hierarchy creates more problems than it solves, fostering inequality, aninappropriate mode of instrumentalism, and agency inattention to the needs of the community. Drawing on the work of Mary Parker Follett, Cooper suggests that

Power with involves a collaborative integrating of desires among participantsin adecision-makingprocess, instead of a quest for dominance by some. It grows out ofcircular behavior in which participants have a genuine opportunity to influence eachother. . . Information,judgment, and advice flow back and forth around the circleofpolitical authority (1991:140).Cooper observes that sometimes the precept of horizontal authority may require administrators to resist or oppose public officials with whose understanding of the public interestor whose activities they disagree on principle.The valueof authoritative judgment can be expanded beyond the notion of horizontalauthority relations in the abstract sense to include actual practices that foster citizeninvolvement in agency decision-making.For example, Stivers (1994) suggests that publicadministrators can improve their responsiveness by actively listening to citizens as wellas actively seeking their involvement. The Government is Us group offers a numberof concrete recommendations along these lines, including:

A llocate [agency] resources to support participation efforts. Reward administrators for working with citizens. Create ongoing project teams of citizens and administrators that fol low projects through from conception to implementation.Hold meetings at more convenient times and places. Bring citizens in when the agenda can still be shaped. Have roundtable di scussions instead of serial monologues. Avoid one-shot techniques l ike surveys (K ing et al. 1998:201).

Through such moves, citizens and administrators may be able to join together in a practiceof active citizenship within the context of agency mandates and responsibilities.

B. The Public InterestThe public-spiritedness of citizenship thinking is another theme common to all the writersin this area. They agree that a public administration using the precepts of citizenship as anethical guide wil l put the common good above any other consideration, including practicalpoli tics, professionalism, or cost eff iciency. Hart argues that the fundamental obligationof the bureaucrat is to be agood citizen; professional obligations flow from and are shapedby this basic idea. Administrators look to regime values and strive for the best headjoined to the best heart-a notion that evokes the ideaof practical wisdom, or phrone-


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Citizenship Ethics 593sis, which A ristotle held to be the form of knowledge appropriate to public life (Hart1984:114).Stivers (1991) suggests that a citizenship ethic requires two important revisions inthe notion of professionalism in public administration. These include (1) broadening thedefinition of expertise to take in the ability to interact effectively with as wide a spectrumof the public as possible and to involve them in agency affairs; (2) seeing leadership asless a matter of being out in front of a band of fol lowers than being the faci litator of acollaborative effort.Cooper draws on Tocquevilles concept of self- interest, rightly understood, for hisnotion of the public interest in public administration. Cooper argues that the Americancontext and history make defense of classical virtue, with its renunciation of self -interest,a tall order. In his view Americans tend toseethis sort of vi rtue as oppressive to individualli berty. He believes, however, that a revised understanding of self , one that recognizesits communal aspects, can rescue self-interest from self ishness: Enlightened self-interest. . . appears to be plausible as a form of civic virtue, but only when its latent otherregarding aspects are fi rmly and explicitly cultivated through community experience andsupported by a theory of community (Cooper 1991:157). Community tempers the ideaof self-interest by adding the dependenceof individuals on a network of associations andobligations to the more usual respect for individual rights. Ultimately, Cooper believes,the task is not tobanish self -interest but to humble it. He suggests replacing theidea of professionalism with the simple notion of practice. This move expands theadministrators moral obligations beyond responsiveness to the legislature and the exerciseof functional rationality to include acting as a fiduciary to citizens and upholding theexercise of enlightened self-i nterest.C. Citizenship as EducationThe perception that involvement in public l ife strengthens understanding of public affairsand enlarges devotion to the public interest has served as the basis for advocates of acitizenship ethic to call upon administrators to educate the citizenry. M athews (1984: 124)suggests that [cl ivic li teracy, the capacity of people to think about the whole of things,of consequences and potential, becomes education of the most crucial kind. Rohr arguesthat such education can and should occur in daily interaction between citizens and administrators. He thinks that the administrative hearing can serve as what Tocquevill e called agratuitous public school to help turn consumers of government services into citizensin the classical mold (1984:139).Cooper believes that public-spirited action by citizens encourages them to understand how the satisfaction of their own wants are intertwined with more general interests:Citizens must . . .not only be possessed of predispositions to serve the common good,but they must also be able to comprehend it (1991:154). Box and Sagan argue thatadministrators must give citizens the knowledge and techniques they need to deal withpublic-policy issues in an informed and rational way (1998: 169). Foley maintains thatToo often, governments role is seen as providing the expertise, with the communitysrole as giving feedback or input to the process (1998: 156). But recognition of the importance of deliberation in democracy means that administrators must move beyond seekinginput to creating opportunities for dialogue about how issues should be framed.Stivers suggests that only through involvement in governmental affairs will citizenscome to see themselves as citizens:


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594 StiversIf they have the opportunity to see themselves as engaged in . ..the exerciseof administrative discretion, therefore in governance, with public administrators, rather thaninvolved simply to the extent of petitioning administratorsto satisfy their needs,they may be able to develop improved practices and make wiser judgments (1988:110).

This perspective suggests that administrators have an ethical obligation to create opportunities for citizens to exercise active citizenship in order for them to develop their capacityfor political life in the highest sense.

D Communi tyThe value of community is also considered an important ingredient in a citizenship ethicfor public administration. Frederickson argues that reconstruction of community is themost important issue facing America (and public administration) today and calls for therecovery of civism (1982504).Two notions of community play an important part in Coopers ethic of citizenshipfor public administration. Community in the senseof covenant, social contract, and groupprocess is the fundamental source of horizontal authority relations C ooper sees at theheart of citizenship thinking. Drawing on Robert Prangers work, Cooper observes thatcitizenship becomes a kindof group dynamics involving friends and equals,aspontaneous field . . .where coll aborators create a common union (1991:136).Community ascovenant calls on administrators to renew and reaff irm the social contract, engaging inregular readjustment or reconstruction of the mutual expectations of citizens (Cooper1984a:144).A nother sense of community is also important, in Coopers view: T he citizen administrator bears responsibility for. ..supporting the existenceof a community of communities that includes the [voluntary nonprofit], organizational economic, and poli tical portions of the [public-private] continuum (1984a: 144). In other words, administrators mustnot settle simply for partnerships between government and profit-making business, butmust nurture the associational sphere where much citizenship-building takes place. Heargues that administrative practice must be sensitive to the importanceof voluntary associations in bridging the gap between the business firms nterest in profit and governmentsresponsibility for the common good.Foley emphasizes yet another dimension of community: the issue of how communityis defined and how community representation is ensured in collaborative relationshipsbetween communities and governments. Unless governments are willing to allocate resources to support adequate community involvement and to turn power over to communitymembers, the request for input wil l result in a h llow exercise: Public administratorsneed to ask whether policies and programs foster ommunity as they are being designedPPr are simply aimed at winning cornmunity acceptance. A citizenship ethic suggeststhat administrators have an obligation to takeites seriously and work to includethem fully. E mpowering communities entails creating structures and processes that wil lintegrate citizens into the governance process (1998:152).Stivers (1990a:269) argues that ethical practice requires administrators to examinehow the unacknowledged political-economic conditions surrounding administrativepractice shape and sometimes determine the level of ci tizen knowledgeabil ity and capabil ity to deal with policy issues. Similarly, Box and Sagan note that administrators are


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often caught in the cross fire of [a] struggle between the values of the community as aneconomic marketplace and the community as a living space for people. This requiresthem to address the question, Whom do we serve, and for what purpose? Answeringthis question based on a citizenship ethic would lead administrators to help citizens achieveself-governance to the maximum extent possible (1998:167).To do so would require administrators to refrain from taking for granted the range of material interests their agencypolicies support and to use their discretion when they can to move the work of theiragencies in more broadly democratic directions.In summary, the literature of public administration offers the following ethicalguidelines based on citizenship values:Maximize horizontal authority relations within agencies and externally with a widerange of constituencies; foster collaborative rather than chain-of-command decision-making; develop opportunities for active citizen involvement in agency

agenda setting, policy formulation and implementation.Put consideration of the widest possible interpretation of the public interest aheadof all other considerations, including efficiency, professionalism, or practicalpolitics; strive for knowledge of what is right given the circumstances; culti vate an other-regarding form of self-interest; act as fiduciary for the broadinterests of citizens.Educate citizens about important public issues and the workings of government;create opportunities for substantive dialogue and activity among citizens andadministrators.Foster community: not only a sense of covenant, friendship, and mutual regardamong citizens and administrators, but more widely, through a critical sense ofwhich community interests each agency supports or excludes; within existinglegislative or regulatory guidelines, use discretion to foster equality amongmembers of a democratic community.

A citizenship ethic for public administration requires administrators to act as citizens,practicing in light of the above precepts, and to act with other citizens, viewed as equalsin what is ultimately a common endeavor.

V. CITIZENSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONThe increasing application of business-derived ideas and standards to the workings ofgovernment agencies raises serious issues for a citizenship ethic in public administration.Market theories, as well as theories of how to structure and manage the private organization, are in fundamental tension with the political values that make up the notion of citizenship. In this section we will consider discrepancies, first between organization theoriesand ideas of citizenship, and second between democratic citizenship and the aims of themarket, especially as reflected in the reinvention perspective.A. Organizational CitizenshipAsChester Barnard (1938),the first theorist to define the nature of an organization, teachesus, organizations are instruments to induce cooperation on the part of a group of individuals toward the achievement of goals that are derived not collaboratively but by a relative


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596 Stiversfew, the managers and leaders at the top. While there aremore or less humane ways ofinducing cooperation, when push comes to shove organizations exist to get things done,and those things take precedence over the preferences of individual members.Within the goal-achievement structure of organization, citizenship values (for example, participation in decision-making) become instruments to induce greater cooperationand achieve organizational purposes. As instruments, their value is dependent on whetherthey promote organizational ends; if they do not, they must be abandoned. But one of thedefining features of citizenship is that it is valuable for its own sake, as the expressionof human aspirations and capacities that can be cultivated in no other way. Citizenshipis an end in itself , not simply the means to other ends. It entail s goods-justice, equality,participation, the public interest, community-that are to be addressed regardless ofwhether they foster efficiency, technical rationality, cost savings, profit-making, or therealization of organizational goals.In some ways the tension between citizenship values and organizational aims is areflection of the familiar politics-administration dialectic in public administration. Fromthe citizenship perspective, however, oneof the time-honored ways of resolving this tension isnot viable: that is, by seeing efficiency as in the service of political ends determinedexternally (what Waldo has called autocracy at work as the price for democracy afterhours [Waldo 1948:75]). The citizenship ethic holds that hierarchy in public organizationas an instrument of political democracy is a contradiction in terms. If the polity valuesequal, active citizenship it must value it inside public organizations as much as it doeselsewhere, even if this means the sacrifice of ameasure (perhaps even a large measure)of efficiency and/or rationality. Thus the promotion of acitizenship ethic in public administration has to proceed with care, not to fall into the trap of selling itself solely on thebasis that it will enable agencies to do their jobs better.A growing literature on organizational citizenship envisions a formof management that mitigates hierarchy through collaboration, participation, and citizenship behavior within the organization, private or public. In contrast to the writings on citizenshipethics already described, virtually all of the organizational citizenship literature treats citizenship values instrumentally (see, for example, Parks and Conlon 1991; M cA llister 1991;Organ 1990; Organ 1988). The flavor of this approach to citizenship in organizational li feis captured in this typical excerpt:

While it is generally acknowledged that OCBs [organizationalcitizenship behaviors]contribute to organizational performance,this relationship has, for the better part, beenassumed to exist and left empirically unexamined. . . .There is some need, however,to reconcile [difficulty in measuring its impact on outcomes] with the realization thatcontextual considerations do modify this relationship-performance suboptimizationis likely when citizenship-type behaviors are engaged in inappropriately (McAllister1991:14;emphasis added).

In other words, citizenship behavior is tolerable only as long as it serves (optimizes)organizational functions. Furthermore, much of the li terature on organizational citizenshiplimits the notion to such values as loyalty, conscientiousness, sportsmanship, a wil lingnessto go beyond what is strictly required by the job description. One central text styles thisbehavior the good soldier syndrome (Organ 1988).On the other hand, Graham (1991) has tried to broaden the idea of organizationalcitizenship to take its poli tical dimensions seriously. Participation, she notes, is controversial in the organizational context, for it raises the possibili ty that the good organizational


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citizen may have to dissent for reasons of principle: Following unethical orders exemplifies poor citizenship at every level. . . . While sidestepping [power] issues by ignoringpolitical participation as a category of ci tizenship behavior results in a picture of OCBthat is extremely pleasant, i t is nonetheless flawed as a result (1991:32).Focusing on public organizations, Golembiewski (1989) argues that membership inan organization, whether public or private, can be viewed as a form of citizenship. Hepresents a range of strategies for enhancing employee freedom and responsibi lity, groupdecision-making, and greater delegation of authority. He maintains that these methodswill not only improve employee satisfaction and productivi ty but will lead to greater political efficacy and participation and thereby promote popular sovereignty (the paradigmaticstatement of this argument is found in Pateman 1970).In rejoinder, Stivers (1989) suggests that while participatory management is a goodthing, i t should not be thought of as citizenship. Not all public organizational decisions areclearly in the public interest. If we equate citizenship with involvement in organizationaldecision-making, that is, in serving organizational goals regardless of their relationshipto the needs and wants of citizens, we are in danger of settling for involvement in organization and letting real (political) citizenship disappear.B. Reinventing GovernmentThe 1990s witnessed a concerted effort to improve public administration by drawing onbusiness-oriented ideas and techniques. The central notion underlying this approach is thatthe bureaucratic paradigm of formal structure and control is obsolete. Instead of relying onprofessionalism to ensure that managerial decisions promote the public interest, government organizations should be customer-driven and service oriented-that is, responsive, user-friendly, dynamic, and competitive providers of valuable services to customers(Barzelay 1997:494-495). The most widely read expression of this viewpoint has beenReinventing Government (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). It argues that the problem is notwhat governments do but how, and promotes entrepreneurialism and creativity on the partof civil servants to maximize productivity and results.President Bi ll Cl inton took up the reinvention idea with fervor and appointedVice-president AI Gore to head the National Performance Review (N PR), the reinventioneffort at the federal level. Following Osborne and Gaebler, the NPR exclaimed that themain problem with government agencies was good people trapped in bad systems. LikeBarzelay, it argued that bureaucratic thinking was outmoded in a world of rapid changeand global competition. In the future, the key principles for government administrationwould be to cut red tape, put customers first, empower employees to get results, and findincentivessothat public servants work better at less cost (Executive Office of the President1993).Advocates of business-driven ideas and practices insist either that their recommendations have no political impli cations or that the new methods will promote democraticvalues. Y et examined through the lens of a citizenship ethic, the entrepreneurial approachraises troubling questions.First, thinking of and treating citizens as customers obviates any notion of sharinghorizontal decision-making authority with members of the public. M any of governmentscustomers have no choice about where to purchase the services they receive, letalone the power to affect what services are available or how they are delivered (Schachter1997).


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598 SfiversSecond, in the reinvention perspective the public interest is treated asan outmodedconcept. The idea that citizens could collaborate with administrators in the exercise ofpubli c-spirited judgment isobliterated by notions of managerial creativity and results.But aremanagers the only ones with the potential for creativity? For all i ts talk of customerservice, reinvention empowers managers, not citizens. By assuming that managerial decisions only deal with means, not ends, reinvention reasserts the old politics-administrationdichotomy, and for the same reason: to strengthen executive and managerial power at theexpense of poli tical stakeholders, whether in the legislature or among the public at large.The Hamiltonian idea that what people want is not participation in governance but services

-c_that wordFwe11 and do not cost very much strengthens the managers hand and excludescitizens.Third, business-driven government ignores the question of educating citizens in favor of serving them. Reinvention has nothing to say about how to inform citizensabout public issues or how to create opportunities for substantive dialogue. I t assumesthat restoring the publics trust in government is a matter of simply delivering tangiblegoods, not enlightening citizens about the complexities of public decision-making or encouraging them to think beyond getting mine.Finally, reinvention lacks any attention to fostering community, friendship, or mutual regard among citizens and administrators. It treats citizens as anonymous units in amarket mechanism.In sum, the reinvention perspective presents public administration with an ethic thatemphasizes efficient and effective performance, cutting through red tape, serving the customer, finding creative solutions to administrative problems, fostering teamwork withinthe agency and competition without, decentralizing, and leveraging change through marketforces. Al l are strictly organizational rather than political recommendations, and in factproponents frequently take pride in this. A s far as relationships with the public areconcerned, business-oriented reforms worry only about whether members of the public aresatisfied-therefore supportive and quiescent-and not about whether they have a voicein decisions, as it is safer and more efficient if they do not.VI. THE FUTURE OF CITIZENSHIP ETHICSFuture work on citizenship ethics in public administration will continue to be challengedby the tension between organizational (or. business) and citizenship values. Continuedexpansion of market-driven approaches to the management of public agencies wi ll requirenormative theorists to strengthen arguments for ethical frameworks grounded in democratic political values like citizenship. Themes of horizontal authority, the public interest,citizen education, and community wil l continue to shape the conversation in this area, butthe danger that such ideas will be weighed within in business framework rather than apolitical one will remain ever present.

As far as potential expansion of citizenship thinking in public administration, twoissues raised at the beginning of this chapter areworthy of note: the question of standingor inclusion and the question of the relationship between citizenship and economic status.A. Inc lusionAdvocates of citizenship ethics in public administration are faced with acknowledgingthat throughout U.S. history citizenship has both symbolized inclusion in a national com-


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munity and been restricted in theory and/or practice to certain inhabitants. Certain others-women, people of color-have been and continue to be defined as different inorder to rationalize substantive nequality among members of the poli ty. Supposedly nnatedifferences justify unequal rights and public obligations, for example, womens specialnature is used to bar women from certain combat duties or from the draft.As aprinciple, the coherenceof citizenship seems to require identical (L e., equal)citizens whose differences are politically insignificant; yet identical citizenship obliteratesvariations in life circumstance that come about because of the very characteristics (race,gender) that make certain people different. Is there a way in which citizenship-membership in the polity-need not be based on wiping out difference? Citizenship thinkingneeds to confront this question (Stivers 1996). The gap between equali ty in principle andin actual circumstance-suggests both its difficulty and its importance. The achievementof a political community that is both inclusive and diverse wil l require those whose membership has been relatively unarguable to begin listening faithfully and with great care tothe views of those they perceive as others. For public administrators, this process maybegin with a lowering of barriers between themselves and the public at large, with particular efforts in the direction of those excluded on the basis of race, sex, or other ascriptivecharacteristic. A citizenship ethic based on true equality and diversity requires administrators to create practical communities of collaboration that are open and accessible to all.6 . Citizenship and Economic StatusIn liberal citizenship theory, becahse of the primary of individual rights, political equalityexists side by side with economic inequality. While theorists separate the economic andthe political, it is clear that in practice the two spheres affect each other. Political rightssafeguard the market economy, while the market enables and constrains political opportunities and priorities.States that are both capitalist and democratic must therefore engage in an ongoingbalancing act. Formal citizenship rights alone are not enough to change the power ofinvestment wealth to shape how many and what kinds of jobs are avail able or to guaranteea minimum level of economic security for citizens. N or, it is clear, does the market itselfensure the political conditions under which i ts continued operation isprovided for. Capitalist economies are shored up by social services, income supports, and public regulationthat have made most citizens comfortable and secure and therefore content with the statusquo (Galbraith 199051).The rise of democratic citizenship has failed to bring about economic equality oreven an adequate living standard for all , and the continued theoretical separation betweenthe political and the economic sets limits on what we as a society are able to envisiondoing. A s Barbelet notes:

Citizenship and class are based on opposing principles .. .;one on equality and freedom, the other on inequality and domination. But the things to which the equality ofcitizenship refers are not the same as those which make up class inequality. I t is forthis reason that citizenship and social class can continue to exist together (1988:58).The result is the system so familiar to us today, in which the granting of formal rightsfails to create the conditions under which all citizens areable to order their lives to attainthe minimal l iving standard that would make their participation in political li fe possibleand meaningful.


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600 StiversI f, as Shklar argues, the source of the ideology of earning is not in the conditionsof employment but in political perceptions, (199195) then citizenship entails not just

formal rights but also the abil ity to be self-supporting. A citizenship ethic in public administration needs to explore the economic dimensions of citizenship and their moral implications for administrative practice.Cooper (1991) leans in this direction when he expands the notion of community toconsider structural relationships between governments, private businesses, and voluntaryassociations. Extending Coopers argument might take us in the direction of a fresh lookat ideas like privatizing and contracting out. Administrators might analyze theirworkability not only in terms of offloading agency operations to increase efficiency butalso in terms of the impact on community-based organizations. A citizenship ethic wouldrequire relationships between agencies and community organizations to meet politicalstandards (inclusion, deliberation, judgment, education) as well as organizational ones.Admittedly, these new directions for citizenship thinking, inclusion and consideration of economic implications, are controversial in that they question long-accepted dimensions of liberal political theory. But the moral issues they raise seem to me to beinherent in the idea of ci tizenship at its most admirable. And in light of the growingencroachment of business thinking in public administration, it may be necessary to developdeeper understandings of political ideas like citizenship if such values are to survive, letalone flourish.

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